Evening Star Newspaper, June 28, 1925, Page 29

EDITORIAL SECTION . EDITORIAL PAGE NATIONAL PROBLEMS SPECIAL FEATURES Part 2—16 Pages i BAWES’ FIGHT ON RULES GIVES G. O. P. A SCARE May Prove Adverse Deciding Factor in Hard Battle to Retain Control of Senate. BY G. GOULD LINCOLN. ITH the control of the S ate at stake in the electic next vea me of the Re. publican | I Vice President, GGen. Dawes, at Repub. lican Senators who are opposed to ma. Jority cloture in the Senate. The Vice his threat to take the issue of the Sen ate rules to the people. His last ad dress on the subject w Manchester, N. H., the home of Sena tor George Moses, Republican President pro te who is leading the opposition to Gen Dawes’ proposal for a revision of the Senate rules. According to the dis patches from Manchester, the thron; which gathered to hear the Vice Presi dent loudly Senate rul Jority rule in that body ator Moses nor his colles Keyes, nor any of the New Hampshire delegation in the House meeting. 1 for either Sen nd his dema One Speech a Month. The next address on the subject of the rules by Gen. Dawes will be deliv- ered in the West some time in July. according to the best information available here. He plans to deliver one address a month during the con- gressional recess parts of the country. His first dress on the subject after his breath- taking inaugural speech in the Senate | chamber was in Ma this was followed by his talk to the As- sociated Press {n New York. Then came the speech in Alabama and that in New Hampshire When last March the Vice President opened fire on the rules he was vigor- ously criticized by many of the Sel tors, Republicans and Democrats ali His critics were confident that his tack on the unlimited debate permit- ted in the Senate was to be only a nine-days wonder, and that it would pass away and be forgotten, as have many other attacks on the Senate rules in the past. But it hasn't hap. pened that way. Gen. Dawes has had no little encouragement outside the Senate. And now members of his own party are beginning to wonder what will be the effect of his among the people or fate of Republican Senators who are opposed to a change in the rules and who must stand for re-election next year. Fight for Senate Control. The Republicans have a job on their hands to retain control of the Senate in the next Congress. Twenty-five of the Senators who come up for re- election are Republicans and only 7 are Democrats, and the last are from rock-ribbed Democratic States of the South, wheye Democrats are sure to win. ‘The thargin of control by the Republicans in the present none too great. If Gen. D: the voters in the States tors who support the present unlimited debate of the Senate, with filibustering possibilities, it may be just the amount chusetts, and sition required to defeat some | s, it s the chance e will amend ing to prompter action sion. In that event the by Vice President Dawes falls to the ground. re is the chance, too, that With the reconvening of Cong matters of importance will occu public attention and the fight on the Senate rules will be forgotten So far the Democr caustic in their comments Dawes proposal as licans, or more so. no split along party lines. But the senatorial race next year is to be fought out individually—there is no national election to help pull the Re. publican ticket through in some of these doubtful States and anything may happen Test in Legislation. is, however disturbing possibility in the performance of the Senate at its next ion, when im- portant measures urged by President Coolidge come before it. How is the Senate going to act, for example, on the administration’s tax-reduction plan? How long will it talk about tuxes, and how long about the World Court proposal? If the opponents of the administration undertake to pre- vent action by filibustering tacti or unduly long debate, will not Vice President Dawes receive more and more support for his crusade against the rules amongz the people who put President Coolidge in the White House by the greatest plurality a President ever received? Vice President Dawes is discus ing the Senate rules in a non-parti- san W just at present, although admittedly he is seeking to build a back-fire ut home under Senators who are against a change in the rules. If he keeps up the work and the people really met interested in the question and favor his plan, it may not take long for it to develop into a political issue. Already in California a_candidate for the Sen- ate against Senator Shortridge, who comes up next yvear, has announced as part of his platform the Dawes plan for amendment of the Senate rules. ure, that rules look on th There has been There On Record Against Cloture. Glance at the list of Republican Senators who are to come up for re- election in States where the fight Top Hats and Telephones Are Not Ideal of Japanese BY YUSUKE YSURUMI, The rising tide of liberalism in Ja- pan as exemplified most recently by the passing of the manhood suffrage bill cannot be understood separated from the change in Japan's attitude toward China. Japan’s “vigorous for- eign policy” reached its climax in 1915, when she tendered to Peking the | ‘world-famous nds. Her chanz- ing mood appeared first in Paris and then in \ashington and now she has definitely launched upon her new as taken the occasion to v declare her disapproval of the forelgn control of China in any form. It is the enunciation of a new policy along liberal lines. We know under what difficulties the Chinese are strug- gling to bring about peace and unity in that vast country and they have our wholehearted sympathy. It must not be thought that this new movement in Japanese liberalism is a mere temporary effort to cultivate good will betrreen China and Japan. aders are not a little perturbed because of acks leveled by the Republican making good s delivered in| and pore of the Senate, heered his attack on the | ma- | zue, Senator attended the in widely separated | 2l |ever, has