Evening Star Newspaper, November 25, 1934, Page 31

Part 2—10 Pages EDITORIAL SECTION he Sundwy Star NEW DEAL WINS ACCLAIM OF EUROPEAN CRITICS American Visitors and Diplomats Con- vince Public That Recovery Program Is Wise for U. S. BY ALBIN E. JOHNSON. ENEVA. — They're beginning to quit kickin’ Roosevelt's dog around—in Europe. ‘That is to say, it is becom- ing increasingly unpopular and a bit embarrassing these days for certain diplomats, industrialists and economists—and even newspapers—to belittle, or actually misrepresent the Roosevelt administration’s various and sundry monetary and relief schemes. Not that certain circles in the politi- cal, financial and economic life of the Old World are coming to like Washington’s many puppies any bet- ter, but they are having trouble in convincing a skeptical public that they are all, from N. R. A. to X Y Z, Jjust nondescript curs. ‘The change in the attitude of open | hostility, which ruled some months ago, to fearful apprehension or joyous | expectancy which exists today, has| come about gradually. It is due to| several factors. First, perhaps to the | influences of several thousands of| American visitors. Second, to the| voices of American Ambassadors, Ministers and consular officials, which are becoming more and more audible, and third, but far from least, to the activity of the American delegation of observers to the last conference of the international labor office. American visitors to Europe are amazed at the seeming ignorance which exists in France, Switzerland, Holland, Germany, Italy and even England over what has happened, is happening and promises to happen in the United States. The ideas as to what lies behind President Roosevelt's anti-depression policies are even more fantastic. They range all the way from Communism to dictatorship. Anxious to Discredit. After & few weeks around Paris, Geneva, Amsterdam or Berlin the amazement of the average tourist turns to resentment. Not since the time when the Rothermere Press of London created “Uncle Shylock” to aid the war debt campaign have the powers that be in Europe been so anxious to discredit the American Government in the eyes of their re- spective publics. For them every- thing that has happened in the financial, economic, commercial, or even political sphere overseas has either been inspired from ulterior motives or is proving a gigantic failure—a failure which is going to bring additional hardship and suffer- ing to Europe's already despondent millions. For example, it is the rich and powerful United States which is seek- ing to push the French government off the gold standard, the French peasant and petit bourgeoise are told. The average Frenchman—excluding 4he workers who haven’t anything anyway—does not want to devalue his currency. The Poincare govern- ment did that once before and re- duced his savings, in gold value, by 80 percent. But in damning the United States for having devaluated the dollar the French industrialists and financiers are not pointing out that it would be American commerce, and not Frances, which would be affected adversely if exchange rates were readjusted. But, to get back to “Uncle Shy- lock.” The reason for that slan- derous campaign, which ended as abruptly as it began, with an apology from Lord Rothermere and a dis- claimer of all responsibility for the actions of his editorial employes (some of whom were fired upstairs) was obvious, Its counterpart in France, Italy and other -defaulting countries was equally easy to explain. Governments and financial circles wished to prepare the populace for repudiation—and then tell Washing- ton that they had been driven to default by their peoples. Washington Blamed. There have been other occasions when it was found desirable to blame Uncle Sam for embarrassing situa- tions. During the Chinese-Japanese controversy over Manchuria, for ex- ample, Washington was first held responsible for the League’s im- potency, and later Sir John Simon sought to have the Japanese believe that the League acted under pressure from the United States. Yosuke Matsuoka, American-educated spokes- man for Tokio, knew differently, however, and Sir John's hopes died aborning. And in the Disarmament Confer- ence, which is slowly expiring after 30 months of forced feeding, it is also Wasihngton which is to blame. If the United States would enly agree to a mutual assistance pact with France, all might be well—but would it? The chances are 10 to 1 that even an Anglo-French-American entente would not be regarded as sufficient security to justify the Prench G. H. Q. in scrapping its military machine. It took the clever Salvador de Madaraga, former director of the League's dis- armament section, and former Ambas- sador to both Washington and Paris, to lay the original sin at America’s door. If the United States had rati- fied the Versailles treaty, accepted the covenant and entered the League, rea- sons De Madaraga, then Italy would not have bombarded Corfu, Japan would not have raped Manchuria and Germany would not have withdrawn from the Disarmament Conference. But here again one is justified in having serious doubts as to the sound- ness of European reasoning. ‘The most recent, and perhaps most insidious, drive against things Ameri- can, however, has been the antag- onism, particularly noticeable in gold bloc countries. According to newspa- pers, financial authorities and even officials, nothing that has developed out of the Roosevelt financial, eco- nomic and social policies will endure. The N. R. A, the codes, the C. W. A, etc., etc., are at the best palliatives— dope which will leave the American public with an awful headache for years to come. Again the reason behind the criti- cism—or misrepresentation—is ob- vious. Just as the arms barons of Europe pray nightly, “Give us this day our daily war scare,” so do the ‘European industrialists, landed pro- prietors and coupon-clipping class get down on their knees anc pray that the American social experiment will fail. ‘Why? Because they know that if the United States succeeds in readjusting the relationship between capital and labor, if the 40-hour and 36-hour week become reality, if child labor is per- manently abolished and other social and for World. reforms are incorporated in the in- dustrial, social and political structure of the Nation, it is going to be well- nigh impossible to hold the European workers down. ©nly another war will save them—but after that is over all hell is likely to break loose. A war [ might preserve the present capital- labor set-up in most European coun- tries because Germans, Frenchmen, Britons and Italians are nationalists and patriotic. almost any sacrifice for the fatherland or la patrie. But in times of peace they see more clearly. New Deal Appeais. It is not an overstatement to say that nothing which has emanated from the United States in years has so caught the imagination of the European masses as the New Deal. | To be exact, nothing except perhaps America’s entry into the World War and Woodrow Wilson's original Four- teen Points. But the part Americans played in the war is forgotten. And as for the League, most European governments that count swallowed it because it was mixed inseparably with the medicine of Versailles. As a rule the Americans who come to Europe are a rather decent lot. They do not (except the neuve riche and a few hyphenates who are more royal than the king) make the eagle scream nor do they sport the Stars and Stripes in their buttonhole. It is hard to get them to participate even in Fourth of July, Thanksgiving and other fete days because they do not like to be conspicuous. There even was a time when one heard them say unkind things about Volsteadism and express doubt over the wisdom of their country’s war debt, immigration, tarift and Japanese exclusion policies. Now all that appears to have changed. It is difficult to find a single American in Europe—whether he be an expatriate or just plain tourist— who will criticize the dollar deflation. “It's playing ‘Hell and Maria’ with us over here” they say, “but if its helping out back home we'll take our medicine.” One by one they are selling their Swiss mountain chalets or villas on the Cote d’Azur and trekking home- ward. They came over de luxe; they go back a la Bernstein or on the Baltimore Mail Line. One thing the depression has proved, and that is | that the Americans who knock around Europe are sports. Instead of grouch- ing they recall the days when the odds were in their favor, when they got 45 French francs, 15 pesetas, a fist full of German marks and 25 or 30 Italian lire for a dollar, to say noth- ing of the 3.25 pound sterling. They recall also, not so long ago, when the proud British pound sneaked off the gold standard overnight. On Saturday it was worth 25 gold francs i Switzerland, on Monday it Was worth 15. Not only were the “remit- tance men”—the retired army officers, civil servants and pensioners (and just plain income tax dodgers)— caught high and dry, but tens of thousands of European investors found themselves bankrupt. ~The Bank of France was caught for a quarter billion it is said. Yet Lon- don didn't suffer. It “tipped” the disbursement officer, who had to pay the expenses of an imposing delega- tion to the League Assembly, and he appeared at the local banks in time to change enough pounds at par to pay a few hundred thousand francs expenses. Uncle Sam Warns. Uncle Sam didn't do anything like that, they will tell you. He gave everyone ample warning and then de- preciated slowly ‘and steadily. Those who wanted to “get out from under” had their chances. Others had an opportunity to pull out and take their losses. Even the American consular offi- cials and diplomats—except one or two or three—didn't squeal. They knew that some-time-or-other Con- gress would wake up and square the deal. It was tough going for a while, but that's all water over the dam. Americans in Europe—those few who remain—have become rampantly patriotic. If you don’t believe it, and aren’t afraid of a fight, just try raz- zing Roosevelt in your favorite pub on Piccadilly or cafe along the boule- vards. You may even get a kick on the shins from some French Socialist or German anti-Nazi refugee. The alacrity with which American diplomats in Europe rise up to defend their Government is another phe- nomenon not seen in decades. No ambassador waxed enthusiastic in the days of Coolidge, Hoover or Harding. Today they overlook no opportunity to “front” for the New Deal. Strauss, Bowers, Bingham and Steinhart all have become shock-troops. In Berlin and Rome it is not easy—but Lon- doners, Parisians, Spaniards and the Scandinavians cannot plead ignorance when they belittle the American ex- periment. Down in Italy about all the people are allowed to read is that Roosevelt has adopted this and that—all pol- icies first enunciated by Il Duce. Of rising wages, shorter hours and aboli- tion of child labor one hears nothing in Italy—and reads less if that is pos- sible. Europe Gets Data. It was at the recent conference of the International Labor Office that the curtain was really torn aside and Europeans got a first-hand view of the American New Deal. And at the same time Europe's reactionary Em- ployers’ Group got what may become a nasty jolt. Washington’s _ delegation of ob- servers—Elmer F. Andrews and H. S. Hanna, representing the Government; John L. Lewis, representing American workers, and E. Arthur Baldwin, rep- resenting industry—did not partici- pate officially in the conference. The United States was not then a member of the I. L. O, so, of course, could not vote. Nor did they play the tra- ditional role of “silent observers.” ‘They were both visible and audible. They spoke publicly before the con- ference—at the invitation of President Justin Godart—and privately at the request of various delegations, prin- cipally those of the workers and gov- ernments, they divulged aplenty. ‘There was no excuse for any of the 160 delegates representing industry- labor-government of 46 different countries leaving Geneva uninformed. When the conference was -pon- vened, although it had been ‘an- nounced that Washington would be (Continued on Fourth Page.) They can be led into{ WASHINGTO D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 25, 1934 What’s Ahead for Banking ‘) New Alliance With Administration May Mark New i’hase—Many Questions Faced by Financial Men. BY NEIL CAROTHERS. Professor of Economics. Lehigh University. \HIS cynical generation always greets any reference to the lamb that lies down with the lion with a derisive query as to what thereafter happened to the lamb. There is a not unnatural tendency to question the lamb's good sense. Last month that remnant of the American people that still surveys the passing show with a philosophical and speculative eye was edified by the unique spectacle of 15,000 lambs lying down with the lion at one time. The 15,000 lambs were the scarred but surviving veterans of the 30,000 banks that had so blithely supported the new economics in the jazz dec- ade which ended in 1929, that new economics which preached a philos- ophy of enonomic abundance, of end- less prosperity through endless waste, of “excess productivity” which could be offset only by excess consumption. The lion was the adminsitration. The locus of this rapprochement of leo and ovis was Washington City, and the occasion was the annual meeting of the American Bankers' Association. It is worth while to look into the background of this reconciliation. For 8 year and a half the banks have been abused, coerced, pursued, persecuted, regimented and regulated. They have been described as financial leeches draining the resources of the people, as panderers to speculation corrupt- ing the morals of business, as confi- dence men selling blue-sky securities, as x"respon.s\ble guardians of the Na- tion’s credit, as Business incompetents arriving at universal insolvency and as disloyal malingerers in the grand war on depression. At one time or another they have been accused of causing the depression, of prolonging the depres- sion, and of sabotaging the recovery program. Only a few days before the Wash- ington meeting, in the course of a most startling exposition of the close resemblance between England’s eco- nomical, budget-balancing, non-inter- ference, wage lowering, increased production program of recovery and our own squandering, regimenting, in- creased cost, production restriction ex- periments, the President by radio to the Nation made the following state- ment about the English banks: “And let it be recorded that the English bankers helped.” Not so long before that, the Federal Advisory Council raised its voice in mild protest against the headlong course now being pursued, only to be told to hush and stay hushed. The head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, traveling in Europe on the busi- ness of his bank, was warned and threatened by that notable authority on international finance, Senator El- mer Thomas. This