Evening Star Newspaper, May 9, 1937, Page 33

REVOLUTION IS EFFECTED INF OREIGN POLICY OF U.S. Neutrality Act Puts Capstone to New Structure, Created During Last 4 Years Under Roosevelt. BY CRESTON B. MULLINS. NACTMENT of the neutrality law of 1937 puts the capstone to a revolution carried out in Amercian foreign policy the past four years. Reforms since March, 1933, stand unmatched in more than 150 years of American history. Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State had his task in the development and practical application of American neutrality policy, and the principles he established remained for more than a century and a half as the standard American attitude toward foreign con- flicts; President Monroe defined the American stand on Latin America; President Wilson brought the United States onto the world scene in full stature 20 years ago. But the past four years have witnessed a complete reversal in relationships wjth Latin America, a revivification of commer- cial policy in the promotion of the reciprocal trade program, and a grad- ual approach toward effective co- operation with the rest of the world for peace. When President Roosevelt at the Capitol, March 4, 1933, pledged his regime to the policy of the ‘“good neighbor” the full implication of the phrase was unrevealed, nor could the all-pervading character of the reform that was to come be divined. What he | promised was the policy of the neigh- bor who respects himself and so re- spects others, who prefers to live in amity, but who knows how to defend himself against aggression, and who believes, with the New England farm- er, that “good fences make good neighbors.” Main Points in New Policy. The essential facts of the new American foreign policy are two: (1) The determination to keep the United States at peace with the rest of the world; and (2) The restoration of the armed strength of the United States to meet whatever menace to American secur- ity that may arise abroad. The spearhead of the drive to as- sure continuing peace for America is neutrality legislation, but there was serious difference between the Presi- dent and some congressional elements and dozens of other essential war ma- terials to belligerents, and whether to Tequire that all transactions with bel- ligerents be for cash. If he is a collective peace man he will forbid American ships to trans- port certain specified goods—which would be essential war materials— when the sanctioning states have the sea power to preserve their own trade in these goods with the United States, and to cut off the trade of their op- ponents, and will require all trade with belligerents to be cash when the sanctionists have the financial re- sources to pay cash for all purchases of any kind in this country. Example of Operation. A concrete example may be some- thing like this: Germany and Japan g0 to war against Russia and are de- clared aggressors by the League of Nations—or its moving spirits—and sanctions are voted. Germany and Japan, defying sanctions, evoke mili- tary measures by the sanctionists. The President then must determine the advisability of extending the neu- trality act provisions to the latter and forbidding American ships carrying essential war materials such as oil, cotton, copper, scrap iron The League would rely upon the | naval force of Great Britain to enforce sanctions. The British empire, being virtually self-sufficient in all war ma- terials, would not find the restrictions onerous. But Germany and Japan, probably cut off from the American market by British sea power, and in any event finding it practically im- possible to pay cash for these mate- rials from America, would suffer a body blow. Thus, American resources would remain available—for cash—to Great Britain and her sanctionist allies but would be denied to their enemies. Discretionary neutrality legislation conceivably can inspire reasonable | charges of unneutrality by virtue of the unequal operation of regulations applied after war begins, but the theory of the school which supports the discretionary law is that if peace can be kept only by giving up neu- trality, such a surrender is advisable. | | THE SUNDAY . STAR, WASHINGTON, D. C, MAY 9, 1937—PART TWO. Dictators at Odds Hitler Resists Mussolini’s Attempt to Force Germany Into Decisive Action ‘Against Western Powers Soon. POPULAR FR s D3 ONT REGIME FACING DOOM IN FRANCE Republican Rule Itself May Be Threat- ened—Middle Classes Held Turn- ing to Fascism. BY WILLIAM BIRD. ARIS—France’s “Front Popu- laire” experiment, begun just & year ago, when the Socialist, Radical and Communist par- ties united to win a sweeping majority at the polls, is approaching its end. And the end is full of menacé for the tranquility of the country. It may even threaten the republican regime iteelf. No French government since the war has had s0 many enthusiastic admirers in foreign countries. The disappointment that must follow its demise will extend far beyond the bordess of France. And if, as many men now begin to fear, it Is fol- lowed by some form of fascism, or even by serious threats of fascism which may necessitate. constitutional changes and restrictions on civil lib- erties, people of Leftist sympathies the world over will have a bitter pill to digest. The fact must be faced that Leftist experiments on the continent of Eu- led to some form of fascism or dic- tatorial