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Editorial Page Spec ial Articles NAZIS PACT WITH TOKIO SPURS U. S.-SOVIET ACCORD Conversationis on Russian Debt Likely To Be Resumed—P: sychological Effect On Dictators Given as Reason. BY CONSTANTINE BROWN. N IMMEDIATE settlement of A between the Soviet Republics and the United States is sug- the only effective counter stroke to the German-Japanese agreement. duced more than a platonic interest in Washington Government quarters. stir close to panic. | The understanding between Ger- Kbflc by the Berlin foreign office, is | rely an eyewash. The real agree- | agreements can be kept these days and ‘ clauses the following two important | points. ernments pledge themselves, in the event that either of the high con- & conflict with a nation which is not eontiguous to both countries, to give | to the other. 2. Both high contracting parties of the changes they contemplate making in the existing international have signed with other nations in the past. graphs, the agreement provides in ! detail the action which both coun- | a3 soon as they find it convenient to attack the latter country. The first point is naturally of capi- | tal importance not only to France | States as well. It means that in the | event Germany is at war with a Great Britain, Japan will provide Germany with raw materials and also doubtedly through her army, navy and air force—in behalf of the Reich. tangled in & war in the Pacific with either Great Britain or the United to exercise a similar pressure, The second point of the agreement existing treaties—the Versailles treaty, | the nine-power pact and the agree- | two military powers hold in common : the view that they signed these when they were not in a position to :-refuse their signatures. ~Now, how- altogether. Heretofore the Germans have done it brutally by a mere execu- anese have trampled the treaties un- der foot more gracefully. They ex- other powers that what Japan has been doing on the Chinese mainland other interested nations. Now this | pretense will disappear and Japan unchallenged control over China in | the Hitler manner. wardly calm, the Moscow government is considering a move to offset at Japanese-German agreement. The recognition of the Soviet government 1933, created at that time a feeling in Europe and Asia that the two coun- people with a tremendous economic and military power, would stand by i peace. Repercussions in Japan. gesture by President Roosevelt were strongest in Japan. It had come unex- the Tokio government. Ambassador Debuchi, who had failed to inform his renewal of American-Soviet relations, was dismissed from his Washington attitude toward the United States, and the plans of the Japanese staff The effect of the recognition of the Boviet wore off gradually when it be- agreement regarding the settlement of the debts. Furthermore, the discus- with the Soviets was deadlocked, and Japan once more changed its atti- United States. But time had been gained. The Soviet government was defenses in Siberia during the honey- moon period with this country. fesumption of cordial political and economic relations between the two tlement of the debt question broke down because of a difference of about $45,000,000 between the amount asked by the United States and the sum offered by the Soviets. The Moscow government did not want to budge from its position because of the “prin- ciples involved” and because of the consequences on the other creditor nations had it yielded to the Ameri- can demands. The adamant position adopted by ‘Washington and Moscow regarding the number of years over which commer- cial credits were to be extended pre- vented an economic agreement between the two countries. The sequel of the squabble which followed the resumption of diplomatic relations between the U. S. S. R. and | the United States was that the John- son act was applied against Russia, placing that country in the category of defaulting nations. Behind these comparatively unim- portant disagreements was the idea of certain of President Roosevelt's advisers, that he had been somewhat | hasty in his recognition of the Soviets. They pointed out, in addition, that despite the pledges signed by Foreign EDITORIAL SECTION he Sy Stad WASHINGTON, D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 6, 1936. Affairs Commissar Maxim Litvinoff, the third international was as active as ever in spreading propaganda in the United States. Recent Relations. Since 1934 the relations between the two governments have been merely polite. Acrimonious notes were ex- changed between Moscow and Wash- ington, with the result that the Amer- ican diplomatic and consular mis- sions in Russia were reduced to a bare minimum. It indeed looked as if Mr. Roosevelt had made s mistake. The German and the Japanese gov- ernments took full advantage of this impasse—an advantage which ended in the.Japanese-German pact of No- vember, 1936. The Soviet government realizes now that it made a mistake by sticking to “principles” regarding the settlement of the debt. It realizes also that under the present circumstances it is a mat- ter of little consequence whether three, or five, or seven years are granted to pay off the purchases it contemplates making in the United States. The paramount question is to gain the good will of this country. The diplomats in Moscow and in ‘Washington begin to see that if the two countries can get together, a re- sumption of cordial relations might make a strong impression on the authoritarian states. The answer to the Japanese-German pact, they think, is an economic agreement between the Soviets and the United States. Not that an agreement of this sort would materially change the balance of trade between America and Russia. But the other countries which are thinking in political rather than in business terms will inevitably see in the settlement of the outstanding dif- ferences between these two powers an indication that—under certain circum- stances—some other agreements might be reached. They will see a parallelism of political interests regarding the Pa- cific—even if the Government of the United States does not see such a parallelism. There is no doubt that even if Ger- many and Japan will not take seriously a Russian-American commercial agree- ment, the other governments will ex- ploit it as an indication that the two powers have decided to stand by each other in case of an aggression. Plans of Roosevelt. ‘There are signs that this thought exists in the mind of President Roose- velt, who now is in South America forging a realistic accord between the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Roosevelt intends to devote much time during the next few months to the promotion of world peace. His ideas repeatedly have been outlined in this column. But it will take time—and time is precious now—before the planned limitation of arms and economic dis- armament conference can be con- vened. Even if it meets early next year, inevitable arguments and dis- cussions will occur to delay it. And, in the meanwhile, the clocklike plans of the authoritarian states will be progressing. It is not improbable that while the diplomats and their naval, military and economic experts are debating around the conference table, the armies of Germany and Japan will march into Russia. It is for this reason that the Moscow and Washington governments are seriously contemplating, at the pres- ent moment, the resumption of conver- sations for the settlement of the Russian debt, and of the other out- standing questions. The psychological effect on the other nations will be worth the millions which stand in the way of an agreement between the two countries. the outstanding differences gested by Washington diplomats as ‘The announcement of that pact pro- And among the Soviets it caused a ny and Japan, as given to the | ment is kept as confidential as such | contains besides the usual military | 1. The Japanese and German gov- tracting powers becomes engaged in full economic and diplomatic support will keep each other fully informed treaties and agreements which they In addition to these two para-| tries will take in regard to the Soviets Effect of Agreement. and Great Britain, but to the United European power such as France or will exercise diplomatic pressure—un- Conversely, should Japan become en- States, Germany will do her utmost refers to further violations of the | ment on the open door in China. The treaties and agreements at a time ever, they contemplate junking them tive order of Der Fuehrer. The Jap- plained and tried to convihice the was really for the benefit of the will continue her policy to obtain an And while Washington remains out- least the psychological effect of the by the United States in November, tries, representing over 300,000,000 each other for the preservation of ‘The repercussions of that diplomatic pectedly, and upset all calculations of government about the possibility of a post. Tokio adopted a less aggressive Tegarding Siberia had to be modified. came evident that there could be no sions regarding a commercial treaty tude toward the Soviets and the able to strengthen considerably its ‘The differences which prevented a eountries are unimportant. The set- Difficulties Are Besetting (Copyrisnt, Italy 19386,) In Circulating Lira in Ethiopia 'ADDIS ABABA (P).—Italy is hav- ing difficulties in imposing its money, the lira, in Ethiopis. Superstitions and ' prejudices of many centuries in & land where bars of salt, sugar loaves snd cartridges Ethiopia can adjust itself to a smooth monetary system. The Italians have succeeded in & hewever, the thaler is the only coin accepted. A decree had to be passed recently suspending a previous decree that ruled out all thalers and per- mitting the Bank of Italy at Addis Ababa to sell thalers at the same rate in liras at which it bought them. ° coverage in silver. money was nickel. ‘The paper thalers were accepted ex- clusively by Buropeans and a few Ethiopian chieftains and notables live ing in Addis Absba. The main popu- lation did not even know of their ex- istence. Not having any provincial banks and being unable to conserve paper money in primitive huts, the natives wanted only the shining, thalers, which would “keep” if hidden away in the ground or tied up in their shamas, and whose weight gave a reassuring feeling of wealth. ‘The divisional BY JAMES T. SHOTWELL, Protessor of History at Columbia University. HE log jam that has been blocking the movement of in- ternational trade through- out the depression years is at | last breaking up. There have been | signs of it loosening for some