Evening Star Newspaper, January 22, 1928, Page 81

MAGAZINE SECTION The Sunday Sta ARY ILLUSTRATED ' FEATURES WASHINGTON, -VI). (., SUNDAY MORNIN 22, 1928 BY WILLIAM HARD. HAT are we fighting in Nic- ‘ aragua? . And what are we fighting or? And what—and where—is the finish? Such are the questions that people are asking. This writer has tried to pursue the answers to them for some time, and he finds that some of these answers do not at all agree with his own prior prejudices. He here sets down the theories of the State Department, the theories of the State Department’s opponents and_the outstanding facts upon which those thoories are operated. It is necessary first to say a few words about Sandino. the Niciraguan general whom our Gen. Lejeune, commardant of the United States Marine Corps, has gone to Nicaragua to repel or to cap- ture or to exile or otherwise to dis- courage. c: ment of the United States. He has to date repres>nted two ele- is in the field with him in Nicaragua's mountainous north. The ttered thinly over much of e of Nicaraguan territory s a set of adventurous, bel- ths, predatory or patriotic Personal Ambitions and Petty Differences. Rather Than Deep-Seated Patriotic or Political Motives, Are Behind the Trouble There—Gen. Lejeune Has Gone to Exile or Otherwise Discourage Sandino and His Band. “The second is a certain small- | nority of one of the two great political parties — namely. rvative party of Nicaragua n office. It is the government s being protected from domestic ce. It is therefore very much en- Sandino. and it earnestly "nited States Marine Corps nward in its hunt after In the meantime it happens that Hon- next to Nicaragua, likewise ervative government. The rvatives of Honduras are thor- sympathetic with the Conserva- s of Nicaragua. Sandino, most un- fortunately for himself, is fighting on the very edge of the frontier between Nicaragua and Honduras. If Gen. Le- jeune pushes him into Hondurus, the Honduran Conservatives will get him— and will probably get him harder than Gen. Lejeune would get him. Honduran Conservatives are just as unable as Nicaraguan Conservatives to sec in Sandino what some lofty writers in some distant countries are able to sce in him—a great “Latin-American patriot.” It becomes also clear that in fight- | ing Sandino we are not fighting Latin America. Th> Conservatives of San- dmno's part of the worid. who want us| to fight him, are Latin Americans, too. =% % x ET us turn next to the Liberal party in Nicaragua itself. What are the principles of the Lib- eral party? Most of the greatest leaders of the Liberal party in Nicaragua live in the city of Leon. Contrariwiss. most of the leaders of the Conservative party in Nicaragua live in the city of Gra- Th: struggles between the Liberal rty and the Conservative party in Nicarzgua are largely the equivalent of struggles between Leon Granada. apd those s les between thos: two | cities involve few eontroversial than the hearty and hardy foot ball team from | Arfapolis as contrasted with the prin- . ciples of a hearty and hardy foot ball team from West Point. greatest dividing issue between the Lib- erals and Conscrvatives of his country He debated with himself for some time | and then said that the Liberals in Nicaragua tend to dis'ik~ the private srhools maintained by Catholic religious orders. wh-reas the Cons:rvatives lend 0 favor them > political slightnss of that issue mey be said to indicate truly the small- ness of the political @ifferences between the two Nicaraguan parties. The actual Gifferences between them are not fundamentally political, but funda- mentally geographical and ‘That is not a fault. But it is a fact. Nicaraguan statesman are not “anti- American” or ing o party. eral” and the word “Cons>rvative,” there is nothing in the philosophy of either party. taking it one Zay or the other, in the malter of “patriotism™ versus. “foreign intervention Nica- raguan siutesmen ar: “pro-American” of “anti-American.” according to their ?flwfll] convictions or according to heir personal needs. In fighting San- dino, who is a Liberal, we are not fighting the Liberal party in Nicaragua, and the Liberal party in Nicaragua, a5 & party. not hzh!lnf us. accented leader of the in Nicaragua is Mon- eada. He has been in Nicaraguan poli tics for a long time. He took part in the revolution nst Zelaya, prom- N He h#s been active life ever since. end facara E Atious #nd nersisten now holds—bevond doubt—the pery leadership What s his view of Bandino? Extremerly hostile He s with his Conservative antag President of Niceragua—! woping that | Gen Lejeune v { Liberal peliing vy be th Kicaraguan « candidate of the O Preside; 2 next Fall. The s e Cuadra Pasos awh up with Ban- | | He i in | candidate | or President un the | e rvative party for | Chamorro earnestly resisted this de- mand. But then his brother, Diego Manuel while still President, died and w ceeded by Vice President Mary Martinez acquired control of Nicaraguan electorate machinery. Mar- tinez was politically strongly opposed to Emiliano Chamorro. Emiliano Chamorro thereupon perfectly naturally and per- fectly wisely turned right around and. instead of opposing American supe Conservative eandi- | carnest support of rvative administra- tninks that the Con- | 1 inevitably be Conservative sdministra- the elections. Moncads therefore. ionks about for some other body of men v run thos orger that tey may be “free and faly and in order (sr he looks wt it that $he Liberal candidave-—namely, himself may have a chance i them And what body of men o he sug gest for that Gelicate task” Answer: Devil Logs. Janthernecks To Wis end he sgned not long sgo the so-called “Blumson Agreement comtemplating the holding of the next Nicaraguan presidentisl elections un- der Uniwed States Marine Corps super- vision \'MJAX'AGL‘AI\‘ slatesmen, beca of Nicersgusn politicsl congition: often rewent American supervision of Nicarsgusn elections sl one moment end tien request It st the next moment ¥or instapes Nicarsgua’s best soldler and most ex- perwnced practitioner of public afairs i anio Chamorro. He was Presi- eragus from 1937 W 1921 cuons of 1920 he Uransndtied presigency W bis biother, Diego Manue) Then e decided 14 Ty Beiicy ugain the ele In thene elections hie Menuel, eing President the Nicaraguesn electors) The Nickragusn Libersls thereupon demanded Ame vislon of Lhe elections of 19 ) for Ui prest tons of 1924 wrother. Diego would control machinery however an Super- Eanlleng elections in ! GEN, AUGUSTING ( sion of the Nicaraguan elections of 1924, euruestly and positively requested [ | Me i not w obe He was In the whisch coerced now Motcada at enviized for thi midst of circumstince bim. Bo 15 Moncada this moment s sarlly In favor of the Merines und P Bandino. IU s Uue Lhat he yave Bandino his title of genersl This Fappened when Moncadn L arms againet Disg neces Banding, a clerk i w mine, left the mine wnd joined | | Monceda's army. | cada, with Nicaraguan celerity, skipped | bim rupialy over whe grades of lieu- | wnant wnd capain Rnd ) Leolonel and elevated bim fron U genersl wt approximalely one stk That fuet, however, does 1ol convinee Moncads now that Bandiuo should by | President of Nicaragua |3t Banding should tlumph i field, and i he should enter Managus the capital of Nicaragua as & con queror, he would become President of Nicaragus by furce, ke L) | gesture” the | l ‘That would interrupt Moncada's pres- ent plans badly. Moncada hopes to bacome President of Nicaragua himself in th» cours® of free, fair, peaceful. cemocratic, constitutional elections un- der impartial Marine Corps auspices. For some people here in th: United States the Marine Corps seems to mean “n ism." For Monzada it means SANDINO, From w drawing by Luigl Luciont In wetusl practice “constitutionalism " And be thinks that he needs “con- stitutionalism,” and Jots of It A he I going Lo get by President Diaz's elec- Gon offictnls on Nicaragua's next pres- | idential election day Moncadn therefore sides with Lejeune and sides sgalnst Sandino cunnot, however, control sl of | nor all of his colleagues. | for instance, control his | Gen | He canno was FeCEnUY | ollougue Bacass, & fellow leader of his in the Libersl party, recently Vice Press ‘ Jdent of Nicwrugus—wn exile now, but | He 10Ught 50 much | epy ne of the most respected eit- | Letter than he ever clerked (hat Mon j“'m"ly he N . isenn of the NICAigyan commonwealth, | Sacuss has Issued & manifesto saying that Bandino’s sctivities, though des- | Unied o fallure, constitule o “patriotie | I defense of Nicaraguan sov- | ereignty and n opposition o interven- | Uon by the United Sates P SACAHA has changed his view of WY American intervention. He naw American intervention differently when he was Vice President of Nicaragun He becane Vice President W 1925, “OUR MARINES ARE FIGHTING SANDINO. BUT THEY ARE NOT FIGHTING LATIN AMERICA." when Solarzano became President American Marines were then dn Nica- ragua. The Solarzano-Sacasa ticket had been backed on election day by ele- ments demanding that the Marines b2 withdrawn from Nicaraguan soil. Charles Evans Hughes was then our Serretary of State. He at one time said to this writer. in full summary of our actual present-day policy toward the Central American and toward the states in the Caribbean Sea: “Threc policics are open to us. “One is outright annexation. It is obnoxfous to our temper. It i§ incon- sistent with our institutions. We have virtually