government. Beginning with Hungary, where the ,Communist regime of Bela Kun led to the re- pressive regency of Admiral Horthy, the Fascist movement has spread until now it blankets by far the greater part of Western Europe. And in almost evéry case its genesis can be traced to Leftist failures or Left- ist excesses. Socialists Provide Pretext. In Italy fascism emerged from the weakness of the Liberal govern- ment, combined with the menacing attitude of the labor organizations. In Austria socialistic government in Vienna provided the pretext for the Dollfuss coup d'etat, involving the slaughter of many hundreds o: work- ers. In Germany Hitler's ascension was due primasily to the increasing domination of the “leftism” of the Communist party. Georges Izard, one of the chiefs of the “frontist” movement in PFrance, asserts that all these facts prove that Karl Marx was wrong. It rope since the war have all turned | out badly, and in most cases have | ers generally—are*in most countries opposed to any kind of arbitrary rule. They are essentially liberals and democrats, but, if faced with the choice between proletarian and dictatorship and a conservative au- thoritarian regime, they turn unhesi- tatingly to the latter, feeling that it offers some chance of their main- taining their existing class status. The “people’s front government in France, M. Izard holds, has not given sufficient consideration to the middle classes, with the consequence that those classes are now turning away from their traditional liberalism and looking for protection to some of the nep-Fascist movements, particularly the recently-formed popular party headed by the ex-Communist, Jacques Doriot. Doriot's campaign is con- ducted vy cleverly. He insists he is a complete democrat, but in many ways his movement is analogous to Hitler's, Hitler, it will be remem- bered, called his party “National So- clalist,” and asserted that true so- clalism was his aim Doriet, like Hitler, makes his strong- est appeal by denouncing the Commu- nist party. He has achieved what | amounts almost to a miracle, in that he has obtained control of the large suburb of St. Denis, entirely a work- ing-class district, and heretofore strongly communistic. Even the fact that he has been denounced as a Fascist not only by the Communists, but also by the Socialists and Radi- | cals, has not diminished his follow~ ‘ ing. | Repeated Appeals by Blum. Premier Leon Blum has made re- peated appeals to the Extremists in | the “Front Populaire” to moderate | their demands and give the country a “breathing space” in which to digest the social reforms his government has brought about. But there are few examples in recent European history | of such appeals to moderation being | heeded. “It is the business of a gov- | ernment to govern, not to supplicate.” is the way M. Blum's critics put it. Ap | peals to moderation are regarded by the government's friends as well as its enemies as a sign of weakness. In other words, peace is a higher obli- gation of the Government to its citi- zens than is neutrality to other gov- ernments. If pressing for strict neu- as to whether, as he thought, neutral- | ity could be achieved best by prevent- | ing any likelihood of conflict with | sanctioning agencies in the collective is not true, as Marx maintained, that | Although it is quite possible that the middle classes tend to beconte the Blum cabinet may last some “proletarized” and to rally to so-| months more, its authority appears to clalism. On the contrary, the ex- ; be gone. Its greatest chance of sur- peace machinery, or whether, as they thought, American neutrality would be better served by maintaining strict im- partiality in the event of sanctions. In the first case the executive would require broad powers to apply or not to apply stringent regulations against intercourse with belligerents; in the second case the actions of the execu- tive would be made mandatory by legislation and there would be no room for application or suspension of neutrality regulations. The former required a discretionary neutrality act, that is, a law which would permit the President to use his powers or not as he foresaw that their practical appli- cation would deter or assist sanctions by collective peace agencies; the lat- ter required a mandatory bill, that is, a law which would lay down fully in advance exactly what regulations would come into force upon issuance of a proclamation that a state of war existed anywhere in the world. The law enacted retains virtually all of the discretionary features with which it passed the House. The phi- losophy upon which it is based is that peace is most likely for America when the possibilities for involvement in war are at & minimum. These possibilities arise from presence of American inter- ests—economic, commercial and hu- man—in a war zone, or from close association of any of them with the ¢ause of either belligerent. Therefore, these interests must be cut to a mini- mum during war in which we wish to remain neutral. Americans must be deprived of direct financial interest in the outcome; they must not have a commercial stake in the cause of either party, and they must themselves re- main out of contact with hostilities to prevent incitement, through accident | or design, of the American people against one side or the other. Philosophy Effectuated. | To give full effect to this basic | philosophy of the duty of neutrals, loans and credits to belligerents are forbidden; arms, ammunition and im- | plements of war may not be exported | to any belligerent; American ships are not to carry arms to belligerents; American citizens may not travel on vessels of any belligerent, except under such rules and regulations as the Pres- ident may prescribe; American mer- chant vessels may not go armed; and the President, as he sees fit, may for- bid American ships to carry certain other goods in addition to arms to belligerents, and may require that all trade, other than arms, be on a strictly cash basis ‘The effect of the last two provisions is complicated. Its extent may be seen from the phraseology of the law. Section 2 (a) provides that whenever the President shall have “issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 of this act and he shall thereafter find that the placing of re- strictions on the shipment of certain articles or materials in addition to arms, ammunition and implements of war from the United States to bel- ligerent states, or to a state wherein civil strife exists, is necessary to pro- mote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States, he shall so proclaim, and it shall thereafter be unlawful, except under limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe * * * for any American vessel to carry such articles or materials to any belligerent atate * ¢ *.” Cash Requirement. Section 2 (b) supplements this with the provision that whenever the Presi- dent proclaims the existence of & state of war anywhere in the world and shail thereafter find that “the placing of restrictions on the export of articles or materials from the United States to belligerent states ® * * is necessary to promote the se- curity or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives or commerce of citizens of the United States, he shall so proclaim, and it shell thereafter be unlawful, except under such limitations or exceptions as the President may prescribe * * ¢ to export or trahsport * * * from the United States to any belligerent state ® * * any articles or materials what- ever until all right, title and interest therein shall have been transferred to some foreign government, agency, in- stitution, association, partnership, cor- poration or national.” In other words, the President deter- mines whether to forbid United States &hips to carry oil, sciap iren, cotton " 3 | those rights are better neglected. The determination to keep the United States at peace finds further expression in a concerted campaign for removal of those hates and dis- trusts nourished by Latin Americans | for the “colossus of the north.” The “good neighbor” policy has been im- plemented by numerous acts testifying | to the good faith of the United States. Chief among these was renunciation of intervention as a cormer stone of American policy in Latin America. American foreign policy chiefs never |is done with interference in other New World governments. The cut for this campaign was given by Mr. Roose- velt at a Wilson day dinner in 1933 when he renounced armed interven- tion as a function of foreign policy. His statement that “the mainte- nance of constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obliga- tion devolving upon the United States alone” inaugurated a long series of steps out of the internal concerns of other nations. Thus, we killed the Platt amendment and rescinded the Panama treaty, both of which carried certain rights of intervention; with- drew our Marines from Haiti and Nicaragua, and last year refused to intervene again in the latter country at a time of grave domestic crisis there; and at the Seventh Pan-Ameri- can Congress at Montevideo in 1933 Secretary Hull unequivocally pledged to Latin Americans security of their | domestic ‘affairs from the United | States. Reciprocal Trade Aids Latins. On top of this the reciprocal trade program has emhraced eight Latin American couritries, bringing sharp upturns in economic conditions, par- | ticularly in Cuba, where geographical | proximity gives the United States special reason for apprehension over unrest. In the Far East American peace policy manifests itself in withdrawal from the Philippines, a balm for the sore spot in Japanese-American re- lations. By 1945, when the Philippines become independent, American po- litical commitments in the Far East will be virtually wiped out. With re- spect to Japan, too, it has been signifi- cant that during the past four years there has been precious little reaffir- mation of the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of Japan's conquest of Manchuria. Although we do not yet recognize Manchukuo we are not pressing the point and a hint of our future course may be found in tacit recognition lent Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. If such a broad policy of peace pro- motion fails to keep the United States out of foreign wars and to forestall aggression against the United States we have under preparation a national defense force which will soon be capa- ble of meeting any emergency. Resto- ration of the armer strength of the United States is one outstanding achievement of the administration, for it has been above all the personal in- terest of the Chief Executive which has led Congress to greater and great- er appropriations for the Army and Navy. With & program of naval