Evening Star Newspaper, August 14, 1927, Page 37

EDITORIAL SECTION . EDITORIAL PAGE NATIONAL PROBLEMS SPECIAL FEATURES Part 2—18 Pages TACNA-ARICA SOLUTION ! TILL HELD POSSIBILITY Situation “Quiet,” Officials Say, Mean- ing Complicated Occurrences Are Going On Under Surface. BY WALLACE THOMPSON. HE quiet one is likely even in the informed quarters, ta any polite inquirfes regarding t status of a problem which a ye was reputed to be caroming down destruction, and two vears ago was about to burst into war and ruin the reputation of Uncle Sam in South America heyond all repair What that word “‘quiet.” with refer ence to the great question of Chile and Peru. really signifies is that noth ing is happening on the surface. and | the things that are going on under the surface are too complicated for casual conversation. And vet the sit uation igystill pregnant, and an under- standing of its status is important to the student and also to the dweller in Washington who seeks to keep some- where near the running of world affairs. As the Tacna-Arica situation always has had, its manifestations today have | two phases—the geographical and the political. The geographical comprises most of the visibla facts. Chile, it will be remembered, captured all ihe Peruvian coast as far north as Lima and a little bevond in the War of the Pacific. which broke out in 1879. By the treaty of Ancon (signed in a suburb of Lima. the Peruvian capital, in 1883), Peru ceded to Chile the south- | erly province of Tarapaca, and Chile occupied the province of Tacna-Arica. | Iying north of Tarapaca and south of | Peru. for strategic reasons, because | this territory offered a rallying ground | for Peru and Bolivia, ica situation much is all that learn todav. thoroughly in response | he Tacna-A Th st to who had been | Peru’s allv in the War of the Pacific and who had also lost a rich provinge, Atacama, together with its only port. Antofagasta, to Chile. Under the treaty of Ancon, a plebiscite was to| be held after 10 years—that is, 1593 — to allow the inhabitants of Tacna- Arica to vote whether they should be- long to Peru or Chile. Plebiscite Never Held. The plebiscite has never been held. Peru first wanted it held and then did Tot want it heid, on the ground at the end that Chile held control and would not allow a plebiscite to be fairly car- ried out. In the end Chile wanted to | hold the plebiscite, contending that the | treaty of Ancon read that this vote| should he held “after the expiration | or at any time after 3893, while Peru held the terms read | the expiration of the 10 years, or | i rs and rumors of wars is question have torn the West Coast of South America for 40 vears, and finally in 1922 the whole questiol ineluding the boundaries of the terri- tory. was submitted to the President of the United States. On March 4, 1925, his de handed down. He held for Pe tention as to the houndary of the prov- inces under dispute (a question 'of grave importance), and asreed With Chile's contention that the plebiscite | ghouid be held. W Gen. John J. Pershing was appoint <ident of the plebiscitary com- ion and J. J. Morrow of the bound- | ary commission. Gen. Pershing went | to Arica in August of 1925. and for| ‘many months struggled against a sit- | uation which developed at every turn and which he in the end reported to the President made the plebiscite im- possisle. His health required his re- turn to the United States before the final break-up came, and Gen. Wil-| Jiam Lassiter was_sent down in his place in January, 1926. Five months | jater Gen. Lassiter threw up his| hands, introduced a resolution which | was passed by the plebiscitary com- mission by his vote and that of the Peruvian member, declaring that Chile had made the plebiscite impossible and | that through Chile's fault alone it has | failed. This resolution. together with | the proceedings of the plebiscitary | commission, were certified to President | Coolidge. who has never vet acted! upon them. Commission Continues Work. | Meanwhile, howev the boundary | eommission has heen continuing its | work. 1t ran into difficulties before | (3en. Pershing left Arica, through the | killing of some Chilean rural guards hy Peruvian villagers in the disputed zone. This was followed by the with- Arawal of the Chilean member of the houndary commission from the meet- ings thereof, owing to the fact that a | rezolution of censure of the Chilean| rommander had been made the firet <iness of anv formal meeting. a sub ject upon which the Chilean member | Aeclined to allow discussion. Finally. however, the thres delegates were hrought together here in Washington. and for several months past efforts have been made to settle the boundary restion. The vote of censure of the | Chilean police which blocked the work | in the first place has heen put aside. The boundary questions now uudari Aiscussion are confined to the northern houndary of the territorv—that is, be- tween Peru and Tacna-Arica, as now held by Chile. Under the award of fention as o the line was approved. and the duty of the houndary com- mission was to locate it by determin- ing the course of the River Sama. which the arbitrator set as the hour ary. Rut the River Sama has two hranches in it upper reaches, and Peru claims that the true River ma fe that farthest extended into the fer. v of Tacna-A and Chile that the true River Sama is that which lies farther north, in the territory claimed by Peru. At this moment the hound ary commission is locked on this mat- Tar. and also by one of the provisions of the method of procedure of its de- Iiherations which was put in to guar- antee satisfaction to all parties. hut soparently without full appreciation «of the possibilities of deadloch This provision is that decisions of the commission must be unanimous. Just now the boundary commission is trying 1o vise ite procedure by vot ing that a majority rule will decide, a plan which Chile. suspecting Gen N ow agrees with the Peruvians on the boundary question, refuses to ac- President Coolidge the Peruvian t‘or\»‘ | copt. =74 all things tangible in the Tacna- Arica situation rest just there. The issue 18 not unlike the schoolboy prob- jsm as to whether the Mississippi is the river that bears that name, or it it | ix the present Mississippi as far north as St. Louis and thence takes in the Missouri. You will remember that you, as a patriotic American. aged 10 vears, believed firmly in the Missouri ‘heory, for the plain and simple rea son that this would give the United Srates the lonzest river in the world We all have our triotisms, not all of them logi-al Political Phases Subtie. The political phases of the situation are far more and far more heavily charged witk oynamite. As mentioned above, the 1.amsiter resolution. passed Jast Janu ary by the voles of the American and A bk | tears The situation a8 to geography | prejudices and pa-| subtle | | Peruvian members of the plebiscitary commission, places the whole failure of the plebiscite upon the administr tion and domination of Chile in the disputed provinces, reciting allezed outrages against Per ans and de claring that the piebiscite could not be held under present Chilean This resolution is now in the hands of o dent Coolidge as arbitrator. Under the protocol of 1922 only his decision in matters relating to the plebiscite 1s final. Whether he is re quired to accept and publish to world the ter resolution becat it was passed by his plebiscitary cor mission nd declare impossibility, is still an open question. | If he does he casts a lasting cloud | over Chilean good faith, and. accord ing to some interpretations, Peru would then have a right to claim the ritory before some such tribunal as the Permanent Court at The Hague. | If the President rejects the Lassiter | resolution the plebiscite must be re sumed, and probably no one, Chilean Peruvian or American, now believes a | plebiscite possible in Tacna-Arica. ex cept under conditions different from those set down in the award. So the rejection of Lassiter resolution would be a virtual announcement that the award was a failure, which is a | step that seems hardly likely to be taken at this time. If, on the other hand, the President, as arbitrator, never takes any action on the Lassiter resolution, the Tacna Arica situation apparently cannot be resolved by other means, because it is in his hands, as a receivel Actually, the President is theoretically sitting in the back ground, while, also theoretically, Sec retary of State Kellogg is negotiating with the Ambassadors of the two coun- tries in_Washington as plenipoten tiaries. He is trving to get o agree to some solution of the difficul outside the plebiscite, and although the negotiations which were going on last Winter are now suspended. in theory they are still on, and the final proposal before both countries is that offered on November 30 last year, when Mr. Kellogg proposed the sale of the disputed territory to Bolivia. He had previously suggested division on various grounds, and other solu tions. by means of cession and corre- sponding indemnity, but the Bolivian proposal stands still as the last offe of Washington as mediator in th ancient quarrel. The proposal was questioned in terms which virtually re- jected 1t by Peru and accepted in| principle by Chile, and the whole mat- | ter of the fate of the provinces still | hangs. dangling. as it were, on the| raveled string of the endless efforts ai | its solution. | “Chileanization” Alleged. There have been, from time to time, | reports that Chile was planning to an- | nex the territories formally, but notk ing of this sort has really come forth. | Not long ago it was announced that | he “Chileanization” of Tacna-Arica| ad been ordered, or encouraged, this consisting chiefly in more eflectivei representation of the sovereignty of Chile, more elaborate observance of Chilean holidays and festivals, etc. But innexation formally remains unlikely, particularly while the question re- mains in the*hands, so to speak, of the President of the United States as arbi- trator. "There is talk of war as well, and this is always the danger, and indeed the fact that the Tacna-Arica ques- tion loomed always as a possible cause of war was one of the chief reasons why its solution was sought through arbitration of the President. Peru now the | the the most efficient for its size in the world, thanks to long and successful training by an American naval mis- sion. These facts are cited by the jingoes as bearing on a possible out- break. Chile, however, is quiet, with political problems at home and nomic adjustments to occupy her at- tention. War seems very far away, indeed, in Tacna-Arica. But why cannot the matter be solv- ed, the American asks continually. It seems easy to dispose of the territory o Bolivia, who cannot use it as a| base for military operations against Chile. and who would not want to, but would appreciate and could use so well the highway to the sea and the railway and port of Arica, almost di- rectly west, as it is. of La Paz, the Bolivian mountain capital”? Why not, indeed? Shrine of Both Countries. | There is only one answer, and that high, nor very steep, mountain that rises above Arica like a great rock. It is called “El Morro,” or the castle. It commands the port and the sea and the railway. It is on the southern or Chile-ward side of the town and the railway that goes to La Paz. That rock is the reason