The Daily Worker Newspaper, December 11, 1930, Page 14

Page Ten DATLY WORKER, NEW YORK, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1936 ration of the intervention and the activity of the sabotagers became feverish. And finally for the year 1820 Ramsin men- tions two segsions. One of these sessions dealt with new tendencies in the Industrial Party aiming at an armed insurrection and the seizure of power with internal forces. This idea, however, was rejected. Instead, the question of organizing systematic “terror- ist acts against Communists in the villages Was considered, whereby the discontent of the Kulaks was to be exploited. It was de- cided to discuss this question again in the spring with the Kondratyev-Tchayanov group by which time the general situation would have become clearer. And then in May, 1930 a similar character took place. To sum’ up: speculation on an interven- tion; espionage; diversions; military work and sabotage activity with a view to sup- porting a foreign military intervention—that was the essence. of the peirod of the activity of the. Industrial Pe Sabotage gave way to new and sterner methods be- cause, as Ramzin said, ‘the crisis had already begun.” session of a The Criminal Activity of the C..C. of the Industria! Party to Cause an Economic Crisis in 1930. r the role sed and its of the crisis. 4 information ich had pre- sial task of It is now necessary to Played by the work of the a influence on the devel Ramzin gives the concerning the gener: ceded the setting vu causing a crisis in “The fundamental az branches of ‘industry. v the tempo of their de 7 Further, the following measures were decided upon at th sessions of the Central Committee and at meetings of individual groups of the or- ganization: “J, Metallurgical Industry the tempo of dey piopmnenk. is is made particularly clear by a cémpsrison of the old Five-Year Plan which was set up under the influence of the Central Committee and stipulated the figure at 7 million tons of gast iron, with the last Five-Year Plan with 1 million tons, i-e. the old Five-Year Plan was two and a half times smaller; (b) a lack of agreement between the assortment of metals and the demand; (e) a disproportion between the production and the demand for certain metal commodities; (d) the holding up of building work and work for the ex- tension of the factories and the ae plants. “2. Textile Industry. (a) a slow tempo ot development; (b) the building of new factories without a proper. supply of raw materials; (c) a disproportion between the supplies of and the demand for certain war materials; (d) delays in the introduction of new textiles. “8. People’s Commissariat for Ways and Communications. (a) incorrect and irrational usage of the rolling stock and the locomo- tives; (b). the rendering of effective locomo- tives useless; (c) the holding up of the de- velopment of the carrying capacity of the most important lines, for instance Don Basin. to Moscow,.Kusnetz Basin to the Urals. The fuel supply to be endangered also; (d) de- co eral aim for all e all to limit + (a). to reduce spite the inevitability-of an acute shortage’ of coal for fuel in the Don Basin, measures _ to be taken to place locomotives in readiness for the consumption of this coal, although _ this question is one of thé most important in the whole complex of fuel.problems; (e) no work for the improvement-of the economic ‘consumption. of fuel in the locomotives by the ‘planning and construction of new types; (f) considerable lagging behind in the develop- ment ofthe oil fleet which represents one @f the weakest points in the oil ‘supply.. “4. The Oil Industry. (a) slowing down " of the tempo of development by the limita-, the building of ' ; of the development of ‘rational oil tine equip- F ‘tion of boring operations; (b) considerable '* Jaggging behirid of the experimental boring, which is at the same time a factor ‘in the also the inevitably increasing of empty shafts; (ec) incorrect utili- ‘oit gases; (d) slow tempo of -lines; fe) slowing down siderable delay with regard to boring experi- ments so that the tempo of development is lowered and the number of useless pits in- creased; (c) considerable delay with regard to the investment work and the building of houses which is one of the chief hindrances to the development of coalmining; (d) a crisis in the power supply in the Don Basin, the Kusnetz Basin and in Kisel, so that the development and the level of mechanization are limited: (e) slowing down” of tke mechanization of coal production thus ag- gravating the labor and housing problems “6. The Power Industry. (a) slowing down of the tempo of electrification; (b) the causing of crisis in the power supply at the most important points, the Don Basin, Len- ingrad, Moscow; (ce) the slowing down of the building of power stations and the extension of the building periods double and triple so that capital is tied up, including consider- able quantities of monetary capital, whereby temporary crisis in the supply of electrical power are caused; (d) non-coincidence of the dates at which individual sections of the power stations are completed and the dates at which individual sections of the equipment arrive, thus also causing capital to lie unmused; (e) expensive productive costs for the building of power stations as a result of irrational planning; (f) delay in the_building of heating plants. “7, The Fuel Supply. (a) considerable reduction of the tempo of