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eonfirmation of the conclusions drawn above in the possibility of securing imside assist- Played by the former head of the French | ance, in the Soviet. Union, by means of diver- with regard to the independently active role government, Poincare, in preparations for an intervention. It is only in the light of these facts that it is possible to comprehend the extraordinary ease and rapidity with which, on the day following the October conference, the decisions arrived at could be realized in @ now direct contact between Ramzin and Laritchey and the French general staff on the questions involved in the wonking out of the intervention plans. The Cooperation of the Industrial and Trade Committee and the Sabotagers with the French General Staff. “., . Having heard’—states Ramzin in his deposition of .3lst of October-—“that the French general staff was the military centre for the preparation and ieadership of the | intervention, I- proposed to Denisov that a joint conference with General Lukomsky and Colonel Joinville should be arranged before i left Paris, inorder that the question of the coordination of the work of the Indus- trial Party with that of the French general staff in the preparation of t ervention might be discussed and for thi ose con- tact established be . of the Industrial Party h general staff. | “Denisov arranged . this ing in the private rcoms of a Russi first fortnight of Oct rived in-a motor ¢ pointed time; ‘s the Vv ar- ap- | the apartment, whe msky and! Colon! Join, - 1g a perma- nent connection w between the C.C. of the Industria the French | army staff. .~This aintained, on Denisov’s sugges lirect connec- tion with me in ow through Mr. A,; whilst the connection. with the members of sion work, etc. General Lukomsky, in reply ‘to my question on the forces available and the plans for the intervention, stated that the negotiations were not. yet. concluded, that it was therefore too early to count forces and draw up plans, but that the plan which I had repeated, which had beem accepted by the Trade and Industrial Committee, was almost the only one in which there could be no doubt of success, provided the army was well supplied and equipped, and es- pecially if it received active aid from the Industrial Party and its military organiza- tion, which would be given definite instruec- tions and plans of action. “At the close ef the conference Denisov informed us that important negotiatior s were joing ‘on, in France with Briand, and in England with Churchill, on the organization of the intervention; that negotiations on the organization of the intervention were ren- dered difficult by the large appetites of the participants—Poland, for instance of course demanding the Ukrainian territory on the right bank of the Dniepr.* (Statement made 16. 10.) It was at this conference that the idea first arose of the founding of a special military commission of the Industrial Party in the Soviet Union, for the preparation of acts of betrayal by separate parts of the Red Army this purpose suitable eontact was ated with the French ‘ Ramzin’s statement on 16th , 1930 contains the following: ation Lukomsky proposed military. commission be nection with the C.C, of the Industrial Party, this to be in communica- tion with the French general staff. After a discussion, the chief tasks of the military hat a spec founded in «the ©.C. fo the Industrial F engineer | W. A. Laritehev and P: or Kalinnikov, | was made through Mr. Later on the} connection between th acral staff and engineer Laritchev rv Kalin- nikov was kep up with the intermediation of Mr. K., and in some cases with me through Mr. A.” Laritchev, in October, 1930, follows: “|. . Next day Ramzin had an appointment with the president of the Trade and Indus- trial Committee, Denisov, and with the white guard general Lukomsky and the rep- resentative of the French general staff Join- ville (whose name Ramzin told me), At this conference Ramzin received definite orders, as also information as to the time at which the projected intervention was to take place (summer, 1930), the methods of pre- paring for this intervention, and on the formation of the expeditionary corps headed by General Lukomsky. In the evening of this. day Ramzin expected Colonel Richard of the French general staff at his apartment for a consultation. Ramzin invited me to take part in this conference, which was held in his apartment, As the negotiations were carried on in French, which I do not under- Stand, I can only repeat what Ramzin told me—that the discussion referred to the prep-_ aration of Poland and Rumania for the at- ‘ tack, and that the French general staff was taking energetic ‘steps in this direction. Richrd on his part was interested both in Richard on his part was interested in the new buildings which might be of importance for defense} he was also’ interested in the situation in the war and chemical industries.” The character of this conference