Evening Star Newspaper, November 8, 1931, Page 4

ARE ANSWERED IN DETAIL Fiildings Take Up Organization’s Slale-l ment Paragraph by Paragraph The full text of the report of the spe- eclalcommittee appointed by President er to examine and report on the statement of the Navy League entitied “The Presdent and the Navy,’ is printed below. The committee in its report answered €he assertions of the Navy League ngmphlet, paragraphy by paragraph in parallel columns, the first quoting from the pamphlct. the second giving the conclusions of the committee. The dtalic subheads in the text designate the quotations from the Navy League mphlet (which arc indenied) and the ldface subhcads the findings of the committee in regular column width. I (Navy League Pamphlet). Examination of previous naval moves by President Hoover indicates a condition precedent that throws much light on his recent mandatory order that the budget estimate of $401.000.000. “hich the Navy De- rtment had submitted for scal year enced on June 30, 19 be cut by $61.00C,000 down to $340,- 000,000. (Committee Finding). ‘The reduction ir. the 1932-33 Federal budget estimates, including those of the Navy Departm asked for by the President in connection with his econo- my program, will mot interfere with the building program authorized by Congress, with (ne exception of six de- stroyers, the laying down of which under current appropriations has becn temporarily suspended and provisinn for construction cn which would other- wise have been made in the estimates for the next 4scal year. Apart from this the continuance of the authorizcd program—which is one of the main preoccupations of the Navy League’s| pamphlet—is in no wise affected. Of this program, 7 cruisers, 1 aircraft car- rier and 3 submaiines are now build- ing, while the contracts for 5 destroy- ers, shortly to be lald down, have been awarded. =X, (Navy League Pamphlet). When he became President, in the Spring of 1929, Congress had just enacted (by votes of about 5 to 1 in both Houses) that the United States would lay down and build five 10,000-ton, 8-inch gun cruis- ers in each of fhe three immediately ensuing fiscal years in addition to the eight such cruisers we then Lad under _construction, thus planning to provide our Navy with 23. This for Reply. action by cmm:- ‘Was consequent from the American-British-Japanese Naval Conference of 1927 at Geneva ~—whereat the Coolidge administra- tion had refused to meet the Brit- ish views as to the type of cruisers we should have or to yleld to the Japanese any increase in their estah- lished ratio of 6 to our 10 in ton- nage; and this action by Congress ‘was after more than a year of delib- eration on its part. (Committee Finding). ‘The act approved February 13, 1929, commonly called the “15 Cruiser Bill” was not mandatory. It was a condi- tional authorization to construct cer- tain naval vessels. Section 4 of the act provides: “In the event of an international agreement, which the President is re- quested to encourage, for the further limitation of naval armament, to which the United States is signatory, the President is hereby authorized and em- powered to suspend in whole or in part any of the naval construction authorized under this act.” By omission of reference to Section 4, this important proviso is obscured. The false impression is conveyed that Con- gress had made it mandatory to “lay down and build” 15 light cruisers dur- ing the fiscal years 1929-1931, regardlcss of an international agreement, which as & matter of fact Congress had requested the President to encourage. There was no “established ratio” of | any kind between the Japanese and American fleets as a whole prior to the entering into force of the London Naval Treaty on January 1, 1931. The Wash- ington Treaty ratio of 10—6 applied to capital ships and aircraft carriers only. On May 13, 1930, the Secretary of State stated. with reference to the Japanese position prior to the London Naval Treaty, that “Japan never agreed that the ratio should be extended to auxiliary vessels.” (Hearings on Lon- don Naval Treaty before Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Sen- ate, page 25.) With regard to the statement that the Coolidge administration refused to yield to Japan any increase in auxiliary ship ratios at the Geneva Naval Conference, the following statement by the Secretary of State summarizes the Geneva Dego- tiations on this subject: “At the last Naval Conference, Japan had frankly out (o ward proposals which provided in the aggregate of all three classes for very nearly 10 to 7. and they had not been received with dis- favor by the others so far as the dis- cussion went.” (Hearings on London Naval Treaty before Committee on For- eign Relations, United States Senate, page 25.) IIT. (Navy League Pamphlet). But, within five months of enter- ing the White House, President Hoover held up the building of the first five of the 15 cruisers Congress had just ordered be built on a defi- nite time schedule, and he did this s a friendly gesture preparatory to & navg' onference he propose gestur c¢hat was not commensu- Tately sopied by other prospective icipants, although. when judged treaty ratios, they greatly excelled in under-age ships built an building : g Y (Committee Finding). President Hoover did not hold up the building of five cruisers In a publi statement on July 24, 1929, the Presi. dent announced that he would delay the laying down of the keels of three cruisers “until there has been an op- portunity for full consideration of their effect upon the final agreement for parity which we expect to reach.” The President made this statement the same day thas - declaration was made in the House of Commons by the British prime minister in which the latter said that the British government had decided (1) to suspend &ll work on the cruisers Sur- rey and Northumberland, (2) to can- cel the submarine test ship Maidstone, | (3) to cancel two contract submarines, ) to slow down dockyard work and other -naval construction, The consideration set forth above ghould be considered