Evening Star Newspaper, September 14, 1930, Page 102

Brig. Gen. Logan Feland. U. S. M. C., who commanded the United States’ forces in Nicaragua. HE purpose of this story is not to pic- ture Augustino Sandino as patriot or herv, but merely to draw a sketch of the man as I know him and to give, as he gave it to me, some account of his campaigns in Nicaragua. The data cited directly from him were given me in Mexico Cily recently by Sandino himself and by his aide de camp, Capt. Jose de Paredes. I believe it is very likely that Sandino is go- ing to continue his fight in Nicaragua. He is there now. Sandino’s retirement to Merida, Yucatan, after his withdrawal from Nicaragua, has been set down by many as an admission of defeat, and by others as the result of a bribe of $60,000. But Sandino himself told me—and I have every reason to believe him—that he was really calling what he believes is a bluff by President Moncada of Nicaragua. Moncada had announced that if the rebels would stop fighting the American Marines would be withdrawn and the country would enjoy true democratic government. Sandino simply hid his stores and arms, disbanded his army, and left—temporarily. The Marines are still there, Perhaps by the time this article is published the whole bloody business may have broken out again. Sandino is neither a Napoleon nor a Hot- tentot, but to me he is a born leader of men and a clever. tactician after the school of Abd- el-Krim of Morocco fame. Like Abd-el-Krim, Sandino succeeded in adapting modern military tactics to the topographic and climatic con- ditions of the region in which he was conduct- ing his military operations. Sandino does not pretend to be a Napoleon. He is just a plain, self-made man, and he is proud of it. He left his native country, Nica- ragua, at the age ‘of 16, in order to earn a liv- ing abroad as a mechanic—first in Costa Rica and later also in Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States. In the States he learned to speak English fairly well, while in Mexico he got acquainted with the doctrines of anti-imperialism. HAT does Sandino want? Ultimately, of course, the whole Nicaraguan business re- volves itself into the matter of a new canal to parallel the canal across Panama, to take up surplus traffic and serve its own military needs. And Sandino, contrary to general opinion, is not at all opposed to construction of the canal. Being remarkably well versed in such matters 88 economic pressure and military necessity, he knows at least that it is inevitable, and all his fanatical patriotism will not blind him to that fact. What he objects to is simply the way in hich the matter so far has been planned and carried out. The United States, through the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, has acquired the right #o build and operate the canal without taxa- tlon for $3,000,000, und, according to Sandino, only half of that sum was actually paid to the Diaz administration in Nicaragua. Of that half, paid to politicians who are now discred- #ted, little, if any, seems to have gone into the pountry’s treasury, he says. Sandino, who did his share of fighting to get ¥id of Diaz, simply claims that the latter was bribed into betraying his people and that Nicaragua’s present President, Moncada, is be- Ing bribed with equal success to abide by a bad bergain, Sandino has several times told me that what Pe wants for the canal is a joint stock com- pany, half of the stock to be bought by Latin American nations and by Nicaragua in par- $icular, and the other half to be owned by the Dnited States and other nations. The three jon dollars already paid by the United tes are to be applied in full to the purchase of shares. That would give Nicaragua a steady income With which to build railroads, auto roads, sew- ers, power plants, etc., without having to ap- peal to foreign capital and without being sub-< jected to the common humiliation of hearing thiat American Marines only go into the Latiy countries to “clean them up.” A, THE SUNDAY STAR, WASE Light on “Bad Man” S One of the best photos ever taken of Augustino Sandino. He is shown here placing a wreath on the grave of Hidalgo in Mexico City, capital of a free country which Hidalgo helped to release from foreign tyranny. UCH has been written and said aboul the “backwardness” of Central American re- publics and about the “beneficial results” of American occupations. Sandino, however, has an answer to that. He claims that this back- wardness has been fostered by American inter- ests, that revolutions and troubles have for years been deliberately stirred up in order to win unlawful concessions from temporary pup- pet governments. Roosevelt’s alleged fostering of the Pana- man revolution in order to gain the rights to the canal is given as an example. The rebel leader claims that if the unhappy nations of Haiti, Santo Domingo and the rest of Central America had been left alone, instead of being made to wallow in a state or artificially fos- tered anarchy, they would have been able to work out their own salvations and follow in the footsteps of Chile, Argentina and Brazil. The justice of his claims cannot be gauged at the present time. I have seen more of Cen- tral American revolutions than the majority of people, and I know that the “inside stories™ of most of these uprisings will probably néver be generally known. Sandino talks earnestly and well. His arguments, backed up by action, coming from a man of fixed purpose, have won him many fanatical adherents and constitute the greatest menace today to American isthmi- an supremacy. Knowing the man as I do, T am convinced that he will fight for his ideals until he is killed. And after that, knowing his tremen- dous popularity and the indelible stamp his personality leaves wherever he goes, I am cer- tain that somebody else will take up the fight. Not in warfare alone has he trained his lieu- tenants. His popularity is not confined to Nicaragua alone. It has spread over all of Central Amer- ica, to Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico. While he lived in Merida he was one of the most beloved men there, in spite of the fact that he never showed himself at public festivals or other community gatherings. He and his men lived in a house that was given to them. They slept in hammocks and lived frugally without any show or display whatever. There was no surplus talk, no swashbuckling, no Napoleonic strutting. From several of the wealthy men of the town he could have had