campaign | - |1t he denounced the Vice Presiderts ts have been as | have the Repub-| may be hard. A number of these ate. Among them, in addition to Senator Moses, are Senator Watson of Indiana_and Senator Wadsworth “lof New 'York. Senator Watson's friends are anxiously watching to see whether former Senator is going to enter the primaries against the Indiana Senator for the Republican nomination next vear. If he does, the result might be serious for both Senator Watson and the hopes of the Republican party in In- | ai: In New York there looms the possibility of Gov. Al Smith en- tering the race for the Senate | "A couple of months ago Vice Presi- |dent Dawes, at a luncheon in Massa- chusetts. called on Senator Willlam { M. Butler, chairman of the Repub lican national committee, to s |in the Senate rules, and Senator But {ler said he did. More recently, how |ever, Senator Butler. who even |now’ making plans for next year's campaign, is reported to have had a second thought on the question, and 1o doubt seriously the wisdom of raising it just now, when ‘the Re- publicans need votes to elect a Re publican Senator in 1926. Mr. Butler |himself is up for election, and his | Republican Senators have already declared their opposition to cloture | or the limiting of debate in the Sen- | probable Democratic opponent will be former Senator David I. Walsh. It happens that Senator Walsh, how- declared that he is opposed to drastic changes in the Senate rules | proposed by Gen. Dawes. So if the |is any virtue in the Dawes conten tion Mr. Butler might reap the beneft | in Massachusetts. Charges Against Senators. As the contest over the Senate rules become more bitter, the Vice | President has charged Senators who | oppose cloture with selfishness and | has declared that secret deals occur | frequently on legislation, made po sible because of the filibustering power which now is possessed by each |individual Senator. On the ~other |hand, some of his opponents are| | spreading the word that Vice Presi-| |dent Dawes is merely seeking to keep | mself in the limelight so that he| can be a candidaty for the presiden tial nomination in’ 1928—even against | President Coolidge. {hook up the Dawes attack on rules with an attack on Coolidge. But it would be believe that Gen. Dawes would seek the Republican nomination | succeed himself. President Coolidge so far has taken |rules—at least openly. He presided |over the Senate as Vice President himself for two and a half years, and | knows something about the rules amd their working. He saw the Harding |ship subsidy bill virtually killed by | filibustering tactics, and other meas |ures go down to defeat by similar | proces Whether he will be drawn out of a masterly. silence on this sul- ject remains to be seen. The chances | are he will say nothing. If he joined | with Vice President Dawes he “vould | be criticized as seeking to dictate to| the Senate, and also he would be| some of the strongest | upon whom he must | putting through the ! legislative program. | | men of h {rely to aid in administration’s | proposal, then he would be in a po- sition of antagonism toward his run- e in the last campaign. e President has uged the situation. e any change in | correctly | If there is to the Senate rules | looking to majority cloture it will be lforn-sri by the demands of the people who elect the Senators, and not by the Senators themselves. The Sena- ters can scarcely be expected to clip their own wings—lessen their indi- vidual power—which such a change would surely mean. Would Checkmate Dawes. Probably nothing could lessen the | | effect of the Dawes attack on the | Senate rules to a*greater extent than | for the Senate to act promptly on all | measures that come before it for con- sideration at its next session. ! Undoubtedly efforts will be made. | however, to modify the Senate rules at the coming session. Many sugges tions are being put forward tentative- ly. Among those most frequently ad- nced is a rule to compel Senators to talk to the matter before the Senate— certainly after it had reached the |stage where amendments are offered, | if not at all times. The most effective | cure for filibusters, however, short of | actual majority cloture, would be adoption of the plan of Senator Nor- ris of Nebraska to do away with the called short sessions of Congress, which occur every second vear. Fili busters are effective principally in these short sessions, when the day of final adjournment is always close at hand. Vice President Dawes is not by any means alone in his discussion of the Senate rules question. In a current magazine article Senator Moses tells | at length why the rules should not be | changed, and Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi, in a speech in Chicago last week, denounced the Dawes re- form plan, holding that unlimited de- bate is essential. On the other hand, enator Arthur Capper of Kansas, head of the farm bloc. is giving edi torial support in his publications to the Vice Fresident's demand for a | majority rule in the Senate. Cynics may say that Japan has been ! forced by the United States and-Eng- land to give up her plan for dominat- ing China in the interest of a wider distribution of the spoils. There is no doubt some necessity in our new vir- tues: such situations are not peculiar to the Orient, but the new turn in Chinese-Japanese relations has a deeper significa It is an expres. sion of the growing desire of the Jap- nese to take up anew the study of | Oriental civilization. It means that Japan is discovering that Western civilization dominated by the machine and the passion for comifort, offers no solution to the great problem of in- herent permanent national stability, serenity of the spirit, the conquest of himself. Triumphant man may not be re- vealed in the end adorned in a top hat Beveridge | | whether or not he approved a change | Their effort is to| the | ifficult to make the voters | if Presi- | dent Coolidge is to be a candidate to {no part in the debate over the Senate | he Sundwy Star WASHINGTON, D. C., SUNDAY MORNING, JUNE 28, 1925. Editor’s note.—This is the first of a series of articles by Mr. Cline upon the European situa- tion from an American viewpoint. In his sec- ond article, to be published nert Sunday, he will discuss economic conditions in Great Brit- ain as they affect American interests. BY SHELDON S. CLINE. ONDON: Never before in the history of the world did one people ever have so huge a stake in the affairs of another people as the people of the United States have today in the affairs of the people of Europe. No such stupendous sums of money ever before were involved in the relations between nations. Never before were the relations of nations so influenced and colored by questions of money. For, say what you will, the pocket nerve is the niost sensitive of nerves in the makeup of mankind. A long time ago it was said that “where a man’s treasure is there his heart is,” and it is as true today as it not mean that the among nations are more sordid they have been in the past. Money is not the only thing that is sordid. The dollar, in fact, 1s a mightyzdecent thing compared with some of the thifgs which have colored diplomacy in_vears gone by But this is the era of dollar diplomacy, and we need not blush that it is so. The Ameri- can people and the American GGovernment are not the only people and government that think and act in terms of dollars. The al- mighty dollar never before was so almighty as it is today. In America it is a practical concern of evervday life. In Europe it is an obcession. Should Not Feel Abashed. Nor need Americans feel abashed at the European sneer that we are “dollar chasers.” Let's be frank and admit that we are. We ha to be if we are going to keep from being “done.” There are quite number of billions of American dollars in Europe—dol- lars that we worked hard to earn and scrimped ave—and it is going to take some tall chasing if they are to be gotten back where they belong. An eminent recently that E relations today than merican economist estimated rope owed the United States £20,000,000,000. T think that is a little high From the best and most reliable sources of information at home and on this side, I would fix the total. in round figures, at $18,000,000,- 000. This sum is arrived at by placing the debts owed the American Government by the governments of Europe at $£12,000,000,000, in- cluding interest accrued and unpaid: by al- lowing $4,000,000,000 for banking loans floated | in the United States since the armistice and $2,000,000,000 for unadvertised loans and other forms of credit But $18,000,000,000! What a staggering sum it is. The zold stocks of all the world. money and bullion, are estimated at only $9.500,000,000, or slightly more than half enough to pay off Europe's debt to America. A debt of $18,000,000,000 means that Europe has borrowed $150 from each man, woman and child in the United States. From each average American family of five persons it has borrowed $750. ‘Why Americans Are Interested. When you stop to think how hard the head of the average American family had to work, how carefully the mother had to plan and serimp in order to earn and save this $750 to lend to Europe, you begin to get a glim- mering of how and why the average American is so vitally interested in the affairs of Eu- From this there is no escape. Some time, somehow, the debt must be paid, and the law of averages 1s inexorable. The average Amer- ican may not own any of the foreign bonds which have been sold in the United States since the armistice; he may not even own any of the Liberty bonds which were the source of the funds our Government loaned the governments of Europe, but in the event of default by Furope the average American cannot escape from contributing his averaged share. He will contribute it through higher taxes and higher prices for the necessities of life. He will contribute it by consuming a smaller proportion than he ought to be priv- ileged to consume of the commodities his labor helps to produce. It Europe pays its debts to America the average American will in the future be priv- ilegzed to enjoy for himself and his family a larger share of the wealth he helps to create. If Europe does not pay he will haye to be contented, or discontented, with a smaller share. This is as true of John Smith and Henry Jones as it is of John Rockefeller and Henry Ford. When that old law of averages is at work there are no distinctions. America has a stake of $18.000,000,000 in Europe, and the stake of each individual American is one 120-millionth part of that. ‘What Are Chances of Payment. That gets us down to what this article, and others which are to follow it, are all about. ‘These articles are not being written for the much-discussed “international banker.” They are not being written for the high-brow economist. They are not being written even for the capitalist or man of affairs who knows, or ought to know, what he is doing when he lends his money abroad. They are being written for John Smith and Henry Jones, whose meager savings have been and are continuing to be lent abroad without any election on their part. There are several things which John Smith and Henry Jones want to know. First of all, of course, they want to know and have a right to know what the chances are that the money they jave loaned and are continuing to lend will be paid back. Then they want to know, and have a right to know, what use Europe is making of the dol- lars for which they are working and their wives are scrimping. The war loans, of course, are things of the past—water that has gone over the dam—so far as the use made of them is concerned. When Americans furnished the dollars for these loans thev knew they were furnishing them for the purposes of war. We already were in the war and no sacrifices were too great to get us honorably out of it. But John Smith and Henry Jones want to know whether the loans they