Evening Star Newspaper, March 15, 1925, Page 41

EDITO RIAL PAGE NATIONAL PROBLEMS SPECIAL ARTICLES Part 2—20 Pages EDITORIAL SECTION he Sundiy Staf WASHINGTON, D. .| Joy SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 15, 1925. GERMAN REPUBLIC’S FATE | " SEEN HANGING ON THREAD Evacuation of Cologne Area by Allies Would Strengthen Democratic Im- pulses, Says Observer. RY FRANK H. ZRLI public SIMONDS. the German re- This question, put in many forms, asked both as to the immediate present and the remoter fu- is perhaps the outstanding in- terrogation for the American world, hich reckons, not with complete in- Wccuracy, that the survival of the German republic is an essential cir- cumstance in a future KEuropean peace The answer the question very naturally falls into two distinct phases. " As to the probability of the survival of the republic through pres- ent crises and for a period measured hy years by something not less than five and perhaps not more than ten the answer one has here is pretty wnqualified. As to the more future, there is by contrast diversity of judgment and no incon- siderable agreement on the theory that the answer Is undiscoverable at the present time, and will largely de- pend upon incalculable circumstances. Perils in Monar As to the present status of the re- public, one hears the same opinion everywhere—the republic must popular or unpopular, simply because & change would be alike disastrous in the foreign and the domestic situ- ation, because a restoration of the monarchy would mean automatic end- ing of foreign loans, the almost equally sure Invasion of Germany, and, in addition, no end of domestic disturbance. A restored monarchy could only come in with bloodshed, and on its arrival the last hope of financial aid from the outside world would go glimmering. 1 think it would be a matter of common agreement that the feeling toward the republic has undergone material change in the past six vears; that, on the whole, the cause of the republic has declined; that as an ab- stract proposition It is weaker than it was in the Weimar days and in the period of the first Reichstag, with its elearly republican and domestic ma- Jorities. After all, one cannot help recalling the old slander of the restored mon- archy in Bourbon France after the Napoleonic era. Its enemies said that the restored Louis had been brought along in the baggage of the victorious allies of that time. In the case of the German republic one might rathér say that a similar feeling found ex- pression in the view that, although Germany had changed her form of government in the hope of moderat- Ing allied bitterness, the republic had not been able to prevent the treaty of Versailles, the Ruhr occupation, and could not now free German terri- tory of the Cologne area. an last? a great Bitter After-War Days. The after-war period in has, on the whole, been time than the war period itself, which, up to the swift and sudden collapse in the closing days, at least malntained German prestige in the world. With the ultimate and su- preme disaster the Germans turned away from the empire. How deep, how complete the revulsion was no one can perhaps say, but there was the revulsion, there was a restricted revo- lution, the Hohenzollerns went out, a dynasty covered with the discredit of failure and compromised by a rather Inglorious exit. But from the moment of the ar- rival of the republic to the present hour Germany's misfortunes, Ger- many’s humiliations, her present weakness have been inevitably asso- clated in the minds of Germans with the republic—a circumstance which the enemies of the republic have al- ways skillfully emphasized The dis- asters of 1918 have tended to become ancient history. while the humilia- tions and sufferings incident to the unsuccessful Ruhr campaign are still of present memory. Step by step, as a consequence, the political movement has been the right, toward the men and par- t'as of the old regime. The last elec- 1fon but one represented an enormous snccess for the reaction. The last alaction, paradoxically, resulted in a slight reversal, but ended by the creation of & new ministry, in which, for the first time since the war, the Nationalist party was powerfully rep- resented, while the Social Democrats and the Democrats were practically excluded. Scandals Are Germany a bitterer Factor. Again, one must note that precisely ## the leaders of the Republican par- “#ies have been weakened because of 2Heir inability to perform miracles nd their necessity to accept allied acisions which they were powerless @l resist, certain of them have been -pmpromised by personal scandals, by hings which we call at home “graft.” TWst at the moment there is going on sensation which vaguely, perhaps, #ealls the oil business in Washing- on last Winter. The republic, then, is weaker than ti was, has been on the whole grow- ing weaker progressively for five hiears, with the possible exception of fthe period just following the adop- fil«n of the Dawes plan. It is terri- fuly embarrassed at the moment be- fcRuEs of the fallure of the allies to nut the Cologne area in conformity ith the time fixed by the treaty of ‘ersailles. 1t may be'fatally compro- mised, looking to the more distant futurs, if evacuation does not take place presently, if the opponents of the republic are able 10 assert credi- hly that the allies have no intention of quitting the Rhine—in a word, that Germany is to be mutilated further So much for the weakness. It i real, it is unmistakable. If it con- tinues and progresses, no one will much question the ultimate return of a monarchy. But there are elements of strength, and, from the American point of view, of hope. In the first place, the present division into’ par- tles does not mean a square division hetween people who would restore the onarchy today and those who would preserve the republic today and to- morrow. It is a division between those people who hope one day to upset the republic and now are seek- ing to gain control of Germany through mastery of the republican machinery and those who desire to control the machinery to preserve the republic. Doubts Capaclty to Make War. Despite all reports to the contrary, I think there is no informed or cred- ihle evidence in Berlin or elsewhere of any present capacity of the Ger- mans to make war. They may have wore guns than the law allows, but they haven't enough guns or the kind of ‘guns to enable them to face France. And they know'it. They know, too, that to recall a king would Le to loose the French armies, to aholisb all hope of evacuation of the Ithine area, to sacrifice all chance of wpulslde suppory of any Britlsh or . distant | last, | toward | American attempt to restrain France. Then, before they restore the mon- archy, the Germans must decide upon | a monarch. But they are not agreed | There is the rivalry between the sev | eral dynasties, particularly Hohen- ! zollern and Wittelsbach, that is Prus- sian and Bavarian, and there is the other question as to what Hohenzol lern should be chosen. Not the for mer Kaiser, that is out of the ques- {tion. Only less certainly it cannot be the crown prince. Perhaps the crown prince’s son, but there you have cenfusion enough to make res- toration a bit difficult even in the . every one says ¥ in all but name ince Rupprecht is &n, perhaps incognito, but general agreement that he to make an attempt to th by force and you have also the significant agreement that such an attempt would mean | bloodshed, universal strikes, economic disturbances which would abolish the | progress, real, but still restricted, which has been made. Above all, it | would aboli: nfidence | Republic va Vitality. In a word, the republic is here, it can’t he abolished now. The most nearly nationalistic ministry the re- publ vet had is just much a captive of the form of government as the first republican cabinet. Na- tionalist policy may seek to destroy the republic 1y sabotage, to discredit it by piling up confusion, by estab- lishing the idea that under the re- public nothing can be accomplished, that its continuation means humilia- tion abroad and chaos at home—and that, one must note, is the game of | the Communists, too. | Now when you consider | experienced and informed observers agree that short of the deluge the republic has from five to ten years more to live, it is plain that much may happen. You may have a wholly | different situation abroad, the Rhine- | land may all be evacuated with the Ruhr, agreements may be made with the old enemies, security treaties as to the Rhineland, commercial treaties with France and other nations. In |a word, in spite of all that the ex- | treme Nationalists may attempt, the republic may live, even become as- | sociated in the public mind with a degree of comfort at home and of dignity abroad. There you have the real chance of the republic as I see it here, the fact that for a number of years it has &0t to live. That was exactly what saved the French republic between 1871 and 1875, when the majority of the National Assembly was mon- archist and imperial The Hohen- zollerns have already been gone more than six years. Suppose that another | decade passes without a restoration, will it be as easy then to restore? | Evacuation Prime Insue. | 1 feel certain that the republic can- not live, cannot have any real chance | of survival if it is unable to bring | about the evacuation of all of occu- pied Germany. I think it is highly probable that if this evacuation be postponed too long the evil effects of such delay may prove ineradicable. It could not survive, moreover, if the German governments of its period | should undertake any new contract to | accept as permanent the eastern | boundary as laid down by the Paris treaty. It might in the end survive if the present Summer saw the termination of the present debate over the | Cologne zone, the evacuation of the Ruhr and the Cologne bridgehead, the general agreeraent as to the certainty of the evacuation of all the - other zones, including the Saar, under the conditions fixed by the treaty of Ver- salilles. It might survive if Engiand and France and Belgium, together { with Germany, signed treaties sus | anteeing the present frontiers wh these three continental in common. I suppose that the real key of the situation lies in the fact that there {exist at this moment in Europe two dominating distrusts—that of France | for Germany and that of Germany for France. The mass of the French peo- ple believe that the Germans are planning and plotting a new war of destruction and aggression: the mas of the German people believe that French policy is entirely summed up in the purpose to prevent German re- covery, to take advantage of every technical excuse for prolonging the | occupation of the Rhire and in the end to hold permanently the Rhine frontiers. Must Bridge Differences. Unless some bridge be found over these two streams of distrust the whole situation is from the outset impossible. The French will not evacuate, and the Germafs will turn from any republican form of gov- ernment to the most extreme reaction the moment they have the slightest sense of strength or perhaps at the moment when they are seized with despair. Leave out militarists, poli- | ticians, agitators of every sort, and| you still have, I think, a great and decisive number of people on either side of the Franco-German frontier who are almost immovably convinced of the bad faith of the other country. Now, this works quite obviously in Germany, Everything the allies have done, notably the occupation of the | Ruhr, has served to give confirma- tion to this conviction. I do not now try to argue about the wisdom or folly of the Ruhr occupation, much less its legality or Allegality. But| the effect in Germany was perhaps | las bad as it was good—that is, if it brought the Dawes plan it also | strengthened enormously the hands of { those who insisted that France never jmeant to let up until she had de- | stroved Germany and that all at-| tempt at fulfillment was supreme | folly The Dawes plan brought a chang The pessimists were for the moment silenced. But then the new Cologne { dispute interposed. The old cry was | heard again: “What use to concede, | to agree, to promise, to undertake to! perform? A new excuse will be found | for attacking us.” Mind, I am not| trying to argue that such assertions | are right or wrong; I am only trying | to report the effect of such actions upon millions of German minds, filled, crammed with distrust of French purpose, saturated with skepticism of British and American politics. And in the same way I am trying to point out the admirable handle such epi- sodes give to the extreme National- ists, who are to sabotage the republic | now and restore the empire one day. Drift Against Republie, Unmistakably weaker than it was, I gather the republic is still too! strong to upset by force. A mew | putsch would probably go the way is a mon- The Crown P! cgarded as a sover you have s too wi seize the that most | i { t | i h nations have | { some ta time, | greatest | yeariy sum which in 37 years would | | to understand why i not | winning of the war? Chapter 1—What It Is About. CONGRESSIONAL investigation, sta last year for the sole purpose of determining wheth- er an aircraft inventor named Martin getting his rights from the Government, broke into a hornet’s The inquiry broadened, as con- gressional inquiries have a way of do- ing, until it embraced the whole ques- tion of our aerial defenses. There rose a storm, whereof Brig. Mitchell, the truculent in command of the Army Air| the center. By now, forgotten Mr. Martin; stion of & united air service, a ate arm of the national defense, the main issue. The controversy proceeded with that vindictivé which to mark all rows in a rmy. The men of the | ir service, speaking more frankly in private than on the witness stand, called the general staff of the Arm:; the general board of the Navy, desk soldiers and mossbacks. The generals and admirals called the aviators “air chauffeurs.” There was hoolgirl stuff”; high oflicials of Governs | ment refased attend func- tions manazed by members of the op- position. Once a mysterious anony- mous commurication, probably from hizh threw the inquiry into an unaccountable panic. Mitehell a Marked Man. Once again, Mitchell seems to have b for immediate re- | moval, Then hidden counter-influences got work, and Mitchell stayed for hen, when the inquiry ended, sent back to the line with the possibility of a court-marti; hanging over his head. Did the Amer- ican Army and Navy recognize the duel, doubtless there would have been coffee and pistols for breakfast ali along Potomac Park. Conggessional inquiries always listen to some real wisdom and great deal unsupported bunk. This w no | exception. The several thousand pages | of testimony contain some facts, many | half- ths masquerading as fact, and | a lot of flat contradictions, together with at least a thousand pages of ir-| relevant matter. This series is the earnest attempt of a neutral to set forth the vital facts in the contro- ted was nest a Gen William second Service, was every one had the qu sepa becam seems the to social a Gen, marked en to Mitchell was of Gen, What Mitchell's Contention. then, omitting the firework | is Gen. Mitchell’s contention? | He holds to bezin with that the | future dan T to our scheme of national defense is air power He believes that when plans now matur- ing in forelzn countries are worked out, air attack presents more dancer | than attack by either land or sea. He maintains that everv form of surface naval craft is in process of being ren- dered obsolete by the air bomb. As the Army fights on land and the Navy on sea, the aeroplane fights in still another element. Its technique, strate- gy and tactics are so different from | those of the Army nd Navy that an | air force cannot be worked out to full efficiency unless it is organized as a whole, and by experts who understand the game. Hence, what we need is a separate air service, under a new de- partment of the cabinet. As T have said, Gen. Mitchell was chief protagonist of this view. Prob- ably most of our airmen agree with GETTING AT THE FACTS HAT troversy? are the Gen high officials the important since the World War. The North American most winnow out the facts. merits of the Washington Mitchell's charges, heated rebuttals from congressional investigation, show it to be question aircraft cou- of national defense raised aper Alliance, of which The Star is a member, commissioned Will Irwin to visit Washington and Will Irwin was chosen for this work; first because he believes international co-operation will prevent future wars and hence has no sympathy with alarmist opinion; secondly, because his experience as a correspondent in the late war gives him a first-hand knowledge of conditions under discussion, and, finally, because he is regarded as one of the foremost reporters and news writers in the United States. Mr. Irwin has presented his findings in a series of 13 articles, of which this the first. daily. is Mitchell, though consideration military etiquette and perhaps of their jobs keep the rest silent. The higher officers of the Regular Army and Navy, especially the Navy, differ with Mitchell on every point. Though the airplane, they has revolutionized tactics, it remains an auxiliary. In our first line of defense, the Navy, the battleship is still the undefeated heavywelght champion. The air bomb is a new enemy, but not a dominant one. On land, infantry is still the kernel of the matter. You cannot beat an enemy unless you oc- fear say, BARUCH WOULD REMIT for | cupy his territor 'ANTI-AIRCRAFT TRIALS 'PART OF ALLIES’ DEBT Money Loaned France Was Spent for the Common Good. BY BERNARD WM. BARUCH. | 1 am deeply interested in the ques- | tion of allied debts from the stand- point of fairness to ourselves. We| have gone through the phase of the situation wherein financiers, both here and abroad, have said that the loans should be canceled because it would ruin our country to receive the money, and through the phase in which attention was drawn to the alleged inability of the allies to pay. But the fact that the allled and American experts felt that Germany,| deprived of her colonies, Alsace-Lor- raine and Upper Silesia, could pay a| amount to a capital sum of more than-‘ $10,000,000,000 makes it very difficult | any one of the| allies cannot pay what it owes. I am of the opinion that when once a settlement is reached payment will not be so difficult as is feared. The world has greatly increased its wealth since the war. But we must face the question not alone in what is just, but in what is| honorable; not so much in whit was | actually borrowed as in how much of it was spent in the common cause so much in what is due this generation in money, but what is due future generations in international | prestige and good will and in the feeling of having done our full share. Spent to Save U, S, Seldiers. Should we ask the debtor nations to pay the money loaned to them to buy the things allocated to them be- cause they could use them more read- ily and effectively than we in the For instance, should we ask France to pay for the copper in the shells used in laying down a barrage to protect American soldiers when we had no 7587 Or should we remit that portion? 1t would not mean a contribution of the whole debt. It would not mean a contribution of those sums of money which were spent for food by the allies and then resold by them to their civilian population. It| would not in any way affect the money which was used for the pur- chase of material that went into the permanent industrial life of.the bor- rowing country. Nor would it affect | the money borrowed to bolster the exchange of an allied nation, or the money with which to buy things af- ter the end of the war. of the inglorious Kapp affair. Re- i (Continued vu Third 'fiq ' America the money cash in France, where for munitions and for trans- portation of our troops. There would still be left a very large sum of money which the allies would owe us. The question is not So much what amount we can prac- tically collect, but rather how much we ought to collect. spent by us in Falrness Essential However, if we consider this from the standpoint of a contribution to- ward a common cause, the settlement of the whole question of the war and the peace should be made upon a fair understanding of the common cause that involved us in the war. We should not rob future generations of the honorable heritage of having helped conduct a great war greatly and of making a righteous and Jjust peace. But no settlement of these debts excent on the basis of full pay- ment should be made unless some such arrangement can be effected, satisfactory to reasonable American opinion and on the facts. MacDonald and_ Herriot did much ast Summer.. Now Herriot and Churchill and our own Government are moving toward a settlement that may bring peace and rest to the world. * (Copyright, 1925.) Report; ‘Greenland Rich in Minerals What are described in a Scandina- vian report to the American Chemical Soclety as the world’s richest deposits of graphite have been discovered in Greenland. “An American engineer, J. R. Sweet,” says the report sent from forten, Norway, “has been in Green- land for a whole year on work for the biggest graphite deposits in the world, sufficient for large-scale min- ing for at least 100 years. “Hy using appropriate methods of refining, the wo ng can be made very profitable, notwithstanding the rather peculiar working conditions. Sweet is of the opinion that Green- land is enormously rich in minerals, On the other hand, it would be fair| for the 'allied gountries Lo repay and ought to he opened to foreign capital and lnniw.," England and else- | Succeeding articles will be published and how do that without infantry? the case, an independent air force would merely complicate matters. What we need, in both Army and Navy, is an aerial arm skilled not only in fiying, but in Army and Navy tac- tics; and integral part of the force. Admiral Sims, by the way, dissents to the point of believing that aero- plane bombs have an edge on surface craft and that the battleship fis doomed, but he opposed the united, independent air force. 1 have used the phrase “national de- can you Such being SPOILED BY “ECONOMY” Sees Justice in Claim That Some of :Aged Guns and 7-Year-Old Ammunition Useless Against Even Obsolete Air- planes in Test, BY M. H. MeINTYRE. 3SERVERS of the joint Army Anti-Aircraft Air Service dem- onstration at Fort Monroe, Va., last week, saw more than the failure of the ground de- fenses in the tests. In their opinion the failure was due not entirely to the lack of skill on the part of the gunners behind the three-inci anti- aircraft rifles, but to a rigid applica- tion of the economy polley. In other words, it is sald by im- partial experts, those interested chiefly in the question of national de- fense as a whole and not biased eithe: in. their attitude regarding air power or anti-aircraft power, that the ad- mitted poor showing of the ground defenses was due at least in part to| economy. The remarkable demon- stration of the air officers, viewed in the same sense, was all the more re- markable because they put on an up- to-date demonstration with machines just as far behind the times as were the guns which fired at their targets. In the first place, it is pointed out, the reduced enlisted personnel of the anti-aircraft forces at Fort Monroe decreed by Congress for reasons of economy, when it cut the enlisted personnel of the Army to 125,000 men, permitted only two~ guns to be used in the fire tests agalnst the sleeve targets towed by the airplanes. It seemed that at least the usual four- gun battery would be used for an occat.on of the importance of that test. But, although the exhibition had been ordered by the Secretary of War, and members of Congress, as well as high ranking officers of the Army and Navy, had gone from Wash-. ington to witness the demonstration, only two guns could be put into ac- tion. There were not gunners enough to man more. Ammunition T Years Old. Failure to hit the targets in com- paratively easy ranges was traceable to many other factors, all hearing a close relationship to economy. The guns themselves were 1918 models. They fired ammunition sald’ to haye been at least seven years ‘old. The fuses were erratlc—more erratic than those used in the war. Some of the shells proved to ge duds. The 1918 models were used because none of more modern patterns was available. Congress had provided for a post-war model. It has been de- veloped as a pllot. It was shown to the visitors, and they were told what fense.” There are wo ways of defin- ing that term, and the difference is important You may say that national defense consists in equipping yourself 0 strongly that you can protect every Amertfcan interest in every part of the world by force of arms. To do this, you are going to need the greatest armament iii the world. One finds it hard to distinguish this “perfect de- fense” from militarism and imperial- fsm. Average M View. The great majority of Americans would give the term another defini- tion. Here we are, 3,000 miles away from any nation powerful enough to trouble us. We are so self-sufficient that even a blocade would deprive us only of our foreign commerce; it would not keep from us anything necessary to maintain our life and to arm our men. If we can prevent an enemy from landing on our shores and cut- ting our sea-communication, we shall have enough national defenses. Any- thing further is perhaps a provoca- tion. When an American capitalist gets squeezed in a foreign business deal, when a missionary gets massa- cred in China, that hardly justifies the use of armed force for indemnity, jus- | tice or vengeance. After all, most of | these matters may be adjusted or com- | pensated by the existing machinery of | diplomacy. If we regard the matter in this light, world-wide limitation of aerial armament is the best defense, and by all odds the cheapest. By mutual agreement, cut down the air forces of | all nations to such a point thit while| they can protect Yheir own territory, | they cannot muster the superior of- fensive force necessary to attack their | neighbors, | May Be President's P I venture a guess, here and now,! that President Coolidge has in mind | at this moment just such a scheme of | defense as regards aircraft. Stories in the news which look like' feelers | | from the White House; the sudden | silence about the League of Natlons! disarmament plan; a hint in a recent | aircraft debate in the House of Com- | mons; a kind of semi-official announce- | | ment that Japan will accept a 5-5-3 | ratio of aircraft, as she has of battle- ishlp.‘l: certain unexplained incidents in | the inside workings of the congres-| sional committee investigating air- | craft—all point toward this conclu- sion. Mr. Coolidge may not be quite | so silent as his press agents would make us think, but he is the most | mysterious man who has occupied the | White House in our time. Before he ever pokes his head above ground. he | has bullt his substructure. If he guc- ceeds, satisfactory home defense of our continental area—and probably of our colonies—will have been achieved to the satisfaction of most of us, and | the aircraft inquiry will have been most happily. settled. | But in case he fails? Then we must | needs consider seriously the defense of our populationsand our cities from | | this new and subtle enemy, and the | | question of ways and means becomes | | important. “Supposing a Case——" the sec- ond installment of Will Irwin's series on the aircraft controversy, will be published tomorrow in The Evening Star.) (Copyright, 1925, in United States, Canada and Great Britain by North American Newspaper Alliance. Al rights reserved.) Writer Asserts. [it would do agalnst hostile aircraft. | But there was just one of it. Econ- | omy policies had prevented the mak- ing of them in sufficient numbers to | be used in the test at Fort Monroe. If there had been four of them, a regulation battery, the same economy factors would have existed in regard to the personnel, and only two of the four could have been put into action on that account. The officers of the anti-aircraft de- fenses of Fort Monroe, one of the most historic fortifications of the} country and reputed to be one of the show stations of its kind, told the visigors little of the difficulties they faced. They did the best they could with the equipment, they had—guns, ammunition and personnel, 01d Guns Undermanned. They attempted tq stage a modern demonstration - with; near-antiquated equipment and withi one-half the re- quired number of mén. That they failed was no lul’DrkG‘y The surprise Jay in the condition bf unprepared- | ness, which was all too obvious to the spectators, who were permitted to see for themselves the real situation of | the anti-aircraft defenses at Fore| Monroe. ‘ { Statements made Ly Brig. Gen. Wil- liam Mitchell, storm'center of the air power controversy, that anti-aircraft fire could not be depended upon to protect a city from enemy air ralds, {either in the daytime or in the dark- ness of night, were supported 100 per cent by the tests at Fort Monroe, at least in so far as thoge tests can be applied to the question of relative values of the airplane and the anti aircraft guns. Of course, it is admitted that bet- ter results will be had in fire ef- ciency from the ground when the post-war weapons are mdde avail- able. They will increase the rate of fire, be fixed on Improved and more stable mounts, have greater vertical apd horizontal ranges and other advantages which go to make for greater accuracy jn fire and all around effectiveness. It may be, too, that when the war-time ammunition reserves are exhausted, the efforts of the ordance experts to develop better shells will have been frultful and will add to the increased efficiency of anti-aircraft gunnery as compared to that which prevalls at the present time. Certain it is that the powder will_be_fresher than that loaded. in (Continued on Third Page) | him {move and what were i ment of anti-administration WARREN RENOMINATION HELD FULL OF DYNAMITE President’s Action Considered Futile by Some G. O. P. Senators—Hughes and Stone Backed Nom 0. MESSENGER. in recent months has| occasioned more specula- | tion, surmise and gossip in| political circles than Presi- dent Coolidge’s course in re- newing the riomination of Mr. War- | ren to be Attorney General after its first rejection on 'a tie vote by the| Senate. The subject was vitalized by | realizing that President Coolidge had | come to clinches with a faction of his party in the Senate possible serious friction with element in the next Congress. i Dealing with the subject frankly and with what information is at hand it ‘must be said at the outset that when President Coolidge so promp; renewed the submission of Mr. War- ren’s name to the Senate for its ac- tion, not only was great surprise felt by many Republican Senators, hyt also apprehension felt that the re- nomination might be futile and that 80 far as party politics was concerned it was loaded with political dynamite. Conferences with President idge very properly elicited the mation that political strategy and polie were subordinate to higher questions in this case. He was quite aware of the party politics being played by the Democratic party and of the aid which was being furnished to the Democrats by a faction of his | own party | tha Cool- | infor- | Called on Hughes amd Stome. | President Coolidge felt assured that public opinion would sustain him eventually in the attitude he has taken. Many of his friends wanted to make a statement, following sending of Mr. Warren's name to the Senate, explaining wh felt constrained to make that the conditions which actuated it. They believed that there would have been an im- | mediate response from public opinion | which would have indorsed him. | It is not revealing any confidential information to disclose an interesting | incident of this case. When the | nomination of Mr. Warren to be | Attorney General was announced and | Democratic' opposition appeared, later to take the form of a atrict party movement, with the reinfor Republi- cans in the Senate, President Cool- idge took steps to make sure that he was right before insisting upon the confirmation of his appointee. | He called in Secretary of State Hughes on account of his eminent legal ability, his judicial mind and his knowledge of anti-trust matters and history, and likewise the then Attorney General, Mr. Stone, for similar reasons, and requested them | to make a report to him upon the law and upon the facts of Mr. War- | ren's alleged affiliations with trust| organizations. | Ready to Face Test. He asked them to go over the records of all Mr. Warren's earlier connections with big business. The | result of the inquiries made in that| neutral and judicial undertaking con- vinced President Coolidge that no | valid objection could be raised! JACKSON LED foreshadowing | ¢ it | as later—it might as we inee for High Post. nst' ither the tices of Mr was assoNat Presiden, ion of Mr. Warren's ability he Nad rrern he with business affairs = had a high opin- acter, the manifested th diplomatic senvice, and with this re- port of his chgsen advisers before him he felt justified in insisting t the nomination ywhould confirmed As subsequent developments a ingly pointed out that part fac tional capital was 1o be of case, and ersistently indi iven by long his own advisers | being pla and factionalism, it conceived that the P ment aroused AS he viewed the herdswas b appointen slaughtered upon t tar polit expediens rather, it should be said, of pol¥ opportunism—humiliated and re ed. It may be pictured that anotier thought was in his mind, too. Theie had been ind weakened strict ty loyalt Senate, forecasting fut of fac- tional troubles t is possible he thought that i Ic impending well now and made ou h cabinet e st ated the thing nay be readily esiden's resent- that . olitics th vd in likelih the and a crisis over party lovalty might precipitated 1 be threshed and let and for all the fact ined whao is who in line-up. 1f the fight let's go to it and have out deter party bound to come, it over as 1o is Demanded Party Loyaltr. The President at the outset of his sec- ond adminis et douht exist as to where he stands on In his inaug address T one would deny that full and free expression and tunity for indepe of @ the party. There narrow and bigoted partisanship. if there is to be responsible party ernment the party label must by thing more than device cur office. Ur wh elected under t desig tion are willing to_assun sponsibili exhibit su ther nee L me - ss those party sufficient nt loy they « principles « tion merely is made at the an operat coherence of the broad general parts platform, the a mockery, no decision polls and there is no representation of the popular will. Common honesty 3 good faith with the people Who suppe a party at the polls require that partr when it enters office, to assume the con- trol of that portion of the Governme to which it has been elected. Any other course is bad faith tion of the parly pledges. That was the state of mind in which the President found himself when the most overt act of factionalis took form consideration of Warren nomin: There can be question in the minds of the average man that the effect of the joining of several Republicans with the solid phalanx of Democrats adhering togeth. to oppuse politically the ation con- stituted a partisan attack on the Presi- dent’s administratin DEMOCRATS and a viol party th INTO DEFINITE STATUS BY NEWTON D. BAKER, | Secretary of War in the Wilson | Admnistration. i (Today is the 157th anniversary of | the birth of Andrew Jackson.) OR the Democratic party the birthday of Andrew Jackson, «eventh President of the United States, is f special impor- tance. He received the Demo- creed as a polished theory, he only partially understood, from Jeferson, and made it Into a soing concern which carried elec tions, abolished privilege and estab- lished the fact of popular govern- ment upon the Impregnable rock of a direct appeal to the people them- selves. The party will do well to| overlook non-essentials as it rever- ently celebrates the anniversary of| the old hero. His ways are not our] wa but in a magnified and altered form his problems are our problems. | and any adequate solution of them must be compounded out of just such courage and faith and simple-minded- | ness as he breught to bear. Andrew Jackson was born in 176 just eight years before the event known as the American Revolution. | He died in 1845, 16 years before the| Civil War. Between those two epoch- marking events he conceived, em- bodied and carried out a revelution | all his own, without which the first would have been incomplete and the second impossible. That the Jackson revolution was bloodless was'due to the fact that his enemies thought discretion the better part of valor As it was, he probably felt, as would Sir Nigel of the White Company, a little disappointed that no gentlemen would accommodate him with a little trial at arms. Certainly he never he eratie which itated as he took on in turn the prin- ciple of the secretarial succession, by which the proud families of Vir and Massachusetts aristocrats coming to regard the presidency dynastic inheritance, the Bank of the United S Senate of United States at its w and Fr under Louis Phillipe the the Jefferson it cademic A mode. Ja all its implic nd roug vet Rough-manr 1-spoken men put him he was a gentleman in all that counts in the composite of mear ings in that term. He was a truthfu frank and brave man, who said what he thought, did what he believed be right, worshiped the memory of his fine old wife, and wrecked his first cabinet in a chivalrous battle for the rights of a woman whom he thought ill-used. Since ticular Jackson's day men of no par- family at all have risen to the presidency . upon no pretension but talent, and have served their country with splendid devetion and immortal success. Other Senates have fought other Presidents—perhaps it would be truer to every Senate has fought every FPresident both before and after Jackson—but that we have an independent Executive in this country at all is due to Jackson's “protest” and the deep-seated popular conviction which it -produced that in those perennial contests the place for the peaple is with' the Presiflent There are stra contrasts strange parallels between the of Andrew and Woodrow Wilson, but both left their heritage of courage, that pare all other virtues, great enough found a tradition o and careers Jackson of Democrat or Centrist Approved By Socialists May BL MAJ. HENRY T. ALLEN, Commanded the American Army on the Rhine. Without some unforeseen crisis in its presidential campaign, Germany will remain republican. Germany fully recognizes that its most fun- damental consideration — economic restoration—is largely dependent upon the aid and the co-operation of its recent enemy states. That explains why the selection of Luther as chan- cellor, though he is only mildly na- tionalistic, was considered by many to be doubtful wisdom. But his strong support_of the republic, his Intimate knowledge of the Dawes pian in all its external relations and his modera- tion, however, make him prominent in the forecasts of the elections _of March 29. Were the Soclalists iess strong, his chances would be more brilliant. The Sociallsts claim, with much right, the responsibllity for founding the German republic, and are insistent ‘that another of their party. possibly Loebe, president of the Reichstag, sucoceed the Soclalist Ebert to the presidency of the Reich. The hopes of the Monarchists, encouraged by suceess In the recent elections, are ! celitered on securigg maximum recog- | Head Germany nition In this troubled perfod, when the republicans are split infin- ential German pape ha even come out boldly for the ex-Crown Prince while the names of Hindenberg Mackenson, Von Tirpitz, Bulow and the ex-Kaiser have been mentioned It is but natural that France. and Belgium, and perhaps other inter- ested countries, would view the elec- tion of a genuine Nationalist or Mo archist with grave apprehension. It would mean for them a continuation of the violation, at least of the spirit, of the disarmament provisfons of the Versailles treaty It would diminish the. hope, alread too slender of France's patticipation in any confer- enee on security and Rhineland evacu ation in which Germany might he In ciuded, and it would still further give occasion for demonstrating that a smaller state may not impose its will on a iarger one without increasing difference, and decreasing the chances of agreement through reciprocal guar- antees. these reasons it would meem that a candidate llke Dr. Marx from the Centrists or some one from the Democrats who might secure the good will of the Socialists will 3 chosen to continue the policy of | terest, harmony and extermal con- uvuvn of the late-Fresident Ebere