Evening Star Newspaper, January 25, 1942, Page 7

Why Tokio Clare Boothe, well-known au- thor and playwright, recently in- terviewed Gen. Douglas MacAr- thur in Manila. She was in Bel- gium when the Germans invaded that country in May, 1940. Henry J. Reilly, brigadier gen- eral in the Officers’ Reserve Corps, served in the Philippines several years and later in the World War, when he received the D. S. M. He is a former editor of the Army and Navy Journal. By CLARE BOOTHE and BRIG. GEN. HENRY J. REILLY. Last May 6 Senator Claude Pepper of Florida made, on the floor of Congress, a flerce and flery speech against the Japanese. Demsanding that “we turn a searching inquiry to this bandit of the East * * * lurking behind the door to stick a stiletto in our backs,” he suggested as one easy solution of the problem, sending Chiang Kai-shek “some gal- lant American boys at the controls of some first-class bombing planes * * * in my opinion,” he said, “50 of them can make a shambles of Tokio!"” And 130,000,000 Americans not only applauded the incendiary Floridian’s personal opinion in their hearts, but also believed it was a fine picture of the just fate that awaited “the ban- dits of the East” if they should choose—as the popular phrase was— to commit “national hara-kari” by warring on the United States of America, ‘Today 130,000,000 Americans are asking in bewilderment and rage, where are the avenging flames from | Why | the funeral pyre of Tokio? hasn’t the Japanese fleet been sunk “within a couple of weeks” as many & tablecloth admiral—and a couple of bona fide ones, t0o—so often pre- dicted it would be? Why is it, on the contrary, roaming at will in the Japanese and China Seas? Where is the “distant blockade” based in Hawaii and Singapore which was so soon to bring Japan to her ¢conomic knees? Where are “Japan’s feel of clay” about which a whole book was written? (Can it be that our heads, not her feet, were made of clay?) Why has the Japanese Army, which “everybody” knew was bled white and thin by four years of the “China incident,” still got enough military “oomph” to attack not only United States possessions in the Far East, but also the colonial jewels of the Dutch and British Empires? Why did “imp :gnable” Hong Kong fall in two weeks? And why, oh why, if it is still true that Japan is committing hari-kari, is she do- ing s0 in such a messy fashion on soil under our flag, instead of being forced to expire on her own door- step, or before the bloodstained altars of her own pagan gods? The bitter answers to these bitter questions lie largely in an under- standing of the military situation implicit in the disaster which has overtaken American arms in the Philippines. Had sufficient planes, troops, warships been available to Gen. MacArthur in the early weeks of December, we could have stopped the Japanese invasion and then | sent help to Singapore. So long as | America held the Philippines, it held a fine land, air and naval base out of which to operate on the flank of all Japanese movements on the | China coast, the Malay Peninsula and the Netherlands East Indies. Conversely, the loss of the Philip- pines means that the Japanese con- trol all the islands off the coast of | Asia, from Paramashuto south of Kamchatka to the N. E. I, and that bases of their attacks on the Dutch possessions can be moved from For- mosa and the Pescadores to Min- danao and the Sula Archipelago a thousand miles closer to the N. E. I. It means that unless the N. E. I. can be held, America’s only remain- ing bases in the South Pacific for an attack on Japan become Aus- tralia and New Zealand, 6,000 miles | from Tokio. But are the Philippines really lost? Is Not in THAILAND, ¢ A INDO-CHINA AN iy /7 PHILIPPINES. ] - L ol T s SINGAPORE. N SUMATRA -~ IAVA DUTCH EAST INDIES INDIAN OCEAN AUSTRALIA taliation for Pear ERING STRA! KOMANDORSK! 15 Se DUTCH HARSOR 4 ALEUTIAN IS, S . JOHNSON 15, o 7 CAROLINE 15 0 PORAPE - T © KINGMAN REEF . PALMYRA 5. o CANTON 15, curreron . -~ 5\ § PANAMA CANAL: GALAPAGOS 15. SOUTH AMElld had the fully mobilized man power of a fanactic nation of 101,000,000 people, which has had universal military training for almost 75 years and which, according to the Presi- dent, has been preparing for 25 of these 75 years to fight the U. 8. A. and the British for the control of the Far Pacific. It is estimated the Japanese have 10,000,- 000 trained reservists who can be called to the colors. Of course, they have not the officers, arms and equipment for this number. They have for perhaps 3,000,000 Seasoned in modern warfare by four years in China, this profes- sional army, less the troops needed for holding Chiang Kai-shek, oc- cupying Indo-China and Thailand, and invading the Malay Peninsula, was poured into the Philippines, which lie right in Japan's Pacific back yard. According to our War Department, 200,000 men, fully sup- ported by naval and air units, were thrown against MacArthur's 55,000 defenders in the invasion of Luzon. And why did MacArthur not have “more on hand” to meet this over- whelmining attack when it came? He had too little on hand because there was too much in demand by our Allies and by ourselves in the European theater of war. Gen. Marshall, who had long understood the Pacific danger, had siX or eight months been sending Wwhatever reinforcements he could lay his eager hands on to the Philippines. But he was faced with other fronts, other foes. He had | had to find troops, complete with modern armament and planes for Alaska, Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone and all our newly acquired Atlantic bases ‘from Iceland to Trinidad, to Dutch and British Guiana, not to mention material we had committed ourselves to send to the British in England and Africa and the Russians holding before Moscow. Aamiral Stark, commanding a one-ocean .Navy, committed to safeguarding two oceans and seven seas, was in the same unhappy fix: Too little on one hand, too much in demand every- where; that was the road to the Far Eastern disaster. Potential Planes Worthless. And where did the Japs get “the stuff” from? The planes, tanks, guns, armaments? From an in- dustry which has been built from the biginning for war output for many years, from the “slave labor” With the exceptions of 20 miles of the Batan Peninsula on the Island of Luzon, a portion of Min- | danao and the three small fortified | islands — Corregidor (Fort Mills), | Caballo_(Fort Hughes), El Fraile (Fort Drum), at the mouth of Manila Bay—all-important of these 7,083 islands of the Philippines (a combined area only a little smaller than the British Isles) have fallen into Japanese hands or under Jap- anese control. And they are in con- trol of all the air over them, and the seas around them. In spite of the incredibly gallant—and useful— delaying action MacArthur and his men are fighting, when such am- munition, armament and food as they have in larder or locker run out, surrender must ring down the first act of the drama in the Philip- pines. Hopeless Military Assignment. ‘Why did this happen? Because Gen. MacArthur and the gallant soldiers under his command | were faced with a hopeless military assignment. From the b_egmnin.g they didn’t stand a “Chinaman’s chance,” which, incidentally, seems | rather better than the white man’s | against the Japanese in the Orient now. On that dark December day when the Japs erupted all over the Pa- cific, Gen. MacArthur had fewer than 55000 trained and equipped American and native troops. He had & limited supply of imported ord- nance and ammunition on hand, and no native armament industryl to make up action loss in these. He had a small number of tanks and airplanes and “flying fortresses.” How many was once a deep military | secret. But that they were not enough is no military secret io anybody now. The number was far too small to overcome the many times larger Jap Army aviation, which, once the Jap Army had established bases in the Philippine Islands, could lay its eggs almost at will. MacArthur’s naval support, Ad- miral Tommy Hart’s Asiatic squad- ron, was a mere handful of cruisers, destroyers, submarines and Navy planes, based at vulnerable Cavite. Admiral Hart's assignment, which was in effect to protect 11,444 miles of Philippine seacoast against the whole Japanese fleet and its air arm, operating out of nearby Tokio and closer air and naval bases, was perhaps even more of a pineapple than MacArthur’s. In the China Seas themselves it is doubtful if Hart's squadron was strong enough to stand up against one Jap battle- ship, fully supported by airplanes, destroyers, and submarines. How unhealthy life on a cruiser must be today in the China Seas one may guess, reading in the papers, that Admiral Hart “arrived in the N. E.- ."—not aboard his flagship, the cruiser Houston, but in the bowels of & submarine. Japan Well Prepared. And what did the Japs have? Plenty—and that near at hand. They A of 101,000,000 people with low liv- ing standards, from quantities of hoarded raw materials, scrap, oil, | iron, rubber, bought from Great Britain and the United States of American to use plishment of our very destruction. There can'be no argument that potentially America’s industrial war output is much greater than Japan’s. But MacArthur codld not hold the island of Luzon with potential planes or bullets. And why was help not sent to MacArthur from Singapore and the N. E. 1?7 Because the British and the Dutch were themselves, l50!!\ the very beginning, in a simllar jam. That great baseball-loving nation, Japan, was executing a in the accom- | gigantic series of military squeeze plays on Dutch, American and British positions. None knew where the “main attack” would really fall, so none dared leave his base in force to help his neighbors out. In fact, the attack on the Malay Peninsula began even before the Japs landed at Luzon. And the fall of Hong Kong, the last great Euro- pean fortress on China’s coast which could threaten the flank of Japan's southward march, the nightmare loss of Britain's two great “unsink- able” capital ships, the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, had left the Jap battle fleet sailing pretty, free from danger of any “knockout” blow and substantially in control of the China Seas between Manila and Singapore. ‘While the British, caught with their imperial shorts down, tried to get set with everything they thought they had to stem the invasion that steamed down both sides of the Malay Peninsula toward the ram- parts of Singapore, Dutch subma- rines and Dutch aviation did what little they could to reiieve the heavy pressure on the Philippines until Jap bombers began to drop their visiting cards in the N. E. I, and, as a testimonial of greater favors to come, landed troops in both British and Dutch Borneo. Australia and New Zealand, even before December 7, had sent to North Africa, Eastern Asia and the Malay Peninsula nearly all the troops they could spare. The sicker Singapore and the Philippines look- ed, as the Japanese galloping con- sumption raged to their north, the more wisdom dictated, perhaps, to the Australians and New Zealanders, that they keep the remainder of their man power to roll with the home. Philippines only indirectly by stage ing offensives on the Sino-Japanese front. Sorely lacking modern arma- ment, ammunition and airplanes, they had found it impossible even to drive down behind the Japs on the Kowloon Peninsula to relieve the besieged British at Hong Kong The handful of American planes and pilots (estimated at between 50 and 150) sent before December 7 to their army of 4,000,000 to lick the Japs with could do little more than try to help the British under bombard- ment at Rangoon—the mouth of their own lifeline, the Burma road. Handicapped by Distances. From the beginning MacArthur and his 55,000 troops, facing an in- vasion by 200,000 men, were on their own. For the British and the Dutch and himself, were also—from the be- ginning — looking desperately for help. Looking where? Thousands on thousands of miles off across the purple wastes of the Pacific to the U.S. A And what was the U. 8. A. doing? Reeling from the first few weeks under the shock of the losses in planes and ships at Pearl Harbor. And then taking, for the first time, alas, a good look at the immutable geography of the Pacific Ocean. Realizing that “help,” ships, guns, punch, should the punch land at | The Chinese could “relicve” the | the Chinese, like MacArthur | planes, tanks or troops, to reach MacArthur directly had 7,000 miles out of San Francisco, 5000 miles sut of Hawall to go. But not entirely realizing that these thousands of miles were exceedingly dangerous miles, a reckless highway for ships to sail. Less than 2,000 miles west of the Hawaiian Islands lie the first nasty little group of Japanese islands, the Marshalls. From there on west to the Pelew Islands, only 500 miles east of Manila, there are nothing but Japanese islands. It is reasonable to suppose that a nation which has been preparing to gain mastery of the Pacific for 25 years has garri- soned, armed and supplied these like dens of thieves. This explains, no doubt, why Guam and Wake, lying between Honolulu and the Philip- pines, have both been captured, without naval interference out of Hawail. S0 “help” sent from the United States must either pick or fight its way through this pirate’s nest of Japanese islands—well supplied with submarine and air bases—or else trek far south, below the Equator, and from there trek again north to the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. This reasonably safe route is a piddling matter of 12,000 miles out of Prisco. Meanwhile, remember Tokio lies only 1,500 miles from Luzon. Simple arithmetic will show that one Jap troop or supply ship, used in the attack on the Philippines, could make almost eight round trips to an American “relief” ship’s one. Other Strategic Bases. Another unpleasant little item on the geographical agenda is Formosa. This isiand, only 400 miles from | Northern Lugon, has been Japanese | since Japan grabbed it from China after the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Well known to military | men Is that on Formosa’s southern tip ihere are a number of Japanese military bases. Off Formosa, in the Pescadores Islands, is another im- portant Japanese military base which no white man is supposed ever to have visited—but which white men will certainly have to visit yet if this war is to be won. Expeditions such as those landed in Luzon could be secretly assembled in these bases, sail across the Bashi and Balintang Channels, where there is very little shipping, and suddenly _appear in the hot, red, tropical dawn at Aparri, Vigan, the | Lingayen Gulf ports, Mlmomn.