Evening Star Newspaper, September 27, 1936, Page 29

Editorial Page Political Round-Up Part 2—10 Pages U. S. PUTTING AIR DEFENSE ON EMERGENCY FOOTING Thoroughgoing Reorganization Affect- ing Almost Every Combat Unit—New Plane Deliveries to Start Soon. BY JOSEPH S. EDGERTON. OLLOWING in the footsteps of the troubled world powers which have put their air forces on war-time status, the United Btates today is putting its air-de- . fense system on an emergency footing. To attain combat status, the Army Air Corps and the General Headquar- ters Air Force, spearhead of the Na- tion’s air defense, now are in the midst of a thoroughgoing reorgani- gation which is affecting virtually every combat unit in the air service. At the same time the Navy, with its aviation units already in battle trim, is fighting to bring its air strength up to full treaty allowance. Into its remodeling of ‘the land- based air defense system the War Department is putting the experience gained in more than a year of in- tensive experimental operation of the new G. H. Q. Air Force. The re- : organization also is reflecting the ex- perience gained by Italy in the Ethi- * opilan campaign, in which aviation played an all-important role, and by both factions in the present Span- ish fighting. With the Navy the problem is not : one of reorganization to attain com- bat status, but of strengthening the existing aviation organization, not only to round out under-strength : squadrons, but also to provide squad- rons for new carriers now under con- “ struction. of 1934 authorizes a total of 1910 * useful airplanes for the treaty Navy. + The Navy estimates its airplane strength at 1,205, as of July 1. Air- plane contracts already awarded or * to be awarded are expected to bring the strength to 1,460 by the begin- ning of the next fiscal year. The authorized treaty strength in air- craft, at the present rate of con- struction, will not be attained until between 1940 and 1942. Army Corps Under Strength. The Army Air Corps also is sadly wunder strength in airplanes for the + combat squadrons of the G. H. Q. Alr Force and, like the Navy, is seek- ing the equipment it so sorely needs. Unlike the Navy, however, the Army s faced with an immediate problem— that of putting its fighting air force on a war-time basis, with every de- tail of its tactical, maintenance and supply systems organized for emer- gency duty. This is being accomplished by a re- organization which reaches into every $# major unit of the Air Corps and the ‘ G. H. Q. Air Force. Bolling Field, where the reorganization has reached « full tide, has lost virtually every trace of its former set-up. Its tactical squadrons have been broken up or moved away; its administrative or- ganization has been re-cast in a new mold, and it has been given new non- combat squadrons of a type never be- fore known in American military avia- tion. Because it will serve in time of war as the head of the main arteries between the War Department and the combat aviation outfits in the field, Bolling Field is being developed along lines which will set it apart from all other Army airdromes. The reorganization now in progress in Army aviation ranks second in im- portance only to the reorganization of early 1935, which gave the Nation the new General Headquarters Air Force. That reorganization is regarded by ranking military leadérs as the most important change in the make-up of the Army since the close of the World » War. It was the purpose of the War Department in the G. H. Q. Air Force reorganization of March 1, 1935, to give the United States an aggressive, co-ordinated air force which could be | wielded as a unit by the field com- mander of the American armies. The _ present reorganization is intended to perfect the G. H. Q. Air Force and to » put it on an emergency basis in every * yespect. Has Reconnaisance Squadrons. As now constituted, the G. H. Q. Alr ¥orce comprises all the units of at- tack, bombardment and pursuit avia- tion . stationed in the continental , United States. It also has a few re- , . connaisance squadrons for its own and some transport airplanes. The building up of Army and Navy aviation forces has imposed a great strain upon the military training cen- ters which feed new pilots into the squadrons. Both services are badly in need of trained combat pilots. ‘The Navy now is just beginning to benefit from a new aviation cadet pro- gram which only a month ago sent its first installments of new pilots into the Navy and Marine Corps squad- rons. From now on each month will bring & new detachment of these cadets into the combat squadrons for three years of active duty. Naval avi- + ation cadets are selected at naval air stations throughout the United States, the local station at Anacostia among them, and candidates who can meet the rigid entrance requirements are given a month of elimination flight training which carries them up to the solo-flight stage. If successful, they then go to the Navy's flight-training , center at Pensacola, Fla., for a year + of training to qualify them