is suffi- ciently clear, It shows that both sides, on the one hand the representative of the French general staff, ‘and on the other the Trade Industrial Committee and the White Guard generals, exerted every effort to realize the common aim. In another statement, Ramzin speaks of a sweecting with Joinville, and explains what the ‘generals demanded from the. Russian sabotagers: Z j “At my meeting with Denisov, Lukomsky and Colonel Joinville, whieh took place in a private house in Paris between 5th and 10th of October, 1928, the chief matter discussed was, as I have already stated, the practical question of the creation of a military organi- zation of the Industrial Party. Of this I shall not speak here. The negotiations were car- ied on in Russian, as I ‘know very little French. Prom time to. time Denisov and refers statement of 16th of to this conference. as Momtgxk. + e“ogel tw d 110 commission were laid’ down. I have made a detailed statement on this subject in -an- r place. -Contact betweem the French general staff and ... in’ Moscew was re- solved upon and established. In accordance with Denisov’s suggestion, diréet ¢ommuni- eation with me was to be maintained by Mr. R., and direct communication with the member of the C.C. of the Industrial Party, engineer Laritchey, by Mr. K. Denisov in- formed us that instructions to this effect would be given in Moscow. Communication with the French general staff was to be maintained on normal lines and was later actualized by .Laritchev and by Professor Kalinnikov, the representative of the Indus- trial Section of the State Planning Commis- sion of the Soviet Union.” The report on these orders from the French general staff is further confirmed by Kalininkov. Espionage work of this deserip- tion, in direct communication with the French general. staff, was to be extended. According to Kalinnikov’s statements: “Ramazin, according to his own declaration in the C.C., was to establish direct cormmu- nication wiht governmental circles in France and England on his next journey abroad, and to negotiate on military questions. I remem- ber Ramzin’s speaking of wanting to utilize Ryabuchinsky’s connections with Loucheur, who supported the Trade and Industrial Committee {Ryabuchinsky informed Ramzin of this at their next meeting). Ramzin in- tended entering into communication with .General Lukomsky in order to receive direc- tions for the military staff of the Industrial Party.” (Statements made by 16th of. October, 1930.) ~ Fyedotov too was aware of the orders on the organization of sabotage nuclei in the army. He makes the following statement: “The chief aim of the nuctet which’ were ‘formed was the giving of reports on the con- ditions and trends of: feeling in the Red Army and fleet; the organization ‘of measures reducing the fighting capacity of the Red Army, of measures for disorganizing the army,.of measures diminishing the defensive capabilities of the country and leading to actions of diversion; the laying idle of build- ing activities im the most: important factory and power staton enterprises, etc.; to obtain departments of industry.” @tatement made on 2st of October.) egies e gy Connections with the English Army Compared with the active role played by the governing circle in France, the role of Great Britain appears in a somewhat differ- ent light. The government circles in Prance, having both the Trade and Industrial Com- mittee and the military centre of the Rus- sian White Guard emigres close at hand, took over the entire leadership of the prep- arations for the intervention against the Soviet Union, whilst the role played by Great Britain has naturally been secondary. This outlines the activities abroad of the Trade and Industrial Commitee, and of the Industrial Party in preparing*the foreign intervention. Plans and Times Proposed for the Intervention. The survey of these activities can be com- pleted by «. statement of the exact plan laid down for the intervention of the times pro- posed at which the intervention was to take place, of the various amendments and of the work to be accomplished by the sabotagers in the Soviet Union in order to ensure the success of the projected armed conflict, On 2tst of September Ramzin made the following definite statement on the plan of intervention which had been worked out: “According to information recieved from P. A. Paltchinsky, France was to be the chief leader of the mtervention, but its immediate execution was to be achieved with the aid of the military forces of Poland and Rumania, with the assistance of the Baltic}a personal intervi States. According to Paltchinsky’s state- ments, hopes. were also entertained, though very, doubtful ones, of inducing Czecho- slovakia and Yugoslavia te take part, but main reliance was placed on Poland and Kalinnikov on } Rumania.” The’ negotiations carried on betWéen Mechtchersky and Ryabutchinsky on the one hand, and Poincare and Briand on the other, were—according to Ramzin—on these lines. “The