anything he wanted. He refused all local aid from his supporters in Nicaragua, and he took only the barest necessities. S’IORIES are heard all over Cental America of how he went hungry again and again to give food to poor people who needed it more than he. Perhaps they are untrue in fact, but still they are true of the character of the man as I know him. His soldiers, many of them mere boys of 16 or 17, worship him with a fanatical zeal, thor- oughly convinced that he is always just, even if terribly severe. He himself, in his awkward, clumsy way, is extremely fond of these “chil- dren” of his. Again and again he makes one of those dra- matic gestures that stamp him as a leader of men. They have been ascribed to a clever and subtle showmanship, and in effect he is un- doubtedly one of the greatest showmen alive today. Personally, however, I am convinced that his actions are prompted by a terrible earnestness, and I doubt if he himself is aware of playing to a gellery. No matter. Whatever the motive, the effect is the same, and the effect is the only thing that counts to the American Marines and the Nicaraguan canal. Whili he was operating near El Chipote, for instance, he took possession of the American gold nme of San Albino, where he had. once worket’. 14 @ common laborer and where he bad begun to sow the seeds of revolution among his countrymen. He remembered that in his day, in accordance with a custom widespread throughout Latin America, he had been paid only in *“scrips,”™ tokens that were exchangeable in the company’s commissary. The first thing he did then was to call the seventy-five laborers together and ask them how much the mine owed them in back wages. Every penny of the claimed amount was paid out of the gold on hand, and every one of those men was thereafter a loyal potential fighter for Sandino, But the mine workers were more valuable where they were. For months Sandino worked the mine for the benefit of his cause and his men. George Williams, the English engineer, colned the metal into $10 gold pieces called “Indios,” which were used as payment of wages and for food bought from neighboring ranche ers. They won the leader many volunteers. In Honduras the “Indios” were sold for $20 each, because they were made of pure, unal- loyed gold. When Sandino evacuated the mine he re- fused to destroy its machinery, partly because he and his army might need it again and part- ly because his nation might some day need it. THROUGH such methods he pays his way +™ and wins volunteers and cash subscriptions, He allows no rowdiness or promiscuous looting, Some of his foodstuffs, moreover, are grown .for him by his own men. The wounded who *are still able to do a bit of work are sent be- hind the lines and turned into farmers. The San Albino gold mine was equipped with the best machinery of its kind found in Nica= ragua. His sparing that, in spite of the fact that it was American owned, was understood and applauded by his followers. His reasons were plain to them. But not always is he so considerate of foreign property. When he took possession of the rich La Luz and Los Angeles mine, on April 28, 1928, he found there 355 pounds of gold, which he cap- tured, and about four tons of dynamite. The latter he used to blow up the whole works, ma- chinery, galleries, everything, with an explosion s0 exuberant that people in Honduras thought there had been an earthquake. Again his action may be interpreted as a shrewd piece of showmanship, as a gesture for mob support. George B. Marshall, however, the superin- tendent of the mine, was treated with utmost consideration. He accompanied Sandino for several months as his prisoner, until he died of fever on June 27, 1928, Where Sandino obtains his arms is still a mystery. At one time he used old rifles that had seen service in Mexico before, but when he ran short of ammunition for them he found several new sources of supply. One of them consisted of captured machine guns, rifles, bul- lets and other supplies of the U. S. Marine Corps. But if he is popular for his justness and for his eagerness to pay his way and to spare civil populations any undue burdens, he is equally famous for his great severity. Among his own men discipline must be maintained, and the punishment for infractions is as hard as it is swift, Punishment, as a rule, means death by the firing squad. There can be no imprisonment, because he can hardly carry a calaboose with him through the jungles. ‘HE case of Antonio Galeana is famous +* throughout Central America. Galeana had been one of Sandino's officers, trusted, layal and zealous. But when he violated a girl in a mewly occupied town the hand of the -com= T his Is the Nicara of His War Agai dold to Rafacel Fortune Who Cor durkish Troops the World War a dino in the Jungle in the Mexican Ca By Rafae mander was fearful and swift. Galeana w: court-martialed and shot. And those methods, “guerilla warfare on large scale,” are eminently suited to his md and to the country in which he operates. us, accustomed to European tactics that i volve enormous “overhead” in the form of larg camps, supply depots, etc., they seem like methods of a loose rabble, hence the term “ba dit.” But there is nothing loose about then The leader is too thorough for that. Ew move is carefully planned and commanded and every command is implicitly obeye@ bd cause of a rigid and unrelenting discipline, During the last Sandino campaign I spen months in Nicaragua as an independent oj server. Later I talked to him again and aga and checked his statements by those of h aide de camp, a young man, by the way, wh for a time went to school in San Francisco. Rafael de Nogales, author of this e Vice President Saca To a trained military observer it becomes ap- parent that Sandino’s methods are those of military leader who, like Abd-el-Krim in the deserts of Morocco, knows how to adapt Euro- pean methods to local conditions. In his first fight with the Marines at Ocotal, May 16, 1927, Sandino had only 60 men. Subsequently he built up his force to a prob able maximum of 1,500. He could have had many times that number, but he purposely kept, his forces low to insure better mobility and ease of supply and to keep the drain on the civil population down to a minimum. Early in 1927 two widely varied forces op- posed each other, The Marines knew nothing of Sandino’s methods of guerrilla warfare and he knew nothing of theirs. Attempts on the part of both sides to adopt the opponent's tac- tics proved fatal, L