Evening Star Newspaper, November 20, 1921, Page 45

EDITORIAL PAGE NATIONAL PROBLEMS . SPECIAL ARTICLES Part 2—16 Pages EDITORIAL SECTION : The Swunidny Star. WASHINGTON, D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER ‘20, 1921 Society News Arms Parley Filling Public Eye, - Crowds Congress From Spotlight BY N. 0. MESSENGER. RESIDENT HARDING finds him- self in the position of one entitled to say “I told you so.” His arms limitation and far eastern conference starts off with the jewel of success glittering upon its forehead. From the time that Secretary of State Hughes, head of the American delegation and as such spokesman of the government of ‘the United States and of the administration, ef- fected the coup of presenting a defl- nite program of limitation of naval armament, inviting the co-operation ©of the nations, there was not a ques- tion of a final agreement being reached. An agreement—some kind of an understanding, broad or narrow, eir- cumscribed or liberal, whatever it be, it's bound to be. Its assurance was vouchsafed by the prompt acquies- cence of Great Britain and Japan and the concurrence of France and Italy in the basis proposed. ‘Whatever the final terms may fur- nish in disappointment to the over- expectant or surprise to the pessi- mistic, they will provide gratifica- tion to the middle-of-the-road people, who will be thankful that at least the ~ * menace of a contest for supremacy in naval building has been removed. And for that much, if they get mothing more, they will think they have cause to render thanks. 8 * ¥ kK Leoking, backward, it will be re- ©alled that President Harding him- sel? never ylelded to overenthusiasm over the ptospect, and the chances are that, while he can now be able to say “T told you s0,” he did not feel confident that he would e able to rejoice in such a favorable prospect as 15 now presented. You will remem- ‘ber how from time to time he back- pedaled and besought the public to g0 not too fast in expectations. That was not because he lacked faith in the ultimate outcome, but ‘because he was dismayed by the avidity with which a section of the public rose to the lure of idealism fnvolved in the project, while he foresaw the limitations but realized the practical possibllities. * k ¥ * One of the current writers on the arms limitation conference, in his de- Yightful way, spoke of “optimism be- ing an occupational disease of the American writers. He's right—and the present writer confesses to having an aggravated case of it. ecretary $Hughes Is responsible.-for he spread the Infection. In the many intimate and pains- taking conversations the American premier held with the group of writers attending his dally confer- ences at the State Department, it can- ot be recalled that ever did he falter once in his confident prediction that the conference on limitation of arma- ment and far eastern questions would have a successful outcome. ‘With his broad vision he foresaw the result of the nations sitting down calmly at the council board and dis- cussing in a business like and matter of fact way a proposition that pos- sesses all of the elements which would appeal to a meeting of the ‘board of directors of a great corpora- tion—a business proposition, if you please, with the mndded equation of humanitarianism. * ok ok * Possibly it has occurred to others | 4 i l | l sions of the conference that they bore a resemblance to a board of di- rectors’ gathering more than to an international assembling of diploma- tists. The plain, matter of fact' way in which the business was under- taken and transacted was appealing to one’s appreciation of simplicity as an element of strength. Only the green baize table conformed to the traditions of diplomatic procedure. If a smiling chief clerk had but passed around the customary gold pleces, even that resemblance would have been dissipated. * Kk ok * But do not get the impression that there was any lack of solemnity in the proceedings. On the first day, it is true, there was some—well, let it be called overenthusiasm—in the audience up to the time that Secre- tary Hughes sprang his surprise. They did not quite appreciate the gravity of the occasion, it seemed. But no such criticism could be laid against the second meeting, when every one was waiting the expected acceptance in “principle and spirit” of the American terms. ‘When that was forthcoming, and it became apparent that the confer- ence was headed for a successful out- come, the setiousness of the delibera- tions was reflected in the demeanor of the audience. Every one seemed to feel that he was participating in an epochal event. And such f{t is. There can be not the shadow of a doubt that history will write it down so. Mr. Balfour predicted this when he said that “the first and opening day of this congress was one of the land- marks in human civilization,” which, of course applies to the .conference as a whole. * % ¥ ¥ Congress? Its nose is out of joint. Congress has been pushed plumb off the first page by the arms confer- ence, oven in Washington, where Congress still has a measurably sacrosanct position with the public. Just think