the Tacna-Arica question has not been solved, either | materially or spiritually. For the | Morro is a shrine of both Chile and Peru. There the Peruvians made their final stand when the Chilean army encompassed the city of Arica in the war of the Pacific, close to 50 years ago. And there they stood and died 10 a man, shot down. or finally the heroic remnant rather than surrender. No spot on earth is .0 great a shrine of Peruv | patriotism as that old Morro at Ari The Chilean has his own sentiments also, for the victory of the Morro at Arica is one of the great battles of | Chilean arms, won as it was by sheer !hare-hand fighting, not with artillery or with hombs, but man to man, a su- ! perb achievement. The Morro is the | symbol of Chilean prowess. There it stands, and as long as it stands the Tacna-Arica question seems {destined to remain unsolved. The plan {for a corridor to the sea for Bolivia, {leaving the Jand to the north to Peru and that to the south to Chile, failed, | largely because Chile would not allow !the Morro to be within the Bolivian {zone. and Peru would not leave it to {either Chile or Bolivia. And so on {down the line that single rock so to speak, hae wrecked all the dipiomacy {and all the generosity of our good |efforts. The problem of Tacna-Arica {18 “quiet” asleep on the Morro of | Arica, as'it has been for nearly half la century. A new thought, a new {mind may solve it, but those deepest lin it and wisest in its ways look up lat the Morro and report again that “ihe situation is quiet.” is a not ver nor very grim Nobody has vet suggested Hughes and Johnson as the Republean ticket, with “Let Bygones Be Bygonea” as the pi u’x_‘cynpal plank x‘,lhe platform. has two new submarines and | strong and well trained Chilean navy less than in the past.| The Peruvian navy is, in fact, one of | rule. | the plebiscite any 0 to speak. | now | | is being nursed along cautiously and | he Sunday Star |5 WASHINGTON, I BY G. GOULD LINCOLN. HE Republican pre-convention campaign is on. President Coolidge’'s that he did not choose to run for Presi- 1928 was the starting sun. It caught one, totally unprepared. That one was former Gov. Frank O. Lowden of Tllinois, an expected candidate for the presi- iential nomination against Mr. Coolidge himself. But as far as has heen learned, the President took no one into his confidence regarding his Many of the presidential were caught flat-footed. None was on his Some of them even now will be slow to get off. But already there are signs that the race is on. ' There a plethora of for the Republican nomination for President, although, had the President said nothing, he could have had the nomination with little or no trouble. The very number of possible candidates, to- gether with their individual strength weaknesses, may deadlock the next Republican national convention, just as the convention was deadlocked in 1920, with Lowden, Johnson and Wood playing the steliar roles. A deadlock in 1928 would result, some of the most astute Republican leaders say, in the nomination of President Coolidge. This is denied by others, just as stoutly. But unless the President should let it be known that he would refuse the nomi- nation, and decline to run if nominated, in unmistaken terms, the chances are that the mention of his name, with the convention deadlocked, would result in a stampede Coolidge Today the race for the Republican nomina- tion is anybody’s. The names which loom the largest are Charles Evans Hughes of New York, Herbert Hoover of California and Frank 0. Lowden of Iliinois, with Vice President Charles G. Dawes, aiso of IHinois, proba a parity with the others. But this does not come near exhausting the list of presidential possibilities. The Senate hoasts its group of favorite sons, including both Curtis and Cappe) of Kansas, Willis of Ohio, Borah of Idaho, s of Nebraska, Edge Jersey, watson of Indiana, and possibly Hiram Johnson of California, it he should recant his renunci tion of presidential ambitions. Speaker Long- worth is the shining light of the Republican party in the House and is expected to get into the race—indeed, is said to be already in it. New England may put forward another gover- nor for high honors, Gov. Fuller, whose popu- larity in the Bay State has made him a great vote getter there and whose handling of the Sacco-Vanzetti case has recently made him a center of public attention. There are those who would include Secretary Mellon of the Treasury Department in the list of possibilities for the Republican nomination, as the choice of the great State of Pennsylvania. x ok ok ¥ 1f M. Hughes does not put his foot down on the mcvement to nominate him, he will be possibly the most formidable candidate of the lot. It is no secret that many of the most influential men in the party, men whose busi- ness it has been for years to round up delegates, look with favor on the nomination of the former Secretarv of State, former Associate Justice of the United States and former governor of New York. Not long ago reports were pub- lished to the effect that Mr. Hughes was the choice of President Coolidge for the nomination in the event that Mr. Coolidge himselt was not to be a candidate. gave out a statement declaring that he was announcement dent in the field, bar plans for next vear. possibilities, therefore toes. is material and to At that time Mr. Hughes D). C., SUNDAY MORNING, fivst, last and all time for the nomination of President Coolidge, and fthat he himselt was “too old.” But the President has taken himself out of the picture as eifectively as he can. Mr. Hughes is apparently in the pink of condition for a man of his years—he is 65 years old and would he almost 67 at the time he entered the White House, should he be elected next year. At present Mr. Hughes is in Europe Mr. Hughes was the party standard hearer 3. He lost by a shade to Woodrow Wilson, v because of stupid political blunders made in California by his managers, and be- cause of the Wilsonites' slogan “He kept us out of war.” Thousands upon thousands of voters feel that he was the real choice of a majority of the people then and that he should have been elected, and this feeling makes him the choice of many of these thousands for the nomination next year. His record as Governor of New York, on the bench and as etary of »mmended him to the people * State has * % * On the other hand, there will he those who paint Mr. Hughes as a friend of the League of Nations and the World Court. Much will be made of his leanings toward the league and the court by the irreconcilables. It seems scarcely likely, however, in view of the positive stand which has been taken by this country against entry into the league that this issue can be revived against Mr. Hughes now The fact that Mr. Hughes comes from New York will be urged as a particular reason for his nomination, both because of the large elec- t I vote cast by the Empire State and because man Republicans believe that . Al Smith i< to be nominated by the Democrats and that Hughes would be the hest bet, barring President Coolidge, to run against the popular governor in New York. Go * R Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce and former food administrator of war days, must be reckoned with. His popularity in the country is great, though with the politicians it has not heen so marked. ness looks to him as hoth v safe and an able administrator. He is held to be an ideal candidate for President by many at a time when the country needs a business administration to reap the full benefit of the great commercial growth and development which has come America’'s wa He appeals to the imagination of the American people as the trouble man who has brought relief to millions in Russia, Belgium and other countries abroad during the war period and immediately afterwards. More recently he has placed a great section of the United States in his debt by his masterly handling of the Mississippi flood relief. Indeed, he would be the recipient of thousands of votes in the States of the lower Mississippi Valley which no other Republican could hope for. Kven though he might’ not carry any of these States in the general elec- tion, hecause they are fundamentaily politically Democratic, he should stand an excellent chance of obtaining the Republican delegations from those States to the coming national convention. * K ok X Opponents of Mr. Hoover in the wheat and corn belts charge him with opposing the Mc- Nary-Haugen farm relief bill. They charge him, too, with having fixed the price of wheat during the war at $2.20 a bushel, when the price in the open market was hovering around $3.00, and they also lay against him the operation of the Government grain corporation during the war, which in the end netted the Government some $60,000,000 or $70,000,000 profit, profit which, they say, should have gone to the farme AUGUST 14, 1927, The charge that Mr. Hoover fixed the price of wheat during the war is denied by Repub- licans here. Indeed, they say the $2.20 price was fixed by the late President Woodrow Wilson himself. In substantiation of this asser- tion they point to an eleventh-hour plea made President Wilson by Senator Curtis of Kansas, now Republican leader of the Senate; former Senator McCumber of North Dakota, and several other Republican Senators from the wheat country. They visited the President at the White House, having been informed that the price to he fixed for wheat was lower than they believed it should be in justice to the farmer. The day after their visit the price was announced. to * ok K K Mr. Hoover, however, is not without strength in the Middle West and the Northwest. All those who oppose the McNary-Haugen bill, and there are many, will favor rather than oppose his nomination. 1f the new administra- tion farm bill which has been presented to the President by Secretary Jardine should becoma a law, or a similar measure, at the coming session of Congress, it is believed that the farm issue would be largely taken out of the next ampaign. much to the benefit ‘of Mr. Hoover. Recently Henry ¥ord has come out for Mr. Hoover for President, and Senator Couzens of Michigan has taken a similar stand, all of which should materially aid him in obtaining the Michigan delegation. : The attitude of Senator Hiram Johnson ot California. toward the Hoover candidacy will be watched with no little interest. They have heen political enemies. In 1920 Johnson had the California delegation in his pocket, and Hoover, although popular with the people, did not have a look-in. Last Winter Senator Johnson insisted he was entirely cured of the bits of the presidential bee, that he had no ambitions looking toward the White House. But taking himseif out of the race is a different thing from standing idly by while Mr. Hoover is nominated. One danger which the Hoover candidacy may face is that of being hugged too tightly to the bosom of big business. 