Evening Star Newspaper, June 19, 1932, Page 25

Editorial Page EDITORIAL SECTION he Sunday Star, Part 2--8 Pages WASHINGTON, D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, JUNE 19, 1932 RADICAL MOVES IN CHILE GIVING CONCERN TO U. S. How Far “New Social and Economic Sys- tem” Would Clash With Foreign Interests Is Declared Uncertain. STON of far- 1 the sou NERVAL. | reaching 1mpor- | rernmost. part ent, succeeding apidly, have kept v of polit stu- d in Chile during the last listic revolt was ed in Chile. the of the world. the situa- d. Some v another can dis- d. in the opinion hened when it the leaders ington, pre- military dic- and only two advocate of ation of American capital in clopment of Chilean natural . an intellectual and a nternationally minded, w: iend of the United States. in the Chilean revol was a guaranty against nfiscation and the cries apital which corre- | reported, aghast, from San- Assurance as to Property. J headed by i a communique in by progressive ation of cer- - utilities, dis it was cleac] ists would be respecte: o intention of molesting her Chilean or d _Se Davila. “Con- will be respected as they been. The foreign deb it al Seno avila and were uld not molest Amer- | apparent in mest of ‘ashington is embodied in the . which the New d two days after detat had been ccm- a_disposition_in_diplo- | today in Weshington to coup Presid®t Carlos G. Davila, | to the United | pon a radical h, then, personality of hat he had left n explain: and the importanca nt of international laration of Aim. a had declared m of his gov- nplishment of | ons: Organ- e country's pro- | control ‘of the | of ample social | d assurances of work for all these assur- on in this known writer and | ational affairs said 5 a few days ago: ! 11 of the evidence yet reported | it appears that Davila's so- for the far more s military associ- m which rides into power tary dictatorship will be neither dangerous to its opponents nor effective for its nds.” | And another wr went even fur- | ther: “American investments in Chile | are in little danger,” he said, “and it is | able that anything will come | ties—so the present situation, se- | rious though the Communistic talk may | have been. will in all likelihood eventu- | a j of the tempe But this optimistic attitude was only | | persons, a result of the superficial knowledge of Latin-American conditions for which distance and a traditional lack of ia- terest should be made responsible in the United States. Those who had been observing the progress of radical ten- dencies on the other side of the Rio Grande; those who knew the psycho- logieal effect of doctrines of reform and change on the Latin masses in a period of widespread discontent and re-exam- ination of all values; those who had | rd cf the long-standing feud be- n the two widely separated classes of the Chilean society; those who could recognize the real forces behind this first socialistic attempt in South Amer- ica, did not let diplomatic assur- ances of the new Santiago regime be- fuddle them. Tempest in Teapot. They kncw that the overthrow of | conservative President Montero amount- ed to something clse than a mere “pe- riodical disturbance” or just “another tempest in a tea pot.” They knew dec; roots than the advanced per- \n‘m:l ideas of former Ambassador Da- vila. quo so ambiguous and contradictory in itself as the rule headed by Davila could not subsist very long. It was not pos- sible to harmon economic and social changes for home [ umption with polite, timorous as- surances of respect for the old order of things to the international audience. One of the two tendencies had to prevail, definitely, over the other. Either the more moderate elements, like DAavila, forcefully checked the ad- vances of extremists and implanted a new government on the classic pattern, with only a difference in name and or else the radicals carried out the real intentions of the revolu- tion. And in the carrying out, the moderates had to be sacrificed. Concern of United States. Acccrding to cfficial Commerce De- partment estimat United States investments in Chile amount to scme $815,000.000. Tke Cosach nitrate com- bine controlied by American inter- ests, which drawn the bitierest criticism from Leftist elements, is cap- italized at 000.000. Of the 000,000 invested in Chil- ean bonds, all except about $80,000,000 is in obligations of the national govern- ment. The rest is invested in bonds of the Mortzage Bank of Chile, which are government-guaranteed securitics. Extremist lcaders in Chile do not con- fine themselves to asking the confisca- tion of foreign capital directly invested in the count ‘They also demand the on of foreign debts, which have bearable with the depression. this is not the only danger. menace, from the point cf view nited States, lies in the propa- gation of the Chilean crisis to tie neigh- | boring countries, and thence to the res of the Latin American continent. Alrgady signs of radical agitation are those countries. The success of the Chilean movement will undoubtedly have a gerat influence in shaping the policies of opposition leaders everywhere, who have been play- ing up what they call the failure of capitalism—as shown by the world de- pression—and the establishment of a new and happier