The New York Herald Newspaper, April 17, 1854, Page 2

Chen filled the office of Foreign Secretary, Baron Brunow Capressed his ancious desire that we should see and make our- Selves acquainted with that document. At that time I was able to answer with the most perfect sincerity that I knew nothing whatever of it, and during the whole pe | engag: woareare about to go into a war, toask what are the ' jnents to which her Majesty’s government have pledged themselves, and for which they are about to ex- pend our best blood and treasure? Py * The Farl of ABERDESS—My lords—I may take this op- at of observing that, in entering upon this war, riod—not a very long one ceriainly—that I held ofice, no | porte fot t 4 reference or communication whatever was made by Baron } St lagen y dhs ow that we will have tie support Brunow to me with regard to this document, which, if it J en be bindi on the British government, her } y's government. I presume we must be bad been held to be bind ng upon the Britis Ib government, See Ee aielet heaton thet would infalhbly have the noble earl opposite became the head of ment, then immediately the correspondence or the memo randum which th upon hithself as a gentl —and which was also bindi noble earl as a gentlems the individual to whom he the whole of his conceived, gave him enc forward, beeause now i Siasece idl ossediion the uni ng entered into in 1844. What was that understanding? It was not made, but, if this memorandum is cor- me it is, for it never has been cont nt entered into during the E: h her Britannic Majes was, that if anything is own expression in his judgment, on the ment in it—was brought idence in En, er, the effect of whic occurred in Turk: seof Russia held to be binding | h minister, but as | ment of this o municated | to a speech of the Eu hen, as he | ty’s minister at St. hought waa the time | c we shall receive @ different support. (Hear, ‘The noble earl first stated, [think, that he was r ied this war would never have taken place had I not bad the misfortune to be at the head of the govern- untry. (Hear.) My lords, he referred eror of fiussia made to her Majos- Petersburg, in which his Maj sty was pleaved to express an opinion favorable to myself personally, and alluded to a long acquaintance which he was pleased to recognise he hal had with me. Now, on that I will say that 1, of course, cannot but be flattered by the good opinion of any’ sovereign in alliance with our own Queen. (Hear, hear.) That was the po sition in whieh the Emperor of Russia stood at the tine, | and, of course, [see nothing to be ashamed of in the good opinion expressed of an humble individual like in alliance with us. un Russia and England should | myself by a monar. (Hear, hear.) pr concert together & the course to be pur- | But the noble earl is not without his compliments al: sued; and it was assumed that if Austria followed in the | (Laughter.) The instaut be arrived at the head of affairs cain of Russia, as trem the period of 1844 up to the pre- | in this country, what happened? (Hear, iow) Why, + moment Russia bas always assumed that she would, | the Austrian government wrote to congratulate him, and #rance would feel herself obliged to act inconformity | the noble earl, then Secretary of State, returned a des with the course laid down between St, Petersburg, Lon- | patch full of gratitude (langiiter) to the Emperor on that » and Vienna. The object was that, in the event of reseen accidents hastenin, icish empire, England, Russia, and Austria nbination by which they would compel Frange to ac cept eny terms they might deem desirous. When that agreement was entered into the noble earl now at the | boad of the government was the Foreign Secretary ; when he acceded to power again it was supposed that there was no very cordial understanding between the | | ceived incoming ministry and France: there were two very con siderable dissensions between France and Russia, arising out of the question of the disputed protectorate, and it was thought thad if 2 Sia could succeed in Linding the F Minister of 185: the obligations which he entered into in 1844, France would | occasion, the dissolution of the | ister who Lever recollect in austria as the bittg ene rz Austria | my of the English n ng in the train of Prussia—should enter into a | distinction of Pri he Holy Places, or rather out of | any notice, or without that profound senso of | that*possessed my noble friend, | earl ogain has come to the memorandum prepared in — | 1844, in which he has dabbled a great deal, and in which And this congratulation was by the only Min jon. (Hear, hear.) That was the 5 warzenburg beyond that | of jany other minister. | (Hear, hear.) Now, my lords, I received no congratulation from Austria, and yet I have been long in communications with that’ gov. ernment,and indeed have been branded in this House and in the country os a pupil of the detested Metternich. (Laughter.) “But no congratulations reached me. I re- 1 the congratulations of his Imperial Majeaty through Sir H. Seymour, but they were received without ratitude (Laughter.) be tsolaled, England, Russia, and Austria would make | he fancies he has made a great discovery to turn to a arrangements amcny themselves for the settlement of the | great account. Duricith difficutly, and then would arise the question how | 4he spoil was to be partitioned le'ween Russia, Austria ant | thing wore to be produced. Engand. There can be no doubt that these papers con- | opinion I am unable ‘ained abundant e nee th 4 the British government, ibe noble ater dang nal understanding of 1844. There was this great ence, that the one was a theoretical agreement as of unforseen eveuts ther, a proposal to be carrried into effect imme aicly and without delay. I think the language of th despatches very strongly bears out my view of the case The very jirst paragraph contains a report of a declara! by the Emgerar of Kussia, made in the most graci manner, of his extreme Majesty's governmen!, which, he trusted, woul continuance,and he also begged that this azsur be conveyed tothe noble Earl, for whom he said he equal regard and esteem. Either upon that day or the day t this design was developed at I cannot understand what 1 means when he says that there was no the Litte what should be the course in ¢ 2 in this laie proposition than there was in | He even thinks there is a correspon. dence connected with it, and that there must be some- How he has formed that to say ; but T can only state that everything that exists on that subject ison your lord- ship's tate. Now, with respect to that memorandum, the history of it is briefly this:—whon the Emperor of Russia was in this country, he, in conversation with me, with the Duke of Wellington, and with the late Sir Robert Peel, repeated those apprehen- sions which he entertained ef the probable dis- solution of the Turkish empire, and expressed his anxiety as to the consequences that must necessarily ensue from such European calamity. ‘The whole drift of this memorandum—the only practical effect of this memorandum—is simply this. It requested us to do leasure at the formation of her | nothing—at all events, to do nothing without an under be of long | standing, a previous concert with Russia; but not at all to the exclusion ot other Powers (hear, hear)—not in | the least. It is quite true that the Emperor, as your lordships well know, treated the former dynasty of following, I think certainly at no more distant interval, | France in the same manner a9 he has done the presont; the Emperor referre! at once to the converaation which | but he never insinuated in the al he had in England in 1844, in a manner whieh evidently | hitest degree that we were precluded from correspontence with tho French shows that he thought the time had arrived when the | government; and the fact is that I myself personally cunderstanding then ent ed into might be acted upon. And hero I must say that whatever fault we have to find | with the Emperor—and I am not standing here as the | apologist of his course of policy—I do not think we haya & right to say that he has wilfully misled or deceived us. T rather think that, as between the two parties, he has more reason to say that he has been misled by the con- duet ef the British government. (Opposition ers.) What ia it we are going io war for? To put down the sasumption by Russia of a right of protectorate over Tur- | tion. key. ButI ask, has Russia upon any. occasion concealed her determination to claim this protectorate? Has sh at any time shrunk from ber demand of ler owa int pretation of the treaty of Kainardji? Jas she ever con- cealed her determination to obtain these demands by ne- gotiation, if possible, and if not, by foree of arma? . * ‘* * * * @ | ror was well founded in his appre! communicated to the French ambassador the substance of the communications that had taken place. (Hear, hear.) There was not the slightest uneasiness on the part of France on the subject; for, as I said, it had no other practical effect in the world than that thera , should be no separate action in the event of the c mity taking place which he anticipated. (Hear.) Now, this memorandum which, after an interval of ten years, I see again, I look at, on the whole, with great satisfac- Iseo nothing to find fault with init. (i It seems to me, always supposing that the Em nensions as to the solation of the Turkish empire—for of his sincerity I cannot doubt, howev sions may have been—but, acting on that belief, I see hear.) | nothing ‘but that which is wise, and moderate, and jndicious in the memorandum, and there are some Now, my lords, we are going to war t@ prevent the Em- | things in it to be admired, and particularly such as your peror of Russia exercising a protectorate over a portion of the subjects of the Sultan, although the nobie lord | then Secretary for Foreign Affaira described such protec- forate as being