The Daily Worker Newspaper, December 11, 1930, Page 12

4 DAILY WORKER NEW. YORK, THURSDAY. DECEMBER 11 Page Eight , 1930 Again to the question of the time to be fixed for the intervention, and to postpone the term proposed in 1930 for at least one year. . . » Without the certainty of support from sections of the Red Army troops, in the form of counter-revolutionary organizations, and without directing the activities of such sec- tions, our work in preparation of the inter- therance of the intervention by means of| ventions was obviously inadequate, This suitable measures of military significance.” | question was raised by him* in the Central (Statement made on October 16, 1930.) .|Committee of the Industrial Party as the of the Soviet Union would be slighter in 1930 than in later years. ...” The same idea is repeated by Ramzin in his-statement of October 31: .... 2. ceeees The Concrete Plan of the Intervention “... It was Intended to begin the inter- vention in the following manner: Rumania was to seize upon some pretext, for instance, a frontier conflict, this to be followed by a formal declaration of war from Poland and the intervention of the Baltic States. The Wrangel troops were to take part in the in- tervention, and to march through Rumania. England was to aid the intervention with its fleet: 1. in the Black Sea, where it would cut off the oil fields of Caucasia; 2. in the Gulf of Finland, where it would take part in the operations against Leningrad. It was also planned to land Krasnov Cossacks on the coast of the Black Sea, that these might reinforce and strengthen the rising on the Don, Great hopes -were set on a@ rising in the Ukraine, and on a consequent cutting off of communications between Moscow and the Donetz Basin, “The whole plan consisted of a combined action: The main attack was to be upon Moscow; this attack to be backed up by a second one against Leningrad, whilst at the same time the South army was to advance from a base on the right bank of the Dniepr. In the interior of the country the operations of the intervention troops were to be sup- ported, not only by mass insurrections, but by the activities of the Industrial Party in aggravating and worsening the crises by the means of diversion action in the war indus- tries, in the power works, etc.” (Statement made October 16, 1930.) The same statements have been made by} the other accused. Kalinnikov, for instance, observes: *“,.. the governments of France and Eng- land, and the Russian white guard emigres in the Trade and Industrial Committee, view- ed the middle of 1930 as the next suitable mo- ment for the intervention. This information was brought from .., to Ramsin by Mr. K in the second half of 1928. At the same time he was informed of the plan which I have enclosed, laying down the scheme of the intervention.” (Statement made October 16, 1930.) ~ Laritchev’s statement of October 16 is to the same effect: “The leading role in the organization of the intervention was played by France, who realized its plans of preparation with the active aid of the English government, where- by the cooperation of the latter envisaged certain measures prescribed by the Deterding group (occupation of Baku and Grosny),” (Laritchy, October 16, 1930.) Laritchev, too, confirms the motives caus- ing the sabotagers to decide in favor of 1930: . “1930 was expected to be the year of the greatest crisis, in consequence of the disproportion in the development of the va- rious branches of economy, especially in the metal industry, and of the costs of the great large-scale plant in course of construction. We received directions to this effect on the preparations for the intervention in 1930 from various members of the Industrial Party, and this formed the main factor of the political struggle in connection with the laying down of the Five-Year Plan.” (State- ment made October 16, 1920.) Among the various statements, a very char- acteristic one is the following one made by Laritchey on the fole played by the French general staff in provoking the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway: “The conflict on the Chinese Eastern Rail- way in the summer of 1929, was, as I learned ally of Rumania, to operations from the sea and on the coast, to landing operations against Leningrad with the aid of the air fleet, etc. The directions formerly received by Chrennikov were therefore considerably extended and supplemented to correspond to the development of the program of the mili- tary offensive, and were adapted to the fur- Further Postponement of the Intervention. But the hopes set on 1930 too were doomed to disappointment, and a fresh delay, this time of brief duration, until 1931, took place. Referring to this fresh postponement, Ram- zin states October 16, 1930: “By the second half of 1929 news arrived from abroad that it would be impossible to that it was postponed till the following year. “The chief causes of this postponement were: 1. The increased revolutionary activity of the working masses; 2. complications in the military situation of France in conse- quence of strained relations with Italy; 3. Germany’s uncertain attitude, and the con- flicting interests of Germany and Poland; 4. The failure of the adventure in the Far East, which proved the difficulties of a fight against the Red Army; 5. The absence of agreements between the chief participants in the intervention. “The somewhat altered plan for 1931 now! army had increased. The intervention had | began to take shape in accordance with the to be postponed to a later time. This post- | changed general situation, This plan al- ponement was rendered further ‘necessary. as | ready recognized the small probability of | Ramzin stated, by the course of foreign po- great risings in the interior of the country, | jitical combinations in the relations between , especially in the Ukraine, since the counter-| France and Germany, in connection with! revolutionary organizations, for instance, the ; , } “League for the Liberation of Ukraine” had * Ramzin is referred to. t been destroyed; it also recognized the effect of the general improvment of economic con- Til. The Criminal Activity ditions in th coming year. Therefore, the * new plan put much more serious demands P repare an Intervention _The work of the sabotagers’ organization | on the inside help to be rendered by the Industrial Party, and stress was laid on di- i . Es ‘ version maneuvers, on espionage, and on to carry out the instructions which it received ; open treachery. In order to yp tie: the So- | from abroad, from the Trade and Industrial | viet Union as far as ible beforehand and Committee and from the French govern- | to compensate in part for -the stronger eco- mental and military organizers of the inter- nomic and military position of the Union vention, was continued until recently, in| as Compared with 1930, the new plan included fact, up ae — vise : we Ake A - | the economic blockade of the Soviet Union, | ‘* important that the character of this work | oe before and after the year 1928 should be com- pared. } “The new plan increased essentially the som Signs ~ teres asin rpitioe ges: According to the statements of Ramsin the now Finland's participation wes caida pied following sessions of the central leadership | : » We | took place before it was reorganized and made armament and equipment of the intervention into the Industrial Party army and air forces. The southern group ; of the Polish, Rumanian, and Wrangel sol- diers was to occupy the Ukrainian territory on the right bank of the Dnieper, and then to advance in as straight a line as possible on Moscow. It remained uncertain whether Germany would take part in this operation | (although there was a Possibility of mobiliz- ing considerable numbers among the mem- bers of the “Stahlhelm” for instance), for Poland was naturally afraid to let German troops march through East Prussia,” (State- ment made October 16.) This statement deserves Special attention. It describes the persistency shown by the governing strata of certain foreign powers in the organization of the military inter- vention against the Soviet Union, Kalinnikovy ‘states: “. . . After returning from the London World Power Conference, via Paris, to the Soviet Union, Ramzin and Laritchey estab- lished connection with the Trade and In- dustrial Committee through the agency of Ryabutchinsky, who maintained contact with the French government via Loucheur, They ration of the intervention. So far as I was informed before my arrest,: the term of the intervention was postponed to 1931, “The total plan of operations was, how- ever, left unchanged. The French staff con- tinued to insist that Poland and Rumania should take the initiative. It was pointed out that the opportunity for such an initiative would be given by open occupation by Poland of Lithuania, which is continuing its Soviet orientation, this would bring about an inter- national conflict into which the Soviet Un- ion would be bound to be drawn, and which would lead to an armed collision between the Union and both Poland anu Rumania, which (Statement made October 16.) Charnovsky’s statement with reference to the causes of the postponement’ tallies with this: jese Eastern Railway proved the contrary, The Character of the Anti-State | Work of the Central Committee of the Industrial Party up to 1929. First Half of 1927 1. A session took place at the beginning of 1927 in the building of the Plan Economic Commission in Laritchev’s office. The fol- lowing were present: Laritchev, Paltchinsky, Rabinovitch and Ramsin. Paltchinsky and Rabinoyitch informed the others of the exist- ence of the Central Committee, and a pro- gram of work was agreed to based on the assumption of the inevitability Of an eco- nomic crisis and a counter-revolutionary coup detat. The question of the necessity of timely preparations for the taking over of power and for the leadership of the economic system were discussed, in so far as, accord- ing to the opinion of the reporters, the lead- | ing role in the administration of economic | life should fall to the engineers. 2. A discussion inthe spring of the same year took place in the building of the Plan most urgent and important work in prepa- | is bound by a military alliance with Poland.” | (oe EEE France's attempt to induce Germany to dis» solve the existing agreement with the Soviet Union, and with the attempt to liquidate Lithuania as a state by its annexation to Poland. The failure of these plans, which be« came evident in the summer of 1930, again tended to delay and ponstpone the interven- tion, and Ramzin was informed of thin on the occasion of his journey to the Interna< tional Congress in Berlin in July this year, ... As a result of this information the mili« tary intervention was postponed for a year, | till the summer of 1931. This year appeared | to be favorable in two respects: 1. The proph. |ecies of some agronomists led to the expecta« | tion of a failure of crops in the Soviet Union jin precisely this year; 2. It appeared likely, | according to the assumptions based by the |Trade and Industrial Committee on Supple« ‘mentary data supplied by Ramzin on the | course of the reconstruction work, that maxi« mum difficulties would arise, culminating in |1931 in consequence of many delayed orders, | Besides this, the political situation in Gers |many and England might be expected to | yield in 1931 a better political constellation | in Europe for the champions of intervention, (Statement made Octeber 16.) | With respect to the rest of the sabotagers, | who. were initiated to a less degree in the exact plans of the Cent-al Committee of the Industrial Party, it may be seen from their ‘. .. The experience gained on the Chin- statement that they we-e informed that the | time chosen for the intervention was close | that is, that the fighting powers of the Red | at hand, that 1930, or at latest 1931, was to see the intervention, and that they adapted their work accordingly, : We can now pass from the work accome plished abroad by the sahotagers in prepa- ration of the intervention to those activities within the-Soviet Un‘cn itself which were directly bound up with the preparations for the intervention. of the Industrial Party to Against the Seviet Union the Engineers’ Association of the Soviet Une ion. The following were present: Paltchine sky, Rabinovitch, Chrennikov, Laritchey, Fye- dotov, Tcharnoysky, Ramsin and Tchayanov, | The quéstion of a bloc with the counter-revo- lutionary Kondratyev-Tchayvanov group was discussed. 5. A session took piace in the building of the Supreme Economic Council. The followe ing were present: Rabinovitch, Chrennikov, Tcharnovsky, Paltchinsky, Laritchev, Ram- sin and Strichoy. The session discussed the concrete line of work with regard to the fuel | Supply industry and the metallurgical indus- try. The minimal variants of the Five-Year Pian and of the annual plans were discussed, with a view to: delaying the development of local fuel supplies, in particular, peat and the coal in the Moscow area and the Kusnetz Basin; and causing deterioration in the sup- ply of fuel for the metallurgical industry, With regard to the metallurgical industry, it was decided to seek to delay the production of cast-iron and rolled iron so that it should not be more than from six to eight million tons by the end of the Five-Year Plan. Fure ther, it was decided to work for the creation of disproportion between the production and the demand of metal goous, and to delay the building of new metallurgical works and the mines. On the political field the land quese tion and the question of repaying the czare ist debts, above all to France, were discussed, 6. A discussion took piace in the building _of the Zekubu (the central organization of the, Learned Professions). The following were present: Paltchinsky, Rabinovitch, Chrennikoy, Ramsin, Fyedotov, Tcharnovsky Economic Commission, The same persons were present. It was pointed ‘out that the intervention was a completely practical pos- sibility. mE ? 3. A session, of the Central Committee in the spring of the same year took place. The following were present: Paltchinsky, Rabino- vitch, Chrennikov, Laritchev, Ramsin, Tehar- novsky and Fyedotov. The session listened to a report by Paltchinsky and on the instruc- tions from emigrant circles concerning the work to lower the tempo of the development of industry and to create crises by causing disproportion to develop between the funda- from Ramzin and Kalinnikoy, a diversion instigated by the French and English staffs; A test was to be made of our mobilization capacity and of the fighting powers of the Red Army on the one hand, and on the other, of the attitude of the broad masses of the population towards the possibility of war, of extent of the consolidation of the Soviet power and of its influence over the masses of the workers and peasants at a time of inner and outer difficulties,” (Ibid.) The first plans, and the first times pro- posed for the intervention, are confirmed by | tiated the necessity of postponing the inter- Charnoysky, He states that as early as the vention for a year by poin' out that, to autumn of 1927 Ramsin had informd the ma “pes - Sabotage center of his conference with Rya- |< puchinsky, at which: learned that — in view of the delays in the armament and equipment of the intervention army and the absence of mutual agreements among the Baltic States in the matter of the carrying out of the intervention, and in view of the fact that the Soviet Union would not take the initiative in war; as the success- ful fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan would be thereby thrown out of gear—the infer- yention would probably have to be postponed for a year or a year and a half. The Trade and Industrial. Committee further substan- | dotov, Teharnovsky, | and Tchayanov. The cuestions arising out of two tactical variants were discussed. Firstly, the slow and gradual exciucion of the individual responsible communist cole leagues by the influence of the engineeringe technical Central Committee, and secondly, a violent counter-revolutionary coup d’etat with armed insurrection. The second tactic was declared preferable because, as Ramsin pointed out, the Central Committee was con- fident of an approaching overthrow of the government by an intervention. In the opine ion of ‘those present the time and the necese sary forces for the intervention could be greatly reduced if parallel with the interven- tion an armed insurrection took place. _ 1. A session in the building of the Plan Economic Commission. The following were present: Rabinovitch, Laritchev, Ramsin, Fyee ky, Chrennixov and ‘Tchays anov, It: proved that, thanks to. the casté 15 EI IN RNC PUES Pee