of it, here is Congress witnessing the finishing touches be- ing put to the new tax bill, in the daily action of the conferees on the bill composing the differences be- tween the House and Senate, and the public apparently is not giving a whoop about what is going on. Only a few weeks back and everybody wore an air of gloom because the tax bill was seemingly bogged down and the country was going straight and swiftly to the dogs, in consequence. Now Congress itself is leaning over the. balconies in the arms limitation conference hall breathlessly watch- ing the diplomati; and entire pages of, the daily neWspapers are given over to the countless details of the great assemblage. * ok ¥ ¥ And two weeks from tomorrow an- other session of Congress is to begin. ‘The solons are planning a brief holi- day if they can effect it, between the lapse of the extraordinary session, which began April 11, and the regular session, which will open on the first Monday in December. It promises to be a long and im- portant session, for there is a great deal of unfinished business coming over from the current session. The program fixed upon at the outset proved to be too elaborate for accom- plishment. Nobody at this stage of the game would dare predict how long it will last. In fact, Congress has in recent who witnessed the two plenary ses-) years become almost & continuously going concern. The preceding Con- gress expired only a little more than a month before this one came into existence and one does not have to remember very far back when one Congress merged into another be- tween suns. * Kk X % A few years ago, at this period preceding the opening of a new session of Congress, there would be wise speculatipn upon the Presi- dent’s message, with the public won- dering what bills would come up first. Now everybody is more inter- ested in what the “committee of ad- mirals” will do with the American suggestions for naval limitation and what the secret councils of the com- mittee on far eastern questions will decide to take up first. The public must expect to read a great deal of technical accounts of tonnage and displacement, about per- centage of naval strength allocated to the nations and a lot of profoundly important but more or less profes- sionally applicable information which will be a liberal education in itself on naval affairs if closely followed. ‘The question is how long will the im- patient and fickle American reading public follow these accounts. * k k% Here is a guess: They will read it all, “eat it up,” because it is evident that the heart of the American people is passionately fixed upon the objects of the international conferenfe, and at this time that meeting and the purposes in view constitute the big- gest things in the public eye. Premier Briand of France, in his address to the conference ‘'at the second day’'s session, touched a key- note when he declared that it would be a pity if mere dollars and cents Involved in the limitation of arma- ments were the sole consideration. They are not, if the demonstration of public interest in the conference is a guide to sent!ment. The public utterances of delegates to the con- ference also show that they are not. The lessening of the risks of wars in the future is the main considera- tion of this conference in the intent and purpose of the delegates and the world at large. —_— U. S. TO USE SAME STAFF FOR POSTS IN AUSTRIA Api:ohatment of Arthur Hugh Frazier as Charge d’Affaires Expected. ThewState Department is preparing to employ virtually the same staff of men who have been representing the United States in Austria semi-official- ly as the American diplomatic and consular agents under the new peace treaty, ratification of which was pro- claimed Friday by President Harding. Appointment of Arthur Hugh Frasier, United States commissioner to Aus- tria, as American charge d'affaires ad interim, is expected to be announced within a day or two, officials of the department said. His appointment would follow the precedent established in the case of Germany, Ellis Loring Dresel, com- missioner to that country, having been named several days ago by President Harding as charge d'affaires at Berlin. The consular staff will be very lim- ited, probably not exceeding three men, it was sald by department offi- cials. 1 Indemnities of the Losers - And Debts of the Winners BY FRANCESCO NITTL Former Premier of Italy. T the end of the war there was a great deal of ‘dis- cussion &s to the indem- nities to be pald by the losers. As a matter of fact, the’ subject had never been broached before. To be more precise, the entente in all its declarations, and Wilson in his fourteen points, had not even re- motely alluded to any demand of indemnities in the event of an allied victory; at that time the claims of the entente appeared to be limited to the reconstruction of invaded territories and of that part of Belgium which had been de- vastated. But the cessation of hostilities was followed by a period of war- like exaltation; minds were over- cast, former promises forgotten and the morale of victory justified every abuse. Wilson's fourteen points constituted a solemn pledge and covenant by which not only the United States, but all the entente powers, were bound to the enemy peoples and in a higher and greater sense to humanity and civilisation. Unfortunately, all the peace treaties concluded at.Paris have resulted in a negation of these principles and have brought about the situation of profound spiritual discomfort in which the winners are now placed. * % % X At first there was much uncer<" tainty as to whether it was more advisable to ask the vanquished, or, to be more precise, Germany (for the other losing nations had immediately declared their com- plete insolvency), to pay to the winners of the war the total amount of the expenses sustained by allies and associates or to limit the allied request to certain cate- gories of war damages. In the first event, the indamnity claimed” would have amounted to about 700,000,000,000 francs or lire at par; in the second, at not less than 350.000,000,000; altogether over 1,080,000,000.000 francs (about $200,000,000,000). It was stated and inserted in the treaty of Versailles that Germany and her allies were the sole re- sponsibility for the war. They were therefore bound to reimburse | unreservedly the whole cost of the war, because a principle sanc- tioned by jurisprudence says that the malefactor must repair the evil he has wrought to the utmost of his means. On the strength of this recognized prin- ciple it was proposed to saddle the losers with the whole weight of the war expenses. During the winter of 1918 and in the beginning of 1919 fantastic re- ports and figures, compiled by ‘wholly irresponsible persons, were submitted to the wvarious parlia- ments, before a public accustomed to the most astounding events and prepared to believe anything, thus contributing to the creation of that atmosphere of delusions and vio- lence which has been more harm- ful to the countries of the entente than any economic loss. * Xk * The thesis of a reparation of war damages prevailed on fhat of total reimbursement of the cost of the war besides damages, for a very simple reason. If the idea so warmly backed by Mr. Hughes had been adopted, namely, a re- quest for all damages and all ex- penses, the indemnity would have soared to an impossible figure. It would. have then become neces- sary to reduce all credits, as in cases of bankruptcy. France held first place as reggrds reparations (at first she demsanded 56 per cent of all the sums paid by Germany) and could therefore ‘lay claim to the lion's share-of the indemnity, whereas on a sum representing the reimbursement of the whole cost.ofi the: war she would have been entitled to less than 20 per cent. The treaty of Versailles lays down that Germany, having brought about, by her unjustified attack, all the losses and damages _sustained by the victors, is bound to indemnify them. .But in view of the permanent maiming of Ger- many's national resources, as as- certained at the peace treaty, Ger- many is only held (but unre- servedly) to the reimbursement of direct damages and of pensions as -specified in annex I of Part XIIT of the treaty. The commission of reparations establishes the total amount of Germany's debt, to be paid in yearly installments fixed year by year by the commission. The payments will continue for thirty years and even longer if . at the expiration of that date the debt be not Sully settled. ko The commission of reparations is invested with sovereign powers on German territory, powers far more ample than those claimed in Turkey by the commission for the Ottoman public debt. It may even (which is an unprecedented fact in the history of civilized nations) modify the laws and regulations of the state in Germany and establish all sorts of controls, while Ger- many must ,not consider these .eanctions as acts of hostility. The peace treaty has not only .forced Germany to acknowledge herself solely responsible for the war, but has also indulged in the irony of obliging her to declare that she would not be offended at any violence committed on her territory. Always, according to the terms of the treaty of Versailles, Ger- many, after having handed over all her transferable possessions (colonies, shipping, submarine ca- bles, commercial organisation abroad, rolling stock, etc.), was to pay on May 1, 1921, not less than 20,000,000,000 marks, gold, in goods and raw materials, subsequently issuing 100,000,000,000 marks, gold, in bonds to bearer and binding herself to all further issues which the commission = of reparations might require. " * % ¥ % Speaking at the French cham- ber on the 5th of September, 1919, the minister of finance, Klotz, cal- culated the German indemnities, on the basis of the Versallles treaty, at 275,000,000,000 marks, the inter- est ‘of which was to mature till 1921, after which date Germany would have commenced to pay her debt in thirty-four yearly install- ments of about 25,000,000,000 marks each, of which 13,760,000, 000 marks would have been handed over to France. As.a matter of fact, France continues to put down in her budgets the sums deriving from the indemnity which Ger many is unable to pay. As