Evening Star Newspaper, January 8, 1922, Page 6

The following statement reports the Seventeenth meeting of the committee on limitation of armament: The seventeenth meeting of the com- mittee on limitation of armament was held this morning, January 7, at eleven o'clock in the Pan-American Union ; Building. Prince ‘Tokugawa committee as follows: addressed the e He said that he did not wish to take { T Sazenn - s - the time of the committee in the per- formance of an unpleasant task; as some of the delegates knew, he was about to take his leave of them to start that afternoon on his return journey to Tokio to assume his parliamentary responsibilities. It was needless for him to say how greatly he appreciated the courtesies and consideration which he had received and the spirit of co- operation on the part of his colleagues which he had encountered. That which the conference had accom- been successful; its full accomplishment was not yet completed. In bidding adefu to his colleagues he desired to state that he would always remember with gratitude and pride the privilege it had been to sit with them at the conference and he hoped and trusted that their paths might meet again. Conference Regrets Departure. The chairman (Mr. Hughes) said that he was sure they would all deeply regret that Prince Tokugawa had to leave them. They were indebted to him for his co-operation and he might be assured of their abiding affection und estéem. He was leaving then the most pleasant memorles of his as- sociation with them in this important work and the contribution that he had made personally to the success of their efforts. The chairman then suggested that the committee proceed with the had been presented with respect to the abolition of the use of asphyxiating and other poisonous gases in warfare. He then the resolution as follows: The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and 1 analogous lquids, materials or de- vices having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civillzed world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized powers are parties. Now to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the consclence and practice of nations, the signatory powers declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto. Cendemns “Barbarous Imveations.” Mr. Sarraut said: “1 rise to express my full and frank adherence to Mr. Root's resolution. From the first we condemned the bar- barous inventions and the abominable practices introduced by Germany in the late war, the new methods con- sisting in the use of gases, burning liquids and poisonous substances, and the first thing we have to do here officially is solemnly te denounce those who took the initiative in these things. We should all hope and work for the final disappearance from war- fare of these infamous practices if indeed” other wars are to come, a thought that is abhorrent to me. “We may, no doubt, accomplish this by setting an example to the other countries. The reports of experts who have maturely considered the ques- tion have indeed pointed out the extreme difficulty, if not impossibil- ity, of taking practical precautions against the threat and the use of these poison gases and chemicals. It is an_ established and indisputable fact that chemicals that are used in the manufacture of gases and poisons are the same that are used for in. numerable ordinary substances nec essary to the industrial and peaceful life of the human race. “The reports of experts have es- tablished the Impossibility of exer- cising an effective supervision over the production of gases which may be used as weapons of war, and hence the limiting such production. logical consequence entails the im- possibility of preventing any country whatever from arming itself in ad- vance against the unfair use of those gases which an unserupulous enemy might secretly prepare for sudden use upon an unprotected enemy, as we bhave seen done during the late war Declared Bond of Unien. “But if the exercise of authority in the matter does not at the moment a practicable the Root resolution is mone the less a useful accomplish- ment; in the first place, because it ‘will be & bond of unjon between the powers here represented and, further, because their agreement and their example may be such as to bring about the adherence of ‘all the na- tions to the same principles. But, mesnwhile, we have here presented a grand example possessing a not in- considerable persuasive power, and thug, it may be, preventing the repe- titien of certain atrocities committed by €ertain belligerernits during the late war, It is with this loftily humane motive that the French delegation sul ibes with all its heart to the Foot resolution.” MF. Balfour said that as he under- stopd the matter the.proposal before the meeting was the reaffirmation of the admitted principles of interna- . tiomal iaw. In that sense there was < nothing new in the proposals made by Mr. Root. Indeed, on the very face of the document itself it was pointed out that the greater number of na- tions, in_the various treaties which hi subsequent to the rmistice, had explicitly or implicitly jared that in their view the pres- i j % Yent proposal was already part of the £ ¥ affirm the law. accepted law of nations. He believed that the United States of America, swho had not ratified those treaties, had made separate treaties, but in * these treaties also they had by im- ¥ piteation afirmed the present proposal % am part of the general-law. * ¥ More- #0ver, he remembered that in March, 11928, a declaration had been made by the allied and associated powers, dnesponse to an appeal made to them 3 the Red Cross Soclety, In whioh in - icit terms they laid down the same Fobtrine. Behind all those formal acta ‘there had been the findings of the two _Hague conferences which, although so ‘dar as he was aware were not ratified By the United States cf America, were accepted by all the other powers en- b in those conferences, undoubt- edly with the sympathy, although not with the explicit ratification of Amer- Sees No Change. Therefore he supposed he was right @n saying that the document before * them neither made nor professed to anake any change in international Jaw. It would be interesting to com- % pare the proocedure on this point with 7that which had been adopted with re- gard to submarines. There also they had declared in very clear terms what ! they conceived to be the e BT i what undoubtedly was the law of na- tions as regards attacks on merchant .ships by ships of war. In that case ‘ they went further than it was now * proposed to do, and further than it as possible to go now, for they had §.made an alteration and proposed an extension of the law of nations. é“rhcy had agreed among themselves to ¢.be bound by regulations which were s in advance of the actual law of na- Dtions, and they had also aitered the nctions which behind the law of nations, in that they introduced the “to'lrfl of Mr. Root's clauses, which would oonvict the individuals who ‘broke the law as gullty of piracy. So| .. that in dealing with submarines they had gone a good deal further than was practicable in the present case. *"They could now do no more than re- It might be asked in the first case * swhat was the use of merely coming s s.forward and reafirming what nobody V.denfed? Personally he thought such a course was important and valuable if ullt.la of such afi ! lamentable occurrences of ‘the i, war, and all ghe developments whi ich A consideration of the resolution. which [ I | d| different states. The:preoise metliods l that war caused in the use of noxicus Bases, were taken into account. course ‘they must all admit, as M. Sarraut_had well pointed out, that a mere affirmation of the law without adding any sanctions to it would not relieve the nations of the world from: taking precautions against those wha were prepared to break' the law, and who, if they were allowed to do So with impunity, might dominate the world by the mere indifference’ they showed to the laws which the world had endeavoreed to lay down. That was what had actually ocs curred in 1915. In 1915, as In 1922, the present proposal was the law of n. tions, and because it was the law of ations no nation but one had faken any steps toward using noxious gases or had contemplated, as-part.of their! possible military operations, that such gases should be used elther by them- selves or by their. enemies. The result had been very near to a complete dis- aster for the allied armies. The shock of that new Weapon of warfare had been wholly lecal, for the invention of aciemce came to_ the rescue, an finally the allles and their unscrupu- lous enemy fought out the. war on equal terms. That example, unhap- pily, was now before them and could not be ignored. Their specialists had peinted out in Washington, and an examination by a committee of the league of nations had brought out a similar result at Geneva, that it was perfectly impossible so to arrange matters that a nation bent upon doing: 80 should not in time of peace—what- ever the rules of war might ake such preparations as would en- able it to use that monstrous and in- human method of warfare at its will if war broke out. They knew that at least one great civilized nation had not thought it improper, or. at all events, had chosen, whether proper or not, to break the law of nations. Guard Agaimat Future. That wretched example might un- happily be followed in the future, and, therefore, no nation could forget that it was open to attack by uncsrupulous enemics; no nation, therefore, could forego the duty of examining how such attacks coyld be properly dealt with and effectively met. Again, there was a parellel in the case of the sub- marine. The British empire delega- tion had desired to.abolish subma- rines, but that was found impossible, and it was admittedly impossible to stop the erection of worka in which poison gases could be manufactured in unlimited quantities. The British empire delegation, therefore, had to say—and he was sure they had the sympathyt round that table, for no dissentient voice had been raised— that if submarines were allowed they had to contemplate as a coneeivable possibility that they would be mis- used and that precautions would hav to be taken agaimst such misuse. He believed “that every other nation recognized that, unhappily., subma- rines would remain a pecessity, as in the case of poizon and lethal gases. ‘Therefore, the relief which such a resolution as this would give to the world in connection with poison gas would not be the complete relief which they all desired; it would not remove the anxieties ' and preoccupations ‘which the possible use of gas neces- sarily involve. But were they, there- fore. to say that they would do noth- ing? Were they. therefore, to say that resolutions such as that now before them were useless? Were they, ther fore. to say that it was an empty form solemnly to repeat rules which were already accepted, although they vere not in a pesition by the estab- lishment of new sanctions absolutely to prevent their use by any nation ;l:)\cr,upuluul enough to desire to use em? Amswers im Negative. Those questions he would .answer in the negative. “ He believed that if by any action of theirs on such an occasion as the present they. could do something to bring home to'the con- sciences of mankind that poison gas was not a form of warfare which civilized nations could tolerate, ‘they would be doing something 4mportant toward discouraging them. No sanc- tions. were provided in the present document; Wo sanctions could be pro- vided there. But if any one looked back even upon the history of the late lamentable war they would see. notably in the great test case of the United States, that the gradual ris- ing of public indignation against some grossly immoral use of the weapons of war had had a profound influence upon the history of the world. He was quite sure that the moral indignation roused in the con- sciences of the United States had had a most powerful effect upon the whole trend of events. He thought that by the present resolution, backed a: it was by the consciences of the ci ilized world, although there was no sanction laid down in it, for no sanc- tion was possible, they would, in fact, be creating a sanction not formally, but informally. He believed that the outraged consciences of the world would rise in indignation and that any nation would be very bold and very ill-advised it, in theé face of that universal opinion, it deliberately vio- lated the rules which on the present lon they were invited deliber- ately to affirm. ‘Therefore, ‘without committing himself to the adtuallan- uage of the lution, "he most | eartily assoclated. himself and:also thé British empire delegation with the ‘policy which the. Am in dele- gation, through the mouth of Mr. Root, had put forward for their ac- ceptance. Resolution Adopted. Admiral Baron Kato sald that the question of poison 's had been dis- cussed fully and the opinions in re- gard to them were now very well known.. He would not, therefore, take the committee's time by repeating them; he simply wished to express his approval, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, of the resolution presemt- ed by Mr. Root. ‘The resolution was then unani- mously adopted. The committee then began the dis- cussion of the question of the limi- tation of aircraft. The chaigman pre- sented the following report of the subcommittee on aircraft:r 3 * Form of Proceduwre, . - 1. In conmsidering the limitation of aircraft as to numbers, chafacter and use, the committee on airéraft adopt- ed a form of procedure which took up the various 3“““”' involved jn the following order: (1) Commercial air- craft, (2) civil aircraft, (3) military aircraft. Heavier-than-air and Hght- er-than-air craft were. considered separately since the- conditions got- | erning the two are not in all cases the same. An effort was made to detér- mine whether or not it is possible 4o impose limitations e:r’“ (.h!lrk(l) number, (2): character, -(3)--use, adl after discussion of %m-&hm that might be employed effect -sugh limitation, whether “limitation was def be a duty to ot the tial | facts which will have a decided beac-' ing upon the determination of the troper policy to be adopted, and this done in this report. Commereial A Afreraft. 2. Difterent mietlipds of. imposini such limitation may be adopte bg adopted by any state must be in con-. formity with its organic states it may be possibl an arbitrary limitation; in eu? the exercise of the police power, or ot the power to tax, a practical limita- tion may be enforcéd, In the United States, where laws passed by ‘the Con- ess must conform to thé . ‘onstitution of the céuntry, be some difficulty,in findh fective means of imposin tion, t nevertheless ;mz If necessary duch found. ; 3. Before dluuulnf 1 of the matter it. will be well.to r carefully the effects which would follow the imposition of the limitation upon the numbers and char- acter of commercial aircraft which may beowned and operated by the nationals of a state. In the first place. if commercial aeronautics is % to follow the natural laws which h: ave govs eans of trensportation and com- ::‘unle:uon. the n:mber and la,h%mm- on financial onuld-rmu. Th-g 18, commercial aeronautics as a business hart Lee | gation of ‘the atr w! will not thrive unless the operation f | of the aircraft wil return a substan- tial profit. The state may interfere with the operation of these natural laws by granting to the owners and operators of such aircraft a direct or indirect subsidy. By so doing enter- prises which would not:otherwise be financially successful may be enabled to.live, and in this way the number of aircraft used for commercial pur- poses will be greater than if the natu- ral laws of development had been al- lowed to take their course. Development Unlimited. 1t is not easy to foresee what con- sequences to human progress will come |n the future from the develop- ment of aeronautics in all its branches. They will marvelous wheré natura are favorable to such development. To try to limit them now with ar- bitrary laws, even if these laws have world progress. 4. If among commercial aircraft we class those owned and operated for sport or pleasure or convemience. the nymbers -of these will depend largely upon the wealth of the na- tion, ‘upon the inclination of the people toward aeronautics, upon the cost of the aircraft thus employed. 5. The development of aircraft has presented the world with a new and improved means of transportation and communication. One of the causes of warfare in the past has been a lack of the proper distribution of the world's resources in raw material, food products, and the like. Another potent cause of war has been the lack of understanding between races, peoples and nations. Any addition fto the transportation and communica- | | tion facilities of the world should operate to improve the distribution of resources and likewise to lessen the causes of misunderstandings be- tween peoples, and thus lessen the causes of warfare. Any limitation, therefore, limiting a means of transportation and communication between the dif- ferent parts of the same state and between different states. It seems|Mercial aircraft in general, and will inconceivable that any limitation jaffect the future welfare of the na- should be imposed upon commercial | tions. This question, therefore, can- aeronautics unless it were with the avowed object of thereby limiting the air power of a state and thus de- creasing the liability of war. Com- mercial aeronauties, “with its attend- ant development of an aeronautical industry and a personnel skilled in the manufacture, operation and the maintenance of aircraft, does furnish a basis of air power. ment of commercial aeronautics and the development of _a_. nation’s air power are Inseparable. All of Military Value. 6. Speaking broadly will be of some anilitury value, matter what restrictions may be plac- ed upon their character. Some can probably be converted with but few changes into military aircraft: others can be designed so that with major or minor alterations, or even with none at all, they can be employed for |, As ‘a matter of g fact, the uses of aircraft in war are! military purposes. many. During the world war highly specialized types were designed for special uses. Military aircraft have likewise been developed to a degree of perfection not yet reached in com- mercial aircraft. It is quite reason- able to suppose that similar develap- ment will take place in commercial aircraft; that they, too, will be espe- clally designed for the uses to be made of them, and that they may depart quite radically from the military types used in the world war. In military aircraft as a rule a prem- fum is placed upon performance. Con- sideration of initial cost, of cost of apertion and of maintenance are largely disregarded. The safety and convenience of the operators and passengers are con- sidered only as tiese affect their ability to perform: their milif duties. If as seems evident, commercial aircraft must be specially designed the - service they are to pe in er to have a chanos of being- #lly successful, any effort to provide for their.-conyer- sion_into military :craft. will intfoduce complications which 'will- increase the cost of production and operation. This may itself automatically act as a limi- tation, for business enterprises will not be willing to have such conditions im- posed unless they are compensated in some way for the extra cost. Heavier-Than-Afr Craft. 7 The war value of an aeroplane may be said to lie in a combination of two or more of the following caaracteristics: (a) its sultability for offensive and defensive equipment. (b) its radius of action. (c) its gpeed. (d) its carrying capacity. (e) the height it can attain. It'is not desired to go too deeply into technical matters in this report. The committee wishes, however, to point out that the peace value of air- craft *{s at present intimately bound up with the general characteristics which make up the value of the air- plane in war. The last four of the characteristics enumerated above are dependent upon the relation between the amount of fuel cargled, the horse- power of the engine, the lifting sur- face and the total weight. The com- :mittee is of the opinion that formulae :could be evolved defining the inter- relationship of these factors in such 2 way as to limit the war value of the machine built in comformity there- with. Tt is more difficult to insure that war equipment shall not ‘be mounted in a commercial aeroplane. In this.matter the comiittee is of the opinion that definite rules cannot be 1aid down. Radius of Action. Radius of action is of high com- mercial value. A reliable air service from Europe to America in, say, twenty-four hours, should prove & highly profitable undertaking. Again, in countries where there is perhaps the greatest scope for the develop- mént-of ‘airways, countries of great -déserts for.example, radius of action is éssential. Speed is plainly the ¢har- acteristic on which aircraft ‘rely to gain advantage in their competition with othdr means of transportation. It is not yet comfort and security, but time saving that will tempt passen- | gers, mails, and valuable cargoes fsom 01d established services. To limit d is to sto] ncy. -The .power of, carrying numbers of ngers or quantities of goods is comm heights may 'eventually -be a . de- finite ‘requirement.: .As a matter of fact the ‘ducdess of fécent experi- ‘mients indicates that, 'with special ‘means of supe ing motors, navi- i in the future lise high regions of” the atmos- to /take ‘@dvan of a less| resistance. of the air and of favor- able high-velocity winds. The factors which comprise “mili- ug pe nce” have, therefore, a commercial value, and it is the opinfon of’ this committee that any limitation of the character of civil commercial airoraft must hinder jthe -natural development of aviation, it 1s probable that ction as to character will.have, in fact, an even more -adverse reaction on the prog- ress of diviation than would be caused by a restriction,on numbers. “"Method: of Limitation, Wt s can be limited .as to number and character by an agree- ment -arbitrarily fixing a maximum numbe# for edich nation that will not be exceeded, and by imposing techni- cal restrictions’ in such a way as to limit performance. 9. The differe: in o fe law as between 8 'fll;':.:rob-bly t & mystem of limitation preven being of universal application. More- over, the rules of formulas whereby alone the character of civil and com- rcial airoraft can be limited must oo time’ they "will® bs. sasy "t same time they easy evade, and infringement will not be casual: glan “':“;,"::.m,'f“ ‘:!"hompo'er o oring surtase; capacity certainly be: enabling one of higher power to be 1 conditions | rapidly installed: l the purpose of preventing war, would | nat impossible to conceive of civil be, In the opinion of this committee, [and commercial disastrous from the point of view of | signed with a view to ultimate war {1t is necessary, however, to add that placed upon commercial ; aeronautics would have the effect of [efcouragement. The develop- Inection with its military enterprises. | all aircraft | o power continually inspecting all of its manufacturing plants in order ta ascertain whether the limitations it imposed were being enforced. these points received the closest of consideration with refer- ence to the limitation of Germany's air power, and the matter is so com- plicated that the final drafting of the technical rules has not yet been completed. But taking rules as drafted and even assuming con- tinuous inspection of a most stringent character, it appears that there are still loopholes for evasion. No rules can’ prevent aircraft being designed in peace to permit of the ready in- | stallment of larger tanks in war; | ¢ngines can be made interchangeable, even carrying sur- face can be in by the stand- ardization and interchangeability of wings and other methods, and It is alreraft being de- requirements. 10. For the above reason, the com- mittee Is agreed that in the present stage of development of aviation a universal limitation by formulae of the character of commercial aircraft is impracticable. Question of Subsidy. 11. Without expressing an opinion as to the desirability of abolishing subsidles for the encouragement of commercial aviation, the committee points out that such’ subsidies, direct or indirect, can have a great influence on the character and number of com- merciai aircraft in relation to their war value. In fact, subsidles will tend to decrease the natural diverg- ence between military and commer- clal aircraft and render the latter more readily adaptable to war uses. ndirect subsidies or other encourage- ment are most difficult to prevent, and even when.acting in good faith gov- ernments of different nations will place different interpretations on such The question of whether subsidies are granted or not will have great earing upon development of com- not be determined from the point of view:solely of the adaptability for war uses. Civil Alrcraft. In this discussion a distinction is drawn between commercial -aircraft and civil aircraft; the latter will com- prise all aircraft operated by a state except those which it operates in con- Civil alrcraft will therefore include any which are state-operated in the customs service, for transporting the mails, the exercise of its police pow- ers, and the like. It is readily apparent that as aircraft operate in a medium where there are no physical barriers, they can compete in some measure with every means of transportation used on land or water. It is therefore possible for much of the transportation re- quirements of any state to be met by the operation of aircraft. Such air- raft manifestly are not dependent for heir being upon their ability to be operated at a profit. The state will de- cide how best it may enforce i laws, exercise its police power, trans- port state-owned merchandise or mails, and the means used will be those which are most efficient and most economical from the standpoint of the state Itself. The cheapest will not always be the.best or the most satisfactory. The number and the legitimate use. of aircraft by any government for| such civil purposes will therefore be limited only by the estimate placed upon the service which they can ren- der and by the consent of the people to raising by taxation the amount of 't'l,:;‘;:y whlclh must be employed for acquiremen mlllznlenlncc. t, operation and . If the civil agencies of a state use aircraft for police or other pur- poses that are essentially military in character, this class of civil aircraft i should be discus under the limita- tion of military aircraft. 14. The number and character of :\;c:ncl.vrlil’l:lmntt can be limited only ra T shaien rY agreement among the 15. It would, again, be utter!. - practicable to set up any uenc;alm ing under authority other than that g( a llfltl‘or‘llll:ell to regulate the num- er of civil aircraft owned an - ated by the state. B omar Lighter-Than-Air Craft. 16. The characteristics of lighter- than-air craft are such that lfml!l- tion of number and character presents little technical or practical difficulty. It is & peculiarity of these craft that their efficiency “is very intimately bound up in their size. Small dirigi- bles have a war value of thelr own, ybut it is limited d they cannot_be considered as affensive weapons. For example, a small vessel of this kind cannot attain any considerable height while carrying a useful load, and even if fllled with non-inflammable gas its vulnerability to gun fire at the heights it could reach precludes its being utilized for such purposes as aerial bombardment. Only in large sized dirigibles can a useful load be carried to a reasonable military height at a fair speed. Limitation of sise is therefore sufficient to insure that lighter-than-air craft should be in- capable of offensive aerial action. Moreover, the constitution of large dirigibles requires large shed accom- modation and cannot be kept secret; in this respect they resemble surface ‘warships. . 17. It is, therefore, possible to regu- late their numbers and size by a sim- ple system of international agree- ment, and infringement of such agree- ment can be readily detected without & detailed system of control. 18. The committee is agreed that the possibilities of war use for large dirigibles may still exist. Although in the later stages of the world war it appeared as if the defense had the mastery over attack in lighter-than- alr craft, the introduction of larger craft filled with non-inflammable and carrying their own protect aeroplanes may again permit boi bardments being carried out by dirigi . This committee desires, however, to draw attention to the fact that dirigi- bles become {increasingly efficient with increage of sise. Any limit which is imposed on the size of commercial possibility of their development for legitimate civil enterprises. Limitation of Use. 19. The committee is of the opinion that it would be useless-to attempt to lay down a rule that civil and commer- cial aircraft should not: be used in war, ‘as they copsider that mo nation could deny itself the value for war purposes of their commercial machines, provided that they are suitable for n& ‘warlike purposes. It is understood that when ‘will be manned by service personnel of the state and carry proper distinguishing marks, and will in fact become war aircraft; their use does not therefore require discussiop in this part of the committee 20. The use of civil and commercial aircraft in s governed by the international air ‘convention, which amply safeguards a state’'s sovereignty in_the air against abuse. 21. This convention has already been ratifled by Greit Britain, France, Japan, Bel Porty igium, Greéce, Serb-Croat and Slovene State and . It will at a very near date come into force for these various powers and later for the other signatory states and also non- ll"‘i tory powers who desire to adhere to it. 22. The committee is aware, however, that for certain reasons the - United States has not yet announced its adher- ence to thi Foed s convent ‘The committee, ore, the of the subcommittee on !Irotrun and IR T i &na based upon the ) and upon one m| above’ ‘be drawn up at this conference to which the assent of all powers repre- nted could ‘be given. e g believe that this is most desirable. Summary of Comclusions. up- 8t/ evsalon is to b’ insured 5; g:u peace and to remove the causes ::y mfl&hnbvmntuatm#&uhw ~ nfiuu&m«mmtumtm ent of commerecial wving the nationals of another'aircraft in onlor‘tn retard the develop- | ber of mili Second: consideration | an ment of air power, the immediate result will be the retarded development of means of transportation and communi- cation, which will itself, if unrestrict- ed, largely act to bring about the same result—the removal of some of the causes of warfare. 24. This committee is unanimously of the opinion that in the present state of development of aeronautics there is a technical possibility of the limitation of numbers, character and use of civil and commercial aircraft with regard to their utilisation in war; they are, however, agreed that such limitation of numbers and es- pecially of character is not practi- cable, except in the case of lighter- than-air craft of above a certain displacement. 3. 25. As regards the desirability" of: limitations the committee has touchied on those factors which must be under- stood before arriving at a decision. It feels it to be a duty to lay great stress ypon the following fact which will have a decided bearing upon any determination of the proper policy to be adopted: Any limitation as to number and characdter of civil and commercial aircraft heavier-than-air or lighter-than-air, which is effica- cious to hinder their utility for war purposes, must interfere disastrously with the natural development of aeronautics for legitimate civil and commercial enterprises. To limit the sclence of aeronautics in its present state is to shut the door on progress. It is for the conference to decide whether the Ilimitations which can with difficulty be devised and im- posed are to be adopted at such a cost. Military Alreraft. Note: In the part of the report which follows, the word “military” is used in its widest sense to denote “pertaining to the fighting services whether naval, military or air.” Preliminary Remarks. 26. The committee agreed that be- fore entering upon a discussion of possible limitation of the numbers of military aircraft it was desirable that the present relative air strength of the nations represented should be ascertained and tabulated in a simple form designed to facilitate compari- son between them. The results of this investigation are tabulated in ap- pendices 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 attached to this report. It is remarked that though these forms afford a guide to the relative military air strengths at the present day, it is impracticable to present a complete estimate of a pation’s air power, since air power is (as has been already shown) inti- mately bound up in factors other than the military establishment. Differ- ences in organization and adminis- tration of the various national aerial forces are a further obstacle to di- rect comparison in detall; these fa tors must not be forgotten when studying the statement presented and must be kept in the foreground of all discussions as to the possibility of limitation. As to Number. military aircraft presents from one point of view less difficulty than tbe similar problem in the case of com- mercial aircraft. It is obvious that if a limitation on the number of military aircraft is agreed upon be- tween nations it can be imposed by @ state without that interference with the liberty of citizens which complicates the question of aircrar: devoted to commercial pursuits. But when the details of such an agree- ment are considered, it will be found a matter of great difficulty to find a reasonable basis on which the allot- ment of relative strengths can be made. For example: (i) The ‘'status quo” cannot serve as a starting point, since the state of development of air services differs widely in the case of the various powers (see appendices), and in no case can these services be oonsidered as complete. (ii) The size of a nation's navy and army will influence the basis, in s0 far as aircraft are essential auxiliaries to those services. (iii) National policy will differ as between nations; some nations, for example, will wish to have large air forces for coast defense where others prefer to trust to older methods. De- velopments on the lines of the sub- stitution of air forces for other forms of force are likely to be con- siderable. (iv) The potentialities of air forces in policing and garrisoning semi- civilized or uncivilized countries are as yet only partially realized. The number of aircraft required for such duties will vary with the size and nature of the territories to be pa- trolled and with the value placed on their services by different nations. (v) The geographical position and peculiarities of a state, the situation and strength of its possible enemies and the nature of a possible attack must influence the number of air- craft it will desire to maintain. (vi) Different terms of service for personnel will influence the effec- ‘tiveness of air services and the size of the reserve. (vii) The state of development or possibilities for civil aeronautics will have, as has been shown above, a direct bearing on the number of mili- tary aircraft which it may be de- sirable for a state to maintain. ‘The problem of finding a suitable ratio between the air forces of vari- ous powers is thus at the present time almost insuperable. As to Character. But even should it be possible to fix the ratio, such a limitation would be of little value without some limit as to the character of the aircraft When the question ef limitation of maval armaments was considered by the conference it was found necessary to limit the displacement of individual ships as well as the total tonnage. In the absence of similar provision the limitation of numbers of aircraft would only result in competitive building of aircraft of greater and greater power and size. The methods of limitation must therefore atteript to legislate for both number and character. . Methods of Limitation. 23, The following methods may be employed: First. -The. limitation of the num- tary aircraft. The .. limitation of the amount: of -horsepawer for military aircraft.. - . - Third. The limitation of the lift tonnage for military aircraft. Faqurth. The limitation of person- nel for military aircraft. g Fifth. The limitation of military aircraft budgets. These filve methods may be applied in ‘combination or singly and are con- sjdered in detail below: Limitation of the number of air- craft is the most obvious method of limiting the strength of the aviation force, but in attempting to apply this method the question of size and type the | at once arises. It might be necessary to limit the maximum wing surface permitted to a single aircraft or it might be necessary to prescribe the number of aircraft in each of the type groups, such as combat planes, bombing planes, etc.; this ‘qu of definition of type presents great dificulty. In order to make an ef- fective limitation of the numbers of military aircraft to be paintained in peace time by any nation it will be neécessary to have a detailed under- standing on the following points: X (1) On the number and tyr?u actu- ally in use organised aerial units. - (2) On the number and types held in reserve. (3) On the number and types of en- gines held in reserv (4 planes ced by e On the replacement (‘;: oth by other to enter into ’po-lbl to build up an u e to bu ‘war reserve merely b the planes so held as convertin nthun into civil or. e on the limitation of the alon: tion of 1 ionlty in an wastsge may cent per month. The sedond method of limitation— The limitation of number of.| =R L THEv éUND&Y STA]IZ, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUAR¥: Official Statement of Discussion of Arms Delegates of Poiso * nous Ea of horse] (1) Total horsepower in assembled 8. 2 (2) Total horsepower in assembled engines. (3) Horsepower in a single indi- vidual plane of a given type. 'his can only be based on the cubic capacity of the engines; there will be no guarantee that a nation: has not discovered a secret which will enable greater horsepower to be got out of limited capacity nor is it rea- sonable to expect any nation to dis. The more de- tailed the limitation the greater the administrative difficulty of enforce- ment, particularly under present con- ditions when admipistrative methods are 8o widely different, and as pointed out in the first part of the report any enforcement, to be effectual would entail such detailed inspection by a foreign commission as to be intol- erable to any: nation. 2 The third method of ‘limitation, :lmltltfon of lift tonnage, may &pply 0: (1) Total lift tonnage in bled planes. (2))Total lift tonnage in all planes assembled or not assembled. (3) Lift tonnage of a single indi- vidual plane of a given type. Any method must presumably be based on wing area and, horsepower. It has ‘been mentigned that,the. actual horsépower may be unknown and it is likewise conceivable that a nation may discover a wing shape of ex- treme lifting efficiency and neglect to disclose the fact. Limitation of lift tonage may therefore be wholly illusory -and the remarks ‘s to in- spection made in the last paragraph apply to this method also., Fourth Method Fails. 83..The fourth method ‘of -limita- tion,. whether. of the total of orga- nized personnel for war aircraft, or only of pilots in the permanent mili- tary establishment. fails by reason of the difference. in organization be- tween' different states. A nation which has a separate air service has to include ‘in’ its “organized personnel those employed in, recruiting, aupply, transport, admihistrative headquar- ters, etc., etc. In the case of nations whose air forces are contained in their naval and military forces, sup- ply. etc., personnel are included in naval and military establishments; 2 fair comparison cannot therefore be made. Moreover. the difference in terms of service, long or short, vol- untary service or conscription, must introduce incalculable factors which directly affect the efficlency of organ- nized air forces and the size and effi- clency of the reserve. 34.The fifth methdd of limitation, limitation by means of limiting the budget and thereby controlling the amount of. money that may be ex- peaded annually for aviation, seems simple in theory, but it is difficult of application. The various methods of distributing budgets for material under different subheads make it im- practicable to determine or compare the actual sums expended exclusively assem- for aircraft, and the question s at|Ma present. further complicated by the factor of power of the currency of various na- tions. 35. Of the five methods of limita- tion. limitation by lift tonnage or horsepower appears to present the least objections, but to make these or any other methods effective it would be necessary, as previously pointed out, to organize a system of inter- national inspections. Any system of international inspection _would be al- most certain to arouse ill-feeling and would tend to cause friction rather than to insure harmony and good feeling between friendly powers. Impracticability of Limitation. 36. Objections in ‘detall to each suggested method of limitation have been advanced above—there is one insuperable objection which is com- mon to every method, namely, the close relationship which at present exists between civil. or c ercial aeronautics and air power:- Unless civil or commercial aeronautics are strictly limited—and ft - has been shown in the uerly part of this report that it is not practjcable to. limit them—a nation desiring air power in excess of the limit imposed or agreed to will ‘devélop, its civil and commer- clal aeronautics to any extent de- sired. Granted a flourishing aeronautical industry, the number of the present type of perishable military aeroplanes actlve on any given date is only one of the elements of al¥-power. During the war a single American firm con- tracted to deliver 100 aircraft a day, and the output of the engines can be organized on a similar scale. A na- tion’s air power can thus be multi- plied not only by the actual number of civil and commercial aircraft in use, but also by the capacity of the industry to turn to the manufacture of military aircraft in large quanti- ties. Limitation of the number of ho wer .and lift: tonnage would, under such conditions, prove illusory. ‘This commercial industry will fur- ther provide a great potential reserve of pilots and skilled technical per- sonnel and will thus discount to a great extent any limitation of num- bers of the personnel of military aviation. - Reasons Cited. :37. It is the opinion of this com- mittes that the-limitdtion of military air power (as regards heavier-than- air craft) is not practicable at the present time. Their reasons for this decision are as follows: (I) The difficulty of finding a basis for the proportion of aircraft to bo allotted to the various nationa (II) The difficulty of devising tech-~| r‘xllu-l methoda to impose such. limita- lon. (III). The difficulty of enforcing such methods. .(IV) The interdependence between air poweriand & commercial airoraft industry which it is not practicable to limit. 38. Many of the remarks already made apply to lighter-than-air craft, but, a8 in the case of commercial air- craft of this nature, limitation is both possible and practicable. It is un- necessary to recapitulate the - ment that the military value of & dirigible is dependent on its size, and the size of dirigibles and the number maintained can be limited by agree- ment of a few simple rules.” Infrao- tion of such rules can be rapidly as- certained without detalled inspection. But' -nfih 8 limitation .of lighter-than- air aviation forces would not effect a limitation of this kind of air power of a nation unless a limitation were also imposed on {ts lighter-than-air commercial activities. The line of demarkation between thq large com- merclal airship and the military alr- ship 18 very slight, and a commercial dirigible would require little, if any, alteration in order te adapt it to mili- 8 The objectio the 39. It is neoe; of humanity and to lessen the chances of international friction that the rules Sratt i war HOUIE bo aiified and 5o P e an e made L bgf ._]\numnumu.l n é::nflkemti ith, 3 by this Eommi ?ear h’; QO] draft 'oode af:“Rujes f %v-r,' submitted for rcr:: committee = rks by th¥ ~war: " The r power—may ‘apply | Viewpoint on a matter which affects 50 1tmitation to: land T close such a secret. the relative purchasing | POS®! in d|a later date. - ases and many and varied interests. In some cases the national policy has not yet been determined. . This committee recommends, therefore, that the question of the rules for mircraft in war be not con- sidered at a conference in which all the members are not prepared to dis- cuss so large a subject, but that the matter be postponed to a further conference, which, it is recommended, be assembled for the. purpose at a date and place to be agreed through diplo- matic channels. Conmelusions Arrived At. 42. The committee are agreed that among the more important elements which influence the power that & na- tion may exert by means of aircraft are the following (1) Thé adaptal to aeronautics. (2) Geographic location and char- acteristics of the territory occupied by the nation and its dependencies. (3) The ability to produce and maintain aircraft and accessories. (4) The amount and character of aeronautical activity outside the mil- itary establishment, such as com- mercial and civil aeronautical ac- ;.ivi!lcl, and sport and pleasure fly: ng. (5) The size and efficiency of its air establishment for military pur- poses, consisting of (a) the active establishment, including permanent headquarters, ‘' bureaus, _squadrons, schools, technical establishments, de- pots of material and nnel, etc.; (b) the reserve establishment, in- cluding organized and unorganized reserve personnel and war reserve of material. 43. (1) The adaptability of a na- tion to aeronautics. Interest of the general public in aeronautics seems to be imherent in some nations; in others it is dormant or almost lacking. The confidence of a-people in aeronautics in general is undoubtedly a factor worthy of serious consideration when estimat- ing the air power of that country. It is possible that a far-seeing gov- ernment may stimulate the interest of its general public in aeronautics by exhibitions, general educational measures and by the encouragement in a financial way of individuals al- ready interested, and thus increase the adaptability of its people’ to aeronautics. Geographical Location. 4. () G phic location and char- acteristice of the territory occupied by the nation and its dependencies. This may be looked on as closely akin to (1) The physical character- istics of a country will have a con- #iderable influence on the attitude taken by its inhabitants toward avia- tion. It is obvious that, while gov- ernment action may improve the fatural characteristice of a country to a certain degree, by making aero- dromes,, etc., it is not possible for any limitaticn of such action to be except by limiting the total amount spent by the nation on aviation, a method which ha;llr?n.dy been shown to be largely ineffective. -45. (3) ‘Th{ ability to produce and intain aircraft and accessories. he maximum aeronautical industry ible for a nation to build up un- der ideal conditions is determined by (1) the extent to which manufactur- ing in general is carried on. (2) by t1e character of articles manufactured, 3) by the manufacturing methods in general; thet is, whether articles are manufactured by machinery or by haad; (4) the supply and availability of essential raw materials. In the manufacture of many articles the raw materials used and the manufactur- ing methods are similar to those em- ployed in the manufacture of air- craft and accessories. The amount of this class of manufacturing carried on in any country is an essential factor in estimating the ability of a nation to: produce aircraft. bility of its people T The ability to expannd an existin aeronautical industry idly enou te meet war conditiol s one of tl nt elements of air power. ?:j:! ‘:s“:c estimated by (1) the rnumber of individuals skilled in the manufacture of aircraft and acces- sordes, (2) the number of individuals Whose training in industries similar 1o the aeronautical industry forms a basis for learning readily and rapidly the special problems encountered in the manufacture of aircraft and ac- cessories, (3) the size and oondition of the existing aeronautical industries and the sizse and number of manu- facturing oconcerns that can readily be converted to the manufacture of aircraft and accessories, (4) the ex- istence of a definite program previously determined upon and the extent to which orders have been previously | placed in anticipation of an emer- gency with a consequent perfection of plans, (5) the amount and state of avallability of the essential raw ma- terials, (6) the quantity of available jigs, tools, dies and production draw- ings for going into guantity produc- tion of dard equipment. . 46. (4) The amount and character of meronautical activity outside the military establishment has been ex- haustively discussed under the limi- tation of civil and commercial air- craft. It has been shown that this is intimately bound up with (1) (2) and (3), above, and that, with the excep- tion of lighter-than-alr craft of above & certain size, it is not practicable to 1imit it except perhaps by limiting the amount of subsidies to commercial aviation, a method whi has been shown to be difficult of application, and to be otherwise objectionable. It has also been shown that the limita- tion of lighter-than-air craft would have a disastrous effect on aviation. 4 (5) Existing estblishment of airoraft used for military purposes and the reserve. Sise of Organmised Regerve. size of the organized reserve '?;?adewnd upon the size of the mili- tary establishment and the rate at which members of the military estab- lishment are trained and returned to olvi] pursuits. Any reduction in the permanent peace-time establishment will carry with it a consequent re- duction in organised and trained reserves. There is, however, a type of personnel whose civil pursuits fit them for immediate service in the air establishment. This is made up by those engaged in commercial and civil aeronautics and industril pursuits which . require the - same trades and basic knowledge and ex- perience as is required in the opera- tion and maintenance of military afr- craft. This class will not be serious- by any change in the mili- es! ishment. 48. Technical considerations have led the committee to the conclusion that the limitation of the fifth 1y affected abl military purposes (including the ac- tive establishment and the organized reserve), although theoretically pos. sible, is not practicable. The com- mittee also desires to lay stress on the fact that, even if such limitation Was icable, it Final Cenclusion. T is of the opinion that it is mnot rrncfiubh to impose any effective limitations upon the numbers = or characteristics of air- cru.muonhrr gm-n,:;rol u: :;nllur{. ing in the. £ S et s ~comm! . of K 3"& ave of airceats n iuroi’é'o‘ui: b th be governed by the rules of warfare s adapted to. 't by & fy’ther .canference whi jould e held at Respectfully submitted by For the United States of America: WILLIAM A. MO! Chairman, lfi@-l .n:._vn.mlu‘-'m.unuu be. | Hichsta: Aifrod =, N¢ ve ichols, . lieved and desires to place on record " Frepch. Airplanes - ot > that dne way in which it would be poseible to limit the alr power of a nation would be by placing a limit upon the number of pilots in the per- manent military establishment, and consequently agrees with the general reasoning of the report in so far as It is not contrary to this opinion. (Signed) COL. R. MOIZO, Riccardo Moizo, Colonel, R. L A. The discussion of this report was not concluded when the committee adjourned to meet on Monday mext. January 9, at 11 o'clock a.m. WARNSOF REVCL - FPAREYFAS Secretary of Labor Sees Danger if Peace Hopes Are Crusher. Revolutions against the govern- ments of the world may arise 1f ths high hopes for assvrance of pel~e raised by the conference on Mmite- tion of armament are crushed, Sec- retary of Labor Davis says In aft Ar- ticle written for the Moursa€brt Magazine, a publication of tYe Loyal Order of Moose, of which ¥r Davis is the director general. “The entlie lod; oY Amderican wage-earners,” the Secreras Ay =, “is charged with a whole-Souled de sire for any reasonable or phssible reduction of armament.” The Amer- ican workman's knowledss of eco- nomic and poltical principies, his watch on the social forces at work in the world and particularly thosc social forces as they work in their own country, have been far keener than they have been credited with being. The past six years have serv- ed especially to sharpen the work- er's judgments, to heighten his as- pirations and to raise his hopes for the improvement of life in his favor. The worker has set his eyes on the conference in‘Washington to reduce this costly and wasteful burden of armament with & yearning for re- licf and a right to belief that it will be dangerous to ignore.” U. 8. Could Foree Lead. “It seems t. me impossible that any body of intelli en, und par- ticularly the great men of the world assembled In Washington. will dare to continue in the coursc that has nearly broken the hack of the world already and that threatens civiliza- tion itself. “It seems to me that America is in a position to force the rest of the world to follow @ courageous ex- e. ither we may far surpass the rest of the world in armament, because our riches will permit us to build ships and make guns in a number that the rest of the world can never afford. because America’s economic is so patent, America’s O superiority delegates can say to the other dele- gates: “America has decided to dis- arm to the last possible degree within the limits of safety. That is our ex- ample to the world. You are at liberty to follow this example. or go home and take the consequences with your peoples.’ Would Face Revoluti “I believe that no delegate to that conference would dare go home with- out copying our example. He would be sure to face a revolution. “Qur people know now that the world is the poorer by waste of the humblest lives and talent and that at some time or other the mind of man F'must make-jeigl master of his pas- sions. _ Our people are settled in th belief that no question of expedien. or -policy is sutficiently important to stand in the way of a method or set- tling the disputes of the world better than this way of everlasting drilling and killing. “To my mind this is not old fogyism, but opinion in a stage of advance- ment that cannot be safely ignored. It is these people, these typical Amer- cans, who are the formidably modern The men who regard themselves ax experts and masters of polity and diplomacy will' do well to keep up with them.” ITALY’S MONEY CRISIS LOOKS MORE HOPEFUL Bourses to Open Tomorrow and Plan Is Announced for Affairs of Banca di Sconto. By ghe Associated Press. ROME, January 7.—The Italian financial situation is much mere hope- ful, in the view of leading financiers here. All Italian bourses are sched- uled to open next Monday and to re- sume normal business. Announcement was made today that for the board of directors of the Banca Italiana di Sconto, which re- cently was granted a moratorium, there will be effected a “conservative attachment” of their property, de- pending upon their active or passive , participatjon in_the bank's affairs. There was still much discussion to- day of what effect on industry the Sconto's crisis will have. Numerous commercial organizations and cham- bers of commerce are petitioning the government to work out some plan to overcome any possible industrial crisis that may arise. PISTOL AND RIFLE CLUB FORMED FOR PROTECTION —— |Action Taker by American Security and Trust Company Repre- 3 sentatives. Representatives of the American Security and Trust Company have organized a rifie and pistol club, in order to enable the men of the or- ganization better to protect their lives and the property of the com- pany in the case of emergengy. The following officers were cnosen: ‘Edward E. pwan, president; J. Elliott -Moran, vice president; Ross Pol- lock, secretar: L.’ Colton, treas- urer, and Hans W. Ireland, executive officer. . R. D. Le Garde, adjutant gen- eral of the District National Guard, who is recoguise: *flon‘ of The coun! experts in rifle and pistol practice, will give instruction. application has been made to H the National Rifie Association of America and the club is to be en- rolled a: affiiiated organisation of the civilian class. The charter members of the club are as follows: Edward E. Swan, P. C. Brady, J. E. Walker, Paul E. By- ron, H. E. Preston, C. C. Boswell, Hans {'W. Ireland, W. F. McCully, Earl D. ‘Thompson, James L. Goldsmith, Ar- thur M. Nyman, A. C. Harmon, H. Kimball, L. E. Donaldson, W. W. Beck, R, A. Clay, Ross E. Pollock, J. Barrett, J. E. Moran, C. H. Knight, S. 8. Gheen, K. J. Winfleld, P. Riddle, Richard E. Harris, John P. Balster, Louis L. Corn- ;-u. Harry P. te, W. F. Smith, . N. Dorsett, Leonard Clark, M. K. Irwin, L. P. Riddle, H. G. Muller, T. W. Hanks, W. M. Dyér, J. O. Gray, jr.; ‘Willlam Boure, Theodore L. lier. ", -Bhkls n E. ll‘uh(u', T. Pimper, y, A. W. Sher- | maa L, B. L. Col- wfron, B. Leet, Wil- liam" R. 7= am Y. Collins, . M. Perley, T. R. Burch, P. W. Fin- ney, Percy C. Davis, P, J. Seltzer, Pax- mlam& 3 kg.bfilml;' qu D. james C. n, ir.; - Uam Rutherford, V. 1. Me- D. B Findley, A. G. Kiows Souder, William 8. I