the fuel supply industry; (b) reduction of the production of fuel, particularly peat ‘and coal in the area; (c) limitation of the tempo pment in the Kusnetz Basin; (d) delay in the measures for the improvement of the quality of the coal for smé elting pur- poses, and as a result a worsening: of the quality: of coke and metal.” “(Statement on the 21st of September, 1930.) The sabotage work in this direction was begun by-the. old engineering Central Com- mittee. The new Central Committee which began to work in the second Half of 1928, strengthened the work for the ‘causing of a| disproportion in connection with the new aim of producing a.crisis in the year 1930, particularly as the carrying out of'the old tactic especially in the plan work was made practically impossible, as Ramzin Yays, “as a result of the energetic carrying out of the general policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” “The fundamental measures in industry,” declared Ramzin, “had to be directed towards aggravating the already inevitable economic difficulties... .” Continuing, Ramzin declared that as far as he was aware there had been no definite concrete plan for the causing ofan economic crisis at the: moment of the intervention “The chief task of the Industrial Party con- sisted in a systematic work and the direction of the economic system so that by carrying out the above mentioned measures the econ- omic difficulties would be acutely aggravated and in this way a favorable basis for the intervention created.” (Statement on the 2ist of October, 1930.) In general the sabotagers saw the 1930 crisis ‘in the following form: “A particularly acute crisis was to occur with regard to the fuel supply in the central industrial area and in. the North-West dis- trict, and this would then immediately de- velop into a catastrophe with the military interruption of communications with the Don Basin and as a result of the weak and. ob- viously insufficient development of the pro- duction. of local fuel such as the peat and cod] in the Moscow area, and’ the unpre- paredness af the consumers for its broad and rational ‘utilization, A: similarly acute crisis was to develop in the metallurgical ind and particularly in the war industries, as a result of the retarding of the development of the metallurgical industry. Here also the military interruption of connections with the metallurgical south would cause an immedi- ate Catastrophe. The cuiting off of the Don oicumyne. } “eater” Sods ciently strong turbines, a clumsy and extreme- frequently caused the necessity of cutting off ably have increased greatly by 1930. The crisis in the fuel supply plus the unprepared- ness of the railways for a large-scale utiliza- tion of the local fuel supplies; would then have created a transport catastrophe. “In this way the system of measures ad- opted by the Industrial Party were to have Jed about the year 1930 to a general economic crisis and to have formed the basis for con- siderable discontent on the epart of broad masses of the population With the résult that insurrections and strikes would finally para- lyze the economic life of. the country. The separation of the industrial south from the centre of the country was to play the main role in the-final accomplishment of the crisis.” (Statement on the 3ist of October, 1930). Ramzin also points out what the sabotagers succeeded in accomplishing in each of these branches of industry. Ramzin administered the power industry. He says: “The creation of crisis in electrical indus- try. The general direction of the work of the Industrial Party was directed here also above ail towards reducing the tempo of the power stations. It is sufficient to point out that in the Five-Year Plan of the*State Planning Commission the production of dis- trict power stations was given at from 10 to} 14 milliard kilowatt hours, whilst their pro- duction is now. given at 20 milliard kilowatt hours. The Industrial Party however, paid particular attention to the production of crisis: in the electrical supply in fhe most important districts, i. e. in the: Don Basin, in Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals and the Kusnetz Basin: “(a) -Thanks to the systematic delay in the building of the power stations Shterov and Suvevo the Don Basin is still experienc- | ing a power supply crisis and is now feeling this crisis narticularly sharply. The build- ing of the latter.power station Was delayed | by the State Planning “ommission of the Soviet Union,. chiefly through Professor A. A. Agorev, under the’ pretext. of. the possi- bility of meeting the demand for power by fetching it from Dnieprostroi. The building of the Shterov power station was greatly! delayed for a number of years owing to the ordering of irrational equipment (insuffi- ly complicated system of firing, the use of irrational furnaces of a French type instead of the reliable American types, etc.) The dates of delivery did not coincide with the dates forthe fitting of the individual parts of the equipment, unsystematic ordering of equipment. abroad, ete. “The Don Basin is therefore not equipped with a power station and this delays the mechanization of production, increases the labor and housing difficulties and represents a retarding factor for the development of the Basin as a whole. “(b) For a number of years Leningrad has been experiencing a permanent crisis with regard to power supply as a result of the insufficient strength of the power station, the wear and tear of the equipment and its unreliability, particularly with regard to the turbo-generators of the old stations, The exclusion of individual machines from use -rsiadiiaiemetemnaresesitaciaaialpinteai tamer tpentaamn consumers. The reason for this crisis is the delay in the extension of the existing stations and in the building of the Leningrad station. “(c) The Moscow city power stations (M. O. G. E.'S.) are in a similar situation be-' cause -the strength of the stations is not ca- pable.of satisfying the demand. The result is. that new consumers cannot be taken on and large and irrational expenditure must be per- mitted for the building of small stations, This ‘situation came about as the result of the de- ne ee jlay in extending and modernizing the works in Kashira and the delay in building the works in Bobrikov. For the works in-Kashia “Resolutor” dynamos were ordered which could not operate on the flinty coal of the Moscow Basin and which demand a. pause for repairs about every 150 to 200 working hours. . Further, irrational Ripnares. were built here. “Tht result-is that the boilers of the Ka- shira works have a low capacity. and a very low level of efficiency even after an ex- pensive and protracted, refitting. “d) Similar crises of power supply are ‘present in the Urals and, in the Kuznetz Basin, a Forcing up Power Station Costs. ‘The “without en be se Sa-pesek ak fn ee ot thn KO all HIRA wy O21 BX kilowatt hour produced by our stations was about 35@ roubles and even rose to 400 and 450 roubles as against a possible cost of 250 roubles. In this way the working costs of the stations were about 40 per cent higher than necessary, whereby a considerable part of this extra cost was in monetary capital. “3, Hampering the Heat-producing In- dustry. The heat-producing industry is one of the most rational and effective methods on the field of power supply because it rep- resents a great saving of fuel and investe ments. Without opposing the indisputable advantages of the heat-producing industry, the Industrial Party succeeded in causing in the beginning an absurdly dilletante attitude towerds this question. For instance, for Moscow it calculated the possible strength of heat-supply at from 40,000 to 50,000 kilowatt hours instead of the thoroughly possible 300,000 to 400,000 kilowatt hours. Exactly in this fashion the ‘Electrostrom’ gave a fig- ure of approximately 40,000 kilowatts instead of a possible 150,000. ¢ “ Chiefly based on the MOGES and the ‘Electrostrom’ the Industrial Party suceeded in causing a delay in the heatproducing in- dustry of at least, two years.... “.,.The carrying out of the fundamental plans of the Industrial Party with regard to the power supply was guaranteed \by tite fact that the chief hedies which completely con- rolled the solution of the various questions fully in the hands of the Industrial ;.:The general leadership of the work of thé Indust Party with r rd to the power supply was carried out, by me.” (Statement on the 3rd November, 1930. With regard to the fuel supply Ramzin points in his Statement of the 3rd November to the following minimal plans of the Cen- tral Committee of the sabotagers which were adopted by the State Planning Commission but afterwards altered and extended by. the operative State organs: “The main aim with regard to the fuel supply was above all the slowing down of the tempo of production: and of the prep- aratory investment and investigation work connected with it. In order to characterize the suecesses of the Industrial Party in. this connection it is sufficient to compare. the figures for fuel supply contained in the Five Year Plan of the State Planning Commission pushed through by the Industrial Party for the year 1932-33 with the latest calculations for the same year: State Planning Comm. proposal in millions Latest eof tons Stipulations Increase The Dott Basin 50 15 1.5 fold Kusnetz Basin 6 19 3.1 fold Moscow Coal Basin 4 10 2.5 fold Ural Coal District 6 li 1.8 fold Peat 15 33 2.2 fold Oil 20 42 2.1 fold Total production calculated on the fuel index 100 180 1.8 fold “These figures show: that the tempo of fuel production was set almost 50 per cent below the possible level” (Statement on the 8th November 1930.) Laritchey who carried out the sabotage work in the fuel supply industry, declared: “I was entrusted with the working out of ~ all questions connected with the fuel supply, and with the workinz out of measures to lead to a fuel supply crisis, Im general these Measures were as follows: the drawing up of the daily and future plans for the fuel supply . was carried out im such a fashion that the fuel situation remained constantly strained and thé fuel. supplies.in the country were . held at an extremely low level. Such a'situae tion would in case. of’ the least transport stoppage inevitably have ted to the collapse of the fuel ey and the paralyzing of gio . factories.- . “The ¢ chief measure of the ‘sabotage acti- vities ‘in this direction was the reducing of the plans for the development of the fuel supply in disproportion with the general growth of demand, and above all the develop- ment plans of the basie fuel supply districts of the Soviet Union the Don Basin and the Kuznetz Basin. ‘The Bon Basin occupies the most important position in the fue) supply of the Soviet Union. “The sabotage activity, was directed to re= ducing the plan for the- development of the. raat ur saybit to Tor ePLCus: