Evening Star Newspaper, December 11, 1921, Page 47

EDITORIAL PAGE" NATIONAL PROBLEMS SPECIAL ARTICLES EDITORIAL SECTION The Sund ay St » ‘ < Part 2—16 Pages Congress Back on First Page And Has Job Cut Out For It; power in every branch of the govern- ment, and by majorities phenomenal in size, are accountable in the utmost | BY N. 0. MESSENGER. RESIDENT HARDING has not been so engrossed Wwith the affairs of nine of the nations of the earth, presented by | their envoys in conference here, that| letter of the he could not find time to make a| comprehensive survey of domestic conditions to present to Congre upon its reconvening for the regular session, which was in one respect @ notable affair. There was the picture of the am- bassadors and ministers of these con- ference-attending countries, With those of other countries as well; the high-class journali: of all lands where the printing press whirs. with the American lawmakers and the executive administrators of the American government gathered in one hall, to hear the President make brightening, his recommendat i Europe, Asia and the two A\mvrlc‘a:‘ eloment. virtually touched elbows as the visitors sat below the rostrum from which the President addressed them. * % Congress “came back™ with a rush and resumed its place on the front page of the great daily newspapers. from which it had been crowded for a while by the overshadowing arms | conference. The President's message | attracted widespra tention, judg- | ing from the display given it in the “just cussed There doubt that he talked about things that the peo- ple are interested in and which they | will claim. had all the time in the back of their! Well, it minds. cven while s were | the focused for the time > fasci- | tunity to nating international conference and|the voters, its interesting figures. i Of course, tow the country may be expected to resume consideration of home is- sues, after trifling with the foreign dishes set by the arms conference. ta President Harding disclosed in his mddress” the fact that he has kept constantly in touch with domestic questiony and his comment upon them was in line with his characteristic . mental process of dealing with big upon higher ! nesitate achievement ¥problems — matter-of-fact, business- | 3 like, safe and sane. And vet he did | Prows’ not hesitate to take advanced ground | to political And there on suggestions for mew treatment of the tariff question. It will have to be admitted that he has the courage of his convictions. ¥ ok ok % What is the prospect for the legis- lation of the session? There is prob- ably mo leader in either body Congress who would risk his reputa- toin as a prophet upon predicting the definite results of the long season | SIENS: i of legislative grist-grinding which| DUt when President stretches ahead.® For instance, it now segms assured that the tariff making is to proceed under conditions which will render | the process different from the con- Struction of aforetime tariff laws. 01a lines of action will be superseded by the new method, in which the operation of the “bloc” system wili figure extensively, upsetting all the familiar standards of party procedure. The republican party is charged with the responsibility of framing the new tariff law, and will be held to actountability November for doing it. But will the! republican party. as a political unit, | make the law? H * A republican candidate for re-eiec- tion to Congress might be expected to make the claim, in case his con- stituency proved di sfied witi the highly prom appreciated = * gation. this world Jaw, that the party should not be held |y, vo a1y political or party considera- Table for the conglomerate measure | ;, o that feems destined to come. but| wauld Be be able to “zet away with | i : The watchful democra It is minor- Wil try to see to it that he does notiFucceed. #“Fround will be taken by the is estimated now that the tariff can be made into law by next May. Granting that it turns out as hope- fully predicted, and that it becomes operative .immediately, its force and effect will be apparent by .the time the campaign comes on. be its reaction in the political field? There is one possibility holding out comfort to the republicans, and that is that employment conditions, now Dpeople in a better frame of mind, and {that this condition will be added to whatever impgtus is given industry by the tariff, the republicans to reap the benefit of it all. n politics and hope that luck will smile upon them. | “Goodness kno our share of bad luck, % the feud of 1912 and the narrow mar- gin by which the: the old-time politician still avers was is said conditions are on the upturn. due to natural causes of action and reaction. the philosopher and economist will leading journals of the country. Well. f say, but due to the beneficent rule of the republfean party, the politician | won't politicians will have an oppor- try shock President ¢ Hushes to suggest that political considerations should be taken | zccount at all in connection with the * {arms conference. since their minds and hearts are fixed discussing the more sordid rank and file of the politicians, who would not a moment themselves the reflected glory of the are certainly looking forward | | pretiend that the conference will prove dolefulest over sation of progress evinced by visible Harding Hughes. Senator Lodge and Mr. Root, they were told to be of good cheer;| {there was no change for the worse. | but, on th contrary, everything looked One of the cynical features of com- {ment in circles surrounding the con- ference has been the suggestion that the administration has so much at stake in the success of the confer- ence that advantage might be taken in the elections next |!0 Wring conc lican delegation. cen harbored, { ference leader President and of the American dele- Tyey know that with the President and the administration the objects of which applies to every country a party to the confere | gued that the participating nations| | are on trial before the whole civilized S WASHINGTON, D. C., SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 11, 192l law for the bill. * oK k% What will may operate to put the is a recognized republicans’ still There the * they say, “we had | contemplating lost in 1916, which bad luck.” to he no reason to industrial and busiuess made in goods. be long now until out their claim upon it would profoundly Harding and Secre- into house, And well it might, aspects. But we now are on the debt, how to attract unto looked for. The “low s : apparently ets in this direction. PL is no reason now to ap- the momentary ces- the leaders talked with aly. and Secretary e material. 8- A and unemployment has been steadily inéreas- labor would be found locally. The rails, roll- ually. £ ok % K ing. Itely is doing better than almost any INg Stock and locomotives could be built in this int other European country in balancing its FEngland and France by men who are now have to budget. 1,500,000,000 lire. ssions from the Amer- That idea has not however, by the con- who have sensed and the true attitude of the! tions. lire, while exports conference are far and a questiod of principle It is ar- an undertaking. &cifoerats _that the republicans. in Bkt ¢ ¥Hl—Iitaly, Russia and the East £\ OME of the greatest difficulties which con- &-"fronted the pe conference arose out of freatics signed between the allies during fl.|e War. It was the cternal problem of reconcil- Ang contracts with altered circumstances. Tloyd George held strongly that it would be for nations to start repudiating treaties as ‘as they did not suit their interests or because [y , were incompatible with an jdeal solution. '*ofih?fls in his opinion would contribute more to dat# the bitterness and uncertainty which de- 5 ternational confidence and make co-opera- injpossible. Treaties were the laws governing whational conduct. and, as such, ousht to be ¢ as very sacrosanct. 12,08 the other hand, he considered that a selfish é intic insistence on treaty rights was almost \bad as repudiation. Circumstances were always . Skanging, and as they changed laws imd treaties bad £p ‘be changed, too. He never hesitated, there- y&i%to vége modification on the parties to a treaty 1; ‘he contended that modification must be byV !1 Not only was consent the only road to further agreed modifications later on, it was the only way of securing execution. Peace conferences have no executive power, except against the enemy. Execu- tion of decisions, therefore, depends upon the vol- untary actfon of the parties concerned. p * * % % These difficulties came to a head over the Italian frontiers and China. In 1915 a treaty had been signed . between Italy. Russia, Great Britain and France, whereby Italy undertook to come into the war, while the allies undertook to support in the eventual negotiations for peace her claims to a Jarge part of Dalmatja and also to certain other advantages in the eastern Mediterranean. The treaty was reasonable at the time. It secured the assistance of Italy in freedom's great struggle with Germman autocracy and militarism. The frontiers agreed to were fair as a strategic protection against tie great Austro-Hungarian empire. The total disappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy, however, and the emergence of the idea of nationality as the basis of the European settlement changed the sItuation. President Wilson, who was bound by no treaty,’ naturally stood out for frontiers between Italy and her neighbors corresponding to. the nationality line, both on the ground that it was fust"in fteelf and because it was.necessary to lasting péacs fn southeastern Europe. Orlando demanded stsadfly his rights under the treaty—and Fiime in additton, France and Great Britain were torn in two: on the eac hand they heid tnemseives bound by the iworld. and will be called upon to {Continued on Third Page.) - lish his case and appeal treaties they had signed; on the other they sym- pathized with the American view as to what was the wise and right thing to do. * % Kk % The dispute was long and a basis for com- promise difficult to find. Finally Wilson announced that he would negotiate no longer, but would pub- to the world. Lloyd George urged him to delay. He pointed out that Orlando was not the difficulty, but the intense national sentiment of Italy which refused to