order of things, as planned in socialistic and communistic theories. Participants in Mass Meetings. y a few days ago Socialist leaders t ed in two huge mass meetings in iago, at which Chilean workers and other supporters of the new regime cel brated the completion of its first wee in power. In the meantime, from m: of the Latin American capitals come press reports intimating the possibility that the Chilean movement may spread to other southern republics. The situaticn is particularly danger- ous in the nations bordering Chile, where internal unrest has been revived by the Chilean events, and in the Cen- tral American States, where Red propa- ganda has been active lately against the large holdings of United States and British capital. It is nct long ago that a Communistic revolt was energetically put down by the Martinez government of El Salvador. Under the present circumstances, per- haps the State Department should re- consider its earlier decision not to rec- ognize the Martinez regime of El Sal- vador, which had been set up with the aid of armed forces. Reccgnition by the United States, and the moral sup- | port which tnis entails, may be a guar- anty against the repetition of the Chil- can crisis in El Salvador. And a crisis in El Salvador, or in any other of the Central American countries, at this par- ticular time may be full of international complications. ~Certainly, it would be a tremendous setback to the progress of | pan-Americanism. In view of the, difficult Chilean situ- |\ ation, anything which may contribute to the stability of the present Carib- bean governments must_certainly have far-reaching effects on the next politi- cal developments scuth cof the Rio Grande. (Copyright, 1932.) Bars on Liners Suffér Huge Slump Because of Econemic Conditions world's threaten to become | h the decline in pas- | the reduced consump- 10lic beverages by many who | for reasons of pleasure or This is a development of seri- eration for shipping companies | tourist season doesn't,result in brisk | liquor interests. the height of the tourist season he most important ocean highway, North Atlantic, the receipts two or cars ago from liquor sold during round-trip voyage of some of the big | 5 exceceded £25,000. On vessels of ircumstances the receipts | from same source frequently ex- | ce~ded £10,000 in a round trip. As the tendency is now to encourage | 1" aveling by a class of the public unable to induige in “high rolling,” it is as-| sumed by some traffic experts that the ‘ chief reliance of shipping in the im- | mediate future will be this type, which, | even if it is endowed with a considerable thirst, must rigorously circumscribe | consumption of alcoholic beverages to | make ends meet. Matter of Economics. There are drys in this part of the! world, and probably in the United States, too, who would welcome the decline in liquor consumption on the high seas, but those who have had to make a study of the requirements of passengers traveling between the United States and Europe, England and South America and England and the East in- sist that it is simply a matter of eco- nomics. While hoping for a big volume of &merican tourist traffic in the weeks principal | just ahcad, the steamship companies | are puzzled regarding the amount of “stufl” which should be assembled in advance. With th: hom> consumpticn of whisky lower than it has bezn for years, and the export trade in the same commodity suffering from a blight, the “hard likker” interests will have adai- tional cause for porturbation if the business on the North Atlantic high- way. Beer Brewcrs Less Worried. ‘The purveyors of beer are not so anxious, because there has been a good demand for it aboard ship. But not even the most confirmed optimist believes the average liner’s bar will do 50 per cent of the trade it did three years ago. In that year it was estimated that the ships of three com- panies plying between Southampton and New York carried in the four Sum- mer months approximately 6,300,000 bottles of beer and stout, 180,000 gal- lons of draft beer, 2,430,000 bottles of mineral water, 124,000 bottles of whisky, 36,00) bottles of gin. 24,000 bottles of vermouth, 14,100 bottles of rum, 14,100 bottles of lioueurs, 15,600 bottles of brandy, 174,000 bottles of champagne and 180,000 bottles of other wines. (Copyright, 1932.) - September Selections. From the Boston Evening Tanscript. Ex-Gov. Smith of New York thinks that presidential nominations should be made in September. But the objection to a change is that most candidates are afraid that the people won't love them in Septemb:r as they d> in June. / that the change had | They knew, finally, that a status | 2 violent declaration of | BY DENIS TILDEN LYNCH. EW YORX.—The beer racket is mcre menacing to law and| order than all other rackets combined. It has made | systematic grafters of many | | policemen in the communities where | it flourishes. On this, all are agreed. | ‘The traffic in wine and spirits corrupts only prohibition agents, the Coast Guard ‘ and those in high places. | Wets and drys of all degrees also meet on common ground in estimating the quantity of beer made in this coun- try. Statisticlans of the prohibition | unit of the Federal Government and | the Assoclation Against the Prohibition | Amendment varied but little in their | estimates for the fiscal year ended June | 30, 1930. The Government estimate was | 22,033,290 barrels; other experts put it | at 25,480,387 barrels. In the brewing | industry here a barrel always measured | 31 gallons. | About half of the beer sold is de- | livered in barrels. Because of its bulk, draught heer cannot be transported heut the knowledge of the policeman on beat. And the policeman—there are few exceptions—collects his share of the graft in the beer racket on delivery or within the next 24 hours. When the beer industry was revived, without benefit of Congress, the gang- ster-brewers speeded up delivery by using half barrels. This change was necessary because the deliveries must be made between 2 and 6 o'clock in the | morning, while the rest of the com- | munity is sleeping: and it was easier | | to_handle 15'. gallons than 31. | In pre-prohibition days, When the yearly output of beer was 50,000,000 to | 80,000,000 barrels, New York City con- | | sumed an average of 10,500,000 barrels annually. The lowest estimate of the | annual amount of beer sold in the | metropolis since 1926, when the in- | dustry reached its present high degree of efficiency, is 5.250.000 barrels. Of | this amount. 2.400.000 barrels, or 4.800.- | 1 000 half barrels, are delivered in bulk. | The balance. 2,850.000 barrels. is bot- | tled at the brewer.es and delivered by | the case, or made in the speakeasies and in homes. Divided in Three Parts. In New York Cily the beer racket is divided into threo parti—the manu- facture, dictribution, and retailing of the product. Each is an entity in it- celf.” This division spared the city the wholesale assassinations which fea- | tured the racket in Chicago, where the same gangsters brewed and distributed. | In the metropolis the brewers sell out- right to the distributors, who are the only contacts the retailers have with the industry. The estimated annual profit to the brewers and distributors on these 4,800.000 half barrels is $70,800,000. ‘What proportion of this sum is shared with their political partners and paid to law-enforcement cfficers for immunity ! is not ascertainable. And dependable data do not exist on which to approxi- mate the profits cf graft involved in the remaining 5.300,000 kalf barrels drunk in New York City yearly, cold in bottles and as wort for home brew. But our ruling class collects a tax on most of it On the basis of Grover Whalen's esti- mate of 32000 speakeasies in York City, made when he was police commissioner, these places have paid about $50,000,000 annually in graft. in lieu of taxes, since 1920. This levy was collected by the police, “Feds,” as the prohibition agents are known to the bootlcggers, and “chowder bovs,” those persistent hawkers of tickets for the so- cial adventures of ward politicians. From the Summer of 1923 until March, 1931, the speakeasy graft in the metropolis may be computed, con- servatively, at $59,840.000 annually. This represents an annual levy of $1,800, no! New | New York’s Grafting Hosts Third Article in Series “Shall Underworld Rule?” Reveals Evil Conditions in Gotham. very much more than was paid by each first-class salcon in New York when toe State license was $1500 and the Federal retail license was $25. During this period the speakeasies were systematically preyed upon by five groups of collec Feds,” chowder boys. patrolmen, captains’ men and in- | spectors’ men. The approximate annual | collections of these private tax gatherers follow: SFeds? .. . $32,000,000 Chowder boys 6,400,000 Patrolmen ... 4,800,000 8,320,000 Captains’ men . 8,320,000 . $59,840,000 Two Important Events. The beginning and end of this period are marked by U0 important events in the life of the metropolis. The Sum- of 1923 witnessed the reawakening f of the city’s bootleggers to the possi- bilities latent in the breweries. Although good draught beer was obtainable in Chicago, Buffalo and other cities almost since the beginning of prohibition, the average glass of beer sold in New York City prior to July, 1923, was near-beer, to which the bartender had added either alcohol or ether. And until then, the city’s police force did not know cor- | ruption on a large scale. With the re- | T Convention BY MARK SULLIVAN, HE Democratic presidential nom- ination will be decided this week. tion does not meet till the week following. Nevertheless, by Sat- urday night, or before, the question will be answered. The question is, stated in terms of the opposition to introduction of barreled beer, police- | men on beat began collecting $1 on each ! half barrel of the 4,800,000 delivered annually to the speakeasies. Even if | he is not present when the delivery is | made, he is sure of being paid, for his capacity for making trouble is great. What he collects is never shared. | The end of this period, March, 1931, | witnessed the Legislature of New York State preparing for its investigation of conditions in the metropolis with a com- mittee of its own creation. The munic- ipal government was in the hands of Democrats, and therr nominal State leader, Gov. Franklin D. Rcosevelt, had saved them a year earlier from being forced to tell strange tales about magic | tin boxes and their other mysterious