The Daily Worker Newspaper, December 11, 1930, Page 15

—_ elopment the Don Basin could therefore not rely upon this group of pits, and the number of pits deepened yearly did not increase between 1925 and 1929, on the contrary, it decreased.... “With such a plan of development of the Don Basin and its actual carrying out, a great crisis in the fuel supply industry must have occured in 1930 in accordance with the general directives of the Industrial Party concerning the preparation for intervention in this year. “The Kuznetz Basin with its tremendous possibilities of a speedy development is of especial importance as a powerful mobiliza- tion basis. As a basis for the fuel supply in the heart of the country, free from the danger of invasion and destruction at a time of military action, the Kusnetz Basin should have been prepared at any time for a pro- duction considerably exceeding the local de- mand and should have been considered as a district of importance to the whole Soviet Union and in particular for mobilization. This role ot the Kusnetz Basin was delib- erately disregarded by me and by the whole sabotage organization of the State Planning Commission in accordance with the instruc- tion of the Industrial Party when working out the Plan for the development of the dis- trict. Obviously reduced tempo were given when the Five-Year Plan was drawn up and in particular in relation to the tasks of the years 1930-31. Apart from the development of the basic fuel supply district, the Don Basin and the Kusnetz Basin, the develop- ment of local fuel supply is of tremendous importance for the whole fuel supply plan and in particular in relation to the defense of the country (the local coal fields, peat, ete.). In particular this is important with regard to districts which are greatly depen- dent on fuel supplies brought from great dis- tances, for instance, the Leningrad district, the central industrial district and the Ural district... . “.,..The weakness of the existing transport facilities of these fundamental fuel supply districts, increased by the general disorgan- izing work of the Industrial Party, would have quickly led to the complete paralyzing of the fuel supply in a period of crisis or military action and would nave made it im- possible to utilize < district like the Kusnetz Basin of such importance for mobilization.... “_..The impending of the development of oil transport and the creation of an obvious disproportion between the production of oil and the existing transport means; waters and railways, belong to the sabotage measures directed towards the destruction of the fuel supply.’ (Statement of 3rd November 1930.) Referring to the metallurgical industry Ramzin declares: “The minimal rates of development carried out by the Industrial Party in the metal- lurgical industry can be seen by a comparison of the figures of cast iron production accord- ing to the Five-Yéar Plan of the State Plan- ning Commission ‘eight to ten million tons) with the latest figure of seventeen million tons or almost twice as much. This slowing down of the rate of development in the metallurgical industry whilst simultaneously increasing the extent of the investment works led inevitably in 1930 to an acute shortage of metal and to a‘ crisis in the metal supply: It is sufficient to point out that the deficit of sheet iron increased from year to year and in 1929-30 had reached 37 per cent. “The metal shortage is made still more acute by the fact that the assortment of metals do not fit the demand and that also a disproportion exists between the production and the demand for individual metallurgical commodities. The metal shortage was ag- gravated by irrational usage.” Tcharnovsky, who has directed the sabo- tage work in the metalurgical industry, de- clared: “With regard to the suppiy of the metal working industries with metals, our main aim was to create a deficit of suply in all forms of metal and half manufactured goods to meet the needs of the People’s Commissariat for Ways and Communication and other offi- cial institutions. This was done above all by slowing down the tempo of development of the smelting industry: a.) the so-called great metalurgical industry, that is the production of the metal works in the Don Basin and the Urals, and b.) the small metalurgical indus- try which isithe: mechanical:and engineering work of the central industrial district antl the north west district. “The deficit in the metal supply created an imediate threat to the development of all branches of industry and transport, a most important factor in the defense of the coun- fy at a moment of intervention when not DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1930 industry, and thus.created apart from the crisis and congestion in production, a dan- gerous situation for the defense of the coun- try at a momoent of intervention when not only arms and ammunition but every loco- motive and every .waggon is of importance as a means of defense. | | “In particular the delay with regard to re- pairs and the reconstruction of workshops for the production -f ~heels and axels for locomotives and wagons in the works of the great metalurgical industry during the course of the last three or four years was a consid- erable hindrance to the repairing of rolling stock units as the production of these parts which continued in the factories of the small metalurgical industry met with dificulties owing to the poor quality of the metal.and was unable to meet the growing demands of the People’s. Commisariat of Ways and Com- munications and the Waggon factories which are considerably increasing their production. The same is true of the other individual parts of the rolling stock, the springs, the couplings, etc., whilst a timely solution of this task by the setting up of special workshops for the centralized production of axels by rol- ling and forking, of the bandless Wheels by rolling (or by casting the wheels of steel by the Grifin system) and also for the central- ized production of springs, couplings, etc. would have made possible the complete de- velopment of the means of transport, would have guaranteed the develpoment of waggon buliding and in part of locomotive pbuilding and thanks to the timely centralized methods of production would have made possible con- siderable economies in material. “The delay in the solution of the tasks mentioned will bring our railway transport into a chronic state of shortage with regard to these parts and abolish at an acute moment of intervention the possibility of speedily overcoming this dificulty as a result of the inevitable increase of demand for these parts. “The slowing down of the tempo of devel- opment in waggon building, locomotive build- ing and in the building of river steamers is also of considerable negative importance in the case of an intervention..... % “....Similarly, the development of many engineering works for the supply of the chemical industry was held up to the damage of .our defensive capacities in case of war or intervention. ‘The production of chemical apparatuses is made dificult by the unpre- paredness of our metalurgical industry to produce special sorts of steel, acid resisting steel, non-rusting steel, steel which is capable of standing high pressure and high tempera- tures under the effect of acids. The slowing down of these forms of production creates extremely unfavorable conditions for a ser- ies of forms of production of explosives.... “....Not less behindhand is the develop- ment of the production of lathes, of essential importance not only for general production, but also for defense; for instance for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, etc. of which we were able to convince ourselves by the experience of the world war. Tool mak- ing is of similar importance in this respect and its development is also very backward. These two branches of industry which are of essential importance in case of war. or in- tervention, demand the greatest attention, but in fact they have only received stimula- tion in their development quite recently. For instance the plans of four factories, for the production of lathes were put forward for confirmation only in 1930, This delay was due to the sabotage work with regard to the setting up of plans for the various branches of industry. “A general conclusion may be drawn that with the close coriection of all branches of the metalurgical industry and in particular the engineering industry, there is no single branch which has not suffered as a result of the incorrect organization of the engineer- ing industry and in case of an intervention the branches supplying military equipment wil sufer directly as also will work and con- nections in the hinterland. (Statement of the 3rd of November, 1930.) Finally Fyedotov decalred in the textile question: “The work for the preparation of crises in industry, leading to the closing down of the factories, to commodity shortage’and there- fore to dissatisfaction amongst the popula- tionsbecame the main ‘work .of the sabotage organization in recent years. Individua? acts of sabotage were considered as too dangerous and not in acordance with the aim. On the other hand, however, the destruction of the systematic preliminary conditions led to ser- ious difficulties, - “In order to prepare the way for the in- tervention it was necessary to accelerate the crisis and bring it about in 1930. In the tex- tile organization the work in this direction began as early as 1927 and was continued in 1928 in accordance with the instructions and demands from abroad and the guidance of the Union of Engineer Organizations.’ (Statement of the 2nd of October, 1930.) This work was supplemented by other par- allel work which took on a greater and greater significance and became the chief work of the Industrial Party in 1929-1930. The analysis of this work gives conclusively the possibility of determining what the In- dustrial Party became finally as the result of its close connection with the organizers of the intervention. According to the statement of the sabo- tagers themselves the work was determined upon them as follows: “The tasks and instructions received from abroad, declares Ramzin,” can be divided into htree categories: “J, Informational taks aiming at obtaining information concerning the political, ,eco- oe, The Seul of Pars i 7. TKATE - nomic and military situation in the Soviet Union; “2. Organizational tasks in special organ- izational questions; “3, Operative tasks and tasks with regard to the plan economy: ana “4, Diversions.” (Statement of the 31st of October.) The concentration on espionage and treas- on in the work of the Industrial Party in this period is clearly seen from the mere enum- eration of these tasks. In order to carry out this whole work and to co-ordinate it with leading circles abroad it was necessary to have, 1.) money; and 2.) a correctly built up organizational apparatus for connections, And these two questions received great attention from the leadrs of the C. ©: of the Industrial Party. This work was continued down until quite recently. The information on the questions of the organizational connections with the foreign organizers of the intervention for espionage and treason gives the following picture ac- cording to the evidence produced. The Connections of the Industrial Party with the French Agency in Moscow.. : As early’as the first meeting between Ram- zin and Riabushinsky in Paris in August 1927 the C.C. of the Industrial Party. This work was latter mentioned a certain Mr. K. who lived in Moscow, a person through whom it would be possible to maintain connections with the Trade and Industrial Committee. Ramzin then took up this connection, In Moscow in the middle of 1928 he made this Mr. K. acquainted with the accused Kalinni- kov and Laritchev. Mr. K. is a French citi- zen, and according to his own statement he holds a certain position in the hierarchy of the French government service in the Soviet Union. “i A second conection existed through the meditation of a French citizen Mr. R. who lived in Moscow and was organized with the assistance of the chairman of the Trade and Industrial Committee, Dennissov in October 1928 in Paris. According to the statements of Ramzin this Mr. R. is an official of the French government in the Soviet Union. These two persons were the chief medita- tors between the C. C. of the Industrial Party and the Trade and Industrial Committee and the French General Staff. In , jaccording to the, stat nits . 0: fanldin’ aah dechiea in las teams ats rather high official of the French govern- ment to Ramzin at one of these meetings, that the-Freneh General staff was-dissatis- fied with the existing means of communica- tion, because they went a roundabout way. over official personalities. The French Gen- fed in thé name of a} Page Eleven * = es ¥ eral Staff therefore ¢ dered it necessary to organize a direct ccnmcction with the mil- itary members of the Industrial Party, and proposed for this purpos? a Colone, Richard, a member of the French General Staff, whom Ramzin met in Octo! °28 after a confers ence with Colonel Jo e. The connection with Mr. K. to Palchinsky in the ZEK.U.B.U. After that, declares Ramzin met Mr. K. iwice in 1928 in his (Ramzin's) own roois where he introduced Mr. K. to Kalinnikoy. At the end of. 1928 they met in the rooms of Laritchey where Mr. R. was also present. The latter was to visit Ramzin in Moscow in accordance with the agreement with Denissov in Paris. This meeting was to take p'-re in the rooms of the Thermal Technical I:stitute under the pretext om Mr. R. wishing to view the ine stitute. Mr. R. was to hand Ramzin a letter from a certain official French institution, This actually took place in November 1928. This letter, which was written in Russian, contained the request to permit French en- gineers to visit the Institute and to grant facilities to the bearer ci the letter, After this Ramzin, acording to his own statements had three meetings with Mr, R. in the second half of November 1928. In the rooms of Kalinnikov he introduced Mr, R. te | Otechkin. That was jn the spring of 1929, At the first meeting with Mr. R. the ways to establish a correspondence with the Frend& , General Staff through a certain French ime - stitution in Moscow were decided upon. Apart ° from personal meetings a connection through third persons was established in this Case ; through Otchkin and the engineer of the Elektro-import, Gordon. Mr. R. also undere * took to put forward the correspondencé of the sabotagers to the Trade and Industrial Committee (Statement of Ramzin on the Sist October 1930). Finally Ramzin received, ace cording to his own statement of the 25th October, the last news from Mr. R, in Febe ruary. or March 1930. This news referred to his temporary absence from Moscow abroad. Thus correspondence between Rame ~ zin and Mr. R. lasted unti] quite recently (March 1930). The persons mentioned in these statements of Ramzin and implicated in the whole affair, Kalinnikoy, Laritchev, and Otchkin ¢ome- pletely confirm Ramzin’s statements. In his detailed statement of the 31st October, Kaln- nikov declares that the connection with the French governmental circles and the Russian white guardist emigrants of the Trade and Industrial Committee was maintained in the begining by Chrennikov and Fyedotov and in part by him, Kalnnikov. The conection, he declares, was maintained in Moscow through....over Mr. K. and Mr. R. and Ramzin. And further also through a highly placed person....” (31st October 1930). Concering his personal meetings with the persons mentioned, Kalnnikov declares that his meeting with Mr. K. in the autoumn of ‘| 1928 took place in the foyer of the Chamber Theatre during a first night of “Natalia Tarpova.” Why he met Mr. K. in the Chame ber Theatre he explains rather peculiarly: “On the occasion of the meeting with Mr. EK. in Ramzin’s rooms I learned that the personnel of the....were very much inter- ested in the performances of the Chamber Theatre and nver missed a first night, I therefore went to the first night of “Natalia Tarpova” in the hope of seeing Mr, K, there, And in fact I met Mr. K. there in the foyer during the first pause. Mr. K. was accom- panied by two ladies and a gentleman whom Mr. K, introduced to me as Mr. R, “During the next pause Mr. K. informed me that he had met Ramzin and Laritchey @ little before and that he had made state- ments to them concerning the date of the in- tervention and the plans for its carrying out. Mr. K. repeated in detail the information given by Ramzin to the C. C. of the Indus- trial Party and which I have given above, “The news item which I learned from Mr. K. was his wish to know the opinion of the C. C. of the Industrial Party concerning the date fixed for the intervention, and also to know what econimic state was to be expected in the Soviet Union for the midle of 1930.” (Statement on the 31st October 1930.) The control of the foreign connections, ac- cording to Laritchey on the 3ist of October 1930, that is to say the connections with the Trade and Industrial] Committee and with the French; General; Staff, was concentrated fn the hands ef Ramazin.s; is} 04! if “All the negotia‘ions concerning the pre- parations for an ingervention were conducted by Ramzin throug; a certain Mr, R. Apart from Ramzin, Koelinnikoy also maintained conection with this Mr. R., and I once saw Mr, R, in Kelinikev’s rooms (in autowpn