evacu- ate the territory concerned, and that publication would cnly harden that sentiment and make agree- ment impossible. Wilson agreed to a postpone- ment for a couple of days. Lloyd George then set to work once more to try to bring Orlando and Wilson. nearer toiagreement. He had got some way and was hupeful’of success, when the news’ came that Wilson's letter had been published on the stroke of time.s As he had predicted, the effect of the letter was not to influence the Italian peo- ple toward moderation, but to excite them to fury. Orlando anriounced his intention of going imme- diately to Rome to consult his parliament. ~Lloyd George urged him not to go. He told him that he would have a triumphal journey, but that his triumph would make his own fall certain as soon as the excitement had died down and compromise was again in the air. But Qrlando insisted, had his triumph, and within a few weeks had fallen from office. Eventually, two years later, the ques- tion was settled by direct agreement between Italy and Jugoslavia very much on the lines of the com- promise Lloyd George had endeavored to bring about. * X %k Xk 5 The second difficult case was over Shantung and the Pacific Islands. In January, 1917, when the Germans started the unlimited submarine war the 2llied admiralties were at their wits’ end to find anti-submarine craft. There was only Japan to turn to. Japan consented to send torpedo boats to protect the Mediterranean sea routes, but on con- dition that France and Great Britain agreed to support their claims to inherit German rights in the far east north of the equator in the final settlement. The admiralties were insistent that this naval assistance was vital, and in February the assurance was given, Japan at the same time undertaking to support any ciaim Britain might make to inherit German rights in the- southern “Pacific. It is curious to think that had the Unijted States declared war two months earlier the assur- ance pledging the Frerich and British attitude*would never have been: glven. . 5 When the peace conferenee, therefore, came to deal with the matter France and Great Britain In view of the widespread interest aroused in the plan proposed by Frank A. Vanderlip for utilizing the proceeds. of the debt owed by the allied governments to the government of the United States for the rehabilitation and restoration of Europe, and the undoubted importance of his suggestions, The Star asked Mr. Vanderlip for a more detailed explana- tion of his plan. The article published below is the result. i By FRANK A. VANDERLIP. ULSTIONS indicate interest. are enough asked about the plan for handling the interallied to the United Statex sented to the Economic Club doubt that people are interested. That plan, briefly, suggested that the pay- ment to us by the allies of the interest, and gradually, the principal, of what they owe would probably not only. be an impossible drain upon thelr resources, but so far as they did pay it would disorganize our industrial affairs, because payment would have to be To avoid the danger of ruin- ing our debtors and harming ourselves, it was suggested that for a time the interest payments be devoted to the rehabilitation of Europe, expended under our direction. would be no relation between the sogrce of the payment and the place of expenditure. Much of the expenditure would be in form of revolving credits and would result in replacing allied obligation with obligations of other governments, specific security of the railway, grain ware- hydro-electric plant, that had been undertaken.. * %k % ¥ The most frequent question that is: If the allies are unable to pay us interest would them to put cash in our hands to make such expenditures as I have suggested for the re- habilitatio nof European economic life? It is difficult for people economic difference between making a pay- ment to us here in America and making pay- ments to be expended under our direction in * ok %k Let us take, for example, the situation in . Ttaly is one of the richest countries in Burope in its effective labor supply. It is one of the poorest countries in native raw There is at the present time much unemployment. The official figures of unem- plosment when I was in Italy were 450,000, Tt is not only levying taxes, but is collecting them. It has actually reduced its circulating notes, having cut down its note circulation from the high point more than ‘The weakness of the Italian situation lies in the necessity for imports and the inability to export under present condi- For the first five months of this year italian imports were in excess of 6,500,000.000 leaving excess of imports 3,848,000,000 lire. If Italy were to pay us here in America, the deficit in her foreign trade balance would be increased by the amount she paid us. is obviously impossible. * k% * On the other hand, if we were to undertake, for example, the development of hydro-electric power in Italy, she could readily furnish all the labor and a considerable amount of the industrial manufactures connected with such She could domestically ralse the credit for that work. program might well be the furnishing ef a VANDERLIP EXPLAINS HIS PLAN FOR