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Communist International to German Party By G. ZINOVIEV, Chairman. EAR COMRADES:— Your party conference is being held at a moment of profound change, stirring the thinking section of the whole German working class to its inmost depths. Never before has such a heavy responsibility lain upon the party conference of the German Com- munist party as on this occasion. Without exaggeration it can be.said, your party conference will decide the fate of the German Communist party for many years to come, and with this the fate of the German revolution. I. The International Situation At the present juncture the Third International is more than ever incorporated in Moscow, and the Sec- ond International more than ever in London. The international position of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has become strengthened in a manner hitherto unheard of. The number of recognitions of the Soviet govern- ment on the part of the mightiest governments of the European bour- geoisie is the outcome of the foreign policy pursued by the first proletarian government in the world. And that the balance thus drawn is satisfactory is due to the efforts made by the van- guard of the whole international pro- letariat. That the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has been recognized de jure by a number of bourgeois governments is not the most important point. What is important is that the de jure recognitions have taken place without any material or moral con- cessions whatever being made to the international bourgeoisie on the part of the proletarian government. The mightiest party of the Second International is in power at the mo- ment in the mightiest of the bourgeois states. The so-called labor govern- ment, headed by McDonald, is natural- ly pursuing a bourgeois and not a pro- letarian policy. At the present mo- ment there are broad masses of work- ers in England who do not yet perceive the policy pursued by Ebert and Noske. But MacDonald’s govern- ment is showing itself in its true colors more and more. Since the time of Marx, the greatest and most dif- ficult problem of the labor movement in England has been the formation of a revolutionary proletarian mass party. At the present time the objec- tive pre-requisites for the formation of a Communist mass party are given in England for the first time. In the Far East and the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the leaden clouds of imperialism afe pierced by flashes of lightning with ever in- creasing frequency. In India, in Egypt and in China, the movement against imperialism is growing strong- er and stronger. New events are maturing in the Balkans, pregnant with fateful inter- national consequence, The knots tied by the shameful treaty of Versailles have not yet been cut. The Anglo-French competitive antag- onism becomes more and more acute. The French bourgeoisie is paying for the piratical occupation of the Ruhr district with the disastrous fall of the frane and by financial ruin. The im- pending election to the chamber will draw the balance of the inexorable combat going on within the various fractions of the French bourgeoisie. The German bourgeoisie is enjoying an apparent breathing space. What is happening at the present time may be designated as the shadow of an im- - provement in the international situa- tion of the German bourgeoisie. But it is nothing more than a shadow. Now as before, the drawn sword is hanging over Germany. It will either become a colony exploited by victo- rious imperialism, or it will accom- plish. the proletarian revolution — Germany is definitely confronted by these alternatives. 11. The Further Prospects of the German Revolution. The proletarian revolution in Ger- many is inevitable. The error made in the estimation of the speed of events in October, 1923, has been the cause of much difficulty to the party. But this is none the less a mere ep- isode. The fundamental estimation re- mains. The revolution is coming. It is difficult, at the present mo- ment, to state definitely when the re- volution is likely to take place. It is possible, ‘and indeed highly probable, that the decisive struggle will begin much sooner than many people expect; it may be that before a year has passed we shall find ourselves in the midst of the decisive battle. But the possibility of the slower development of events is by no means excluded. The party must at the given moment be prepared for both possibilities. And where the Liat of our cause depend on the subjective factor, that is, upon the extent to which the pro- letarian vanguard is organized, the party must so order its ranks that it is ready to plunge into the decisive struggle at the shortest notice. The slogan of the fight for the pro- letarian dictatorship, for the establish- ment of Soviet power and the prepara- tion of armed insurrection for this purpose remains fully and entirely in force. Persevering and _ tenacious work for the arming of the workers— this is the task to which we must now devote our most serious attention. We can well comprehend the impas- sioned energy with which the German not win over the man in small cumstances from the Fascisti. An dispense with doing this Pane renouncing the hope of the hegemony of the revolutionary movement, and then it is superfluous to speak of the dictatorship of the proletarian at all. There was much that was super- fluous in the late campaign fought around Schlageter. But we cannot permit Nihilism in the national ques- tien, We have no right to forget, even for a minute, that very considerable strata of the German proletariat are still under the influence of clericalism. The party must regroup its ranks, and so conduct its work as to win the workers for Communism. This is ren- dered possible, beyond all doubt, by the pre-revolutionary period. In the coming parliamentary election the Party is marching forwards with closely welded ranks, penetrates into the deepest strata of the masses of the people, and seeks to further the cause of revolutionary enlightment of millions and millions of working people. If the results of the elections are favorable to our party, the work- ing class will go forward with fresh courage, faith will be increased in the Russian Party Congress decides, “No more political concessions.” British Imperialism Takes It In. comrades discuss the ‘question as to whether we should have resorted to arms in October and November 1923, or whether the retreat was unayvoid- able. To revolutionists such a ques- tion is bound to be a burning one, But despite everything the party must not look. backwards, but forwards. The party is not demolished, the party has retained its fundamental core, the party has emerged with closely welded ranks and all honor from the period of illegality. The party must now, more emphatically than ever before, make it clear to the working class of Germany that the most important of its tasks is: the preparation for the definite struggle for power, for the proletarian dictatorship. lll. Winning over the Majority. The task of winning over the majority of the proletariat, and of augmenting its ranks by the largest possible number of sympathizers from the petty bourgeoisie of the towns and the peasantry, still remains one of the fundamental tasks of the party. We must not under-estimate the first successes gained by the Fascisti among the workers. These are extremely dangerous symptoms, and the party must devote its serious attention to them. Unless we put the national question in a Bolshevist re we shall powers of the Communist Party, and the worknig class will be strength- ened, There can be nothing more danger- ous for a revolutionary party, during a@ period in which it finds itself be- calmed, than the under-estimation of the tasks bound up with winning over the majority. This task has not yet been accomplished. ~ Until we have won over the majority of the socially decisive strata of the workers we can- not vanquish the bourgeoisie. Your party conference must consider the whole of its steps and resolutions from the standpoint of whether these conduce to the furtherance of the aim of winning over the majority, or whether they are likely to lead to fresh danger of alienating the masses of workers, and of thus contributing to the conversion of the Party into a sect, The trade union question must also be approached by us from this point of view. In the interests of winning over the majority of the working class it is our duty to maintain unity in the trade unions, and to keep in view the fact that the sightest false step in this direction may cost the party its head. In view of the en- ormous importance of the trade union -| question, we devote a special docu- 0}ment to its discussion. IV. Party Work Among the. non-Pro- letarian Strata of the Population. A party which demands the hege- mony of the revolutionary movement, a party which aims at the seizure of state power and the conversion of the bourgeois republic into a Soviet re- public—such a party must perform much preparatory work among. the non-proletarian strata of the popula- tion. The working class and its party can only put the idea of the proleta- rian dictatorship into actual practice if they prove capable of neutralizing a part of the petty and middle bourge- oisie in town and country, and in bringing the other part into their camp. We may as. well candidly ad- mit that up to now our party has done extremely little towards winning the sympathy of the man in a small way of, business, the employe, etc. in the cities, and still less towards winning over those strata of the peasantry whose class position is such that they can and must join the working class against the bourgeoisie. The party conference must devote its main at- tention to this problem. V. The United Front Tactics and the Transition Slogans. The most important statements to be made by the Executive Committee of the Communist International with reference to this subject have already been given in the January theses based on the Moscow consultation. At the debates held in January between the Executive Committee of the Com- munist International and the leading representatives of the German left, we defined the united front tactics as a method of our agitation, and as a method for the organization and mo- bilization of the masses for a long period in advance. Have we any rea- son to depart from this formulation? In our opinion no such reason exists. If we are to understand, under unit- ed front tactics, such opportunist er- rors as were lately committed in Sax- ony, then it need not be said that we are opposed to united front tactics of this description. Happily, the fact that opportunist errors have occured in this or that country, during the utilization of revolutionary parliamen- tarism, has not yet led anyone to draw the conclusion that it is unallow- able to utilize revolutionary parlia- mentarism at all, and that the party should not take part in the Reichstag elections. The Comintern will not abandon the continued application of united front tactics in other parts of the world simply because this or that great op- portunist error has been committed in Saxony. It now perfectly clear that the unit- ed front tactics in particular have to be exactly adapted, in each separate country, to the stage of development which has been attained by the labor movement in the given country. In Germany the stage arrived at requires us to adopt the tactics of a united front from below, that is, we can dis- pense with negotiations with the of- ficial leaders of Social Democracy. The united front tactics from below must, however, be carried out sincere- ly and determinedly, down to their last logical consequence. In this question all fractional diplomacy is unallowable. It is equally imperative to arrive at a clear conclusion with reference to the question of partial demands and transition slogans. The Russian Bolsheviki fought against the Men- sheviki for ten years on the question of partial demands and _ transition slogans. What was the attitude of the Bolsheviki? They never opposed partial demands and transition slo- gans. The Bolsheviki themselves even put partial demands and issued transi- tion slogans. The Bolsheviki did not differ from the Mensheviki in that they opposed partial “demands and transition slogans, whilst the Menshe- © viki supported them. No, the Bol- sheviki differed from the Mensheviki in standing for the preparation for proletarian revolution, whilst the Mensheviki-opposed this, They differed in the fact that for the Bolsheviki every partial demand and every tran- (Continued on page 8.)