1f he becomes known generally as the candidate of the inter- ests, it may harm him. He is popular with labor today, as with business, and doubtiess his friends will see to it that the business label is not too prominently displayed. Some of the old-timers are recalling the fact that in 1920 there was a period when no one knew whether Mr. Hoover would seek the Republican or the Democratic nomination for President. Many Democrats were urging him as their candidate. But Mr. Hoover declared in unequivocal terms at that time that he was a Republican and had always been a member of that party Probably either Mr. Hughes or Mr. Hoover would he acceptable to President Coolidge as his successor. Both have served in his cabinet and with distinction. The policies of the Gov- ernment under Coolidge would continue prob- ably with little change with either Hughes or Hoover in the White House. But the President is to keep his hands off in the selection of his successor, according to the word from the Black limu. * o ox % Forper Gov. Frank O. Lowden of lllinois, has been the “white hope” of the MeNary Haugenites for months. He has been the base around which they have rallled their opposition to the renomination of President Coolidge. Now Mr. Coolidge has taken himself out of it, which has been both an encouragement and a matter of worry to the supporters of Mr. Lowden. (Continued on Third Page) AVIATION PROMOTERS TO HOLD PUBLIC'S CONFIDENCE| | Experts Fear “Hay Wire” Flyers Will Stage Some Attempt Resulting in Serious Disaster and Lose Support Won by Flights Across Oceans. lem was not BY FREDERICK R. NEELY. | American enthusiasm over flying, | planted in the hearts of the people by Col. Charles A. Lindbergh and given | even deeper root by the succeeding successful non-stop over-ocean flights, | 17 immediate families will | loss and history and-such a pilot the absence mission or hoard, the National Aero-| EAGER 1 they lose, their | mourn’ their | ord | such- | to do so-and- sound. will r failed” ginning | clothes, to emerge of such a com- BY EDWARD J. JORDAN. | The automobile industry is just be- | does not lie in a group of men sitting from swaddling | around the table figuring out what Thera are a great many ex-| somebody owes: it lies in the introduc- | travagances in the busine: AUTO INDUSTRY SEEN AS LONG WAY FROM ECONOMIC BASIS |Manufacturers of Today Seen as Only in Infancy, Imposing Great Burden of Responsibilities and Hardships on Dealers. | solution for the European problem it is not | tion of 2.000,000 Fords and 2,000,000 GENEVA FAILURE CALLED THIRD SETBACK FOR U. S. Simonds Says American Delegates Threw Away Their Best Cards at All Parleys on Disarmament. BY FRANK H. SIMOND) HE failure ference cossive of the Geneva Ce rks the third »pointment of the suc | ington, and now | failed "to see which bulked larg: mation of the proper an international meeting. |71t s true in the main that G | was foredoomed from the standpoint by the previous fail Washington, and Ambassador was condemned to seek to re lomatic means the cards whi een flung away in 1921 over, at Geneva, and no Washington, an Ameri did addr itself exclusively protection or advancement Ameri can interests. Nevertheless. after neva, as after Paris and Washing- ton, the American people are faced with the fact of failure In this situation t now patently open. It in the case of Paris, sociates about the & indulge in much bitter and not a little self-righ inforced by moral ind the other hand. just as possible to find in the actual proceedings les- wons which may well serve, if learned to make the two affairs relatively in expensive bits of national education nternational affairs Why Wilson Failed. Mr. Wilson failed at Par he had neglected at the moment when the United States entered the war to | insist upon a clear and unequivocal greement between the United States and its prospective associates as to the terms of peace following the vic- tory which our entrance i ed. In- stead of precise and definite under- takings witnessed on all sides, he con- tented himself with obtaining from an deleg: 10 courses are as o assail our as een table and to ecrimination ness, tion. On is possible because the European opponents of Germany | o during the course of hostilities wholls casual indorsements of the vague for- mula of the 14 points. Once the victory was won, however, Mr. Wilson was in no position to com- | pel the allies to accept his interpreta- | tion of the application of this formula to a peace settlement. He still had a measure of power, due to the allied | desire to obtain continuing American aid and support, but this American aid was no _lon a matter of life or death. In the last analysis, Clemen- u. Orlando and Lloyd George wers | bound to foliow the demands of their own people, even when these ran | counter to Mr. Wilson's views. Thus Mr. Wilson was in the end | brought to the point where he had to reject the Treaty of Versailles, which was patently inconsistent with his principles, and thus confess failure abroad to an unsympathetic domestic | audience, abandon all hope of any league of nations and come back igno- miniously or make the best of what had been done and represent it to the American people as a substantial vie- tory. President Wilson chose the latter course. But the American people did not face the President’s difficulty. Therefore, they rejected the treaty. This saved the United States from ay really serious consequences of the Paris failure, but it did not in any sense modify the fact of failure. Washington Conference. Three years later, at the moment when the Washington Conference was meeting, Secretary Hughes had pre- cisely the same advantage that Presi- dent Wilson had enjoyed in the Spring of 191 ‘We had prospective suprem- acy in the battle line, assured by ou naval program, then approaching com- pletion. The British and the Japanese were faced with the prospect of ov whelming American superiori while | neither had the financial resources to build to the extent which would insure parity. We had simply to insist that G Britain and Japan agree to our view as to parity or ratio. not only with respect craft but of cruisers as well, fi of all branches of fighting | t line | it would ;not have been wiser for tis could poss situation Two courses might build itish 1. outbuild them, both 1t legally he money, Coolidge's only other new econon At per- int had, of ng. ant prac suading them abandon structions and scrap a cert relatively old tonnage. We speaking, 100,000 tons cruisers bt and by had above n am o ndern They Parity and Economy. had to offer what weapon of employ? Patently delegation w the fact at we T ex. n and vs obtainable w Even at t tain ag T wat the 1 should equal tonnag branches of naval craft, But such parity involved the ron struction of at least 300,000 tons of new cruisers, ich a program was at once a mockery from the stand point_of economy and of limitation. Yet all our delegates could do was to advocate the principle of limitation and quote the words of Mr. Balfour Washington, which repre: ted lritish acceptance of v in all ranches while we had superiority in ing branch. We had, let it he ed, pretty zood moral argu- but we had no cards. We had to offer. We had flung away ur real resource at Washington—we | had scrapped our capital ship tonnage, We might threaten to build, but that | would take time, and our British as- sociates might well conclude that the American people would in the end refuse to spend the money. F.om_these three experiences Paris, W ngton and Geneva seems to me a simple and inevitab! nclusion must be drawn In inter- 1 negotiations it is not enough to have a good case; it is not sufficient to have national sentiment united and insistent In addition, it is not onlv essential to have power, but to use it while it is still valid. At Washington we could have obtained cruiser parity because we had battleship superiority to trade with. In 1917, before we en- tered the war, we could have laid down almost any reasonable terms as tha price of our co-operation, because it spelled victory for the allies. But wa could not in Paris in 1913 use the power we had failed te employ in 1917, nor at Geneva that which we had not applied at Washington in 1921-22, True Basis for Agreement. Equality with Great Britain in every branch of naval craft is always poss. ble for us. We have only to build to obtain it. But equality with economy was always fmpossible after Mr. Hughes agreed to scrap battleships while permitting the British to keep their superiority in cruiser tonnage | and even to expand it at will. Limita tion will be possible when we confront the British with choice between our superiority and equality on our terms. It never was and never will be poss! ble on any other basis. From an American standpoint, it |seems to me the Geneva Conference | represents a real step forward dip'o- matically by contrast with Paris and ‘Washington. For the first time the practical American interests were not | sacrificed to personal or political con- | siderations. ador Gibson and ed themselves to ! the businesd in hand. The illusion of ss did not cover the reality of failure, and we know after the con- ference where'we stand. ‘Whether as a matter of high policy n o rence. s con i States in all leaping into the sea | . |intended to be, and others may fail on | carefully by the “air people” against | an il wind in the form of freak, pub- | licity-seeking adventures "that may chill the budding flower and delay its | immediate development. | Taking advantage of the aerial age | {in which the country awoke one morn: ing to find itself, a number of over- zealous airmen have rushed into print with announcements of all sorts of non-stop projects that fire the imagi- nation to the point of almost believing that this aviation game has reached | the limit of its possibilities and that nothing is too big for the airplane to accomplish now. All the good work that has been |done by Col. Lindbergh, the other sver-ocean flvers and thousands of con- | scientious airmen who fly day after day for the advancement of aeronau- tics would be seriously impaired if every ambitious pilot seeking personal glory is allowed to take a half-pre- pared expedition over the seas with the odds for his success overwhelm ingly against him. Public Now Favorable. a've got the public on our side now.” according to onme prominent military aviator here, who has the “interest of flying close to heart, “and we cannot afford to have it revert {back to the period of skepticism in | which it yemained so long. | “We know that every spectacular | flight announcement mnever will be carried out. Some of them never are the ground for want of resources and | But a few forced land- | organization. ings out in the oceans, details of whicn we may never learn about, will work a great hardship on us. It will mean that a large number of ‘converts’ to aviation will jump back over the fence to the other side and we'll have a hard time bringing them around to our way | of thinking again.” Which leads up to the statement that the next big long-distance flight project must succeed. It should be organized and equipped just a little bit better than Lindbergh, Chamber-/| lin, Maitland-Hagenberger, Byrd and his assistants and Smith and Bronte were. These flights were carried out amid a certain degree of hysteria on the part of the public. Now that they have succeeded, the ground-man has come to regard other flights as being cntirely possible of accomplishment. Attacks Foolish Gamblers. | ! There is no commission or hoard | of airmen and engineers in existence | to pass upon the feasibility of forth- | coming flights in order to uphold the good name of aviation and save the | !lives of aspiring pilots. Some airmen here in Washington think there should be. They argue that the world is full of people who care not the snap of a finger for their lives, but are willing to gamble them against tremendous odds just for publicity and a pri: If they win, aviation will not be bene fited wemendously because the prob-| nautic Association, with what author- ity it possesses, is endeavoring to regulate the flight projec It cannot |tell an inexperienced aviator with a | “hay wire” plane that he cannot undertake a big flight, but the associa- tion cam refuse to have the flight nducted under its auspices, thereby depriving the pilot of any official recognition that may result from the endeavor. Must Meet Requirements. The association, before supervising such flights, insists that the pilot hold a_certificate from the F ion Aero- (Continued on Third yet on an economic basis. The princi-, telephones to cut down the cost of pal reason for that is, while we have | transportation, break down the bar- 20,000,000 automobiles in use in this | riers of language, religion, custom and country, there are only about 5,000,000 prejudice—transportation and com- in all the world beside. One of the | MUication: most important facts about the busi Merchandising in Lead. ness today is that last year the in.| That is the significance of this dustry shipped over 700,000 automo-| tremendous shipment of automobiles to & " foreign countries. biles to foreign countries. Meantime, merchandising has suc That is not important merely be-| ceeded production as the dominant cause it indicates an increase in the | broblem in the industry. dutpiit ofiEhs automoBlis Induatey. and| /. AL eV asriCeic LAt ek I (18 CoCs an increase in export busine It | effort on the part of the manufacturers has always seemed to me that the| to change models to renew sales to old owners, to make long trades with and to hold up their volume production so that they can and second, and British and Japanese | British to have shown themselves a compliance was assured. | bit more vielding is a question for de- | It was assured because we offered |bate. Certainly if they are interesied |them for nothing something better |in any.future revision of the debt set- |than they could otherwise obtain. |tlement, they hardly hastened that That was the situation. We, who had | happy day by taking a line which im- prospective superioritv, offered lh!"poses vast new expenses upon the British actual equality, but on our|American people for naval construc- terms. tion. But that was patently for them And at the outset to_decide. cepted our proposition, as they were| Having the power in 1921 bound to do. both for cruisers and |failed tc employ it. Having th o battleships. But when the French re-|power in 1 the British used it fused to meet our views in the matter | fully and freely. They could not pre- of submarines, then the British saw a | vent parity in the long run—and heaven-sent means of evading the ob-|they did not attempt that. They noxious idea of parity in all branches, [could, however, prevent limitation and they announced that they could | With economy, ‘or, in fact, all real not reduce their cruiser tonnage, or |limitation as Americans see it, and limit it, unless the French accepted |they did. We shall pay now in the their views as to submarine: cost of new construction because Mr. the British ac 22, wa “I'Never Pretended to Make Friends” BY BRUCE BARTON. l to the daughter of Europe's N the matter of money most men make a conscious ef- fort to provide for their old age. They save and invest and figure that at 60 they will have such-and-such an income. In the matter of friends too few take such wise precaution. Hence the cities are full of lonely old folks who have outlived their generation; the friends of their middle years are gone and they have made no new ones to fill the vacant places. A man whom | very much re- spect was speaking of this the other day. “Until | was 40 years old | sought deliberately to make my friendships among men older than myself,” he said. “Since | passed 40, | have tried just a deliberately to find friends among younger men. | am lay- ing up friendships for my old ag Wise old Sam Johnson lowed the same good rule. “If a man does not make new acquaintances he advance: through life, he will soon find himself alone,” he said to Bos- well. “A man, sir, should keep friendships in constant re- proudest court. But what was the end of it all? On a little rocky island he frotted away the last years of h life. Who was there to share his exile? Not his wife: she had gone back to her father. Not Berthier, his lifelong comrade; Berthier had deserted without a blush and become captain of Louis XVIil's bodyguard. Two of his trusted marshals had insulted him. Marmont, his petted favorite, conspicuously betrayed him. Even the personal attendants who had slept at his door turned backs on his failure. “What tude!” you exclaim. But self had set the example. After all, | care only for peo- ple who are useful to me and so long as they are uséful,” he ence remarked. And agai “I have made courtiers; | have never pretended to make friends.” The fine tomb in Paris is a monument to the dazzling pects of his career, erected by those who knew him only from a distance. Those who knew him best raised no monument to him on the shores of St. Helena. His little garden there became a crude potato patch, the billiard room in which he had played and talked a haymow, and the room where he died a stable. Over the ruins might well have been written: “I made courtiers; tating terms to emperors on the | never pretended to make battlefield, or marrying himself | friends. (Copyright. 