re- cently as last year, in an official request of the commission of reparations, the French govern- ment valued the damages sus- (Continued on Third Page.) Economic Questions Which Bear On the Problem of the Far East ~ BY G. GOULD -LINCOLN. CONOMIC questions not only underlie but are n reality the fundamental esuse of the so- called problems of the Pacific which are in process of solution at the Washington conference. These economic questions will come in for their full share of discussion about the conference table before the con- ference is concluded. A full and care- ful study of these matters has been made by the experts of the United States, and of course by the experts of Japan, Great Britain, France and the other nations that have been in- vited here to discuss the far east situation. , In considering the economic side of the far east problem, it is neces- sary to look with particular attention to the situation in which Japan finds herself. Her need of a constant in- flux of rew materials is the key to many of her political policies; the key to her interest in China, whose vast territory contains untold quantities of the raw materials which the 1s- land empire requires. * x % X It is the desire of Japan to build up a great manufacturing country as a source of wealth and prosperity to her people, just as England has dong in the western hemisphere. It is impossible, however, to “make bricks without straw,” to manufacture tex- tiles without the necessary fibers, to make steel without the needed coal and iron. ~A survey of Japan and her re- sources reveals the fact that Japan has at her command, and within her- self, adequate supplies of copper, silk and camphor. In fact, her silk and camphor industries today amount almost to a monopoly. The United States, for instance, obtains practically all of the raw silk, which is made into silk fabrics from Japan, as well as quan- titles of ‘manufactured silk goods. Japan's silk industry depends largely upon her market in this country for raw silk and if it were suddenly shut off, the industry in Japan would receive a severe blow that would be reflected throughout the country. In regard to camphor, that article is- belng made synthetically to some extent in this country, but we are still largely dependent upon Japan for this commodity. ta ok ox o Of the raw materials which Japan must have for its manufacturing in- dustries, those for textiles are cot- ton, wool and jute. The coarser grade of cotton she imports from India, and the finer grades from the United States. Japan is at present making efforts to grow cotton in Korea, which she dominates, so as to provide a source of this raw ma- terial practically of her own. Wool Japan buys for the most part from the British empire, from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Jute Japan obtains from another branch of the British empire, India. Japan has developed a large' crush- ing industry—for the production of vegetable oils and food products. For this industry she must have soya beans, which grow in great quanti- tles in Manchuria, and peanuts, some of which she raises herself and some of which she brings in from China. There is copra, too, obtained from the cocoanut, which Japan imports from the South Sea Islands, the Phil- ippines and New Guinea. Japan has large deposits of clay useful in the manufacture of pot- tery, chinaware, etc., and she has already developed this industry to a very considerable extent. * % ¥ x The great fundamental industries, however, of a manufacturing coun- try—such as the United States or Great Britain—are the iron and steel industries. Here it is that Japan is woefully in need of raw materials. In the first place, for the manufac- ture of steel and iron it is necessary that both fuel and iron ore be ob- tained in large quantities. Japan's coal supply is entirely inadequate. It has been said that the coal deposits of Japan would not last the Unied States two years. So far as petroleum is concerned, Japan has an inade- quate supply to meet her own needs, and her product of petroleum is only about one-third of what she now uses. To offset, in some part at least, her deficiencies in these fuel supplies, Japan has turned to the development of hydro-electric power, and with some success. Aside from the fuel 50 necessary in manufacture of iron and steel, it is found that Japan is sadly deficient in iron ore. It is an outstanding fact that where the great steel and iron industries of this country and other countries have been located is at points to which coal and fron ore can be brought together at comparatively little expense and in great quanti- ties, as in Birmingham in England and Birmingham, Ala., and Pittsburgh, Pa, In the United States, and in Hankow, China. Manchuria possesses great quanti- ties of both coal and iron ore. It is natural, therefore, that Japan should have her desires to control these Manchurian supplies. Her desire to control in China is primarily to per- mit her to obtain the raw materials she requires for Japanese industries, according to the economists. In fact, the question of emigration, an outlet for Japanese population, is not nearly s0 dominant a factor in Japan's poli- cles today as is the question of ob- taining raw materials. * k% % In: brief, this is Japan's position withjregard to raw materials. There are other industeice than those men- tioned for which she must import materials, too. Japan would like to take over the job of developing the vast resources of China. But today Japan has not the capital to develop these resources as they might be de- veloped—the capital which Japan could afford to put into China would mean many years before China's de- velopment could proceed on a scale commensurate with the resources of that country. Japan would probably like to have European nations and the United States lend her the mioney properly to develop the resources of China. Inci- dentally, if she could obtain such loans in large sums, the nations from which the money was borrowed would have an interest in seeing that Japan was allowed to work out the development of China’s resources. But these other nations are demanding the “open door” and equal opportu- nity in China for their capital, too. The United States, for instance, is tremendously interested in the mar- ket offered by China for her manu- factured products, particularly ma- chinery of various kinds. The United States is interested, too, In obtaining some raw materials from China, among them carpet wools, etc. The United States also is interested in China as a place for investment of capital. Until recent years, Ameri- cans have been content to invest their capital in the United States. But the i financial situation has changed with the enormous increase in wealth here, and American capital is seeking more and more for flelds of Investment abroad and China is a very fertile field, indeed. * k * ¥ The more concessions, leaseholds, etc., which other nations hold in China, the more closely is the door shut to American capital and to American products. It matters little if the policy of the “open door” is proclaimed if one nation dominates through concessions in a given slice of Chinese territory. Of the raw materials obtained by the United States from the far east, silk from Japan, jute from Indi vegetable ‘oils from China are out- standing importations, along with copra from the South Sea Islands and the Philippines. Like the United States, Great Brit- ain and her colonies want China for a market and for a source of raw ma- terials; they want an opportunity to invest their capital in China, too. And 50°it s with the other powers gath- ered here to discuss the problems of the far east. France has great in- terests, and so have Holland and Bel- gium, and, to a less extent, Portugal, in the east and in China. Holland's holdings in the far east are very large. Her colonies in the orient have an area one-fourth that of the United States and a population of some 50,000,000. Japan’s right to obtain such raw materials as she may need from China is not denied by other powers. In fact, her needs and her geographical position with relation to China are recognized as of especial significance. But the other nations, because of their own economic problems and in- terests, are not anxious to see Japan dominate in China to their exclusion. The Japanese, on the other hand, rec- ognize the fact that being dominant in China they would be economically independent of the rest of the world, to a very large extent, at least. OVER HALF OF PEOPLE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED 1920 Statistics Show Majority of Persons Above Ten Years 0Old at Work. More than 50 per cent of the to- tal population of the United States ten years of age and over in 1920 was gainfully employed, the census- bu- reau has announced. Out of a total population of 82,739,315 persons ten years of age and_over, 41,609,192 were gainfully employed at the time of the deeennial census last year, or 50.3 per cent, the bureau announced. The total was made up in the fol- lowing number of persons engaged in the several general occupational classes, in the order . of their nu- merical importance: Manufacturing and mechanical industries, 12,812,701; agricultural, forestry and animal husbandry, 10,551 3 trade, 4,244,- 354; domestic and personal service, 3,400,365; clerical occupations, 3,119, 955; transportation, 3,066,305; pro- fessional service, 2,152.464; extraction of minerals, 1,090,854 and public serv- ice, 771,120, the latter group including employes of the United States. Costs of government for the city of Portsmouth, Va, for the fiscal year ending December 31, 1920, amounted to $1,622,996, or a per capita cost of $29.61, the bureau announced. Total revenue receipts in 1920 were $1,201,- 621. LLOYD GEORGE—The Man and His Times 'V—The War; the Road to Victory IRECTLY he became prime minister Lloyd George applied to the national affairs the same direct, energizing, un- conventional methods which he had used in the board of trade and the munitions ‘ ministry. The British are generally regarded , as a somewhat conventional people. It is a political maxim in England that it is danger- ous to touch constitutional principle or prac- , tee. Lloyd George cared for neither where it ‘was & question of winning the war, With afew ' swift strokes and in three days he transformed the constitution which had worked unchanged «for more than a century. = . 'The cabinet disappeared, to be replaced by a war cabinet of five men without departmental functions, possessed of supreme power. The other ministers, including even the foreign sec- retary, were to be satellites called in only when their own subjects were under discussion. Par- liament found that it was to be led not by the prime minister, but by a deputy. New minis- tries were created to deal with shipping, the enrolling of the nation, the air service and the . food supply. Then having reconstructed the machinery, Lloyd George sat down to do the .work. The whole nation was put on rations in order to economize food and so release agri- cultural workers for the trenches and reduce tonnage required for importing food. Imports of all kinds were cut down to the minimum for the same reason. Landowners were ordered to plow up new land. Shipping was brought un- " der = single control and distributed to the best service of the allles. Industries were combed .out again and again to see where women and disshled men could replace men fit for active service abroad. * * k k- The strain was terrible and events added to it. In January Germany announced her intro- duction of unlimited submarine warfare, and by May was sinking tonnage at the rate of 800,000 tons s month. In February the Russian revo- lution occurred and Lioyd George saw at once that it was bound to weaken if not destroy Rus- sia’s power to co-operate miilitarily with her allifes. Then came the military failures in the apring. The French attack was a disaster. The British attacks were local successes, but pro- duced no impression upon the general German position. And during the long wet autumn there went on the steady British attacks on le Ridge, bloody, costly and ren- . dered fruitless by mud and rain. Often and often have I sat with Lloyd George in his house at WaMen Heath listening to the bdom of the guns, sounding quite clearly through some peculiarily of the ground, more than 100 -— - miles away. Never did I see him lose heart or falter, however weary or overwrought, but few others knew how he felt the steady march to death of the cream of the British youth during those autumn months of 1917. The one redeeming feature in the situation ‘was the declaration of war by the United States on April 2, 1917. From that moment Lloyd George felt secure. He knew the immense re- serves they, commanded, and he was confident the American people would display the same energy and capacity in organizing for war that they had done in developing the industry and production of their own country. 8till, for the moment, except by sea under Admiral Sims, where they played an immediate and notable part in defeating the submarine campaign, the advent of decisive American forces on the fleld of battle was necessarily far off. * * X % From the moment he became prime minister he concentrated on the main problem of how to ‘win the war. He knew that it all depended upon effective co-ordination of the allied efforts. Up’ to the present Germany had been able to at- tack and destroy or defeat them one by one, and they had been unable either to make an effective combined attack or to save one other. In 1915 Germany had broken Russia and the western@llies were without shells. In 1916 she had attacked France and Russia had been paralyzed. In 1917 the allles attacked without proper co-operation and while Russia was in revolution, and Germany .withstood them with- out serious difficulty. And in each winter she had laid low a little ally—first Serbia, thea Rumamia. What was she going to do in the ‘winter of 1917 Lloyd George was convinced that she would endeavor to destroy Italy before American aid could arrive, and early in the year he had in- sisted on preparation being made to render her effective assistance in case of need. But unity of effort was more difficult. There was the difficplty of placing the troops of one nation under the command of a general of another nation. There was the difficulty of inducing the various governments to forego their inde- pendence sufficiently to submit to a common authority. There was the language difficulty and ‘the opposition of national and personal pride and inertia all along the line. * k Xk *k It was the disaster of Caparetto, foreseen ’ by Lloyd George, that enabled him for the first time to bridge the gulf. No sooner was the defeat of the Italian army announced than the plans for assistance were brought into play, and Lloyd. George himself hurried off to Italy. The succor of French and British troops was suffi- cient to stop the Austro-German attack, and at Rapallo Lloyd George secured the agreement of the allies—cordially assented to by President Wilson—to the constitution of a supreme war council consisting of one member of each of the allled governments to direct the war, and of a military committee with Marshal Foch at the head to advise them as to the military policy to be pursued. On his way back Lloyd George stopped in Paris to make that speech in which for the first time the public were told with perfect frankness the truth about the war. But the Germans were not going to wait. The submarine campaign had failed. The at- tack on Italy had falled. Every hour the American forces werg growing, and though they did not expect them in effective numbers till the autumn of 1918, they realized that in the United States the allies had gained an ally of immeasurably greater strength than Russla. So they determined to make one more effort to win the war before the American troops af- rived. - AJl during the autumn and winter, therefore, of 1917-18 the secret maps showed the transfer of the German divisions from Russia te the ‘west. Steadily the tale rose till every effective Gorman division was in place ready for the final blow—the blow everybody felt qoming. * % K * ‘The winter had been difficult. War weari- ness was acute. The losses of 1917 had been terrible. Pacifism raised its head. Lord Lans- downe wroté his famous letter seeking for =2 peace by consent. But Lloyd George stood steadily for victory. He believed that nothing save defeat would break the control of Ger- many by the Hohenzollern and military despot- ism. And he believed that unless defeat and disaster were inflicted on the nation which had caused the war, there would be nothing to pro- tect humanity from going through this terrible experience again. As he put it in a well known speech: “There is no security in any land without certainty of punishment. There is no protec- tion for life, property or money in a state where the criminal is more powerful than the law. The law of nations is no exception, and, until it has been vindicated, the peace of the world will always be at the mercy of any nation -whose professors have assiduously taught it to believe that no crime is wrong so long as it leads to.the aggrandizement and enrichment of the country to which they owe allegiance. There bave been many times in the history of the world criminal states. We are dealing with one of them now. And there will always be criminal states until the reward of international crime becomes too precarious to make it profit- able and the punishment of international crime ‘becomes too sure to make it attractive.” - At last, on March 21, the anxiously awaited blow fell on the British front. It was worse than anybody had expected, and for the first few days it looked as if the Germans were going to win the war. They had made, for the first time, a genuine “break through.” But the col- lapse in morale which the German expected after their terrific blow did not take place, and . at last the jaded, battered British line came to a halt, pressed right back to the outskirts of Amiens, but stlll intact. Once during those try- ing days I saw Lloyd George really depressed. It was the only time during the whole war— the day when the news came that the British line was definitely broken. But a few houfs later when I went into the cabinet room he was making jokes with his colleagues to lift the weight off their minds, master of himself and thinking only of ways and means of saving the situation. It was pretty bad. The worst had ‘not oc- curred.’ But the German onslaught was only checked. It was certain to be repeated as soon as the Germans, with feverish energy, could build up their resources for a second blow, and if thas was as successful as the first, the British and French armies would be divided and the war would be lost before ever the Americans could arrive. So every lever within reach was pulled. calling out men up to fifty, tonishing short space of time, most of the gaps in the battered British army were filled \up again, largely with lads of eighteen and men over forty. * X X Xk . But Lloyd George saw that this was not enough. If the Germans were able to continue their battgring tactics uninterruptedly during the summér nothing that the allles could do could enable them to last out.. One day he saw. in a flash the way out, and instantly acted upon Nt. He sent a long personal telegram to Presi- dent Wilson pointing out the extreme gravity of the situation, explaining that in one way. and.in one way only, could it be put right and asking that the United States should send 100.- 000 men a month to Europe for four months, and that such of these men as were not suffi- clently trained fo fight as American divisions, should be- brigaded regiment by -regiment with . French and British troops in order to make up the necessary numbers. He algo offered the ‘whole resources of the British navy and marine to transport and protect them. It was a big thing to- ask—the reversal of the whole United States Army program, the brigading of Ameri- can troops with those of the allies, the in- evitable dislocation from so rapid transporta- tion. But to lis eternal honor President Wilson did not hesitute. He accepted the whole plan, and within a few hours there began that amase ing transportation of the American troops across A new conscription act was’ passed _ and, within an as-" 2 i the Atlantic in numbers far greater than Lloyd George had asked for, or that the wildest Ger- man pessimist had dreamed of as practicable, and which made possible the allied victory the same year. * %k % % “One other act Lloyd George took during these fateful days. The military arrangements of the Versailles council had broken down. The military council had made the plans, but diffi- culties of many kinds had prevented their fruition when March 21 came. Liloyd George decided immediately for Marshal Foch as gen- eralissimo. Foch had always impressed him as the greatést general on the allled side. He had asked for him for the Versailles councll. His plans for dealing with the impending on- set had seemed complete. He was the only general whom he felt he could ask the British and American armles to serve under. Lord Milner went to France and agreed with Clemen- ceau and Gen. Pershing that Marshal Foch should co-ordinate the strategy of the allies, and a week or two later, at a meeting of the supreme council, he was made the commander- in-chief. So at last the allies had a real unity of com- mand. The effect was immediately seen. Prac- tically alone among the generals and statesmen of the. allies Marshal Foch was confident that victory would be achieved in 1918. Throughout the German attack he had been flercest in his determination not to yield a yard of unneces- sary ground, or even to contemplate the pos- sibilities of disaster, and at a time when every- body else was wondering® whether it would be possible to hold out during 1918, so as to win in 1919, when the whole Ameris Army had arrived, Foch made up his mind to win the war in 1918.. He saw that once there was unity of command,: with one mind directing the French, British and American troops as one army, it was a positive advantage that the Germans should attack first and exhaust themselves, al- ways provided the allles could resist the blow. He saw_that the German advance would open a dangerous flank and that if the allies could launch a counter attack delivered with sufficient ‘strength and followed up through the rest of the year with further continuous attacks the ‘whole of the German army ‘would crumble into ruins. He saw, too, that the allles still had the strength for an effective counter blow, and that the enormous stream of America’s reinforce- ments pouring into. France would enable him to keep up the pressure during the rest of the year. ‘ * % %k % So he brought his plan into operation. The Germans made a second desperate thrust, this time toward Paris, and agaia they were parried, By Philip Kerr (His Secretary, 1917-1921) largely by the valor of the American troops at Chateau. Thierry. Then they prepared another blow, which was to be the final one. Foch, ex- plaining the plans to nobody, began to denude the line of all its best reserves. They were steadily and quietly moved south. The Americans, not yet fully trained, were given more and more of the line to hold. People began to be anxious at this concentration in the south. Did it mean panic? asked some. Did it mean political pres- sure from Paris? asked others. But Foch kept his counsel and when the third German attack was delivered in July, he suddenly launched that counter attack by French, British, American and Italian troops which neither the Germans nor any one else expected, and which turned the tide. Then came the attack of August on the Amiens front, in which British, Americans and Australians took the leading part, and which forced the first general retirement. This was followed by one blow after another, including the smashing of the Hindenburg line by the Canadians, the American forces playing a stead- ily more decisive role as the months went by, until in October the military might of Germany was no more and the negotiations for the armi- stice began. Unity of command and the advent of the American Army in time, as Lloyd George had foreseen, added to the valor of the allied troops, had won the war. * % * % . ‘There were some anxious moments over. the armistice. The German government endeavered to sidetrack the allies by negotiating with President Wilson alone. The notes.in ,which President Wilson discussed the armistice with Germany did not, as is well known,. entirely satisfy the allied deaders, who were afrajd that they might be faced with the alternative of having to mccept an armistice which ‘was in- decisive, or of continuing the war for another year. However, the negotiations 'were. finally trapsferred to Paris, where they were handled by Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando and Col House. They decided that the allies were so exhausted, and the prospects of the winter were 80 dangerous, that if Germany would make such a military surrender as to render her impotent to renew the war, they would stop the blood- shed. So the armistice térms were drawn up. ‘The German revolution and the- flight -of the kaiser destroyed the last elements of Germany's resisting power, and the German plenipoten- tiarfes signed them on November 11, 1313, in Marshal Foch’s raliway coach in the forest of Compeigne. giome (Copyright, 1921, by the McClure Newspaper Syndicate.) the Teagus of Wstiohsr™, . -