Evening Star Newspaper, July 14, 1935, Page 33

Editorial Page Civic Activities EDITORIAL SECTION he Sundy St Part 2—10 Pages BRITAIN LACKS SUPPORT TO BLOCK ITALIAN PLANS . League Holds No Ally to Keep Peace. Germany May See Austria With 1l Duce Busy. BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. HE recent plebiscite in Britain, | engineered by the friends of the League of Nations, has produced an astonishing re- sult. Eleven years ago when British support of the protocol which under-'1 took to make the League a living force might have insured the future of the | Geneva institution, Parliament re- | jected this program indignantly. And Chance to Strike cumstances which would insure Brit- ish control of that system. The fact that France and not Britain has steadily been dominant at Geneva has accounted for British lack of sym- pathy with the League, notably in Labor and Liberal circles. Thus it| is only as the League has begun to crumble visibly that British public opinicn has rallied to it. Having bee. largely responsible for WASHINGTON, DG SUNDAY MORNING, JULY 14, 1935. John Bull’s New Outloo With Cabinet Shuffled, Baldwin at Helm, Nation Faces Changing Ideals at .Home With Crisis Abroad. | Special Articles Travel — R esorts 'DEMOCRATS HELD LOSING OLD FAITH IN ROOSEVELT Believers in State Rights May Choose “Regular” in 1936 Says Political BY MARK SULLIVAN. N ANY view of the political situa- ‘ [ is still safest to assume thst Mr. Roosevelt wi'l get renomination from the Demociats. For a tense few hours last week i* seemed possible he might not. The split ketween him and his party in the House was not an hind it lay recognition of the fact tion looking toward next ycar it ordinary division w:thn. a party. Be- | to Avoid Clashes, Commentator. determine to prevent renomination of the Democratic President, who has set himself against the most important of Democratic traditions and prin- ciples. If the South should, with any | degree of unanimity, determine that | the Democrats must not renominate | Mr. Roosevelt, he would not be renom= | inated. . Six months ago, or three months, to | have suggested that the Democrats might not renominate Mr. Roosevelt would have been fantastic. It is no longer so. If Mr. Roosevelt were not | already in the White House, if he did not already have the nominal status | of a Democratic President, there would not be the faintest possibility of his that Mr. Roosevelt, his advisers and his policies are as far removed from | the Democratic pecty as from ihe Re- | publican—that they are indeed far removed from any political party that America has 2ver krown. It is still possible Mr. Rocsevelt | wrecking the League, however, the | British can now do little to save it. | For the League could only be saved now if it werc invested with very spe- cific authority and very definite means * | to deal with aggression. Faced with | the necessity of agreeing to embark the explanation of that rejection was that the protocol would have bound the British to use their money and their ‘military forces to restrain ag- gressive action by any other nation. Now, 11 years too late, the British pulilic by the millions have voted not merely for economic sanctions but for military as well when nations in- dulge in aggression. Thus, face to face with the unmistakable purpose of Mussolini to make war against Ethiopia, the unhappy Tory govern- ment in England is called upon to act to prevent what is manifestly a move of aggression. Moreover, it is called | upon to act through Geneva and by | employing the machinery of the League. | But today only the Soviet Union and France are available at Geneva as allies of British action. The United States has never come, Germany and Japan have come and gone, Italy is packed and ready to go if interfered with. As for France and the Soviet | Union, after British dallyings with | Germany over naval affairs they sym- | pathize with Italy and not with Eng- I land. And, in addition, they still count upon Italian aid if there should be a new putsch in Vienna this Sum- mer. Suez Canal Real Threat. What then can the British govern- | ment do at Geneva? If it undertakes | to close the Suez Canal against Italy that cannot be interpreted as other than an act of individual hostility, for there will be about it no semblance | of a collective action. Actually the | British would be in the situation the | United States found herself in four | years ago, when Mr. Stimson was try- | ing unsuccessfully to persuade the i League in general and Britain in par- ticular to act against Japan in the Manchurian affair. The League was originally purely and simply an Anglo-American ex- their fleet anc-army upon coercive sanctions, the British would undoubt- edly draw back now as in the past, unless their own immediate security were at stake Ethiopia to Seek Aid. Just what will happen in Geneva when the Ethiopian affair comes up again remains open to doubt. The Ethiopians wili, of course, press for protection. Unquestionably the French will try to have the issue pushed aside Probably they will be supported by the Soviets, who also are interested in preserving = common front toward Germany. As for the Italians, even if they linger in the face of debate, they will certainly depart if there should be a hint of censure of their course. Under such circumstances it is almost posaible to imagine the Ger- mans returning to Geneva just for the joy of supporting the British | against the former allies of England. In zay event, when the Germans get ready to move into Austria it is plain that the precedents furnished by Japanese action in Manchuria and by Italian in Ethiopia will come in handy. But the truth is that France, Italy, the Soviets and the little catente are already turning to regional and mu- | tual assistence pacts as guarantees of | security and abandoning even nominal | reliance upon the covenant of the | League. Yet even here there is little sense of certainty, for Italian rela- tions with Germany have materially improved in recent months.e What remains sure is that a Ger- man attack upon Belgium or France | would insure British actica against | Germany. At the moment German STANLEY BALDWIN, NEW HEAD OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. BY HAROLD E. SCARBOROUGH, Author of * d Muddles Through.” 6 ITH" as one London newspaper complacently noted, “a speed and smoothness and free- dom from public commotion which some other countries must envy,” Great Britain has just secured a new cabinet. The actual business of in- may have done, they inevitably have made enemies during their tenure of | office, and as inevitably have failed to live up to their campaign promises. | It is also pretty generally admitted | that MacDonald no longer appeals to the imagination of the British public as he once did: the electorate has tired of the vagueness and semi-mysticism of his speeches, much as 12 years ago | RAMSAY MACDONALD, RETIRING PRIME MINISTER. ‘The “general post” in the other cabi- net offices is, with one exception, an extension of the window-dressing proc- ess. The retention of Neville Cham- berlain as chancellor of the exchequer, Walter Runciman at the Board of Trade, Walter Elliot as minister of agriculture and J. H. Thomas as do- minions secretary, indicates that no important change is contemplated in folio for League of Nations affairs"— | for Anthony Eden. In a speech immediately after as- suming the premiership, Mr. Baldwin | commented with the appearance of per- fect frankness upon this maneuver. “I have deliberately devised this new | procedure,” he said, “in order to give special emphasis to the importance which we attach to our membership may not be renominated. To express it with some refinemert of words we might say that the Democratic party will not renominate Mr. Roosevelt, but that Mr. Roosevelt, because of the patronage at his disposal, because of the obligations of appointive office- holders all over the country i him, because of his coatror of the relief funds, which compose what Lemo- cratic Frank Kent bas called “the largest campaign fuau in history,” and because of sume cther reasoas of leverage and exvedicrcy—becanse of ‘these factors Mr. Roosevelt 'nay be able to get himse'! reroominated. The | possibility of droppiny him will recur | and grow. One of the shrewdest politicians in | Congress, who haipens to be not a Republican nor a Democrat, but a | representative of the rmasll third-party | groups, offered tecently to bt that the Democrats wiil nc” renominate Mr. Roosevelt. Willingness of one man to make a comparatively small et is, of course, slight as 4 sign of the {uture. Changes Occur Daily. The situation changes from day to day. At the time this article is written it may be stated thus: The Democratic party leaders would 2reatly prefer to renominatc Mr. Roosevelt if that course is Lracticable at all They are as relu:tant as the leaders of any party aiways are to drop a President serving his first term. Mr. Roosevelt may be alue to force his own renomination even against the | wishes of the ieaders. In the nnmost minds of most of the leaders. their mood is one which would deny re- nomination to Mr. Koosevelt unless he is willing 0 be a Democrat un- being nominated next year. | Any discussion of Mr. Roosevelt's renomination or his re-election must take into account one possibility. | One mentions it, however, only to dismiss it. The hope of the Demo- cratic leaders is that they can, so to speak. re-make President Roose- velt. They hope they can drive | out the coterie of radicals and queer ‘mlellcctual.s around him, that they can substitute themselves as the President’s advisers, that they can | create, so to speak, a party regency, and that they can cause the Presi- dent from now on to conform 9 | Democratic and American traditions. | On this hope the Democratic leaders base all their expectations of being | able to get through next year without | & chaotic split in the party. | Radicals Move Ever Leftward. | The hope is thin. Mr. Roosevelt | has gone so far in the radical di- | rection that he can hardly turn back. Even if he should attempt to turn back, if he should try now to make his course, from the present on, satis- factory to conservatives, they would hardly trust him. The probabilities point strongly the other way. Mr. | Roosevelt has started on a course of holding the radicals to him. But in order to hold the radicals he must be himself constantly more and more radical. Always the extreme radicals, such as Senator Huey Long, will out- bid him, and always Mr. Roosevelt wili be tempted to increase and em- phasize his appeal to the radical voters. In the condition in which the ;Democrsrs find themselves, denial of Roosevelt, and periment. It was gravely compromised | attack upon Italy, or the invaslon of | fopy 0" Siapjey Baldwin as prime it got fed up on the brilliant verbal | fiscal, industrial, agricultural or im- | of the League of Nations. Our foreign when the United States declined to join. It was further seriously injured | when the British, between 1920 and 1924, ignored it and left it to France | and her allies to organize the League | machinery. From 1924 onward the British have been trying to recover | lost ground at Geneva, but they have | never been successful because they | have always refused to underwrite the League principles with their own | wer. Since 1926, when Germany entered | the League, British policy has ex- | ploited Geneva to the utmost, but always as a means of evading specific |. responsibilities. The nightmare of the British mind has been involve- | ment in a new system of continental | alliances like that which existed be- fore the war. Always .the British | have talked about a collective system | as a substitute for the old order, but at no time have they been prepared to make a collective system effective. Always they have been ready to sub- scribe to general principles, but never ! to undertake precise obligations. Affair at Lowest Level. ctually the fate of the League was decided by the Manchurian epi- sode. When, by reason of British refusal to act, the League was dis- closed to be impotent, the decline of Geneva set in and it has been proceeding with utmost rapidity ever since. The Ethiopian affair marks the lowest level yet attained and perhaps the lowest attainable. Having failed to halt Japan in Asia and Italy in Africa, how can the League pe to stop Germany in Europe? e answer, of course, is that it @n't, and no one will longer depend upon it to accomplish anything when the purposes of a great power are involved. $But the British plebiscite over the | sague has made the task of the Brit- i government incredibly difficult be- cause the results of that vote vir- tually dictate that it shall stop Italian &nmre in Abyssinia. Thus, if it not force the issue at Geneva, wWhen the question comes up, it will be condemned at home. But if it tries to do this in Geneva, then it ¢an count on no aid and will simply cipitate the resignation of Italy. ordingly, the British friends of League may prove to be indi- gectly responsible for its crowning ter. # What makes the Tory situation en more unpleasant is that a gen- al election is in sight and its course Geneva is bound to become an ue in the approaching campaign. e opposition can and will charge t the Rational government has at times ‘displayed little enthusiasm d less ‘regard for the League. Measurably this accusation is true, but it is @lso true that the British government. had no choice, for British public sentiment would not support the old association with France which Austen CHamberlain established at Geneva, and without France Britain was helpless. Now, moreover, this French partnership can be restored only at.& prohibitive price. Laber Position Difficult. Doubtless British policy will con- tinue fo Wobbie until after election. Both . government and the oppo- sition Will continue to assert that British action is based upon the League and ‘&gain and again will re- affirm allegiance to the so-called col- lective system After election, how- ever, with Italy probably in full tilt | in Ethiopia, the Tories, if they win, will have to face realities. As for Labor, if it is victorious its situation will be even more difficult, because it will find itself friendless at Geneva and faced by French, Soviet and Italian hostility The fact is that the British official world has pever taken much stock in the idea of the League, while using it as & convenience