1927.) fol- pair. Viewed from this standpoint, no other human career presents a sadder spectacle than Na- poleon’s. Most readers of his- tory remember only his splendid hours. We think of him hold- ing court at Versailles or dic- their overhead and keep down their prices. The rapid change of models contributes to increased factory production, but it has placed a burden upon the dealers and dis- tributors, which they are finding it very difficult to carry. In this merchandising period of the industry we have a very interesting situation. Instead of employing sales- men to sell new automobiles, these salesmen are simply serving as pur- chasing agents, buying old automo- biles. Dealer’s Problem Is Great. | The chief problem of the automo- bile industry is not to deliver new au- tomobiles at all. The factories ship- ping, as they do, sight draft against bill of lading to the dealers, and the dealers, as proud as they are to hold the lines which they represent, being inclined to take all of the automobiles that the factories will ship, create this situation. But the dealer handles all of the time paper and all of the old cars. When he trades a Packard and a Hupmobile on a Studebaker, and a Dodge on a Hup, and a Ford on a Dodge, and a motor cycle on a Ford he has had a lot of turns which are not very profitable, with the result | that _the mortality among dealers in the industry is very large. So when you read about factories making large sums of money, paying large dividends, and getting a lot of publicity about the great feats they are accomplishing in the business, re- member that one fundamental has not yet been met. It has bean met in every other indusiry, There is no other industry in the world that can ship merchandise to dealers and make them take it and make them pay cash against bill of lading. .It is the only industry that has been able to con- tinue to do that, and when the fac- tories which are making so much money now begin to assume the re- 8po! for handling the time paper lves - and taking the trades, there may be less production. | The industry will begin to grow into and get down to Thereupon the American Govern- ment and people went off on a bitter attack upon France. They sought to force the French to accept the Ameri- can view, and held the French respon- sible for the failure of limitation in all directions save that of capital ships. And that was precisely what the British, who had carefully foment ed the French resistance, had hoped for. Mr. Hughes now faced Mr. dilemma. He had not got parity, save in the capital ships, where our st riority was enormous. He had tained this and a Japanese ratio by agreeing to scrap ou gram and abandon fortifving Philippines and other outlying islands. But_we should only have parity if the Japanese and the British accepted battleship terms in the cruiser branch. Claimed Success at Conference. Since the British had refused all cruiser limitation, Mr. Hughes now Wilson's ob pro- the the negotiation or claim a limited suc- ce: But political circumstances were again important. 1If the Washington Conference falled, the Republicans in 1 would be placed in the position of the Democrats in 1920, when failure at Paris had made campaign ammuni- tion. And so far as prestige was con- cerned, there was no mistaking the fact that failure would be disastrous. Like Mr. Wilson before him, Mr. Hughes chose to represent the con- ference as a success. But unlike their course in 1919 the American people in 1922 concluded that Washington was a success and readily accepted the official view that the United States and Great Britain had agreed to equality in naval strength as a prin- ciple and in practice. For the time being the actual failure was disguised, Washington counted as a success, and Mr. Hughes won general praise. Hughes consented to scrap our battle- ship tonnage in 1921-22 without get- ting cruiser limitation. At Washing- ton we gave away something for nothing; at Geneva the British stand- point was nothing for nothing. Cost of Parity. does not represent a fallure Genev |of American diplomacy; it only repre- relative | | { | Little by little, however, the truth became apparent. While there was a jparative equality in the battle- field, Britain and then Japan em- upon ambitious building pro- grams. Presently it became clear that t; nominal equality between the sents the liquidation of the Washing- ton failure. At last the truth is dis closed; the fact and the cost of the blunder are apparent. We know where we are. Moreover, at the pre- cise moment that London perceives that Washington is serious and th American people mean to have parity and are readv to pay the price, we shall get limitation on rational lines. What we shall not get, now or is limitation with economy. To re rict, it is necessary to expand; to get disarmament, it is necessary to increase armaments, There the unpleasant paradox, which happens had either to announce the failure of | to be cotemporary truth as well. (Copyrizht. 1927.) Mining Meerschaum. Extremely primitive means are said to be used in the mining of meer- schaum in Turkish Asia Minor. This is done by sinking pits about 30 meters deep, lining them with scaffolding and then opening up transversal galleries. The mineral is dislodged by hand and with picks. It then is hoisted to the surface by buckets drawn up by hand. Lighting the mines is accomplished by use of petroleum or carbide lamps. Meerschaum occurs in dry as well, as moist or dripping deposits. The latter are of the best quality, although in pits of this type cave-ins are apt to occur. The meerschaum is polished and dried and pieces of tha finest quality are submitted to a final polish with felt and wax before being ex- ported. The mineral is used largely in the manufacture of pipes and cigarette holders, although that of poorer quality is used in making beads, rosaries, girdles and othe& products,