The Daily Worker Newspaper, December 11, 1930, Page 10

ee Page Six or # sf DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1930 Bchevsky, Krassovsky, Chrennikov, Fyedotov, Ramzin, Laritchev, Charnovsky and me, ~=Kalinnikov.” (Statement made 16th of Sep- tember.) This statement ig of special importance In that it reveals the extremely active role played, and actual impetus given, by the governing circles of France and England in forcing the intervention and in making -use of both the Trade and Industrial Committee and of the Russian sabotage organizations in the Soviet Union for this purpose. As may be seen from the statements of Ramzin, Laritchev and others, the leading role in the preparations for the intervention was played by the governing circles of France. This last factor must be emphasized and the driving force of France’s role are further confirmed by 2 number of other facts. The French Government and its Role in the Preparations for Intervention. Whilst the Trade and Industrial Commit- tee, as an association of the former Russian industrialists, set itself the main task of regaining possession of its former property, the government circles of France set them- selves a more general task: the consolidation of the position of world imperialism, after the overthrow of the Soviet power with the aid of military intervention. The Soviet Union is a thorn in the flesh of the bourgeoisie of France. The French bourgeoisie, personify- ing the general political reaction in Westérn Europe, set itself the task of destroying- the Soviet Union by means of a military inter- vention, actuated thereto by political interests, entirely independent of the like initiative in the Trade and Indus- trial Committee and in the Russian sabotagé organizations. And whilst the Trade and Industrial Committee was anxious to obtain the aid of the armed forces of the interna- tional bourgeoisie, and especially of the French, for its ends, on the other hand the French bourgeoisie was equally anxious to exploit for its aims both the Trade and In- dustrial Committee and the sabotage organ- izations in the Soviet Union. Here the French governmental circles, whilst pursuing their own independent policy, fell in unconditionally with the aims of the Trade and Industrial Committee, and the visits paid to France by the two leaders of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party. Ramzin and Laritchev were made full use of by precisely these circles, with the intermediation of the Trade and Indus- trial Committee for the furtherance of their aims. Here the October conference played a definite “part. For the rest, the extent to which the gov- ernment circles of France were directly in- terested in the idea of a speedy realization of the intervention—directly interested in fhe sense of impartial conquest enabling the wealth of the Soviet Union to be exploited by foreign capitalists—may be seen fairly plainly in the statement made by Fyedotov on 2ist of October, 1930: “Charnovsky informed me that a confi- dential message had been received from Ramzin, to the effect that during his stay in Paris he had been obliged to agree, in the name of the sabotage organizations, to the granting of concessions to the interyention- ists at the expense of Russia, these conces- sions having been agreed to by the Trade and Industrial Committee: The cession of a part of Caucasia to England, especially the oil industry region, and of Ukrainian ter- ritory on the right bank of the Dniepr to Poland and France. _“On this I pointed out to Charnovsky”— continues Fyedotov—“that Karpov*) had on the contrary assured us, on behalf of the Trade and Industrial Committee, that in the case of an intervention the, interests of the State were not to be violated, and had re- quested the engineers of the textile group to be informed of this, and that I refused to pass on this message from Ramzin to our Sabotage organization, and begged Charnoy- sky to inform Kupriyanov and Nolde per- sonally.” In another statement, madé by Fyedotov on 20th of October, 1930, he states that Karpov, whom he met in Berlin in 1928, de- flared to him that: - _“,,,. Both France and Poland calculate on the subsequent exploitation of the inner wealth of Russia by means of various con- ‘tessions, whilst Poland hopes’ at the same time to find fidrkets' in 3 one of the members of’ the Trade and In- dustrial Committee intends betraying the interests cope as a State, and. that, should such fears arise anywhere, they should wee ' $ White Guard, emigre, textile industrialist. its general |~ a, ‘but thiat' dt, be quieted.” (Statement made 20th of Octo- ber, 1930.) Fyedotov’s last statement, made on the 31st of October, 1930, is even more definite: “. .. Charnovsky then informed me of an extremely important confidential message from Ramzin, to the effect that during his stay in Paris he had been obliged, in the course of negotiations with the French gen- eral staff and the Trade and Industrial Com- mittee, to accede in the name of the Centre of the engineers’ organizations to the conces- sions which had already been made by the Trade and Industrial Committee at the ex- pense of Russia. France demanded full payment of the tsarist and war debts, and at the same time comprehensive concessions enabling it to exploit the ore and other min- eral deposits of Russia. England demanded the oil fields of Caucasia. Poland, Kiev and a tract of Ukrainian territory on the right