sources of wealth. In 1930 he vetoed | | 2 bill empowering him to appeint a | committee of his own choosing. In| | 1931 the Legislature took the matter into its own hands and adopted a reso- luticn which did not require the Gov- | ernor’s signature. | | It is easy, if the mind is brought !down to the level of local politics, to | understand the Governor’s position. He | was seeking his party’s nomination for | | President and did not want to alienate | | Tammany, whose loyalty to him made him Governor and whose treachery to | | Alfred E. Smith, Democratic nominee | | for President, lost him the State in | {1028, By the end of March the Repub- | | lican majority had agreed on the per- sonnel of the committee, which selected | a5 its counsel Samuel Seabury, who was | knifed by Tammany in 1916, when he | | was the Democratic nominee for Gov- | | ernor. | Most of the graft gathered by the in- spectors’ men and the captains’ men | went to politicians. Some held city offices and were amenable to a sub- poena from the Seabury committee, and because of this these collections sud- denly ceased. Groups Worked Independently. ‘These two"groups of graft gatherers worked independently, levying $25 to $100 a week on the ordinary speakeasies, and as much as the traffic would bear on the night clubs and cabarets. Scme captains, and a greater proportion of inspectors, refused to touch the boot- legging graft and remained clean. And save in a rare instance or two in the past, this has been true of the officials at headquarters. In many instances, grafting members of the department availed themselves of the integrity of their superiors and collected in their (Continued on Third Page) BY PROPOSALS AT GENEVA | and French World Force Plans as f Possible War Threats. lombia, Ecuador and Peru par- | BY SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, | Former Chancellor_of the British Exchequer and Secretary of State for Forelgn Affairs. ONDON.—The questions of policy and principle propounded in the recent speeches of the principal delegates to the International | Conference on Disarmament at Geneva raise far greater issues than were at first contemplated. Let me say_something about two of the most vital of those questions—the | German demand for equality and the French demand for the creation of an | armed international force and of addi- ticnal guarantees of security. I do not | | piace them in opposition to each other, | | for they are not inconsistent, and both | | are of first-class importance. It may | | well be that the conference will group | and regroup itself more than once in| | the course of the discussions to which | | they will give rise. |~ The German claim was thus described | ‘by Sir John Simon to the House of Commons: “Germany said at the beginning, ‘We were invited to join this Disarmament Conference and we come into it as a member of egual status with every- body else. We are in fact a member of the League of Nations and a member of the Council of the League of Na- fons” Now Germany says, ‘When dis- cussing the question of what should be the level amount of our armaments in the future, there is a question of status involveq’ and Germany is not the only part of the world where questions of status have their importance.” Interpretations Differ. ‘This is obviously true, for the exist- ing size and character of Germany’s armaments are defined by the pro- visions of the treaty of Versailles and therefore limitations imposed the victors of the vanquished as a condi- tion of peace and not tke result of a general convention which prescribes limits for the forces of all the signa- tory nations. This, as Sir John said, is not a technical question, far from it, it is a political question of funda- mental importance. It is not primarily, at any rate, a question of amount or of quality. It is the question upon what basis the limitation of German arma- ments is to rest in future, and Ger- many's claim is that if she is to give her s'gnature to any disarmament con- vention which may result from the Geneva conference she should give it as an equal. It must, I think, be admitted that here we are confronted with an ambigu- ous phrasz which is capable of being interpreted in two very different ways. Sir John Simon interprets it as mean- ing equality of status; it might equally mean actual equality of force with those nations with which the German Reich is _comparable, particularly France. If the former is the meaning which the 3ermans attach to it, I would go all possible lengths to meet them. I not only understand the feeling which moves them but I sympathize with it. It was not the leasi of the merits of the conference of Lozarno that on cer- tain important matters it substituted an agreement freely made and volun- tarily undertaken for pre-existing obli- gations compulsorily imposed. The further that course is followed, the better it will be for us all. Spurns Other Suggestion. But the second interpretation is a wholly different thing and if the phrase is meant to convey the second meaning of which it is capable, I must say at once that in my view at least the con- dition is quite unacceptable. This sug- gestion was put forward by the German | delegates at Locarno and was at once rejected by me as the spckesman of the British government. In common with the representatives of the other povers I formally expressed the hope and be- lief that the agreements reached at Locarno would facilitate the solution of the political and economic problems which confronted Europe and would in particular effectively hasten the dis- armament foreshadowed in Article VIIT of the covenznt, but rone of us could for a moment contemplate the estab- lishment of an equality of armed force between our former adversaries and =urselves. On this point I find myself whollvy i;) agreement with the view expressed Y bate. There are, as he said, very ce ous political and economic dangers in Europe at the present time and an- tagonisms deep-rooted in histcry which are not by any means assuaged. To place German armaments cn an equal- ity with those of France would be, in the present temper of men’s minds, to make possible the active resumption of m'@rose t?znugml:hms' 0 those who advocate it I would say, with Mr. Churchill, “Do you wish nyr war?” And I would repeat with him that “I earnestly hope that no such approximation will take place in my time or in tha. of my children.” Fears Great Calamity. “To say thi Mr. Churchill con- cluded, “is not in the least to imply any want of regard or admiration for the great qualities of the German peo- ple, but I am sure that the thesis that they should be placed in an equal mili- tary position to France is one which, if it ever emerged in practice, would bring us to within practical distance of almost measureless calamity.” The memorandum presented by M. Tardleu raises issues not less funda- mental. It makes a two-fold demand and in one respect, at least, it is quite unambiguous. condition of any further di-armament, | first, the creation of an international force and, secondly, increased security for peace to be provided by the as- sumption of new and more precise ob- ligations on the part cf the signatory Powers to come to the assistance of the innocent victim of any unprovoked ag- gression. The second of these conditions is nothing less than a demand for the re- vival of the Geneva protocol of 1924. M. Paul-Boncour leaves us in no doubt on this point. In his second article he observed that “the Tardieu plan, narrowly examined, proves to bz a pre- cise adaptation to the questions of dis- armament of the principles of the Gen- eva protocol which were outlined by the French delegation and myself in 1924.” He goes on to observe that the balance of parties in the French Parlia- ment was then very much what it is now and that then as now M. Herrlot was prime minister. It is not likely. therefore, as he observes, that the fall of M. Tardieu will change the attitude of France on this question. U. S. Opposition Clear. ‘The result is serious. There is no need to speculate what reply the United States would make to such a request for binding promises of support in fu- ture comtingencies which cannot be clearly foreseen and in quarrels in which America may feel no concern. If the obligations contained in the exist- ing covenant of the League were greater than the United States was and is prepared to accept, it is clear that §t (Continusd ge Third Page.) Winston Churchill in the same de- | France requires as a | } sanne Until Eu BIG WORLD ISSUES RAISED LOSS OF U. S. WAR DEBTS IS REGARDED CERTAINTY Chamberlain Regards German Equalilyi Little Hope Seen in Moratorium or Lau- rope Comes i~ Political Understanding. BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. | CMORROW, as the date falls, il bz the anniversary of the Hoover moratorium. The fact that it will also se2 the Lausanne Cenference in session serves to give additional incentive to a brief backward glance. It is clear now that| the moratorium itself failed of its larger purpose, which was not only to arrest immediate German bankruptcy, but also to provide a psychological im- pulse toward general recovery. Instead more and more it seems to have been what the French Ambassador described it to be at the time, namely “a pause between crisis and catastrophe.” What M. Claudel cbviously meant & year ago was that events had already gone too far to permit any reversal of | direction before certain things had happened. And ke must have had in mind the state of feeling prevailing alike in his own country and in Ger- many, which he knows unusually well | for a Frenchman. It is clear now that the underlying cause of the failure of | the Hoover moratorium was that, fol- | lowing the death of Stresemann, his| successor, Bruening, under the pressure of the rising force of the Hitler Na- tional Socialists, felt impelled to adopt ! a new attitude in foreign relations. l Policy of Moderation. The Stresemann policy had been one | of moderation. To cbtain the evacua- ticn of German soil he had agreed to | Locarno, which was the permanent re- | nunciation of claim to Alsace-Lorraine | |and at least a temporay postponement | | of al efforts to recover the Polish Cor- | ridor or realize union with Germany. Bruening, when he took over the real | guidance of foreign affairs, had before | hum a similar unique objective, which was to end the reparations payments; in a word, to remove the financial bur- den upon Germany, as Stresemann had the political. But_from the very