in itself was not surprising; but it was startling testi- mony to the status of our banking sys- tem that the Senator was not told that he has no more right to question the activities of the New York Federul Reserve head than Charlie Chaplin— and probably much less competence to do so. But hard words break no bones. They merely leave scars. And one more scar is hardly visible on the banker's epidermis. Hard words have been the least of their troubles since March 4, | 1933. What happened to them in the | period of the bank moratorium need not concern us here. It was a time of emergency and the first-aid treatment, | though drastic, was probably neces- sary. It might be mentioned, how- ever, that some 10.000 State banks, laboring under the fundamenta! delu- sion that they were wholly free from | Pederal control, very suddenly discov- ered that when it comes to banking | control the Constitution is just a quaint old relic of the past. | But the general bank closure was |some of the consequences. The pur- only the beginning. Since that mel- | poses of this public witch-hunting ABROAD TO BY ALICE ROHE. Although Luigi Pirandello has been awarded the Nobel Prize for literature, he will not lose the title of “Para- doxical Pirandello.” The university professor, author of 365 romances and essays, who turned playwright at 50, wrote 22 plays by the time he was 55, created a new Italian theater and made a question mark a dramatis persona, is, at 67, still producing at top speed. The 1934 Nobel literary prize—which he accepted with a characteristic, de- lighted comment: “There are poor authors, too"—was awarded not for a specific work, but for his general contribution to literature. This is the second time in seven years that the Nobel literary prize has gone to an Italian. Both recipients are islanders, but they are striking contrasts. Grazia Deledda is a Sar- dinian who writes elemental tragedies of Sardinia’s rugged mountains. Pirandello is a Sicilian who writes baffling dramas of shadowy border- lines in the human mind. | For so long—12 years, to be exact— has America accepted the “Pirandello conscience” that this professor- novelist-dramatist has become a sort of state of mind. ‘When I first met him in Rome, “Six Characters in Search of an Author” had not begun their tormented quest in the New York theater nor had his first volume appeared here in trans- lation. Already his tragedy, “Henry IV,” with its satiric juxtaposition of normal people and a madman, had been called another “Hamlet.” His “Right You Are (If You Think You Are”), with its stinging arraignment of smug concrete-truth seekers who are un- able to recognize truth when they see it; his “Six Characters,” with its ironic demand of what is fiction, what is real, had invaded cocksure tra- ditions. The point, however, which many people accentuated at that time in discussing this ultra-modern dynamo of enthusiasm (a supposed prerogative of youth), was that he was a professor of 55! What must they think today? COMFORT INU.S.1S LUXURY PIRANDELLO |Noble Prize Winner Impressed by Hos- pitality and Acquisitive Mental Stand- ard of America as Land for Masses. For Pirandello at 67 is not only writ- ing plaw, but is directing his own company at Rome, starring Marta Aba, whom he calls the greatest actress in the world. Paradoxically, the play he is producing at present is d’Annunzio’s “Daughter of Jorio.” Surrounded by Work. I always ¢hink of Pirandello as I knew him on that first visit—a man extremely sensitive to human suffer- ing, eager to help tormented, groping humanity; a man who negated the charge of destructive doubt by show- ing that what he destroyed was pre- tense, shattered in order to construct Justice. Pirandello at that time was living in a villa off the Via Nomentana. The immediate impression upon entering his study was of being completely sub- merged in a vibrating atmosphere of work. There was nothing academic or ‘calmly pedantic—as I had expected —about the smallish, active man in white linen who sprang from the desk, ink still wet on a manuscript. The gray Van Dyke beard, the thinning gray hair seemed incongruous with the alert, youthful manner. The small, birdlike, all-seeing brown eyes surveyed me amiably as he extended a welcoming hand. With quick move- ments he took manuscripts off a stand and made room for coffee which a maid brought in. “Yes,” he said, interpreting the look in my astonished eye, “I work all the time. I don’t live; I work.” He spoke in a matter-of-fact way of having written for 30 years, keeping up his professorial duties at the same time. He was, he explained, writting a novel, “One, None, a Hundred,” when he stopped to write a play in Sicilian dialect for his friend Musco. He had interrupted the novel, which he would take up later, for five years. Although his novel, “The Late Mattio Pascal,” the story of a sup- posed suicide, really. started the grotesque movement, Pirandello ob- jects strenuously to having his plays considered grotesques. The underlying | | | | ancholy period the life of the bank- ers has been just ene thing after an- other. They were dragged through congressional inquisitions, with broken reputations, midget shows, hoarding by the public and some highly personal | details of strictly private finance as | were primarily political, and not one public prosecution for violation “of banking law resulted. No money- changers were driven from the temple. But in the eyes of the public the banks were blackened, a scape-goat was cre- | ated and the ground was laid for the | subjugation of the banks. After that the banks had their se- curities business taken away from them. They had to accept a regula- tion that will restrict their profits from loans to speculative borrowers, | if ever again that large mass of shorn | sheep should grow a new coat of fleece. | They had to give up their interest receipts from deposits in other banks. | They had forced upon them a guar- anty of bank deposits that they almost unanimously disapproved. They had to accept as a partner a new stock- holder who was as alien and unwel- come an intruder as a fox in a rab- bit warren—the same being the United States Government. Other Wounds Accidental. All these woes were visited upon them intentionally. Far worse were the accidental wounds they received in the war on depression. Emerging from their dugouts after the collapse in the Spring of 1933, the banks were caught in the barrage laid down by the New Deal. The recovery program, firing a miscellaneous general bom- bardment at depression, dropped high explosives over the whole economic terrain. No major industrial or financial interest in the country es- caped injury from this fire, but the banks appear to have been hit in more places than any other group. The securities law discouraged in- vestment. The stock exchange re- form diminished the sale of securities. The A. A. A. and the N. R. A, re- duced production. The P. W. A. cur- tailed the demand for private financ- ing. The experiments with the currency induced a flight of capital and engendered a public fear that stifled investment. The Federal Re- serve was stripped of its power to control credit and prevented from | initiating a revival of confidence and a renewal of credit extension. And the R. F. C. went into the banking business on such a scale that its vast loans over the whole area of industry and finance absorbed a large part of the existing market for bank credit. The net result was that the most vital function of the banks, that of providing credit for a reviving in- dustry, was destroyed. Reform and recovery measures prevented a re- vival of confidence, and Government financing became a winning com- petitor for what business there was. The banks were ready to do business, but there was no business to do. Wherepon the whole administra- tion cracked down on them. A Gov- ernment that had restricted produc- Special Articles BRITISH GET ADVANTAGE BY MISTAKES OF DAVIS Peace Policy Toward Japan While U. S. Stands Uncompromisingly Against Parity Makes This Country Target. BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. T IS impossible not to feel a sense [ of regret that President Roosevelt continues to employ for his inter- national relations and, in partic- ular, for discussions so important as the naval negotiations at London, a diplomatic agent whose whole career has been dominated by ideas of utopia and not of reality. For the blunders of Mr. Norman H. Davis at London are likely to prove very costly to this | country in no distant future. The actual problem at London was, on the one hand, to stand fast to the resolution of the administration to | consent to no change in the relative strength of the three great navies— the British, American and Japanese— as fixed by the ratios of the Wash- ington treaty; and, on the other, to| prevent the British from making the | United States a convenient instrument | of their balance of power policy in the | Far East. It was perfectly clear from the out- | set that the British were as opposed | as the United States to conceding Japanese parity. It was, however, equally clear that all British strategy would be directed toward making the | United States bear the brunt of Jap- | anese resentment for the denial of a demand which the whole country ry garded as just. Mr. Davis, then, had to avoid permitting Mr. MacDonald to make him the “goat” of the dis- | cussions. This he completely failed to do. On the contrary, the British prime min- ister, by very cleverly proposing a compromise in principle—which was unacceptable to the Japanese but on the surface seemed to show a friendly and yielding spirit—left Mr. Davis standing like Casabianca. Actually what the American representative was doing was pulling British as well as American chestnuts out of the fire, but it was only the American hand that was getting scorched. Mr. Davis ought to have been the more on his guard because this was precisely the game played at Geneva in the last stages of the Disarmament Conference when the British proposed concessions to the Germans which they knew the French would not ac- cept, and dragged Mr. Davis along | after them. The result was that the Washington Government suddenly found itself up to its neck in a Euro- pean diplomatic tangle, the Germans alleging America was sharing in the | coercion of the Reich, the French that American financial interests, con- | cerned with their German debts, were selling out French security. But what | real interest we had in the mess no | one could imagine. British Peace Policy. British policy in the Far East is, moreover, identical with its policy in Europe. In both continents the British desire to keep out of any new conflict. A way of escape is open if there exists a balance of power with- out them. In Europe, for example, if France and her allies on the one hand and Germany on the other were of about equal strength, in the event of a war the principals would become exhausted to an extent which would leave the victor too weak to be a menace to Britain; or, if either party became dangerous, the British could step in and support the other de- | cisively. Now 1if in Asia there should exist between the Japanese and the United States a stale of hostility as well as a condition of balance, the result would be the same. The British would not have to worry about India or Australasia because Japanese energies and resources would be completely consumed in meeting the Ameérican attack. As a neutral, too, they would obviously profit largely from the elim- ination of both belligerents from the world markets. If, however, there were any chance of Japanese victory, then the British would come in on our side for their own safety. The fundamental blunder of French statesmanship in Europe has been repeated by Mr. Davis in the Far Eastern matter: He has not perceived | that the basic purpose of British diplomacy is not to be caught in any alliance or understanding which would ally them to either France or Germany in Europe, or to Japan or the United States in the Asiatic situa- tion. Thus the French have always started from the assumption that the British were their natural allies and Mr. Davis set out with the assumption that Britain and America must enjoy a similar relationship. Now it is true that Germany and not France can be a menace to Britain, that Japan and not the United States may threaten itish interests in the Far East. But it is equally true that France in Europe and the Urited States in Asia may, without British intervention, dispose of these potential dangers to British security. And the basic principle of British diplomacy is to let the other fellow do the work when possible. ‘That was the game Lloyd George always played with Clemenceau, Mil- lerand and Briand after the war. That is the game Ramsay MacDonald is now playing with Mr. Norman H. Davis, who sets out from the stand- point that since American and Brit- ish interests are identical there must | gains be community of action. The British prime minister assumes that since American and Japanese interests are opposed, the British can let Uncle Sam take action, while they sit pretty, dis- closing friendship for the United States and sympathy for the Japa- nese. Target of Resentment. The result must be that the United States by standing uncompromisingly against Japanese parity becomes the target for all Japanese rasentmenu( while Britain appears as a friend who | was unhappily powerless to moderate | the intransigeance of the United Siates. Yet, as every one knows, the British are just as unready to agree to Japanese parity as the Americans. And if they had been brought face to face with that issue instead of being permitted to evade it, they would have been compelled to share Japa- nese resentment with us. Mr. Davis, however, in London as in Geneva—in fact, as always in thel long and unvarying list of his diplo- matic failures—set out from the as- sumption that in a poker game to love your neighbor as yourself is the principal rule. Now. for the British (Continued on Fourth Page.) | (Continued on Fifth Page.) 1 ’ an international conference is a poker game. They play it with ut- most regard for the rules of poker, and what these rules permit they never hesitate to do. Mr. Davis, how- ever, goes into the game imspired by the ruies of a community chest drive, and the results are disastrous. The United States should never have permitted itself to get into a discussion like that in London on such terms as to enable Great Britain to play it off against Japan. If it were impossible to advance to find any common ground for action between the two Anglo-Saxon countries then there was no need of going at all. But to walk into the web resolved to play the fly in one more international affair was absurd. Talleyrand once said that the Frenchman and the Briton were as natural allies as the ‘horse and the man. But he added that it was unnecessary that France should always be the horse To be angry with the British, as some of the obviously inspired cables from London suggest Mr. Davis was, when he found where he had been landed, is quite absurd. It is not the fault of the British that Mr. Davis misunderstood the situation. British statesmanship would be justly criti- |cized if it was stupid enough to shoulder risks it could avoid or bear burdens for which other shoulders were conveniently waiting. I have attended innumerable inter- national conferences and I never saw British statesmanship vary its tactics. Always the attempt has been to let the other fellows do the work. At'the Washington Conference the British used French stupidity to enable them to escape agreeing to American parity except in battleships. Thus while all the profit of Sarraut’s refusal to agree to Mr. Hughes’' proposals went to the British, all the blame fell upon the French. That, of course, was because Mr. Hughes assumed from the start that the one thing he wanted the | British also wanted, namely parity all |along the line. But in reality the | British wanted to get parity where | they did not have it and to retain the | supremacy which they already pos- | sessed. They got both, and, for the moment at least, charged the bill to France. In any international conference the British delegates will at once assume a tone of sweet reasonableness and a position of a mediator. They know what they want from the start, they know how much they are willing to pay for it. But if they can get it for nothing, so much the better. At Washington they wanted to eliminate our prospective supremacy in capital | ships, and if it had been necessary, | they would have paid for it in parity all around. But, thanks to the | French—and Mr. Hughes—they paid | nothing. | In the Far East the British want | to avoid any peril to themselves from the rising tide of Japanese ambition |and strength. In that respect their interest is real. As a matter of fact Japan is 10 times as great a menace for the British as for the Americans. | But the British also want to avoid as |long as possible any suspicion in the | Japanese mind that they are reallv blocking the Japanese game. Just as long as Uncle Sam seems the wicked partner. John Bull can radiate secure benevolence. Just why there should be an Amer- ican-Japanese tension over the Far East and not an Anglo-Japanese fric- tion no one on earth can explain ex- cept in terms of the blindness of American statesmanship and. diplo- macy. Even in the economic sphere it ds British textiles and not American automobiles which are suffering from Japanese competition. Why there should be talk of an American-Jap- enese war and not of an Anglo-Jap- anese conflict is incredible, until one | begins to reflect upon the comparative | skill of British and American diplo- macy. | Years ago at the Washington Con- ference 1 remember a distinguished | Dutch journalist calling my attention to the fashion in which the control of a conference held in an American Capital had shifted. “Yes,” said he, | “the voice is still the voice of Hughes, | but the hand is the hand of Balfour.” And at Geneva, some years later, un= less I am mistaken, it was Karl Radek, the famous Russian correspondent, who said: “Ah, I see England still ex- pects every Davis to do his duty.” But just imagine what would hap- | pen if the question of British security | were actually raised! Consider with what speed an “escalator clause” emerged in the London Conference of {1930 On one occasion, however—at the 1927 Coolidge Conference at Geneva—the British tactics were used |at their own expense. At that cele- brated meeting Japan strove with in- finite finesse to display its equal sym- pathy for both Anglo-Saxon nations who quarrel was a heaven-sent oppor- tunity. If that quarrel could have been prolonged the profit for the Jap- anese would have been incredible since | their mastery of the Far East would have been beyond challenge. Yet they emerged from Geneva wearing the halos of the peace makers, equally praised by both the British and the Americans for having tactfully con- tributed to. the persistence of a dis- pute in which Japan could be the only er. One is permitted, perhaps, to regret that the American State Department has been less diligent than the Jap- anes foreign office in studying the methods of British diplomacy. There is so much to learn from it and, on our part, such an obvious need to under- stand it. Fundamentally, too, it bor- rows the art of the Japanese jiu jitsu, which is the art of letting the other fellow’s energy prove tha cause of his own undoing. (Covyright. 1934.) British Churchman Asks Peace Pledge by Men LONDON.—A ,call to all British men to pledge themselves never again to support a war, has been issued by Very Rev. H. R. L. Sheppard, recent- ly appointed canon of St. Paul's. He ,has sent thousands of letters to all parts of Great Britain, sug- gesting mass meetings at which men would vote for the following resolu- tion: “We renounce war and never again directly or indirectly will we suppors or sanction another.” #