whenever possible. The basic idea of a collective system to prevent war is repugnant to the British ‘official mind save under cir- ~ Austria, which would be the same in its effect, would bring France to Italy’s aid. The Soviet Union is now com- mitted to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany a6d France is allied to both Slav states. But just what France | could accomplish on behalf of either remains obscure. However, Germany | is little likely to resort to force any- where openly for the present. Her | game must be to wait and see what | happens to Italy in Ethiopia and how | the present Anglo-French quarrel | turns out. British Effort Pledged. i The British, as I have said, are bound | to make a desperate effort to restore | some semblance of reality in the League. They are, too, certain to go, on with their obvious campaign to get | the United States to join them in a | collective system to prevent war a system which would have to center in Geneva. The possibility that out of the mess some Franco-German truce might emerge is also not absent from the British mind. But the Germans have become so cocky over their re- cent agreements with London and the French are so suspicious because of these same agreements that the prom- ise of successful talks between Paris and Berlin is not bright. In any event the Anglo-German naval agreement has done for the League as an agency to restrain Mus- | solini’'s Ethiopian adventure and the British government is doomed to be ! caught between the pressire of League sentiment et home and the | resentment of Italian, French and Soviet publics abroad. On the sur- face these details would seem to point to the development of Anglo-German intimacy, but the simple truth is that | there is no enthusiasm for any such | association in Great Britain, where the domestic excesses of the Nazis are still viewed with utmost disapproval. Because the naval agreement with Germany seemed a heaven-sent op- portunity, the British admiralty im- posed it upon the government end the government had to make the best of what resulted. It has still to do that and at the same time to try in some way to protect the League from the consequences of Italian plans and French support of those plans. Undoubtedly the French will make this excessively hard for the Baldwin cabinet, but the domestic political situation in France is far from at- tractive. Perhaps Baldwin may be able to find a way to soften French resentment, but here, again, his task will not be easy. Meantime, with a war assured in Africa, an election in England and with the domestic political conditions in France becoming disturbing if not alarming, the general situation in Europe seems uniquely designed to favor Hitler’s plans. German rearma- ment is proceeding apace, the iron circle about the Reich suggests ap- roaching disintegration and at any moment opportunity may beckon in Austria. Nevertheless, if the outside circumstances are propitious for Ger- | many, there is no mistaking the | mounting economic and financial crisis at home. And that, in the end, may be responsible for precipitating 8 new crisis, just when the situation seems superficially most tranquil. =, —— Find Ancient Haven. VATICAN CITY, July 13 (#).—Un- settled relations between the Vatican and Nazi Germany have called atten- tion to the existence of one of the strangest of international curiosities, a liny German independent state be- tween Vatican City and Rome. Guide for Readers . PART TWO. Editorial Organization Activities and Fraternal News......D-4-5 Resorts .. D-6-7 » T | minister in place of Ramsay MacDon- | ald occupied something less than 12 | hours, but the change-over has been |and it is scarcely surprising that its final scene partook somewhat of the nature of anti-climax. To understand why a prime minis- ter should resign when he was backed by the largest majority in British par- liamentary history, it is necessary to indulge in a certain amount of retro- spection. The immediate factor de- termining Mr. MacDonald's decision was plain enough; he was physically a tired man; he was suffering badly from insomnia: his eyes were trou- bling him. But the fundamental causes which led to his replacement by Stanley Baldwin are national and not personal in their derivation. The last gencra' election held in Britain took place in the Autumn of 1931, and resuited ir & landshde in favor of the then rewly styled “na- tional government.” Of the 615 seats in the House of Commons, the Con- servatives alone secured 471; their Liberal allies, 58, and Mr MacDonald’s National Labor party, 15. Although leader of the smai:est party n the country, MacDonald was chosen as prime minister, and although in.the ensuing years there were a good many defections from the national govern- ment ranks, its pariiamentary strength today remains at the respectable fig- ure of 506. Politics Submerged. For nearly fous years the over- whelmingly doininant party submitted w the leadersaip of a politician who was once rezarded as its bitterest enem, It can scarcely be said that the submission was ac- cepted with anytihing approaching en- thusiasm. The best that the Conserv- ative apologists found to say about the arrangement was that the times demanded the subordination of party considerations to the national wel- fare; the worst, tnat nc avowed Con- servative could cossibly get away with as much Toryism as MacDonatd was. The one thing certaic is that whereas predictions that the rational govern- ment wouldn't lasi s1x months began early in 1932, 1t in fact last under Mr. MacDonald’s leadership for three years longer than that. Nearly a year ago. however, the signs began to multipiv that the Con- servatives were preparing to aesmand the titular as weil as the actual lead- ership of the national goverament. Mr. MacDonald’s public appearances became fewer and fewer: his speeches in important parltiamnentary debates less and less frequent Had st not been for his perfectly natural ana un- derstandable desire to remain in office through the King's silver jubilee cele- brations, is is quite probable that his resignation would nave been handed in months ago. Then as now, he would have been sutceeded by Bald- win, who as a mattec of fact since Christmas has been credited with being prime minister ir: all but uame: dwo Faciors Guide. ‘Two considerations governed the final decision to make the chiange in the premiership and simultaneously to reconstitute the cabinet. One con- cerned domestic cffairs; the other, foreign policy. By law there wwust be a general election at least once every five years. It is, however, ~onacered & sign of weakness in a British cabinet to live out its full term of cffice before ap- pealing to the eieciorete for u fresh mandate; and it is wiely blieved that the next election will be held this Autumn or, at the latest, next Spring. So far as domestic ccrcerns are in- volved, the cabinét reshuffle is largely to be ascribed 1o motives of elec- tioneering. 1t is well recognized phenomenon in British politics that the electors tend on general grounds to vote against the party in power.. No matter how well the leaders of that party think they Consarvative | | fireworks of Lloyd George. in the making-for the last four years, | Moreover, the war spirit is abroad; | nationalism is in the ascendant, and although it is arguable that Baldwin is really and fundamentally more of a philosophical Liberal than is Mac- Donaid, the Tory party managers have perceived that through some inexpli- cable psychological process the British | public will feel more “safe” under the leadership of the Worcestershire squire, ironmaster and generally John- Bullish Baldwin than under the trans- cendentalism of the Lossiemouth inter- nationalist and one-time pacifist. | perial policy. The redistribution of the minor cabinet offices likewise largely indicates just a general desire to tighten up the machine, and has been received without excitement even by government supporters. Tt is, therefore, the exception noted above which has created the greatest immediate interest in London: Sir John Simon's removal from the for- | eign office to the home office; the pro- motion of Sir Samuel Hoare, formerly Indian secretary, to the foreign office, | and the creation of a quite new cabinet post—that of “minister without port- SEEDS OF NATIONALISM T LACK ROOTS IN CANADA | Astute Observers Think Coalition Cab-| inet Might Be Success, However, Aided by Economic Stress. BY D. M. HALLIDAY. ORONTO.—Seeds of a national | government for Canada which are being sowed so assiduously | in.Ottawa as Parliament ends are falling at present on barren po- litical soil. But there are many astute observers who think a coalition cabinet is not far removed and that the movement will gain in strength and will achieve its ends through press of economic circumstance facing the Dominion today. There is little encouragement being | given its aims in Ottawa by the two major political parties which are about to engage in an election battle. Some support is coming from the Conservative ranks, none from the Liberals, whose federal leader, W. L. Mackenzie King, is being backed at long odds to be the next prime min- ister. If there should be signs of a general demand for a coalition there is a strong probability that Premier R. B. Bennett, whose health has been serjously impaired by the stress and strain of the last five difficult years, would step aside, but the Liberals, confident of victory at the polls, see nothing to gain. Champion Free Parliament. Their attitude is that with all the provinces of Canada, with the. excep- tion of Alberta and Prince Edward Island, having