for service in the fleet or with the Marines. ‘The Army Air Corps also is able to offer greater opportunity to its stu- dent pilots than ever before as a re- sult of the enactment by Congress of new legislation improving conditions for the fledgling military fiyers. As & result of this new legislation the Air Corps now is able to assure its stu- dent pilots who are unable to win com- missions in the Regular Army com- missions in the Air Reserve, extended . active duty as Reserve officers and dis- charges from active duty with cash bonuses of $500 each and training sufficient to qualify them for Com- merce Department transport licenses and scheduled air transport ratings. . The Army’s General Headquarters Air Foree is being established under the scheme of reorganization on the - principle that bombardment aviation ' 4s the backbone of every air force in - the world today. - “No one can stop its development mor predict its ultimate achievement,” said Col. Follett Bradley, acting chief , of staff of the G. H. Q. Air Force, re- + ferring to the role of bombardment sviation. Although the present reorganization . wps.begun last month, it probably will be many weeks before if is carried to The Vinson-Trammel act completion in all its phases. This reorganization is confined to the con- tinental limits of the United States. Under the final reorganization plan six Air Corps activities are listed under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air Corps. They are: 1—The office of the Chief of the Air Corps, in the War Department here; 2—the materiel division, Wright Field, Ohlo; 3—the Air Corps Technical School, Chanute Field, Rantoul, Il.; 4—the Air Corps Training Center, Randolph and Kelly Fields, Texas; 5—the Alr Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Ala.; and 6—Bolling Field, in the District of Columbia. The materiel division, at Wright Field, is the great proving ground of the Air Corps. It includes not only the great group of laboratories and testing apparatus at Wright Field but also the chain of air depots or main= tenance bases in five States, and the Air Corps Engineering School, also at Wright Field. At Wright Field and at each of the air depots is sta- tioned a transport squadron, com- posed of cargo airplanes used in the moving of airplane engines, parts and equipment between the tactical posts and the depots. The Air Corps Training Center, the famed “West Point of the Air,” is one of the world's greatest and most mod- ern aviation training outfits. At Randolph Field are located head- quarters for the whole center and the Primary Flying School, with its headquarters and headquarters squad- ron, the 11th Air Base Squadron; the 46th, 47th, 52nd and 53rd School Squadrons and the 20th Photo Sec- tion. Kelly Field is the home of the Advanced Flying School, which in- cludes its own headquarters and head- quarters squadron, 12th Air Base Squadron; 6lst, 62d, 63d and 64th School Squadrons and 22d Photo Sec- tion. 14th Base Headquarters. Bolling Field, under tne reorgani- zation, has become the home of 14th Base Headquarters, the 14th Air Base Squadron and the 1st and 2d Staff Squadrons. From it have disappeared the old Station Complement, 14th Bombardment Squadron, 21st Observa- tion Squadron and 100th Service | Squadron. The Service Squadron was broken up to provide personnel for the new 14th Base Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron. These units are the equivalent of an Infantry brigade headquarters and headquar- ters company. The former Station | Complement has been reorganized | into the new Staff Squadrons, ‘which are entifely new units in Afir Corps history. The 14th Bombardment Squadron has been rendered inactive for the present, after being trans- ferred to Langley Field, Va. The 21st Observation Squadron, reconstituted as the 21st Reconnaissance Squadron, |also has gone to Langley Field for service in long-range coastal patrol operations. Bolling Field, now in the midst of a great construction program, has gotten rid of its only combat or- ganizations in order to be ready for its primary war-time function of pro- viding communications between the War Department and the combat out- fits in the field. In case of war military aviation traffic at Bolling Field probably would increase to 30 | times its present volume, it is esti- mated, and the capacity of the field will be taxed to the limit to handle this traffic without the complication | of tactical operations. Langley Field, Hampton, Va., 110 miles from Washington, has been de- veloped as the main air defense base for the Atlantic seaboard and is the home of the three wings of the G. H. Q. Air Force. The three great tactical Wings con- stitute the G. H. Q. Air Force activ- ities and they comprise the whole com- bat strength of the Army Air Service within the continental United States. They are the 1st Wing, with head- quarters at March Field, Calif.; the 2nd, based at Langley Field, and the 3d, at Barksdale Field, La. G. H. Q. Air Force headquarters have been es- tablished at Langley Field. Units of 1st Wing. The 1st Wing is composed of the 17th Attack Group, 7th and 19th Bom- bardment Groups, the first at Hamil- ton Field, Calif., and the seconc at March Field; the 23d Photo Section, 38th Reconnaissance Squadron and Cadet Detachment, at March Pield; and the 88th Reconnaissance Squad- ron and Cadet Detachment at Hamil- ton Field. It also includes the 4th and 5th Base Headquarters. The 3d Wing, to which the great cities of the Atlantic coast must look for their air defense, is composed of organizations at Langley Field, Field, Mich. At Langley Field we find today the Wing headquarters and Headquarters Squadron; Base Head- Juarters and the 1st Air Base Squad- ron; the 2d Bombardment Group, com- posed of the crack 20th, 49th and §6th Bombardment Squadrons, all of World War fame; the 8th Pursuit Group, which is made up of the 33d, 35th and 36th Pursuit Squadrons; the 37th At~ tack Squadron; 2d Photo Section; 21st Reconnaissance Squadron, and a Cadet Detashment. There also is at Langley Field, Flight A of the 16th Observation Squadron, under control -of the Commanding General, 3d Corps Area. Mitchel Field, N. Y., is the home of Base Headquarters and the 2d Air Base Squadron, the th Bombardment Group, 8th Photo Section, Cadet De- tachment, 14th Photo Section and 97th Observation Squadron.’ Selfridge Field, long the home of the famous 1st Pursuit Group, still houses that organization and the Base Headquarters and 3d Air Base Squad- ron and a Cadet Detachment. The 3d Wing, at the new Barks- dale Field, comprises its own head- quarters and those of the 6th Air Base, together with their headquar- ters squadrons; the 3d Attack Group; 20th Pursuit Group and 5th Photo Section. Air Corps Observation. A ‘There also are a number of Alr Corps Observation, Airship and Bal- lon Squadrons which are assigned to discontinued station complements, and Army observation work and to such other military posts as the United [ Mitchel Field, N. Y., and Selfridge| (Continued on Ninth Page.) {nch sale * ¢ * makes any EDITORIAL SECTION The Sunday Star WASHINGTON, D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 27, 1936. Twin Specters at Genev Spain’s Example of Civil War Added to Menace of Great International Conflict. BY JAMES T. SHOTWELL, Professor of History at Columbia University. HE - drama sbeing Geneva is much more than a enacted at | 8nd have remained democratic. | was the first organization of nations is an instrument of liberal democracy. | action; they weigh all kinds of argu- | fact that its failure to anticipate Its methods as well as its ideals were It crisis in the history of the |in Which the small powers were rec- League of Nations. Behind the scenes other forces are at work than those in evidence. The talk is about the League's failures and the way to reform its structure; but the real is- sues have now quite left Abyssinia or Manchuria behind. The problem of averting wars between nations has taken a turn which brings it back from distant exploits of imperialism and | fundamental idea of Woodrow Wilson was that the League was to be the | raises new and peculiarly sinister pos- sibilities at home. ognized along with the great; if they were not on an even footing in the | Council, they shared the rostrum in the Assembly and worked side by side with their powerful neighbors in bu- reaus or committees. Idea of Wilson. Moreover, the method was that of free parliaments—open discussion. The repository of a “Monroe Doctrine for The civil war in Spain has smeared | the world,” by which he meant the a handwriting on the wall. the menace of international war rises the specter—more terrible still, if pos- sible—of civil war. The double line- up has already begun; for the first struggle, the opposing ranks of hostile or suspicious nations; for the*second one, the forces of revolution confront- ing those of reaction. The question Behind | safeguarding of national liberties from | | aggression by the strong and a -, Y A o | on their way, or even if they are The problem of | portunity for democracies to express | their will in their accustomed ways. ‘Whatever the League has been, it | has kept this ideal in view and has not violated it in form. In substance | it has at times yielded to politics of power, but upon the whole it has of the League’s future is part of the | kept to its professions as well as larger one, whether the institutions of liberty and representative govern- ments can protect themselves against such dangers. It should be remembered that the League which was set down in'a war- shattered world in 1919 was and still most governments. From first to last, the League stands as a symbol of democracy in international affairs. Now, this is just where the test of 4oday strikes hardest. The institu- tions of democracy are not keyed to crises. They call for deliberate CAMPAIGN OF ROOSEVELT IS HELD ONE OF DEFENSE Administration Decidedly “Tax Con- scious,” Observer Says—Communists Believed Supporting President. - BY MARK SULLIVAN. HETHER Mr. Roosevelt and the New Deal are on the