in relation to the statement that the action of the United States “was not commensurately copied by_other prospective participants.” It should be noted that the tempo- rary suspension of the construction of three cruisers did not in any way vio- late the “definite time schedule” stipu- ted by Congress. The so-called “15- er bill,” which authorized this con- struction, included a clause to the ef- fect “that if the construction of any vessel authorized to be undertaken in the fiscal years ending June 30, 1929 or 1930, is not undertaken in that fiscal mncfl construction may be in the next succeeding | | Thus the three cruisers in question did not have to be laid down before June 30, 1930. ‘These cruisers, as well as the other two cruisers constituting the first five cruisers of the “‘15-cruiser bill.” were all laid down prior to that date. Two further cruisers were subsequently laid down. bringing the total now under construction to seven. Eight 10.000-ton cruisers have been completed. We thus have 15 such cruis- ers built or building. No further cruis- ers of this type could, under the Lon- don naval treaty, be laid down before January 1, 1933, invnn_v event. I (Navy League Pamphlet). The President’s initiative for a conference led to his conversations at the Rapidan with h prime minister which, Teached agreements that have never been divulged in their entirety: which suggests why the adminis- tration refused to allow even an executive session of the Senate Committee <n Foreign Relations to see the full record of its negotia- tions and possible commitments preparatory to the London Naval Conference of 1930. (Committee Finding). It is incorrect to assert that secret agreements were admittedly reached during the President’s ccnversation with the British prime minister. There Wwere no secret agreements. In the joint statement issued at the close of these conversations on October 10, 1929, it was announced that “An agree- ment on naval armaments cannot be completed without the co-operation of other naval powers, and both of us feel sure that, by the same friendly and candid discussion of needs which has characterized our conversations, such mutual understanding will be reached as will make naval agreement next January possible.” "The follcwing clause appears later in the joint statement: “In view of the security offered by the peace pact, we have been able to ena, we trust for- ever, all competitive building between ourselves—by agreeing to a parity of fleets, category by category.” It should be recalled that on July 23, 1929, over two months before the conversations between the President and the British prime minister.. the British govern- ment's acceptance of this principle had been publicly annouhced by the prime minister. The next day the President made the following public statement: “The prime minister introduces the principle of parity which we have now ad , and its consummation means that Great Britain and the United States henceforth are not to compete in armaments as potential opponents, but to rate as friends in the re- duction of 1t.” The lack of foundation for the as- sertion that there were agreements be- tween the United States and Great Britain, which had never been divulged in their entirety, was demonstrated long before October 28, 1931. In the Presi- dent’s message to Congress of July 11, 1930, he said: “I take this opportunity to repeat with the utmost emphasis, that in these negotiations there were no secret or concealed understandings, promises or interpretations nor any commitments whatever, except as ap- pear in the treaty itself and in the interpretive exchange of notes recently suggested by your committee on foreign affairs, all of which are now in the hands of the Senate.” On October 30, 1931, the Secretary of State declared that an assertion of their existence was “entirely false and has been publicly refuted many times.” ‘The administration declined to make public all of the records of the negotia- tions leading up to and during the London Conference on the ground that, as explained by the President in his message to Congress referred to above: “This treaty like all other interna- tional negotiations has involved state- ments, reports, tentative and informal proposals as to subjects, persons and governments given to me in confidence. * * * To make public in date or in the press such confidences would vio- late the invariable practice of nations. It would close to the United States those avenues of information which are es- sential for future negotiations and amicable intercourse with the nations of the world.” However, an _opportunity was pro- vided for any Senator to examine all the records, provided that he would agree (o hold the same in confidence. A number of Senators availed them- selves of that opportunity. Futhermore, two members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate were members of the American delegation in London and were familiar with every phase of the negotiations from beginning to end, and their knowledge was available to_the members of the committee, It is inaccurate to state that the ad- ministration refused to allow even an executive session of the Senate Com- mittee on Foreign Relations to see the full record of negotiations. . (Navy League Pamphlet). The treaty consequent from that confererice put in effect a naval holiday as to capital ship building until its expiration on December 31, 1936; it set up the quotas shown in table 1 for other or auxiliary com- batant vessels: and it provided for another conference in 1935 unless that should be made unnecessary by further agreements reached at some such prior conference &s 15 now planned for next February al Ge- neva, (Committee Finding). Table 1—*“London Naval Treaty Ton- nage Quotas for Auxiliary Types” is misleading as a result of the inclusion of aircraft carrier tonnage. Aircraft carriers, like capital ships, were lim- ited by the Washington and not the London treaty; which limited all ves- sels of less than 10,000 tons, whereas all existing aircraft carriers are over that figure. _Therefore any combina- tion in a sirigle table of categories lim- ited in two separate treaties based on differing comparative tonnage levels re- sults in misleading ratios. VI. (Navy League Pamphlet). LONDON NAVAL TREATY NNAG] QUGTAE FOR AURILIARY TPES ™ United British Japanes States. Empite. z:.'ng;:',' Line. A 1 Aircraft carriers.. 