totally rejected it. “The second is absolute abstention from all conc>rn whatsoever with the affairs of these countries. The result, in some cases, as w2 know from experi- snce, has been continued disorder. con- tinued lack of internal prace, continued danger of intervention by European porers. This policy has not always meant more human happiness. It has often meant less, “The third policy is the one to which we have settled down. It is the stabili- zation, where necessary and where pos- s'ble, of constitutional local self-govern- ment. -We never wish to do more than | to help to set up such a government. | if it can then be maintained without nur ass'stance, we are delighted to with- draw. We are not looking for the se- curity that might come to us from a permanent military occupation. We are | looking for what we believe will be a botter security. We are looking for the security which we are convinced will be ours when every Central American country and every Caribbean country is oMectively and happily governing itself in accordance with constitutional meth- o Mr. Hughes not only said this, but he did it. When he saw that Cuba was abl> to operate constitutional govern- meont unhelped. he took our Marines out of Cuba. When he saw that Santo Domingo was able to operate constitu- tional government unhelped, he took our Marines out of Santo Domingo. He was abundantly willing, therefore to listen readily to the Solarzano-Sacasa clements in Nicaragua that were de- | manding the withdrawal of American | Marines from that country, | He announced his intention of with- | drawing them. He was destined to re- ceive a great shock. The Bolarzano- | Sacasa administration, just as soon as it had taken office, concelved a just | fear of Emiliano Chamorro. It antici- | pated— justly—that Emiliano Chamorto | uld be able to throw it out of power | by force. It therefore immediately de- | manded —and for several months se- cured--the retention of American Ma- rines on Nicaragua’s soverelgn soil Bacasa, who now commends Sandino's resentment of the presence of American | = Marines In Nicaragua, was for several months kept in office as Vice President by their presence there It is manifest, therefore, that. even if we are now annoying Sacasa, we are not violating his principies. This will be- come cven more manifest as the story proceeds. * % % % ’I‘HE heart of the rest of the story is the ultimate conflict that emerged between Sacasa and Diaz. After Cha- morro_had overthrown Solarzano, and after Sacasa had fled from Nicaragua. | 2 7 the Nicaraguan Congress elected Diaz | to be President and we recognized him Most of the critics of the State Depart- ment in the United States say that we ought to have recognized Sacasa as th legitimate vice presidential heir to Solarzano. The question, then, is 1f we had recognized Eacasa and If he thereupon had been able to acquire and retain the presidency of Nicaragua, would our problem in Nicaragua today at all different—essentially—from what it is? The answer is would not be. Diaz, upon getting into office. de- manded protection from us against his violent domestic enemies. Sacasa would have done precisely the same thing. His record proves it, beyond doubt. that it absolutely When he fled from Nicaragua he | came to Washington He went to the State Department He and the State Department had a conversation cs<entially as follows Sacasa: “Will you recognize me as President of Nicaragua? Chamorro has forced President Solarzano out. I am the legitimate successor to Solarzano. Will you recognize me as President?” The State Department: “Certainly. Go to Managua and essume the func- tions of President. We will recognize you." Sacasa’ agua because of Chamorro. cannot go unprotected the Marines to put me into office?” The State Department: “No; we are bound by the Central American treaty of 1923 to recognize you as the constitu- tional President if you are in office. But we are not bound by the treaty—and it would be wholly contrary to sense—for us to put you into office by force. Sacasa: “But. then. will you at least send me to Nicaragua on an American warship in order to show the Nica- That is, 1 w he State Deartment: “Yes, perhaps, if you will promise to land and go on to Managua by your own exertions.” Sacasa: I can't do that because of Chamorro.” S0 the matter ended. Sacasa was not to be blamed. He, just like Chamorro and just like Moncada, was and is in | Counser “But 1 cennot go to Man. | Will_you send | regui | liked individual, but | system of government by armed revolt raguan people that I have your good | the grip of the Nicaraguan social and poiitical system. which no cne man can instantly change. R TH’Z moral for us. however, in con- nection with our present problem in Nicaragua, is perfectly clear, Instead of recognizing Sacasa. who was very properly afraid to go back to Nicaragua without an accompaniment of saldiers, we ultimately recognized Diaz, who had staved in Nicaragua and who was able to show some sort of con- stitutional claims upon the office of President by being able to get himself elected to it by a more or less constitu- tional Nicaraguan Congress. San- dino thereupon rises unconstitutionally against Diaz, and Diaz says to us: “Your poliey is the maintenance of constitutional government in Central America. Help me.” The alternative situation can be im- agined with absolute verity as follows Sreash» the Libera!, instead of Diaz, the Conservative, is President of Nicara- ally against him. say to us” He says what in effect he has already twice said to us in the past. He says: “Your policy is the maintenance of constitutional government in Central America. Help me” We can now answer the questions: “What are we fighting in Nicaragua®" and “What are we fighting for?™ In Nicaragua we are fighting not Latin American liberty and not a Nica- an political the spirit and In Nicaragua we are fighting not for the triumph of a party or of a man and not for the extension of the mili- tary power of the United States. but for the habituation of Nicaragua to constitutional processes. It has nothing in the world to do with banana companies or with mahog- of that kind. dollar of American investment in Nica- ragua our interest in the Panama Ci canal route and our guan seneral 1 party and not a dis-/ | party antmosity plus a natural misun- any companies or with anything else | If there were not one al and our interest in the Nicara- along with many followers of his who ! abandon our purpose of stabilizing con- stitutional government in Nicaragua. We must do a nasty job or else retreat lr;on; the accomplishment of a high ea This writer observes in the State De- | partment no tendency toward retreai- ing. The campaign against Sandino— and against any other similar persons who may arise to bs his successors— will go on. Th~ Nicaraguan elections | of next Fall will be supervised by our Marines. They will bs peaceful. The | country will be made peaceful. On January 1 next a constitutionally elect- ed Nicaraguan President will be peace- | fully inducted into office. By that time | the new native Nicaraguan constabu- larv will be in full existence. " Will the new Nicaraguan President |and the new Nicaraguan constabulary ! be able to govern Nicaragua peacefully | without us? We hope so. We fervently hope so. One thing is sure—absolutely sure: | _They will be given the chance. 1If they use it successfully and if they cause their own constitution, which they themselves have written, to op- erate in practice in accordance with its own provisicns of internal peace, Nica- ragua will never see our Marines again Hunting the Mammoth. MORE than once a complete mam- | moth—skeleton, flesh, and even hair—has been found in the perpet- ually frozen ground of northern Siberia not far from the ice-bound coast of th Arctic Ocean. Without doubt there are many more mammoths there still, t- be discovered in future years. in the oldest and greatest of cold-storage plants. One was discovered in 1921 and the flesh was still quite fresh a greedily devoured by the dogs of th. | explorers. |~ Mammoth formed a steady article ot diet among the early races which in- | habited France and Spain the warmer | intervals of the great Ice Age, when | Scandinavia, northern Germany and | the British Isles were covered with a | deep blanket of snow and ice exactl: like that which covers Greenland the present day. In those days, per- | haps thousands and thousands of years ago, the climate of southern Prance and northern Spain was probably much hik< | that of Labrador today. which is on about the same paral of latitude | This climate was exactly suited to the woolly rhinoceros, the hairy elephant which we call a mammoth. and the huge herds of bi imilar to | the American bisons or buffaloes whic! i'“"" the plains of Prance as they | ranged the Western prairies two or three generations ago. | At that time the caverns along the | river valleys were inhabited by a hardy interest in peaceful conditions through- | race of hunters. who were at about the out the Central American and Carib- | same stage of culture as the more back- bean region would still oblige us either | ward of the American aborigines when to conquer and administer Nicaragua Columbus landed. Like them. they ourselves or eise to aid the Nicaraguans | lived entirely by hunting and. badly to learn how to operate constitutional armed though they were, managed to government through presidents and con- | hunt