Evening Star Newspaper, March 24, 1935, Page 29

U Editorial Page Civic Activities Part 2—12 Pages WORLD TRADE STABILIZED AT THIRD OF 1929 LEVEL 1934 Commerce of Nations Falls Only 3.9 Per Cent Below Level Re- corded in 1933. BY ALBIN E. JOHNSON. | The number of employed dropped ENEVA—The world's eco- | Sharply in Germany in December nomic condition in 1934, | and there was an increase of more based upon complete and |than 250,000 in unemployed during official statistics of some 60 | that month, the total number of countries, indicates that an | Workers in receipt of relief being apparent stability has been attained. | 2,604,434. The downward trend in world trade— | Paradoxically, increased production exports and imports—has been | and trade do not seem to be faithfully | checked both as regards quantities | reflected in employment and unem- | of commodities produced and their | Ployment figures. In Japan, for ex- gold values. In fact, world trade dur- | @mple in industries where the out- | ing 193¢ was omly 3.9 per cent less | Put has increased around 34 per cent | (in gold value) than that of 1933, | the number of workers has increased | although it amounted to only one- | by only 3 or 4 per cent. - third of what it was in 1929—the Meanwhile world stocks of primary | year the depression began. commodities have shown little tend-l In quantity, world trade remained | €ncy to decline during the past two practically unchanged, as compared | YEars, remaining on an average about with the previous year, averaging be- | 50 per cent higher than in June, 1929, tween 74 per cent and 75 per cent of ‘ Estimated in pre-depresslqn gold what it was before the crisis, The | dollars the value of the world’s trade amount of goods exchanged between | (exports and imports of 75 countries) nations was, in 1932, about 74 per | in 1934 was $22,308,000,000, as com- cent of what it had been in 1929, | pared with $23,211,600,000 in 1933, | During 1933 there was a slight im- provement, which was maintained in 1934, But—while conditions as a whole, based upon world-wide commerce. pear to be improving, there is a str ing fluctuation in the trade move- ments in different countries. Where one group of countries registers gains another group will register losses, indicating that the upward trend 1s by no means universal The gold bloc countries—France, | Italy, Belgium, Holland and Switzer- | land—are still on the toboggan. | indicating that trade actually fell off | by nearly a billion gold dollars in 1934 | as_compared with the preceding year. | Exports of 75 countries in 1933 to- | taled, in gold value, $11,203,200,000. Exports of 75 countries in 1934 to- | taled, in gold value, $10,776.000,000. Imports of 75 countries in 1933 to- led, in gold value, $12,008,400,000. Imports of 75 countries in 1934 to- taled, in gold value, $11,532,000,000. ta EDITORIAL SECTION he Sundiy Star WASHINGTON, D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 24, 1935. Armed Truce in Europe War in Immediate Future Held Improbable, but Permanent Peace Is Equally Unlikely. Situation in Table Form. i Gains, or losses, in gold dollar values | of imports and exports of 27 countries | While bankruptcies decreased during | during 1934, as compared with 1933, | 1934 in a majority of countries, they increased considerably in France, 8witzerland and Holland. Russian Gains Lead. Russia, which for the first time is furnishing the economic and financial sections of the League with official figures, appears to be the most flour- ishing country in the world. Ger- many and Japan also show remark- able improvement in trade and pro- duction. While the gold value of trade of various countries cannot be taken as an absolute index of their economic condition, because of the drop in prices in terms of gold which con- tinued during 1934, statistics form an interesting basis for comparisons. For example, world trade, in gold values, was 19.2 per cent less in 1930 than it was in 1929; in 1931 it was 286 per cent less than it was in 1930; in 1932 it was 32.2 per cent less than in 1931; in 1933 it was 10 per cent less than in 1932, and in 1934 it was only 3.9 per cent less than in | 1933. When measured in the terms of | national currencies, trade increased | in practically every country with de- preciated currency. The increase in the value of exports was particuiarly marked. Production of basic commodities— pig iron, steel, zinc, coal, lignite and | petroleum—showed gains, exceeding | in every instance the 1931 level. Pe- | troleum, for example. was in excess of 1929 production. World production of steel in 1934 was 61.2 per cent higher than in 1932 and 20.7 per cen: higher than in 1933. While the wo:ld pig iron production in 1934 was still only about 63.5 per cent of what it was in 1929 it was 27.5 per cent higher than that of 1933 and 58.4 per cent higher than the production in 1932. | | Reich Gains in Pig Iron. | Germany showed the greatest ad-| vance in pig iron production. Her| 1934 output was 66 per cent higher | ing were as follows (in per cent): | Imports. Exports. | . 2 14 | | Country. o Huneary Finland | New Zealand nada Sweden Czochoslovakia Belgium | Switzerland | France Holland United States Russia .. China Brazi Au rmany % Irish Free State. . Ttaly n Bulgaria Denmark Spain Eithonia nanzed +Unchanged. tendency upward. 1Unchanged. tendency do vnward. It will be seen that imports and ex- ports have increased in Yugoslavia, Australia, Hungary, Finland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Japan. Both im- ports and exports have decreased dur- 1934 in Belgium, Holland, the United States, Soviet Russia, China, Germany, Denmark and Spain. In Italy, Ireland, Brazil, France and Switzerland the joint tendency of both exports and imports also was down- ward. China, Soviet Russia, Germany, the United States and France showed | the greatest losses during the year. e P L Britain Trade Averages. | Great Britain's monthly average of exports in 1934 was $99,190,000 (gold), as compared with $101,290,000 in 1933. Britain's monthly imports in 1934 averaged $171,520,000, as against $173,- 410,000 (gold values) in 1933, showing | a loss on both sides. National business conditions natur- ally are reflected in bankruptcies and | business failures and here again the League’s Economic Intelligence Serv- ice has compiled some striking charts, The monthly average of bankruptcies in Germany during 1934 was 226, as | against 326 in 1933. In 1931 the than that of 1933; Russia showed a| monthly average was 1,133. gain of 46 per cent; Great Britain of | Austria reports in 1934 an average 45 per cent; Japan of 21 per cent;|of 59 bankruptcies, as against 80 in the United States of 205 per cent.| 1933, | Pig iron production in France de-| In Belgium the average did not creased 3 per cent in 1934 as com- ' change from the previous year, stand- pared with 1933 | Zinc, an important commodity, | showed strikingly the up-pick in in-| dustry. The increase in world pro-| duction of this metal during 1934 was | 20 per cent over 1933 and 51 per cent | over 1932 production. Canada’s gain | was largest, being 47 per cent higher | than in 1933; Germany showed a 43 per cent gain; Belgium, 27 per cent; Mexico, 26 per cent, and Poland, 22 per cent, over the previous year. The | United States, which is the world‘s} greatest zinc producing country, re- ports a gain of 13 per cent over 1933. | France, on the other hand, shows a de- cline of 8 per cent in 1934. Russia shows the greatest advance in coal production, having increased | her output in 1934 by 27.4 per cent; | Germany’s coal production increased | 13.7 per cent, and Japan's, 10.1 per| cent. South Africa, Belgium, Canada, | India and Great Britain also show | slight increase in coal output, while | France's production was 61,000 metric | tons more than the previous year.| Production dropped in Holland and | Poland. | Unemployment Checked. ‘The trend of employment and un- employment during 1934 also indi-| cates that, except for the gold bloc countries, conditions are markedly | better. France, Holland, Belgium, | Switzerland and, to a certain extent, Italy, reveal a deepening unemploy- ment problem. Conditions also are bad 1n Spain, Norway and Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, despite the fact it is an agricultural country, is in a bad way. As a result of the uncertainty due to the transfer of the region from the League’s administration to Ger-. many, unemployment is mounting in the Saar. Poland also is still sufferinz | severely. The situation in Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, Pinland. Hungary, Austria, Australia, Japan and the| South American countries, is im- | proving steadily. In many cases em- | ployment has risen much faster than | unemployment has decreased, indicat- | ing that many of the so-called “middle | class” which were living on savings, | have exhausted their resources. ‘While the figures for January of 1935 show that unemployment grew |° considerably in most European coun- tries as compared with December figures, nevertheless the number of men out of work was less than in January of 1934, Ireland and France are two notable exceptions. French officially unemployed, in receipt of government relief, have passed the 500,000 mark, while trade union esti- mates place the actual number of idle at well above a million. The Irish Free State reports 138,799 registered unemployed in January as against 94,266 a year ago. Unemployment has increased steadily in Ireland sin June of last year. ¥ | thonia, 51 per cent; United States, 28 | Czechoslovakia, 25 per cent; Canada, | 23 per cent; Brazil, 22 per cent; Swe- ing at 405 per month. In 1932 the average was 288. United States Failures Fall. In the United States, where there was an average of 2,652 failures | monthly in 1932 and 1602 in 1933, there were but 1,015 monthly in 1924. France and Switzerland, as well as Holland show precarious business con- ditions. In France there was an average of 1,254 bankruptcies monthly last year, compared with 1,147 in 1933, while Switzerland’s reports show 88 per month, as against 77 in 1933. ‘There were 252 liquidations monthly in Great Britain during the year, as compared with 262 monthly in 1933, while actual bankruptcies per month totaled 326 in 1934 as against 367 in 1933. Italy had 1,170 failures per month in 1934 and 1,431 bankruptcies per month in 1933. The yearly failures in Italy have averaged between 12,000 and 16,000 ever since 1929. Other countries where a healthier business condition existed in 1934 as compared with 1933 (as indicated by decreasing numbers of failures) are South Africa, Canada, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Trade, when calculated in national currencies, showed different trends than when calculated on a pre-depres- sion gold dollar basis. Consequently, except for the gold bloc nations, condi= tions improved steadily in most coun- tries. For example the value of trade increased, during 1934, as follows: Es- per cent; Argentina, 28 per cent; den, 20 per cent, Jugoslavia 18 per cent; Japan, 17 per cent; Finland, 17 per cent; Ceylon, 34 per cent, and British Malaya, 45 pe cent. Since the end of 1933 world stocks of tea, rubber and lead increased slightly, Stocks of tin, copper, zinc, wheat, cof- fee and cotton showed marked declines during 1934. Sugar stocks showed a seasonal increase toward the end of the year. Guide for Readers BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. IKE the earlier crises of Octo- ber, 1933, when Germany left the League, and July, 1934, when she precipitated the putsch in Vienna, the present uproar provoked by the announcement of her military program has served to make clear two facts: The first is that war in any imme- diate present is wholly improbable, | and the second that any prospect of permanent peace is equally lacking. Germany has still to arm before she can hope to fight successfully and her potential enemies are unwilling to take the offiensive in a war of prevention. The situation today, thus, is quite like that between 1905 and 1914 when European tranquility was shaken by the successive crises of Tangier, Bosnia and Agadir, each of which quickened the peace of armament and intensified the tension. Then, at least, the murder of the archduke at Sarajevo touched off the powder magazine. Before the next explosion it would seem that Europe has still quite a way to travel, but not less evident is the fact that it is well on its way along familiar pathways. Germany’s recent announcement is in itself not open to real question. Only a fool could imagine that a great people would forever submit to restric- tions of their .sovereign rights and most of all their right to parity in the means of self-defense for a period longer than their own weakness made inevitable. What Germany is doing is natural and inevitable. What makes German action the cause of a Euro- pean crisis is the man who today con- trols German destinies and the pur- poses he has proclaimed. Cause of the Agitation. ‘The fact that the treaty of Ver- sailles, which is the public law of Eu- rope, forbade Germany to claim a mili- tary parity with Prance like the naval equality we claim with Britain does not warrant denunciation of Ger- many's present course, for the treaty was imposed and in the respect of de- militarization, as in that of reparations and of the guilt clause, was contrary alike to reason and common sense. But the fact that Germany is today in the hands of a man and a party whose program of violence is on all fours with the Italian or the Japanese ex- plains the agitation of Germany’s neighbors. The true criticism of Germany’s course is a criticism of the methods and not the morals it discloses. Now, as between 1905 and 1914, the true objective of German policy must be to separate Great Britain from those continental countries—today France, Italy, the Soviet Union and the states of the Little Entente—which are bound in any case to resist German purposes. But the several brusque moves of Hit- ler, recalling those of William II a quarter century ago, have all been calculated to set British nerves on edge and confirm the underlying sus- picion beyond the Channel that Ger- many in present hands is a postitive peril to European peace and there- fore to British security. British Keep Open Mind. Editorial Page. Frank G. Cai D. C. Civic Affairs........D-4 Automobile and Aviation..D-5 Organization Activities— Women’s Clubs, - Masonic, Eastern Star, American Le- gion, Naval Reserves, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Pages D-67 Cross-Word Puzzle....... Today the British people are still on the surface keeping an open mind. Simon goes to Berlin as Haldane went before in 1914. Since no one is ready to fight, there will be conversations all over the lot and not impossibly recurring debates for several years. Again and again the British govern- ment of the hour, because of its home situation, will have to maneuver in such fashion as to “put Ggmany on the spot” before the British public. | UPPER LEFT: ANDRE FRANCOIS-PONCET. FRENCH AMBASSA- ! DOR, WHO PRESENTED FRANCE'S PROTEST TO GERMANY. TER: VITTORIO CERRUTTI, THE ITALIAN AMB DOR TO BER- LIN, WHO CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER KONS TIN VON NEU- RATH OF GERMANY TO DELIVER THE ITALIAN PROTEST TO | HITLER'S ARMS PLAN. RIGHT: BARON VON NEURATH, WHO ! DELIVERED CHANCELLOR ADOLF HITLER'S SHARP ANSWER TO | BOTH THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS. LOWER: PRESENT-DAY GERMAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH. —A. P. Wirephoto. In a word, British statesmen will have | to educate the British public to the | idea that Germany constitutes a true danger. And every time Germany | thumps the table and rattles the | saber the idea will penetrate a little masses and have decisive results when the real crisis arrives. ‘What Americans must see is that | “Nazi” Germany has now gotten on the nerves of most European peoples; that the real apprehension of these | deeper into the minds of the British | peoples is not over the right of Ger- TARIFF DISCUSSION HELD BY GASTON NERVAL. EWSPAPER reports from Buenos Aires intimate that, in accordance with the views of the preparatory commis- sion, the forthcoming Pan American Commercial Conference will not be allowed to discuss possible reduction of customs duties. It is difficult to understand how & conference supposedly intended to promote inter-American trade will succeed in avoiding, and disregarding entirely, what seems to be, today, the greatest barrier to commercial rela- tionships among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is no longer a secret that the world depression, plus the high cus- toms duties adopted by the United States, and, in some cases, retaliated by several of the Southern countries, have undone in four years the work of business men and picaeers in inter- American trade during the last two decades. Not long ago, statistical figures released by the Commerce De- partment showed that totals involved in export and import trade between the United States and the Latin American countries were back where they had been more than 20 years before. While in the last normal year be- fore the depression inter-American trade amounted to $2,000,000,000, by the end of 1933 it had shrunk to a sum far below the average given for the period immediately preceding the World War. ‘The year 1913 is usually considered the starting point in the tremendous development of inter-American trade, which became one of the commercial characteristics of the post-war era. That year United States exports to and imports from, Latin America amounted to a little over $800,000,000. The total for 1933 had dropped to nearly one-half of the 1913 figures. Depression Blamed. depression had something to do with it. As a matter of fact, it had a Iot to do with it. Trade figures all over the world have dropped in the past four years as a result of the nearly every nation. shrinkage has been um.xu% in latin Evidently, the world-wide economic | has ESSENTIAL TO PARLEY 'Pan-American Trade Impaired by High Duties Which Should Be Considered at Buenos Aires, Observer Says. America, where the economic struc- ture of most countries is entirely de- pendent on one or two specific com- modities. The price of these com- modities having tumbled to record lows, governemnt and private reve- nues have suffered enormous cuts and a general economic disarrangement has ensued. In some of the Southern republics, such economic difficulties have not stopped short of political unrest. Un- doubtedly precipitated by economic factors, a series of internal revoits and changes of government by violence have taken place. This, naturally, could not have begn an encouragement to foreign trade. Moreover, almost at the same time that the world depression set in, the flood of money which had been pour- ing into Latin America from Wall Street in the most extravagant man- ner—in the major part, excessive and unsafe government loans—was sud=- denly cut off. Deprived of profits by the slump in the value of prime commodities, and then deprived of the credit with which they had been paying old debts and buying from abroad, the Latin Amer- icans found themselves forced to cut down their expenditures to a minimum. Clock Set Back 20 Years. But the world depression is not the only factor responsible for the un- paralleled decline in inter-American trade. The depression, alone, could not have brought it about, because the depression has not set the clock of Latin American economic condi- tions in general 20 years back. Nor has it reduced Latin American trade with Europe to the pre-war level. If the fall in the trade of the Americas is, then, out of proportion with that in the commerce of other regions of the world, there must be another reason to account for it. The reason is not hard to find. It is contained in a single word, which become exceedingly popular of shrinkage in the buying powes of | Sm Latin Americans poin! v G WIREPHOTO | many to qualify in armaments, but about the use Germany means to make of these arms when she gets them. The time has passed when her pos- session of them can be prevented. the hour has not yet arrived when she is ready to resort to their use. Mean- time we are to have a truce during which the nations which feel them- selves menaced will draw together just as they did 25 years ago. Europe will thus be divided into two systems of alliances and the balance of power will rest with the British. To post- pone war, too, the British will avoid as long as possible committing them- selves to either side irrevocably. Recurring Crises Likely. The unfortunate circumstance is that German purposes, as fore- shadowed by Hitler in his book, do constitute a threat to European peace, and the manner in which these pur- poses are pursued must be a constant threat to continental tranquillity. So we are likely to see recurring crises, each possibly a little more acute than the preceding and., between times, conversations like those of Simon in Berlin, Laval in Rome, Flandin in London. None of these conversations, however, can conceivably produce any decisive result because the various European countries have made up their minds to fight rather than to abandon their present territories, or, by contrast, remain within their ex- isting limits. But they must increase Germany’s isolation. As I wrote two years ago, when Hitler came to power Europe passed from a post-war to a pre-war period. ‘What has happened since then has been completely in harmony with pre-war circumstances and unintelli- gible only to those who still cling to the notion that Kellogg pacts, Stim- son doctrines and disarmament con- ferences have any surviving impor- tance in a world which has lately witnessed the Japanese action in Manchuria, the Italian adventure in Ethiopia and the German putsch in Austria. Today no nation wants war in any immediate future. But since they do not, war statesmen must avoid crises which might precipitate con- flict and conferences which infallibly produce crises. The far-famed tech- nique of Geneva has been discarded because everyone now perceives that meetings at the League between the statesmen of countries whose policies are irreconcilable and whose spirit is uncompromising can only lead to ex- acerbation. In one word, Geneva has become the sounding board of the dis- cord of mankind, and conferences the public barometer of international dis- agreement. Conversations Private. So now Laval goes to Rome to see Mussolini, Flandin visits London to talk with MacDonald and Simon is scheduled to go to Berlin for a con- versation with Hitler. The conversa- tions in every instance take place in private, there js no “pitiless publicity” and there is, consequently, no later furious dispute. If the statesmen who talk together cannot agree upon anything else they can sign a com- munique which is open to every form of interpretation because it is gener- ally designed to say nothing, which is the expression of the spirit of old- fashioned diplomacy, whose watch- word was “Say nothing,” as con- trasted with the new, whose slogan is everything. When one comes to consider what Hitler and Simon could actually agree upon, the problem is a little difficult. Both are engaged in a form of “gshadow-boxing” which has little or {Continued oo Tendh Page.), (Continued on Tenth Page) | the French political world. Autos—Avi Cross-Word ation - Puzzle CAN FLANDIN SAVE FRAN Solution to Int BY PERTINAX. | INCE the resignation of Dou- | mergue last November, P. E. Flandin, president of the Council, and Plerre Laval, minister of foreign affairs, have been the dominant figures of Their | personal action and influence—mainly devoted, in the case of the former, to | financial and economic matters; in the case of the latter, to foreign | policy—summarize the activity of the whole cabinet. ‘The time has come to ascertain whether they are worthy of their trust, whether they will be able to succeed where Doumergue | conspicuously failed. That is, will they be able to straighten out me{ parliamentary institutions of France | and put them in harmony with the | exacting requirements of the present | period: An authoritative leadership | in home affairs and energetic prep- aration, both diplomatic and mili- AND LAVAL CE IN CRISIS? !Commentator Wonders ifiThey Offer ernational and Domestic Difficulties. under arrest on the day of general mo- bilization—an experience from which he was probably saved by Malvy. In the same manner as Flandin's ancestors, Laval has now developed an extremely conservative tendency. He is really a pillar of society and his charming daughter is a favorite in some exclusive sets of young people. 1t is really refreshing to record how easily the boldest adepts of revolution spend the second part of their lives in making the present social organi- zation profit by the political credit they managed to create for them- selves, in the first part. through the propagation of subversive ideas. The gods never gave Laval the gift of eloguence; shrewdness led him along. Do not believe that having been turned toward moderation he has parted with his former friends: he has remained on good terms with them, especially if they happem to be journalists. He can be a generous benefactor. Such is the team which now man- tary, against external danger. So far, it is still doubtful whether Flandin and Laval will remain long in power., Doumergue tried to im- pose his will, from above, on all con- tending parties and factions. The sanguinary scenes of February 6. 1934, had left a marked impression upon the average Frenchman; they had produced a feeling of awe which | had reduced the Radical-Socialist | and Socialist majority in Parliament | to passive acquiescence in the deci-| sions of a government of national union, born of the impatience of public opinion at the sight of the misdeeds of so many politicians. Doumergue might have succeeded in carrying out his scheme of con- ward in the early Summer rather than in the late Autumn. His error was that he did not realize that this submissive attitude would not last forever and that as the Stavisky and Prince scandals receded into the past, the profiteers of the old regime would again raise their heads. When he finally made up his mind to extend and consolidate by executive ordi- nances whatever reforms he had been able to enforce, and to introduce a constitutional reform intended to strengthen the executive authority at the expense of the legislative, it was too late. The opportunity had slipped away: the spell was broken. There- fore Flandin and Laval, who as mem- bers of Doumergue’s cabinet had fa- vored opportunist rather than dic- tatorial methods, were forced, when they shared his succession, to fall back upon the use of expedients. Attitude Traced. Flandin belongs to what is some- times called the “republican nobility.” ‘That descriptive term can be applied to men whose forefathers during the last three-quarters of a century have fulfilled important public functions or have shone at the bar. Toward the end of the second empire, in the late '60s, those forefathers were very radical in their views. In their judgment, the long expected advent of the republican regime was bound past, not only in regard to the mode | of political life, but also in the form of society. They were political and social reformers and outspoken “anti- clericals.” But little by littie, as they gathered wealth and were burdened with hon- ors, the outlook of these men changed appreciably. They became extremely conservative. P. E. Flandin's father stitutional reform had he put it for- | to mean a drastic rupture with the | ages national affairs. So far it has evinced a great deal of hesitation. On the one hand. Flandin has scrapped Doumergue'’s constitutional reform to the delight of the advanced parties which did not relish the prospect of having to live under the threat of parliamentary dissolution. He means to do whatever he can to disarm the “leagues” which forced the ‘“cartel- list” regime to surrender in February. 1934, On the other hand, he attended the mass of commemoration cele- brated at Notre Dame on February 6 to the intense irritation of the old school. In the financial and economic field he has balanced the budget (on paper), but has not been able to check the falling off of tax receipts. Out of that failure—which can be ascribed only to causes over which he has no control—the dreaded deficit of the budget is bound to appear | again. Public finances cannot be re- habilitated for good until economic life has been revived—in other words, | unti] the costs of production have been brought beneath the level of selling prices. Attacks Interest. The most effective manner to achieve that end would be to de- | valuate the currency; but since that operation in France would be fraught with political and social repercussions | of tremendous extent, Fiandin can | hardly do otherwise than attempt & | direct compression of costs by reduc- | ing their least rigid element—for | instance, the rate of interest. For | that purpose he has resolved that | the state shall no longer borrow on the long term market, but shall fill | up the deficit (about 14,000.000,000 francs this year) by issuing treasury | bonds that the Bank of France, con- | trary to orthodox practice, would be | authorized to rediscount. So far no- | body can tell whether such an ar- | rangement will do anything but enable the state to get easily in debt. It is | said by many that Flandin is follow- |ing the example set by President | Hoover with his Reconstruction Fi- nance Corp. | Simultaneously, an effort has been | made to let the wheat and wine | markets find their natural level of | prices, the estimated surplus in poth | cases being withdrawn from the mar- | ket at the government's expense in order to eliminate the influence of | overproduction. It is too soon to pass | judgment; but agricultural prices seem | to have sunk a little deeper—although | they are still twice as high as world was procurator general (director of | prices—and therefore general discon- public prosecutions) in Algiers and, late in life, became a Senator. When Clemenceau sent Malvy, the Radical- Socialist minister of the interior, to trial before the Senate sitting in its capacity of High Court of Justice, un- der a charge of neglect of duty amounting to treason, he had to rely upon this astute lawyer to rescue the governmental case, which had not been too well conducted. Later, as a reward, Clemenceau appointed him to the much coveted post of “general res- ident” in Tunis. Such are the political surroundings in which the present head of the French ministry was brought up. He is ambitious. He wants to sustain the family tradition of success in public life. He is personally courageous. A few years ago he silenced the Social- ists, who accused him of having placed his political influence at the service of Doctrine Uncertain. But as far as his political doctrine is concerned, he seems to be rather uncertain. He makes a striking dis- play of economic liberalism. He seems to be an Anglophile. But what does economic liberalism mean at a time when the state is willy-nilly com- pelled-to interfere with private busi- ness at nearly every turn? What prac- tical purpose can be served by a pro- British bias when the relations be- tween France and England are neces- sarily determined by the willingness or unwillingness of the London cabi- net to assume continental commit- ments? Behind Flandin's great oratory it is hard to discover any settled program beyond a good deal of deft maneuver- ing. Himself a moderate, unlike his friends of the center, Tardieu and Paul Reynaud, he has always been careful to spare the feelings of the Radical-Socialist leaders and to pose 8s a man who could conciliate the Left and the Right. In contrast with that “grand bour- geoise,” Pierre Laval was born in & peasant family far away from Paris, in Auvergne. He laboriously made his way to the bar while earning a liveli- hood as & school teacher of the second grade, attending to the discipline of the boys. Thus he happened to serve under Herriot in the “lycee” of Lyons; but as the great Radical-Socialist leader was a brilliant professor of “rhetorics,” Laval did no more than escort the pupils to the class room and watch them in the dormitories. Today Laval is supposed to be a rich man. Not that he ever achieved strik- ing success as a lawyer, but he ap- pears to have been very much in de- promoter of private interests behind the scenes. He married the sister of & Socialist Deputy of his native province and was elected to Parliament on the eve of the World War. In that first encounter with politics, Laval's socialism ly bordered on dangerous! Communism; he had been put, with another mem! f Parliament, on the list of those who had better be placed the Aeropostal Co., by making use of | the time-honored tactics of retaliation. | mand as & kind of conciliator and | tent in the rural districts is on the increase. On the surface, at any rate, we are passing through the stages of Hoover’s administration in | America. | As to Laval, so far he has fared | more fortunately. On his arrival at | the Quai d’Orsay, when he took stock of the international situation he | seemed to be the gloomiest man on | earth. He behaved as the peasant who is about to buy a bit of land and | carefully emphasizes all its disad- vantages. Of course, fundamentals | have not been altered during the last | three months. But the problem of | the Saar has been solved (by the | way, French prestige materially suf- | fered in the plebiscite); the conflict between the Little Entente and Hun- gary about the responsibility incurred by the latter in preparation for the Marseille murder has been lessened; Franco-Italian relations have been improved and there is even a pros- pect of Prance and England joining | hands against the German menace. Fate Shapes Policy. From the point of view of French interests, the really auspicious change is that France has never been nearer to her goal—the formation of a group of powers strong enough to save the peace treaties. But curiously enough, most of these developments have been forced upon Laval by cir- cumstances, with the exception of the Jjourney to Italy it cannot be said that he really intended to do what he has done. A move by the British government (as regards the dispatch of international troops to the Saar); & virtual ultimatum of the Little En- tente; the threatening exhortations of Russia; the belated realization of the German peril by the British cabinet, as distinct from the British people— these things have contributed power- fully to shaping French policy as it stands today. Laval's personal de- sign was to seek an interview with Hitler and wrest some kind of settle- ment from him. However, he has had to move in the opposite direction. On the whole, the Flandin-Laval cabinet has proved more competent than the Radical-Socialist ministries of the 1932-34 era. But something more is required to deal adequately with the economic and international difficulties and with France's internal crisis. A strong leadership must be found somewhere; this bids fair to become a psychological necessity. Ex- isting parties and factions do not supply it. Where are we going to find it? Such is the anxious question that will be put, time after time, in the forthcoming elections; municipal elec- tions next month, senatorial elections in the Autumn, legislative elections next Spring. It is not so easy, after all, to find rulers of the strong type. High Prices and Dole. From the Austin (Tex.) American. High prices, fixed by law, solve half of the proble: All you need then is & dole for who can't buy.