bullding designed to attain treaty limits by 1942, and with the Army receiving 40 per cent more personnel than it had two years ago, we are mending our fences like any good neighbor would. Treaty Tonnage Retained. Sono after March 4, 1933, Mr. Roose- velt expressed the determination to sce the Navy bullt up to standards prescribed in the Washington and London naval treaties. Although both have expired, their basic tonnage fig- ures have been retained as our imme- diate objective. Besides this treaty program, which is to be fuifilled by 1942, the United States is building two 35,000-ton battleships to meet competition in this class from Great Britain, Italy and Japan. The naval air force also has a 1,000-plane build- ing program to be completed by 1942, which will give the Navy a total air force of 1,910 planes. The War Department appropriation bill for 1935 increased the standing Army from about 118,000, where it had remained since demobilization after the war, to 160,000, or by 40 per cent. This strength will be reached by June 30 this year. Increases from 185,000 to 210,000 men have also been author- ized in National Guard strength. In sccordance with recommends- 1 trality rights is likely to lead to war | cease repeating that the United States | BY PERTINAX. O COME forward as a prophet is a very risky venture. But the interpretation of symp- toms cannot be called prophecy. Have all outward signs been com- bined to deceive us? We feel inclined to be bold and to say that, however striking the apparent triumphs of the dictators, their position today is not | as formidable as it appeared last year. “It is the end of the co-operation between Hitler and Mussolini,” a per- son in high authority remarked to me the other day. Let us hope so. But for the present we must never relax our attention; we must be pre- pared for anything. However, we cannot help believing that a change is slowly taking place in the international situation, and we are sure that the forces working for peace anc democracy ought to win, although they wiil be put to many exacting tests of courage and endur- ance throughout the remainder of this year and in 1938. During the last three months Hit- ler and Mussolini have been behaving very differently. Hitler has been more silent than usual, and he has kept more remote from the transaction of public busi- ness. All witnesses agree that he is meditative and seclusive, that he in- dulges in endless deliberations with himself. Those around him are find- ing it difficult to make him reach final decisions in matters that are brought to his desk. He knows that, for many months to come. he cannot take any step that might expose Germany to the risk of being involved in prolonged warfare—this much was explained to him, we have learned, by the high military command on Jan- uary 9. Therefore Hitler does not wish to sink deeper in Spanish affairs. Fur- thermore, he well knows that an attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria could not be brought to a decisive conclusion within a week end or even a few weeks—a general war would probably ensue unless, of course, as the outcome of social disturbances, France should become paralyzed. He sticks to an attitude of reserve and temporization. All the Nazi leaders who crave rush and speedy -action now set their hopes upon Gen. Goering. Meanwhile, in the enforcement of the new four-year plan, the German people are now confronted by s lack of raw materials (owing to the marked and continuous rise of commodity prices throughout the world) and, of course, by the depletion of the re- serves of gold and foreign currencies, tions of the Baker board in 1934 the Army Air Corps has been segregated with its” own General Headquarters and s building program . instituted which within a few years will carry the number of military planes to the recommended -figure of 2,320. That this program is far from completion, however, was revealed by the state- ment in 1936 that the Army could muster ‘leas than 350 modern combat planes in case of emergency. Neutrality legislation, reciprocal trade, non-intervention, rearmament— these are Americi’s' answer to growing threst of war. 1 | ciliation with Gen. | ferent. WILL THESE TROOPS MARCH AGAIN TO WAR? Upper: German goosesteps in Berlin. Lower: Italian Infantry on Parade. the origin of the whole trouble. The | tension is extreme. Dr. Schacht, president of th2 Reichsbank, has a fertile mind, but there is a limit to the tricks that can be contrived. After all, when every- thing has been said, nobody can make bricks without straw. The recon- von Ludendorft points to the fact that Der Fuehrer is doubtful about the prospects of the policy he has carried out since last year. Ludendorffl may be a dangerous fanatic. His ideal of a totalitarian war enlisting the services of religion to the full may be the most deadly | weapon of selfmurder ever placed in Germany’s hands—and in 1914-1918 she made use of several. Nonetheless, Ludendorft gives Der Fuehrer sound advice when he urges upon him the necessity of coming to terms with Russia 80 as to bring the huge re- sources of Eastern Europe into the fold of German economy. Such an accomplishment, of course, would make it easier for the German Reicix to strike a blow at the Western world or to bully the Western world into acquiescence to many of its schemes. Hitler Lost Audacity. However, as a brutal force Hitler has; perhaps, lost his former audacity —and Ludendorff’s policy would be brutal to the extreme. Yet, if Hitler does not come to terms with France and England under the guise of an economic conference, etc., he will be compelled to try to terminate his quarrel with Stalin. This does not mean that Stalin—who, despite many press reports, is stronger than ever— would yleld to his entreaties. Hitler realizes this—and he is a perplexed ruler. Mussolini's demeanor is entirely dif- When he issued victorious from the Abyssinian war, most ob- slrvers were under the impression that for a while ‘he would keep ¥ae peace, digest his conquest, follow & restful policy and conciliate the Brit- ish and French governments, It was felt that he wanted their support against any advance of the pan- Germanist policy in Central Europe, as it could not be to the advantage of Italy for a German “Mittel Europa” to develop in close proximity to her own frontier. A revival of German influence here would re-establish the very oppressive situation which ob- tained there up to the Great War, through the close conjunction of Ger- many and Austria-Hungary. Recent reports that I1'Duce would keep hands off any German move In Austria, if they prove substantial, can only indi- cate he is ready to go to great lengths to obtain Hitler's support. The war materiel of the Italian Army (already inadequate before 1935) was depleted in the African campaign, and all its miljtary stocks have fallen to a very low level. So, after Abyssinia it was only natural to think that a period of recuperation ‘was planned by the Italiap dictdtor. Instead. with a sort of feverish ac- tivity, Mussolini has plunged head- long into all kinds of undertakin, and these are telling very heavily upon the resoyrces of his own na- tion. I am told by a high authority that its Spanish campaign has already cost Italy 1,000,000,000 lire. Oonsid- erations of bome - policy- probably -ac- < count for the restlessnes of the Duce. If expert onlookers are right., one | cannot trust the figures published | this Spring about the condition of Italian finances—published seemingly for the enlightenment of the Fascist Grand Council, but actually in order to impress the outside world. 50,000,000 Francs Borrowed. Indeed, the National Bank of Italy | does not possess 3,500,000,000 lire in | gold, plus the amount of foreign cur- rencies requAsitioned from Italian in-| vestors abroad. “I need money,” said Mussolini to a prominent British visi- tor four or five months ago—and lately 50,000.000 Swiss francs have been borrowed on burdensome terms | from a Zurich consortium. Nowadays, | it is not an unusual occurrence for | the Italian taxpayer to tear up the dfficial notices setting forth the| amount he owes the government. For 17 years Mussolini has kept in & state of continuous excitement a population which for centuries had led an easy and careless life, however poor its circumstances may have been. It would not be surprising if, in the long run, a reaction set in. You cannot be told every day that you are fated to be a hero without getting bored with the whole paraphernalia of heroism. Mussolini snatches any occasion of triumph that may pass near by, even if it be an empty one. He is ready to buy at any price any opportunity to demonstrate that Fascism can ray. In that spirit he threw himself into the Spanish civil war. But there he has been bitterly disappointed. On the warship that brought him back from Tripoli to Italy, his anger could hardly be described when he was first informed of the rout of four-Italian divisions on the Madrid front. He realized at once that the morale of the Fascist rank and file could be easily impaired when they found them- selves thrown into a foreign land— that is, into surroundings not so close- ly watched and managed as the politj- cal atmosphere at home. It also aggravated the Duce to learn that Italian prisoners were paraded in towns and villages, ordered to sing the “Bandiero Roseso” or other revo- lutionary hymns, that they were of- fered Spanish citizenship and plots of land taken from the clergy and aristocracy. He cannot safely afford to reimport into Italy men who have freely breathed an air of freedom, if not of anarchy. May Get Victory in Spain. It is possible—even, perhaps, prcb- able—that Mussolini, notwithstand- ing the London board of control, will be able to gain victory in Spain. But what will be the use of it? Italian troops cannot maintain themselves in- definitely in the peninsula. Even Spanish generals of the Franco party lately experienced the greatest diffi- culty in persuading their officers and men to live on tolerable terms with foreign allies. Therefore the presence in' Spain of the Italian militiamen and regular contingents, the posses- sion by Italy of points of vantage in the vicinity of France’s and Britain's vital lines of communication across the ‘Mediterranean ought to be put to good sccount as soon as possible. In other words, Germany must be ready, st the earliest date, for a deci- sive action against the Western powers 2 that would enable Italy to profit from its territorial occupations and con- tinuous threats against France and England. Mussolini, in his exchange of views with Berlin, always stresses the point that in another year Britisn rearmament will have made good progress, and that by then the game may be up for the powers that want to disturb the political and territorial status quo. He undoubtedly has agreed to sacrifice a good deal to the pangermanist policy in Central Eu- rope, and has entered into a working alliance with the Reich. But will Italy be able to wait untts Germany is ready to act? In the famous conferences of last January with Gen. Goering, Mussolini did his best to persuade the latter that decl- sive action ought not to be further delayed. He has probably won Gen. Goering to his views, but Gen. Goering has failed, s0 far, to move Adolf Hitler from the advices tendered to him by von Blomberg, von Fritsch and, now, Ludendorff. Duce’s Position Weak. The truth of the matter is that Mussolini cannot expect Germany to incur, for the sake of Italy, risks that, for the present, she is not willing to incur for herself. This is the weak spot in Mussolini's position. He fancies he can perhaps remedy it by making himself very frightful to the Paris and the London cabinets. Thus, on March 25, Count Ciano, Italian foreign min- ister, Mussolini’s son-in-law and per- haps successor-designate, warned the British Ambassador against the seris ous consequences that might .follow from the anti-fascist addresses de- livered by so many leaders of the Anglican Church. This warning im- pressed Mr. Baldwin and some other British leaders, but does not alter the Tundamental state of affairs. Possibly Mussolini would back down if the French and British governments made up their minds to tell him: “So far and no further.” But so far the London and Paris governments have stuck to the idea that they had better refrain from .doing anything that might make it impossible for him to retrace his steps with dignity and to save his face. By the time this article is published, perhaps the for- eign office and the Quaj d’'Orsay may know better. But however they may view the situation, it is evident that the prospects of both dictators have not improved of late. Great Britain and France should be more aware of their strength. Compulsory Education, Is Decreed in Iran Iran is determined that all its peo: ple must learn to read and write. This the ministry of education at Teheran bas decreed and drastic measures are being taken to enforce the order. Day classes are being established in all parts of the ocountry and evening classes are springing up in many cen- ters. Notioes have been posted on atreet walls and are being shown on motion picture screens, asking people to send their gardeners, chauffeurs and other servanis to classes at least twice weekly. Police have been ordered to stop persons who look like servants and take them by foroe to the nearest _class. Iran hopes to make all. its-peo- ple literate {n not less than two years. A perience in all European countries since the war shows that, when they feel their existence as a separate class threatened, they turn against social- ism and rally to fascism or what- ever other movement will protect them from “proletarization.” . Middle Classes Fascist. It is the middle classes, M. Izard holds, that rendered fascism pos .1l in Italy and Hitlerism in Germany. ‘The middle classes—meaning small business men, white-collar employes, doctors, lawyers, and intellectual work- | viving yet awhile is the reluctance of the conservative opposition to give the final thrust. Like the Spanish mata. | dor who, facing a dangerous animal, ‘prerer.s to wait until he is weak from | loss of blood before going in to kill, | the Prench Conservatives feel that they | have nothing to lose by waiting. Each | day brings new disappointments and ew discouragements to M. Blum's supporters. The drift of middle-class opinion toward the opposition is al- | ready marked and may become & rout. | (Copyright. 1937.) BY GASTON NERVAL. HE Secretary of State has called to the attention of Congress the fact that the application of immigration quotas and re- strictions to the citizens of the other American republics would be in con- flict with President Roosevelt'’s good neighbor policy, which is gaining so many friends for the United States in Latin America. A study of the changes in the im- migration policies of the United States shows, only once more, that international relations are based much more on pragmatic interests than idealists would care to admit. Among the principles which the founders of the United States an- nounced to the world, at the end of the eighteenth century was the right of every man to travel and change residence at will. It was considered indispensable to the enjoyment of those other three “inalienable rights,” life, liberty and the pursuit of hap- foundations of the new Republic. These United States were to be the promised land for all the free men of the world. The prohibitions and re- strictions of the old continent across the seas would find no room in this new country where liberty and equality of opportunity were at last to reign among human beings. The new Na- tion was to be an asylum for political and religious refugees and the socially downtrodden. New Blood Needed. ‘The “Founding Fathers” were cer- tainly sincere in their convictions, but perhape the eagerness with which they upheld their liberal principles had something to do with the necessities of the United States at that particular time. The United States was very much in need of new blood, of more people, of foreign people who would settle large