defensive with respect to actual ‘votes is a matter of statistics—statistics which will not be compiete until November 3. The elec- tion in Maine this ‘month suggests that they are; so did the recent pri- maries in Massachusetts and Michigan. However it be about actual votes, it is clear that psychologically Mr. Roosevelt and his campaign strategists are on the defensive. Very little of their campaign is attack; almost the whole of it is defense—a strategy of defense which includes attempts to spike some of their opponents’ guns. The administration is “tax con- scious”—in a sense different from tax consciousness on the part of those who pay the taxes. To put it accurately, the administration is conscious that the country is tax consclous. This, apparently, the administration does not like. It seems fair to infer this administration would like the coun- try to remain in & world of dreams, in which the only taxes are those which “soak the rich.” % Old Tax Statute. When the Republican campaign managers, and many eager volunteers from the public, began to call atten- tion to the element of taxes to caus- ing advances in the prices of food, clothing and other commodities, Mr. Roosevelt's Attorney - General, Mr. Homer Cummings, took-an extraordi- nary step. He dug up a statute—long ignored both by Government and the public—a statute which seems to make it a crime to make mention of the amount of tax included in the cost of any: commodity. The part of the statute pertinent to the present situa- tion reads: . “Whoever In connection with the sales * * ¢ or offer for sale of any article, or for the purpose of making . - written or oral * * * intended or calculated to lead any person to be- lieve that any part of the price at which such article is sold * * ¢ or offered for sale * * * consists of a tax imposed under the authority of the United States * ¢ * shall be gulilty of- & misdemeanor and, upon convic- tion thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by im- prisonment not exceeding one year, or both.” 'To this statute Mr. Cummings called public attention. He expressed the “hope” that no one would put him Jn the “embarrassing” position of bringing prosecutions under it. Law Passed in 1918. For the presence of this statute on the books there is a simple explana- tion. It was passed in 1918, It was passed during the war, in the spirit in which it was made a crime to say or do anything that might hamper the country in the prosecution of the war. It was part of the same spirit which made it a crime to give sup- port, even the moral support of words, to any one resisting the draft. It was part of the spirit which sold Liberty bonds by means which included un- official intimidation, in the spirit of super-patriotism. No prosecution was ever brought under this tax-silence statute, at the N. R. A. and the Blue Eagle 3 the 3 | more ominous | double fear which they create—fear | churian episode in the first 10 days, | of both invasion and of civil strife— | when its indecision, due chiefly to | tends to turn men’s minds to more | ments, the foolish with the wise and the experienced. Their capacity for action is lessened by their tolerance | of debate. Witness the long delays in dealing with the Manchurian and Abyssinian wars. The resuit is that as the war clouds grow more and over Europe, the ready means of action. Problem One of Speed. The strategy of defense must be quick—incredibly quick—in the era of air warfare. There is no time for discussion in Geneva or anywhere else if the squadrons of death are poised for flight. security is largely one of speed. It also is one of adequate armaments. when others arm instead of going to Geneva. Undeér the circumstances the League must fit its parliamentary structure to action. Unless it can move with a speed equal to that of the nation that resorts to war, it will be ineffective and will be dis- carded utterly. But this is what most people today are saying the League cannot do. They point, with good reason, to the | war and prevent its happening is the vital weakness of the organization. Once a war has begun it cannot be | stopped without police measures too ‘unaenms to ‘the: policing nations to | be taken on except when their own | interests are imperiled. The League lost out in the Man- cross purposes with Washington, gave the leaders of the Japanese Army time to move on and commit the honor of their country to their cause. Mussolini calculated on the same delays and cross-purposes at Genevn' and played them to his advantage. ‘Why should not this always happen? Is so, what use is the League as a bulwark for peace? New Defection Serious. The simplest answer is that the| | League has already shown its futility | and that the sooner people stop talk- | ing of collective security the better. | | It is not only Rome and Berlin that | speak in these terms now; British and French conservatives, never fully con- verted to the Geneva experiment, are reacting almost as strongly against it. As that experiment can succeed only if it has public opinion solidly be- (Continued on Ninth Page.) LATIN AMERICA HAILS HULL’S STAND ON PACT Confident Administration Will Con- tinue Kellogg Treaty Stand Taken by Stimson. BY GASTON NERVAL. HE Secretary of State’s em- phatic reafirmation of the Kellogg pact and its coroi- lary, the policy of non-recog- nition of territorial gains by force, will be ethusiastically received by the statesmen and public opinion of Latin America. Denying reports that his admis- sion, in a public address, that the Kellogg pact had been “impaired” by certain powers amounted to & sug- gestion of its abandonment, Secre- tary Hull stated that he saw no rea- son why, because the pact had been weakened by repeated violations, the United States should abandon it or any other international it to which it is committed. . On the contrary, the Secretary. added. he sought in his speech before the Good Neighbor League to keep alive and perpetuate the Kellogg pact by link- lnzlllm’th.fln‘flmfi'lfllufl Jeffersonian formula of “peace, com- merce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliance with none.” This is particularly reassuring at a time when a persistent campaign of solation and indifference . toward world events had begun to make other governments somewhat skeptical as to the support which could be expected from the United States in the defense 'of the existing instruments of peace. To Stand By Position. The Latin Americans, sincere inter- nationalists not solely because of their political philosophy, but because of their material necessities, may now be confident that the Roosevelt-Hull ad- ministration has not the slightest in- estern Hemisphere. It was in his Pittsburgh sddress of October 36, 1983, Ut Segretary of State Stimson formally committed the United States to a policy of consistent support of the Kellogg pact. Refer- ring himself to the two occasions in that year in which the Washington Government had called the attention of quarreling countries to their obliga- tions under the anti-war pact—the | Manchurian crisis and the Chaco con- troversy—the then head of the State Department clearly set down the course to be followed by the United States in future emergencies. Starting from the premise that “the declaration in the treaty carries with | it the duty of performance,” he said: “We have made it clear that it neces- sarily alters the whole attitude of the world toward war; that, whereas dur- ing the centuries hitherto war has been one of the natural functions of government, giving rise to legal rights and obligations, hereafter among the signers of this treaty war will be an illegal thing—a disease instead of & normal state function; that whereas hitherto a breach of the peace be- tween two nations has been nobody's business but their own, now, under the treaty, it has become the rightful concern of the whole world, because practically the whole world has signed the treaty.” Invoked in Manchukuan Case. In this spirit and as & natural cor- ollary of the observence of the Kel- logg pact was born the so-called Stim- son doctrine of non-recognition of territorial acquisitions obtained by force of arms. This policy was first invoked with reference to the estab- lishment of the Marchukuan state under Japanese pressure, but on Aug- ust 3, 1932, the governments of the American republics jointly adopted it through their diplomatic repre- sentatives in Washington and later, in the Argentine anti- it a formal and con- recently it was for the conclu- | and Austria-Hungary—to watch that | unfairly compromising the success of | same. And the arguments which Hit- | ler's Ambassadors use in their con- | versations with Leon Blum and An- mD GERMANS THINK ATTACK a ||ON SOVIET MUST BE SOON Officer Asserts Delay of as Long as 18 Months Would Be Suicidal to Nazis, Observer Reports. BY CONSTANTINE BROWN. [{3 OW is it that you, who are H 50 concerned over the spreading of communism in Europe, are not afraid that a war against Russia will be the signal for the communization of the whole of Europe?” I asked a high- ranking German officer. “You admit that a modern war will be so ruthless, 50 brutal, that neither thoss at the front nor those in the rear will be spared. Under the circumstances it seems probable that after a few months of suffering, the combatants might turn their weapons agamst their own leaders, and a period of an- archy such as has not been seen since the religious wars of the seventeenth century might follow?” My German friend reflected for a few seconds and replied: “That is a thought which people in the so-called democratic countries seem to share with a certain degree of sincerity. But these fears are quite baseless.” Then he proceeded to explain the theory which seems to be prevalent in the general staffs in Berlin and in Rome. The possibility of a general up- heaval among the nations of conti- nental Europe might exist if it were not for the power of the German and Italian armies. At the present mo- ment all the efforts of the diplomats of the Reich are directed toward an isolation of the Russian-German con- flict in Europe. The German Armnbas- | sadors in Paris and in London are en- deavoring to persuade the French and the British governments to refrain from intervening in the forthcoming conflict, for the sake of Europes | peace. Herr Hitler wants to fight this war in the “old chivalrous manner in | which duels used to be fought, when God decided the success of arms in favor of the righteous.” Germany has no allies and does not want any. It will have only two “seconds"—Italy no one jumps to Russia’s rescue, thus the Reich’s arms. Hitler demands that Russia’s many allies shall do the thony Eden are that if either of these two countries rush to the rescue of the Soviets, the war will become a world war, with the result that, in the end, we may have a general so- cial upheaval in Europe and else- where. + Don’t Mind Mobilization. “We don't mind,” say these diplo~ mats, “if France, to give the appear- ance that she intends to live up to her system of alliances, decides to mobilize her forces, so long as we know that she will not use them; neither will we mind if the other countries take the usual military measures which are inevitable when two major nations are fighting. But we hope, for the sake of the main- tenance of order in Europe, that ncne of these forces will be used aggres- sively.” The Berlin general staff consider with astonishing serenity the conse- quences of a Russian-German conflict. } The talks between the Italian and the German ranking officers have result- | ed in a plan of operations which might | avert a general European imbroglio. | While the German forces will make their way into Russia either through | Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Rumania, or over the Vistula, Italy will mobil- ize her fighting forces, thus serving notice to France and Yugoslavia to keep quiet. Rome will lay the role of armed struggle over the Chaco. The two contending parties, as well as the six neutral nations under whose aus- pices peace was re-established, agreed that territorial gains resulting from the Chaco war shall not be recognized and that final possession of the land in dispute must be settled by diplo- matic or, if necessary, arbitral pro- cedure. As to the Kellogg pact itself, from which this doctrine may be said to have sprung, it was in Latin America, too, that it was first put to an actual test. After direct representations had failed to secure the return of the small town of Leticia, forcibly seized by Peruvian citizens, the Colombian government formally invoked the Kel- logg pact, late in 1932, and placed the facts of the controversy before that of the United States, one of the sig- natories and sponsors of that treaty. Reminded of Obligations. Acting at the request of the Colom- bian authorities, the State Department reminded the Peruvian government of “its obligations under Article II of the | Briand-Kellogg pact, by which the high contracting parties agreed that the settlement or solution of all dis- putes, of whatever nature or origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.” | Furthermore, the Secretary of State, | in his note to the Peruvian minister of foreign affairs asserted that the reported intention of the Peruvian government to support the action of its citizens holding Leticia would con- stitute “a recourse to war for the set- tlement of an international contro- versy and the employment of war as an instrument of national policy in its relations with another signatory pow=- er and be contrary to Article I of the Kellogg-Briand pact,” and concluded: “If 80, as set forth in the preamble of that pact, such a violation of it would entail a denial of the benefits furnished'| by that pact to the signatory power which violated it.” It is unnecessary to stress the important role which this outspoken attitude of the United States played in averting a major war over Leticia. Having thus tried, and definitely adopted, the principles of the Kellogg pact and the non-recognition of terri- torial gains by force, the nations of Latin America will be pleased to learn that the United States has not with- drawn its support of these perhaps as yet imperfect but well-intentioned at- tempts at the organization of peace, and that it is still committed to the theory ihat the pledge involved in “second” with drawn sword. II Duce has 1,250,000 soldiers under arms and can have 2,000,000 more men fully equipped within four weeks after the mobilization order has been issued. This army will be assisted by one of the best air forces in Europe and by a powerful navy. Thus the German general staff hopes to make an end to the Soviet system of government within a short time. Delay May Foil Plans. Of course, the German rulers are not blind to the fact that everybody in Eu- rope—inclusive of Mussolini—might regard the defeat of Moscow as the sign of Germany's domination of Eu- rope, and would not like it. And be- cause of this possibility, the well-laid plans of Hitler's military advisers may be foiled if Germany waits too long before it strikes. For the time being, Great