moment he took over, Bruening's task was complicated | by the rapid worsening of the economic and financial circumstances of Ger- | many, which was the first great nation | | to feel the full weight of the world depression. And as material condi- tions deteriorated, political passions be- came more acute. As a result Bruening felt obliged to make two far-going con- cessions to the Nationalist elements. He adopted as his own their demand for territorial revision in the east, and by his Austro-German Tariff Union seemed to be preparing the Anschluss. Both these decisions were made long before the Hoover moratorium, but each in turn was responsible in a measure for the financial situation in Germany in the critical days of June. They also explained why the French refused to follow the President’s lead in the sal- vaging of German finance. They fur- ther explained why France attached political conditions to any financial aid on her part to Germany. And the Ger- man state of mind quite as clearly prohibited any political concessions. Hoped for Political Agreement. ‘When M. Laval came to Washington last Autumn one of the major concerns in the minds of Mr. Hoover and Mr. | stimson was to indicate to the French premier the American hope that he would seek a political agreement with Germany, which would permit, long before the moratorium year expired, a material improvement in the political atmosphere of Europe. ~The United States Government in effect promised | | many, then with the other interested European nations. But, in fact, these discussions never came, for the European conditions and the Franco-German suspicions contin- ued steadily to mount. The Lausanne Conference, scheduled to meet at the same moment as the disarmament gathering in Geneva, was postponed, while the Geneva meeting showed Eu- rope in complete disarray and the pro- posals of the French and German di closed a hopeless deadlock. Geneva could do nothing and after five months has done nothing, because political ob- stacles make progress out of the ques- | tion; though fearful of the consequences | of adjournirg and confessing utter fail- ure, the statesmen have prolonged the discussion despite the utter futility of the debate. | Failure Forecast. | Now the Lausanne Conference comes, but it ccmes, like that of Geneva lasu February, with the foregone convic-| tion on the part of the public as well as the statesmen of the world that nothing good can come out of it. And to all the other reasons for inevitable | failure the recent shift in Germany has been gdded. Bruening has at last | fallen victim to the Natioralists and Super-Nationalists of his country. Ger-| many is now in the hands of a cab2l| of soldiers, Junkers and industrialists. | Bui the result of all this has b:‘en‘ that, although France has now a cabi- | net of the Left, the leaders of the moderate and conciliatory groups which make up this new political con- trol have been forced to adopt in the | decisive matters of disarmament and reparations the theses of Tardieu and Laval. In advance of Lausanne, Her- riot has rejected a British proposal for the cancellation of all reparations, and in maintaining Boncour at the Disarm- ament Conference he has indicated the | continuity of policy of France despite the change in party majority. Of course, as a practical matter it is clear that German reparations pay- ments have come to a final end. Ger- many will pay no more, but this sur- cease of payment is not gcln&!o bring any real solution of the dificulty as | long as France refuses to surrender | her legal claims based upon the Young | plan. An extension of the Hoover | moratorium for three years or five will ot go beyond giving temporary post- ponement; it will not provide any way to clean up the whole paralyzing mess. Future Is Doubtful. ‘The French mortgage upon Germany, political even before it is financial, can only be raised as a consequence of two things; German renunciation of all re- visionary purposes in the matter of territory and American renunciation of all claims upon France for war debts. If Germany coes not pay repa- rations—and she will not—France will not pay war debts. Neither will Italy nor jum, for that matter, and the course of Britain is problematicai. Un- less the present chaos in German con- ditions is cleared up, the outlook for the collection of the principal and in- terest of American and lcng term holdings in the Reich, amounting to at least $3,000,000,000, is to say the least problematical. Even if Germany should repudiate both reparations and private debts now the result would not be the restoration of German solvency or prosperity. The situation has gone far berom this point. The country is utterly drained of d_capital, neither the national nor the Prussian budget is in - | be the nominee. to stand aside and leave it to France to initiate discussions first with Ger- uilil rium, many municipalities -ree%mk- (Contjpued on Fifth Page) Gov. Franklin Roosevelt, “Can Roose- velt be defeated?” If the leaders of the opposition know they cannot beat Roosevelt, then Rooseveit will be named on ths first ballot when the convention meets, cr_certainly not later than the second. But if the leaders of the op- position find they can stop Roosevelt, then, of course, they will. The stop- ping,- in that case, will consume five or six ballots. Thereafter the conven- tion will name another candidate. It will not be Sm Smith will be used up in the process of stopping Roosevelt. In the remaining field, by far the most pro“2bl» nominee is New- ton D. Baker cf Ohio. The mere sug- gesting of this now may be a dis- service to Baker's chanc In the process of stopping Roosevelt high feel- ing will boil up. It alread the part of Roosevelt and his managers, their anger will be directed, of course, against Smith. They will hate Smith They already do. Their hate against Smith will extend to any one known to be favored by Smith. If the Roose- velt delegates should get the idea that Smith's present moves are directed toward nominating Baker, they will never let Baker win. After all, it is certain that at the least Roosevelt, even if himself de- feated, will have a veto power in the convention. close to half the delegates. the fringes of the wavering or the un- stable or the seducible and Roosevelt will still have a full third of the dele- gates completely loyal to him. That third can, under the Democratic rule, prevent the nomination of any one who is now, or becomes, objectionable to “Give Us Al Smith.” No one can say that Smith has it to swi But it is pre some of the forces co-operating with v Smith have that intention. ago the Scripps-! newspapers came Ten day ward chain cof 25 ut in an cditorial of tne type called ringing, “Give Us Al ar Smith Now, Mr. Scripps and Mr. Howard must know very well that the; can't have Smith, for Smith Add to this the fact—well those on the backstage of the real favorite of the Scripps-Ho! ard newspapers is Baker, and wWe have reasonable evidence that Baker is the objective of an important part, at least, of the forces opposing Roosevelt. But the probability of Baker getting the ncmination does not rest on his being favored by the Smith forces, or any part cf them. Th: whole sett! points toward Baker being the darl horse in a true sense and the b sens2. Baker is real man. There was, up to a little while ago, 2 factor that made Roosevelt more ilable. Roosevelt, it was thought, Id surely carry New York State in November election: and ability to the biggest State is_und i superior qualifi ty in the purely pol But now Roosevelt secms to have lost that qualification. Due ass about Maycr Walker = ccnfident he can carry Walker, he will be damned b; he does and damned by othe: dcesn't, and in either case much of the availability he see have some mon! managers thems2! doubtful whethsr Roose New York, and are b y:ng the country ing the West and South, without New York. So long as it seemed certaln Roosevelt could carry New York, or more cortain then any of the other aspirants, so long was Rcosevelt practically sure 10 The delegates in that conventicn want victory more than the: went any one candidate—and cavacity to cerry New York is almost a guaran- tee of victory. Rocsavelt may still be nominated. Roosevelt is indeed by far the best bet. But he is a little less certain to be nominated than he was before Mr. Seabury laid ths Mayor Walker scandal on his doorstep—at the most embarrassing possible time. Parenthetically, has it ever occurred to any Democratic leader to inject Seabury into that convention as a dark horse? Suppose scmebody should make just the right kind of speech about that able, patient and dogged exposer of Tammany, and make it at just the right time. How would the convention take it? And how would the country take it? Smith and Roosevelt. Ex-Gov. Smith has announced that he is going to be in Chicago on Tues- | day, six days ahead of the time when the convention meets on June 27 That announcement is a sign of two| states of mind on Smith's part. It means that he does not want or ex-| pect the nomination himself. Men who | expect to get the prize do not attend | national conventions. Smith did not | go to the convention at Houston in | 1928, when he expected the nomination and got it. John W. Davis was not in | the convention that nominated him in | 1924, nor James M. Cox in the one, that nominated him in 1920; nor | Woodrow Wilson in either of the con- | ventions that nominated him in 1916 and 1912. 'To be sure, there is no universal rule about this. Men who sit in the con- vention as delegates are sometimes nominated, but those exceptions are likely to be cases like that of William Jennings Bryan. And somebow one does not think of Smith getting this nomination through some dramatic effort of personality, such as Bryan's “Cross of Gold” speech in 1896. Smith has the power of asserting dynamic | dominance over a crowd and intends | to do ?u ln' 1:hlz conventlotn. o » ever, for the of getting the nomination mpmr, but rathgr for the purpose of keeping it away from Franklin Roosevelt. That is the real purpose of Smith’s going to Chicago six days in advance of the convention. He has another ob- Ject as well, the purpose of having the convention adopt the preeise kind of plank about prohibition that Smith wants. But the major purpose, un- doubtedly, is to meet the other leaders who will be there, and the advance driblets of delegates who will trickle in from day to day. These, undoubt- edly, Smith will try to organize into Not, how- I am aware the conven- | Roosevelt admittedly has | Trim away P DEMOCRATIC SELECTION TO BE MADE THIS WEEK The Question, “Can Gov. Roosevelt Be Defeated?” Will Be Answered Before Is Opened. in resisting Roosevelt for as long five ballots, Roosevelt will lose nomination. Smith wvill find it hard to beat Roose- velt. True, it takes 385 delegates, a third of the convention, to vote some- thing over 500 delegates who are cither opposed to Roosevelt or are, so to speak, non-Roosevelt delegates. hat looks, on paper, as if Roosevelt could be 7 eld. But every politician knows better. Roosevelt cannct be stopped with a bare as Rocsevelt as all but 500 of the nature work Such rearne:s will be when he delega‘es, laws of powerfully i to success gates. There is pro- P those of the dissznt- ing 500 who sec the light and leap for the band wagon. 2 Moreover, 1t will be particularly hard for Smith to weld this p: group of 500 or so no: delegates into a solid force. 200 Are His Own. About 200 of them will be Smith's own. These he can con These will follow any signal Smith gives. ‘They are from New York, New Jersey, Mas- cachusetts, Rhode Island and Pennsyl- vania, and they are Smith's men; first, last and all the time, for any purpose Smith has. }Bu: 90 of the non-Roosevelt dele- ates are Gar Not really Garner's. y are 1 but they are not Garner's deleg: They are the 46 44 from Califor- s _from California cer: ia ly are much more under t. e r the lead arne: the e exr- m G. McAdoo than of th se\fmm Texas T asks. can_there be co-cperation be- h and Gamner? Garner pe: is a genial and fle: n who can co-operate with an refuse 1o work Al Smith to that end. Between Smith and Roosevelt they like Rocsevelt better. And the California delegates under cAdoo—could McAdoo co-cperate with ? Troe, 1 L both th end Roc: experience in Ne , has little reas Mc. prefer Roosew e—and the c if it should see—Willi; d 2 Even if McAdoo perconally Te willing to unite with Smith, could Me- Ad'ao’delh'lr thoss 44 California de! gates And so all the way down tI It is going to be extremely for Smith to weld those rough!: non-Roosevelt de of death. Many of them are in com- paratively small units from Misscurf ma and Virginia. acquired in 1928. © cf grief, the trouble d in 1928, and they wznt to got away from all that. Mcreover, they think there is a feud between Smith and Roosevelt. They shrink from the spectacle of a feud. They recall what a feud (between Smith #nd McAdoo) to the party in 1924. They want, 2 2ll things, to avoid ancther such tug-cf-war as Madison Square Garden in 192 And they think the best way to aveid the raising of a fecd is to go ahead and nominate Roosevelt quickly. Smith’s Reasons. Why dcesn't Smith tell the country just why he opposes Roosevelt? The average man, lacking any specific rea- son of a public nature from Smith, thinks Smith's objections must be per- sonal. That presumably is unfair to Smith; and Smith, in failing to give public reasons for opposing Roosevelt, is unfair to himself. The only objec- tion Smith has ever made to Roosevelt on public grounds had to do with just one speech that Roosevelt delivered. That speech, Smith said, was “dema- gogic.” But “demagogic” is not a terribly harsh word for one politician to use about another whom he does not like. It was not convincing to the public. The average Democrat in Topeka, Kans.,, or San Antonio, Tex., assumes Smith’s opposition to Roosevelt must be personal. Listen to any talk about it in a smoking car. There, the oracles will say that Smith is jealous of Roose- velt; that Smith wanted the nomination for himself and resents Roosevelt's go= ing out and getting it; that Smith thinks he could win this time and is sullen over Roosevelt’s running away with the nomination; or that Smith wanted Roosevelt to play second fiddle to him—wanted Roosevelt to get it, if at all, as a favor handed down by Smith. This feeling on the part of the aver- age man is universal. It makes Smith cut less a man than most of us think he is. If Smith is going to fill suc- cessfully the role he is undertaking the coming week, he should make a statement in simple and unemotional words of just what reasons he has, public in nature, for thinking that Roosevelt would be an undesirable candidate or less than perfect Presi= dent. What reasons does Smith have? It isn't Roosevelt's health: some one is said to have asked Smith about that and Smith is reported to have said: “What do they want in the White House—an acrobat?” Does Smith think Roosevelt is too close to the radicals? Roosevelt is very close to Senator Wheeler of Montana— or perhaps it is that Wheeler mekes himself very close to Roosevelt. Any- how, Wheeler is a real radical. One who follows Wheeler in the Senate feels sure he has a real wish to see the present order of things in Ameri- ca blow up. A goei many folks are more than a little dismayed about the apparent sympathy of spirit between Roosevelt and Wheeler. Is that Smith's reascn for not wanting Roosevelt nominated? J7 Smith thinks that, and if he will sa- so, he will go a good way toward preventing Roosevelt’s nominae tion. An¢ without giving some publia convincing reason, it will be a compact force to resist the nomina- tion of Roosevelt. If Smith succeeds difficult for Smith to beat