are making today and will continue to be called upon to make are still war loans—loans looking to a future war— or whther they are loans for peace. This they have a right to know. Spurn European Sink-Holes. Given the condition that Europe is able and disposed to repay her borrowings, past and present, Smith and Jones are willing to keep on working hard, and their wives are willing to keep on practicing self-denial, in order to continue to make loans to Europe, provided these loans are used in a way to help assure that American boys will not again be called upon to help fight battles In Europe. But Smith and Jones cannot see why their families should be called upon to practice self-denial in order that their savings may be poured into the sink-hole of-a Europe hent on self- destruction and the possible destruction of civilization. ‘American’s Stake in Huge European Debt Stirs His Demand for “Square Deal” to U.S. debtors—he has grown too wise for that—but he does want a square deal, and he wants to know whether he is getting it. He doesn't expect the nations of Europe to g0 out of their way to trade with America because they owe America money. On the other hand, he doesn’t think they ought to go out of their way to avold trading with him because they owe him money. He is familiar with the spectacle of the man who runs up a big bill at the corner grocery, then goes somewhere else to trade for cash. He has a very strong suspi- clon that this is what Europe is doing today, or seeking to do, and he wants to know about it. All Interested in Question. There is no one in America who has not a direct and personal interest in these ques- tions. The farmer sees the doors of Europe being closed to his grain and meat products, and he knows he is hurt thereby. The cotton planter sees the Lancashire spinners scouring the world and spending huge sums of money to develop other sources of cotton supply, and he wonders how suvcessful they are being and what it may mean to his future. The manufacturer and the workers in his factory see their markets abroad being taken away from them by the British, the Germans and other Europeans, often by methods which Americans think unfair, and they wonder to what extent this unfair competition is made possible by American dollars which have been loaned to Europe. All the American people are interested in the upbuilding of an Ameri- can merchant marine, and they know their Government is perplexed as to how to get jt upon a paying or even a self-sustaining basis. They have heard stories about unfair dis- crimination by European shippers, encouraged by their governments, against American ships, and they want to know to what extent these storfes are true. In other words, the American people as a whole are about at the point of making up their minds as to what America's attitude toward Europe shall be in the vears immedi- ately ahead, and to help them make up their minds intelligently they want all the unblased and dependable information they can get, and want it in understandable terms. They are fed up on the outputtings of self-seeking pol- iticians who try to play on American preju- dices to advance their own political fortunes. They are equally fed up on the propaganda of innumerable interests which have innumer- able axes to grind. ‘Wants All the Facts. What the average American wants is an opportunity to take a good look at Europe through American eyes. He wants the facts, whether they agree or disagree with his pre- conceived ideas, and when he has the facts he will arrive at his own conclusions. He wants, with intelligent understanding, to make up his own mind, and he doesn't intend some one else shall make it up for him. I am in Europe to do what I can in a mod- est way to help get the average American “the unvarnished facts he wants. Through the courtesy of our State and Treasury Depart- ments, our Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, T will have access to our diplo- matic and consular officers, our Treasury agents, our commercial attaches and agricul- tural commissioners in Europe. I shall talk also to officials of the European governments and to European bankers and business men, but before I accept at face value what they tell me 1 shall check up their statements with our own representatives. rope. He knows, instinctively in spend less. LA FOLLETTE BY FREDERIC WILLIAM WILE. ILITANT liberalism, not the extreme _radicallsm which Robert M. La Follette per- sonified, is the form the Progressive movement of the future will take in American politics, in the judgment of Senator William E. Borah of Idaho. He confidently expects that liberalism will develoj within one of the existing parties and become its paramount feature. Borah hopes the development may be within the Republican party, with which he is identified. But he is certain that liberalism is on the march, and must sooner or later be the watchword of one or the other of the two great parties. Suggestions that Borah is the logical successor of La Follette as leader of the Progressive forces are not encouraged by the Idaho inde- pendent. Borah does not seem to be making any bid for the leadership of any political party. The work in the Senate, to which de devotes his en- tire time—discussion of public ques- tions and the absolute freedom which he enjoys in advocating or opposing policies or program—this is his work. He apparently will not take the time to look after the machinery of a po- litical party. He is engrossed in pub- lic questions and finds his enjoyment in helping to mold and direct public opinion on important issues. Demand Clean Government. “I do not expect to see any move- ment,” said Senator Borah in a spe- cial interview with this writer, “along lines of what is_ordinarily styled ‘radicaiism.” But I do expect to see a distinctly liberal movement in pol- itics. The people want a clean, economical Government. They also want a Government which will take hold of the problems with which we have to deal—a liberal Government. “When we think of the questions before us, such as transportation, tax reduction, the coal problem, the ag- ricultural question, the adjustment of our international debts, and others that might be mentioned, we see at once why it is that we must be up and doing. The people do not think that these questions will solve them- selves. If they do solve themselves, it will be by a very limited number getting advantage. They want them solved in the interest of the whole country and not in the interest of a few. The dealing with these ques- tions, in proper spirit, is what I call ‘liberalism.” “The West and the Northwest, where the Progressive movement was born and developed its greatest strength, went, with the exception of Wisconsin, solidly Republican in 1924. But these regions have not given the Republican party a blank check. In- deed, they have a claim on the Re- publican_party that must not be ig- nored. We have our distinct prob- lems after the election as well as be- fore. There is ample evidence of a growing conviction in the Western country, and especially in the agri- culwural regions, that too much at- tention'is given to the business side of affairs in matters of legislation and administration and not enough and attached to a telephone. Asia has a civilization of her own. To restore and develop the best in that civiliza- noblest endeavors. consideration from the farmers’ standpoint. “There is a feeling that industry with them, shape legislation and mold it not explic- itly, that just one of two ways is open: That order to pay off this huge indebtedness either the people of Europe must work harder and spend less, or he must work harder and But the interest of trade with the nations RADICALISM DOOMED, BORAH DECLARES policies on too narrow a basis. When the Government is asked for direct aid to railroads and business inter- ests, nothing is sald about Socialism or Communism, but when the same principle is applied to the agricul- tural interests, the cry is at once raised that the Government ought not to go into such matters. So in tariff legislation, in banking and ransportation, the interests of agri- culture have been too much over- looked. The farmer is, in fact, not asking so much for special legisla- tion as _he is for equality of treat- ment. These conditions are likely to become aggravated and might take almost any form politically.” “What is most on the farmer's mind, politically?” Senator Borah was asked. “The farmers are beginning to show a deep interest in a more thoroughly balanced tariff,” he re- plied. ~“That is to say, they feel that the disparity in price between what they have to sell and what they must buy is brought about, in a large measure, through the tariff. The farmer is interested in freight rates and other matters, but what is chiefly worrying him nowadays is the injustice, as he sees it, of giving extra high protection to manufac- tured goods, whereas he must sell, to a very large measure, in the open market. It was the demand for a square deal on the tariff principle that was the mainspring of the Mc- Nary-Haugen proposition. “The farmer requested this bill as simply the other side of the shield of a protective tarifft. The farmer saw in that measure some compen- sation to him for the benefits he feels the manufacturer is getting out of the tariff. It doesn't satisfy him to say to him that a protective tarift is statesmanship and that the Mc- Nary-Haugen bill is cheap politics. “‘The party and the statesmen who are wise in their day and generation will take heed of these conditions and frame their program and policies on a little broader scale. The American people are not radical-minded, but they are exceedingly sensitive to any program of favoritism or any pro- gram of neglect. They are not dis- posed to overturn the Government but they haven't the same profound respect for political parties. Foreign Debt to Be Issue. “There is another subject of tre. mendously growing interest all over the country, and that is the vast amount of American cdpital that is being placed at the disposal of foreign nations. The taxpayers of the coun- try know that they loaned some $9.000,000,000 to foreign countries dur- ing the war; they know that, with but one important exception, no inter- est has ever been pald upon this amount. They know, furthermore, that the interest on private loans is being promptly paid. What happens, therefore, {s that the taxpayer is in effect paying interest upon the pri- vate loans in foreign countries. “Liberalism, in other words, con- sists at this time of the simple propo- sition of giving the people a clean and economical Government and of legis- lating upon these public questions in the interest of the whole people. It is only after ‘liberalism’ is rejected and discarded that ‘radicalism’ has a tion is a fine work worthy of theland finance, and everything that goes | hearing." (Copyright 1925.) in Furope does not end with present or prospective. what the chances are for future profitable the average American loans, past, He wants to know s which owe him money. He isn’t looking for any gratitude from these For it would have been a waste of time to have come to Europe merely to pass along propaganda. We have oceans of that at home. (Copyright. 1925.) AGE-OLD RESENTMENTS BRING CHINESE CRISIS BY NATHANIEL PEFFER. Editor’s note—Mr. Pefer is an American mewspaper man who re- cently returned to the United States after living for five years in China. In that time he served as editor of an American news- paper in Shanghai, was a corre- spondent in Peking for various American newspapers and was a regular contributor to leading American periodicals. Even be- fore he went to the Far East he had been a student of Far Eastern affairs. HAT is the trouble in China all about? Why have the Chinese suddenly turned anti-foreign and begun boycotting and killing foreigners, with the res: that there is talk in London and 6ther capitals about international military expedi- tions? B The answer is that the Chinese are not anti-foreign in any radical sense. They are just anti what foreign na- tions have been doing to them for a hundred years. Fundamentally there is no difference between what is happening in China and what is happening or has recently happened in Morocco, Turkey, Egypt and India. ‘They are all nations that have been ruled by white powers. White rule, has been far from gentle. It has been endured only because the great powers had the strength to impose it. The war has left the great em- pires either militarily exhausted or at least markedly weakened. It also spread a lot of dangerous doctrines about the rights of small nations and self-determination. The doctrines have soaked in. And the subject peoples realize that the weakness of the white empires gives them a good opportunity to apply the doctrines. In that sort of atmosphere it has needed only a small incident to serve as the spark which could be fanned into a flame. 0ld Resentments Flame. In China a strike in a Japanese factory, itself of no importance, ig- nited the spark. Resentment at con- ditions going back generations fan- ned it into a flame. What are these conditions? TImagine in New York or San Fran- cisco the harbor and the whole downtown business district held and governed by Germans, with a German mayor, German police on the streets and German laws in force. The Ger- mans would pay no taxes. The Amer- icans would pay, but they would have no vote and no voice in the municipal government. If a German anywherg in the United States killed an Anierican he would be tried by a German judge. If an American even violated the anti-spitting law he, too, would be tried by a German. This is what is meant by _extraterritoriality — the right of a foreigner in any part of China. to be tried by his own court according to his own law, even if the offense be against a Chinese. Under this right, also, no foreigner need pay taxes to the Chinese gov- ernment, though he make his money in Cina out of the Chinese people. Suppose also that the tariff law of the United States were fixed by the diplomats of all the European powers and that Congress could not raise the rates without the unanimous consent of the European powers, so that any country trying to get something out of the United States could block the increase until the United States yielded. Imagine what Secretary Mel- lon's financial problem would be! These are Chinese legal grievances. There are more serious ones. In Shanghai, the most important com- mercial center and an internationally governed city, there is a nice park on the river front. In that park not one of the city's million Chinese dares set foot unless she is a nurse girl to a foreign baby. The writer was living once in a Shanghai hotel when he was called on by the secretary to the President of China. He invited the secretary to lunch. Immediately afterward he was informed that no Chinese wearing Chinese clothes could eat in the din- ing room. The foreign guests did not like it. In Peking, the national capital, there is a club. No American mem: ber dares to take across its threshold the Chinese minister of forelgn af- fairs or any other cabinet minister, even if he is an aristocrat, cultured and a graduate of Harvard or of Ox- ord. Mistreated by Foreigners. The writer has often seen an Eng- lishman on the main street of Shang- hai or Tientsin booting Chinese off the sidewalk into the gutter because he was in a hurry and the Chinese walk slowly. It is a familiar experience to see a forelgner soundly thrashing a ricksha coolie—the coolie who pulls carts carrying people, as if he were a horse—because the coolie did not run fast enough. Or if a Chinese has a seat in a train and you want it and you are a foreigner, throw him out. This is what has formed the back- ground of racial relations in China— 400,000,000 people tyrannized by an alien minority of a few thousands. As long as the Chinese could be terrified by fleets they endured it. Now they are less terrified, because they know it would take 2,000,000 troops to con- quer them. And they know that no nation is in a position to send them. The Chinese are tired of foreign political control and racial domination. The strike in the Japanese factory caused a little disturbance, and the foreign police fired, killing several Chinese. It was the sort of incident that would bring all Chinese griev- ances to a head and force the issue as to what rights the Chinese have on thelr own soil. e Chinese are demanding equalit; and a showdown on their demand. (Copyright, 1925.) ——— Russia to Expel Nobles. Russia’s soviet government is pre- paring to expel 120 nobles from the Caucasus, most of them from Georgia. ‘The nobles are suspected of having taken part in the recent insurrection. Anyway, they form part of the bourgeoisie. In Georgia there ‘yre many nobles because in the early days of Russian history a man was made a prince If he possessed 100 head of cattle. Some of the exiled princes return to their native land to form guerrilla bands which operate against the Soviet forces. BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. HE recent publication of the text of the French reply to the German note of last Feb- ruary suggesting a guarantee pact, together with the Brit- ish publication of the Briand-Cham- berlain correspondence, serves to put the world in possession of the main facts on which, it is safe to guess, will be based a very long and intricate ne- gotiation. For it is essential to per- celve at once that while Britain and France are fairly in agreement, the difference between France and Ger- many is very wide. At bottom this difference is based upon one circumstance. v de- sires a guarantee arrangement which will close the Rhineland to all mili- tary operations, whether originating in the East or in the West, that is, on French or German soil. Therefore, Germany has proposed the absolute neutralization of the Rhineland, the creation of a no-man’s land, in the mil- itary sense, to cross which would be for either country a violation of the pledged word and would automatically bring the British guarantor into the ensuing war against the aggressor. France Has Other Views. France, on the other hand, ap- proaches the problem with other views. The French desire a barrier against all German attack whatso- ever, but under the Treaty of Ver- sailles, France is permitted to take certain sanctlons if Germany violates the treaty. In addition—and this point is on the whole more import- ant—France is the ally of both Po- land and Czechoslovakia, pledged to aid them if they are attacked by Ger- many, but France could not aid them effectively if she were bound by the guaranty pact not to enter the Rhine- land. Therefore France, in her note, holds out for the freedom of action assured her under the Treaty of Versailles, she asks for a pact whish shall not abrogate the right and the duty member nations in_accordance with the covenant of the League of Nations to support other member nations if they are victims of unprovoked at- tack. What France wants. then, is to find some method by which she shall have her hands free to support Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided these countries are wantonly attacked by Germany. i 'But Germany, while proffering ar- bitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, refuses to make guarantee pacts with them, which naturally arouses their apprehension, and at the same time proposes to France precisely the form of guaran- tee pact which would leave France without recourse. if in the future Ger- many should treat Poland or Czecho { slovakia as she treated Belgium in 1914. Moreover, one has to recognize that the fact of German aggression in 1914, despite the celebrated “scrap of paper,” materially lessens the value of any new guarantee given by her. Germans Fear French. Yet it would be a mistake in my judgment to dismiss the German pro- posal as no more than a deliberate scheme to obtain a free hand to deal with eastern neighbors. The truth is that there is just as firm a conviction in the German mind than France {means to stay on the Rhine and to use the leverage of the Treaty of Ver- | sailles for repeated occupations, as there is in the French mind that Ger- ! many will ultimately assail France | agat | ©One may dismiss either the German pathies happen to lie. But no one can spend a week in Berlin without discovering that the German state of mind exists, exists generally, and, what is perhaps most important, ex- ists among those who are on the whole the ablest and the most influential champions of peace and settlement with all the allies. As the moderate men of France are still under the shadow of the fear of Germany, so are the reasonable Germans under a similar apprehension with respect to France. It goes without saving, then, that no German government would or could assent to a treaty of guarantee which did no more than protect France against a German attack across the Rhine. A treaty which Germany would accept must in the very nature of things carry with it protection for Germany against precisely the things Germany fears, namely, repeated in- vocations of the sanctions clauses of the treat of Versallles to justify new French occupations. For if France re- members the invasions of 1792, 1814, 1815, 1870 and 1914, Germany recalls not alone the incursions of Louis XIV and Napoleon, but also even more vividly the still recent invasion of the Ruhr. Seek Immunity. The most reasonable Germans with whom 1 talked while in Berlin re- cently, while welcoming the idea of a pact, frankly indicated that for them the appeal lay in the fact that it would give them immunity from. further French occupations. They believed, many of them, that France was cer- tain at intervals to seize upon any pretext available, to justify a new oc- cupation. What they advocated was not a door, which was swung closed from one direction, but could open free- 1y from the other. If France desired | security—and they recognized this de- sire—they wished for, immunity. But just as clearly France cannot and will not agree to a treaty which deprives her of the right to go to the ald of her eastern allies, if only such agreement would mean a repudiation of solemn obligations, a repudiation which no nation could consent to without grave loss of prestize and even of honor. If Germany attacks Poland or Czechoslovakia, France is bound to aid the victims of the at- tack, and she is certain to reserve the right to do this by the single avenue of approach possible—namely, by the Rhineland. You have then a deadlock at the very outset, yet the deadlock is not absolutely hopeless, provided Ger- {many jolns the League of Nations. For, as a member of the league, not only does Germany take a new un- dertaking not to assail her neighbors, but she accepts the right of her neighbors to counter-attack if she does assail a member nation. In Like Positions. Is Germany willing to join the lea- gue and agree that, despite the guar- antee pact which she proposes to sign with France and Britain, if she makes an unprovoked attack upon Poland or Czechoslovakia, an attack which is pronounced to be wanton by the lea- gue itself, then the pact is without vitality? ~The question is all here, although it is ebvious that France of | or the French state of mind as un-| reasonable or denounce it as evil, pre- | cisely as one chooses or as one's sym- | EQUALITY IS ONLY BASIS FOR SECURITY TREATY Germans Won’t Accept Implication They Are More Liable to Be Guilty of Pact Violation. might also be compelled to accept the same situation. In other words, for both nations the guarantee pact would hold good only while neither was pronounced by the League of Nations to be guilty of unprovoked aggression Certainly Germany will not now or ever sign any pact or treaty as an equal. She will not consent to be put under duress which is spared to any other country. She will not con sent to any stipulation which gives even the colorable suggestion that she is more likely to affront the peace of the world than any other nation She will not consent to the allocation to France of any right to disregard the neutrality of the Rhineland which is not bestowed upon her also With the idea that the German proposal for a gu ntee pact is no more than_ a new device, new scheme to forward ultimate German plans of vengeance, I do not agree, judging from my own experience. On the contrary, my notion is that what is in the back of the German mind is a very real desire to be done with all the mess of recent v s and months, to get the whole inatter of occupa- tion and sanctions and allied super- vision over with. The German wants peace, but his idea of peace is a con- dition in_which he will not be ex- posed to Ruhr occupations, prolonga- tions of Cologne occupations, inter- minable allled military inspections. Has Different View. Naturally the German views all these things in a vastly different lizht from the allied publics. He sees in them the revelation of allied and mainly French purpose to prevent Germany from recovering at any time, to keep Germany in a state of tutelege and helplessness indefinitel balancing each step toward recovery within Getmany by some new crip- pling demand upon her. The whole origin of the German proposal f a pact is to be found, I believe, in the German conception that a_pledge to France. underwritten by Britain, would serve to satisfy French fears and thus end French interference. It follows, then, that the value of the pact sinks to nothing, for Ger- many, if it does not provide just this immunity which the German seeks “Take the pledge for your own terri tory, set up a barrier in the Rhine- land, but a_barrier blocking you as well me.” That is the reality of the German proposal to Fran And to appreciate it one mu ize | that the fear of French aggression in Germany, of French aggression in the immediate future. is as genuine as that in France of eventual Ger. man attack. Now, the British would obviously like to get France and Germany to- gether on the basis of a pact which would be so limited that it would not g0 beyond British interests. They would prefer an agreement which covered only the Rhine and concerned |only France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other. They are interested neither in Po- land nor in Czechoslovakia, and they are concerned lest French interest in both shall make the accommodation of France-German differences impos- sible and ultimately ‘involve them in 2 new war. Alliances Disfavored. Therefore the British have striven pretty consistently to persuade France to drop her eastern allies. In this they have measurably failed because while the French are prepared to agree that Germany shall not be called upon to give pledges covering all her frontiers, knowing full well that no German government could live, if it entered upon such a con- tract, they are not prepared to sign away their right to aid these un- tries, if Germany does attuck them. After three months of discussion, the British and the French stateimen have been unable to reconcile their difference in a common policy, th - fore they have finally agreed on the present compromise which France has sent to Germany. But Germany is just as certain to take alarm at the French proposals as France at the German. Therefore the next and the really difficult step comes with the attempt to reconcile French views. Moreover, it is cer- tain at the outset that neither coun- try will give way on the essential issue of security or accept any plan unless equal protection is afforded I it to both nations and it is equally clear that the French proposal ¢ not give Germany her measure protection in its present form One must recognize, however, that the present proposal marks a very distinct advance, so far as Britain and France are concerned. We have t least a very definite statement of Brit- ish willingness to undertake the re- sponsibility of defending French and Belgian frontiers against Germany. It is true that the actual form of the undertaking is carefully silent in the matter of names. In form, Britain undertakes to maintain the Rhina against any infringement, whether German or French, but the British commitment in the matter of Belgium was at least equally vague, vet the French found it adequate in the hour of trial. British Responsibility. In fact, then, the British have des clared that French security is a mate ter of British responsibility. But they have avoided the sort of undertaking Poincare pressed for and all French- men have hoped for, namely, an alli- ance between France and Britain, which could only be aimed at Ger- many. Such an alliance would not merely be contrary to British tracition, for Britain only makes alliances in the presence of immediate peril and for the limited period of the &xistsnce of that peril, but it would aleo b= an unmistakable challenge to Germany. To guarantee French security witnout exciting German resentment ¢t appre- hension, this has been the wnole British aim—and it is realized when the British guarantee takes the form of an underwriting of a bi-lateral security pact proposed by Germany Had Britain been able to give such a pledge four or five yvears ago, had France been willing at that time to take such a guarantee, the world would have been spared many evil moments in recent vears. But in this direction, as in the matter of repar- of | tions, it has neeced time to denaze =x- pectations. And it is just impor- tant for the Germans to perceive that Britain realize her necessity to main- tain French frontiers as it is for France to recognize that the possi- bility of an exclusive alliance with Britain does not exist—has in reality never existed since the close of tha World War. As to the German suggestion that the United States be in some fashion Joined to the undertaking. rather as {Continued on Third Page.)