Liberal governments, the future for co-operative measures, particularly to solve the pressing problem of unemployment, is much brighter and that an administration under Mr. King would be able to make as much headway in dealing with national problems as a union government. They champion the principle of a free Parliament and the supremacy of Parliament. It had been freely predicted that Harry Stevens, instigator of the Price Spreads Commission, might be in- duced to accept leadership of a na- tional movement, but his entry into the approaching federal election fight as head of a “recopstruction” party, with social and nomic reforms which he has championed as its main platform plank, definitely quashes that forecast. Sponsors of the League for National Governemnt dissociate themselves from the Stevens party. Stanch Liberals believe the agita- tion for a national government is in- spired by the “big money interests” with their major objective the amal- gamation of Canada’s two railway systems. Supporters of the movement strongly assert that its aims are non- political, for the good of the country. ‘Under a coalition regime, it is claimed pertisanship would be submerged in public service, as the necessity for vote catching pr d become rograms woul unnecessary, “Nationalists” ~ warn . that bankruptcy is staring Canada ln‘ the face and her only hope is for a government “composed of men who will rise above party politics and grapple |in a businesslike way with Canadian problems, divested of any party bids for power.” Cite English Railway Figures. They contend that members of Par- liament capable and willing to carry | on government affairs in a business- like way are so cramped and en- meshed in the tentacles of party patronage and local demand that their efforts are of no avail. Deal- ing with the problem of the Do- minion’s big railway debt, they note that in Great Britain steps have been taken to control highway motor trans- port agencies, and produce statistics showing that railways there have maintained in a large measure the most remunerative classes- of freight. Those who draw an analogy be- .tween present-day conditions and those of 1914-1917 which led to the formation of the Borden union gov- ernment admit that any such eco- nomic crisis as exists today does not bring forth the same natural in- stinctive impulse for rallying all in- terests in a common cause as did those wartime days, although such 1917 Liberal appeals as “the question to be decided at the coming election is whether the people shall rule or whether the vested interests and the monied people shall continue to lead the government” have a st ingely familiar ring today. “New Deal” 1s Issue. Then the chief issue was whether compulsory military service should be instituted. Now the chief issue is Mr. Bennett's “new deal,” or, more ex- actly, how it should be framed and administered, since tne Liberals in the House of Commons voted their support of the economic reform pro- gram sponsored by he Conservatives. At the same time they contended that provincial rights were being vio- lited and that proposed methods of administration of the new laws were violating individual rights. They de- claimed particularly against the “as- sumption of autocratic powers by the executive.” If the Canadian voters should swing away from their customary allegiance to one or other of the two big parties and send to Parliament a big repre- sentation of such “left” groups as Progressives, Farmers, Laborites and members of the Canadian Co-opera- tive Commonwealth Federation, then the “Nationalists” might have con- siderably more sanguine hopes of suc- cess immediately after the election. But as yet the movement appears to have failed to impress either the elec- torate or those high in political party councils, policy is based upon our membershi of the League and it is all to the good that this fact should be clearly under- | lined * * * Ibelieve that the resultof | this important new arrangement will | be materially to strengthen the gov- ernment’s hands in international af- fairs.” 5 Simon Regretful. . As the foreign secretaryship is con- sidered one of the “key” posts of the cabinet, commentators in London were not slow in reading into Mr. Baldwin’s words an implication of dissatisfaction | with the record of Sir John Simon during the last three years. It was also generally understood that Sir John had not been especially anxious to leave the foreign office; and though the leader of the small “Lib; eral National” group has been solaced | with the home office and the post of | deputy leader of the government in the House of Commons, there is an| impression in political circles that he | may not be so happy in his new post | as he was in the old one. For the non-British world, however, this feature of the remade cabinet may prove to be of real and immediate importance. Sir Samuel Hoare, al- though a Conservatice, in piloting the India bill through the House of Com- | mons has developed, in the words of | the Manchester Guardian, “not only | firmness and consistency, but much | skill in conciliation and a temper that | has become liberal rather than rigid.” Capt. Eden (whose friends hoped he | would get the foreign secretaryship it- | self, and who probably would have got it had his domestic political status equaled his international one) has | | become in recent months one of the best-known of British statesmen. The experiment of virtually having two foreign secretaries (“one to stay in the office and the other to go out and get the business,” as a journalist irreverently described the arrange- ment) has of course yet to be tried in practice. It does, however, confirm the view frequently expressed during the last few months in London dis- patches to the New York Herald Tri- bune that the British government has decided definitely to “go all out” on the principle of collective security; in other words, that this Summer and Autumn may witness not only renewetl attempts on Britain's part to stabilize the uneasy Continental situation, but quite possibly a considerable accretion of strength to the League, deriving from whole-hearted and continuous British support of that institution. ‘To a very considerable extent, what- ever is done in this line will depend upon the new prime minister himself; and indeed there is some justification (Continued on Page 3, Column 1.) Swedish Royal Family - Doubts Socialist Era STOCKHOLM (#)—One of the hardest-working royal families in the world has retreated to Summer pal- aces, wearied by a strenuous season of festivities and ceremonies, but not without a certain amount of mental satisfaction. For members of the Swedish royal house, from top to bottom, have had convincing proof that Socialist Sweden has no apparent desire as yet to do away with Kings and Quens. At the recent wedding of Princest Ingrid and Crown Prince Frederik, the largest street crowds ever assemblec in Stockholm roared their approva. of a royal family. Husky Socialist workmen stood on stepladders, climbed trees and struggled for a chance to look at royalty, along with dyed-in- the-wool Royalists. Sweden, with a ‘Socialist ticket in one hand, used the other to wave & handkerchief at a princess who mar- ried a prince; less he is willing to get rid of the| | coterie who now initiate his stcangely assorted policies, and unless pe is willing to make up his policies in con- ference with the reguiar party seaders. | Until the Democratic National Con- vention actually meets next June, it will be imprudeni to dismiss the pos- sibility that the Democrats may re- fuse renomination to Mr. Roosevelt. His policies include an immense re- cuction of the rights of the several | States to exercise government within their own borders. The aim of the New Deal includes making America a “totalitarian” nation, of the type | common to Germany, Italy and Rus- sia, a nation in which power is cen- tered in one national capital. Tc achieve that in America would mean wiping out most of the areas of power in which each of the 48 States now governs itself. | This purpose is no longer merely latent in the New Deal program. With the President's expression of re- | sentment against the recent Supreme Court decisions, the purpose of taking away rights of the States became clear. The President is still indis- posed to state this purpose plainly and make it a clear issue. If he and the country were to face the issue di- | rectly, the New Dealers would intro- duce an amendment to the Constitu- | tion taking away rights from the | States and transferring them to the | Federal Government. By this process | the issue could be fought out as| plainly in the eyes of the people as | the amendment setting up nationa! prohibition, and the later amendment | zepealing national prohibition. | Court Action Resented. This, apparently, Mr. Roosevelt is unwilling to do. His purpose seems to be to create a condition in which there will be widespread dissatisfac- tion with the Supreme Court for deci- | sions in which it sustained the rights of the States. Some of the statutes Tecently enacted by Congress under pressure from the President, and some he still insists Congress must pass, are, in their existing forms, so | plainly unconstitutional as to leave | the Supreme Court no choice but to declare them so. | One of these statutes, the A. A. A. | amendments, if declared unconstitu | tional by the court, may be expected | to create dissatisfaction among farm- | ers. Another, the labor disputes law, | may be expected to irritate organized labor. Yet another, the bill for cen- tralization of the coal industry, may be expected to provoke all labor in the coal