Britain, while feared by the Germans because of her navy which can blockade the coasts of Germany, is not considered likely to get drawn into a European conflict. It is true that the British government is spending huge sums of money on military preparedness. But although the British arsenals and pri= vate arms factories are working 24 hours a day, Great Britain cannot be ready for another 12 months. Further- | more, the British political parties are not united. Among British politicians, in the general staff and in the admi- ralty there are trends favoring the de- struction of communism. Many lead- ers in London believe that Britain's power will take on new vitality in the event Germany succeeds in crushing communism at its source. In private conversations I have had with British generals and admirals the opinion was general that at the end of the “cru- sade” Germany will be so exhausted militaristically, financially and eco- nomically that it will take years before she can really bid for hegemony over Europe. And during this time Great Britain once more will be the dominat- ing power in Europe because she will have time to fully prepare her army and her aviation. France, today, is divided into two camps: Those who, with Blum, believe in the alliance with Russia and want to intervene on the side of that power if she is attacked, and those who see only disaster in such action and are determined to keep a neutral attitude if the British government decides to take that course. | Furthermore, France is on the verge of an economic wupheaval. The French government intefids to aben- don the gold standard -before the end of the year, and it will;take some time before things can be readjusted 50 as to enable the republic to handle any but a war of defense. German-Italian Parallelism. A German-Italian parallelism of interests exists today, while- Great Britain is still smarting over the check to her policies in the Italo- Ethiopian conflict. In Rome it is believed that Great Britain is pre- paring to avenge the insult she suf- fered in the Mediterranean. This German-Italian parallelism will con- tinue as long as Great Britain smarts under the Mediterranean “incident™ and as long as France is divided into uncompromising political factions, with sharp suffering from a serious economic and social illness. But Ber- lin is not fooled by Italy’s friendli- ness. Hitler, and especially his mili- tary and political advisers, knows ‘that the day Great Britain turns another leaf in her political dealings with Italy and the day Prance gets out of her present troubles, Il Duce can no long- er be relied upon. There is not much love lost be- tween the two dictators. Italy dis- likes the idea of Germany establish- ing a hegemony over Europe; Mus- solini needs money to develop his African empire and to raise the stan-ard of living at home. Germany has no money to offer, while the Lon- don and Paris financial markets are still able to provide Il Duce with the two or three hundred million dollars he needs at an early moment. With these indisputable facts in mind, the German genezal staflf con- siders that it must strike at Russia soon, if it strikes at all. The outline of the virulent speech Hitler made in Nurnberg early in September was indicated to this writer in the middle of August by a high-ranking German. The speech was Hitler's, but the ideas were sup- plied to im by his general staff. They are the result of a careful survey of conditions in Western Europe made by keen German observers who profess to know the state of military and economic preparedness of the world to the last machine gun and the last airplane. And it is this force, un- seen to the outsider, which "drives Germany into a crusade against Com- munist dictatorship. “Must Strike Now.” “We must strike now,” I was told in Berlin. “If we wait six more months eur chances for a quick vic- tory will be considerably. reduced; if we wait another year the struggle will be hard, but victory still can be obtained. If we wait for anbther 18 months we are going to disaster, and the general staff itself will oppose a military operation against the Soviets. The s of such a delay may have incalculable results for emm Reich and for Hitler. It may mean his doom and the doom of the coun- try. The destinies of both now are so tied together that we can no longer separate them. And neither Hitler nor the Reich wants to com- mit suicide. ‘The possibility of creating a state of confusion in Europe as & result of our fight against bolshevism is al- most negligible; the consequences of our not - settling the score with the Moscow rulers will jeopardize our existence as an authoritariai state and might endanger the existence of those very states which profess to oppose our aims at the present mo- ment. Europe would be more threat- ened with chaos and anarchy if we do not destroy communism at its source than if we do. It is worth tak- ing a chance for our own sake as well them carries with it the duty of performance. « Wrfl* 1038, as for the sake of the other nations