HANDLING EUROPEAN DEBT dustrially. ki k ¥ Xk Let us look at another project in some de- The food situation in Europe could be if modern systems of grain elevators were established in the agri- cultural districts of eastern Europe. labor necessary could be easily supplied in each of the countries The cost of that labor might be met by English payments, but the payment would not have to be made In foreign ex- The moment that these non-manu- facturing nations could obtain any credit in England they would _spend England has two mil- lion idle men, and ‘as many more working on The English payment would be not in cash or foreign exchangs, but in goods that eastern Europe is hungry for, while English mills are standing idle. The necessary timber for such construction might in part, for example, come from Poland. Poland owes us a considerable amount, has such an adverse balance of trade that she cannot pay outside debts in foreign currency She has almost unlimited forest products and plenty of labor to convert those This program would stimulate her exports, givihg her an outlet for some- thing she can produce, instead of leaving her lumber as it is in its-present stagnant posi- Poland could. easily export lumber to waereas, of course, she cannot ex- port lumber to the:United States. an arrangement thg debt due us from Poland, which she cannot”pay. would be converted into a debt due us from Rumania, for which there would be added security of the system of grain elevators which we would construct. While that arrangement would be beneficial to us, it would be of enormous benefit both to Rumania and to all food-consuming Europe. * k% X * certainly questions tail. indebtedness immensely which I recently pre- to leave no improved were constructed. change. manufactured goods. short time. made, There the but with the further , values. or other work into lumber. is asked tion. it be possible for Rumania, to grasp the anything but a signal success. The Europe. If payments cannot be made to us “ongress came back from its brief va- here, many fail to see how they could be cation to find the conference itself in| made if they were not brought here. a recess extending over several days. There I think, a distinct difference in i The D sts and croakers had the difficulties Involved in the two forms of | taken advantage of it to groan their v cnt rope. idle. were 2,677,000,000 lire, That and France. The result of such a found themselves in the same situgtion as in l’_!e case of Italy. The difficulty was further incregsed by the fact that the Chinese, who, despite their _ numbers, had evolved no effective stregnth of their " own, had also made treaties yielding rights to Japan in Shantung. Japan, therefore, had a good legal case, though the Chinese urged that these treaties had been obtained by force majeure. *x % % % President Wilson stood out for.the:full Chinese claims, the Japanese fortheir full treaty rights. In between stood M. Clemenceau and Mr: Lloyd George, refusing to repudiate their treaty obliga- tions, but endeavoring to arrange a compromise. As usual in politics, it was not a question of ‘de- clding what was ideally right, but of what it was possible to persuade Japan, who was in possession, to agree to execute. It was Lioyd George's view that the best practicable plan ‘was to make an agreement which definitely re-established. Chinese sovereignty in Shantung, created Kalo-Chao a treaty port, but left Japan with Germany’s eco- nomic rights defined under a .treaty guarantee. ‘This was substantially the plan eventually agreed upon. The Chinese delegates, however, taking the view that such an agreement was incompatible with their independence, refused to sign the treaty, which fell to the ground, and the Japanese re- mained in occupation. * %k k k ° The Russian problem brooded over the whole conference like a nightmare. At one of its opening meetings Lloyd George said that the peace confer- ence would fail to be worthy of its name unless it did something to restore peace to Russia. Hence the proposal to bring together representatives of the allies, of the bolsheviks and of Deniken and Koltchalk at Prinkipo to discuss the basis of ‘a peaceful settlement. i Lloyd George has always taken a rather gn- orthodox view of the Russian situation.” A lifelohg liberal, he had no sympathy with the 'tzaffst regime; a keen student of the French revolutidn, he had an instinctive grasp of the forces at work and of the way in which things would «work out. He was never afraid of bolshevism as such. He thought the fervor of the revolutionary enthusiasm, ‘with"its madly idealist experiments and awful ter- rorism, would gradully yield to the facts of life, and settle down to much the same kind of goverp- ment, only under new labels, that had hgd before. He used oftén to draw inde between -the Russian and French utions, ty tween .Lenin and “Trotsky, and Robespiérre Marat, to the great indignation of His Frénchct- leftues. His view always was that the best course would be to get all parties together and u¥ W large amount of employment for the unem- ployed, a development of electric power that would ease the necessity for coal imports, which would help balance her foreign trade deficit, and the conversion of the debt which she could not possibly now pay us directly into an obligation that would give us all the security we now have, hydro-electric plant which would be con- structed. England could help with fjhe enter- prise, and at the same time make some-pay- ment of interest due us by constructing tur- bines and dynamos for export to Italy. one's domestic industrial situation would Le upset, and a great contribution would be made toward setting things going again There are regions in FEurope where building of raflroads would be followed by as rapid economic development as followed the construction of some of the railroads in our great west a generation ago. of Europe would be increased and the buy- ing capacity of great masses of eastern Eu- ropean peasants would soon make itself felt M all the industrial nations of western Eu- If we undertook the construction of well Jocated lines of this character, the direct Such exports from England and France would not upset our domestic . situation, but would quickly put hope and new vigor into the Eureopean situation and would be fol- lowed by new demands in England and France tor the products of factories and mills; there would be reactions on every side that would be advantageous and we would have obtained for ‘the interest claims that cannot be directly liquidated in payment to us fresh obligations from eastern FEuropean nations, railroads we constructed. * K * % There would undoubtedly develop creative pro- grams which we might undertake both in England There are great waterpower de- velopments ready to be undertaken in France, but in the present state of government credit further loans for the purpose cannot be made. It would, nevertheless, be poesible for France to make payments to us of funds that were to be directly expended within her own boundaries. The productive capacity of France could be increased, her fuel situation could tion greatly benefited. plus a lien on the States. No claim. in- which were created. All the where the elevators on his feet. it for English jiqyjqation 18 improved. and creditor. but a program. undertaking, would say, No. mission. Under such armistice. the ‘The food supply have. our debtors to pay. its direct feturn. plus llens upon thing. fare? of the avolded. to induce them to stop fighting and combine in re- building Russia on better lines. But peace was impracticable. Neither the bol- sheviks nor the old Russians were really ready to meet, because neither was willing to yield any part of Russia to the other, and the allles were deeply divided themselves as to the policy to be pursued. So the ctvil war in Russia continued, with the al- lies alternating between the policy of helping the anti-bolsheviks and toying with fresh proposals for peace. And to the end of the conference Rus- sia remained what, to a great extent it still Te- mains, an unsolved enigma. * ok ok %k The last problem which confronted the confer- ence was that of the mear east and the German colonfes. It raised the mandatory question in an acute form. It was clear that many peoples in the world, especially in Africa, were still quite incapable of conducting a stable government under the flerce pressure of modern political and economic competition. Some- civilized power must take charge and supervise their government until they. had learned how to govern themselves. President ‘Wilson wished to enshrine this principle in the .peace by transferring all German colonles and Turkish territorfes to the league of nations, and making it govern them direct. France and Britain both thought the league incapeble of doing such work. Clemenceau advocated out-and-out annexa- tion by a civilized power, Lloyd Géorge an inter- .mediate system whereby the mandatory power should be responsible to the league of nationms, which should have the duty of seeing that it lived up to its responsibilities. It was on these lines that the solution embodied in article 21 of the covenant was based. So far as the German colonies were concerned it was then decided that the powers which had fought the German forces should become the man- datory powers. The real difficulty arose over the near east. Was Constantinople to be internationai- ized, and, if so, who was to provide the pelice and military forces necessary for its protection? How ‘were the Greek and other minorities to be protected in Turkey? What about Armenia, where, in an area which had once been Armenian, the Armenians ‘were now, largely, thanks to massacre, in a hope- less minority, and, therefore, incapable of maintain- ing a government. A mandatory was the only so- lution, yet who was to be that mandatory? Then there were the rights of.Italy under the treaty to thelr respective mandatory spheres in Arabis, the deslre of the Arab intelligentsia to run before they had learned 'to stand, and last, but by no be improved and the character of her obliga- England desires to construct a series of great central electric power stations. She has all the means of doing that within herself, but has not the economic courage to start on such a great enterprise in the face of & situation where we may demand from her hundreds of mil- lions of dollars a year if our claims were to be realized in payments made in the United She eould readily undertake such construc- tion if for the time being she did not have to export goods into our market to meet our She would increase her productive capacily, employ her idle workmen, put fresh courage into her industrial and economic sit- uation by doing this, and we would have in addition to the obligation we now have the further security of the great power * % X X There is nothing really novel about such program—the only novelty lies in the applica- tion to national obligations of those principles which a wise creditor would apply to a tem- porarily disabled debtor. Help put the debtor Give him fresh courage. him a start toward increasing his earning capacity and the prospect of ultimate debt is done every day as between individual debtor The difficulty seems to lie in thinking of the subject in international terms. Quite another question is raised in connec- tion with the carrying out of such a project. It is asked whether in view of the mess that governments have already made in conducting great undertakings it would be possible for our government to undertake successfully such If Congress had to pass on each if the projects were handled after the manner in which we improve inland waterways and construct public buildings, I The work would need to be handed over to a properly constituted com- I have sufficient faith in American genius to believe that we could properly con- struct such a commission. briefly by saying that I would put Herbert Hoover at the head of it, and would rest easy about the results. We have many such men of high motives, of sound imagination, of tech- nical expertness, who would render connection a very great international service. * % * *x Some amazingly good work has been done in Europe by Americans in the days since the . They have shown such a sense of fairness, such a grasp of method, such an | abllity to organize the forces there into self- helpfulness that I know we could successfully undertake such a program as I have outlined if we could put some of our best men at the job. The man who fears that we cannot trust the character, good sense and ability of Amer- icans to undertake a work of this kind has less faith in his fellow countrymen than I I belleve that we can. S The great task would only devolve grad- At best we can only get a portion of t paid at once. We would only lan expenditure as rapldly as in- come developed. I feel profoundly certain, however, that sensibly to start on the program Will result in rapidly developing the ability of ‘With such a program wisely carried out they can, in time, discharge their full obligations to us. . Some part I would certainly expend with no obligation for ‘We are talking now about remitting the debt, about sealing it, or about cutting down the interest for a period to a nominal rate. All that means giving up some- It we are willing to do that, why should we not give it up with the same gen- erosity, but with much greater wisdom, by insisting that the full amount be devoted to the rehabilitation of the egpbnomic life of Eu- rope and toward invigorating its social wel- Even if we get no direct return from some earlier- interest payments, the indirect return would be greater than a direct return, for it would give the impetus,~the confidence, the start toward self-helpfulness that Europe must have if the gravest dangers are to be 'How Arms Conference Looks From Outside Looking In BY G. GOULD LINCOLN. | ate” and in the “House,” the final par- HE Washington conference on | liamentary stage. the limitation of armament from the inside, looking out, | will be public only when a|the conference, it member of the American or some |Dbring forth agreements other delegation undertakes to write | 5ecfet, in completed stage, without his story of the conference. The Washington conference from |Countries affected thereby. the outside, looking in, is another | this feature the Washington confer™ The whole world, generally | €0ce i vastly different from the Ver- matter. tion. |the conference, to of the world ‘Washington observers plants political factions speaking, is engaged in this occupa- More particularly, there are 485 newspaper correspond- ents accredited to the conference, en- deavoring daily to give the news of interpret glances of the eye as may come their way and to get the “atmosphere.” Besides these observers for the press there are gathered in for in the nations of * *x X ¥ With this method of precedure of is impossible to made in any notice to the peoples of the And in ailles peace conference, or any other international conference held in the past, when the destines of nations have been involved. At the conclusions of the committes meetings, there is issued a formal “communique,” in the phraseology of Europe, or “statement” in the Ameri- can language. These statements give }in succinct form what has transpired Various | Pehind closed doors. Sometimes these statements are lengthy, giving in complete detail the proposals however, such the world, not to mention the ac-)yancea by different delegations, and credited diplomatic corps, keeping. their countries informed of Of the 485 cor- respondents accredited to the confer- ence, eighty-seven of them ‘are from overseas—as far as Australia, Japan, the trend of events. China and India. Give * % k % That sort of thing with the newspaper mes | very large measure. In fact, headr of I have put it such a way * % x ¥ formation, committees of subject—the LOYD GEORGE—The Man and His Times means least, the Balfour declaration and the Zion- ist aspirations in Palestine. The problem was intolerably complex. Which- ever way one turned one met an insurmountable difficulty. Lloyd George thought that the key to the solution was that the United States should be given the free hand to deal with Constantinople, Turkey and Armenie, as she chose, but the pther allies were opposed, and it gradually became clear that the United States was against taking any kind of mandatory responsibility at al Eventually the conference dispersed with nothing done, and left the supreme council to attempt to patch things to- gether by degrees. - * X X X ‘Who took the predominant part In the settlement of Versailles? The question admits of no precise answer. Facts were, as always in politics, tho de- cisive thin No statesman, however eminent and strong, can alter them, and the peace of Paris was fundamentally governed by the facts of Europe at the time. Nome the less, the personal factor is im- mensely important. Of personalities at Paris, three were dominant, Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George. They were all strong and able men. No one of them was in any sense subordinate to or under the influence of the other. Each exercised decisive influence. Wilson was always looking for- ward to a new world. Clemenceau looked back- ‘ward, seeing Europe it was and thinking that it would remain what it had always been. Lloyd George stood between the two, always anxious to move forward, but refusing to go ahead of what he thought the people could stand, and day after day shaping conclusions into’ practical reforms. The combination was & good oné. The peace would have been a bad peace had any of the three ele- ments been missing. ky; Lioyd George clearly saw that the peace had many defects. There were féatures in it which he would have alte.ed. But he thought that ‘on the whole it was as good as it was reasonable to expect . victorious nations to agree to so near to the ‘termination of a world war. Some of the worst dangers, such as the dismemberment of Ger- many, had been avoided. Other difficult features connectéd with the Saar valley and the occupation of German territory were temporary. Looking, as always, at the practical possibilities of the time, Lloyd George theught that the foundation of a new and better Europe had been truly laid. - In the first place, initead of the Hohenzollern prevailed right up to the’ dorder. The fact that governments were now at last amenable to the peopies they governed was, in Lloyd George's Looking at the conference from the outside, there are various points from which a view may be taken. there are the plenary, or open ses- sions, of which there have been four |delegations. These subcommittees are up to the present time. Second, there {as follow; are the conferences which the spokes- men of various delsgations hold daily n—and women, | United States; Admiral Beatty, British Third, there are the more private con- versations which the newspaper men obtain individually with delegates or persons attached to the delegations. In view of the demands from many sources that the conference be con- ducted with the utmost publicity pos- sible, it may be sald that the wish for publicity is being granted in a when Secretary the American delegation. inade his‘meniorable addressnt the| oot L T SO s | first session of the conference, which i : 3 was “open,” the world was aston- ished at the frankness in which he 1aid the cards on the table with refer- ence to limitation of naval arma- ments. But necessarily, it was found, } closed sessions of the conferees { must be held at which the delegates| mevw, British empire: Prof. Moureau, could obtain Information regarding | France: Prof. Mayer, France: Lieut. various proposals advanced and give | Col. Pentimalli, Italy; Maj. Gen. Hara- their views in @ more or less intimate | guchi, Japan. At the outset, therefore. a plan was adopted by which the conference meets in committee of the whole, for | the express purpose of obtaining in- and for preparing the various delegations for action. These | committee meetings, it was explained !by the highest authority, are pre- | paratory to further open meetings i at which discussion and final action may be taken by the conference on the major matters to which it is giv- ing its attention. There are two major the conference—one on the limitation of armaments, com- { posed of members of the delegations of the five powers meeting on_this TUnited States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan—and the other on the problem of the far east, coriposed of the delegations of the nine powers taking part in dis- cussions of those problems, the five already mentioned and Belgium, Hol- 1and, Portugal and China. this method of procedure follows the ordinary parllamentary procedure of the Senate and House, which first consider measures in subcommittees, usually behind closed doors, then in committee of the whole in their re- spective houses, usually with . the doors open, and finally in the “Sen- Who are ' (ne replies made by others, as for in- stance, when the Chinese delegation, in the committee on the far east, laid down its “ten principles” or proposals regarding the demands of China. * k¥ ¥ In addition to the major committees of the conference, there have been appointed so far nine subcommittees, some of them composed of principal delegates to the conference and others made up of experts accompanying the First, Subcommitte of techinical naval ad- vicers—Col. Roosevell, ALK, empire; Vice Admiral De Bon, France: Vice Admiral Acton, Italy; Vice Ad- miral Kato, Japan. Subcommittee with respect to air- craft—Real Admiral Moffett, chair- man, United States; Brig. Gen. Mitchell, United States; Air Vice Ad- miral Higgins, British empire: Col. Requin, France; Capt. Roper, France; Col. Moizo, Italy; Capt. Nagano, Ja- pan. Subcommittee with respect to laws of warfare—Prof. George G. Wilson. Hughes, British empire; M. Fromageot, France; Count Pagliano, Italy; Mr. 8. Tachi, Japan. Subcommittee with respect to poison gases—Prof. Edgar F. Smith chairman, United States; Brig. Gen Fries, United States; Col. Bartholo Subcommittee on question of for- eign post offices in China—Senator Lodge. chairman, United States: Sir Auckland Geddes, British empire: Mr. Sze. China: M. Viviani, France: Mr. Hanihara, Japan. Special drafting committee of sub- committee on questions of foreign post offices in China—Mr. MacMur- ray, chairman, United States; Sir. John Jordan, British empire; Mr. Lampson, British empire; Mr. T. Z. Tyau, China; Mr. Kimura, Japan: Mr. Yoshino, Japan. \ Subcommittes on Chinese revenue— Senator Underwogd, chairman, United States; Baron de Cartier (alternate, Mr. Cattier), Belgium: Sir Robert Borden (alternate, Sir John Jordan). British empire; Mr. Koo, China; Mr. Sarraut, France; Senator Albertini (alternate, Mr. Fileti), Italy; Mr. Hanihara, Japan; Jonkheer Beelaerts van Blokland, Netherlands; Vasconcellos, Portugal. Subcommittee on extraierritoriality —Senator Lodge, chairman, TUnited States; Chevalier de Wouters, Bel- Great Capt. In a way. gium; Senator Pearce, Brit! - pire: Dr. Chung-Hul Wai b M. Surraut, France; A Riecl, Italy: Mr. Hanihar&" Jonkheer van Karnebeek, lands; Capt. Vasconcellos, (Continued on Third By Phili ‘ y ilip K (His Secretary, 1917-1¢ b 3 opinion, the greatest single safeguard against, I8 Democracies may get war mad, and may - fected by racial hatred or greed, but they are nig¢r likely to plot and plan war for reasons of pe: profit and agsrandizement as are governments trolled by courtier or military cliques. 2 Secondly. Europe, for the first time, was fo fairly and squarely upon nationality. There great economic disadvantages in the solutlon,’ everybody now sees. But the greatest cam the old system, the cutting up of nationalti - tween conflicting autocratic empires, had beem¥e- moved. ' Thirdly, the idea had been definitely lald d in the peace that war was the concern of aill §a- tions, and that they must combine to try to 5:- vent it by conference and negotiation befbre h#v- ing recourse to force. Lloyd George did not think the machinery of the league was perfect, but ge was convinced that the idea for which it llja it had come to stay. Finally, a commencement had been made with disarmament. Conscription had been abolished’in central Europe. As we have seen, Lloyd Gm' endeavored to induce the allles to enter into e arrangement about armaments at Paris. The ‘Washington conference, indeed, is giving effect af a more seasonable time to what Lloyd George had originally proposed. * % X ¥ For the rest, Lloyd George has too keen a his- torical sense to believe that any settlement could bring a millennium or attempt to make one which could he final. Every treaty, every peace is but a milestone, registering the position at this time. but the highway runs on all the time, and it is at further milestones along that highway that the ideals disappointed in 1919 will come to fruition. It is the fashion today to decry the work of the peace conferénce. History will probably re- verse that judgment. If anything, the peace con- ference was ahead of its times. It planned a set- tlement which contained within itself no seeds of fresh war, and it created machinery desigmed to adjust international differénces by conference and conciliation. The hopes of mankind have been frustrated not so much because the settlement was bad, but because the nations have not been able to live up to it. Passion, fear and prejudice still "dominate the old world, and Indifference and seif-centeredness the new. Had the nations set to work to make. the best of the peace and of the machinery it created, instead of crabbing it and settling back Into their old grooves, things might be_far better than they are today. (Copyright. 1831, by the McClare Newspaper Syndicate.) NEXT SUNDAY—Lloyd Georze Since the War.