Evening Star Newspaper, June 30, 1935, Page 31

EDITORIAL SECTION he Sundwy Staf JUNE 30, 1935. Special Articles Travel — Resorts 4 Editorial Page Civic Activities Dart 2—12 Pages CLEAVAGE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NOT BASIC Both Nations Are United in Peace Desire—France Holds Germany Immutably Bent on War. | inated and it has no counter-balancing C Usy WASHINGTON, D. SUNDAY MORNING, PARTY FORCED TO BACK NEW DEAL AS 36 NEARS But Republicans Are Conceded Real Chance if Conservative Democrats Show Any Strength. BY MARK SULLIVAN. America and Revolution Social Upheaval Is Never Inevitable, It Happens When -Government Paves Way. Lessons in Past Debacles. | the President’s magic continues. Prob- ably the judgment of the Democrats BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. HE naval treaty recently signed between Great Britain and Germany has many aspects, | some of which ®are political | and purely European and others which, since they are naval, have smportance for both the United States ! and Japan as maritime powers. On | the political side this treaty illus-| trates the fundamental difference be- tween British and French policy in dealing with Germany. The British will not admit that National Socialist Germany in itself constitutes an im- | mutable threat of war. The French. on the contrary, cannot see relations with Germany conducted upon any other basis. | It is true that the British do not fgnore the possibility—perhaps even | the probabil; his country to conflict. On the con- | trary, as far back as last Summer | Stanley Baldwin gave Berlin fair warning of British policy when he announced that the Rhine and not the Chalk Cliffs of Dover was Eng- land's frontier. And since then he has given further significant warning by adopting an air program which insures British equality with the Reich. Britisk support of French and Ttalian purpose to prevent the forcible annexation of Austria by Germany | has also been made clear on more than one occasion. So far, then, British policy parallels French. If Germany undertakes to disturb the territorial and military | status quo in the west the British will stand with the French even to the extent of making war if neces- garyv. If Germany attempts to destroy the political status of Austria, British influence will be exerted against such an enterprise, although British readiness to fight is by no means assured. Furthermore, the Pritish_have bestowed their blessing upon Franco-Soviet efforts to estab- lish an Eastern Locarno and Franco- Italian to create a similar agreement in the Danubian region. Backed German Argument. On the other hand, during the dis- armament conference the British eteadily advocated recognition of German right to equality in military means of defense. They did that be- cause they correctly judged that Ger- many was bound in the end to rearm in any case and that refusal to permit such rearmament, which was an essential right of sovereignty, would in the end fail to achieve its objective and incidentally awaken German | resentment which would bestow an | even more dangerous character upon the armament itself. In this view they were, of course, entirely correct. Germany is rearming and has left the League of Nations, retiring into an isolation which if uncomfortable for herself is not without menace for her neighbors. No the French say that the end of all German maneuvers both in the matter of military and naval arma- ments and, in fact, in the diplomatic fleld, is another war designed to es- tablish German hegemony on the con- tinent. They say that German strat- egy consists in endeavoring to sepa- | rate France and Great Britain and | that, as & consequence, when Britain agrees to German proposals to rearm she is actually playing the German game and encouraging Germany to later aggression by disclosing a break in the Anglo-French front. In the naval armament question, too, Rome &eems to have followed Paris, although 1t is not impossible that British action | in the matter of Ethiopia has played | 8 part in shaping Italian decision. For it msut not be forgotten that Italy | course which has largely explained | necessity which would be served by an Anglo-German combination. Brit- ain's prospective enemy in Europe is Germany, and there is discoverable no |set of circumstances which could transform France into a similar foe. Interdependence Recognized. The real defect in British policy arises not from a desire to play the | balance of power game, which is ex- cluded from present” possibility, but from a reluctance to recognize articu- lately, and therefore effectively, the extent of British dependence upon France for security. It is true that progressively, ever since 1925, when the Locarno pact was made, the Brit- ish have been making explicit the truth which was implicit in that con- But the difficulty lies in the | fact that the French and their con- tinental friends do recall vividly the | fact that when Lloyd George and Ramsay MacDonald directed British policy they were trying to play the | balance of power game. But with the return of Baldwin to