135.000 2 Large-gun cruisers 180.000 3 Small-pun cruisers 143.500 4 Destroyer types .. 5 Submaines & 108 400 100,450 52.700 676,700 448.050 (1] 10.2 Sauivalent, to o ratio of nd in all subse- the United States tonnage i3 par. stated as 10.0. and the onnases of the other countries ted in ratio figures based on ‘This shows, as is well known, that President Hoover's delegates ylelded to the British at London in 1930 what President Coolidge had refused to yield “These ratios are eauty about 4.9 5-33. 1 nh;""" to them at Geneva in 1927, namely, that the United States put a large part of our future cruiser tonnage in the smallsgun type of cruiser most useful to British ends and greatly reduce our building of the large-gun type better suited to_our circumstances; and at President Heover's delogates THE _SUNDAY STAR, WASHINGTON, FULL TEXT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE’S NAVY LEAGUE PROBE REPORT PAMPHLET’S ASSERTIONS yielded to the Japanese parity in sub- | marines and an over-all ratio for aux- iliaries of nearly 7 to our 10 instead of the 6 to 10 ratio we had bought from | them at the Wi Conference in 1922 by agreeing to limit our in- sular_fortifications and naval bases in the Far East. (Committee Finding). Expert naval opinion has been far| from unanimous in considering cruisers | of “the large-gun type better suited to | our circumstances.” In discussing this | matter before the Senate Committee, | the Secretary of State stated: “Our | delegation made a most exhaustive | study as to the history of the buildiog | | of that class of ships known as 8-inch | | cruisers. As I said. we had to advise us one of the most experienced and skillful constructors of the Navy.. We reached the conclusion that this new type which had never been tested'in put all of the American ‘eggs’ There are many functions for cruisers, some of which can best be done by an 8-inch cruiser and some of which can best be done by a 6-inch cruiser. That will | be admitted by practically all naval men.” (Hearings, page 22.) Paragraph 8 beiow states that the actual auxiliary ship ratio of Japan is 13.1. This figure is incorrect, the act- | ual ratio at the present time is under- age auxiliary ships being 10.7. It was cousiderably higher than this at the time of the London Conference. Nev- ertheless, Japan agreed to reduce this ratio by the end of 1936 to ‘ess than 7. This represents a far greater sacrifice than was made by any other country. In (his connection the Secretary of State stated to the Senate Foreign Re- Iations Committee: I speak deliberately when I say that the Japanese delegation, and the Jap- anese government, which confirmed the action of the Japanese delegation, had A harder problem and solved it with a greater faith in the pacific relations of the three great powers than any other | nation at the conference.” Hearings, page 26.) The Washington Naval Treaty ratio of 10 to 6 between the United States and Japan on capital ships and air- craft carriers has no connection with auxiliary ships, which are only limited by the London Treaty. (See also com- ment under paragraph 2.) VII. (Navy League Pamphlet). The concessions at London on be- half ~of the United States were, in effect, the price there paid for a treaty comprehensively limiting naval armaments under such conditions that, as alleged by its advocates, others would_stand still while we caught up.” ‘Tthe importance of af- fording the United States such an opportunity to catch up to the ener- getic naval building of less well-to-do countries is indicated by the figures in table II. (Committee Finding). With respect to the “energetic naval building of less well-to-do countries” it ¢ pertinent to point out that the United States has under_construction at the present time a larger total tonnage | than any other power. A check-up on table II shows the fgures cited therein to be slightly inac- curate. . VIII (Navy League Pamphlet). TONNAGES OF AUXILIARY UNDER-AGE VESSELS BUILT AND OF OCTOBER 1. 143 PUILDING "A8 nited British Japanese stes. Empire. Empire 91.200 142,900 70500 507.281 455.985 B835 10207 Ratios ..o o ) “others would stand still while we caught up.” The importance of af- Committee Finding. It will be noticed that Table II shows not only that the Japanese fleet of un- derage auxiliaries, built and building, is within 65 tons of equality, as a whole, with that of the United States, but that the actual ratio js 10.0—13.1— 10.0 instead of the 10.0—10.2—6.8 pro- posed in the London naval treaty. (Committea Finding). There is no basis for citing present ratios in opposition to the London treaty ratios as_though the two were incompatible. The London treaty pro- vides for ratios and tonnages which are not to be exceeded as of December 31, 1936, ie, after a lapse of time of more than five years. The London treaty does not obligate the parties to reduce naval armaments to the pre- scribed limits prior to that date. Ar- ticle 16, paragraph 2, of the treaty pro- it “Vessels which cause the total ton- nage in any category to exceed the figures given in the foregoing table shall be disposed of gradually during the perfod ending on the 31st Decem- | ber, 1936.” IX. (Navy League Pamphlet). As Senator Reed, who was one of President Hoover's delegates to the London Conference, had there had the experience of being forced to yleld material concessions to the British and Japanese in order to se- cure for the United States an oppor- tunity to catch up, there is especial significance to his having said pub- licly after an interview with Presi- dent Hoover on May 2, 1931, that “unless we-build the Navy to treaty limits by 1935, we will have no standing at the next naval confer- ence.” But, as he hastened to add that the President must speak for himself as to his naval gohcy. he thereby indicated that the Presi- dent’s policy might not look to such building. Indeed, not long there- after, the report became current in informed circles in Washington that President Hoover proposed to bring about & general holiday in naval building—a premature report, of which more anom, that was promptly denled. (Committee Finding). It would seem to be apparent that Senator Reed in making the statement here quoted assumed that the other parties to the London treaty would build up to the maxima provided in the London treaty. If Great Britain should fall so to build or Japan to replace on a proportionate basis, the relative standing would not necessarily be affected. Parity can be achieved at any level, high or low. The London naval treaty imposes no obligation upon its signatories to build up to its limits, ‘There is no basis for an assumption that the President intends to abandon the Washington and London treaty ra- tios, nor do the armaments truce or the emergency economies contemplated at the present time interfere with the ultimate achievement in fact of these ratios in all categories. X. (Navy League Pamphlet). Senator Reed's insistence that the Navy be built up to treaty terms made particularly pertinent some studies as to naval building programs that the Navy League had then undertaken, which it pub- lished on August 29, 1931 Committee FI No comment. XI. (Navy League Pamphlet). ‘The first of these published pro- grams looked to rounding out and replacing the fleet in every respect in mccordance with the London na- treaty by the end of that battle was not the ‘basket’ in which to |} 1538 | not_comment remaining_between now and then, the Navy League advocated alterna- tively a more moderate program that it drew up with the aim of com- pleting only some of the treaty ships while merely starting the construction of virtually all others before the end of the treaty, their completion being deferred until thereafter. The year-by-year costs for these two programs are sum- marized in Table III. No comment from committee. XIT. (Navy League Pamphlet). NAVY BUILDING PROGRAMS. Navy Lengue's Treaty progtam. Decrenses. program. 58.881.250 9.994.000 7 Totals $1,003.702 6.250 $236.426.500 ministr: when seeking ratification of its London treaty, had implied that the principal purpose thereof was to give the United States a chance to catch up—at a cost of admittedly more than a billion dollars —it seems permissible out that the Navy League, in advocating a much more moderate program than hat called for by the administration's , has acted with a restraint not supposed to be characteristic of that mythical “big navy” group which the administration apparently delights in holding up to public opprobrium. (Committee Finding). To assume that the administration has implied that the principal purpose of the London naval treaty was to give | the United States an opportunity to “catch up” is erroncous, The treaty was not dictated by the United States It was a voluntary agreement entered into in order to insure common ad- vantages for the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The preamble of the treaty reads in part as follows: “Desiring to prevent the dangers and reduce the burdens inherent in com- petitive armaments, and “Desiring to carry forward the work begun by the Washington Naval Con- ference and to facilitate the p sive realization of general limitation and reduction of armaments, “Have resolved to conclude a treaty for limitation and reduction of naval armaments——" Innumerable public references of offi- | clals of this Government have explained both in the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the American people that the object of this treaty had been to stop a race in naval construction, without menac- ing national security and without sacri- ficing the recognized principle of naval parity between the United States and Great, Britain. XIII. (Navy League Pamphlet). It is also pertinent to point out, as appears in a statement issued by the Navy League under date of Oc- tober 7, 1931, that whereas the maximum naval building President Hoover now seems willing to permit would give employment to an aver- age of merely 34,000 men between January 1, 1932, and June 30, 1933, if the Navy League's program were to be promptly put in practice, it would give direct employment dur- ing those 18 months to an average of nearly 101,000 men as well as the Indirect stimulus to business and employment that would result from employing about 67,000 more men on naval building than President Hoover seems willing to permit. No comment since this paragraph is not within the terms of reference of this committee. XIV. (Navy League -Pamphlet), Within a fo:tnight after the Navy League published its building pro- gram the Italian foreign secretary, Senor Grandi, proposed to tie League of Nations that a holiday in naval building be taken preparatory to and during ‘ne League's disarma- ment conference, which is scheduled to convene on February 2, 1932—a proposal of which President Hoover promptly expressed his approval. (Committee Finding). Signor Grandi's proposal was nct merely for a naval holiday, but for a general truce covering land, sea end 8ir armaments. en this proposal was suggested by Italy during the September, g{‘fl\'fl. .iesl-, sion of the Assembly of the League of Nations the 3e-1etary of State on Sep- tember 16 informally expressed the sympathetic intarest of this Govern- ment with the principles of such a truce, but expiained that as no details of it 'had as h«-n;] received he could on the proposals. This Government's st oficial pro- nouncement upon a definite draft for a holiday plan was contained in the cec- laration made by the Honorable Hugh Wilson during the meetings of the Third Committee of the League of Ne- tlons on September 23. Further com- ment on this is included in a subse- quent paragraph. XV. (Navy League Pamphlet). In view of Franco-Itallan rivalry, such a holiday would be materially in Italy’s interest; for