main purport of the negotiations lay in the idea that actual hopes existed of an intervention, the probable: time of this in- tervention being calculated: for 1930. Gen- eral Lukomsky was to be the head of the military forces effectuating the intervention. Tt was planned to enter, into communication with Gessen and Kaminka, in order to pro- mote propaganda abroad for the. interven- tion.” (Newspaper “Rul.”) This plan, and the time for putting it into execution, were the subject of the negotia- tions of the Trade and Industrial Committee and the sabotagers in Paris, and before this of the negotiations of the sabotage centre in Moscow. Ramzin makes the same state- ments in another place with respect to the negotiation in Moscow in the first half of 1928: “Paltchinsky informed us that he had re« ceived news from abroad that an interven- UNERRTHED A, Aum per of ‘OUNTER - ENOLUTIOMISTS DAILY WORKER, NEW YORK, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1930 Page Seven hopes — discussed the composition of government. : Ramsin states the motives fixing the inter~ vention for 1930 to have been the following: “According to the information received from White Russian emigre circles through the intermediation of Paltchinsky and Fyedo- tov, and direct, from Ryabuchinsky through Ramsin, as also from the Trade and Indus- trial Committee through the agency of Ram- - sin and Laritchev, the negotiations between the emigres and the French government, as leader of the intervention, as also the nego- tiations with the English government, jus- tified the expectation of the possibility of the actual preparation and carrying out of the intervention by about 1930, This term was therefore decided out of political and military considerations.” The motive, therefore, that it would be impossibi ed forces of the intervention ready earlier date. “in 1928” States Larichey ceived notice from the Frade-and Indu: poned, probably until 1930. At the time when I visited Paris with Ramsin and conferred with the > and Industrial Comm € TI learned that the complications of the litical situation abroad, above all, the doubs policy pur. by Germany, whic fate ing both at once, and the attitude adopted tc s Poland huania made open action against Union in- opportune at this juncture, Neve: , the representative of the French general staff, Joinv#l, as also Denisov, assured Ramsin in w that the attitude of the French gover remained unchanged with respect to the support to be lent the inter- vention, and that the French general staff was energetically continuing the work of strengthening the military forces of Poland and Rumania. An expeditionary corps of White Guard emigre forces was being formed and prepared. The leadership of these ac- tivities'was again in the hands of the French general staff (the commission conducted by Janin), and suitable material and financial means, supplied chiefly by the French minis- try of war, were available. General Lukom- sky was to be the leader of the expedition- ary corps.” (Statement made the 16th of October.) +f The sabotagers too, were inclined to be in favor of this postponed term, but for other- reasons. Ramsin continues: “Under the natural conditions imposed by the development of national economy and the realization of -the Five-Year Plan, the year of operation 1929-1930, as. the middle of the Five-Year Plan, will be the most diffi« cult, for in this year it will be. necessary to put a great strain on national economic means for fresh investments in building work whilst at the same time the profits from these investments cannot yet be great enough to have any effect. The difficulties of the situation in 1930 would be further enhanced by the inevitable difficulties of the advance of the collectivization of agriculture, so that the Industrial Party cherished the hope that the food supply irregularities, combined with the extreme disconten§ of broad masses of the peasantry and the growing dissatisfac- tion of wide strata of the population, would accomplish the rest, “Bence, the Industrial Party considered 1930 to tbe the most favorable for a counter- revoluionary upheaval: (&) on account of the niilitary-political considerations with respect to the intervention; (b) for the reason that the Soviet national economy would be pass« ‘} ing through a period: of great difficulty; (c) because broad -massés ‘of. the population would be plunged into discontent. by the eco- nomic difficulties.” (Ramzin, October 31.) The sabotagers worked to bring in 1930 & crisis in the fundamental branches of the Soviet economy, in the transport service, in the supplies of power; fuel, arfd metals, in the mechanization of agriculture, and strove to increase the disproportion existing between various branches of national economy. Ramzin, in his statement of October 16, | 1930, details this plan further. Nineteen thir- ty was selected by the Industrial Party for the intervention, not only for the above rea- sons, but also for the following: