Evening Star Newspaper, January 25, 1942, Page 6

A—-6 = THE SUNDAY STAR, WASHINGTON, D. C, JANUARY 25, 1942, Text of Commission's Report on Pearl Harbor Debacle The full text of the report of the Commission appointed by the President to investi- gate the attack made by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor last December 7, follows: The President, ‘The White House. Bir: The undersigned were appointed by executive order of December 18, 1941, which defined our duties as & commission thus: “to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December v, 19417 “The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on “4he occasion mentioned, and if s0, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were re- sponsible therefor.” The Congress speedily supple- mented the executive order by granting the commission power to summon witnesses and examine them under oath. First Three Meetings Held in Capital. The commission held three meet- ings in Washington December 18, 19 and 20, and on the latter day pro- ceeded to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, where the commission ar- rived December 22 and held meet- ings December 22, 23, 24 and 26 at the headquarters of the Hawalian Department, Fort Shafter, and De- cember 27, 29, 30 and 31, 1941, and January 2 and 3, 1942, at the Sub- marine Base, Pearl Harbor, and January 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 at the Royal Hawalian Hotel, Honolulu. January 10 the commission left Honolulu for Washington, D. C., | held meetings January 12, 13 and 14, | arrived at Washington January 15, | and held further meetings January 16. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. The commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large num- | ber of documents. All members of the military and naval establish- ments, and civil officers and citi- zens who were thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the inquiry were summoned and ex- amined under oath. All persons in the Island of Oahu, wno believed they had knowledge of such facts, were publicly requested to appear, and a number responded to the in- vitation, and gave evidence. ‘Various rumors and hearsay state- ments have been communicated to the commission. The eommission has sought to find and examine wit- nesses who might be expected to have knowledge respecting them. We believe that our findings of fact sufficiently dispose of most of them. Evidence Touches Some Subjects Kept Secret. The evidence touches subjects . which in the national interest should remain secret. We have, therefore, refrained from quotation of testi- mony or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made with the purpose fully and ac- curately to reflect the testimony, which as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction. It is true, as we have found, that due to the enormous demand on the Nation'’s capacity to produce muni- | tions and war supplies, there was a deficiency in the provision of ma- teriel for the Hawaiian area. This was but natural, in the ecircum- stances, and was well known to the | Government departments and local commanders. We have made no de- tailed findings on the subject, since as will appear from our report, we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical fact of failure to take appropriate measures with the means available, At our hearings reference was made to what has long been a mat- ter of common knowledge,—that there are, and have been, diverse views of national policy respecting the basing of the entire United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Har- bor, T. H. We feel that the national policy in this matter is one that has been settled by those responsi- ble for such decisions and that it is not within our province—that of finding the facts respecting the at- tack of December 7, and the re- sponsibility for the resulting damage to the United States—to discuss any | such topic. Regrettable loss of life and ex- tensive damage resulted from the air raid. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures taken to repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the mandate appointing this commis- sion, and the subject is dealt with in our report only to the extent that it bears on questions of responsi- bility for the disaster. All Testimony Invited In Wide Inquiry. . The evidence taken covered a wide scope. The commission in- tentionally invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief that thereby incidental light might be thrown' upon the main issues in- volved. As an example, the com- mission heard evidence to show what had been done at Pearl Har- bor and on the Island of Oahu by Naval and military commands sub- sequent to December 7, 1941, in the view that this might throw some light upon the matters submitted for our consideration. Again, the commission heard much testimony as to the population of Hawaii, its composition, and the attitade and disposition of the persons compos- dng it, in the belief that the facts disclosed might aid in appraising the results of investigative, coun- ter-espionage, and anti-sabotage work done antecedent to the attack ~of December 7, 1941. The commission visited the naval ‘base at Pear] Harbor and air fields of #he military and naval establish- ments, as well as the Army posts and forts and certain of the coast fortifi- cations on the Island of Oahy. The minutes of each meet! the commission are of record. The statements of witnesses received in the meetings previous to that of December 22 have been recorded in summaries. All testimopy received at the meeting of December 22 and the subsequent meetings was steno- graphically reported and transcribed. The oral evidence received amounts | to 1,887 typewritten pages, and the | records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in num- ber. Appended hereto is a map of the Island of Oahu showing the loca- tion of the principal naval and military establishments. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered, and as the result of its deliberations the commission submits the follewing Findings of Fact I About 7:55 a.m. Honolulu time (1:25 pm. E. S. T) on Sunday, De- cember 7, 1941, Japanese forces at- tacked Army and Navy installations and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii. Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morn- ing, Japan planned to announce to the Secretary of State of the United States at 1 pm. of that day, E. 8. T. (7:30 a.m. Honolulu time) the sever- ance of diplomatic relations and simultaneously to attack the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. The mili- tary preparations for this breach of international faith and honor were put in train and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched weeks prior to any intimation of the planned severance of relations. The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as “The | Hawaiian Islands.” This group con- | sists of the larger lslands—flawnfl,' | Maui, Molokai, Oahu and Knual—| {and a number of smaller islands. | They extend from Hawaii in the | south some three hundred miles in a northwesterly direction, including Kauai in the north. For purposes of certain developments and protection. 1 the Islands of Midway, Wake, John- ston, Palmyra, Christmas and Can- ton, had been placed under the responsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian area. The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense | standpoint is the fact that Pearl Harbor, the main outlying naval base in the Pacific, is located in the Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian | group. For this reason all measures for the protection and defense of the Territory have centered in and around Oahu, the other islands being garrisoned by minor forces only. A main outlying naval base, such as Pearl Harbor, is intended for the use of the fleet for taking on fuel and supplies, for recreation and rest of the fleet personnel, and for the repair and refitting of ships. It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in con- flict with the policies of other gov- ernments. It was realized by the State, War and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled, wai+ | in the Pacific was inevitable. v Plans and preparations against the contingency of war are the | joint responsibility of the military |and naval authorities, and within | | the limits of funds and authoriza- | tions provided by the Congress were being ceaselessly carried out. Under these plans the general | function of the Army is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory. The gen- eral function of the Navy is to con- duct naval operations to gain and maintain control of vital sea areas, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers. Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian 2rea against every contingency had been prepared. These included joint Army and Navy war plans and War Depart- ment and Navy Department plans subsidiary thereto which establish the Hawaiian coastal frontier, as- sign tasks and forces to both Army | and Navy for its joint defense, and prescribe that the system of co- INVESTIGATED PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—This special com- mission has completed its appointed job of investigating the Jap- anese attack on Pearl Harbor, and Associate Justice Roberts (center), head of the group, submitted the report to President ordination between the responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by mutual co-operation. v The responsibility for the joint defense of the Hawalian coastal frontier rested upon the command- ing general, Hawaiian Department, and the commandant 14th Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. The com- mander in chief of the Fileet, in addition, was assigned the task of protecting the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and | by supporting land and air forces | |in denying the enemy the use of | land positions within that frontier, and the further task of covering the operations of the Hawalian coastal frontier forces. The commanding general, Hawailan Department, could properly deal respecting de- fense measures and dispositions with either the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet or the comman- dant of the 14th Naval District. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1, 1841, to December 17, 1941, was Admiral | Husband E. Kimmel. The comman- dant, 14th Naval District from April M, 1940, to date is Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch. The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941, was Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short. A local joint defense plan entitled “Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawailan Coastal Frontier,” was prepared by Gen. Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, the latter acting under the direction of Admiral Kimmel. Each commander adopted a standing operating procedure, or standing orders, to carry out his obligation under the joint agree- ment. This joint coastal frontier de- fense plan was intended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Departments or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat| of hostile action, or the occurrence of war. vi The means available to the Army, for the fulfillment of its mission, consist of coast defense and anti- aircraft artillery, mobile gr(mm!i | forces, the Hawaiian Air Force and | |and stating with respect to the | an aircraft warning service. The supporting elements of the Navy consist of local naval defense forces tomprising light surface craft and shore-based aircraft not assigned to the ficet. The fleet as such was not charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor, except that certain alrcraft attached to the fleet, when present, and the anti-aircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as were in port, were available. It was recognized that, prior to furnishing the full war strength garrison, insufficient forces were available to maintain all the de- fenses on a war footing for ex- tended period of time. The re- sponsible commanders made numer- ous recommendations to the War and Navy Departments for addi- tional forces, equipment and funds which they deemed necessary to in- sure the defense of the Hawailan coastal frontier under any event- uality. The national situation per- mitted only a partial fllling of these requirements. However, presup- posing timely dispositions by the Army and Navy commands in Hawalil, the forces available to them were adequate to frustrate a sur- prise air attack or greatly to miti- gate its effectiveness. vil In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of the War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific fleet while in Pear] Har- bor. The writer stated: “If war