with much more money at her command, France is building more than twice the naval tonnage that Italy is. But when Signor Grandi expressed seem- ingly surprised delight that his sug- gestion had so promptly received the support of the American adminis- tration, he appeared to be over- playing his part to those who re- calied not only the premature report of last Summer as to President Hoo- ver’s plan for a naval holiday, but also that Secretary Stimson had been in conference with Signors Mussolini and Grandi_between that premature report and Signor Grandi's move at Geneva. And their in- ference as to the real authorship of the Grandi proposal was measurably confirmed when, on the 23d of Sep- tember, the State Department issued the text of a statement made that day by its representative, Mr. Hugh R.Wilson, in the League of Nations meeting at Geneva. (Committee Finding). France is not building more than twice as much naval tennage as Italy. Recent figures (as of October 1, 1931) show that France is building at_the present time 137424 tons, while Italy is building 85,657, The inference that the United States suggested the Grandl proposal is false. The Italian government’s first public suggestion of a truce was made prior to the Secretary’s first conversation with the head of the Italian govern- ment. Prior to the announcement of the Italian proposal, which appeared in the press of July 9, 1930, before Mr. Stim- son arrived in Rome, no suggestions for an armaments truce had been proposed by this Government nor had any ex- change of views taken place between the United States and Italy in respect te a truce. XVI. (Navy League Pamphlet). Mr. Wilson's statement was to the effect that the United States Gov- ernment had not yet surveyed the question of a naval holiday “with that careful scrutiny which wculd enable us to give final approval at this moment to any particulsr form”: that in connection with a general program of unemployment relief it will forthwith byild a limited num- ber of destroyers (five) which are to be exempted from any holiday agree- ment; “that the London Naval Con- ference (treaty) provides for cer- D. C, NOVEMBER 8, tain cruiser levels” but that “the present cruiser level of the United States is considerably below figures provided for in the agreement. Thus any undertaking on our part not to augment existing naval strength for a year, causes us, and I say it frankly, an embarrass- ment and & dislocation of cnostruc- tion plans. Nevertheless,” he con- tinued, “we regard the general question of disarmament as so im- portant and the necessity of creat- ing a psychological condition propi- tious for the conference as so ur- gent, that we are willing to forego our treaty rights in this respect.” (Committee Finding). The extract quoted from Mr. Wilson's speech to the effect that this Govern- ment_was not prepared on September 23, 1931, to give its final approval “to o | any particular form” does not accord with the Navy League's statement, pre- 0 | viously mentioned, which maintained that the President promptly expressed his approval of a suggestion, which at that time was less concrete in its form. Even at the present time the proposed truce has not become effective and the final form it may take is not yet defi- nitely established. 1t is obvious that Mr. Wilson's state- ment that “we are willing to_forego our treaty rights in this Tespect” (that is to refrain from laying down addi- tlonal vessels permitted under the Lon- don Treaty but not yet authorized by Congress.— See_comment to paragraph 17) referred only to the one year period of the truce, as he himself said. No one had proposed that any engagement entered into In connection with the truce would restrict the United States or other powers after its expiration. In this connection, it may be recalled that the treaty ratios are established as of December 31, 1936. Moreover. it is not at all necessary that the full pro- gram be laid down during the first few years of the treaty. Even the theoreti- cal program of the Navy League does not_envisage this. (See table III). “There is no requirement that building programs be carried out with approxi- mately the same amount of construc- tion by all countries party to the treaty during each year of the treaty period. Postponement for one year of the laying down of replacements, which are per- mitted under the London Treaty as vessels become over-age, does not pre- vent subsequent laying down during the life of the treaty. XVII. (Navy League Pamphlet). The most_obvious inference from Mr. Wilson's _statement is _that, somewhat as President Hoover had held up the building of five of our large-gun cruisers in 1929, so he in- tended specifically to stop the con- struction at least of the seven we now have on the ways and, possibly, what little more building we have in hand, excepting the only exemption specified, namely five destroyers about to be laid down. That is to say that, through Mr. Wilson, he proposed “to forego our treaty rights” to carry on the building of 87,600 tons of naval vessels in order to’ create “a psychological condition propitious for the conference” on disarmament at Geneva but, at the same time, he proposed to start building 7.500 tons of destroyers “in_connection with a general pro- gram of unemployment relief.” (Committee Finding). The inference described as “most obvious™ in this paragraph could only be drawn by someone in ignorance of the public statements made during the discussions in the Assembly and the Third Committee of the League of Na- tions. Jn discussing before this com- mittee the Scandinavian proposal for an armaments truce (which embodied in concrete form the general principles of the Grandi proposal), the Danish the Scandinavian resolution—said that “the expression ‘not to increase the present level of armaments' did not imply that work under consideration would be stopped.” An alternative pro- posal, submitted subsequently by the Italian delegation, specifically stated that “ships in course of construction might on the other hand be completed.” These