industry and a part of the ownership interests. Yet another, the public utility holding company meas- ure, may be expected to cause dissat- isfaction among all radicals, especially those who wish to achieve Govern- ment ownership of public utilities as a start toward Government ownership of industry generally. The sum of all these dissatisfactions would make a considerable body of support for Mr. Roosevelt’s project for changing the Constitution and limiting the power of the Supreme Court. It would also make a large body of support for Mr. Roosevelt in the election next year. Then Mr. Roosevelt, if re-elected, could proceed with the fundamental changes he says frankly he has in mind. South Cherishes Rights. Now the point is, all this means tak- | ing away many of the rights of the | States. And the further point is that leaders of thought in the South are | aware of this, or soon will be. To the South States’ rights is the most dearly cherished of political principles. And the South knows that the best place to | make their fight to retain States’ rights is within the Democratic party. The South distrusts the Republican party and distrusts it especially on this issue. The South will not wish to be forced to vote the Republican ticket in the election next year in order to preserve their States’ rights. Realizing all this, the South may | | He will | open to him? | situated. | would be to act in common judgment | renomination to Mr. nomination of some orthodox Demo- crat in place of him is by far their | best way out. Renomination of Mr. | Roosevelt means a party split. And a party split would mean not only de- | feat for the presidency, but embar- rassment to practically every Demo- | crat running for election to any office | next year. Consider the case of Senator Carter Glass of Virginia; he will be up for re-election next year. Probably Vir- ginia would re-elect Mr. Glass in any | circumstances. But he, and prac- tically every other Democrat running for any office anywhere, would be happier if the party nominee for the presidency were some one other than Mr. Roosevelt. Glass’ Course Questioned. Senator Glass is, in the whole pub- lic life of America, the outstanding critic of the New Deal. If he is run- ning for re-election on a ticket which bears at its head the name of Frank- lin D. Roosevelt as candidate for President, what will Mr. Glass do? not stultify himself—any course that would involve self-stulti- fication by Carter Glass can be dis- missed at once. But what would be He could not indorse Mr. Roosevelt as the head of the ticket. Would he, in his campaign speeches, merely ignore Mr. Roosevelt? That would be hardly what one would expect from any one so forthright and candid as the Virginia Senator. Would Mr. Glass, running in a cam- paign for re-election, denounce the New Deal as heartily as he has al- ready denounced it? That course would tend to make Republican votes not only in Virginia but throughout the country; that | course would not stop with merely taking votes away from Mr. Roose- velt; it would take votes from every Democrat running for any office—and Mr. Glass would not like that. As Senator Glass is situated in Vir- ginia, so are Democrats everywhere By far their best course and by their united strengths nomi- nate some orthodox Democrat for the presidency. If they do not do that, a party split is inevitable. The split, indeed, is already here.- The only question is what form it would take in the election next year, assuming Mr. Roosevelt is able to force the party machinery to renominate him (Copyright. 1935.) Secret Newspapers Defy Censorship By the Associated Press. VIENNA—The child of censor- ship is the illegal, secretly pubiished and circulated newspsper, ard in Austria there are many such children. The most widely circulated of the mimeographed papers is a pert Nazi publication whicn calls itself Illkorr, whick is short for illegale Kkorre- spondence. When the paper first appearec some Jime ago it announced that its pur- pose was “to kesn you informed of all inner-political developments i Aus- tria, which, for ocvious reasons are silently ignored by the official news agency.” The paper then went on to say. “Thanks to itz good connectons in | all the federal ministeries, as well as -with leaders of the various voluntary armed organizations, the police, the army, and leading business circles the Tkorr will at all times be in a posi- tion to provide you with autnentic information on current topics.” Many suspect ‘nat the Illkorr, at times, will find it impossible to resist the temptation to pubiish simon-pure Nazi propaganda with little or no re- gard for the news merits. But for the reading public it is an exciting game to see the news first 1n the secretly circulated paper and then later see it substantiated by subse- wient developments, >