} Mauban and Legaspi. Precisely this | unpleasant surprise party began to happen about seven weeks ago. | Likewise, an expedition could be assembled secretly in the Pelew Is- | lands, sail the 500 miles of lonely | waters to Davao, and only make its | presence known when it attacked. And that way went Mindanao. Why didn't “our fleet” steam at once out of Honolulu to attack the Jap fleet in, say, the waters between Hawaii and Tokio? Because much of the American PFleet was (it may be assumed) operating in the At- lantic, and what was in the Pacific, undamaged by the attack at Pearl Harbor, was probably not any stronger than the total Japanese fleet and therefore not strong enough to operate in Japanese wa- ters from the base in Hawall, 3,400 miles from Tokio. Moreover, all the Japanese islands, running south and somewhat west to the Japanese Caroline Islands, form an outer line of Japanese defense. From these islands Japanese airplanes and sub- marines could operate on the left or southern flank of our fleet, should it attempt to steam 3,400 miles past them to Tokio. Such an unwise maneuver on our part would have been entirely a Japanese cup of tea. Surprise Big Advantage. Did the “treacherous” attack on Pearl Harbor greatly change our strategic situation in the Pacific? First, let us have done with this word “treacherous.” “Treachery” in the dictionary is defined as “se- cret desertion of the cause to which one professes allegiance.” On De- cember 6 the Japanese diplomats were not professing any allegiance to our cause, at. Washington. They were open and full-fledged Axis partners. For 25 years (a fact well knowa to our military and naval men) they had been preparing for war on us. Gauging that the time | had come at last, in the attack on Pearl Harbor they wisely took the | military initiative. Gen. Homer Lea, American mili- tary expert and author of “The Valor of Ignorance,” wrote 35 years ago: “When the rate of speed by which nations move to the point of contact has been ascertained, it de- volves upon ministers of state to anticipate any overt act on the part of the enemy and initiate the war. “When a state does not initiate war, .it commits its first error against the principle of military science. When it waits to make ready for war after hostilities have been declared, it only prepares to destroy jtself. So essential is this principle of initiation to success in warfare that there is no instance within the last 200 years wl}m sufficient warning has been given that permitted the enemy to under- take military preparation. The necessity of a declaration of war is only a modern illusion * * ¢ In fu- tare it can be considered as an established principle that nations will more and more make war with- out previous notification, since mod- ern inventions increase their ability to take their opponents by surprise and to strike the first blow as nearly as possible to their main base.” By failing to anticipate Japan's overt act, by failing to build up in the Pacific the army and navy and air force necessary to win and then initiating this inevitable war, by | allowing Japan to strike first at | our main Pacific base, Pearl Har- bor, we most certainly threw away | incalculable military advantages in the Pacificc. Had we and Britain both acted in time, the Japanese would be on the defensive every- where today instead of the offensive. In spite of its victories, is Japan still committing hara-kiri? If we say so—and make the say-so good— if we fully realize our vast poten- tialitfes in armament and man- power. And if we are willing to shed many tears, sweat gallons of salt and spill a lot of brave Amer- ican blood—otherwise not. (Released by the North American Newspaper Alllance, Inc.) Report (Continued From Page A-6.) airplanes were tracked towards the island and then lost. On November 27, 1941, there was | sufficient partially trained person- | nel available to operate the air- | craft warning system throughout | 24-hours of the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An arc of | nearly 360 degrees around Oahu could have been covered. Admiral Kimmel, on and prior to December 7, 1941, assumed that the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army, but made no inquiry after reading any of the messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments as to what the fact | was with respect to its operatlon.‘ Xy The joint coastal frontier de- fense plan provided that, when it | became effective, the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol, covering the circumference of the | about 20 miles. Prior to Decem- ber 7, 1941, no inshore patrol was conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. Pilots were being trained on week days, and the training involved flying around the confires of Oahu from about 8 o'clock in the morning throughout the day. On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol was con- ducted. XV Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan be- came effective the Navy was to con- duct distant air reconnaissance, radiating from Oahu to a distance of from seven to eight hundred miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in Island of Oahu to a distance of | various areas off the Island of Oahu, and in connection with such opera- tions carrier and patrol planes con- ducted reconnaissances of the oper- ating areas. The sectors searched, however, constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360 degress and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles. reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack. ] ‘Gen. Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnais- sance, but after seeing the warning message of October and November from the War and Navy Depart- ments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnais- sance, if any, being conducted by the Navy. XVi There were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu. Scme were Japanese con- sular agents and others were per- sons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. These spies collected, and through various channels transmitted, information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establish- ments and dispositions on the island. In Hawali the local Army Intel- ligence Service has always devoted itself to matters pertaining to Army personnel and property; and the local Naval Intelligence Service to matters pertaining to Navy per- ' sonnel and property. In addition, | prior to the establishment of an office of the Federal Bureau of In- vestigation in Hawaii, naval intel- ligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil populgtion. When the bureau’s office was established it was agreed by the three govern- menial agencies that the bureau shoould take over and become pri- marily responsible for investigation Means were available for distant | of matters connected with the civil population and that the three serv- ices should co-operate with each other. Efforts were made by the bureau to uncover espionage activ- | ities in Hawaii. The United States | being at peace with Japan, restric- tions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the | content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating be- tween Oahu and Japan. The bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable, prior to December 7, to obtain and make available signifi- cant information respecting Japa- nese plans and fleet movements in the direction of Hawaii. Japan Kept 200 Consular Agents. In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents act- ing under the Japanese consul who | was stationed in Honolulu, Ter- ritory of Hawali. The Naval District Intelligence Office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of In- vesigation, and with the intel- ligence officer of the Hawaiian De- partment of the Army, whkether these agents should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. In conference respecting this question, the commanding general, Hawai- ian Department, objected to the | arrest of any such persons at least |until they had been given notice and an opportunity to register, as- serting that their arrest would tend |to thwart the efforts which the | Army had made to create friendly sentiment towards the Untied States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawali and create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents. It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawall was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokio in his own and other names many mes- | sages on commercial radio circuits. | This activity greatly increased to- ward December 7, 1941. The con- tents of these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan and the consequent restric- tions on the activitles of the in- vestigating agencies they were un- able prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages ransmitted am through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons act- ing for him. It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the™“Jap- anese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United States Navy was anywhere in the sector north- east, north, and northwest of the Hawailan Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane re- connaissance was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore each could attack a given vessel or fleld. Each seems to have been the personnel of the Army and Navy in Hawall ofi ships in harbor for instant defense; all Navy personnel, with the ex- ceptions of those authorized to be absent, were required tc be in their quarters at midnight; all places of amusement in Honolulu and all entertainments at the Army posts were closed at midnight; all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu were closed at midnight. On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and Navy attended social functions at various points on the Island of Oahu, principally the usual Satur- day functions at the various posts and naval establishments. The commanding gencral, Hawaiian De- partment, gnd the Commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, were both guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that evening, but returned to their quarters at an early hour. No Evidence Feund Of Excess Drinking. ‘The percentages of strength in the Army present for duty on the Island of Oahu at 8 a.m. December 7, 1941, reported by all major echelons and posts, were: 24th Infantry Division, 90 per cent; 25th Infantry Division, 85.6 per cent; Coast Artillery Corps, 875 per cent; Air Force, 889 per cent; miscellaneous, including De- partment Headquarters, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Medical, 92 per cent. Estimated general percentage, 888 per cent. Reports from large ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during .the attack, show 60 per cent of officers onboard, and 96 per cent of the men. Of 75 vessels of the Fleet, of all kinds, 49 commanding officers were aboard during the attack, and 22 were en- route to their ships, one was on an- other ship, and one was on au- thorized leave, which leaves two for whom we are unable to account. Intoxicating liquor is sold on the Island of Oahu, and men on pass or on liberty have the opportunity to buy and consume it. Following the established procedure, at home and abroad, the Army exercises dis- ciplinary control of men on pass through its military police, and the Navy of men on liberty by the use of shore patrols. These organizations take into custody any person show- ing evidence of intoxication. On the night of December 6-7, 1941, from 6 pm. to 6 am, arrests of soldiers by the military police, for intoxica- tion, were 38, and arrests of sailors by the Navy shore patrol, for intoxi- cation, were 4. By comparison the arrests of civillans for drunkenness on that night were ,31 Thorough inquiry disclosed there is no evi- dence shows that as respects the use of intoxicating liquor and intoxica- tion, the conditions amongst the men of the Army and of the Navy on the night of December 6 com- pare closely with similar conditions for the several preceding months. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, the, usual percentage of enlisted strength entitled to passes or liberty took advantage of such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of Honolulu. Application of this ratio to total numbers of all the services then on the Island of Oahu and in Pear]! Harbor, amounting to about 75,000 men, indicates that no less than 11,000 soldiers, sailors and marines visited Honolulu that after- In normal times more enlisted | men of both services are absent | from duty by permission on Satur- day nights than on other nights, and on Saturday nights more officers are customarily absent than on week-day nights, On the morning of Sunday, De- cember 7, Army posts and Naval vessels and stations were adequately manned, for the readiness and alert then in effect, by men fit for duty. XVvill The attack on the mos December 7, 1941, was a mln:; alr raid and submarine attack on the Island of Oahu, a bombardment of Midway and a continuous air attack and bombardment og_ Wake Island. Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu con- sisted .of either three or four Jap- anese carriers, with supporting sur- face craft and a few small subma- Tines, and that this force had main- tained radio silence during its ap- proa_ch, which, except for the sub- marines, was from the northward of Oahu, In the attack on Oahu a sus- picious object was sighted in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a.m., by the U. S. S. Antares, Between 6:33 and 6:45 this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U. S. S. Ward. A report of this action by the Ward reached the naval base watch officer at 7:12 ., who notified his chief of staff. ‘The ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warn- ings were issued based upon this report. Another small submarine was fired upon, depth charged, rammed and sunk inside the harbor between 8:35 and 8:43 am. A third small submarine grounded in Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There is no evidence of any damage by torpe- does fired by these submarines. Pearl Harbor was provided with an anti-torpedo net which would have prevented the entrance of tor- pedoes into the harbor, and would have revealed the entrance of a sub- marine. The procedure prior to De- cember 7, 1941, was to keep the net closed during the hours of darkness, opening it only when necessary for s vessel to pass through. It was kept open during daylight hours, on the theory that, during daylight, the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel and other vessels in the vicinity, would detect a submerged or partially submerged submarine. December 7 the net was opened at 4:58 am. for the entrance of two mine swegpers. It was kept open until 8:40 am. when it was closed by orders. The net was not dam- aged. The' submarine was first sighted in the harbor at 7:45 am. The time of its entrance is not 200 fighting, bombing and torpedo planes simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all air bases on Oahu at about 7:55 a.m. All attacking planes had withdrawn before 11 am. As a result of the attack serious loss of life was caused and serious dam- age was inflicted on ships in the ‘The major part of the damage to ships in Pear] Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from planes. The torpedoes were of an obsolete type, altered to increase their ex- plosive load, to decrease their ra- dius and fitted with side vanes to insure functioning in shallow water —a weapon peculiarly adapted to an attack such as the one delivered upon shipr, in Pearl Harbor. Many of the bombs had extra heavy cases and appeared to be modified armor- piercing shell. December 7, 1941, at 9:30 pm. Midway time (11:30 p.m. Honolulu time) a force believed to consist of two cruisers and two destroyers, ap- proaching from the southward, opened fire and shelled Midway Island for about 30 minutes. About noon December 8, 1941 (2:50 p.m. December 7, Honolulu time), some twenty-seven land planes made a straffing and bombing attack on Wake Island. Some loss of life and damage to material resulted in each island. Attacks on Wake continued until its capture on December 22, 1941 (December 21, Honolulu time). High Morale Shown In Defending Attack. Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese were attacking, the commanding general, Hawalian De- partment, ordered Alert No. 3. The alert was executed with reasonable promptness. At the same time the commander in chief placed the fleet on a full war basis and issued a series of orders in an effort to inter- cept and destroy the attacking force. Officers and enlisted men, in de- fending against the attack, demon- strated excellent training and high morale. Antiaircraft weapons aboard ship, which were not already manned, and antiaircraft weapons ashore, which were in position, were promptly manned. Junior officers and enlisted men on their own initi- ative procured from storage every possible automatic weapon. These weapons continued in action during and in spite of low level straffing and dive bombing which had been known to demoralize even seasoned troops. At least three fighter pilots, in total disregard of their own safety, attempted to take off in the face of greatly superior forces then attacking their airdrome, but lost their lives in the attempt. A few fighter planes parked on an out- lying gunnery training field, which 'was not attacked, took the air. This combined antiaircraft and fighter action resulted in the destruction of approximately 30 enemy aircraft; and a number of others were lost at sea because they were unable to rejoin their carriers. XiX The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the at- tack required them to be ready for flight only after four hours’ notice The type of alert ineffect required all Army aircraft to be concentrated in order more effectively to guard against possible sabotage, instead of being dispersed in order to afford greater security against air attack, | and greater facility in taking the | air. This state of readiness, this| | concentration of airplanes, and the | | element of surprise, all contributed | to the effectiveness of the Japanese | attack, and resulted in such perma- ;nent or temporary disablement of | airplanes that very few fighter ain | planes were able to take the air dur- }mg the course of the action. For | the same reasons it was impossible to get airplanes into the air in time to trail the Japanese airplanes back to their carriers. The aircraft warning system, which was remanned by about 8:30 a.m. December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to furnish any reliable information of enemy alrcraft returning to their carriers. Such information as it afforded in- dicated enemy forces to the south- ward and southwestward of Oshu. A report of an actual contact with | an enemy carrier, which later proved to be erroneous, gave credance to indicating enemy carriers might be to the southward and southwest- ward thus causing futile searches in | those areas. | Positions of Naval Forces on December 7. | On December 7 Naval Task Force proceeding toward Oahu. Another was about 700 miles west of Oahu. A third, Task Force 11, was in the | vicinity of Johnston Island, about 700 miles southwest of Oahu. These task forces were engaged in opera- tions connected with strengthening the defenses of the outlying islands. On the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to thé attack, the fol- lowing searches of sea areas were being made: Six patrol planes were searching south and southeast- wardly from Midway. Three patrol planes were in the air engaged in a Joint exercise with submarines south of Oahu. Eighteen scouting planes from Task Force 8 had been dispatched to scout in ad- vance of the force which was on its way to Oahu. These scouted to the numerous reports from other sources | 8 was about 200 miles west of Oahu | of Oahu to & distance of 300 miles; and nine planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some 200 miles to the northward. No contacts were made with enemy aircraft or carriers, except that one Navy airplane was attacked by a , | Japanese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. This incident was .| not reported until next day. Summary of the More Important Facts Pearl Hprbor is an haportant outlying naval base, and its security is vital to both offensive and de- fensive operations. It is the Army's function to insure the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile at- tack, and the Navy's function to support the Army indirectly by operations at sea and directly by making available therefor such in- strumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the fleet when in harbor and are located or based on shore, either temporarily or per- manently. Effective utilization of the mil- itary power of the Nation is es- sential to success in war and re- quires that the operations of the Army and Navy be co-ordinated. Under the then existing plans the Joint defense of the Hawaiian fron- tier was to be co-ordinated by mutual co-operation between the commanders concerned. Plans for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier were prepared by the com- manding general, Hawaiian Depart- ment, and the commandant of the 14th Naval District, the latter act- |ing as a subordinate of the com- mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Adherance to such a plan prepared in advance of hostilities does not suffice to relieve commanders of their responsibility to apply and adapt the plan to the situation as it develops. Where as here the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of two commanders who are to co-ordi- nate their activities by mutual co- operation, the first duty of such commanders in the case of an emer- gency is conference and consulta- tion with respect to the measures to be taken under the existing plans and the adaptation of those plans in whole or in part to the situation. At about tMe time that Admiral Kimmel and Gen. Short assumed their respective commands, the War and Navy Departments were in cor« respondence with respect to ade-~ quate defense against air raids on Oahu and the naval base. The cor- respondence between the depart- ments exhibits a deep concern re- specting the probability of this form of attack. These commanders were acquainted with this correspond- ence. Nevertheless, there has been | amongst the responsible command- ers and their subordinates, without exception, a conviction, which pre- sisted up to December 7, 1941, that | Japan had no intention of making any such raid. Consequently this form of attack was a complete sur- prise to all of the superior officers of Army and Navy stationed in the Hawaiian area. This conviction per- ‘-sisted notwithstanding messages |containing warnings and orders, brought to the attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the possibility of an at- tack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precau- tions and make preparatory disposi- tions in the light of this informa- |tlon. A significant warning mes- | sage was communicated to both the | local commanders on November 24. |On November 27 each responsible | commander was warned that hos- | tilities were momentarily possible. | The warnings indicated war, and | war only. 5 | No Conferences Held For 10 Days Before Attack. Both of these messages contained |orders. The commanding general was ordered to undertake such re- connaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary. The com- mander in chief of the fleet was ordered to execute a defensive de- ployment in preparation for carry- ing out war tasks. Other significant messages followed on succeeding days. These emphasized the im- | pending danger and the need for | war readiness. | In this situation, during a period | of 10 days preceding the Japanese attack, the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them, and failed to collaborate and to co- | ordinate defensive measures which should be taken pursuant to the or- ders received. Dispositions as a re- sult of the messages were inde- pendently made by each comman- der. Neither of them informed himself of the measures and dis- positions taken by the other. The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a surprise air attack. Both commanders were handi- capped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and in- tent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initia- tion of a state of readiness for de- fense. The personnel, material, and equipment were insufficient to place the forces on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for an éxtended period. These defi- clencies did not preclude measures which would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated its severity. A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were on pass or liberty December 6th, for the reason that the state of alert or of readipess demanded by the emergency not been put into effect. With immaterial exceptions Army and Navy personnel had re- turned from leave and liberty hours before the attack ensued, fit for duty. Both pfficers and men responded immediately in the emergency and exhibited initiative, efficlency and bravery in meeting the raid. (From this point on the report is devoted to the econclusions which are piblished in full en Page A-1) Ed {