prescrited by duty and sanetioaed by treaty. The Emperor of Russia is accused of concaaling what hia intentions 1 th rot and confidential communications he distinct- slared that he should employ menaces, if ho found nocesssry to do 0, for the purpose of establish- ing bis own interpretation of the treaty of Kainardji and i and, in fact, I see nothing whatever which I am not read to subscribe to in the contents of that paper. ally were; but, my lords, in one of | a very common notion, and the noble earl has given | currency also to it, that thie is a mere pretext of the Emperor of Russia, jntion of the Turkish empire, and merely framedas the means of engaging us in the lordships and T would do well to consider and act upon in case of necessity. lor example, “1 say, all that relating to interference with the Christian subjects of the Porte; Now it this apprehension of the disso- artition which was to be hia protectorate over several millions of Turkish sub- | brought about on the pretext of that dissolution. Now jects, and the noble lord described that protectorate a3 my noble friend behind me has elready said he had no being prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty. The | monopoly of these apprehensions. These apprehensions British government, it is true, would enter into no ar- rangement for the ultimate di nise the right enjoyed by all nations of vindicating by force of arms that which is secured by treaty. it appears to me that the letter of the noble lord gives ap the whole case about whieh Europe is about to be iavolved in war. Throughout the whole of this cor- respondence the Emperor of Russia has declared bis | ‘ptentions with the utmost candor, and Iam convinced ‘taak, open, and unreserved with regard to what his real Bee My lords, | are not arecent thing, not even of the date of 1844, for | h ion of the apoils of Tur- | these apprebensions le entertained in 1829, and I enter- key, but they did fully recognise the right of protecto- | tained them also, of which Iwill give tate claimed by the Emperor of Russia, and if they re- | fi ognise the right of protectorate, they must also recog: | Your lordships are aware that by the treaty of ondon it was the intention of Mr. Canning to erect Greece into a State, under the suzerainty of the Porte. After the peace of Adrianople, I proposed to my noble friend at the head of the government to constitute | Greece, if possible, into an independent’ State, as more consistent with the interests of Europe, and aa affording Russia than by being connected with fat he himself is persuaded that he has been perfectly | sueerainty. This | of the better chance of ing independent of the Porte in ugroed to in speedy dissolution of was apprehended the vatentions are. Her Majesty's government appear tome, | Turkish empire after the peace of Adrianop!o; and thence uy lords, never to have settled two qu entially distinct. The two questions contained in ommunieations of the Emperor of Russia td ba x dered were—first, the reparation which he expected tions which are | came it that the independence of Greece was established. Here was a practical proof of what has been treated a3 a mere pretext by the noble earl. My lords, many of the observations made by the noble earl on this memoran- for the injuries he professed to have sustained from | dum, and upoh the understanding which he ssems to Tarkey; and secondly, what should be the ultimate | think had been entered into with Russia, I have had the | division of the various parts of Turkey when that empire fell to pieces. With regard to tho second of these ques. tions, the Emperor has exhibited the utmost openness in his communications with the English government: but, | rd to the first, he has never in any way ro- | with [r cognized the right of the English government to inter- ferfere, but has claimed a right of supporting for him- | self that which he asserts is also supported by treaty. [ abail say nothing, my lords, about the manner in ‘which the Emperor of Russia has thought fit in these communications to deal with his other allies, but [ must @ay that such an example of supreme contempt (hear, hear) and utter indifference hi ad no allel sin the days of the Koman Triumvirate (hear, hear); i€ ix paralleled only by the description given by | Anthony to Octavius of his opinion of the character 2 @f Lepidus, Wh were the terms in which the | England and or of Russia spoke of his allies? How did imperial | Em Anthony unbosom he said that, oes of Russia was most frank and 0) for t his own part, he cared very little what line the French | iE proper to take in Eastern affairs; and then, | fie impression that any vitality remained in | might thin stating that tl Turkey was a mistaken onc, and that that empire must fail to pieces. It is not, my lords, without considerable | is most Thave the ineas thatI find this country embarked in able, and, Ifear, long-enduring war mnena' formi fullest confidence in the good understanding happily ex- | isting between this country and France. We have had, upon the part of France, from the moment of the me- morable declaration af the Emperor, “ L’Empire c'est la | paiz’’ down to the period at which he uttered the no less | remarkable sentence, ‘ The age of conquest is past,”” the most abundant cause to be convinced of the entire good faith and of the loyauté of the Emperor of the French. (Choers.) It may be that ata time not very remote, whea it was found necessary in this country to increas the power of defence—to make preparations which if | they had not been made then would have to be made now—there were many persons who entertained doubls as to | the intenticns of that extraordinary man who has rescued Brance from enarchy and confusion, and placed her in the Soremost rank among the nations of the earth; but, in the unsettled state in which that country then was, those persons who entertained such doubts might lave enter- tained them from its appearing impossible that any ain- gie maa, however great, would be able to reunite the turbulent elements, and to announce and carry into effect the determination of extinguishing the thirst for military glory and the ambition of military power. At that time some slarm was created in consequence of the seeming {mpossibility which I haye mentioned; but aow— “ Via prima salutis, “Quod minim? reris, Graid pandetur ab urbe. Hear, hear.) My lords, we are engaged in war with o coantry which at that time was the most anxious to in- stil suspicion against France, and to put this countr; vupon its guard against her well known desire for terri- torial aggrandizement, urging upon the councils of this country the necessity o! reserving status quo. But, my lords, I any that [1 at the commencement of this struggle—not because I fear for the continuance of the spirit of my country: | men in its favor—not because I charge them with under- | with respect to external polities, taking it in a moment of enthusiasm for a just cause, and in the expectation that the object of it will be ob- tained ata slight sucrifice—not because I foresee aleagth- ened «truggle—but I look at it with anxi because I feel that the recent financial arrangements which have ‘deen made have been made in accordance with an unwise | Peel Deticy, and have placed the eountry in a disadvantageous , * + e word as to one or two of the snbjects touched imself to Sir Octavius Seymour? | (Cheers and laughter.) ‘The communication of the Em- | | project. | rupture of our friendship; and, therefore, not only was | the territorial | > look with anxioty | would not do to criticise hisGrace. No | tirely governed by Lord Aberdeen | benefit of reading before. (Laughter.) Nay, I should not be very much surprised if they were being read at this very moment in another place. (Laughter.) I have cen them ina publication which is supposed to enjoy and atallevents, judging from its malignity .d misrepresentations, the origin of it Berhaps, is not ry difficult to discover. (Laughter.) I will venture to make a few observations on the last number of this publication—the Press this memorandum, which the noble earl seems to regard as his grand cheval de bataille, but which appeara to me to be what is vulgarly ealled '‘@ mare’s nest,” (laughter) this article, which commence: was to be expected (laughter)—sa: newspaper. With respect to ith a falsehood—but that In the your 1844 the Emperor of Russia visited our coun- ‘An cstran; t baving then taken placo between his Majesty deomod the season appr coment of a long cherished project, an ‘tunity o? personally accomplishing it, rite for the advi e feized the oppo the co-operation of English minister, between whom | | and the Court of St. Patersburg there h oxisted for thirty ‘That minister was rd Aberdeen, then Secretary of State in the governmont ears relations of extrcino confidence. of Sir Robert Peel. The falsehood to which I alluded is, that there was the slightest misunderstanding between this country and France. I know this estrangement is intended to refer to the Tahiti affair, which cidoceur in 1844. Unfortu- nately, however, the Emperor of Russia visited this coun- try in the first week of the June of that year, and the | firat intelligence of the Tahiti affair was not received until early in the following Angust, (‘“hear, hear,” and laughter:) therefore that misunderstanding could not have invited the Emperor to advance hia loug-cherished The article goes on to state — On his return to St. Petersburg the Emperor, instructod Count Nesselrode to draw ap « memorandum embodying the understanding arrived at curing bis rocent visit, and for ward it to Baron Brunow, accompanied by « private letter from the Emperor to Lord Aberdeen, in which bo. begged thet if any inaccuracy were found in the document it might _ Le corrected.” Now, my lords, I can only say that I know of no such | letter, ‘and I think that my Imperial and Royal corres- | indence is not so extensive but that I must have recol- lected such a letter had it been received, and I can only say I have not the slightest recollection of having re ceived such a letter from the Emperor of Russia. This article, my lords, states that ‘The Emperor succeeded in his first object. "By the adviee of Lord Aberdeen he ad- dressed himself to Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington. His Grace was always favorable to the Russian alliance.” Yes, his Grace was always favorable to the Russian alliance; and why? His Grace was favorable to it for the same reason that he taught me to be favorable to it; and that was, because he | thought it favorable to the interests of England; and [ regret—though forced into a war which I believe to be just and indispensable (hear, hear)—I deeply regret thi Grace favorable to the Russian alliance, but T should hope that every man who valued the England was also favorable to it. (Hoar, hear.) Tt that was resery- ed forme. (A laugh.) The article eontinues :-— Sir Robert Peel, full of tariifs, was entirely covornod, by Lord Aherdosn. It Was definitively settled in Ist4, between tho Emperor of Russia and the English government, that tho partition of in@ necessary, shonld be transacted by without Franes Turkey, whon it be Great Britain and the two imperial cours: Yes, my lords, the writer of this w he talks of his thinking of nothing but tariffs, and of his being, with reapect to external politica, en’ My lords, T have already said that the Duke of Wellington's opinion was pon by the node earl the Secretary for the Foreign De- | shared by Sir Robert Peel, and I humbly endeavored to partment. which Jer it impossible for him (technically speaking) n the table the convention with France, and our engagements with Franee and Turkey, He says, never theless, that these engagements are actually binding on the government as much as if they had been embodied in & more regular form or treaty. [Lord Clarendon—‘‘There is an honorable understanding.””} There is an honorable understanding; but then we are compelled to go to war in support of that honorable understanding. (Hear, hear.) And sorely it is not uoreaaonable on the part of Parlia- ment to demand, when weare entering on a struggle, the iaaue of which noman ean tell, that we should know what it ia that we have pledged ourselves to, and for the purpose of effecting which this war has beon entered into. (Hear, hear.) It is impossible that we can ask tlie noble earl to declare what are the terms on which alone peace will be restored; but I presume there is something tangible about which wo are about to ight. are not about to fight for the mere evacuation of tho Principalities? (Hear.) We are not about to fight upon | at this moment, if I moke peace my first oblect s the original dispute betwoen France and Russia with | . regard to-the Holy Places—we are not going to fight for the retirement of the Russian army on terms under which theirclaims may be repeated; and, therefore, 1 coafess I am anxious to see, in addition to the announce ment that there is to be ‘a vigorous resistance to the project of a sovereign whose further aggrandizem: would be dangerous to the independence of Europe,’ .some security takengthat these pretensions should not besgain put furward (hear, hear); that, having been once repressed, there shoula be a security on the part of Europe es the same being repeated. (Hear, hear.) Tahould like to hear Ministers say that there can be no honorable termination to this war uniess there is an absolute negative on the claims taken by Russia under the toaty of Kainardji, and some guarantee afforded <” tha comtenuance of that ‘wndersiondcag. Hear.) I do not ask anything further, but Ido ask the government to explain a little more distinctly than the noble earl has done, what are the engagements fnto which we are enter- fag or have entered. J will rejoice to know that we have eaproposition for a protectorate over tha Christian subjects gy we Sudan; but 10 think it not unreasonable, when The noble earl basexplained to ua the reasons | act with ther and up to this hour it has been my en- deavor to profit by their precepts and example. I wish to be led by their light and by their wisdom. My lorda, I confess that I have no intention of dwelling on what the noble earl (Derby) has stated, for, acting with Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington, by whom this memo- random wasdrawn up and sanctioned—no, not drawn wp, but sanctioned and approved by them—I care very little indeed for whatever may have fallen from, or whatever the opinion of the noble earl may be on this subject. (Hear, lear, and loud cheers.) have said enough on this matter, and I can but add, that now, being engaged in this war, I trust that— although to the last deprecating and resisting it to the utmost of my power, as far as was consistent with my duty to the country—t do say that I trust I shall not now be found deficient ‘in earrying it on in such a manner as may lead to the only legitimate end of war—which is (Hear, hear.) We | that of s pence likely io endure, and consistent with the bonor of the count My lords, Ido not feel thateven —and it is never absent from my mind—that I act in consistently with this in carrying on the war with vigor (cheers), and your lordehips will recollect that the most virtuous’ cha: the cause in which he wan eng: himself for the combat, murmu This feeling is uppermost in m trust the war will be carried energy that becomes this nati mination will be an end feeling is to the greatest House. (Loud cheers.) ed, oven while armi Peace! peace heart, and though I with nil the spirit and , Tstili hope that its ter ing peace, and I trust this e shared in by the w Tn the House of Commons, on the same nigui— Lord Jonx Russert, said—Sir, in rising to move an answer to jesty’s most gracious mesange, I feel a deep sense of the solemn, I may say the awful, {mport: ance of the motion Lam about to propose It ix now | more than half acentury aince a mesaage of a similar import was brovg)t down to this House, For the period of nearly forty years {his country has hoon in the enjoy mont of the Neasinge of enon, and thoes blessings have LO) or DEED MOTE Wiuely OF mura CxtomsTMY Yaruod. Lue has occasionally thought fit to offer | it interrupts, and upon the miseries it inf i trust that from this House and from the | | dee ¢ noble | | the government of the Sublime | hear, hear.) essential part of the question we are considering, be- cause, if T am not mistaken—and this is no now opinion | of mine, for I have held it at least from the cammence- | ment of the discussions of last year—it is not the pros- | pect of the decay of Turkey, it is not the fear of he?im- | mediate discolulion (hear, hear,) that has incited the demands inconsistent with her | independcace, and to aggressions subversive of her terri- torial integrity (hear, and cheers); the fear that the old’ system of Russia—the system of grees gradually, of depriving, Turkey of her provinces one after another, of interfering more anf more | with her internal government, (hear, hear,) would not be (Cheers.) It has been the fear that the Ot- toman government, instead of declining, would exhibit to Furope a spectacle of internal concord and of great ex- | ternal power and strength, which has impelled Russia | will bo found an unsuccessful Russian government to | tions of legislation, questions of justice, | promotion of the future welfare of thei | been almost the sole object of the government of Russia | toform and to maintain an overpowering army, to per- fect hor military organization, and to be ready on any | c well or ill founded his apprehen- | ‘our lordships a | consequence | assurance that the Porte will protect the Christian r gion and its churches, and pense: | secution of that religion—if Christians had been denied | | the power of resorting to their places of Divine worship— } if they had been injured or sla | ligion, Russia might justly have complained of an infrac- ! tion of the treaty. details with regard to any privileges which the Christians | | possessed—no interforenice is stipulated for with the or- dinary course of the administration of the Sultan in his own dominions. | kind of foundation. interests of | | posals, as I have eaid, in the first instance, of a temp! | character, | accepte My lords, 1 believe | ad vow o'er of the civil wars who wae deroted to | | which had really taken place, (cheers, rivileges of the people have been increased; their bur- Eetaished, autyerithr om extending ond prosperous commerce, wealth has been diffused through- out thecountry. We’ have lately had an exhibition of the pride, pomp, and circumstance of war; but it is im- ‘o think of war without reflecting at the same time upon the bloodslied it occasions, upon the prosperity | r, | sense of | | the necessity that we should engage in this war thas I | appear here to advise the House to reply in terms of | assent and encouragement to her Majesty’s most gracious In per- | forming this task,'T shall’ endeavor to avoid, as far as I m able, consistently with justice to the subject, those | dy discussed in the debates > questions with regard to ‘ament—as to whether more or hens heve been di porsible cts. (fl hear.) It is, therefore, only from a para message. (Hear, hear, and loud cheers.) questions which we have alr of former nights, 1 allude the conduct of the gov less protracted negotiations should have been under taken— at which we aimed. dizement of that Power, and possibly to the destruc of Turkey, £0 ofter system of pose by ar rope, we had no choice left us but to inter years. prevail in Turkey, and those who haye watched the ccn- duet of Lord Stratford will be aware of the advice he bas given on t of Turkey, and having deeply at heart the maintenance of that empire, he has constantly said—not only recent- | ‘her in case she should pre ly, but for a series of years—The independence of Tur- Key cannot be maintained without the assistance of the | | Garedigcstcen tusuae anita adouhe wilt, separa, to hur. | red unless Turkey should adopt, with regard to her Kf dito her Christian svb- | Chi That assistance cannot be rea- subjects in general, and with regs jects in particular, those rules of justice and fair treat- | ment which are established by the’ public opinion of Ku- | rope.” (Hear, and cheers.) That advice, although rot immediately or fully adopted, has yet been so far follow- ed that there has been a great improvement in the trext ment of the subjects of Turkey. and the Christian stb- jecta of the Porte have especially derived great advan- tage from these changes; they have enjoyed the free excreise of their religion ; they have prospered in trade ; and their welfare has greatly increased unler Porte. (Cries of a very important and This is, sir, making successful. to what, 1 believe, attempt—and what,’ I think, Russia must herself con- sider 2 premature’ attempt’ against the independence | (Hear, hear.) If wo look to Russia, we shall ! observe that while, during the long interval of peace, all of Turkey. the Powers of Europe have been attempting, with more or less success, to improve their internal organization— while they have considered questions of commerce, ques- occasion to throw the sword into the balance in her tran- sactions with other Powers of Europe. have been made during the past year—an immense mili- tary force on the side of Russia, prepared to commence, and, a8 we have hoard within the last two days, alresdy commencing, an attack upon the territories and on the existencoot Turkey. On the other side, sir, if we have not, | at the present moment, the material assistance,we have at least the moral approbation of Europe accompanying the { oo we have made to resist the aggressions of | Russia. | byarma those aggressions—two Powers at the head of tho civilized nations of Europe, who have tested by conflict | in arms, and by rivalry in peace, the great qualities which each possesses, and who have learnt from that conflict and trom that rivalry to estcem one another’s courage and capacity. ceed to state, not the de the opportunity of siudying the papers which have bten Inid upon the table, and having of them on past occasions, is fully informed with respect to details—but the great outlines of the proceedings which have taken place. re i ) i | the first instance, that in treating this subject I shall | keep whoily out of yiew the dispute which has furnished, not a cause, but a Emperor of Russia—| (Cheers.) We have joined together to resist Loud cheers.) I will now pro- Is—for the House, having had Tmay as well say, however Ute for the interference of the allude to the question of the Holy ‘laces. I shall not refer to the silver star, to the keys of the great gate or of the little gate, or to any of those dquestions which were put forward as'the subjects of dis- | cussio scrved ihe contention that took place about them or | | not, were settled by the agreement of all the Powers concerned. What I have to speak of are other questions and other demands. | between Russia and Turkey, we must always bear in mind All these matters of dispute, whether they de- Now, in referring to the relations that the Pmpress Catherine, after a successful war, con- aded with the Sultana treaty, containing an article which Twill read tothe House, with respect to the | | Christians generally residing in the Sultan’s dominions, We must also recollect that some territory was tothe Empress by thas treaty of peace, and held out to her subjects that the war had been glorious and successful, because she had obtained an) assurance of protection for those who were members of the same reli article of the treaty of Kainardji were in these term: ven up at she ious community as the Russian nation. The 7th ‘The Porte promises toprotect the Christian religion and its churches, and the Ministers of Russia will be at liberty to meko representations in favor of the new church, whioh is spokon ofin Article 14. ‘The House will perceive that this article contains an if thero had been any in on account of their re- ut that article contains no special Hear, hear.) It is true that protec- tion is stipulated for, but it is @ protection of an excep- tional kind, and not to be exercised without some special without some great injury or maltreatment of the ian subjects of the Porte. Now, coming to tho vents which took place last year, the House will have perceived that no sooner was the question of the Holy Pla- ces settled than further demands wero insisted upon by the | ambassador of Russia, In the first place, according toru- | mor, these demands took the shape of an offensive or de | | fensive treaty: afterwards it was said that a sened was in- | sisted upon, pledging the Sultan to Russia; and, again, | it was said thata note was required, which’ was to con: , tain a stipulation with Russia that the privileges and im- munities held by the Christians inthe Turkish empire | should be enjoyed by them for the future without limit- ation. The Sultan's minister had at first refrained from asking the opinion of her Majesty’s charge d'affaires, or, afterwards, of her Majesty’s ambassador at Constanti- nople with respect to these proposals, although he had | been alarmed at the manner in which the proposals were | made, end at the threats which were used in case those | And here Teannot but re- | Maj proposals should be rejected. fer to the statements which were made by Count Nessel- rode in a despatch written by him to D@ron Brunow, and commfnicated by the desire of tho Russian government to her Majesty’s government. Ina despatch of the 7th of April, after enumerating various de had been rumored had been made by Russia at Constan- tinople, and denying them all, Count Nosselrode ends by saying:— Hontite and threatoning language held to the Porto by our ambassador is not only oxaggefated but dostitute On the 9th of April, two days afterwards, Lord Strat- ford writes, with rospect to the Tarkish ministers:—- ‘This combination of Ivctance to instruct me frankly with the whole caso, is attributable to the threatening language o: P eff, aud to the character of bis propomsin, | u’e Mensebl T cannot doubt that Lord Stratford had perfectly good I cannot doubt that the longuage used to the Perte during the whole of the mission of Prince Menschikolf was of @ threatening character; in the first place threatening, in case the foundation for the assertions he made. proposals should be divulzed, while, at-the same time, great and tempting offers of support’ were made in the event of thoze proposals being accepted; and threatening, during the latter part of the mission, if the propo. sals should be refused, in which case Prince Menschikoff said that great calamities would ensue. In stating to Lord Clarendon, therefore, on the part of the Russian govern- ment, that the report of hostile and threatening language. having been used was totally destitute of azy kind of foundation, Count Nesselrode only puraued that system of deception and concealment which, unfortunately, has been the characteristic of these Russian negotiations. (Cheers.) But at the same time, when the proposals to which [have referred were made at Gonstantinople—pro; iny nd offering the ships and troops of Russia in aid of the Sultan if the terms propose’ by Russia were, jangunge of a very different character was hel to her Majesty's minister at St. Petersburg. In speaking on a former occasion of the conduct of the Russian gov- | ernment, I used, certainly, very strong language of repro- dation. ‘I do not think, Sir, that that language was at all | toostrong. (Loud cheers.) Although the words were uttered im debate, 1 cannot, upon reflection, say that tho terms | used at allexaggerated the character of the trans- action Twas describing; but those terms appear to have J great ladignatics at St. Petersburg, ani the Km- ss'n Las done me the very great honor of ordering an article to be inserted inthe Journal of St Peer surg, in whieh reference is made—not very. tairly anid certainly very unexpectedly by us—to conddentin' pmunications which had taken place between the Km- and the British minister at his court. Such waa ature of that article that it gave an impression— an impression Which was eagorly seized by the abettors of Russia in different courts of Rurope—that the English government bad been some partics to, or had listenod favorably to, proposals for partition of the Turkish om- If therefore became necessary that we should lay before Parliament and the country’ thé communie: that information, which, out of regard to a foreign sove. reign, wo had not before thought ourselves justified in producirg,.we have no reason to regret the ‘publication of the correspondence, From that cortesponience it ap- peers that the Emperor of Russia, having in is44 declared that the time must come when the dissolu tion of the Turkish empire must take place, and that in this cage he should be anxious to learn the do and views of the English governni in 1353. co cluded, and concluded against all ro: that the m a > to whether the tone that was adopted by her | Majesty’s government at certain periods of those nogotia tions was best calculated to secare that honorable peace 1 shall endeavor rather to point out the course which Russia has pursued, and to show that, unless we were content to submit to the further aggran- on the integrity and independence of which have declared essential to the stability of the yarms. (Cheers.) Referring, in the first place, to the afairs of Turkey, I must beg the House to mark that ‘9 great change has taken place in the internal condi- tion of that country during the last twenty or thirty (lear, hear.) We are all acquainted with the system of violence and misrule which used formerly to ie subject, and of the beneficial effects that | advice has produced. Long acquainted with the affairs | but it has been witha view tothe ir subjects—it has (Hear, hear.) | | There was, therefore—oven without the great efforts that lebated the greater part | 1s, which it any arm, secking for advice, and of re- tions | ant in divulging | hand, and that therefore it was necessary that the q lish goverment should be done in such @ case. of State for Foreign Affairs, gave to that overture is be- ree with him as to what was fore the world, (hear, hear,) and is, in substance, that | Parties to any projects of the kind im- ne time that correspond. | there being symptoms in this and | t men’s minds were rather running hat the dissolution of the Turkish we would be no Mi plied, (Hear, bear.) Duri ence was taking place, other countries t! in that direction—t empire was at hand—I took occasion in this House to de clare, in concert with my noble friend the member for Marylebone, that to such @ partition of Turkey as that which might be imagined by those who shared in an- other partition England would never bes party. (Hear, hear.) succeeded me in the office which he now holds with so zauch ability, (hear, hear,) in reply to what Looked al- together like un oller of part of the territory of Turkey for ourselves, upon certain terms, answered in the most decided language that our policy was to mai tain Turkey, and to support her independence and her integrity, and not to be sharers in her spoils. (Cheers.) It may be that the Emperor of Russia, from his obsorva- tion of Turkey, bad arrived at au opinion that the fall of that empire could not be prevepted, and that it was ad- visable, in order to prevent wat, that some arrangement should be entered into on the subject among the ,reat Powers of Europe. ‘That may have been his iinpression, but I rather think the natural impression on the point is that which Sir Hamilton Seymour evidently derived from | the Emperor's conversations, namely, that if the Emperor appeared so convinced that the fall of Turkey was at hand, he had it in contemplation that the fall of Turkey should take place. (Hear, hear.) But, be that as it may, what- ever was the real meaning of ‘the Emperor of Russia in his conversations and otherwise, her Majesty's be a party to any such projects they would be relin- quished by Russia, and that Russia would calmly calou- late the consequences of having all Kurope opposed to ceed’ uemet aggression. (Hear, hear.) 1 will now, again turn tothe mission of ince Menschikoff. The Prince ended with demands relating to the privileges and immunitios of the jans in Turkey. ‘The Turkish minister, boing alarmed, had recourse to the ministers of the four Powers ‘of Coustantinople for their advice. Lord Stratford was disposed to agree with the Turkish minis- ter that the demands of Russia were dangerous to the independence of Turkey, but the four representatives came to the decision that. it was a question which 60 nearly touched the free action and dignity of the Porte that it would not be proper for them, in their then situa- tion, to offer bny advice on the subject. When this deci- sion was communicated to the minister of the Sultan, he declared that the Porte had already come to a decision, and that the decision was adverse to the demands of Rus nia. Pringo Menschikof! having, as have said, pronounced these threats of calamities which would follow the rejec- tion of his terms—threats totally inconsistent with ‘the language which had been held to her Majesty’s govern- ment (hear, hear)—proceeded, with great state and cere- mony, to leave Constantinople, and to return home. At this juncture her Majesty’s government, thinking that a time had arrived dangerous to the independence of the Porte, directed her Ma, jeaty’s fleet, then at Malta, to pro- ceed to the neighborhood of Constantinople; our ambassa- dor there being further instructed, if the necessity should arise, to order the fleet up to Constantinople. This was a step which afforded the clearest proof of the desire of her Majesty to preserve the independence of the Porte. If terms bad been obtained honorable to the Sultan, and which maintained the integrity and inde- | ndence of his dominions, the fleet could have returned; ut while demands were insisted upon which Turkey could not accept, and while there was a menace that these terms should be enforced by arms, it was impos- sible for her Majesty, and for the Emperor of the French, in concert with whom we were acting, to withdraw their support from the Sultan, I lay all the more stress upon the int, because it was, at the time, matter of inquiry in this House. A fear was expressed—a fear in which I did not participate—that. there would be a sudden inva- sion on the part of Russia upon Constantinople; but it was clear tho House approved the demonstration’ which was thon made, approved the declaration which at the time I made—that her Majesty was determined to sup- ort the Sultan against unjust aggression. (Cheors.) When inielligence arrived at St. Petersburg that tho last demand of Prince Menschikoff had been refused, it was decided there that a mossenger should be scat, conveying a letter from Count Nosselrode demanding in the most peremptory terms that Prince Monschikoff’s note should be signed within eight days, and announcing that, in default of such signature, the Principalities, a part of the Sultan’s territory, would be ocoupied by Rus- fian troops. . It was quite impossible for the Sultan, con- sistently with honor, to consent to such terms; and the menaced invasion by Russian troops immediately took place. It became a question what tho Sultan should do under these circumstances. Lord Stratford, whom I have ever deseribed as the best and truest friend of the Porte, (hear, hear,) advised the Sultan not to exercise his right of’ making this proceeding # casus belli, but recommended him instead to venew negotiations, in the | hope that honorable terms might still be obtained, and in the meantime to strengthen those forces by sea and land which during peace had been greatly neglected, as well as greatly diminished. That advice was taken by the Porte, and it was in conformity with the opinion of all the four Powers—France, Austria, Prussia, and England. Fresh cer gebepae etaarae ly took place; the Sultan offered, with the advice of his ministers, fresh terms of peace. These terms arrived at Vienna at the moment when a note had beon agreed to by the representatives of the four Powers there. The Sul- tan’s terms, therefore, were for the moment set aside, cations. Tam not Vienna note; but what is perfectly plain—what, by any one who fairly reads it, will be ndmitted at once, is, that the Vienna note, as modified by the Porte—as altered, in some respects in its wording, by the Porte—conceded to | the Emperor of Russia every security he could reasona. | bly wish for—the privileges and immunities of the Chris- tion subjects of the Porte. (Hear, hear) The Sultan | said he considered 16 due to his own honor to maintain | bpinpatzed and inviolato the Teiviloges and immunities o is Christian subjects. He stated that he was ready to make this declaration in a note to the minister of the Russien government. Therefore, the sole differenco—a difference on which alt the enceseding demands of Russia have hinged—was that, according to the Proposal of the Sultan, the Christian subjects of the Porte would have enjoyed all theee privileges.and immunities, and have enjoyed them under tho sanction of a solemn document, confirmed by the Sultan as their sovereign, under the sanction of his own declaration that it was due to his own honor to preservé them—under the sanction of an , | assurance given to all the five Powers of Europe— | to Russia no less, though no more, than to the other Powers. (Hear, hear.) The Russian proposal on the contrary, was not to increase the privileges an: immunities of diminished, but had been increased by the Porte of late years—but that all these privileges and immunities Phould be confirmed by a special treaty with Russia, so framed that Russia would have oceasion, in every ques- tion, not merely of spiritual but civil matters, to inter- fere’ between the Sultan and 12,000,000 of his subjects. Hear, hear.) Therefore the question was not, as the ussian government put it, a desire on the part of Rus- sia to protect the Christians of his own community in the Sultan’s dominions—that was not the question—that security was offered, that security was amply offered— ‘put the question was, whether the sovereignty of those 12,000,000 people should be transferred from their own sovereign to a foreign sovereign, with overbearing de- mands, and overwhelming armies to enforce those de- mands. (Hear, hear.) The position which her Majesty’s government tock at that time is stated so clearly in the circular which Lord Clarendon, on the 18th of June, ad- dressed to her Majesty's minister's abroad, that it is one of the few documents which I shall take the liberty of reading to tlie House. The following are the terms of the extract, I shall read,— Tho repeated Msurances of the Russian government, given voth to the government of her Majesty and to the French government, that Prince Menschikoff’s mission to Constanti- Bople had reference solely to the Holy Places, had led hor ty’s government confidently to hope that the eatisfs tory arrangement of that long pending question would hay removed all grounds of difference between Russia and tl B der the plea of confirming ancient treati ere put forward by the Russi rotoctorate of the Greek chur wrded the epirit pirktu of its members, a TT ered by the Turkish govern: ent, who, #] vat ese trying ni iations, a most moderate and onctlintory eeirie, nt it would have beon impossible for them to have complicd with theso last nds without derogating from the sovereign rights of the indepondence of the Porte. further demands sador, involvin, Koy, not only a Fights and. fminuni whieh could be ma‘ Sultan, and virtua!ly surrendering ¢! ti m0 01 therefore. entirely a] ford de Redelifie there isa ccmeplete the Fi les, will act im o mbacsadors of tho two countri s been acknowledged by noceseary to the balance of power in Europe. (Cheers.) Such was the position taken by the English and French governments at that time. Now, when the Vienna note. modified as I have stated, reached St. Petersburg, the Fmperor, who had agreed to the original note, who had agrecd to it, even ax altered, with the view of making our sense of it more clear, by the cabinet of London, refused to accede to the modified note. Not long afterwards there appeared that which the Russian government has Acelared to have been a confidential despateh, but which ovght not to be regarded ax oonfideatial, because it showed what was the spirit in which the Russian govern- ment were prepared to agree to the Vienna note. It shewed that, while the Emperor accepted every word of that note, he did not affix to it the sense which was af- fixed te it by the four Powers, the sense which the Enz- lish government in particular had affixed to it, snd, therefore, the intention’ of the Russian Emperor clearly was, according to his own oxpression, to ac- cept the terms, according to one sense at ’Vicnna, according to another sense in London and Paris, according to another at Berlin, and afterwards to enforce another sense at Constantinople. (Hear, hear.) £0 that, in agreeing to sign that. note, if such was his intention, not only he ought not to have mado that explanation of it ‘confidential, but he should have told the powers with whom he was treating, ‘and under whose sanction this note was to be signet, what his interpretation was, and that in proposing to sign it, knowing perfectly well, admitting that he knew what the sense was which the Four Pewers—esyecially Kng- land and France—affixed to it, he affixed another sense to it. Affixing to it such a different sense—a sense which he meant to keep eecret, but which, no doubt, was to be made use of against the Turkish government—I cannot call his proceeding less than what I called it in the speech to which eo much blame has been attached—a fraudu- lent interpretation. Cheers.) ‘That interpretation, however, was given in the note signed by Count Nessel- rode, said, indeed, to have been written by a subordinate in the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, but of which Count Nessclrode assumed the responsibility. The modi- fied note having been thus rejected by Russia, it remain- ed to be considered whether any further effort should be made to arrange the matter, and the Sultan was far from averse to such anendeavor. But an event oc- curred of the utmost importance; a step was taken by the Sultan’s government from which he thought | there was no withdrawal—the declaration of w: It is always in the power of a tyrannical govern- ment to ender to impose on another government unjust terms; g Motes He wie Camvnpinitd Uo Lag Tadiniad Ouipie Waw ai, ibe aiaumple muguid Mol ERGY tue uudignatiog, ALoUid @ answer which J, as Secretary So, too, my noble friend Lord Clarendon, who | vern- | ment hag hoped that when England entirely refused to | | gence. (Hear.) | declined to | French to consider if any ot! | They considered that no other step but war did remain. ‘8 and the other proposals transmitted to Constantinople. | ‘Yo these proposals the Sultan agreed, with some modifi- oing to enter into the merits of the | But w the time of William III. bave governed ana act; councils of the country—we who have believed that we | ture before the | whem we have in. negoti | have agreed not only in the protocols that have been | signed, but so far that the governments both of Austria | not provoke the anger of thoae be ops whom they are iirested. Such was the effect of menaces of Russia towards Turkey; such tho effect of the invasion of the Principalities, containing 4,000,000 of the subjects of the Sultan. The fanaticism—if you choose so to call it—the enthusiasm, as they call it—of the Turks was aroused; they hastened to tle standard of the Sultan; thousands of men aj resist the aggteasion of Russia, The Sultan had, from the first entrance of the Russians into the Principalitie: been encouraged and excited {o war by his subjects; and, after his last proposals bad been rejected, he thought he | could no longer refram from declaring war. It is hardly | for us to blame the conduct of the Sultan at that junc- ture (hear, hear); the wrong was with Rustia, the wrong was in the conduct of the Russian government (Hear, hear.) Itimight be imprudent in Turkey at that time to brave the force of Russia, but it was an im- prudence which we must all honor (lowd cheers) an imprudence which. arose from a just sense of in- dependence, and from natural resentment of inju- cs which had been inflicted, and which were essayod (Cheers). When that war was declared, of course nego- tations beeame more and more difficult. Still, terms of great moderation, of great feirness, were, on the recom- mendation of the four reprosentatives at Constantinople, adopted by the Porte, and transmitted to Vienna, as the basis of e treaty of peace. On considering these terms at Vienna, the’ representatives of the four Powers, in- cluding the Minister for Yoreign Affairs of Austria, were | entirely eatisfied with regard to the moderation of those terms, which were accordingly forwarded to St. Peters- burg, with the recommendation of (he Austrian minister, in the name of Austria, and in the name of hor allies that they should be accepted as fair terms of peace. Russia, however, setting aside the proposal so recom: mended by the four Powers, sent other terms containing the substance of the Menschikoff note, which the Porte hadalready rejected, with, superadded, articles regard. ing refugees, which Russia had not hitherto put for- ward. ‘The representatives, after Proper consideration, declared these new terms inadmissible, and Count Buol, who, greatly to his honor, had manifested the great: est anxiety for the peace of Europe, earnestly request- cd of the Russian minister that propotals, a8 prelimi- naries of peace, might be transmitted to Vienna, modi- fied in accordance with the views of the Four Powers. This prororal was not accepted, but preliminaries of peace preliminaries as inadmissible us the former—were sent by Kussia, in which, although the article with regard to the refugees was not insisted upon, and it was not insist- ed that the Turkish plonipotentiary should go to St. Petersburg or to the Russian headquarters, terms wero submitted which in all other respects could not be as- sented to. Again the Conference rejected these terms as inadmissible, and declared that they would not transmit them to the Porte. We have thus the agreement, not of England and France, but of all the great Powers of Europe, tft, with respect to this dispute betwoen Russia ai Turkey, Turkey bas proposed and is ready to assent to fair and moderate terms of peace, and that the terms of ce proposed by Russia are unjust, intemperate and in- ‘missible. (Hear, hear.) I think,'sir, after this, con- sidering how much connected Austria and Prussia’ have been with Russia now for many years—considering that the three Norikern Powers had been united on many oc- casions of European difficulty—it will not be denied that, in this contest, Turkey must have been greatly in the right in order to obtain such an agreement between the four Powers of Europe. (Cheers.) These proposals—the moderate proposals of Turkey on the one side, and the inadmissible propoeals of Russia on the other—soemed to preclude ail hopes of an amicable termination of the ne- gotiation. ‘The remaining question, therefore, was, whe- ther or no we could any longer maintain the position | which we had hitherto maintained—a, position showing | our interest in Turkey—showing our sympathy with Tur- ey in her struggle, but at the same time taking no active art for her support. Sir, it is obvious that, when the imperor of Russia rejected these terms, he must have in- fended to prosecute the war. (Hear.)’ The intelligence that we have now received puts that intention beyond doubt; but there was moral evidence without such intelli- We therefore considered, with the gov- ernment of France, what step remained for us to take. We came to tho decision that we might propose to Russia within a limited time to evacuate the Principalities, but at the same time inform her that her refusal to do s0 would | be considered equivalent toa declaration of war. | we have taken, and of course no one cou That — expect that Emperor of ' Russia, having refused reasonable terms, would agree to a summons so peremptory. He has ive any answer to that proposal, and it remained for her benhis d and the Emperor of the er step but war remained. (Hear.) hey constdered that, after having given, at all events, an implied promise of assistance to the Sultan in his resistance to the unjust demands of Russia, they would be wanting in honor if they did not fuldl that implied promise of material aid. They considered that the safety of Kurope depended upon the maintenance of an equilibrium, of which the integrity and independence of Turkey formed a part. (Hear.) ‘They considored that it would be impossible to hope to maintain that integrity and independence if Russia were allowed, unchecked and uninterrupted, to impose her own terms upon Turk (Hear.) It was, therefore, decided by her Majesty’s ernment at once to address this House to advise her Ma- Jesty to send down a message to the houses of Parlia- | ment, and at the syne time to issue a declaration of war. That declaration of war has been issued. We can none of us be insensible to the gravity and the impor- tance of such a declaration. (Hear, hear.) We should all have been glad to avoid it.. (Hear.) But I hold that, consistently with our ition—consistently with our duties to Europe—consistently even with the general interests of this country, we cannot permit the aggran- dizement of Russia to take any shape that her arms might be enabled to pursue. (Heer, hear, and cheers.) Sir, there sre but few, 1 imagine, in’ this country, who hink that any other courre was open to us. There are, know, some who believe that this country might re- main altogether apart frem the conflicts of other Eu- ropean Dations, who believe that we might be indifferent when the independence of a Power is assailed, when o country is blotted out of the map of Europe, and when rome Power, already great, obtains a fearful prepon- derance over the other Powers of Europe. These per- sons, I sey, indifferent to the triumphs at one time of democracy, at another time of despotism, at another time of repu made at different i name of one ot th other, may think it rightto say, like the philosophic husbendman of Virgil rf B licanism, and to the aggressions that are riods in the name of one or the mM q Floait, et infos agit Aut 01 joacen. ‘Non res Romane, porituraq regna —. sir, who are following the maxims which, since mated the havea rt to play in the great questiog of the liberties and in ¥ be pendence of Europe—we who believe that pre- | ponderance cannot be safely allowed to any one Power— fe Christian subjects of the Porte—which | privileges and immunities, I may remark, had not been | we who believe that it is our duty and our interest to throw our weight into the scale of these conflicts, and who believe that this country has risen to power, risen to reputation, riven, I will say, in moral greatness by the assertion and maintenance of these doctrines—we who have seen the country support them heretofore, and in- cur great sacrifices for the maintenance of these maxims —maxims which I deem are connected not only with your honor and your dignity, but with your very safety as a nation. (Cheers.) We, I-eay, are not prepared to abat don our position in Europe, and we ask you, by agree: ing to the address to-night, formally to be prepared to maintain them. (General cheering.) But, sir, suppo- sing the House is prepared to assent to this address, I may be asked two questions—questions which I will not deny it is the privilege of any member to ask, and to which I should be glad, if I could, to give full and satis- factory amswers, but’ to which I can only give such my duty towards tho State enable mo to re- ay be asked, in the first place, with what allies are wo about to undertake this contest? (Hear. Now, in the first lace, ‘ay I have repeatedly assured the House, we were acting in cordial concurrence throughout these negotiations, and we are acting in this last and final step, which ends negotiation and ins war, in cordial con- currence with France. (Loud cries of hear.) I have mot been able, as an honorable gentleman asked me, to pro- duce a formal document—a formal agreement with France. We had proposed a formal ayreement to France, but ancther shape of dotument in the then state of affairs ap- ' Frat eh D shuiyl etommnghh Boh 8 le. That was fore only @ provisional agreement, and anything in the shape of a convention before the House. But the two governments are agreed that their concur- rence should be put in the shape of a convention, and I hope before long to Iay a formal instrumont of that na- House. But while I say this as to the formal document, the House may rest assured that with regard to ‘the spirit of ment, with re- gard to friendly intercourse, regard to frank communicaticn, no two governments were ever more allied than the governments of France and Eng- land. (Loud cheers.) Well then, sir, we have to consider the position of those other two Powers with iation, with whom wo nd of Prussia recomme: to the Emperor of Russia | to accede to the rammons that we proposed, and to evacuate the Principalities on ourdemand, I must say I can add but little to the statement fmade ona former occasion, that whife it is perfectly clear to us what the interests of these great German Powers demand, we have no document, no formal agreement which we can lay be- fore the House, or even an assurance that these two Powers will take part in the war against Russia. At the same time the communications made by the Emperor of Avstria and his government have been most frank and straightforward. They have expressed an entire agree- ment with us as to the necessity of maintaining the indeyendence and the integrity of when we asked (as I think we were bound to ask,) some short time , ‘er of Austria for the moment was of a satisfactory nature. (Hear.) It reserved, however, an application to the government of Prussia, and my belief is,, that if the government of Frussia had acceded to thi acceded to the views of Austria, I now shor make a most satisfactory communication to the House. (Hear.) but it did not appear to the Prussian government at they could accede to our proposal. The Prussian go- vernment haa stated to the world its views upon t! subject. I must say these views at present appear to me to Ue too narrow. (Hear, bear.) [had always chought that Prossia wos a European Power. I had always con- sidered her as one of the principal Powers of Burope. But in the document to which 1 vefer, allusion is made only to German interests—the interests of Prussia towards Ger many—and no allusion whatever to her duties towards Bu- rope. (Loud cries of ‘Hear.") I trust, however, that a short time may bring @ communication of another kind. (Hear.) I cannot but think that if Prussia moana to maintain her position in Europe—diatinguished as she has been, distinguished as she is, both in arte and in arms—she can hardly allow that the disturbance of the balance of power of Kurope and the immense agyrandise- ment of Russia which would ensue can bea matter of in difference to Germany less than to Europe. (Cheers.) But, sir, [ state the case to the House as it is—that negotiations are still going on, and that even the of the Danube by the Russian troops has not brought from Aust ia an immediate declaration that sive will be in‘arms to orgore that aggression. 1 have stated that! think she would baye been prepared bad it not been for an fae hension that, Prussia not concurring in her course, dan- ger might surround her if she proceeded to take that step. But [repeat again what 1 have always thought with reepect to this subject, should not feel that it ts th their interest fully aa much a it ia the interest of Eng | Jad, 00 waweel Luvir uadepoudouce aad Ww cueom baie ua peared in arms on the banks of the Danube to | | know how quickly ¢ i, had able to | | domination of Russia. It ia impoastblo that this war should proceed and that the great German Powers bounden duty, hat it is just and un pled aggression. . c] toy belief, euch is my hope upon this ee re othes question which may be ssked mo is with regard to what we expect as the object and termination of the war. (Hear.) Now, sir, I haye said that I will state no more than that which I consider it my duty to state upon this point, and T consider that T should be departing from hat duty if Tatall restricted the government, at any time, from assenting to terms of peace which that gov- ernment thought honorable and just. (Hear, hear.) For my part, J should not think any terms honorable and just which did not provide for the security of the Turkish “em- pire; but, with regard to the manner in which that security is to be provided, woe all know what are tho chances and contingencies of war (hear, hear); we all aspect of Europe may change from one month to another, (hear, hear); and I think tt would not be right, and that'T should be ‘wanting in prudence and in justice to the people of this country, if specify any grounds that were to be required as the grounds of peace. (Hear, hear.) This house well Eeows that if’ terms of peace were to be adopted whioh they should think insecure or dishonorable, the House has it in its power to rebuke and to censure the minis, tera who should make such a peace. This powor has been exercise’l—whether wisely or not is not the ques tion—but this power Las before now been exercised, and the ministers who signed the peace which was disap- proved were driven from office for agrecing to gach terms. think the House may be satisfied to leave the quostion in this position—that, having taken up arms from neces sity for the sake of supporting an ally, our first ebject must be resistance to the aggressor and protection to our ally (cheers), which protection shall continue’so long as that ally is threatened by his formidable opponent. I know not whether Tean add anything to the statement which T have now made with respect to the cause of the war, and with regard to its object. That object is plain and s! An ally of ours, one of the Powers whose integrity and in- dependence are’ sanctioned by the public law of Europe, has had his provinces assailed and invaded. He if re: quired to sign dishonorable terms of peace as the price of the evacuation of those provinces. He refuses to agree to those terms, which he considers dishonorable ‘ogo to his support in resisting that aggression. Wo have already agreed to a convention with Turkey—s con- vention which, not being ratified, Iam sorry I cannot lay before the House, but which provides for the assistance that we shall give him, and provides that Turkey shall not make peace without the concurrence and consent of England and of France. The convention does not contain—E think it would have been 3 very wrong if it had contained— any stipulation with regard to the internal government of Turkeys (Loud ertes of “oar,” hese.) We have proposed no such convention’ to the Porte. We ‘e proposed to her a convention in the nature of a military convention, and which, when it is laid upon the table of the House, I think will’ be sanctioned with the approval of the House as well as of tho country. Well then, TTeave the ease as it at present stands in the hands of this House, fully convinced that the great majority of thia House have at heart the honor and greatness of This country—that they will all lament, as Ido, that the no- fing of war should be brought to ua, but convinced also that they will not be disposed to shrink from a con- test which is honorable to us, and which I trust will end in sccuring the independence of our ally. ‘The noblo lord concluded, amid loud and continued cheering, by moving the following draught of an address:— Most Gracious Sovereign—We, your Mi ty’s host dati- ful and royal subjects, ‘the Commons of thS United Kingdom of Great Britain andIreland in Parliament assem vied, beg leave to return to your Majosty our humble thanks for yo Majosty’s most gracious wm esaze id for the communi e rt Wi tion of th in obedience to your Majesty of the just senso we entextain of your Majesty's anx- ious and uniform endeavors to proserve to your people the bleesings of peace, and of our perfect confidenco in your Ma- Josty’s dieposition:to terminate the calamities of war, when - ‘over that object can be acoomplished consistently with the honor of your Majesty's crown and tho intersats of your poole. We have observed with deep concern that your lajesty’s ondea’ rated the eral pay ra has eon 0 spirit "of | aggression displayed by the Emperor | of ‘ussia in his invasion and continued occupation of the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia; in tho rojection of equitable torms of peace proposed under the sanction of fout of the principal Powers of Europe; and in tion of immonso forces to support his’ unjast pr These pretensions appoar to us, your faithful ma subsersive of the independence of the Turkish ompire: and we fool that the trust reposed in us demands, on our part, ® firm determination to co-operate with your Majesty im « Vigorous resistance ta the projecta of a soworeign whote far. ther sggrandisemont would be dangerous to the indepon- dence of Europe, Loyd Parsxrston then rose and said:—The question which to night is to be submitted to the House is whether her Majesty will receive the support of Parliament in the contest in which this country is about to be involved. Now, it is known, I think, to those who have given their attention to the affairs of Europe for a considerable time past, that the views of Russia. upon Turkey are not of yesterday, or indeed of any recent date. (Hear.) It is nown that for a great length of time it has been the standing and established policy of Russia to endeavor to obtain ssion of at least the 3)" part of Turkey, and subsequently of Asiatic Turkey. This policy has been yursued With undev: and systematic perseverance. it has been ever kept in view. Wheu opportunities havo offered steps in advance have becn made, and when checks haye been CP epgratiaee those steps have been withdrawn, but only for the purpose of taking advantage of the next opportunity which offers. Delay has been no clement in mitigating or in inducing Rusaia to abandon its schemes. Its policy has been to keep one object in view— not to hurry, not to lose its object by prematurely grasping at its possession, but to watch the course of the other governments of Europe, and to take ad- vantage of Sa opportunity which might present itself by which it could get even the slightest advanco towards ¢ ultimate object of its ambition. Now, Sir, doI blame the Russian governmont for entertaining such a policy? A policy of Fn pthoige pte aehtone by legitimate means te @ policy which you may con w ‘ demnas dangerous to yo a may ops spate ended the liberties is not a reproach to the government which pursues it, provided i! be pursued open, undisguised, and avowed means, without without sulderfuge, and without at Now, the course which, IT am sorry to say, the Russian government hae pursued in all these recent transactions has not been that open and straightforward course which would justify in avyowing and in boldly declaring its policy. (Hear, hear.) But was it from ignorance that that policy was pursued? Did the Russian government entertain any doubt whether its dizement in the direction of Turkey would or would not peril its relations with othee countries? No such inference or doubt existed. (Hoar, hear.) I had frequent occasion, when I held the seala of the vorcige Department, to communicate with an eminent. Russian diplomatist upon the relations between the two countries, and his language to me was always this:—He Soculormeree. Fee think crectied ‘goverment gener . You the best, we think arbit i government preferable, (Hear, hear.) You endeavor to propagate your notions, we naturally endeavor to support our own.” But wo have Lee European interests in common, #o long as we jo not come into conflict upon the affairs of Turkey—so long as England and Russia have no differences upon that most important point, the affairs of Turkey—so long,” said he, ‘J tell my yer omc that there is not! in our opposite general principles of government which will prevent England and Russia from acting amicably together in other matters in which they have a common European interest.’’ Now what was it which made the Russian government think the recent occasion seized upon by it was a favorable one for advancing its long- cherished views? Why, no doubt it speculated uy) differences—irreconcilable aa it thought—betwoen land and France. (Cheers.) It imagined that there never could be a cordial union between these two great coun- tries. (Hear.) It speculated upon differences between England and Austria. (Hear.) It thought that the difierences of opinion which had prevailed between these * two governments, and to 4 certain degree between the two nations, would prevent any common action between them, and thinking, therefore, that there was disunion among the great nations of Europe, and that it was im- possible there could be any combination between the Russian government thought it a favorable m for making another st of - Aizement towards Turkey. (Cheers) Bhat step waa tad with all the ability and with all the ity which has ever characterized the policy of that able and ambitious government. It sought no acquisition of territory, it sought openly for nothing which should alarm the great nations of ee and so coisa rovoke resistance. It sought that which was more us the acquisition of any provinces of the Turkish em} it sought by a concession from the Sultan to the me ror of Russia to juire a real sovereignty over whole Christian population of Turkey. (Hear, bear.) We have been told to-night by the honorable member for Manchester (Six. Bright), that he not see what harm would have arisen from the Sultan accepting either the Menschikoff note or the Vienna note, 4 it is impossible for any man not to see that if, bys concession from the Sultan, the on ge had been made the arbiter of all the rights—general, civil, and political — of the whole Christian population of the Turki ; the sovereignty of the Sultan would have been held sim- ply at the will and discretion of the Emperor of Russia. (Loud cheers.) And that was his object, and the greatest move it was that has for along course of time been made towards the extinction and partition of the Turkish em- pire. (Hear ) The Ruasian government pursued the course marked out by it with a secrecy and #1 which showed its certainty that that which it was demanding was a to be granted if Ding whieh could not, and ought n the Turkish government acted upon a just sense of itsown interests, and duly consulted the interests of its allies, (Hear, hear.) In one of the memorandums—the last, I hink it is, of the secret correspondence—what the langusge which the Russian government w: in regard to its policy towards Turkey, and in to the manner in which the Buropoan goveruments should act towards Turkey? Throughout the Emperor of Russia professes an anxious desire to maintain Ta a8 it is. (Hear.) Apprehensions are entertained that will not be 3 be possible; but he says that the mode of doing it will be that the Powers of Europe should abstain from ‘ssing imperious demands upon Turkey, supported by menace (loud criea of hear), and that opinion is recorded at the very moment when Prince the very thing rope should ab- , 8008 to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey, (Cheers.) Isay, thon, itis impon- - sible for any man who has his eyes in his head, or who is capable of drawing conclusions, to doubt that there is a settled intggtion on the part of Russia to overrun and overthrow the Turkish empire, for the purpose of estab- lishing in the territory of Turkey the ascendancy and ‘Hear, hear.) Then it is eaid, it? Is it possible for us to aro?’ The Turkish empire, aaya Manchester (Mr. Bright), is ‘and he declares “Well, but what about maintain things as th the oe fen ve decay i tate a iret Me aly omnia he "yond wis iv is blind to that, and who thinks that the contrary in the fact. (Hear, hear.) Why, I will appeal to the the “TOE, tah eigts, mocnils \pa.8. pees Ok am froth» and correctness of my opinion. Just com- pare the resistance which urkey hos made within the lsst eight months to the armies of Rufsia—compare that-with the military events of a former year, and let any man any whether Turkey has not shown sof sitality ‘and energy which few people im could possibly have alnplayed under cirevmstences so embarrassing as those in which sho was placed. (Hear, hear.) Among the reasons which I havo ‘no doubt in my own mind—and, indeed, it is avowed in this Knee mgt heey the reasons which urged Ruseia to strike the blow at the present time was this:— ‘The Russian government raw that Mg eed improve- ments in Turkey were tending highly to strengthen the ‘Turkish government, and it raw alao that by thease im- provements, and by the progressive wealth aud comfort + Md WO oy OO Cllalinn aud Grook population