bank of the Dniepr. I was astonished at this information, and reminded Charnovsky that Karpov had given me the special assur- ance that nothing of this kind Would occur, that the Trade and Industrial Committee would not betray the interests of Russia, that no territorial concessions were to be made, that a hundred per cent payment was only.to be made of private claims and of the accounts. of .the undertakings which had supplied machinery to Russia, whilst the |e Sower- a . the preparations for the intervention, which was envisaged by the Trade and Industrial Committee, for 1930-31, so that the decay of industry, the shortage of goods, and the discontent of the population would have reached a high point by this time. sc stated that. the Trade and Industrial Committee had been working with redoubled energy of late and reckoned on success, although the prospects of interference from England were diminishing; on the other hand France’s interference was becoming more likely.” According to Karpov: : - . the representatives of the Trade and Industrial Committee waited on Poincare. These representatives were Ryabuchinsky, Tretyakov, end Lianosov. Poincare evinced readiness to examine the question seriously and to submit it to the general staff, with which the Trade and Industrial Committee maintained immediate relations through the military emigres. There could be no doubt that the general staff would give Poincare an answer in favor of an intervention. The in- tervention was planned to be actually car- ried out with the forces of Poland, Rumania, Esthonia, and Latvia, with some slight parti- cipation on the part of French troops and the French fleet, under the leadership of the French staff and of French officers. ’ “But Poincare besides promising that the question of an intervention should be given Sy GORY EAE AE ataR ES Take 7H THIS MAGNEY AND SmAsit AMERICAN CAP} lL Sass SovweT Russyn ‘aati o NOT EXIST IN ne \ THe worip Te CYTHER s payment of the tsarist and war debts was to be made solely in the proportion of five copecks to the rouble in order to maintain the principle of debt obligations insisted upon by France, and that he requested that the engineers of the sabotage organizations should be informed officially of this. I told Charnovsky that either Karpov had deliber- ately deceived us in order that we might act in accordance with the instructions of the Trade and Industrial Committee, or that he himself was deceived, and that in either case it was clear that the Trade and Indus- trial Committee failed to grasp the effect of such a message on the minds of the mem- bers and on the composition of the engineers’ organizations. I expressed my surprise that Professor Ramzin could have kept his agree- ment secret for so long, and expressed the opinion that the news would deprive a great many persons of all desire to work in the organization. I asked Charnovsky to speak personally to Kupriyanov and Nolde on the matter.” (Statement made 31st of October, 1930.) There is therefore no doubt that the ac- tions of the foreign interventionists were prompted by the aim of imperialist con- quest of this or that piece of territory in the Soviet Union. Their aims met with the con- sent of both the Trade and Industrial Com- mittee and of the sabotage organizations of the Soviet Union. Poincare’s and Briand’s Personal Negotiations with the Industrial and Trade Committee: The leaders of the Trade and Industrial Committee, in their endeavor to ensure to the utmost, the new military intervention, set themselves the task of seizing the bull by the horns, and securing a personal audi- ence with Poincare and Briand, at that time the leaders of French politics, one in his capacity of Prime Minister, the other as Minister for Foreign Affairs, rg who were the persons rae om. peat and, Indys- trial Committce et gs the conference . 1928, According to Fyedotov’s statement (20th of October, 1930 oe tae v had told him at the meeting in 1928 that: i . .. the actual reason of his journey to | Berlin was the necessity of a Consultation on attention, pointed out with special emphasis the necessity of lengthy preparations in Rus- sia, Although symptoms of decay, especially of shortage of goods, were observable in the Union, the discontent which the emigres had promised among the population was not finding clear enough expression. Therefore the sabotage work must be intensified by all means. “In this connection he requested the Trade and Industrial Committee in particular to in- tensify its efforts for the frustration of the planning work and especially of the Five- Year Plan of industrialization. The failure to accomplish the Five-Year Plan would throw discredit on the Soviet power, and this was of especial importance for the suc- cess of the intervention.” (Statement made 20th of October.) This information, given by Fyedotov, was repeated by Denisov at the conference be- tween Ramzin and Laritchev and the Trade and Industrial Committee as proof that the Committee was fully convinced of the suc- cess of the intervention. The conference with the representatives of the French government is referred to in simi- lar terms by Charnovsky in his statement of 16th of October, 1930. “The hopes of an intervention cherished by these industrialists (Ryabuchinsky and Konovaloy) were founded on their personal negotiations with the representative of the French government, Briand and with the French general staff.” Finally, we find further confirmation in the statements of the other leaders of the sabotage organizations who had the oppor- tunity of immediate contact with the heads of the Trade and Industrial Committee, The latter did not fail to inform their colleagues as to the success of their efforts. Sitnin states (18th of October, 1980), for instance, that: “S. W. Kuprianow, asked me, before I left for abroad, to visit his former chief, I. A. Konovalov, whilst I was in Paris, and to hear from him how maters stood abr vg visited Koriovalov, ‘who 'totd hiny th ed et "Poincare had recently sent for Trrety- ae and Ryabuchinsky, and granted them an audience. ... He proposed to Tretyakov and Ryabuchinsky, as thé representatives of the Trade and Industrial Committee, that they should send instructions to the engin- Clie: its eers’ orga*izations in the Soviet Union with regard to preparing the soil for intervention.” (Statement made 18th of October, 1930.) “.., hat Poincare promised full support for the Mtervention, and was of the opinion that i# 1930-31 complete sue*“-~ -Aght be hoped #ar it.” Thi# same Sitnin confirms Fyedotov’s statement (based on information from Kare pov), that Poincare, in the course of the interview with the members of the presidium of the Trade and Industrial Committee, stated that the French general staff was commissioned to carry out the practical work of preparation for the intervention. Sitnin’s and Fyedotov’s account of the in- terview with Poincare is further confirmed by another sabotager, Dershavin, who had received the information in Moscow, after Fyedotov’s return. A€cording to Dershavin, Poincare: “promised an active policy in the direction of an intervention, but required that preparations should first be made in the Soviet Union for the disorganization of the economic situation now finding its bale ance, so that dissatisfaction with the governe ment might be aroused in the country.” These statements show clearly that the Trade and Industrial Committee was acually able to submit to the conference in October, 1928 some proof of its work towards pre« paring for the intervention. In view of the above cited facts, there can no longer be any doubt that the initiative taken by the Trade and Industrial Commit- tee was mainly formal in character. In reality it was the governing circles of France, rep= resented by Poincare, which sought to ex- ploit for their ends the Trade and Industrial Committee and the sabotage organizations. It is not for nothing that the accused sab- otagers state that Poincare insisted on the necessity of intensifying the work of the sabotage organizations in the Soviet Union. The same conclusion must be drawn from the second communication made by Denisov at the conference in October, 1928, regarding which Ramzin at first likewise kept silent: Ramzin, in his statement of 31st of October, writes: “Denisov reported that the work of the Trade and Industrial Committee in prepara- tion of the intervention against the Soviet Union had already brought concrete results, for the French general staff had already formed a special commission; under the leadership of General Janin, for the preparas tion of an intervention against the Soviet Union. Denisov stated further that one of the active collaborators in the preparations for the intervention was Colonel Joinville of the French general staff, who would at the same time maintain direct contact with the proposed military leader of the intervene tion, General Lukomsky.” Poincare, who had promised, during the interview, to submit to the general staff, the question of preparing for an intervention, had therefore actually fulfilled this promise before October, 1928, and had laid down a corresponding line of conduct for the Trade and Industrial Committee, in the interests of the success of the intervention. The states ment on the organization of the Janin come mission is further confirmed by Kalinnikov on 16th of October. “Ramzin informed us that the French gene eral staff had formed an international come mission, under Janin’s presidency, of the representatives of France, England and Poland, for the purpose of alloting the roles in the leadership and carrying out of the Russian intervention. This commission de« clared itself agreed with France’s undere taking the leadership in the carrying out of the intervention, as also the providing and transport of war equipment and weapons for the intervention armies. The operative preparations and the role of vanguard were undertaken by Poland... .’ On 16th of October, 1930 Kalinnikov made another important statement: “... after this decision had been arrived at by the Janin commission, England adopted a somewhat more distant attitude towards the intervention, for the reason that the chief economic incentive, the possibility that English industries might earn something by supplying war material had disappeared... .” This was the work accomplished by the Trade and. Industrial Committee; at the conference in October, 1928 the balance of this work was. drawn and communicated to the members of the Central Committee | the Industrial Party, ,> 5.5 =) yr) The; facts communicated . regarding , the personal negotiations between the industriale ists and Poincare, regarding the promises given by Poincare, and the formation.of a... special Janin commission in the . French general staff in preparation for the inter= vention, form at the same time a completa a ie eee i inn os nein na