were the two drafts which_the committee had before it when Mr. Wil- son made his statement. Both of them contemplated permitting the completion an unchallenged explanation of author, the second by its specific terms. There was thus no occasion for Mr. ‘Wilson to make further reference to a matter which was already understood. Moreover, it should have been obvious to anyone familiar with the trend of noted the large tonnage under construc- tion by a number of powers that an armaments truce providing for cessation of work on ships already building would not have found general approval. Finally, it would have been unusual procedure on the part of the United States to have insisted on the right to lay down certain destroyers already contracted for, while at the same time | abandoning work in progress. The American Government was never called upon to consider abandonment of constriction already begun and would in no case have agreed to con- sider any proposal providing for such abandonment. In his note of October 29, 1931, fo the Secretary General of ;}:g p'I..ee:lgue of Nations, accepting the Armaments truc - tary of State said: T g the understanding of this Gov- ernment that the proposed truce should not apply to construction which had begun or for which contracts had been let prior 10 its entry into force.” XVIIIL (Navy League Pumphler). While, as Mr. Wilson admi| adminisiration had not. hag tiar presumably between President Hoo- ver's prematurely reported concep- tion of a naval holiday early last Summer and the 23 September, “to survey this problem in so far asit re- lates to the Navy with that careful serutiny which would enable us to give final approval at this moment to any particular form.” the Navy Igague found ample time between the 10 September, when Senor Grandi first volced lis proposal, and the 25th of that same month to make & conclusive analysis of the actual and relative effects of a naval holi- day that would Stop all building dur- ing 1932. The American-British- Japanese ' results of this, published under date of the 25 September, 1931, are here shown In Table 1V, (Committee Finding). The’ inference that the American Government had time to study the ques- tlon of a naval holiday since early last Summer is based on the incorrect as- sumption made in paragraph 15 (see comments on this paragraph) that this Government was already _considering such a holiday when the Secretary of State went to Europe. While subse- quent to Mr. Mussolini'’s first voicing of the general idea of a naval holiday, this Government naturally made various analytical studies as to the ibilities and consequences of a holiday, it had before it no concrete proposal prior to the introduction in the Third Commit- tee of the Scandinavian resolution on September 11. Mr. Grandi's original suggestion, made before the Assembly September 8, was too vague and general to constitute a definite pro- posal on which technical studies could be based. It was not possible for the American Government to comment in detail on the Grandi proposal, owing to lack of details as to how these holidays were to be carried out. Not until Sep- tember 22 did the Italian delegation in- troduce a concrete proposal in the form of an alternative to the Scandinavian resolution. Mr. Wilson's statement was made on the following day, September 2;’.;1"519 ,?nnl ar-rlt‘. whdh-n differed ma- om earlier drafts, was not adopted by the Assembly until Septem. ber 29. All these dnfyu including & number of modifications in the representative—who was the author of | of construction under way, the first by | its | recent naval discussions and who has| 1931—PART _ONE. Drafting Committee, were carefully ex- amined from every point of view by the te °branches of the American Government. As a result it October 29—i.e., one month after the adoption by the League As- sembly of the final draft—to declare its acceptance of the 'pro truce. The Navy League, on the other hand. claims that it was in a position to make a “conclusive analysis” of the naval holiday by the 25th of September—i.e., several days before the final draft of the Third Committee emerged. This “conclusive analysis” has been shown in the preceding paragraphs to be in- accurate, misieading and based on false assumptions. By devoting more time to its analysis, the Navy League might have come to & mmleonm"c‘ under- standing of the situation. As the final terms for the proposed truce had been outlawed September 29 and Mr. Gardiner'’s pamphlet was not published until October 28, there was ample time in which to correct the false assumptions upon which Table IV is based. Table IV is therefore ob- viously misleading. Reference to paragraph 21 of the pamphlet shows that Mr. Gardiner was familiar with the actual terms of the proposed holiday. XIX. (Navy League Pamphlet). VAL IDAY THAT T Brdr ALY AUXILIARY BOTLD- ING DURING 1982, United British Jananese Staies. Einpy i 3 19 3830 36,425 14074 b - g51200 2., 284150 67.050 5 4i 76.7% 0% 53.2% 097 Q3 L3 1% n2 134 B 19.6% 8% 148 11 [X) 23 00% 18.5% - at Incrse e TRt stiown {5 ine 8 Dear. Te- ‘tively to the corresponding Tatios as en in line 7. The British-Japanese gains Over the United States averace 11 per cent. Lest it be mistakenly inferred that the Navy League is opposed to a naval holi- day, it may be well to recall that. at the outset of that analysis, we said that “the Navy League is most heartily in favor of a naval holiday along any ra- tional lines that will definitely help the United States Fleet_to approach nearer to parity with the British Fleet and to the ratios of the London treaty with that of the Japanese” and thus tend to close the existing gap. But that “any holiday move by American officials tending to widen that gap would not only be to serve the interests of other countries rather than those of the United States, but would be to go back on and to stultify the vaunted accom- plishments of the Hoover administration at the London naval conference: for the prospect of our virtually catching up to the treaty ratios by about the end of the London treaty was the very bait held out to the country by the who led it into that treaty Navy League stood by that when, under date of the Tth of October, it heartily approved the principle of a naval holiday proposed on the 5th of October by Senator Swanson. 10.2% 100 100 Increases ercentages of (Committee Finding). ‘The proposed truce wollld not “widen the gap,” as is implied by the Navy League, since it would merely maintain | the status quo. As has been previously explained, it does not prevent the United States from catching up to the tonnage levels of other powers by the end of the London naval treaty period. XX. (Navy League Pamphlet). As such a naval holiday as Presi- dent Hoover seemed to favor, if we may judge from Mr. Wilson's state- ment, would change the initial American - British - Japanese ratios for auxiliaries from 10.0—14.8—11.2 to 10.0—17.1—134, thus widening the gap in the ratios and yielding the British and Japanese an aver- age gain of 17.5 per cent over the United States in these respects, it appeared inconceivable that any informed American official could approve of a naval holiday that would thus result. But an ob- vious, although, as we shall see anon, perhaps not the basic ex- planation would be that President Hoover, in spite of his partiality to fact-finding commissions, had not taken the precaution to have such an analysis made as was easily done _entirely within the Navy League in less than a hun- dred man-hours of work. Yet it is natural to avoid the finding and the facing of facts that may refute one’s fancies, although dodging them may invite refutation and defeat, (Committee Finding). The ratios described have previously been shown to be incorrect and the course of pointing out these in- accuracies a more accurate picture of | the relationship between the fleets has | B iz that th | t is stal at the Na e had prepared an analysis ot the o | fects of the truce, but this again has! already been demonstrated to have been incorrect. The facts on which correct assertion might have been based were easily ascertainable from public delib- erations and documents, XXI. (Navy League Pamphlet), The latter seems to have over- taken the scheme to stop all naval building during 1932, for there emerged from the fog of generalities at Geneva a definite invitation, on September 30, not to stop all naval building, but merely that no new keels should be laid down during the 12 months beginning on Novem- ber 1, 1831, (Committee Finding). This is the only indication thr - out the pamphlet of what the ":"r'f.?. really involves. As previously pointed out, most of the statement, as well as all the tables, except Table V, either support or leave untouched the assump- tion that all construction would be stopped. This paragraph, in finally ad- mitting the facts, endeavors to give the impression that the truce permits the continuation of construction already under way merely after the defeat of earlier efforts to stop such construction, As pointed out previously (paragraph 17), it was never contemplated that such construction should be abandoned. The inclusion of a series of tables, known to be obsolete by the Navy League at the time the statement was issued, should have been so labeled to avoid misleading the public, XXII. (Navy League Pamphlet), Under date of October 7, 1931, the Navy League published its analysis of the actual and relative results to be expected from the pro- posal made by the League of Na- tions. What seems to be the most likely results are summarized in Table V. (Committee Finding). While the previous tables set forth in this statement of the Navy League show_ that the conclustons reached thereln were untenable in the light of mrarm-btllon':hén a L;fl;l‘tll«lel. it is as impossible ve the Tesults of a truce which has not yet been made effective. In particular the reservations of certain countries are yet to be studied by all before the extent cf ap- plication of the truce, or its effective- ness can be gauged. In consequence, any table purporting to show its results must be based on an assumption. The assumption contained in Table V that the naval holiday would ban the lay- no sound foundation, although it is m 80 to appear in the pamphlet under discussion. XXIII. (Navy League Pamphlet.) Here, again, we find that propos- als voiced through the League of Nations would militate -particularly against the United States while es- pecially favoring the British and Japanese. For the initial ratio of 10-135-10.5 would be changed to 10-14.7-11.9, thus widening the gap between our fleet of auxiliaries and the treaty ratio of 10-10.2-6.8 and yielding to the British and Japanese An average gain of 11 per cent over the United States. (See comment on preceding para- { graph.) XXIV. (Navy League Pamphlet.) RESULTS OF A NAVAI AY_THAT NOULD BAN e RORG A e AR ;g%’ T'émug N Ap;épnu . BETWEEN NOVI i 1% AND’ NOVEMEER 1. 1033 United States ritish Japanese mpire. Empire. (] D buid 1 Nov! 1. T4 3 Nov. 1, 1932.] 456.050 615.632 4 391560 574.332 64.470 41300 91.0% 8487 6.2% 13.5% 7 107.5% 104.2¢ T3 1059 19 69.0% 5927 9 TIncreases ... 10 Percentares of T ORIy, *The percentage creases in ratios shown in line Spectively to _the correspong aiven in'line 7. The British-Jaby Over the United States average 11 per cent. The Navy League has taken what steps are within its power to make known its analysis of the League of Natjons design for a holiday in naval building not only to President Hoover, but to every member of his cabinet, to every member of Congress and to the press of the country. It may be assumed, therefore, that the facts are known. It follows that if President Hoover's administration accepts the proposal made by the League of Nations, it does so knowing that its action specifically serves British and Japanese interests to the prejudice of analogous interests of the United States, although the responsibility of the President is primarily to and for the United States. But, as suggested above, we should look deeper than lack of knowledge of the facts for an understanding of the President’s