eventuates with Japan, it is be- lieved easily possible that hostilities | would be initiated by s surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.” The writer stated that the “inherent possibil- ities of a major disaster” warranted further speedy action to “increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned” * * * The letter proceeded: “The dan- gers envisaged in their order of im- portance and probability are con- sidered to be: attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gun fire” It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satisfactory, described the probable character of an air attack and urged consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. It concluded with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the co-ordination of Army and Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. If also urged the conduct of | joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids. Kimmel and Short Got Coples of Letters. The Secretary of War replied February 7, 1941, giving the present | and prospective status of the| Hawalian Department in respect of airplanes and anti-aircraft artillery, other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to the Com- manding General, Hawaiian De- partment, with direction to him to co-operate with the local naval au- thorities in making the suggested measures effective. Admiral Kimmel and Gen. Short received coples of these letters at about the time they assumed the commands which they held Decem- ber 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch also received coples. The joint coastal frontier defense plan and plans subsidiary thereo envisaged the possibility of an air attack and estimated that, if made, it would most likely occur at dawn. An agreement the Hawalian Air REPORTS ON PEARL HARBOR—Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts (left), head of the tom- mittee that ‘investigated conditions at Pearl Harbor prior to and during the December 7 attack, is shown with White House reporters yesterday after filing with President Roosevelt the 50-page repott. —A. P. Photo. S o (1) air bombing| this series of messages a tacit agree- 'ment that the measures taken were all that were intended by the de- partment. November 29, 1941, the chief of naval operations sent a message to the commander in chief of the fleet, ‘which was in substance a quotation of the chief ‘of staff’s dispatch of November 27 to the commanding general, Hawalian Department; and in addition directed the addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act, and ordered certain action in case hos- tilitles should occur. Kra Isthmus Threat Known on November 30, consideration the possibility of sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing Ma- rine planes then on those islands; of relieving Marines stationed there by the substitution of units of the Army. Gen. Short, Admiral Kimmel and Rear Admiral Block had been in conference concerning this pro- posal. Air Surprise Unlikely, Plane Officers Thought. At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Ad- miral Kimmel and Gen. Short, re- spectively, this proposal was a sub- Ject of discussion. Gen. Short held discussions with Admiral Kimmel November 30, 1941, the chief ol]‘on November 27, December 1, 2 and naval operations sent a dispatch to | the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded the message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for his in- formation, in which it was stated the indications were that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus, directing the com- mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet | to do certain scouting, but to avoid | the appearance of attacking.Ad- Roosevelt yesterday. Left to right: Brig. Gen. Jo-eph McNarney, |mira] Kimmel testified that he had Admiral William H. Standley, Justice Roberts, Rear Admiral |yiewed this message as indicating | testimony Admiral Kimmel and Joseph M. Reeves and Maj. Gen. Frank McCoy. Force and the Commander, Navy Patrol Wing two, established the responsibilities for the joint use and operation of the available air forces of the Army and Navy. The stand- ing operating procedure, Hawaiian Department, and standing orders of the United States Pacific Fleet and 14th Naval District also prescribed measures for protection against air attack. Frequent joint drills and exercises were conducted during the year 1941 to insure such measures would be effective, Vil For months prior to December 7, 1841, the Secretary of State was repeatedly in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, not tonly in cabinet meetings, but in meetings of the war council, and on the occasions of those contacts and in conference with the Secretary of War and the negotiations with Japan and the | growing tensity of the relations of the United States with Japan. At meetings of the war council the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations were also present. The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and the Secre- tary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotiations, and all three of these officials were cogni- zant of the growing threat of hostilities and of the military and naval needs and measures conse- quent thereupon. The Secretaries of War and Navy were in constant touch with the chief of staff and received from the Secretary of State and the resiilts of their confer- ences with him. The latter officers in turn advised the responsible com- manders in the fleld of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities. The responsible com- manders in the Hawalian area were aware that previous Japanese ac- tions and demonstrated Axis | methods indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war. IX | October 16, 1041, the commanding | general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief of the Fleet, were advised by the War and ‘Nuvy Departments of the changes in the Japanese cabinet, of the 'probobfllty of hostilities between Japan and Russia, and of the possi- bility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. Both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make pre- paratory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic inten- tions or constitute provocation as against Japan. Admiral Kimmel made certain dispositions of units of the Fleet, and placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Har- bor. At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in | training operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly impor- tant to the training of the Fleet personnel, and the Army was also conducting intensive training, par- sponsible commanders testified that to undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawalian area would nec- essitate curtailment of training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought the situation was not such as to require this. ’ November 24, 1941, the chief of naval operations sent & message to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggres- sive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending nego- tiations, the statements of the Jap- anese government, and the move- ments of its army and naval forces, Secretary of the Navy discussed | the chief of naval operations, and | imparted to them the information | ticularly of its air arm. The re- | —A. P. Wirephoto. to be ended, with little likelihood of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that hos- tilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that in the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this Nation should not commit the first overt act; that the department com- mander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense. The message directed him, even prior to hostile action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed nes- essary, but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil | population or disclose his intent. | He was directed to restrict the in- | formation contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers, |and to report to the chief of staff the measures taken. |of this message was communicated the commander in chief of the | Pacific Fleet. On the same day (November 27, |1941) the chief of military intel- ligence sent a message to the In- commanding general, Hawaiian De- partment, directing him to inform the commanding general and his chief of staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue and that subversive activity might be ex- pected. Message to Fleet A Warning of War. On the same day (November 27, sent a message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dis- patch was to be considered a war ‘warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize con- ditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious ex- pedition against either the Philip- pines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japa- nese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It directed the execution of a defensive deploy- ment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. Samoa and continental districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage, and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and Army authorities. The commander in chief of the fleet communicated the purport of this message to the general commanding the Hawailan Department of the Army. At the time of our hearing Gen. Short had no independent recollec- tion of the last mentioned message, although he felt that it must have been shown to him. November 27, 1941, the command- ing general, Hawalian Department, in response to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report meas- ures taken, informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his com- mand against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy. No reply referring to this message was sent by the War De- partment; but Gen. Short testified that he considered the adjutant general's message referred to in the Sabotage Precaution Ordered on Nov. 28, November 28, 1941, the command- ing general, Hawaiian Department, received from the adjutant general of the Army a message stating that the critical situation required every precaution to be taken at once against subversive activities, within the scope of the Army's responsi- bility; that all necessary measures be taken to protect military estab- against sabotage, against propa- ganda affecting Army personnel, and against all espionage. The mes- sage disclaimed ordering any illegal measures, and wafned that protec- tive measures should be confined to replied to the last mentioned mes- sage, outlining at length and in de- tail the measures taken to prevent message. The purport | > | tial to continued operations should by the department commander to | be retained until the last moment. telligence officer on the staff of the | 1941) the chief of naval openuom; which, under the caption “Japanese | next succeeding paragraph a reply. | lishments, property and equipmeni | It stated that Guam,| that the Navy Department was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawall. The Navy Department sent three | messages to the commander in chlef of the Pacific Fleet; the first of | December 3, 1941, stated that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their ctodes and burning secret documents; the sec- ond of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential | documents and means of confiden- | tial communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emer- gency (this was sent to the com- mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet | for information only), and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the | naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized | to destroy confidential papers then | emergency, and that those essen- Responsible Officers | Feared No Air Attack. The foregoing messages did not | create in the minds of the respon- | sible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable immi- | nence of air raids. On the conlrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabo- tage and surprise submarine attack. The necessity for taking a state of been required to avert or meet an air-raid attack, was not considered. X December 1, 1941, the director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin | Naval Situation,” stated: “Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive prepara- tions are under way for hostili- ties. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and Northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and For- mosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be car- ried out by small individual units, but the organization of an ex- tensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date, this task force, under the command of the com- mander in chief 2d Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually con- centrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the com- bined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major cap- ital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the great- est portion of the carriers.” The naval intelligence service in Hawali, due to lack of information carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home ports, Xl At about noon E. 8. T. (6:30 am. Honolulu time) December 7, an ad- ditional warning message indicating an almost immediate break in re- lations between the United States and Japan, was dispatched by the chief of staff after conference with the chief of naval operations, for and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawali in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until -after the attack. Xl The commanding general, Ha- waiian Department, the commander in chief of the Fleet, and the com- mandant 14th Naval District, their senior subordinates, and their prin- cipal staff officers, considered the possibility of air raids. Without ex- ception they believed that the chances of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl Harbor were practically nil. The attack of Sunday, December 7, 1941, was, therefore, a complete surprise to each of them. While Gen. Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures, they did not, on or subsequent to November 27, 1941, hold any conference specifically directed to the meaning of the messages received from the War and Navy Departments or concerning action required to be taken pur- . | suant to those messages. For some time prior to November 3 concerning this matter in an effort to compose certain differences of view. At one of these conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his war plans officer, Capt. McMorris, who was present, concerning the probability of a surprise air attack {on Oahu. According to Gen. Short, | Cupt McMorris replied there was no | probability of such an attack; and, according to Capt. McMorris, his reply was that the Japanese would never so attack. According to the ‘Gen Short did not discuss means | or measures for Hawaiian defense to be adopted in the light of the or later, under conditions of greater | war readiness, which would have | indicating that the bulk of Japanese | the information of responsible Army | messages. On and after November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, independ- ently took such action as each | deemed appropriate to the existing situation. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was taking, and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action had been taken, nor did they con= sult as to the appropriateness of the actions taken by them respectively. Action Is Taken After Messages. After receipt of the messages of | November 27 the following action was taken: The commanding general, Ha- waiian Department, ordered alert No. 1 (see next succeeding para- graph) into effect on November 27, and it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft warn- ing system operate daily from 4 a.m. to 7 am. The commandant of the | 14th naval district, in his capacity ‘ as base defense officer, called a con- | ference of all the destroyer com= manders of the inshore patrol, ad- vised them that something might happen, and that they should be on | the alert. The commander in chief | of the fleet made certain disposi- | tions of units of the fleet for the purpose of strengthening his out- posts to the south and west of the Hawalian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese sub- marines found in the operating | areas around the Island of Oahu ‘ should be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department, Operating Procedure | For Air Alerts. In the Hawailan Department's standing operating procedure gov- erning the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, three states of | readiness were prescribed, khown as | alert No. 1, alert No. 2 and alert No. 3. Alert No. 1 was thus defined: “This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.” Alert No. 2 was thus defined: | “This alert is applicable to & | condition more serious than alert | No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface and aircraft, in addition to de- fense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.” Alert No. 3 was thus defined: “This alert requires occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installa- tions on outlying islands.” Xl The responsibilities of the Army | included the installation and opera- | tion of an aircraft warning system for the detection of water-borne | and air-borne craft at a distance from the coast. Throughout the late spring and summer of 1941 the Army was engaged in the instal- lation of permanent facilities for this purpose on the Hawaiian Is- lands. Permanent installations had not, on December 7, 1941, been com- pleted. By November 27, 1041, certain mobile equipment had been installed at tempporary locations, and was being operated intermit- | tently throughout the day for the purpose of training personnel in its operation. On November 27, | 1941, in connection with the order for alert No. 1, the commanding general, Hawailan Department, or- idered that this system be operated each day during the period from 4:00 am. until 7:00 am. It was intended that in the future the Navy should have officer personnel in the information center, but up to December 7 such officers had not been designated. In accordance with the order in effect, the system closed at 7:00 am. Sunday, De- cember 7. A non-commissioned offi- cer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed to re- main at one of the stations, and was granted leave to do so. At about 7:02 a.m. he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of north of Oa~ hu, at a distance of about 130 miles, He reported” this fact at 7:20 a.m. to a lleutenant of the Army who was at the central information cen- ter, having been detailed there to familiarize himself with the opera- tion of the system. This inexperi- enced lieutenant, having informae tion that certain United States planes might be in the vicinity at the time, assumed that the planes in question were friendly planes, and took no action with respect to them. The recording of the obser- Gen. |27, 1941, thaWu'Depl.mnzntlnd 'Itlmm-detldimedmtth-. ‘uumnmw under See REPORT, Page A-1) /