parts of its huge territory and help in the building of that gigantic national experiment which 'was one day to astonish the world with its success. Immigrants were wanted for labor in the Middle Atlantic States and in the South; the slave trade was an ex- treme example of “assisted immigra- tion” for economic development. Lands beyond the Coastal Plain were avail- able for settlement to persons of small means. Industrial opportunities were created by the growth of manufactures in New England and the Middle At- lantic States to such an extent that laws were passed facilitating the im- portation of contract laborers. Before the demand for people to fill the Western lands had declined, industry began to respond to the stim- ulus of an increased domestic market, and ‘s call arose for laborers in coal and iron mining, smelting and re- fining of ore for steel, the mechanical industries and almost every branch of manufacturing and mining. Western States flooded Europe with literature containing alluring pictures of the advantages of life within their borders. Large corporations maintained agents abroad who recruited laborers by offer- ing prepaid tickets. Nearly 36,000,000 people entered the United States in the nineteenth century to help develop the country. when most of the land had been settled, when the industrialization of the country was an accomplished fact, when labor was no longer scarce but abundant, the desire began to take shape to reserve the enjoyment of material welfare and “blessed institu- tions” to the descendants of those who had created them, and to them alone. Under the alien contract labor law of 1885 and its amendments, trade unions sought to restrict the recruit- ing of cheap immigrant labor, which .was affecting wages and working con- ditions in basic ingpstries, - Gradusity, 1 : piness, which were recognized as the | By the end of the century, however,, Immigration Quotas Are Termed “Good Neighbor” Policy Drawback | as the standards of living became higher and native labor more and more available, the provisions of that law were made more stringent. It was not until after the World War, though, that the restrictionist tendency effected real changes in im- migration laws. The activities of for- eign-born groups in behalf of their belligerent fatherlands were cited as showing the dangers to which a nation was subjected when many of its citi- zens were not assimilated. In 1917 a restrictive immigration act was passed by Congress over the veto of President Wilson, who called its main feature, the literacy test. “a test of opportunity, not one of character, and therefore contrary to cherished national prin- ciples.” By the end of 1920, and in spite of that legislation, immigration began to approximate its pre-war level. The literacy test was clearly not having the effect upon labor supply that the Im- migration Commission had expected. Domestic labor was being injured. | Even the large industrial fnterests | had now turned against undiscrim- inating immigration, for this was re- sulting in the establishment of com- petitive industries. 1921 Act Closed Doors. The doors were finally closed by the emergency quota act of 1921 and the permanent quota act of 1924. The latter provides that the “annual quota of any nationality for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1927, and for each fiscal year thereafter, shall be a num- ber which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in Continental United States in 1920 having that national origin bears to the number ‘of inliabitants in Con- tinental United States in 1920." The 1924 act left unrestricted the immigration of citizens of Canada and the Latin American republics. In 1932, when economic conditions were unusually severe and had made more acute the problems of domestic labor, certain groups in the United States. began to agitate for legislation plac- ing immigrants from all countries in the Western Hemisphere in the quota system. Bat even then, when inter- American relations were not nearly as friendly nor as mutually profitable as they are today, the attempt was une successful. The new proposal, limiting immi« gration of Latin Americans to 10 per cent of those coming into this coun« try in 1930, appears even more in- congruous today, when by means of the “good neighbor” policy and the liberal commercial program of Secre tary Hull the United States is regain- ing the confidence and good will and the friendly co-operation of the Latin American countries. (Copyright, 1937.) Dog Is Found Buried With Regal Splendor CAIRO (Special). — Recently the tomb of a little dog was discovered in the great cemetery west of the Pyra= mid of Cheops at Giza. He had been buried with all the ceremony of = great man of Egypt, carried out by the orders of the “King of Upper and Lower Egypt.” The mscription states that the dog was the guard of his majesty. Abuwtiyuw was the name of the honor guard and his majesty ordered that he be given a coffin from the royal treasury, fine linen in great quantity, incense and perfumed ointe ment and that a to;b be built for him in order that Abuwtiyuw might be honored before the great god, Anubis, The reason for Abuwtiyuw’s being buried in this ceremonious fashion was that, like human beings buried in this way, his Ka might enter the after~ life, and he might continue to gus: the king forever. - (Copright, 1937.) 1