time past, but the pry that first worked |it free was the joint action of the three great democratic nations, the | United States, Great Britain and | France, to hold their moneys steady when France readjusted the franc to the level of world prices. That co- | operative act of constructive states- | manship was long overdue—so long, | indeed, that when at last it came, the world was taken by surprise at the apparent ease with which it was | carried through. Not only France, but the other | gold standard as the very symbol of stability passed over to the regime of regulated currencies without any of the social upheavals that had been prophesied. And then the barriers to trade began to fall. Tariffs were slashed. The way seemingly was open- ing up for a vast new movement of trade, bringing world recovery at last. But these high hopes of the open- | ing weeks of October were not des- | tined to be realized. There were still | obstacles ahead; some of them were | mere snags beneath the surface which the current of trade could sweep | aside, but others bared jagged fronts of the politics of power or prestige. With all of these the new era which dates from 1936 will have to reckon. Just what are they, and how can they be dealt with? Outbreak of “Politics.” First of all, there was espe- cially virulent outbreak of “politics” in the two democracies of the United States and France, weakening and even partially paralyzing economic action for the time being. Presi- dential elections cost this country much more than even the $10,000,000 80 lavishly and wastefully spent by the political parties. Big business holds back until an election is over, especially if its sympathies are not with the administration. This is but natural, for it has to calculate against | an uncertain future. But once the nation has spoken, business must act or else close shop. Being American, it has in this instance | turned at once to action; it has raised | wages, thus increasing purchasing | power at home, and moved out into the world market. Thus the election itself was the second great leverage in freeing business from the depression. In France things went differently. The government of M. Leon Blum, which devalued the franc, unlike that of Mr. Roosevelt, who had his N. R. A. behind him, plunged at the same time into a series of major economic re- forms. The Bank of France and the great munitions industries were taken out of the hands of that small but powerful group which had long mo- nopolized these centers of political and economic power. On the other hand, labor engaged in a minor—happily bloodless—war of strikes. Exasperated sympathizers of both sides of the civil war in Spain threatened to involve Prance in a European class and na- tional struggle. Over these confused issues presided a government made up of a coalition that reached all the way from the Communist Left to good bourgeois Re- publicans. It would have been hard enough to hold these discordant ele- ments together at any time; it could only be done now by persisting in a policy of reform which, in the eyes of conservatives, was upsetting the very basis of society. ‘The fact that Prime Minister Blum is a Jew adds to the nationalist hatred of him and all his works; although fair-minded critics admit that he is not only a man of unshaken integrity but also of cool and sober judgment. His enemles have done their best to undermine confidence in the franc. It is not the first time that factions have | countries that had maintained the | never compete with Texas or Brazil. Italy must now face the costs of a barren conquest before it can function normally in peace-time economics. It cannot materially help recovery, either of Europe or of itself, unless it can induce other nations to “loan” it the money with which to cover its losses. On the other hand, even if it went bankrupt—as other nations have done with less cause—the effect would be little more than a belated sanction. There would be some dis- turbance outside Italy, but not enough to stop the current of world recovery. With Germany the case is wholly different. There is every reason—but one—for it to join in with the West- ern powers in policies of freer trade and economic recovery. That one reason is not economic; it is political. Germany needs credits to get under way, and under ordinary circum- stances there would be every reason for those credits to be advanced by the other trading nations. But at present they would be used for the one greatest industry of Germany— that of munitions; and it cannot be expected that Germany’s neighbors will supply the capital to help it to secure arms for possible use against them. The result has been to make Ger- many go back to primitive methods of barter, arranging all its trading with one supreme aim—to get raw mate- rials for munitions. Not having money enough to buy the things it lacks for its new armaments, it arranges its exports so as to bring back a bal- ance of copper, rubber, cotton or the other materials it needs for its vast program of mechanized warfare. The result is a complete dislocation of Ger- man foreign trade. Just at the moment when by a gi- gantic national effort it has readjusted its internal economy and brought it to the point of greatly increased produc- tive capacity, Germany has adopted ‘s foreign