Evening Star Newspaper, August 10, 1924, Page 29

NATIONAL PROBLEMS SPECIAL ARTICLES Part 2—12 Pages INFLUENCE OF AMERICA AVERTED LONDON FIASCO Continuance Necesgary "if Dawes Plan Is to Be Successful in Operation to Assist BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. F one is to understand the com- promise which ended four years of Anglo-French debate over the subject of reparations and made possible, 5o far as these nations are concerned, the application of the Dawes program, it is essential to re- call once more the enduring state df-mind of the two great peoples, the fixed ideas which dominated their lcaders and their policies. On the one hand from 1920 on- ward the British were convinced that at the back of the French mind was a prevailing and predominating fear of Germany, which would, in the end, drive the French to disregard all question of reparations when they saw Germany, under the operation of the Dawes plan, regaining economic and political strength. That France would take advantage of a real or even a fictitious failure of Germany to comply with the terms of the agreement, thrust French troops into the Ruhr again and bring about the economic ruin of Germany, this was the British apprehension. Each Suspicious of Other. ‘The French, on the contrary, were wonvinced that once the Dawes re- port had been translated into action and the economic recovery of Ger- many was assured, the British would both be unconcerned with a failure of Germany to pay reparations and directly interested in seeing that Ger- man production was not stimulated to the point of becoming a menace to British exports. In other words, the French feared that for selfish rea- sons the British would oppose any effort of France to get reparations at the risk of disturbing economic con- ditions, just as the British were afraid the French would seek security by crippling Germany without regard to British commercial and financial Interests. The problem at London—the prob- 1em at all the previous conferences— has been to find a way to reconcile the mutually conflicting interests and the equal distrust of the two peo- ples and their leaders. How was-it possible to deal with the realities as opposed to imaginary dangers? For Tt is apparent that just as it was pos- sible that France might take ad- vantage of a mere pretext to invade Germay again and upset the eco- nomic recdvery, because this eno- nomic recovery seemed to threaten French safety, so it was equally pos- sible, to say the least, that Germany might take advantage of the British opposition to -all coercion to repeat its previous campaign to evade all reparations. That part of the French apprehension which avas real and based upon experiénce had to be met; ihe legitimate right of France to get reparations and to resort to some form of coercion - if willful evasion were repeated, was undeniable, Entitled to Insurance. And it was“just as apparent that the British were ‘entitled, particular- 1y as they were to find much of the money to finance the German recov- ery with, to insurance against any deliberate intervention of France which was based not: upon real and willful German evasion, but upon French. fears stimulated by the re- covery of Germany under the Dawes plan. Two legitimate Interests de- served protection, two natural sus- picions had to be laid, France had to be deprived of the chance of un- warranted intervention, Britain had to be prevented from defending Ger- man evasion in order to avoid French intervention. Now if you look at the intricate and puzzling, compromises ‘which were ul- timately arrived at you will perceive that, shorn of all their encumbering details, they come down to this: Where and when the quarrel between French and British interests becomes acute, where it becomes a question whether German default is willful and obyious or French allegations of such default are unwarranted, then it is to be left to boards of arbitration, and, in fact, to the decision of American citizens acting unofficially, to eettle the issue. Herriot's Hands Tied. ' France went to London determined to keep the right to intervene, which had permitted the occupation of the Ruhr, undisturbed. Herriot found himself compelled to pledge in' ad- vance of the excursion that he would not sacrifice the French right of mv[ dependent action in case there was willful German default, and he was equally’ pledged to- retain the right to the reparations gommission, in which France was able to cast the deciding vote to determine: the fact of a German default. Britain at London sought to estab- lish as right-the principle that no single nation could intervene, no mat- Europe. H ner stone of the whole Dawes edifice. These American and British bankers, moreover, asked at once absolute pro- tection against the consequencs of any disturbing political or military Intervention.- In effect the bankers asserted that they could not undertake to find the $200,000,000 unless they were assured that no matter what happened there would be no new military operation on the part of France. For it is plain that any such intervention would lessen the security the bankers might have in Germany for their $200,000,- 060 loan. In a word it is clear that whether Germany wilfully defaulted or not, so far as reparations were concerned the bankers would be equally opposed to a military action which would with equal disadvantage affect their security for their loan. Threatened French Situation. But this demand of the bankers instantly threatened the whole French situation. Under the Dawes plan the Germans are to pay some $600,000,000 annually when the pro- gram is in full operation and of this sum a little more than $300,000.000 will go to France. Of the $200,000,000 of the bankers' loan about half will also go to France, but it is plaif that France would not think of surren- dering the right to enforce the vay- ment of an annual contribution of more than $300,000.000 merely becaus~ she would get $100,000,000 out of the loan. The struggle then became to find a formula by which everybody's legitimate interests should be con- served and over this the battle raged for nearly two weeks. In the end, as I have said, the solution which was reached amounted to the ap- pointment of arbitral committees to decide whether any German failure is wanton and deliberate. If the arbi- ters decide that it is, the right still remains with France or any other| nation to act independently, if its| associates decline to march with it. Bankers Given Security. i bankers are thus insured | against any deliberate and wanton destruction of their security by French action based upon a pretext ! and not upon actual willful default. The British are insured against the evil political and economic conse- quences of any similar French inter- vention, but France retains the right to intervene, if, in fact, Germany eva- sion .1s real and is so pronounced by | an arbitrat-board of which Americans | are the deciding members. And un- mistakably this is the limit of the rights of any one of the parties in interest, whose conflicting claims | could only be adjusted by compro- | mise. i Of course, in practice all the com- | promises and agreements will work | only as the present state of good feel- | ing between .the French and British | government endures. But the compro- mises take the whole affair out of French and British hands pretty com- pletely and put it in those of the man who is to be agent—general or, better still, general manager of the whole “show.” And this man will, quite obviously, be Owen D. Young, who is responsible for the larger part of the Dawes plan, itself. The all-important, thing was and is | that the Dawes plan should somehow | be put in operation and this seemed impossible because neither the Brit- ish nor the French were willing lhllv it should be put in operation by any. body controlled by a French or Brit- | ish majority. What the London con- ference really amounted to was an 'answer to- the question, “Can.the Diwes plan be put in operation?’ And it. must be remembered that the Dawes plan, like the London confer- ence agreements, represented a com- promise between British and French views and interests brought about largely by American intervention.’ See Both Sides of Problem. I do not think it is an exaggera- tion to say that both in the making of the Dawes plan and In the formu- lation of the agreements at the Lon- don conference fo put it into opera- tion the real success has been due to the fact that American representa- tives, ‘Mr. Young and Gen. Dawes in Paris and Mr. Young and Col. Logan in London, have been able to see both sides of the problem, the British as well as the French, and to recognize the essential and legitimate rights of both. And in the same fashion it in the long run the Dawes plan does work out, it will be due largely to American. influence in applying it. For it must be patent thaz just as the British and French have heen and remain unwilling to trust each other, but ready to accept American arbitration, so the Germans, wno are naturally unready to accept either British or French direction, belisving The ter what the state of faet, and that the . decision as to German default would be traneferred from the reparations commission to a new commission, in which not French but British influ- ence would predominate, -The Eng- lish were opposed to intervention, to any occupation of the Ruhr under any circumstances. They wanted to-put an end to the whole process of coer- cion by force, by military action. Now the one thing that is apparent is that neither of the two countries could possibly have its own way—Her- riot could no more give in to MacDon. ald than MacDonald to Herriot.- This ‘was the situation which had in the past ended: in the failure of conference after conference and most notably of the conference of - Genoa, ‘which wrecked Lloyd George, and that of Paris, which preceded .the occupation of the Ruhr and made it inevitable, It was the danger of such a deadlock which from the outset made the Lon- don conference at once interesting and diffieult. - The problem of the politicians, too, was made more difficult still by the presence and participation - of - the representatives of international finance. Americans and Britons were bound in any event to find the bulk of the $200,000,000. - which was to be Joaned ‘to eTmADY #pd’ was the cor- that both would be exercised without regard to German interests and solely o suit the .selfish interests of. the allied nations, must in the 2ni recon- clle themselves to accepting ‘American advice and supervision. For the Ger- man case is on the whole more des- perate than the British and even than, the French. If the loans provided for | under the Dawes plan are noi forth- coming there will be collapse in the whole fiscal and economic system of Germany. The loans will not cowe ! until the Dawes plan is accepted and Germany has taken the necessary | steps to make application possible. & - Bears American O.K. Like the British and the French, the Germans récognize the folly of as- suming responsibility for rejecting the Dawes plan, because it bears an Amerjcan name, has been indorsed by the ‘American Government and people and is beyond-all question that single highway by which approach can be made to American capital. .Europe wants American loans and America has indicated that the Dawes plan is the American idea of a solution of the European tangle and the ‘only basis of American financial participation in European rehabilitation. Unmistakably, before tg Germans <. . (Continued on . ht %umlmg %tuf WAS HINGTON, D. C, SUNDAY MORNING, AUGUST 10, 1924. What Defense Test Will Mean to America By CAPT. DANIEL S, APPLETON, U. S. A. HEN the general staff of the Army first decided to carry out a practi- cal test of America's system of de- fense on land the proposition was referred to as a fest mobilization. The word “mobilization,” however, did not seem to con- vey the correct impression to the minds of the American people. It created & mental picture of great bodies of soldiers and vast quantities of war material and supplies being concen- trated at varfous points throughout the coun- try for some underlying purpose perhaps even involving immediate or future international dispute. The impression was the natural outcome of the use of the word “mobilization” in accounts of the early phases of the World War, when the very fact that a nation was known to be “mobilizing” its military resources, served as an indication of its pending entry into the conflict. But this impression, this mental pic- ture, which the War Department's announce- ment would make on the minds of the great body of American citizens was considered as by far the most important element to be con- sidered in assuring success of the project, for it is this great body of citizens on whose co- operation and irterest the whole matter of defense of this country is dependent. * ok K k When the chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Pershing, with the personal approval of Presi- dent Coolidge, officially announced to the pub- lic that on September 12, 1924, there would be held throughout the United States a practical test of the country's ability to meet an emer- gency on land, he referred to the plan as a “defense test.” These two words are, perhaps, the most carefully and thoughtfully chosen of all the many terms that might have been used, because they present an absolutely true indi- cation of the meaning of the plan, they defi- nitely imply that it is to be a test of defense and not offense, and they bear directly on the particular legislation upon which the whole plan is based, the National Defense Act of 1916, This act, which prescribed what may be called America’s first national defense policy, had no sooner been passed than the country became involved in the World War and tha consequent necessity for raising an enormous citizen army in great haste, with the knowl- edge and means at hand, but before there had been sufficient time to undertake the necessary study and practic of the new law in order to carTy out its provisions as intended. The real- ization of what would have been the tremen- dous saving in men, money ‘and time had this act been in effect two or three years sooner, has led to an understanding by the govern- ment and a few of the people that it is in time of peace that the practical application of its provisions must be studied, worked out, and, if necessary, amended. * ok ok k Even the World War did not furnish a practical test of our new policy, because it came too soon after the enactment of the law fully and intelligently and thereby be enabled to express its unbiased opinion of the system’s worth. In’addition to the opportunity for study and instruction acquired by the War Department itselt from the coming “defense test,” there is a much more potent and far-reaching pur- pose in mind. This is the opportunity to ex- plain to America and Americans in a prac- tical way the real meaning of our national defense system as- laid down by the country's laws. Since these laws contemplate defense ot the land by every man who claims its cit- izenship and not by a small body of profes- sional soldiers, it is only right that every such man should have a thorough and un- biased understanding of what his country expects of him, and, above all, just how he is to come up to these expectations and what effort he should make in time of peace to pre- pare himself for a national emergency. * k ¥ % The coming “test” involves the assembly, rather than mobilization, of the military man- power at present actually belonging to the three components of the Army of the United States—the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves. The total num- ber of men who will actually be assembled is approximately 350,000. Of this number about 80,000, or nearly 23 per cent, are officers, the high percentage being due to the large num- ber of reserve officers, who in time of peace are assigned to organizations whose enlisted Strength is simply a skeleton, which in time of war is expanded by voluntary enlistment, draft or whatever other means the Govern- ment may decide upon to raise men for the national defense. The first two components, the Regular Army and the National Guard, will be actually as- sembled in full strength, assembled at, such places, and, as far as possible, under such conditions as would confront them were the country called upon to undertake an exten- sive mustering of its land forces to meet an emergency. * ok ok ok Physically. so to speak, the test will, there- fore, be limited to the Regulars, the National Guard and the officers of the Organized Re- serves. However, although the third com- ponent of our land forces, the enlisted force of the Organized Reserves, does not exist in peace time except in skeletonized form (its total strength is between 2,000 and 3,000), the fact that in time of great emergency, re- quiring the nation’s greatest effort, this com- ponent becomes by far the most potent ele- ment of defense, makes what seems to be only a paper concentration in reality the one in the success of which the War Department is most interested. This does not by any means imply that the Government is not in- terested in trying out the other components, but that the latter are less of an experiment than the Organized Reserves. The “defense test,” therefore, becomes a test of the country's principles of depending on September 12, 1924, the date_chosen for the “test,” Is the sixth anniversary of the battle of St. Mihlel, in which for the first time fol- lowing our entry into the World War a great citizen army tested itself against the might of a nation whose very existence had long been based on the theory that it could not depend on its people in time of national dan- ger unless a great part of their peace-time lives was devoted to absorption of an iron military. discipline. St. Mihiel and the Meuse- Argonne proved the worth of our present pol- icy better than all the contentions of its ad- vocates put together, and it is, therefore, well that the country not lose sight of proof so tangible and conclusive as the accomplish- ments of our citizen army in the World War. But if this citizen army does not exist in time of peace, or exists only in a small frac- tion of its war strength, just what can its prospective members do to help make the plan a success? Simply be interested. Be in- terested to the extent that they form a men- tal picture of what they would be expected to do were the call a genuine war movement. Since the War Department's plan contem- plates the localizing of recruiting or of the draft into States, districts and even towns, this interest should be lccal, and local in- terest, involving local pride, is not only the easiest to foster, but the most genuine. It is not considered bloodthirsty or brutal for col- lege boys to think and talk foot ball, for in- stance, for two or three days preceding the annual big game; neither does it savor of militarism in the minutest degree for the American who is an American to awaken in himself and his fellow men a keen interest in his Government's project to make sure that its plan to keep his homeland secure is a good one and a practical one. * k ok kg The coming “defense test” is no less a mat- ter for community spirit than pride in good streets or good schools, and a few conversa- tions, discussions, even arguments beforehand, cannot help but increase popular interest to the point where it will become the foundation of the plan's success. Clear, intelligent, truthful dissemination of information by those who devote the whole or a part of their active careers to America’s defense is not the least of the missions incumbent upon the members of the three components of the Army of the United States. The military policy of the United States is no longer a missing link in the chain of our national organization; it is a splendid theory, based on the essential principles of our Gov- ernment and the oft-expressed wishes of our people. On September 12 the. Government in- tends to show itself and its people that this policy is not limited to a theory, but that it is also practicil—a live, existing, cconomical and democratic system, through ‘which the citizen may be enabled, should the need ever arise, to take up arms for the defense of his country without being mercilessly hurled into the fray without the least idea of what he is expected to do or how to do it. But this uamustered governing that policy; the test is, be made at a time when international rela- tions are undisturbed and the whole country can sit back and regard the procedure care- therefore, to ready claimed, KILLING OF MRS. EVANS LAND SYSTEM OUTCOME {Had Resisted Expropriation of Her Property Under the Mexican Agrarian BY HENRY L. SWEINHART. HEN Mrs. Rosalie Evans, a British subject, was shot to death from ambugh on the road near her ranch in Pueblo, Mexico, one week .ago the nation awoke with a start. People everywhere shuddered when they read the accounts of this dastardly killing, and for two reasons: First, Because the crime was against a.brave, lone woman who, since the death of her husband a few years ago, had been fighting to defend her property and prevent . its expropriation; and, sec- only, because of the foar of interna- tional complications which might re- sult. “They openly say. they will kill u: she wrote recently to her sister in the United States. The “they” to whom she referred were certain guer- illas and other persons who had been prowling about and encroaching on her property in an effort to force her to abandon it. She refused, however, _to.give up the hacienda which she and her husband had acquired some vears ago and developed from a wil- derness into a spot’ of rich agricul- tural beauty. During the past few years it had been a constant struggle on’ her part to hold out. But death alone could conquer her. Agrarian System to Blame. While the immediate cause which 1ed to the killing of Mrs. Evans may have been robbery, the desire to ob- tain the 2,000 pesos which she is re- ported to have been carrying as pay roll for some of her employes, it is undeniable that there was a deeper underlying motive; and that this was incited by her determination not to be dispossessed of the property which she owned and which she desired to retain. -Reports had been reaching this' country for some time past of serious efforts to drive her from her land' in order that it might be divided. ‘The agrarian system In Mexico was responsible, at bottom, for the death of Mrs. Evans. She fought it as a matter of principle and declined to yield to a system which grants to agrarian commissions in the various states of Mexico the right to expro- priate any and all lands’ Yor the pur- pose of subdivision among. the people. A group of people in any “puebio” or community in Mexico can petition the local agrarian commission ; for. llmls to e given them by the government; and haturally when ‘they seek such a dlvi- sion they. select dccessible : -mi valua- ble tillable of” producing lands. It s not known that any other foreigner owning land in Mexico his-given up his or her life as a result of opposi- tion to agrarianism. Mrs. Evans fight agalinst the agra- rian system of Mexico led her to the courts. Her case umed diplomatic importance through the efforts of the "British charge d'archives in Mexico™ Program: City, H. A. Cunnard Cummins, to de- fend her rights. The Mexican gov- ernment protested against the activ- ities of Mr. Cummins, and he recently left the Mexican capital. He has just returned to London to make a report to the British foreign office in regard to the affair. Great Britain, not yet having es- tablished diplomatic relations with the - Obregon government and not having any diplomatic representative in Mexico City, the United States took charge’ of the British archives after the departure of Mr. Cummins and shortly after agreed to look after all the British diplomatic interests in Mexico. This Government, therefore, is acting on behalf of Great Britain in sceking satisfaction for the death of Mrs. Evans. Just who were seeking the lands of Mrs. Evans and how the lands were to be disposed of has not been made clear. According to the reports so far available, there seemed to be some doubt as to who was behind the movement to oust her from her es- tate. The effort was being made, however, under the cloak of the lard division or agrarian system. Mrs. Evans, of course, was to have been Temunerated for her land after it had been expropriated, but- shé de- sired the land, not the remuneration, which she is understood to have claimed would have been insufficient compensation in any event. The Mexican government claimed that she was making unjustifiable resistance to the plan for the division of the land under the agrarian program now in force. How. Agrarian Program Works. The Mexican constitution provides for a national agrarian commission and for agrarian commissions in the various states. The state commis- sions have the authority, under cer- tain restrictions and subject to the approval of the national commission, to expropriate and divide for the general use of the people property belonging to owners of haciendas, or large estates, farms and other lands. A presidential decree fixes rules and regulations to-‘govern in-the- appli- cation of the agrarian program. It exempts small holdings of .certain described classes: « for instance, a tract of less than 150 hectares (370 acres) ‘may. not be seized for com- munal purposes. The United States, in its dealings with Mexico over article 27 of the “constitution of 1917, made no effort to tell the Mexican government what laws it could or could not pass, main- taining only the following position, as stated officially by the State Department: “The fundamental question which confronts the Government of the United States in considering its re- Tations with Meéxico-15"the Safeguard the great body of citizens for its safety, and not by any interpretation, as a few misguided individuals and even organizations have al- a militaristic exposition of its war-making facilities! Government's WASHINGTON FOR ADDED citizen, America’s “Everyman,” must co-operate with and aid the Govern- ment to his utmost for the short period in- volved if the “defense test” is to bt of any real value to the United States and himsel. PREPARES POPULATION Coming Elections Sure to Make Changes Which Are Expected to' Require Additional Homes ASHINGTON is once more preparing to play the part of host to the quadrennial 8 influx of new families which marks a new Congress and a new or renewed administration. The changes among the guests on these four-year house parties which the voters of the country provide for their public servants necessitate a lot of back-stage bustling on the part of the permanent population. of the National Capital, principally involv- ing housing, but affecting also many other phases of private industry here. At first it would seem that political campaigns, national elections and changing parties would have littte effect on private industry in the Capital, but a second thought will show otherwise. Keeps Realtors Busy. Consider the field of real estate, for example. Defeated statesmen mean new ones from “back home" to take their places, and every such change in the official family means activity among the realtors. Depart- ing lame ducks must vacate the houses or apartments in which they have been domiciled, and there ap- pears on the for sale or rent market a correspondingly large number of properties over which salesmen may fight for commissions. Should a different administration come into power, housing facilities must be found for cabinet officers and their wives and families, for the many executive assistants and! their families and for hundreds of private employes and servants in the official retinue. It cannot be taken for granted, in view of recent tendencies, that all retiring statesmen will return im- mediately to Main street. As a m iny of property rights against con- fiscation. Mexico is free to -adopt any policy which she pleases with respect to her public lands, but she is not free to destroy without com- pensation valid titles which . have been obtained by -American citizens under Mexican laws.” ‘Whether the attempted taking of the -property of Mrs. - Evans could have ‘been’ classed as confiscation, and whether the Mexican authorities ‘were. entirely within their -’ legal rights in attempting. to force her to give. up the property, are matters which will probably be threshed out and'decided in the near futuré; and N heirs” are citizens of the United - States (she herself having formerly lived in this country), the question may possibly come before the Mexican-American claims’ com- mission which is to meet shortly to adjust all claims of citizens of the two countries. - In the meantime, however, Great Britain will await| suitable punishment of the cuiprits|. _rerponsible for her deathy - ter of fact a study of developments In past years indicates that a ;noa’ many will remain in Washington. The reason, simply, is that the Dis- trict of Columbia is a good place in Which. to live. Most men in public life on coming to Washington are surprised to find that the seat of gov- ernment is an ideal spot for perma- nent home-making. Back home they had thought qf the Capital as a city of public buildings and monuments. That it should have a non-transient, satisfied coterfe of home-owners, many of them entirely independent of direct connectidh with the govern- ment departments, did not occur to them on casual consideration. The city's desirability as a resi- dential spot is further enhanced, they find, by its utter lack of a factory district, with its attendant unsightly surroundings and alien neighbor- hoods. No tall smokestacks rear themselves above the skyline and belch forth mantles of black smoke to threaten the befogging, by an fll wind, of the residential section. When these facts are taken into ac- count the urge to go back home gives way to a determination to settle down in this community of broad ave- nues, imposing buildings, shaded parks and prosperous citizens. As a rule statesmen find it ‘just as profit- able, it not more so, to enter business or to pursue private professions in Washington as' in their -home States. Most. men in public life are lawyers. Lawyers realize that the Capital City is the home of all laws, and the legal colony accordingly grows larger and larger each year. At hand are the United States Supreme Court, the De- partment of . Justice, the Congres- sional Library, the various legal agencies. of the nation and the gov- ernment’s law.making body itself. ‘What other -city .could offer so many advantages? Many Oficials Stay. Many former public officials are well enough fixed financially that they do not have to re-enter private business. They are ffee from any possible drawback in selecting Wash- ington as a future home and they usually make the most of it. Consider ‘a few of these former leaders of the Nation and their fami- lies. Woodrow Wilson spent the re- maindéer of his days in the S street home which he purchased after re- tiring from a public career. Warren G. Harding owned a handsome resi- dence here and his widow has estab- lished herself in an apartment near the scene of her. late husband's ac- tivities. Chief Justice Taft neces- sarily has-settled here. Many of these three former Presidents’ Cabinet members have taken up their perma- HUGHES GAINS TRIUMPH IN WORLD DIPLOMACY His Is Greatest Single Influence in Bringing Success to the London BY OLIVER OWEN KUHN. MERICAN disinterest has been the fusing iron in the London conference on reparations. And Secretary Hughes interest in first-handed promotion of confidence in the disinterest of this nation has made ‘“interested disinterestedness” a new force to be reckoned with in future diplomacy. Only through the belief that Ameri- cans had no axes to grind and were honestly secking some settlement that would insure the economic and financial weal of the Old World, were statesmen of various contending nations brought into line and agreement reached in Lon- don giving some promise of insuring a peaceful future. And, though Ambas. sador Kellogg, Col. Logan and Ameri- can bankers labored to make their dis- interest plain, it was not until Secretary Hughes appeared in England as a visi- tor and traveler, denying official import in his visit, did statesmen of allied powers renew their tasks of settlement with optimism and real satisfaction, \Conference in London. Though not representing this Govern- ment, as has been repeatedly stated, Secretary Hughes conferred here and there in the highest places of the British government. The French pre- mier, Herriot, and other distinguished Frenchmen sought counsel in his cham- bers during his London stay. Belgians | and Italians likewise turned to him for advice as to future courses. Officially Secretary Hughes said nothing. Un- officially, and as man to man, Secretary Hughes is declared to have said many things. The gist of remarks was: “The world has seen what contentious na- tional feeling has brought about. There must be comity, there must be real ef- fort toward good will. National inter- est is as nothing compared to general interest which will insure a going world, one that can live in peace and prosper. Here is the Dawes report. It insures the thing. we all wish. Let's settle our dis- putes in a compromising way and open the highroad to gencral prosperity for the whole world.” Haiken Back to Speech. Statesmen of the Old World hark- ened back to the day when in New Haven Secretary Hughes made it plain that the United States could not be expected to do anything in any ‘Wway until Europe should first set her own house in 6rder. Here in London was a chance to do so, possibly the last chance for many years. At least it was an auspicious occasion. That the psychological moment had ar- rived few could deny, for, first of all, there was will to do if combative ele- ments in various nations could be silenced. Secretary Hughes learned that Herriot at heart wanted nothing better than peaceful agreement that would insure economic and financial advance. But Herriot was beset by political enemies at home. Secretary Hughes took note. During his stay in London the American statesman made it plain that although the American government could not and would not be committed, nevertheless there was in America a great force demanding that something be done toward the restoration of Europe. These Amer- icans could be counted upon to make the Dawes report a living thing, and financially were able to do so. If there were any qualms or misgivings previous to the arrival of Secretary Hughes in London, these faded, and as a result all England agreed that nothing should be done there to haz~ ard the success of the conference or impede Premier Ramsay MacDonald in his efforts the reconcile the British and French viewpoints on the Dawes report. ‘Makes Paris Optimistic. Secretary Hughes, having healed many a contentious sore by his fore- looking attitude in regard to the Dawes report, then went on to Paris. Here he met the arch-enemy of Her- riot,-the man expected to bring about the overthrow of the present premier for concessions to England, and, as a consequence, treated Germany with moderation. That man was Poincare. Again, unofcially, Secretary Hughes talked with leaders of conflicting po- litical thought. Almost as if by magic clouds of pessimism faded. The French press reflected a new note of confidence, a new notg of willingness to make sacrifices for the common good of all nations. Herriot, in Lon- don, felt these reactions. He took | new courage and proceeded with as- surance, at the same time With a compromising attitude on all points. which up to that time had been of sorely contentious nature, and by their very character designed to throw the London conference on the rocks. Secretary Hughes must have chuckled as he took a train from Paris and flitted toward Brussels, there again to advance the cause of compromise in the general unpromis- ing situation. In Belgium again he was permitted to meet the leaders af thought in governmental and busi- ness circles. Having confidence in the man as a man and the man as Secretary of State whose philosphies as to what was necessary to bring about a new state of things in Europe were respected. - It'was immediately noticeable that after Secretary Hughes left Belgium the Belgian delegation in London thought less of clinging to the Poincare theses in re- gard to the Rhineland and the Ruhr and adoped a modified attitude, one easily blending with the general tone of the conference. But Secretary Hughes was not con- | tent. He penetrated “enemy” country as well, just as Chancellor Marx and Foreign Minister Stresemann were nent residence in this city. The list of home-owners includes former .7 (Continued on Third Page.) ‘were about to depart for London at the behest of the allies, there to pre- Parley. general modification of some of the points considered the allies last word in compromise. Secretary Hughes did | not confer officially with these Ger- man statesmen. He met them at a social function. This, however, did not preclude a half hour's serious chat. Paris a few days before de- clared that the Germans woquld sink the conference barge by counter de- mands. After Secretary Hughes talked with Teutonic leaders, how- ever, there was a distinct change in the German attitude and as subse- quent days proved. the Germans ac- cepted the allied viewpoint and prom- ised to carry out the Dawes report faithfully and to the letter. For the first time since the Franco-German war French and German premiers met and held conference. This is but a forerunner of a series of construc- tive Franco-German conferences which eventually will settle minor questions that may arise outside the application of the Dawes report As Secretary Hughes took the ship home from Bremen he is reported to have been in high glee. Surely there was occasion for smiles. While on the high seas the radio carried to him results of his unofficial but nevertheless effective actions—he had brought agreement in the London conference where agreement was du- bious. He had opened the gates to new scttlements—greater understand- ings that will redound not only to the credit of the esteemed of State, ecretary but America as well Distrust In Overcome. One fact in Secretary Hughes' ac- tivities has been overlooked. That is the fact that he has given rebirth to confidence in America's ideals—firm belief that when trials are greatest and human fortitude is worn to the vanishing point, America may be counted on'to help as no other nation on carth is able to help in the task of leveling those difficulties which make the world a difficult thing to contend with, During the war and immediately after confidence in Amcrica’s determi- nation to see justice done was at height. America’s disinteredness was declared then the key to successful solution of Europe’s difficulties. Na- tions, even the allfes, were at each other's throats because of peculiar national interests handed down for centuries, and these interests were the borning place for hatred and an- tipathy. America could solve varjous problems by virtue of the -faith each nation had in America. Then came a period of aloofness on the part of America as a government and Ameri- cans as a people. The idealism cred- ited in Europe during and immediatc- 1y after the war was declared a hoax Following the general law of psy- chology that in disappointment there is born distrust, European nations began to distrust America with an ardor not exceeded by wartime en- deavor. Everywhere the displeasure of the people was manifest toward Amerioans. Governments likewise flouted American sincerity when it was expedient to do so. The sun of America, insofar as confidence. and European esteem were concerned surely was fast setting and it is a known fact that this feature has . been given serious consideration by officials of the American Government America Again Gives Ald. Reactions, small in their way but multitudinous, were as straws in the winds indicating future troubles and difficulties of far-reaching nature There was no minimizing the stiua- tion. Of such stuff everlasting inter- national misunderstandings have arisen. But after Europe had floun- dered and floundered and sunk deeper into the quagmire without America's helpful aid, the Dawes Commission and report came into being. It was hailed as a way out, but dubiously in some quarters. There was needed a steadying hand to pilot the nego- tiations necessary to its fulfilment over the quicksands. Americans were designated to represent American in- terest and they accomplished their purpose in large measure. But it must be admitted that it was Secre- tary Hughes’ influence more than an yone other single force that has insured success of the London con- terence. And this very diplomatic victory is certain to be reflected at times in the future. Though Europe is to profit by settlement in London, America will undoubtedly profit in Europe’s quickened consci- ousness that after all America right and will endeavor to remain right. Requickened trust will follow is U. S. Trade Not Hurt By Japanese Tariff Because Japan's imports from tho United States are principally staples, only a small share of this trade— less than 2 per cent—is affected by the recent increase in Japanege im- port duties to 100 per cent valorem on a dong list of luxuries, F. R. Eldridge, chief of the Far Eastern division, in the United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, explains. The Japanese ban, calculated to re- duce the unfavoratle balance of trade and encourage simpler living, affects but little American exports to Japan, which consist largely of such com- modities ag raw cotton, lumber, iron and steel, machinery and heavy chemicals. The Japanese exports to the United States, on the other hand, contain & much larger proportion of luxuries—silk and silk manufactures alone comprising about 80 per cont of the total shipments. These two items constitute approximately 40 per cent of the total export trade of #ent Germany’'s case and asking for Japam.