and kill the cave-bear, who has gresses of their own choosing. | left the marks of his claws on the The former course would be indubl- | walls of so many of the caverns; the tably “imperialistic.” The latter course, | rhinoceros, and last, but not least. the it is contended by the State Depart- mammoth. were armed with ment, is obviously an effort to reach, wooden spears. lol:lndhm:es of hard- ich is the very opposite of wood sharpened charred. witn gt wr:n-" o stone clubs and flint arrows. And with ss2 s these, : hunted down their big game. 3 WHAT‘MIu\emtuwme spears they threw in the manner of third question which was posed javelins, as the Tasmanians did their at the opening of this article? “What | wooden spears when first discovered. —and where—is the finish of our | The s could kill 8 kangaroo present Nicaragu: ? ,g“um'lmmae'm’w- It is clouded just now by new uncer- tainties. m,mamuunx. They most likely ran down their party, Moncads, besides being unable | fleet-footed gquarry—the wild horses, to control Sacasa, cannot, as has been | the bisons. the reindeer—by relay hunt- noted, -control all of his rank and file | iDg. as some of the Indians did. per- ps originally taking the idea from wolf-packs. But something differ- been necessary with the Jority. whose hide was twice as that territory can see only Conservative, is president | American Marines are figh! side of Diaz against Sandino, w! | himself a Liberal. They thereupom, | hating the Conservatives (who live in | another part of the country and whom who is a sort of paculiarly sanguinary, but also peculiarly thrillng. Rodin | caping Hood, and they provide him with nu- 3 gles of India. Then cam Tt would seem to be thoroughly fdle | Seaoming; and silly for the State Department to call all such people “bandits.” not so simple. The growth of Sandino's forces convincingly shows that behind him there is a motive higher than—or additional to—the motive of theft. That motive is Nicaraguan political like mode: and gra It was no light task to s fiint knives, but it was possidle. and then they chopped off pleces of the flesh which they carried to their caves and roasted or grilled on their fives | In proof of which the ashes of the fire and the charred bones of the mam- moth remamn to this day. Forcing With Radium. \lousfll. the famous Austrian bot- 7% anist. was among the first to ex- pertment with the growth of plants for many years and o consider the effect of radium emanations upon the resting buds of trees. He placed small tubes containing & preparation of radium aga the terminal duds of & liac bush for from one o two dayvs After a certain length of time the duds that were treated openied. whereas the e Testing state pent of M hours with & 482 milligrams of pure chloride of radium the duds opened & month later mstead of It the tollow g Spring This method of foremg had the diadvaniage of acting unevenly upon the dud so that oue Dart was | mare affected than the others. Inuead | of placing the tude agaiist the duds. he | then tried other experiments whieh | the radiations were made to act upon the duds, and @ these tests the results were more nearly uniform Curiously enough, the effect of the emanations or of the radiam could de oblaiied only it the buds were treated i the latter part of Novembder or De- cember. Afler treatment i Septemder fof Oclober there was no result whet. ever. One the other hand. if the tree~ ment was delayed unill January o February. when the resing stage of the plant was coming t1© & closs, inere WS DO Acvelemation evident. Indecd SHNE CAses the eftect of the radium was actually to retard the developument. This would indicate that the dud may Mot be campueiely farmed W the Autumn uniil several weeks after the loaves have fallen from the tree Th produce any effect at all the treatment must Dot Be oo short, for thete s & pamt delow which the radnun | sems to have no mftuence whatever. NOor may the treatment be o pevs longed, for 1 that case the pant sevins 10 be jured. These results are stilar W those oblained I experiments made 0 fAnd ot whether and to what extont the Winter buds can be forced by ether NAPNE And By warm water ar | osliive resilts were oblaed with sevs feral other plants, sueh as the ohestaut, | the tn!\&; Ahe Norway mape and oihers Some plants however, remamed imndits forent 1o the treatment. Among ihese Were the ginka or Japanese “wmalhns P DRI Beet L e e Lee. the Deech and the lime The beech and \he e Al fatled 1o give results whem treated With ether and Wih warw waler ] derstanding of the ultimate purpose of our foreign armed forces. ‘The task defore us, therefore, is not a pleasant one. We must crush Sandino, are probadbly well meaning. or else . N Phote sireeht W A\ Phaiee