power in the national cabinet, whose foreign policy he has always directed, recognition | of the interdependence of France and | Britain has been restored and has endured. It is the tragedy of post-war Europe that the effort to balance the power first by a Liberal and then by a Labor prime minister has been re- sponsible for France's resorting to a ity—that Hitler may lead | Loc": the rise of Hitler. The performances of Lloyd George created a state of mind in Paris which, after his fall, | | led to the occupation of the Ruhr. MacDonald’s destruction of the Lo- carno partnership, when he came to | power in 1929, led France to adopt both in the monetary crisis of 1931 and in the armament discussions in 1932-33 an uncompromisingly rigid | policy. Whether Germany ultimately uses her arms for a fresh war of aggres- | } sion or not, only a war of prevention | could stop her rearming. The French | could, had they chosen, have pre- cipitated such a war when the Reich withdrew from the League and an- | | nounced the purpose to rearm in BY F. BRITTEN AUSTIN, Author of “Tomorrow?" INCE 1933 the outside world has been uncomfortably unable to ignore the United States. The | 1933, But they were unready to do | | that. The next best thing was to | | accept the inevitable and join the ! British in their effort to set a limit | to German rearmament. But they | | were unwilling to do that either. | | Thus their later performances have been contrary alike to common sense | and logic, which are never quite the | same thing. | Treat Situation Practically. | Great Britain won't fight to keep | Germany disarmed, either on land or on sea, or, for that matter, in | the air. Having made up their minds | to this fact, the British have en- | deavored to deal practically with the | situation thus created. They have begun to overhaul their armaments | and they have renewed their efforts to persuade the Germans to agree to set limits to theirs. In the matter of military armaments they failed because the French blocked the way. In the field of naval armaments they have ignored the Prench and settled | the matter directly with Berlin. Even the French cannot, however, condemn the British for the terms of the London agreement, since these terms insure that the French fleet | will remain superior to the German. although they now argue that they | must themselves have a larger pro- | portion than the Washington und‘ London treaties allotted to them.| But, save in the field of battleships, | they are not bound by these treaties New Deal is a major political | and economic phenomenon whose os- cillatory manifestations disturb life in a Chinese village as much as they convulse the London markets or cause the feverish planting of cotton in Bra- zil: and for a century and a half the social ideals of this republic have set the standar¢ for contemporary civil- ization. The end of that New Deal is not yet. If the first fine careless rapture of the brain trusters has been conspicuously abated, forces have been liberated in America whereof no man can predict finality. The Huey Longs, the Father Coughlins, the Dr. Townsends and their enthusiastic followings are symp- tomatic of much. They are potent. | The incessant (and nonsensical) talk about Soviet Russia is another por- tent. The abysses of the depression have been left behind, but there are still twenty-odd million people on the re- lief rolls, cut off from activity, and the vouth of the country, emerging in mass from school or college, despairs of finding a job, of usefully employing its exasperatedly thwarted energies. UNCLE SAM AT FORKS OF ROAD. “Where do we go from here?” No-always by & minority, sometimes tiny, body knows. | prehensively or optimistically mutter | ruthless to achieve it | that America is headed for a colossal There are those who ap- | which clearly knows its aim and is It has been | computed that during the French Rev- { and perhaps violent social revolution. | olution there were not more than 3.000 Outside America, there are watchers who whisper the same thing. Probably those vaticinations are, as Mark Twain remarked about his obituary notice. much exaggerated. It is to be hoped s0. The world disturbance caused by the Bolshevik seizure of Russia would | be but a ripple compared to that con- | vulsion, Popular Idea an Actuality. ‘What are the factors which produce a revolution? The popular idea is that an intolerably oppressed people one day rises romantically in its wrath, bursts its bonds and overturns its rulers for a bright new era. The reality is not quite so simple. The first essential, of course, is that the mass of the people should be dissatis- fied with their lot. Many times, during | convinced revolutionists in Paris, nor more than 20,000 in the whole of France. Lenin himself said, after the seizure of power in 1917, that the Bol- shevik party numbered only some 30,000, whereof (he added, cynically) each 100 contained 60 fools, 39 erim- inals and one genuine Communist. Just before the seizure of power, he | had written to his committee in Petro- | grad. “Revolution is an art. ., .. It | the prosperity period, did the Komin- | tern bemoan the impossibility of revo- lutionizing America while every Amer- | jcan worker had his automobile and his radio paid for out of the highest | wages in the world. | But nothing is more certain than that revolutions are never made by | the mass, nor even by a majority, but | million in the streets, Wi would be childish to wait for a formal majority.” Yet a widespread, popular malaise, 2 mass surge of discontent must pro- vide the opportunity and the medium for the exercise of that art. For the October coup. Lenin cried: “Everybody into the streets! A million in the streets!” He had his million in the streets, manifesting hysterically like a stampeded herd; but that million did not effect the revolution. Trotsky did that, with approximately a thou- sand men, armed and resolute, who seized the telephone exchange, the ! power stations—the nerve centers of the city. Nevertheless, without that F SOME foreign student of govern- ment were to come with a de-| tached mind to study the Govern- | ment of the United States as it | has functioned for the past 28 months, | he would find a set-up like nothing | | that ever existed before. He would | not find “party government”—that is| ‘“out" in America, temporarily at least. He would find, however, a dif- ferent thing, “party politics” still functioning as a hang-over from the past. What is the picture of the Ameri- | can Government as it exists today? | | There is the President. Around the | President is a group of persons who | belong, most of them, to no party, | who have no status in public life ex- cept what they acquired through the accident of their relation to the Presi- dent. They are not members of the | House, they are not Senators, they are not Democratic leaders, they are not | Democrats at all. Their ideas have no relation to American politics, the ideas come partly out of the new ex- periments in government that have been set up in Europe. I have spoken of these persons as a group. But they are not a group. Their only common denominator is their relation to the President. The | ideas of some conflict with the ideas of others. The ideas of some are re- lated to Italian fascism, of others to | Russian communism. It should - be added that the proposals of some go no further than to make marked changes, though not to the extent of revolution, in the American form of soclety and government. Attempting Too Much. The various ideas originated by these persons they pour into the President’s mind. Of the President and ideas, it can be said that, in an old American phrase, his eyes are bigger than his stomach. He is at- tracted by more ideas than he can digest, or the country can digest. The 1 mass hysteria bewildering everybody, ' country, indeed, is suffering from an Trotsky's thousand men would have been promptly suppressed. The Bolshevik coup was a spectacu- ldr performance, staged by men who had profoundly studied the technique of revolution. But it did not appear from nowhere overnight. It had a long prologue in the miseries of a land-hungry peasantry and of an underpaid . industrial proletariat in- | terwoven with humanitarian, reddish- pink sophistries of an intelligentsia which fatiguedly doubted its right to enjoy the civilization of the aristoc- racy and the middle class whence it was drawn. It had a backdrop of & great war conducted by perhaps the most scandalously incompetent gov- ernment the world has ever seen. It! had a rapturous first act, featuring Kerensky, who preferred revolution made with a speech and a smile to revolution made with a machine gun. Kerensky was a lawyer. The first acts of most revolutions are made by lawyers. Trained to win victories by dialectics, they naturally believe that the world can be remade by a speech. ' The idyllic first act of the French revolution was made by lawyers, and the speeches were fine. The second act showed the redeemers of human- thout that! ~ (Continued on Tenth Page.) Can We Save Freedom? indigestion due to the fact that | gulped bites of fascism disagree with gulped bites of communism, and both | disagree with the American concep- tion of government and society. At this moment the most thoughtful | student of government and society | cannot tell surely whether America still remains what is called individu- alistic or capitalistic, or whether the country is irrevocably committeed to a course which can only end in collec- | tivism., | That the President is overdisposed ! to swallow new ideas is well known to ‘his intimates. Some of those close to him know it and try to guard him against 100 many and too hasty meals. Some of the radicals, however, take advantage of the trait and study him to know when they can find him in a mood of enthusiasm for something novel. If we follow the mechanism of gov- ernment 8s it now operates we find | that the President. having received the ideas from the intellectuals and radicals (occasionally from some com- Plete conservatives), transmits them to Congress. In some cases the ideas and | the bills in which they are expressed are actually written out by the authors | of them and are transmitted to Con-| | gress without being read by the Presi- dent. To Congress the measures go with | the President’s backing and authorit | That is the only standing the meas | ures have—if they came directly from the intellectuals and radicals, Con- gress would give no thought to them. Leaders’ Willingness Is Amazing. The measures are transmitled to Congress through Democratic leaders in Congress on this point is sound. The President is a shrewd politician. He follows a course designed to hold to him the farmers, organized labor, the distressed and the radical, four groups which, if kept intact, may be a majority next year. Another reason for the deference of the Democratic congressional majority to the President is the “power of the | purse” which Congress itself voted him | He has more than $4,000,000,000 to spend, practically in his own disere- tion. A Congressman whose district or State wants some of that meney must be in a position to get it, and he can hardly hope to get it if he has a record of voting against the President’s measures. Yet another reason, of course, is patronsge. Patronage Not Enough, But the reasons of patronage and money would not alone be enough. The largest reason for willingness of the Democratic majority in Congress to pass bills just because they come from the administration is the election next year, the belief that the President still commands the faith of a majority of the country. Can the Republicans, that i, the Republicans alone, defeat Mr. Roose- velt next year? The vote in 1932 was 15,761,841 for the Republican, Mr, Hoover; 228213857 for the Democrat, Mr. Roosevelt For convenience, speak of it &s 16,000,000 for the Re- publicans, 23,000,000 for the Demo- crats. Those sixteen millions in 1932 must | have been the rock-bottom Republican v Never before did the Repub- licans carry so few States except when the party was split in 1912. Never was there so much reason for Repub- licans to vote the other ticket—the depression alone must have accounted for millions who voted, not so much “Democratic” as merely for a change. How much shall we estimate the number of Republicans who in 1932 voted Democratic? Is three millions too high a figure? One would guess there must have been a million who left the party temporarily because of dissatisfaction with the party's record on prohibition, and two millions more who were restless because of the de- presssion and voted merely for a change. If the three millions who voted for Mr. Roosevelt in 1932 should return to the Republicans next year. that chanze would leave twenty millions for Mr. Roosevelt, nineteen millions for t Republicans, Another Switch Possible. There must now be another larze number who next year will switch How much shall we estimate the number of old-time regular Demo- crats who next year will vote against Mr. Roosevelt—Democrats with a past record of uninterrupted party fidelity who now think. accurately enough, that Mr. Roosevelt has departed rad- ically from Democratic principles, and who will vote against him next year? If there are as many as a million of these, the sum of these with the other group of switched votes would be enough to defeat Mr. Roose- velt. Is there any offset to these esti- mates? Is there any considerable number of voters who, having voted Republican in 1932, will next year vote for Mr. Roosevelt? Surely there can- not be many. There is yet another possible loss that Mr. Roosevelt may suffer next year. Up to a few months ago most of us who observe these matters ciosely in Washington were confident and Great Britain were agreed on Which they did not ratify, and in German armaments in the Disarma- | the capital ship category Japanese ment Conference. | denunciation will terminte that agree- in that y. The willingness of the leaders to accept the measures is ex- that Senator Huey Long of Louisi- ana next year would head a third Western Civilization, Which Once Was Europe’s, Today Is Menaced Within Continent London replies to Paris in the naval | matter that Germany is going to’arm | and from the point of view of British interests a voluntary agreement on the part of Berlin to set & modest | limit to such rearming is all to the good. As to the break between French and British policies, that break, in so; far as it has occurred, has been due| to the French demand that Britain| shape her policy to conform to French | estimates of German design. That, from the British point of view, is un- reasonable, and if the French do not | like it then they must still put up| with it. France Held Pacific. It is possible to exaggerate this cleavage in thought and action. Thus if the Germans should imagine that Great Britain is setting out to sub- stitute a German for a French part- ship they will come to grief. For the basis of the Anglo-French part- nership, so far as it exists, is the per- fectly clear perception in London that the policy of France is purely pacific. And no such conviction exists in re- spect to Germany. France, so every sane Englishman recognizes, is out for peace at all times and wholeheartedly. Since British policy in this respect co- fncides with French there is no basic | disagreement. If the same situation were to be created between London and Berlin it would first be necessary for Hitler to renounce all of the fa- mous objectives of his foreign policy. But Britain will not follow French policy, pacific as it is, when British judgment is that the policy is pursu- fng mistaken ways and is destined not to prevent but to precipitate war. Again and again in the post-war pe- riod the truth of both of these state- ments has been demonstrated. When crises have arisen which were due to the adoption of methods of violence by the Germans, Great Britain has stood by Prance. When French policy has seemed by its rigidity and un- compromising character to be calcu- lated to drive the Germans to ex- plosive action, London has pretty ostentatiously disassociated itself with Prench diplomatic activity. 1t is frequently said that this course is a disclosure of the British habit of employing the balance of power technique, but I think this interpre- tation is mistaken. As far as balance of power goes, so far the British have got to stand with the French, since the disparity between France and German forces is real. For their own security against an armed and de- termined Reich. Britain needs the Prench Army and Prench and Belgian territory. That need cannot be elim- k ) | upon the size of the French or Italian ment soon. Anglo-German strength is not, however, contingent—so far as the Germans are concerned— navies. The French would have a grievance if, after having settled upon German strength, the British then undertook | to keep French down to any figure incommensurate with French ideas of security. But that bridge has yet to be crossed. Actually what angers the French is the fact that the British made a direct agreement with the Germans and the further circum- stance that this agreement constitutes & tacit recognition of Germany’s right to arm without regard to the terms of the treaty of Versailles. Aim to Avoid Naval Race. “How can the British logically jus- tify their course in denouncing Ger- man military rearmament through the Council of the League and agree- ing to German naval rearmament at London, since both actions constitute similar violations of the treaty of Versailles?” So the French inquire. But the fact is that the British can’t and won't try to do it, for they are not interested in logic but in avoiding a naval race with the Germans. Thus they have agreed that the Germans shall have ships in excess of the num- | ber allowed by the treaty and the | Germans have consented to let the British decide how many more. “Wouldn't it have been better to settle the military problem the same way?” the British ask, pointing out, as Hitler | himself has done, that at Geneva the | Germans offered to stop with 300,600 men instead of 550,000, which is their present goal. When, however, the Germans ex- claim that Hitler, by supreme skill, has separated London and Paris, and the French promptly declare that this is the truth, it is possible to sympa- thize with the British view that at least in stupidity there is perfect parity between Paris and Berlin. And the British are entitled to make the same comment when Berlin and Rome see British policy in the matter of Ethiopia in the same light. When the British encourage German military occupation of the demilitarized zone on the Rhine or the destruction of Austrian independence on the Dan- ube, .hen the French or Italians, as the case may be, will have a basis for complaint and the Germans for re- joicing, but not otherwise The basic truth in the. contempo- rary European situation is that if Germany and France fight again, Great Britain will Lave to support (Continued on’ Tentb Page.) A\ BY ANDRE SIEGFRIED, Author utc“znmmr- Crisis.” “America omes of Age.” Etc. HE white race, Europe, the West—here are three terms whose meaning should be more concisely defined. the past they were synonymous, the white race being limited by Europe, | and Europe then constituting what was meant hy “the West.” Today these terms are not synony- mous and it is largely due to this fact that the present crisis of our old continent has arisen. 1t seems to me that many problems would be clarified if we could use these three terms with a clear, dis- tinct knowledge of what they really mean There exists today a European civ- flization which perhaps is in the process of disappearing, but under whose traditions we are now living. It is based on a triple concept: Knowledge, Man and Production. Our idea of knowledge comes from the Greeks; we are their intellectual heirs. The ideals we have for man come to us in a direct line from the eighteenth .century and are founded on Christianity itself, which taught us respect for the human individual—something that is pretty well menaced just now. Our meth- ods of industrial production are de- scended from the same eighteenth century, even if we take into account what has recently been added by the Americans in division of work and mass production. Harmony of Race Is European. But this magnificent civilization which in the last hundred years has transformed the world was possible of realization only in the framework of special circumstances; this con- sisted in the first place of a white race with unique and incomparable ‘workmen and, in addition. the atmos- phere of a continent so well adapted to the development of human po- tentialities. It is very distinctly European, this harmony of race with its civilization and its geographical setting. In our old continent we have the impression that man has civilized and subdued elemental nature to the point where it hardly ever appears in its original form. When beyond Vienna and the River Elbe we come in contact with more rugged and grander scenery, and no longer feel that the atmos- phere is what we call truly European. ¢ In| Itself, Says Economist. Everywhere in the other continents, above all in the newer ones, like America, Africa and Oceania, you are imbued with the feeling that nature has not been vanquished, but that by its very grandeur it subdues man. If you accept this interpretation what you mean by Europe becomes very small. Until the sixteenth century the idea of Europe coincided with the term “the West” and with what was called Western civilization. But since the renaissance and above all since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Europe has actually conquered the world. This great process has meant the continuous spreading out of the white race. All improvements on this planet, wherever you look, have been done on the European plan. ‘White Race Widely Dispersed. The importance of the fact that the white race can no longer be con- sidered entirely European cannot es- cape us; & great section of this race has grown and prospered on the other side of the oceans: Canadians, Amer- icans, Australians, South Africans, South Americans (at least a large por- tion of them) belong undeniably to the white race and are never thought of as Europeans. Nevertheless, our civilization, pro- jected beyond our borders and adapt- ing itself to new geographic condi- tions, still remains the civilisation of one zace, though it is no longer, as Decoration by Robert Lawson. formerly, the civilization of one con- tinent. Thus is born the idea of what we mean by West—a civilization which has overflowed our continental boun- daries; one whose real center of grav- ity is we know not where. Twenty years ago we could never have imagined all the consequences of these changes that have taken place, that Europe as a whole is no longer Western according to the sense in which we have attempted to define the European tradition. An impor- tant part of our old continent has broken away from the Greco-Latin influenice under which Christianity developed. Lines Sharply Drawn. The Russia of Stalin, the Germany of Hitler—are they Western? Who would claim that they are? Certainly not the Russians or the Germans themselves. When you travel in Eu- rope it is easy to distinguish the regions that were dominated by Rome—others have different characteristics which persist even today. We still continue, no matter what happens, to believe in the unity of Europe; but this unity, if we ever succeed in reviving it, will not be superimposed on the unity of the West. Here is something we would never have dreamed of saying before the war, even though a hundred years ago the discourses of Fichte contained a revolt against the standard civili- zations of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, and as a conse- quence ‘of this same world evolution, t we are forced to admit that the whole ‘ol what we call the West is no longer European. This we have known for a long time, but in reality we attached | very little importance to it. ‘When Auguste Comte talked of the West, was it not Europe he was thinking about? | I remember well, in my youth, when | the United States itself, that young giant, was classed as a secondary power and France assigned only a | Minister Plenipotentiary to Washing- |ton: it is only since the Spanish | American War that the French go ernment has sent an Ambassador to that post. In the not so distant past the American_civilization was spiritually dependent on Europe by way of Eng- land. The World War gave all these newer countries the consciousness of their own spiritual as well as geographical individualities. Today the civilization of the United States stands largely on its own foundation, and if it’is still undeniably attached to our old Greco- and at a distance. “Rising Tide of Color.” Thus we see that henceforth a part —and an important part—of Western civilization will continue to exist out- | side of Europe; some people have even | thought, at some of the serious crisis | of our history, that the heart of our | civilization might some day be no longer fixed within our European bor- ders. We may object that this is| simply an academic question. But it is, alas, only too near to the truth, for the white race and Western Eu- Tope at the moment are menaced from many directions. Competing with the white race there arises what an American writer has called “the rising tide of color,” and threatening Europe with their com- petition is an America with superior equipment and a mechanized Asia profiting by cheap labor. And finally there is the most troubling spectacle of all, which menaces what we call Western civilization—the growing flood of doctrines which are contrary to our ingrained respect for the hu- man individual and his right to free- dom. A definite part of Europe is now opposed to the West and a part of the West tends to escape from Eu- rope. In this very disturbing dissocia- tion, where shall we find the treasure that we want to defend? And where shall we place our lines of defense? 9 Latin tradition it is so only indirectly | traordinary and astonishing. It goes beyond anything that existed even during the Great War: at that time ‘Democn(ic leaders sometimes refused to accept, indeed publicly opposed, measures proposed by President Wil- son, even measures generally regarded as desirable in the interest of con- ducting th war competently. The | private disbelief of present Demo- cratic leaders in some of the measures imr_v publicly support is so well known that Washington hardly even gossips about it any more. From the leaders the measures are transmitted to the two chambers of Congress. The rank and file of members accept the proposals because the lead- | ers accept them. Just lately there has | been some restless protest of members | against some of the measures they are asked to enact, and a faint, very faint, | | disposition of leaders not to accept | without question measures proposed | by the executive branch of the Gov-| | ernment. One important Democratic | | leader has lately told important com- mittees to read carefully all measures coming from members of the adminis- tration. Now what is the engine, or the fuel, of Government as thus carried on? Why do Democratic leaders accept, and why does the Democratic majority | in Congress enact, measures which they would reject if they were exercis- |ing their private judgments and con- sciences measures which are palpably | contrary to the principles and tradi- | tions of the Democratic party? Party Solidarity Is Factor. There are many reasons. One is the | motive of party solidarity. All the | Democrats (and Republicans of | course) in the House come up for re- nomination and election next year | (except such few as voluntarily retire). In the Senate one-third come up for re-election. In the same election the President will be up for another term. The Democrats want, naturally, to go into the campaign as a united party. Every Democrat in Congress looking forward to his personal campaign hesi- tates to be known as one who did not “go along” with the Democratic Presi- dent (excepting a few like Senator Carter Glass, who will go before the Virginia electorate next year as the outstanding eritic and opponent of the New Deal, as one who has furnished an intellectual leadership of opposi- tion greater than that of any Repub- lican). Another reason is the belief that the President still has the country with him, that he is the symbol and spokes- man of & majority. This motive will ticket, and that he would take some millions of votes away from Mr. Roosevelt. This now seems less cer- tain. Mr. Roosevelt seems to have realized the possibility, as well as any | one else, and has taken steps to avert it. Mr. Roosevelt is going plainly to the left, and so far to the left as to leave little room for Senator Long to start a third party, little occasion for Mr. Long's followers to be dis- | satisfied with Mr, Rooseveit. Conservatives May Hold Key, But there remains still the possi= bility of & defection from Mr. Roose- velt quite different in nature. Huey Long is a man of facile attitudes, with no compelling concern about convictions or consistency. It would be comparatively simple for him next year to say there is no occasion for him to head a third party. But the situation of conservative Democrats is quite different. I refer to Democrats like Lewis Douglas. He can hardly, next year, after his outspoken criticism of Mr. Roosevelt, vote to return the latter to the White House, In a similar situation are literally scores of Democratic leaders, many of them higher in the hierarchy than Mr. Douglas. Not all | have spoken out, but there are many who feel privately the same way as Mr. Douglas, and some who have stated privately that between now and next year they will publicly dissociate themselves from Mr. Roose- velt. * ‘What will Democrats of this type do? Democrats never identified with public leadership can satisfy their convictions by voting quietly for the Republican candidate if he is rea- sonably satisfactory, or by staying at home. But Democrats who have been conspicuous in the party, like Mr. Douglas, or Democrats who as public characters have provided lead- ership to large groups of voters, ean hardly live up to their obligations by merely staying at home on election day or voting quietly for the Re- publican candidate. e opportunity for “Guide for Readers PART TWO. Editorial ,............ Civic Affairs .. Fraternal News ... Organization Activities eontinue so long as popular faith in Resorts ..