policy as to the Navy. (Committee Finding). As has been previously set forth, the Navy League's analysis of the proposed truce is incorrect and does not accord with the facts. Consequently, in the light of the foregoing information, the statement that the proposal “specifically serves British and Japanese interests to the prejudice of the analogous in- terests of the United States” is not justifiable. It has been demonstrated that the criticisms of the truce set forth are based on erroneous premises (in particular, the assumption that con- struction in progress would be suspend- ed) and inferences as to the attitude of this Government. The position of the United States, with respect to the truce, is set forth in its reply to the invitation to participate, as follows: “The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the secretary general of the League of Nations, and with refer- ence to the latter’s note of October 2 with regard to an armaments truce proposed by the Assembly, has the to make the following declara- tion: “‘The Government of the United States has received the resoluion of the Council of the League of Nations of September 30, 1931, suggesting an armaments truce and declares that, without prejudicing its ‘position at the forthcoming General Disarmament Con- ference or affecting any proposal it may desire to submit to that conference, it | is prepared, for the period of one year beginning November 1, 1931, to accept the truce, vided that like action is taken by the other principal military and naval powers. “‘It is the understanding of this Government that the proposed truce shall not apply to construction which had begun or for which contracts had been let prior to its entry into force. “‘The Government of the United States hopes that by a unanimous ac- ceptance of this truce an atmosphere of confidence will be created which will prevent competition in armaments and prepare the ground for the successful conclusion of the General Disarmament Conference.’ " XXV to XLVIIL (Navy League Pamphlet). (Paragraphs 25 and 26, together with paragraphs 27-47, embodying a personal letter dated November 14, 1930, to the New York Herald- Tribune from the president of the Navy League, reprinted pamphlet under review, rela LP | D HOOVER IS CLEARED BY NAVAL INQUIRY |Gardiner Accused by Group of “Inaccuracies and False Assertions.” (Continued From First Page.) ‘The verdict of the committee was expressed in & concluding paragraph as follows: | “The committee finds that in its en- tirety Mr. Gardiner's statement con- tains many inaccuracies, false asser< tions and erroneous conclusions, and | that his assumption as to the Presi- dent’s attitude toward the Navy is wholly unwarranted.” Gardiner’s criticism of the Presi- | dent's suggestion for immunization of food supplies in time of war was char- acterized as consisting “largely of ex- pressions of Mr. Gardiner's personal opinion, as publicly expressed by him about a year ago and now incorporated in_the Navy League statement.” The report declared that President Hoover's proposal for cutting the 1932- 33 naval budget estimates from $401,- 000,000 to $340,000,000 will not inter- fere with the naval building program authorized by Congress, excepting the postponement of keel-laying for six cruisers. The building program ready under way will be continued, and contracts have been awarded for five destroyers, it was pointed out. League Leaders Silent. ‘The committee denied that the so- called “15-cruiser act” was mandatory, as cha by Gardiner, quoting the act to show it was a “conditional au- thorization,” with a proviso that the act could be ded by the Presi- dent, in tthe event of an international agreement. Gardiner was in New York last night. He was reported as announcing he would have nothing to say until he has had an opportunity to read the report "e?efnuyf' Chairman Howe of the Board of Directors of the Navy League also declined to comment. Wil- liam M. Galvin, executive secretary of the league, said he had seen a c of the report, but he, too, had “noth- | ing to say.” marily to the immunization of food supplies.) (Committee Finding). ‘The subject matter of these para- graphs relating to the immunization of | food supplies in time of war consists | largely of expressions of Mr. Gardiner’s | personal opinion, as publically expressed by him about a year ago, and now ine corpgraud in the Navy League state- ment. XLVIII and XLIX. (Navy League Pamphlet). It would be difficult to exm too much regret that the most ani- tarian of pacific intentions had led President Hoover into exhibiting the abysmal ignorance of why navies are maintained and of how they are to accomplish their major mission that his proposal to immunize sea- borne food supplies ed to those, here and abroad, who are in- timately conversant with maritime matters. For acceptance of his sug- gestion would have worked not onl diametrically counter to the inter- ests and weight of the United States in world affairs, but, in effect, would have made for bigger and bloodier wars. And yet such is the llryt:hol- ogy that is not only controlling our internal naval policy but dictating its external sul tion to those of foreign naval powers. It has been necessary, however, to say what has been said above if we are to have a real aj iation of the impelling motives of Presi- dent Hoover's efforts, at every turn, to re; to reduce and to starve . | the ited States Navy—under the | present plea of budget limitation on which we may have further cause to comment. (€ammittee Finding). These DI"IDIII contain no state- ments of fa but consist solely of general opinions and conclusions. ‘The committee finds that in its en- tirety Mr. Gardiner's statement contains | many inaccuracies, false assertions and erroneous conclusions, and that his | assumption as to the President’s atti- tude toward the Navy is wholly un- warranted. Done at Washington, D. C., this sixth day of November, 1931. JOHN HAYS HAMMOND, Chairman; HUGH RODMAN, ELIOT WADSWORTH, WILLIAM R. 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