The Daily Worker Newspaper, December 15, 1934, Page 6

a Page 6 DAELY WORKER, NEW YORK, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1934 Continuation of the Full Report on Conversations of the United Front for Spanish Workers Reply of the L.S. 1. Not Made Month After Appeal (Continued from Preceding Page) | the Young Commun: and the} Young Socialists. | andervelde. — Our Young So-| cialist Guards have adjourned for | three months precisely because | they had certain difficulties (with the Young Communis' Notice that I don't anything else; proceed very quickly, that’s fine, but at another time when we addressed proposals to you, we received no answer. you are anxious to THERE CANNOT BE TOO MUCH EFFORT EXERCISED IN THE BATTLE AGAINST FASCISM "Thorez.—I will also say a word on | this subject. | This objection against the united | front coming from those who direct a party of the working class and who possess sufficient influence, if only by means of their own forces, | to raise a powerful barrier against | fascism, makes us Communists fear for the workers; we consider such an objection dangerous. The ex- perience of Austria in this matter is significant enough and even in France, we can say, last Sunday and the Sunday previous, that wherever there is still a tendency in the So- Party to weaken united ac- and not unitedly to apply the of the pact—neither the So- Party nor the Communist } y advanced, while the bourgeoi- rties gained; this was partic- 9 at Lille. On the other hand | we struck great blows together ve both progressed, Socialist and nist. its time formulated any ich prevented the or- ganization of united action. You know it, and I tell it to you bluntly, ly desire is instantly to or- united activities; but if we argue, we shall argue.We have adopted the habit in France of discussing things very frankly with our Socialist comrades; and if someone says to us: you should have accepted our former offers, we answer; perhaps when proposals were made by the Communist Party in 1932 and January 1933, the Social-Democracy could elso have acecpted the proposals of united action made then by our party, but low would that have helped us? I yomind you of these things simply because, precisely there too, it could have been said that the united front was not important; there also is was true that one party was strong and the other weak. Vandervelde—The German Com- municsts represented a very large fore: Thorez.—That’s why it was a great crime not to have answered these appeals in 1932 and in 1933 for the organization of united resistance against Hitler. Now since March 1933 you have made such responses as allowed the or-. genization of united action, since it is on the basis of such moves that we succeeded in organizing our united front in France. That is why I am afraid your declara- tion will not encourage the reali- zation of the united front where it does not yet exist, and that it will not contribute very much to those actions which have elready _ been consummated. Tt isn’t that we would not like to} discuss all problems and quietl ‘breach every delectable controve: but the problem for us is to det mine how we can actually, from thi very meeting on, come to an agree- ment on at least a minimum of two or three huge meetings, two or three Jarge cemonstzations in favor of our Spanish comrades. There is the spirit in which we have come to obtain united action. THE APPLICATION OF THE FACT OF UNITY OF ACTION IN FRANCE Wardervelde. — I want to observe that when our friends in France concluded their pact of unity, they did so in contravention of previous decisions of our _ International, which state that we cannot agree to united action in the individual countiies except as a result of an understanding between the two In- ternationals; and up to now the C. I. never answered our overtures. Nevertheless, when our French comrades took the initiative to con- clude a pact of united action on their own responsibility, we held a session of the executive committee and no one posed any objection be- cause they had violated the previous decision, no one disapproved of this initial step. Furthermore, there are in the executive and, I daresay, in the secretariat of the International, men who have publicly approved the pact; you know about it per- haps, I wrote an article myself, openly aquiescing to what had taken Place in France. Something which it seems you find impossible to. re- member is that we are here, Adler and I, not in our own pe:sonal Name, not even in the name of each of our parties, the Austrian and tc Belgian, but as representatives of the Labor International and it i undeniable that in many countries the opposition to the united front is | the Socialist International were to you cannot say that the | to Nov. 18, strong. Under ‘these conditions the only thing that we are permitted to do is to inform you that the question has already been placed on the agenda of the November session of our ex- ecutive, when the problems will be analyzed, and unquestionably the French experience will be a very important element in the eyes of} epresentatives. | But as a matter of reasonableness you cannot demand of men who| received a precise and limited | date to overstep the bounds of } is mandate, to take the initiative | in organizing certain united dem- | onstrations. Thorez.—Let’s see, suppose that) we decided to have a great cam-/| paign of demanstrations in all} countries together with the Social- ist Party, and that some one from speak at one of these meetings or- ganized by the two parties in France, and that there would be a} speaker of the Communist Inter- | national; is that an impossibility? Vandervelde.—If citizen Vander- velde were not president of the In- | ternational, it would certainly be probable that he would welcome the invitation; but, because he is presi- dent, and, so far as Adler is con-| cerned, because he is Secretary, it| is impossible. Thorez. — Think what such a meeting would mean, even if it were | only held in Paris. | Adler. — The problem is enor- mously more weighty than being merely one of meeting this week or not. This would be an action so! grave for the future of the working class, of such great importance, that it cannot be undertaken lightly. It is not necessary to lose sight of the | fact that your proposal now to con- clude a pact will bring to the minds of Socialists in all countries the | remembrance of the parallel case! when the idea was suggested of| | forming spontaneous pacts, which | then gave the impr mn of being ;@ maneuver. And our parties are on guard against these maneuvers. | | You know the history of your In- | ternational Communist congre: : | you know all that. i Thorez.—We also know a littie| jection that our Socialist comrades | | about your congresses. (smiles) | “WE ARE READY FOR | DISCUSSIONS” | Adler. — Where you will never | find any maneuvers that we tried| | to put across. | | For myself, I can personally say that I am the only one, up to the} French experience, to establish and ca:ry on the united front and) united action in our workers’ coun- cils, on a democratic pian, in Aus- | tria after the war. During those years we really had a parliament of Communist and Socialist workers, | we deliberated openly, we made a} great success of it, and I believe that we served the revolution at | that time by this form of worke: democracy between the Commun: and Socialist Parties. I, who was also-president of that conference in Berlin twelve years! ago, when the three executives were | present, believe I have the right to say that what we want is a real) ; and solid groundwork and not an} improvised solution for the moment, adopted at a conference where one man, important. though he might} | be, comes to make such a proposal. It does net belong to the Interna- tional to conclude any pact which might lead to misunderstandings in all countries. Why did we accept) your proposal to come here? This} is a serious question; what can we do for the future under conditions as they are today, by engaging in united action? And it would be a real clerification for our, executive to have an answer to this question coming from your side. We have had a good deal of dis- cussion on the German events; I would like a few words to say that I do not believe what you remarked about Germany to be exact. Take) the Vorwaerts (Socialist Party or- gan of Germany) of January, 1933; there you will find a few articles by Stampfer calling for a united front} at that moment. I could review) the whole story in detail, since it} was so interesting to me that I made a study of it. At that mo- ment a man, who we did not know to be either a Communist or an agent provocateur, brought a piece of paper at the last minute: “Do you want to make the united | front?” Such proceedings were not appropriate; in order to come to any agreement serious conversations on a serious basis are necessary. We do not believe that we can organize any meetinng with speak- ers representing the two Intezna- tiona's; this would be perfect, if we had had some previous discussions before our conference now. We re- fuse to make any pact ad hoc (on the spot). It is first of all neces- sary to lay an organized basis, as you did in France, with bonds and guarantees covering both parties, in order to avoid all misunderstand- ings. You know that that was not easy in France, but it is a groat deal more difficult in the case cf ar organism grouping around itself the yarties of various countries unde: cntirely different conditions. iz 3 sheer utopia to think you cr come among us tonight and securc a result for the coming week. Afi | We are speculating on m: REGIME | Here is seen a group of workers seized in the heroic fighting in Asturias against the Fascist government. It was in Asturias that the workers and peasants had established the first Soviet m Spain, we must create an altogether serious basis in order to come to some real results. In brief then, we say to you: we are ready seriously to discuss these conditions, and we do not hide any of the difficulties among our parties but we do not believe that an im- promptu pact will produce an ter effects. Serious negotiations must take place, if we deside to bring about a practical and real result. Vandervelde.—And in order to bring this about, the essential thing will be to insure cooperation be- | tween the Russian Revolution and the proletariat of Western Europe. Even when I possessed an extremely hostile attitude towards the Com- munist Party of Soviet Russia, I always said that on the day when I) would fave to choose between 1e5- toration (of the Czer) and Lé I would be with Lenin. It is evident that the many obstacles which ex- isted for some years, and which normally and permanently might prevent united action, have disap- peared or are tending to disappear. Certainly what occurred in France is a factor whose importance it is impossible to evaluate. THE QUESTION IS TO SUPPORT THE SPANISH WORKERS, NOT “MANEUVERS” Thorez.—So much the better. Cachin—I am really pleased to hear you speak of maneuvers as you have done. This is exactly the ob- in France made to us long ago. And here the French experienced it precisely. Moreover, only done by our section but in the name of the C. I., and it was as-| i sumed more and more by the united | | front everywhere. Least of all, speak about maneuvers. I do not believe it possible that serious and con- scientious men could have a more honest, more loyal attitude than the Communist Party in France, and let } me hasten Party. extraor to add, the Socialist Yesterday's elections were inary; the total results in the first voting seemed like the vote | of a great many more cantons then there really were. Vandervelde.—Nobody denies that. Cachin.—If this objection of a ~| possible maneuver was demonstrated to have been completely false in France, in a great country where there were so many reasons for mutual distrust, if the pact has been carried out in absolute | yy I beg of you, let us stop tl talk of maneuvers, I am not in touch with the latest news from Spain; nevertheless, con- | cerning the Workers Alliance in Spain, our comrades have stepped into the struggle in complete har- mony, and neither one nor the other party has occasion for a single instant to suspect that we were carrying on some maneuver. What took place twelve years ago, you may think about in whatever way you please, but let me tell you that events are no longer the same. We are living in a Europe which bristles with six fascist nations; if tomorrow fascism sets itself up in Spain, what force, what power will it not be able to acquire, and what ominous encouragement will fascism in France not draw from such a happening? Will not fascism become a danger throughout the world? And to think at such a time that uvers is really to have the most mediocre opinion of us. The danger is here; the fire is in our homes; the work- ing class is menaced everywhere with terrible tragedy; it is on that account that we are so grieved by delays caused by certain considera- tions of the past. You are Social- ists, we are Communists, but for the moment danger is such, it is so enormous, that we must come to some understanding. Moreover, let me return to our concrete proposals. Isn’t it possible, from this moment on, instead of saying there is nothing to be dene until the thirteenth of November, to; think of a campaign such as we proposed to you? I do not see how the organizing of a few great demonstrations in common could in the least damage any subsequent negotiations, that you desire as much as we do. I think, on the contrary, that this would aid them. wuld facilitate them. "OR THE SPANISH WORKING “CLASS The terms of your declaration, cond allew me to say after Thorez, are restrictive; on the other hand, the terms of cur proposal are the broadest possible, in a sense they are unique. We propose to work all that has passed in twelve year< ‘ in common for the most imme- his was not) diate action in favor of the work- ing class in Spain. This imme- diate action of the two Interna- tionals at the present time, out- side of national actions, would be an event of prodigious moral breadth coming after the French experience; it would cause an enormous satisfaction to permeate throughout the working class; at a stroke, all discussions of details would disappear; it would enor- mously facilitate subsequent | rapprochements, rapprechements which are very necessary in view of these grave events. Because | temorrow perhaps even more seri- ous incidents will occur, pressing upon beth of us in spite of any | united action which we may form | then, This is the sense in which we re-| ret keenly that you find it impos- ible to do a you assure us of your efforts hasten the convocation of your ex- | ecutive; moreover, in all countries actions must be launched in each of the local sections, and an at- tempt made to organize a Is before Novem- | | ber 13. We insist, in any case, that | to} | mow all about that, but this is an | tarism are yet alive, is Moscow call- | realized in France. Valdervelde: I can o what we have already s: y repeat the single mandate given us. Cachin just stated, there was some- thing which struck me and which personally I would be disposed to | retain. When we drew up this dec- |laration, just before coming here, we were predisposed to inform you what the situation was, but declaration there were cer- tain things that were a litt! and that. for my part, I w ly prejudiced towards thri if the declaration were going to be| published. If you care to review | the text again, I shall indicate pas- sages which could be suppressed. Firstly, the fourth paragraph which reads: “Thus it happened | | that in several countries the first impression had heen that this was not a question of anything else but another so-called maneuver of the united front.” I make no difficulty about recog- nizing that this is a little hard, which we could without any incon- | venience suppress. (Assent). Also, we could suppress further on these two paragraphs: where the is wrapped around such as England. the Nether- Jands and the Scandinavian coun- | tries. “In these countries the numerical connections between their Socialist and Communist parties have such as to be considered a negli tendency; even then those who spoke in the name of these parties managed things on their own ini- tiative and worked on their projects of forming pacts on united action es if they represented a very im- portent fraction of the proletariat. “Under these conditions, our par- ties in these countries did not re- ceive in any pleasant spirit any propositions which were inspired by these methods.” I believe that with the view of publication, we could also suppress these two paragraphs. (Assent). Furthermore, there are two little} orrections of editing, always in view | of publication. In the following third paragranh | we could replace “brusque solu-| tions” by “improvised solutions,” and say: “After what has passed since the last 12 years, any united action in an international sense must, on any hypothesis, be prepared by prelim- inary discussions.” Finally, we could suppress a part of the last paragraph, which con- stitutes a repetition, and simply say: “It is for this reason that in the appeal which we communicated to you we engaced our parties in agi- tating without any delay for the | support of the Spanish workers. “On your part, you have taken a parallel attitude.” (Assent.) In that way our declaration will have lost its sharp character, and I think we can correct it In’ this way without in the least over- stepping the mandate confided to us. (Assent.) Adler—These are matters of style, and I agree with Vandervelde. But the problem remains and I confess openly, in our first discus- sion of this whole affair I always said: we are not sure at any given moment: is this really a change of } course at Moscow or is this only a br ache of a higher sort? We really pose this question. 3 if we | did that, we would be trespassing | However, in connection with what | | your Thorez.—Neither one nor the other, but simply a desire for in- | ternational unity. Adler.—That’s only a phrase, we Does Moscow | important question. | really understand now what the ation is in those countries where ocratic liberties and parliamen- ing for a different attitude than that which characterized the C. I. during all these recent years? Do they now really understand that they no longer need say to us: these are social-fascists, traitors to the | proletariat who defend the bour- geoisie? Is it really that, or is this a maneuver that we are not yet aware of in all its details? This alternative is the real basis of our decision. | Cachin.—It has been | grams, etc., to itself. in France, each party kept its ob- servations concerning methods, pro- We were the ones who consented to these con- cessions regarding criticism in or- der to carry out united action, Even before our pact was signed in cussion on this question. Very affirmative on at least one of the four points we have submitted. Vandervelde—Let us understand ; one another. “On Oct. 11 the C, I. sent us a letter, and you are speaking here in its name by virtue of the mandate given to you. “We received this letter imme- diately; without losing an hour we asked the advice of members of our bureau, who through chance were lin session at Prague. Without an instant’s delay Adler telephoned me and asked my advice. I replied im- mediately: agrecd that we meet at Brussels Oct. 15, four days after the letter, We are in session here, we have just listened to what you had —| to say. What other sort of reply do you wish us to make? We, too, rep- resent an International; it is abso- lutely necessary that you give us the time essentially necessary for our different sections to deliberate con- cerning the proposal; we are glad that this will occur relatively early, |France, we maintained public dis- since the question is on the order of the day of the approaching confer- quietly, each time that anyone of | ence of our Executive. It is not a the Socialist: Party declared: We|Very easy thing to gather together ;can form the united front in France |@% Executive comprising the repre- because the Communists have ,Sentatives of numerous countries, not changed their policy, we answered: |Only of Europe but eventually even No, the Communists changed their policy, but the work- have not|of the United States. “Do not feel that we are here with j ers, Socialist and Communist, want |the intention of clinging to ques- |the united front. And perhaps be-|tions of procedure. No, we explain |cause we have in France a strong|why; necessarily, certain delays are | Communist Party, this desire which | unavoidable. With great regret that | We raised was decisive for the real- | we did not discuss this much sooner, ization of the united front. we neyertheless do not take the at- As for your reservations regard- |titude of being unfavorably predis- formally ing the future, which occupies you|posed with regard to the proposi- agreed, not only in our pact with |So much at this moment, it is no] tions that you have made to us. the French Socialist Party, but in a proposal of the C. I, written black-on-white, that from the day on which a pact is concluded for united action, criticism of any sort c j against either party is forbidden. united | front similar to the one we have} Have we accepted this affirmation in France? Yes. When the pact | was concluded, did we observe this resolution strictly? Yes. And thereby a considerable improvement certainly resulted in the interests of | the working class! And then you have in the affirmation of the In- | ternational, in the pact which was realized and carried out in France, as well as in the guarantees which you may subseauently prove for yourselves, there are assurances which should from now on, it seems to me, completely satisfy you. Yes, Adler, there occurred on part as on ours, certain violences; struggles occurred | which sadly lacked honesty; but | this is no longer the question; | the question of this actual mo- | ment is that we are between the two fires of .a general fascization of Europe, between two fires of | war; there is the real probiem. | (Signs of assent.) We repeat } once more that the actual situation in Spain was one of exceptional gravity and the fact that tomorrow, | so far as the purely formal question is concerned, you will have rejected | the possibility of any united cir- cumstantial action which may aid the working class of Spain. i Vandervelde.—That’s true, only | we are bound by our mandate. CACHIN STRESSES NEED OF} IMMEDIATE ACTION Cachin—I am very restless at seeing this immobility on your part and your failure to discover the | slightest possibility of hastening the | solution of such an urgent prob- Jem. Vandervelde.—You seem to think that we oppose you on the basis of some legal argument about pro- cedure; it is not that at all; it is the material impossibility, which exists in an institution such as ours, | of adopting impromptu resolutions without having even deliberated with others. This indispensable de- | liberation involves us in- certain delays. Thorez.—This is a matter of | anxiety which we consider legiti- mate, which arises only out of con- sideration for the interest for the working class and which we feel is justified: the anxiety to preserve | one’s party and to obtain certain | guarantees of security from it. We have concluded a pact with the So- cialist Party in France, all these questions were anticipated, andi there should no other difficulties about that here. But this is some- thing different, you seem to ac- cumulate mere objections. I tell you very frankly, citizen Adler, that this is neither any new course, nor any maneuver of a higher sort, on the part of Mos- cow. There never was, and there never will be, any change in the policy of the Communist Interna- tional. It is not necessary here to open a diseussion on the policy of the C, I. We consider what we have done to be just. I add even that we consider the experience of the Bolsheviks, in contrast with the experience of the Socialist Parties in other countries, as henceforth conclusive, I may even Say, decisive. POINTS TO WORK IN FRANCE To whatever we have bound our- selves, that we loyally respect; we have proved it with the Socialist Party of France, and we hope to, be able to prove it with the entire Socialist International. We did not offer a single criticism from the moment we acted together. Ac- matter of an impromptu unimport- ant detail. There will evidently take place a deliberate, ripe understand- ing in which both Internatioals will participate. | And I am no less serious when I propose a great international meet- jing. In France, we didn’t conclude |the pact all at once; first, there | strations, before we. were to con- | zations, j one influenced the decision of our com- rades of the Socialist Party was the long length of time during which we succeeded in establishing and maintaining contact with the Socialist Federation of Seine. On the 8th of July when the Croix de Feu had just demonstrated in Paris, before the signing of the pact, we assembled in the Boise de Vin- cennes, 100,000 Paris proletarians, and this was a decisive element. And when we held impressive meet- ings in the Bullier Arena, the ef- fect of such demonstrations quite convinced our Socialist comrades that their acceptance of the pact was no longer a question of any maneuver, Since then, you know, a certain opposition in the Socialist Party to the united front rapidly began to disappear. At our last committee mecting, a telegram was sent to us from Montlucon an- nouncing that they were no longer hesitant about achieving a pact of united action. I do not pretend to believe ‘that in the last ballot a majority vote was cast for us with the Socialist Party at Montlucon; I think rather, that they under- stand that fratricidal war could no longer continue and in face of the grave danger which menaces us, it is finally necessary to succeed in cementing united action, Cachin.—I add a fact. When on the 14th of July, we met with a delegation of the Socialist Party, Blum used this same frank lan- guage which you address to us to- night. We declared to him that, for our part, we would very quickly revise his suspicions of any maneu- ver. As it happened, whenever we met each week, sometimes more often, what happened? It was soon Maurice Thorez, who, presenting a resolution, often met with the de- mand from Leon Blum: “Do you agree?” Such was the practice of the agreement. There, in concrete life, is what became of your old suspicions! We insist on these facts, which are in our eyes decisive, be- cause we feel that the French ex- perience will be from this time for- ward a fact which can dissipate all prejudice, WE MUST FACE THE FASCIST DANGER I do not believe that in a single country in the world the working class is under any illusions of the extremhe dangers of the present hour. If among us the working class, which has rather a well developed political sense, threw itself into the united front, bursting all resistance, it is because it felt more keenly the necessity of overthrowing all objections in order to rally everyone in face of danger. In face of that we were full of courage. We dis- puted, we will’ continue to dispute, bu’ now only around the problems of offering a front against the ex- treme danger. I do not know what would happen in France if in six months you were to have a more powerful fascist attack; perhaps you would bitterly regret for having passed so much time in discussion while the danger menaced us. Fer, France fallen, Spanish fascism tri- umphant, international reaction {might well say: “They could not get together.” That is why, I repeat once more, “However, in the actual state of things nothing should prevent any of the other parties of the Interna- tional from doing what our French ‘comrades did and from taking united But, before that, immediately, we | measures wherever such action can would like to agree on some point.!pe consummated.” Cachin—That fact. Vandervelde—As I told you, when is an important had to take place many forms of |We were surprised by France's in- united action, many unified demon- |itial step, there were among us some who declared to our French com- clude any pact, between our organ- |rades: “You have taken a step con- We have a feeling that |trary to earlier decisions of the In- of the elements which surely | ternational, but we shall not invoke them against what you have done.” BEFORE THE 13TH OF NOVEMBER Adler—Some further words. When we say that the session of our Ex- ecutive has been called for Noy. 13, that does not mean that a review of your proposals will be postponed until then, We shall advise all the members of our Executive concern- ing our meeting tonight; as soon as we obtain the account of our meet- ing, we shall forward the text of it to the members of our Executive, and immediately deliberations will commence on the subject. “Allow me the observation that | the situation in our International is a little more democratic than in yours: if you receive an order from Moscow, everything is regular; with | us the members of our Executive | must often confer with their respec- tive parties.” Cachin—We too, comrade. Thorez—We confer among our- selves also, but it happens that we) are more in harmony among our-/ selves, Adler—This harmony is pre-es- | tablished with you. (Smiles), “Among us it is often necessary to confer with the central committee of the Party before a member of the Executive may discuss a question in the midst of the Executive. “Tf, then, our Executive can delib- erate in one month, that will be really quick work; but from tomor- row on we shall activize ourselves in | this matier, | “One word more on another point. | “The problem is not as simple as you pose it. You say: in France ‘united action has been accomplished, the experience is decisive. Maybe; I do not wish to enter into details. “But in my country we have also made an attempt at the united front, and in the beginning we were also under the charm of fighting in common against fascism. Unfortu- nately, we did not have the same experience as in France, where in the last few weeks the movement has grown. On the contrary, in Austria we had some regrettable ex- periences. If you read the Inprecor during the period of the united front there, you will find a number of articles which we condemn as un- fortunate, as we hope you do. One particularly accuses Otto Bauer of being a traitor in the same breath with the Schuschnigg government, ete.” Thorez—The other day Vander- velde quoted a passage from some- one, I don’t know who, in which he compares Communists to dogs, Vandervelde.—i cited that to dem- onstrate the state of mind of cer- tain countries, such as England, but it wasn’t my own point of view. Cachin.—My remark was only by way of verification. I underline the fact that I was really astonished by the passage; it appeared to me that Citizen Vandervelde did not base himself very strongly on his predicated little appreciation of us. Vandervelde—I felt that in it- self it required no nuances. United Front Action To Help Struggles Refused by L. S. I. we would have no difficulty in finds ing not only words but entire pos ‘lemics hurled at us. Vandervelde.—A year ago I was asked to participate in a united front meeting with the Communisis which took place in Flandre St. I went very willingly, but I certainly was finely tricked in a Communist pore the next morning! (Laughs er.) INCIDENTS ARE INDICATIONS OF A STATE OF MIND Notice that such incidents are ine dications of a state of mind that has gone on for years. Adler.—Our concern is to deter= mine whether, as you say, the French experience is really chare acteristic and valuable for all coun tries. Or whether the situation in France is, from the point of view of the external policy of the So- viet Union, a special case, while other countries will be treated in the same manner as heretofore, If the experience of France is charac teristic, then this is really a cause of hope for all of us. But if we see that in other countries, as in Austria, other tactics are used, then there is reason to fear that this is only a maneuver. You under- stand that from that time on it was necessary for us to learn whether the French example is characteristic or not. If it is, we say that there is a change in course of Moscow. You are not delighted to hear that. We hope that the resolutions of your approaching congress will give us the possibility of becoming clarified. Thorez.—Permit we to say that you are not travelling on the best road toward facilitating a united front. Adler.—I know that you French would like to have things the other way, but I have my own responsi« bility, and I am anxious, you un derstand, before all, not to create any misunderstandings in our In- ternational. We wish to be entirely loyal and frank; toward our Party this is our first duty; and we hope that we will progress on that basis, And from this viewpoint I con- sider that our conference will have been a useful step for the common good of every one. But tomorrow if we publish articles in our papers saying: There are some who want united action, others who do not want it, who are on the look-out for maneuvers, then the situation will become aggravated. If tomors row we discover in your papers ac« counts on your part to this effect: Perhaps there are some in the S, L, I. who desire united action, but there are a few traitors who do not want it; then our meeting today will have a bad effect, and in a direction entirely opposite to what you desire, Cachin—So far are we from that state of mind that we have re- solved to make a request that the authentic report of the proceedings be drawn up in common. I allow myself again to point out that in the last objections you make you are haunted that the Communists want to maneuver with you. Adler.—That you want to maneu- ver, no! Cachin.—No one wants to maneu- ver. I repeat that to think of maneuvers at this moment, before the immense danger that menaces us all, is truly to humiliate us. IT IS NECESSARY TO EXPECT UNITED ACTION Vandervelde——I am convinced that the toiling masses in France desire united action, and they were the decisive element in the pact which was concluded; I have no doubt of that for an instant. Only, recollect on the other hand, that in some countries where the peril is less great, where the dise proportion in forces is infinitely more outstanding, there are in the Socialist Parties prohibitions, objec- tions and oppositions, which per= haps have no reason for existing in France, but which do really exist in other countries, It is necessary to see things as they are if one wishes to effect anything at all. Cachin.—We have arrived then, I think, at the end of our explana- tions. (Agreement.) What is there to be said further? There will be then a stenographic account of our meeting, with the reservation of some last minute corrections, which will be come municated to the comrades of our two Executives. But for whoever it is immediately published, I think we shall tell the truth very simply. (Agreement.) That we met, that we made cer- tain proposals, that we regret that the two delegates of the S. I. were not able to acecpt them immedi- ately, but that they will submit these proposals as soon as possible to their Executive. (Agreement.) Adler—Can we draw up a com= mon communique, perhaps? Vandervelde.—It would be diffi- cult; it would be better for each of us to make our own, we have suffi- cient confidence toward one an- other. % Thorez.—We can assure you that in the editing of our communique, as in our commentaries on your declaration that there will be abso- lutely nothing to injure what we Adler.—You're lucky in finding only a word here and there in an cording to the terms of the pact possible for you to answer in the! land addressed unpleasantly; but ' \ wish to attain: united action. Vandervelde.—We equally make we regret keenly that is is im-jarticle written by someone in Eng- | the same declaration to you. The conference closed at 8:15 p.m