policy which is almost liter- ally the same as that which European nations labored under more than two hundred years ago. For it is based on the “balance of trade” idea, accord- ing to which nations used to try to |in a balance of gold or treasure. If, | Insert the phrase “raw materials,” we | see how German foreign trade is | planned at present. The fallacy of the earlier system was long since made clear, but it was much better business than this adaptation, for gold has a universal application, while those raw materials which Germany is most anxious to import as her trade bal- ance have only one chief use. Germany Chooses Security. It must be said that the guiding principle in all this is not peace-econ- omy at all; it is war-economy. The Germans have no illusions on this matter. For the present, at least, Ger- many frankly faces the choice be- tween prosperity and what it regards as security—and chooses security. ‘When the problem is stated in these terms, there appears no reason for any other nation to find fault with Ger- many’s choice, for all of them have done the same. National security is BUFFER STATES LEAGUE SOUGHT TO CURB REICH Czechoslovakia and Rumania, Fearing Invasion, Seek Poland’s Aid in Guarding Resources. BY ANTHONY LANE. RAGUE.—Formation of a sort of League of Buffer States, running from the Baltic to the Black Sea, is now being at- tempted, in view of the increasing menace of war between Germany and Russia. In a long confidential talk with a Little Entente statesman who has played a leading role in European affairs ever since the war, it was disclosed that Germany has definite intention, in case of hostilities with Russia, to march through Czechoslo- | vakia and Rumania. The advantage of this route, from Germany's point of view. is that it goes through a country rich in both wheat and oil. At one stroke Ger- many would obtain food for the army and fuel for motors and airplanes. Moreover, the route leads directly into the rich Ukraine. Germany’s hope is that Poland will remain neutral. Italy has already succeeded in detaching Yugoslavia from the Little Entente, leaving | Czechoslovakia and Rumania isolated. For that reason the Czech and Rumanian governments are now striving to persuade Poland to make common cause with them, pointing out to the Poles that, if they allow Czechoslovakia and Rumania to be overrun, it is only a question of time until Poland will be swallowed in her turn. | On the other hand. if Poland will join the proposed pact, it will make a continuous barrier running from Dan- zig to the Black Sea. It is doubtful whether Germany, if convinced that Poland would make common cause with the other two buffer states, would dare risk the enterprise. Haste is felt to be necessary in form- ing this defensive bloc. Information here is that Germany, while not yet fully ready for war, will certainly have completed her war preparations by next Summer, and that, if European diplomacy does not succeed in or- | ganizing the necessary barriers before that time, there is better than an even chance that Germany will decide to open hostilities. How seriously this menace is being taken is evident from the recent speech of the British foreign minister, Capt. Anthony Eden. It is the first time in modern history that England has taken a public commitment to go to war in definite circumstances. But England will take such action only if France or Belgium is attacked. Germany may seek to maneuver in such a way that France will remain neutral. Instead of, as in 1914, work- ing on the plan of first annihilating France and then turning against Rus- sia, Germany, in view of Eden's threat, would probably seek by diplomacy to limit the war to the eastern front. (Copyright, 1936,) Restoration of Otto to Throne of Hungary Is Believed Unlikely ARIS—“Dat ole debbil” of Hapsburg restoration has been jumping up again lately. This time it has taken a new form— namely, the restoration of Otto to the throne of Hungary instead of Austria. It is well known that Germany is opposed to restoring the Hapsburgs to the Austrian throne, because it would mean first of all that the famous anschluss would then be an impossi- i g i g aEE ] i rhy di Ey SE; 22 i E £ : i : l i | I i retire in favor of the legitimate heir. It has been said often that Haps- burg restoration would mean war with the Little Entente. That is correct, if the restoration took place in Vienna. But in Budapest it is quite a different story. Restoration in Budapest will not mean war with the Little Entente. But it will mean something extremely serious for Italy. It will mean that the anschluss—the annexation of Aus- tria to Germany—will became a fact overnight. The fact is that the Little Entente | does not care a rap about Hapsburg restoration in Budapest. The only friend Hungary has in Burope is Italy, and Italy is not taken very seriously as a factor in a possible effort to re- build the former Hapsburg empire. ‘What is important is that, if Otto should get the Hungarian throne, Germany would immediately swallow Austria, and Austria would not find & friend in Europe to defend her. And the annexation of Austria would place Germany on Italy’s frontier, a thing that Mussolini would not iike at all. ‘That is why it is not believed that arrange their commerce 5o as to bring | |in place of “gold or treasure,” we | Trade Boom Is Blocked Jam Is Breaking Up, But There Are Still Barriers to Be Surmounted Here and Abroad. the fundamental basis of & nation’s existence. But there are two ways of assuring it; by armaments and by the development of substitutes for war. Now, the German dilemma is largely due to the fact that it is immensely competent in the former fleld, in which it has had long experience, a proud history and an unrivalled plant; while the substitutes jor force in international affairs with which it has experimented —the League of Nations, the Disarmament Conference, the World Court, arbitration, con- ference and all the post-war crea- tions of international agreement— have left it dissatisfied and aggrieved. The long and ghastly shadow of the World War still lay over the confer- ence hall; distrust persisted, and where there is distrust there can be no true settlement. Therefore Germany came to the conclusion that its case would be listened to and rights would be respected only when it could strike the table with a mailed fist. Hence the Third Reich and the re- birth of German militarism. But hence, as well, the old vicious circle of pre-war days, with not only Britain and France frantically racing against the German lead, but smaller nations as well. Hence, also Chinese walls to trade so that each nation shall learn how to live by itself, in a state of economic siege in time of peace. This is the real obstacle to recovery. Not the actual danger of war, but the tremendous dislocation in both finance and industry; above all, the ment of Germany. New Seif-Denials Demanded. The measure of Germany's effort to meet the difficult situation in which she finds hersel{—difficulties partly of her own making, but nevertheless real enough—has been brought home to Germans in that great proclama- tion which Hitler issued at Nurem- berg on September 9 last. This was one of the most eloquent appeals ever addressed to any nation. In spite of the long list of achievements which it recites, there must be a new four- year plan, with new self-denials and continued national isolation. Why? There is but one answer to this, from Hitler to the street-cleaner: Germany | must be prepared against the dangers | of “bolshevism.” For that it must {mlke every sacrifice. | Now what is the real meaning of this? Outside of Germany it is re- garded as a smoks screen to hide other ‘lmbmom. How would Stalin’s legions |feach Germany? The frontier of | Russia is far east of Prussia. More- over, the whole drift of Stalin’s policy has been against foreign adventure. ‘The object lesson most frequently cited in Germany is the civil war in Spain, for which Moscow is blamed. I was in Spain a few weeks before the rebellion and have seen enough of things there to deny this theory of history, widely held in America as well. The government of Azana was not Communist, although it included some on the Left Wing; and in the chief reform it was putting through— the division of the great estates among the peasants—it was about a cen- | tury and a half behind most of the | rest of Western Europe. In one small German state, Mechlenburg, where the old system had lasted on, it was Hitler's government itself that carried through the reform. After Spain’s military leaders re- volted, the liberals in Azana’s govern- ment had to make way for radicals ‘who are more given to action than the milder men previously in power. But Moscow came fully into the scene only after it had become desperate. History Too Complicated. All of this history was too compli- cated for most people, however, and Hitler's warning against Soviet inter- ference in Western Europe was effec- tive because it bore some resemblance to the final state of affairs. The fact that the Nazis were helping Franco was not in the headlines. The conclusion is that Germany needs an army second to none just about as much as we or Great Britain need a fleet second to none—for bar- gaining purposes in diplomacy. It is a dangerous method, but so long as foreign offices play poker with guns beside their chips, they can’t blame Germany for wanting to join in. To carry out her program, Germany needs certain raw materisls, such as copper, cotton, nickel, oil, rubber and & few other such staples of industry. It apparently has a strange delusion that these can be procured if it can get back its colonfes. But Germany’s trade with her colonies before the war, after years of development, was less than 1 per_cent of her whole foreign trade. It is clear that, economically speaking, the return of the colonies would mean little. As for supplies of raw materials—they come from where the raw materials exist, and that is chiefly outside colonial territories. ‘The real reason for Germany's de- mand for colonies is prestige. As & great power, she feels the need of & place in the sun. She is denied it by those who seem to be.basking in the sun overmuch. But what if all stopped on their separate “possessions” and made the open door & .reality? That is the solution nto‘.vhlt.h liberal isolation and economics maladjust- | m PROGRESSIVES OF WEST ARE KEY TO G. O. P. HOPES Support of Liberals Beyond Alleghenies Held Necessary for Survival of Republican Party. BY MARK SULLIVAN. TAGNOSIS of the disease of the Republican party is eas- der than prescription of rem- edy. Still, “diagnosis” is the proper word. It is not a case of post- mortem. is life in the Re- publican party and sixteen million voters are not going fo remain with- out a political organization to express them. Yet it is no easy thing to say, at this time, what the Republican party needs to do. The prescription for cure has yet to appear. Practically all the doctors agree on one point, that the West and Mid- west is the location of the party’s most serious paralysis and the place where it must again get its feet if it is to be a winning party. As Re- publican Representative Hamilton Fish of New York puts it, “It is the height of political folly to any longer believe that the Republican party can survive without the support of the Western liberals” Certainly that must be accepted as true. Unless something wholly new is ahead of us, unless the Republican party is to become something so dif- ferent that it cannot now be envis- aged, unless the future political line- up in America follows geographical or unless there is a political line-up in which the divisions are not geo- graphical at all but are group or class cleavages—unless one of these things happens the Republican party must accept Congressman Fish's pre- scription for cure and look to getting back the West. Republicans and the West. How much the West has meant to the Republican party in the past and how serious the West's present defection can be shown by a few facts. Take all the presidential elections since that of 1896—that year is an appropriate dividing point because that is the year in which Bryan was the Democratic candidate running on a currency issue, and on that issue at that time several Western States went Democratic that had never done so before. Take, then, the 36 years be- tween 1896 and the first PFranklin Roosevelt year, 1932. But omit from the period the presidential election of 1912, because in that year there was & cleavage caused by the Progressive | party under Theodore Roosevelt which practically cut the Republican party {in two. We have remaining seven presidential elections in ‘which condi- tions were normal (beginning with | 1900 and ending with 1928, but omit- | ting 1912). In those seven normal presidential elections let us look at how the West voted. I give the names of the States with in each case the number of times they went Republican: 6 6 6 6 6 Nebraska No. Dakota __. 6 Colorado - Here are 20 States, beginning with Ohio and running west to California, composing the entire territory between | the Pacific Coast and the western boundary of Pennsylvania (omitting | Southern States and the three small | Southwestern States of Nevada, Ari- zona and New Mexico). In this terri- tory all but one State went Repub- lican at least five out of seven times; | eight went Republican six out of seven | times, and seven went Republican seven out of seven times. Those States, this territory, were the backbone of the Republican party. In no presidential election that the Re- publican party has ever won could it have won with all those States missing. (Indeed, rarely could it have won with any substantial number of those States missing.) Yet every one of those States went for Roosevelt in 1932, and went for him again in 1836. In many of the States the vote for him in 1936 was | party is wounded deep. For about 30 years that part of the Republican party which inhab- ited the West has been called the “Progressive Republicans.” ‘“Progres- sive Republicans” was a well recog- nized political division. It was as well recognized as “Southern Democrats.” The Republican party in the West was practically as sectional as the Southern democracy. That is, the “Progressive Republicans” were lo- cated in the West almost exclusively. (Although there were some small out- posts in the East of the type of Pinchot of Pennsylvania.) New Zealand Builds WELLINGTON, New Zealand (#).— New Zealand has bid for prosperity with its own “N. R. A.” Maximum hours, minimum wages, compulsory collective bargaining und rigid conditions of labor® have been imposed by Parliament upon all adult men and women of the islands. Such social reform measures in New Zealand are not new; the first step along that line was taken more than 44 years ago with an investigation into sweat-shop conditions. ‘The capstone of the work was con- sidered by many to be the recent de- cision of the New Zealand Arbitration Court establishing minimum wages of £3 16s for men and £1 16s for women for a 40-hour week. ‘The first industrial conciliation and arbitration act was passed January 1, wage provision set by the Arbitration Court under an amendment passed June 8, 1936. In fixing the wage the court was empowered by law to take under con- sideration “the general economic and financial conditions then affecting trade and industry in New Zealand, the cost of living u:d sny fluctuations lines utterly different from the past, | greater than in 1932. -Clearly this is | the territory in which the Republican Throughout the entire years this Western Progressive Republican sen- timent expressed itself in public life through a group of Senators who were called the Western Progressive Republican Senators. The group ranged in number, as the years went by, from about 10 to about 16. In the year in which Franklin Roose- velt first ran for the presidency the number was about 10. And—this is the point—every one of those West- ern Progressive Republican Senators has departed from the Republican party, most of them departed in 1932, more in 1936. I say ‘“every one.” There is one exception, Senator Nye of North Dakota; Senator Nye ap- pears to have supported the Repub- lican candidate, Landon, in the re- cent election; but Senator Nye's Re- publicanism is so dubious that he is hardly a real exception. All Supported Roosevelt. Johnson of California. Norris of Nebraska, Cutting of New Mexico, La Follette, jr., of Wisconsin, all sup- ported Mr. Roosevelt in 1932. To them was added Norbeck of South Dakota in 1936: and also Couzens of | Michigan—although Couzens died dur- ing the campaign he had, before his death indorsed Roosevelt. One of the Western Progressive Republican Senators, Frazier of North Dakota, | supported Lemke in the recent elec- | tion. Borah of Idaho, did not support | Roosevelt in either 1932 or 1936—but neither did he support the Republican candidate, Hoover, in 1932, nor Lan- don in 1936. l In the same list belongs, to some | slight degree, at least. even Senator | McNary of Oregon. Although Mc- Nary is the official Republican leader of the Senate, his support of Governor jLandon in the recent presidential ‘umpflzn was perfunctory. McNary | was himself a candidate for re-elec- “uon and apparently found it prudent, | knowing Western sentiment as he 1does. to make his personal campaign | without taking on the Republican | presidential candidate as what would | have been a handicap to him. It is | said that so well understood was | Senator McNary's leaning away from | the Republican party and toward the New Deal that the Democratic Na- tional Committee refrained from mak- ing any marked fight against him for Senator. | The sum of all this is that all | but one of the Senators who have | been spokesmen for Western Repub- lican Progressive sentiment, are now out of the Republican party—either all the way out of it and over into |the New Deal, like Senator Norris |of Nebraska, or half way out of it ;lnd existing in a kind of political | no-man’s land, like Senator Borah of | Idaho. In all the territory from the | Western boundary of Pennsylvania to | the Pacific Ocean, out of forty-six Senators in twenty-three states, shere are only three real Republicans. Not Individuals Whe Count. When we count the Western Pro- gressive Republican Senators and find them practically all gone from | the Republican party, it is not they as individuals who count, it is the political sentiment they reflect. Those Senators did not go away from the Republican party until after a ma- Jjority of their voters had gone. They |are astute politicians and they have the instinct for self-preservation that every man in elective political life |has. They went because the voters | had gone. It is not merely the West | as & geographical term that has gone, is the West as a prevailing state of political mind. Now here is the West, utterly gone from the Republican party. And— ironic situation—here is the present management and official leadership of the party located in the West, in the persons of Gov. Landon of Kansas, as titular head (because he was the re- cent presidential candidate) and Gov. | Landon’s Topeka townsman, John M. Hamilton, as national chairman. To say this is no derogation to these indi- viduals. No one, so far as I know, is able to name any one else whose leader= ship at this time, would promise any better. About all that can be said is that | time must pass before any one can tell | what is to be the future of the Repub- lican party. It had more than 16.000.- | 000 voters in the worst defeat it ever | suffered. That is nearly 40 per cent of the total vote of the country. In three recent elections the Democratic party has had less than that percente |age. On each of these occasions, prophets wrote obituaries of the Demo- cratic party, only to see it arise and shine. There is less occasions for requiems over the Republican party today. (Copyright, 1¥36,) Its Own“N.R.A.” Upon 44 Years of Social Reforms | opinion of the court, be sufficient to enable & man to maintain & wife and three children in a fair and reasonable standard of comfort.” Other sections of the law provide for unionization of workers, in some cases compulsory unionization, and sets up a system for the arbitration of industrial disputes. In reducing hours to 40 a week the court was asked to increase hourly or piece-work wages so the total weekly pay envelope of the employe would be Jjust as large as under the longer work week. An attempt was made to limit, so far as possible, work on Saturdays. In the long and bitter debate over the bill, one member of Parliament in defending higher wages declared: “As the volume of production ine creases so must the spending power of the people to purchase and consume goods.” One member asked: “Must the people of New Zealand go hungry for no other reason than that there is too much for them to eat?” Manufacturers contended higher wages and shorter hours would in- crease production costs so much that prices would be forced up, thereby lowering the purchasing power of the workers’ wages. Members of hflhmt‘h‘m‘ farm- ing communities pleaded that farmers ocould not meet the additional eosts.