The New York Herald Newspaper, April 28, 1863, Page 3

il x i ine HEE antl i : i & = < be ag ‘hominy, in the general viciuiby of Sav: ‘mer’s corps was on tho eft bank of tbe Chickahominy , about half between Bottom’s Bridge and New Bridge; iklin and Porter were algo on the lett remained to be done to complete those br: . attack ced on Casey’s <livision, I think, about one @eclock. 1 was at the time confined to my bed by iliness, and affair was the = Bey in full retreat. I order- learned that hig gervices serious, General Sumies the receipt of the first order, ectually stretched his command out op the road, beads of columns were at the brid when he received the order. his force crossed at the bridge near \)r. and moved by the shortest route upon Vair near which point he came in eontact with the ene- left, and drove them some little distance, thus re- pressure on the right of Heintzelman, who up to support Keyes. The enemy renewed the junday morping, but with much less vigor then fore. They were repulsed with comparatively ifficulty, and our troops regained most of the lost the day before. The river rose very much on , 80 ag to render the bridges by which Sumner had tirely impracticable at au early hour in the af- 3 fcr gah a were bye structures of yes corduroy, and a large portion of tuem were washed off by rise of water. During the battle of Fair Gaks, and time after it, the ground was 80 ry as vo ren. te move masses of artillery. ‘enemy had continued to hold their positions in New Bridge, bad they mot? A. Yes. idge would it not bave been from their positions lew Bridge, and thus of your army? Could not jo not think it could have feast the chanees would bameomly to cross the Chicks- in: Ue nity of Now Brie, fe ad mt yt ab that point NABE the position y with wane perce, your right wing op- erating om the poy the Chs iny, ond the left rf " if 80, Nooo their ume ‘postion such that it could net A. [do not Junk that an attack in the ‘en successful before the com- to portions of the arny. those bridges completed, or were they ‘The most important ones were com- think, about the 20th of May—not far 8 5. u n pepe au ia LTEpteeget iiegets fire re Ef = rit a 4 i HENS pga? ie E | | ot bridges, why was not tempt made to drive the enemy from that position ? causes of the delay were, think, the con- ground and the necessity for finishing the for the salety of meet with a disaster in the attack. hat points were the defensive works to which were mainly in the vicinity of the then to the right of that, vosition of tee eoeny 98 oe Pe ‘The of had expected to att considerations, would bave been to in front of the enemy’s works at Rioh- t!ilery, where they had heavy guns. Ibat, fend the condition of the bridges, were principal Peasons for not advancing at that time. ‘There were four di- I should think the ions must have been 30,000 men, not the want of communication between ~ fight and lett wings of your army prevent your reaping tone advantages which you mixht have otherwise ob- bained from the dofeat of the enemy at Fair Oaks’ A. 1 think that if there had been reliabie communication Be- the right wing and the centre and lett wing, we would have pained greater advantages by the battle. Q. It is true, is it not, that the enemy retreated in con- ‘after the battle of Fair Oaks, and that there wasa * panic io Richmond in consequence of that defeat? A I no means now of telling in what condition the ene- ‘my retired; and I do not remember receiving information ef any special panic in Richmond at that time. Ido not remember how that was. VvHE SEVEN DAYS’ FIGHT. @ When did you first know that Jackson's force were 6 Frederiekshail, and that the euemy was meditating striking a blow on your right wing? A. I think that the of Jackson being at Frederickshall reached ine on the 24tb of Jone. and on the afternoon of We 25th | received some other information. But I do not tank I got what | regarded full authentic information entil the 27th. How jong before the battle of Gaines’ Mill did you receive that information? A. Tire day beiore, I think. Q. What was the strength of your right wing just prior te the battle of Gaines’ Mill? A. At that time there were Shree divisions, the strength of which was probably less than 35,000 ineu, That is mere estimate on my part, bor I do not now remember what the strength was. @. As #000 as you had reasonabie cause to believe that the enemy proposed to attack you iu force, should not the wings of your army have been united to repel the ealck? And was this done? And if not,why not? A. The right wing was drawn ia to the immediate vicinity of the bridges a* Boon as was cable under the circum- , after we koew itely ef Jackson's approach. Prom ws o- pogt tdi He eppeare:| ks of the Chickahominy, ‘and made several ‘on the right bank as well eg on the left, Bo that! do not think more troops could wisely have been sent vo the support of Porter at Gaines’ farm than were actually sent. Q. Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, as an attack was to be made by him, would it not Rave = i been better to have placed both wings of our army e side of the Chickahomany prior to the battic f Gaines’ Mill? A. Ido not think that they to have deem brought to the same side of the river before actually were Q. What ad was gained by leaving the right wing of our army to be attacked by a greatly superior force? A. It the enemy from geting om our flank end rear, in opinion, enabied us to withdrane the Q Will you explain what was done by the right wing of our army at the time, or about the time, the left was with the enemy, which saved our flank from at- ‘and enabled the army and its materiel to be with- mn? A. By desperate inflicted % great a the enemy as to check his movement on ‘he Left bank Gnd gave us time to get our materiel out of the not the enemy have bees held in check, with and exposure to us, If our whole army hid been the right bank of the Chickabominy before the of Gaines’ Mill, and Bis © cross resisted? Sf i E. 253 = i called Tearnot give ihe hours without consulting papers. Q. Woe it recalled after Hemtaried to go over? A. [have ao rerolwction of Slocum being stopped. If there was ported of the day 4 Ber's command crossed over im the afternoon, Two bri ‘of General Keyes’ command came op late in the , bot Ido not think t orensed the river. G. Lit you suppose the cemy to be your in Strength vefore the battic of Gaines Milly A. My reeol- fection in that | dir. @ And did you suppose at that time that you would be Piiged to retreat? A. It was a oontingeory I thought of, Bat may tovpreesion i that up to the thine of the battie of Grimes" Mid T stil hoped that we should de able to bold mur own. . It the evemy was your superior m oumbers, was Bot ihe strongest reason for hot figntiug him, except were cuncentrated? And incase be himew( divided, a of bis force on one side of the Chickahoml- ‘on the other, as he did, would pot that far. ou, thougn inferior, atehance to defeat him in de We bad great diliiculty im ascertaining the in 1 do not soe that, under the oir. time, We could have doue differently had enncentrated their fores on ak, war 4 Would it or ot havo yosnible » by snoentration ot your force tho right bank of the river" have marched directly i. with the main body of your army and ry , leaving such force as might be vienble to check Tis Of the river? not; I think the enemy force enongh still bave prevenied #uch « inevement. preston at the time disifinetiy, force was withdrawn tothe right %erk of Hes 4 ! ti pe ‘& & Lis 38 eo i i that or left wing of the army was on the right house, as the most cen- statement of the retreat incl the batties of Malvern Hill? A. As soon u (Oh Be seagate a8 improv! cross. sent some staff officers an James river to bring me back the the roads. ‘The trains were put io motion, I think, om the night of the 28th of June, or it may have been on the morning of the 2uth, and as the great trouble was to handle that immense mass of wagons,! tried to get them out of the way the firat thing. We had only one road practicable for the trains aud © go on aiter leaving White Oak swamp. As soun as wagons were well out of the way Sumner, Fr aud Heintzelman were ordered to take a position neur Savage's Station, and vo bold it uotil night. In tho meantime the commands of Keyes and Porter were push- ed across the White Ouk swamp, in order to sion of the roads coming in from Kichmond between tho White Oak swamp and the James river, and cover the further movement of the trains, Sumner and Franklin ‘were attacked at Savage's Station, and after a severe con- teat repulged the enemy. After night crossed the White Oak swamp. 1 think the whole command got over by daybreak in the morning. ‘The trains were kept mov- pee hg Kies t. The troops were placed in position from swamp to the vicinity of Malvorn Hill to bite cover the movement, They were attacked in the after- oon at several points along the line—at White Oak swamp mainly by artillery. But at Nelson’s farm the most serious att by the the lighting there continued unt! sions ‘were most warmly engaged were those of Hooker, Kearny aud McCall; while, still fur ie ge serious attack was made by the gion, T | eneral Wise’s o ‘The enemy were again sepilsed at all poi bo the night the army was concentrated upon Malvern Hill, A portion of the trains were at Haxall’s, and the rest at Harrison's Bar. Early in tho morning the troops were placed in po sition at Matvern Hill, and they were attacked early in ‘tbe afternoon, Tho most serious effort of the was about the left of our position, no attack bei jo on our right, where! was most apprehensive of it. I deter. mived, even after a signal repulse of the enemy, to withdraw from Malvern Hill and go to Harrison's Bar, inainly for two reasons: the first was, that the position wasrather too extensive a one for the number of men; the second was, the necessity of getting: below City Point, the channel being 8 narrow at City Point, so near that bank of the river, that it was the opinion of the naval officers that we could not count upon getting our supplies that far up. The night after Malvern the movement was continued upon Harrison’s Bar, which was a very fuvora- ble position for the gunboats, the ground on either bank being compietely swept by their fire; sveps were taken at once to strengthen thi ition. Some little time after we reached Hurrison’s we occupied a point op the other side, which was intrenched, and gave usa secure debouche on the south bank of the river. Q. On or about thp 28th of June, after the battle of Gajues’ Mill, was it not thought necessary to destroy tho baggage of the army, and were not orders given to that effect? A. I have no recollection of any such order being given. A-certain amount of property was destroyed at some of the railway-stations. Q. But no order was given a eta 1 of the baresn~ gf the seme af nat Nog 1" 0. By whom was the battle of Savage's Station fought? Did you yourself direct the movements of the troops, or ‘were they directed by the corps commanders’ A. I given general orders for the movements of the troops, Dut the Aghting was done under the direct orders of the Corps commanders. Q. By whom were the movements of the troops in fighting directed the day after the battle at Savage's Sta tiony A. I gave the general orders, and each corps was commanded by its own commander. Q. Who selected the positions and directed the move- ments of the troops at the battie of ina A T selected the posit in a general way; it in, I rode over cen ‘indicating to the dif nearer our to occupy. Ther: part the position right that were, I think, selected by General Barnard and General Humphrey. More or jess change was made by every corps from the geoeral position thas I had selected. Q. At what hour in the morning were ‘on the field atthe time of the battle of Malvern Hill, and at what brah cal he jeave? A. | was op the ground very shortly after daylight, and, 1 presume, occ! 4 some four hours dn riding over the leery Twas again on the ground in the afternoon—1 should think somewhere about two or half-past two o’clock—and was over the whole position at that time. Had the commenced in the morning before you left? A. No, sir; no enemy in sight, Q At what point or points were you from the time you left the fiel until you returned? A. J was at headquar- ters, near Haxall’s house. @. Were you down to the river, or on board the gun- boats during any part of that day, between the time you left the tic! your return to it? A. I do not remem- ber; it1s possible I may haye been, as my camp was di- rectly on the river. Q. How far was the gunboat from Haxall's? A. There were generally some gunbvals iu the {immediate vicinity of Haxull’s. Q. How far was that from where the heaviest fighting ‘was daring the day? A. From Haxail’s to the point where the heaviest fighting was, | supppose was two miles and @ half or three miles, There were parts of our line that were within a half a mile, probably, or leas than thas, of the headquarters. Q. Had the fighting ceased when you went back to the field in the afternoon, or was it still in progress? A. Still in ‘The moat serious Aghting was after I went yom the ground the ye second time. 'Q. To what points on the field did you go on your re- turn? A. I went over nearly the whole fleld. menced near the left, by a house that was there, and then passed around by the positions of General Sumuer and General Heimtzeiman, (o those om the extreme right. My apprehensions were for the extreme right. | felt no concera for the left and centre. 'Q. Did you remain on the fleld during the remainder of bp aand A. 1 camg back to headquarters just about Q. The troops were withdrawn that night to Harrison's Bary A. Yes. Q. Were they withdrawn in pursuance of a general order or by direction of the corps commanders? A. In pursuance of # general order, WHO WITHDREW THE ARMY FROM THR PENINSULA. Q. Was the army withdrawn from the peninsula ia ac- cordance with your opinion? A. It was not, @. Why, did you not approve of ity A. I thought the James river the true line of operations, and that the pro per policy to be pursued was to reintorce the Army of the Potomac, avd contiuue the movement om Richmond ia that direction. Q. How many available men did you estimate that you had at Harrison's Kar, and how many more would you have required in order to inake @ successful atternpt upon Richmond? A, i think 1 had about 85,000 or 90,000 men at Horrison’s Bur,and I would have wndertakon snowuer movement in advance with about 20,000 more of rein forcemvnts. My view was, that preity much cverything that the government could have controlled ought lo have wen marsed om the James river. 1 did not think the enemy would trouble Washington #0 loug as we bad 4 powerful army in the vicinity of iichmond, and did not shure the apprehensions for the safety of Washington that were eu tertumed by ayreat many. I asked for 50,000 men at first, on the ground that I thought the army should be a# strony as possible, and as little as possible left to chances, When General Halleck came down to Harrisou’s Bar, my rocoliection is that he stated that 20 ag Be something about that nomber, was ali that could be had. and I said that | would try it again with that number I have no recollection having asked at & subsequent period for a greater number (han 20,000 as @ necessary preliminary to @ movemeut. Q About how many men were leet in killed, wounded ‘and missing from your army from the 25th of June until you reached Harrison's Landing? A. I think the lows was ‘about 14,000; Dut | could not tell positively without look. ing at the returns, @ Wid you state in what you consider your chances for success would have been with the addition of 20,000 men to the number which you had at Harrison's Landing than they were when you were in front of jueh- mond. and beiore Jackson had formed a junction with the rest of the rebel forces’ A. I should have counted upon the effect of the batties which had just taken place upon the enemy. We had thea strong reason to betieve that the enemy's losses had been very much heavier than our own, and that portions of his army were very much demoralized, especially after the battle of Malvern Mill. Q. From whom did you receive the order to withdraw the army trom the peninsula? A. From General Halleck. Q. To what poiut was it ordered? A. To Aquia creck. Q. To what point did it qo’ A. A portion landed at Aquia and the rest at Alexondn M’CLELLAN’S REMOVAL FROM COMMAND, Q. Will you give a concise statement of the araistance rendered by the army under your command to the Army Of Virginia? A. [think, before the termination of the campaign of the army of Virginia, that it hat boewa Joined by the whole of the army ef the Potomac, except jome cavalry, that bad not arrived, aad a portion of General Keyes’ corps, that was left at Yorktown ta gur: rison. I think that every efort was made to barry (or. ward the troops, aad vo give Cordial assistance to General Q. Do you remember when and where you first re cotved orders to forward troope to General Pope, if you received any’ A. The order was for the Army of the Potomac to go to Aquia as rapidly ar possible, aud there they were met by orders from General Halleck to come here or go to Alexandria, as the case may be Q. And each corps, as it marched in parsuance of those orders, ceased to be under your coramant? A. Yes. . Did you receive ehy orders at Alexandria to forward troops to the assistance of General Pupe’ A. Vet; troope end supplies, and 1 sent everything down but my own mua M'CLBLLAN PUT IN COMMAND OF THE DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON, Q. What position did bw occupy after your a el at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which hard been aucer your command to the arsistance of General Pope? A. Iwas for mme litle time—ome or two days, two or three days perhape—wvhout omy im; merely at my camn wat any command. On Me the ts: of September, I received verbal instructions from Geveral Halleck to take command of the delences of Washington. 1 was, however, expressly prohibited (om, in any way, aasatning any contro) over the troops under Geseral Pope. 1 think 18 was on the next dey after that that | was in- structed verbally, by the President and General Malieck, wo go out and roset army, which was coming in, and to assume command of {t when it approachet the position, that | considered I+ Ought to occupy for defensive pur poses and to post It property: MCLELLAN ENTERED UPON THR ANTIETAM CAMP AION WITHOUT ORDERS. Q How long did you remain in command of the de fevows of Washington, and what orders did you next re cere, and (rom whom? A. 1 de pot think tliat order, as signing (he commnad of the defences of Wasi ever re ther one iseued in i oteky vert WHA Coneral Halle t NEW YORK HERALD, TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1863.-TRIPLE SHEET. uh it wasn ver def aaté why ther 1 wos woo three mes of | Lthinke that was one of hows yeaah gree Ge ahape thal’. When the ome came I bid that portion of the army of the peninsula which landed at Aquia creek receive thar direcuons t) march to the assistance of Geveral Pope from you or from General Halleck? A, I think in every case vtrect from ‘Q. Did that portion which landed at Alexandri receive their instructions to march to the assistance of Geueral Qe orders direct from General Halbeek, excerpt of Franklin and Sumner. I think that Hoi landed at Alexandria, and that Hooker and Kearney both landed there, The orders for Franklin and Simmer were given rough me, but by direction of Gneral Haiic k. Q. Did you bave any interview with the President in relation to taking command of t..e troops fer the Maryland campaign, OF receive amy instructions from bin on that point? A, Ido not think he gave me any ivstruetions after that morning when I was told te take command of the army in front of Washington, J do not chink he gave me any ‘uctions about the Maryland campaign. THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF THOUGHT MCLELLAN TOO Past. Q. After you commencet the movement did you re- ceive any instructions from any one? A. I received some telegrams that might be looked upon in the natare of im structions from General Halleck and from the Presijent. a eeeiee Ay in ai iM ‘f ond ord was Gn error ing so far away from Wasi ington; that 1 was goii ‘ho. fast. He had the im- pression that the force of the enemy was on ‘he south side of the Potomac, and that they had only a swat! force in front of mo to draw ine on, and then they would come into Washington im rear. As late as the i3h of September I recollect @ telegram of General Halleck in which he pressed that same idea, and tlls me shat I am wrong in geing.x0 for away. ; Q thon the 1d campaign was planned and con- ducted by you, without any instructions from any one other than those which have indicated as coming from Genera) Hatleck by A. 1 had conversa- tions with General Halleck, before starting, in reference to the positions given to the corps that were firet thrown over on the Maryland side, The campaign assumed shape as tt proceeded. When | left Washington we knew very little anout the position or intentions of the enemy, and nothing more definite could, at that time, be decided yn than to carefully until we g°imed accurate information the euemy, and to foliow such a direo- tion as would enable us to cover Wi » and, if necessary, Baltimore. IMPORTANT ORDER OF THE ENEMY DISCOVERED. Q. Will you give a statement of the principal events connected witn the Maryland campaign? A, When at Frederick we found the origival order ixsued to Gen, D. H. Hill by direction of General Lee, which gave the orders of march for their whole army, and develo} their mtentions. ‘The substance of the order was Jackson was to move from Frederick by the main Ha- ratown road, and, leaving it at some point near Middle, arg, to cross the Povomac near Sharpsburg, and endea. yor w capture the garrison of Martinsburg, and cut off the retreat of the garrison of Harper's Ferry in that di- General McLaws was ordered, with his own command and the division of General Anderson, to move out by (be same Hagerstown read and gain possession of the Maryland Heights, opposite Harper’s Ferry. General Walker, who was then tly somewhere near the mouth of the Monocacy, a, Lovetig: {illo axd gain poasogs Heights, inns eom. Wryzed b "s ferry. General ng? fered Hill to serve as a rear gu Manassas, &c,, were ordered to take a position either at Boonsboro or Hagerstown, I have now forgotten which. It was directed in the same order that jormnae Walker, McLaws, &., had taken Harper's were to rejoin the main army at Hagerstown or Boons- boro. That order is important im another sense, It shows yery plainly that the object of the enemy was to 4 \o Pennsylvania, or at least to ia land. pike. The corps of Porter's corps, wore parallel to and on the jeft of the main pike, thus in Pee to support either Fran&lin or the right, as . Franklin was ordered to i 5 : i until the morning. Franklin wo strong in numbers and position for nim to attack. It was on that morning, about nine o’clock, that a. surrendered. The last of Frankiin into Pleasant Valley about twelve, 1 think. ‘thas oye in regurd to Hurper’s Ferry Su the morning of tho 16th & close exami und was made, and preparations made for the attack. Fie plan decided upon was to attack their left. The oorpe of Geveral Hooker was thrown across the Antietam early iB the forenoon of that day (the 16th), g#ined possession of the opposite ridge without serious resintance, and then turned to iis left, moving along the crest of the ridge, ad- vancing steadily until dark, having encountered very sharp resistance during the latter part of its march. during the evening the ne Mavedeld was thrown over w support Hooker, Early on the morning of the 17th the corps of General Sumner was also ‘over the Antietam to support the troops already engaged. Franklin's corps arrived on the ground from Kobreraville in the course of the forenoon. The result of the day's fighting ou our right was that we gained a considerable portion of groynd beld by the enemy the uight before, acter a very stubborn resistance on his part—the fo tunes of the day Vurying several times, but finally resulting in our favor, [t became necessary to throw Franklin's corps across the Antietam to support our right soon after it reached the field of battle In the centre the effort was confined mainly to artillery practice. On the left Burn side crossed the river somewhere about noon, and, aiter severe fighting, gained possession of the height which w the object of bis attack, but was finally obliged to yield it to the attack of a stil! holding & position on the further bank The next morning | fouud that our joss #0 much disorganization in some of the commands, Ubat f did per to renew th wok that day, ¢ pecially Of the arfival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting bout 15,000 men, AB an tusiauce of the condition of some of the troops that morning, F lua to recollect (he returns of the Firit corps—Gavral Hooker's corps—mate the morning of the 18th, by which there were avout 3,500 men reported present for duty. Four days ator that the returns of the same corps showed 15,600. | had arranged, however, to renew the attack at daybreak ov the Lvth. Bat [ learned some time during the vight, or early in the morning, that the ener: abandoned bis position, It afterwards proved that he moved with great rapidity, and not being encumbered by wagens was enabled to get his troops ucross the river bette we could do him any se- rious injury. [think tat, taking into consideration what the troops had gone through, we got as much out of Oem in this Anlicam campuign as endurance could tear, By Mr. Odell — Q. What was your force at Antietam? A. I think that before those two divisions I alluded to came up our force was about 90,000 men—not far from that, it may have been 42000 or 04,000. There were by no means that E many engage’ in the battle. Q How many had you engaged im the battle? A. My recollection i that the estimate that we formed shortly after was that we had (rom 70,000 to 76,000 men engaged. Tam deducting the camp guards, ke. 1 think we must have had from 70,000 fo 75,000 men engaged. By Mr. Gooch — Q. At what number did you estimate the force of the enemy? A. | think our estimate at the time, and which was pretty well borne out by what occurred, was, that we fought pretty close upon 100,000 men. They were every where un strong force. 'Q. We have to close our testimony a8 soon ax posible, as it must be written out and the reports made to-mor- row (Congress bad not then extended the time of the comm ties as it did afterwards ), and we have not time to ask more questions, Is there anything further that y wish to add to your testimony? A. No, sir; I do got now think of anything. NEWS FROM HOOKER’S ARMY. HRapar ares, Ant oF THe Potomac, April 27, 1803. } Laat night Secretary Seward, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Fred, W. Soward, the Prussian and Swedish Ministers, Judge Vell, and other distinguished | reonages, arrived at beadquarters. A number of ladies accompanied the party. To-day the distinguished visitors reviewed a considerable body of troopa, and subsequeally de,ar'od for Washington. Every thing remains quiet on the other side, The enemy has movod @ large force up near the fords, and also dis- plays an mereased ounrber in the vicinity of Fredericks. ‘borg. Hamors bave been in circaiation dering the last few days, that the rebels were avout to abandon tLeit present porition, Nothing definite, however, ts yet known con ening such a movement. ’risoners are broxelt in al nowt daily from the outpomis, but their iatormacion is conteting and upsatwfectory ‘A Freder ckabarg rebel correspondent writes to a Rich mond paper that his Lapression i# confirmed that our army i# withdrawing from the line of the Rappahanno ek ‘The weather to-day is warm and pleasant. The rowds are improving. Affairs this side of the river ore unchanged, Hgrribie Tragety wt Toler. Tote, Apri 27, 1869 Alingo Drown yerterday hy ive br 3 wire and two children, five mitos eae: ef ue ; te warts. ved bimpelt WAJOR GEN. BANKS’ ACHIEVEMENTS. Additional from the Depart- ment of the Gulf. | | OUR SPECIAL ARMY CORRESPONDENCE, Three Batiles Won, Three Gun- boats and Three Transports Captured in Three Days. The Battles of Fort Beasland and Irish Bend. The Queen of the West, Diana and Hart Destroyed. The Rebel Transports Newsboy, Gossa- mer and Era No. 2 Burned. REBEL TRANSPORT CORNIE CAPTURED. The Rebel General Ryley Killed, General Mon- ton Missing and Colonel Clark Wounded, Additional Names of the Killed and Wounded, &e., . &e., &e. ‘The steamship Potomac, Captain Hoffman, arrived last Bight at seven o'clock from New Orleans. She brings no Tater dais than those alresay received, but she brings one of the Hena.n’s special correspondenta, with an ac- count of the splendid operations of General Banks in the Teghecountry, - ~ = Cherivilion, F. Marion, N. A. Sherman, lady and two children; Mr, Lob, lady, two children and servant; J. 8 Keough, Miss Collins, #. Wooldridge, Mrs. A. Hall, Mrs Bebmers, Mr. Townsend, Miss Townsend, J. C. ‘Davedport, Mise M. M. Speering, and twenty-six in the steerage. ‘The steamship Blackstone, Captain Berry, from New Orleans April 19 and Key West April 23, at one A. M., arrived at this port lato last might. She passed in the river, while coming down from New Orleans, ship Under- writer towing down, and going up steamor Continental. At anchor inside the bar, bound out, the ship Zouave and bark Fanny Eaton. Ship William Chamberlain was at anchor outside the bar, bound in. At sixP. M. of the 19th the steamer Matanzas crossed the bar, bound in. The United States steamer Bienville was at anchor out- side the bar April 21. Latitude 25 88, longitude 84 18, passed schooner May. Same evening, off Margues Key, was boarded by the United States gunboat Sagamore. April 26, latitude 36 96, longitude 1434, exchanged signals with ship Wallace, from Key West. ‘The Blackstone brings the following passengers: nie com veneran Sse 6 merville, J. 8. Sewell, Lieutenant A. Aurlaz,” lady, child and servant; Jas. Powell. From Key Weat—Mrs. Robert a daughter, 8, Sbifith, M. Spavin, Uhited States Our Army Correspondence. New Ontzane, April 19, 1863. The boasted spot of Southern rural grandeur—"The Country of the Atak ” “The Garden of Louisiana,’”’ “The Paradise a ee ours. ‘TRAED BATTLES, THRED GUNAOATS AXD THREE TRANSPORTS 100? iN THARE DAYS. From Berwick City to Opelousas the victorious army of General Banks has advanced. Three battles, three qun- oats and three trangports the enemy bave Jost in three days. Twice were they defeated by the main army of Gen. Banks behind their intrenchmentes on tho Beasiand plantation, between Pattersonville and Centreville, as the straggling fire and final silence of their guns in the face of our batteries on Sunday and Monday fully proved, while Grover at the same time was reaching their rear, harassing , Ongoging and Onally driving them before him with such rapidity that they were compelled to make a stand on Monday at Irish Bend, where a sharp and de. cisive battic was fought, in which tho rebels were de- feated and fled into the woods. Three gunboate—the Diana, Hart and Queen of the West—are no more, The two former were fired in the Teche by the rebem, to prevent them falling into our hands—the former on Monday, the latter on Tuesday— while the Union gunboats Estella, Calhoun and Arizona, at ten o'clock on Tuesday morning, discovered, attacked and destroyed in Grand Lake the famous iron clad ram Queen of the West. Three large transporte—the Newsboy, Gossamer, and Era No. 2—which were lying at Franklin, were als» ce? stroyed by fire, amit was found impossible to get up ‘Stoain and escape up or down the Teche before our troops would overtake and seize them. The consequence was that, like the Diana and Hart, they were buraed to pre- ‘them from fallinginto our hands. BRIGHT KXPRCTATIONS OF THE RNEMY. ‘The last accounts state that our forces are still foliow- ing up the retreating, demoralized and panic stricken remoant of an army of eight thousand men which a week ago wore guarding the gate of this paradise, hourly ex pecting reinforcements aad an immediate advance of the army aod navy, when @ sudden, combined and over whelmiog dash upon Brashear City and New Orleans should be made. ‘The commands of Generals Emory and Weitzel on Thursday and Friday arrived at Berwick City. General Banks aod stall, whe bad been encamped for some days alongside the railroad, vo the right, about a quarter of « mile from the dock at Brashear, embarked on board the Laorel Hill on Satarday afvernoom, the 1th instant, at wenty minutes to two P. M., landing at Berwick (across the bay, about half « mile distant), remaining there about two hours, when they started for the front. DOLDNESS OF TUR KEMY. On landing at Berwick City the brigade of General Weitzel proceeded to the outekirte, ahead, and to the right. A strong infantry and cavairy force was thrown out as picket, and the artillery posted iu position, com- manding the roads and woods, evemy from the first, was very bold, and appeared sived to harane Our force ax much as possible, con testing our apparent advance with vigor, approwching to ithin aebort distance or our pickels, showing thom selves and firing thelr pieces. ‘The following day & reconnoiseance was made by Cap- aia Habbard, of General Weiizei's staff. He was accom panied by the cavalry companies of Captain Williamson and Lieutenant Perking, Qur party had advanced but « short distance when the enemy fred pon them, retreat ing bebind buildings. The rebels were in caxy range from Fort Buchanan, and a signal being given for the fort to open fire, 8 few shells were thrown in the neighborhood of the enemy, who soon dispersed aud fe hastily into the woods. The object of the reconnotssance having beeu os compiubed, the party retarned jo Berwick City, report. iwg tue country olear for miles around. THE ARMY ADTANCING. At twelve O'clock M. the next day (Saturday, April 11) an advance was ordered, Williameon'’s and ferking’ cavalry wero again in the kaddig, ekirmisuing with the enewy ail day, ‘The following i@ the order in which the advance was made — Righth Vermont, Colne! Thomas, extreme right; One Hundred and Fourteenth New York, Colonel & th, right centre; One Hendred and Sixtieth ik, Lieutenant Colonel Van lation, left contre, Twel feut, Lieutenant Colooe Peck, left wing jansou's Firet Lowiniana cavelry was in the ext nivance, chmely followed ty akirminbers from ive ferent regiments. Captain Bainbridge ® Firet Unit tates artillery, Company A, tod the -ixth Masmietueet s | betiery Captain Careth, avoomnpunied tem | The ebemy Were Reon 81) along the march, in smal ynads and singly, whieh thus compelled « careful at firing OF the ekiruishers at dountial porn with ceosesemas me After edy abou five mice, the esemy opeved with « y non | teeive prod Night piers, poster - j hoove on the tight, Rawmbridge's art 7) iy | on, iv po einetire were the hat the rebels sod Gring, Himbered Wy Liew coms and worrmity | of dence, another buried Keel In the trunk of a large tree Dy he side of the house, while @ third struck (be rest z = E i 3 § i & of the house in ruins. In addition to the artitiory the enemy had (our hundred cavalry and two | lowy ing that p hundred infantry. The advance was now resumed, and beyond 4p vecasional stray musket shot and the capture of @ {OW prisoers nothing tmportamt cecurred. 6 eavairy were sur poried by the Gne liundred and Sixtieth New York, and the gunboat Chiton rent by General Woizel's orders, Colonel &. 1. placed @ guard over the houses and plomtations. Iie » sad out Duildings were fled with sugar, corn asses. Tne advance wes now very rapist, the Cititon ahead, voce pe wouds, Many of the families of the jaken fo Mhawares that when our ‘cos Arrived at their residences an untouched half eaten dinver on the table, or wal article lett here and there, proved with what surp they heard of our advance, and in what baste tt Black and white all hurr erorsed the Atchalulay: Acoumpanied the enemy. @ there Wo welcome us. It was well that General Weitzel pisced 4 guard over their homes and property, or the owners would have re- turned to a homeless desert. At hiif past five? M, Pat ter-onville was reached, ‘This vilingo is dotrnt nine mulles from Berwick Clty. The Atchafalaya raus to the right, parallel with it, aud in this neighborhood, it will be remembered, that some four weeks ago the Diana was captured by the rebels. ‘Tum FRONT. At four o'clock General Banks and ataif started from Berwick City for the front. General Emory’s division | followed the advaneo, the ambulances and wagons bring | ing up the rear. All had arrived at lattersonville by #ix P. M.,, including the staf, A detachment of Major Robinson's cavalry acted as General Binks’ body guard Nearly every house of respectable size and appearance in the village was honored by either division, brigade or regimental headquarters, while the Commanding General and eta eccoupied a large white house to the right, some twenty yards from the side ot the road. The whole army was ina very small space, but a strong force of infantry and artillery guarded it well on every sido from surprise and attack. VEELING THR KNEMY. At six o'clock on Sunday morning I started for the extreme front. Williamson's cavalry were scouring the country ahead and on the right, occasionally skirmishing with the enemy, who were out of range of our artillery. About seven o'clock the Seventy-fifth New York moved slowly abead, throwing out akirmishers, and acting 4s support to Bainbridge’s artillery, The tofuntry deployed towards the dense woods on the left about half @ mile in the advance of a large force of Generals Emory and Weit zeV’s commands. Artillery was algo posted to the right and centre, and in front of the Atchafalaya. ‘The skirmishers having moved about half a milo, and beyond a bend of woods about two hundred yards, dis covered a large ferce of the enemy’s cavalry advancing on the main road, Falling back to their support, the skirmishers reported what they bad seen whon the ar opened, firing three shells, Tho enemy hastily left. " About eight o’ciock a cloud of dust was seen jn the distance, It was evidently caused by @ large force of the enemy advancing. This fact was communicated to Geveral Weitzel. Captain Williamson was also notified of the move, and cautioned to be on the alert against surprise. MOVEMENTS OF THK ENEMY, T now looked along the level country beyond the woods to the left. With the exception of the buildings on the plantations, the shrubbery around, and the rr: on the sugar and corn fields, there was no obstrugtict ae eae mores bodies he ap be cea ies with ' eye. By could see that they were rebel Bette mnt tal ghey were moatly joo su ches wer and four, This was aboek Ries oedeck £.¥. Tt were moving from what appears be a road, leading ‘in the ‘direction of the woods on the Jeft, and some buildings to the right. IN LINK OF BATTLE. General Banks and staff, accompanied by Genorals Emory, Andrews and Weitzel, now rode up for the pur- pose of reconnoitering the country. After a careful sur vey they were only ablo toseo a few robel cavalry, and in afew moments their horses’ heads were turned in the direction of Pattersonvilie, General Banks rema:king, “There are no enemy in front. We will advance the army, gootiemen,’” Hait™an bour ‘after the cavalcade returned General Weitzet’s brigade of artillery and infantry advanced to the open ground beyoud the point of woods en the left and formed in line of battle, as follows:— Seventy fifth New York contre; 114th Now York right right; eon New York loft cen- otf it. ‘Captain Bainbridge’s battery, Company A, First United States, was in position at the right, and Captain Caruth’s oa) yorareoarsger se if Of: Gen. ‘Binory division * Gen, "0 formed the extreme left of the line of battle in the ad vance, and was composed of the 110th and 162d New Yorn, Foorth Massachusetts and Sixteenth Vermont. NARKOW EACAPE OF GENERALS BANKS AND KMOKY. At this time ay Speceprs and Emory had « nar row escape from i enemy's sharpshooters, Gen. Emory was placing his men in position when Gen. Banks rode up. Ihe two commanders were not more than threo feet apart. and were hago Sym nara an to future movements, when suddenly from woods on the left, not more than two hundred yards distant, half o dozen muskets were discharged, and tho bullets went whistling past and betweeu the Generals, one ball entering the breast and killing one of the body quard. ick as lightning General turned in hy dae eae w os eae apd cdavediog r y said As » Men, there are bat a nem oF we have bad more sbots."’ As a number of the body guard put spurs to thelr horses two or three hasty shots were fired from the party in tho woods without, however, doing any injury. Generais Ranks and Emory quietly walked their horses in @ line further from the woods, and the conversation ro wumed as if nothing had bappeuod. I may here state that when our soldiers eutered woods the guorillas had disappeared in the thick upderbrusb, and nothing more was soov or hoard of the The remainder of | Emory's division was now drawn up in second line of battle, supporting General Weiteal , and iu different directions, the reserves being in the rear. THR ENEMY IN LINE OF HATTLE. The enemy at this time began to xbow themacives in considerable sorce (half past ten A.M.) Two regimenta were drawn up im line of battle directiy ahead and in front of a large sugar house, not more than a mile and & half distant, Other butiatogs were ja the neighborhood, and it was impossible to form any idea of what was be yond them. Foo dark line of lutaptry, scarcely visible to the eye, was in admirable position, forming ahalf square, with tne point towards os. They appeared ready to ro. coive us ‘The rebel cavalry were quietly walking their horsoa over the whole country, some riding very joiureiy to wards our tin wroaching wo within’ half or three quarters of a mile, for the purpose of recounoitering. When satisfied they rode in haste towards the column KETRRATING AND PURSUTT Our advance remained stationery until cavalry could bo went to feel the way ahead, Suddenly the two rebel regiments drawn up in line of battle disappeared, Their cavairy followed, und a few moments after the deuse t marked their course. They were ‘or two hours these eiouds could be moment becoming more indistinct finally disappeared. Captain WA speed a tug fire from the rebels o the opposite bank of Volley alter volley was fired ax our men redo rapidly 1@ and a half the discharges the fre and smoke being easly soen by our ‘whole force, and heard, It would have boom very foviieh for cavalry wo return the fire, as they were exy the rebels were hid in the underbrush ao OF all 8 ng not & man war Wached. not, however—one seriously tm the body, time Captain Mack's Eighteenth New York rapidly placed in position om thin aide of the Techo, and a sharp fire was kept up for pearly an hour, the «bells (alling and burw in every direction, Under this fire two regiments off Colonel Gooding’s brigade mud & section of Captain Bradbury's First Maive artillery, Lieuteuant Morton, crossed the river ver the pontoon bridge, throwing out skirmishers and driving the enemy before them. Several shots were exchanged, but whether any of our mon were killed or wounded I ain nnable to state. Whilst retreating, the rebels on the other side fired the buildings along the banks of the Teche to prevent, as 1 supposed, their ailording 4 nheiter to our sharpstooters ADVANCE OF OUR ARMY. About one o'clock /. M. the whole force was ordered to advance. Skirmishers from the torantry and sqoads of cavalry from the different companies wore detached and pont alow to feel (he way. Owing to the thicknens of the cave Golds and the plaoists® houren and build ings, i+ was found necessary for them to Koop op & pretty sharp Gre Occarimally « rebel, inounsed oF op foot, could ve seen in the divtunos, but om obsery ing Our advace, hastily left. As our (orees were moving along the road borderiug the Teele, some two miles end a ball from Patvereaville, Gfty of sixty rebel cavairy suddenly sprang from out of & piece of woods 00 the oppenite ide, advanced @ few pacer, and fired their carbines. (uick aa thought a section of ‘artil lery (twenty pound Parrots) way turved apen then ibe bursting slacli« forced them [rom their cover inte (we open ground, and they beiug now in full sight and exey range, the ehella were ent amonget therm in beowt) ul style, explodiny, plougbine wp the earth, and seaturing the pieces of ebetl all around. Never men rie tas ‘and as cach moment their backs became lew 4sumet, oot coutinned, men, who had langhed and shoutedgat their a) yppearing, one long, loud, Wild FOL, whieh een d xen trom ovina the rebels bad fe recently let, reowing a if mckes them In their hasty retrest. Half ao gain oaw them, this tune, however, at « y texp@ctt:! dutanes, aud o renee of Our bens wnt won, They could just be distinguished by the naked These me werg Winer Uieo ao hour ago, having learned sense by exyeriebos ORTRECHON fy TH TromE ener Hanks and reported that. one bi iy foot hag, aod reachen © 01 the Gistanee over the river Viet RAL, ARTUR MAL HINCR THE ADTANCR— eu aL vom Tat Vim (eet A tow mennenta inter and a report arrived that the gur wat (ane wae ih kagt, General Danke aed tad rode nthe foxd 6 the bonk Of (he river, aboat ® tendred dixteut, aod from a riting ground (he masta a our web ititie quobent Vises waa seen, with « t nearly o mile distant. Every body pod look at her, aod the conepuence of long ereagh to heer fromm her, for 7 of moke, & Th, O04 as whirring aren, tatter eee eb in het as Aypronched as, peseieg over ovr ee ee ground wey wih a ng ndei mantally wwovery car, for (wes the thier to take a6 ma be ome Toe neat ‘urtant and anothe gue wae Gred, ibis time Punter filed Verret on board | opposite, from the other side of the mark (bat both were firing at, for a shell Feetly over us, and lodged im the centre of » hank Olty Yards distant, neatiering the earth over diers who were resting Lhewsolves at the fcampered off im double quick. It was very fortunate that veither of these shells burst, As, if they bud dope so, several of the ata! must have | been Killed or wounded. “It's becoming rather warm here, gentlemen, and as we are evidently the target they are firing at, t tbink we bad netier disperse,” said General Hanks, as be quiotly turned bis horse’s head and walked d.cecky 10 @ line to wards the battle fleld, where he was joiued by his staff, The astonishing coolners with which the Commanding General and his sia acted jn this case no doubt poke woll (or thelr bravery, but poorly for (heir judgment At least that wax my opinion, cor | was one of the party When tho order was given to disperse I expected to soe them gallop off out of range at double quick: but what was my surprisy whea | saw them walking their horses as if they were going to a al PREV ARING FOR A RATTLI-IN POSITION, It was nearly five minutes before another gun was fired from the Viana — they calouiated that shot by time fom ther and the distanoe that a mounted ‘of the sboll hammed far overhead, ape #t w advance, ip nearly w direct tne They evidently did not kuow al Banks, Had we ridden rapidly from the #pot when the ret gun was heard we should have been r where the shel! struck, and, ay f a(terwards exploded. It was about ten m General and staff F oO three o'clock when the » field. The enemy had Jos from bebiad the breast works, and already rapid diy cau » aod ploughing up the Autry D0 stand second lines of ; skirmishers ond rapid posting of bat ter iea, with the roaring ©. thug eholl, formed one of the grandest spectacies imugiaable, The following Was the positin of We infantry and artillery at [our o’elock |". Mon sunday General Paine’s bel ‘al Emory's division, comp sed of the Four LA Now Hamp shire, One Hundred and Thirty -third ka One Hundred and ceventy-third New York, aet be right of the line of batue, while brigade formed the left, ia precisely the same order a¥ in the early part of the day, A second line of battie waa also formed of Colonel In grabain's command, avd part of Colonel Goodings Thirty - eilth Maswchusetts aud Fiftysixth New York re ments, Captain Bradbury's First United States artillery, ngaged the enethy just above the obstructions in the Teche, white Captain Caruth's and oue section of Cap tain Bradbury's First Maine batteries, uuder command of Lieutenant Healy, engaged the enemy in front. One piece of Capt. Mack's Fightecuth New York (twenty. pound Parrott) was ordered about the same time to take position between the road and the riyer-—about ihe tame place that General Banks and stam had formerly oocu jed—and open fire on the )iana, Twenty rhells were at the versel, was struck several timer, ‘There was something very singular In the actions ot the Diana, She would suddenly appear eveey five or ten minutes, fire and thea disappear. Captain Mack thinks that she was lashed to the side of the dock, when, by the loosening of the rope, she would turn by the force of the stream into the centre of the foche, fire her gana, and was then instantly drewn out of sight, One shell from the Diana burst very near the gun. A piece of the Li lee private Corson’s cap, and lodged in a tree near by, AN ARTILLERY DURE, Soon our batteries replied to the enemy's fire, and a constant roar of artillery wa: heard, with occasional ra- ‘pid firing, sounding tp the distance like heavy muaketry. For more than two hours the (ring was kept uy {nm addition to the powerful gong trol tho Diana, the enemy were well supplied with batteries and gans oh large calibre, answering our rapid discharges with pl it. One, @ thirty-two pound #inveth bore, at the left of the road and near the end of the breastworks, on this side of the Teche, was fired vory rapidly, and no doubt did great exeoution, It was cither a Parrott or a Columbiad. During the whole of (his time Genoral Hanks and stat were under fire, riting from one portion of the fleld to another with apparent uncoscern. ‘Abead, bebind, and on each side of us the shells wore falling or exploding, the earth every instant rising in & cloud from where they struck, while the air was filed with lem from the bursting missiles and white circling smoké, which curled and sailed upwards, ri ‘Suddonly, while we were botween the two lines of bat- tle, @ round sbot atruck the earth about forty yards ahead Dehind the firet Ii Us ou bute sort distatice , ab al jean ug dad the second line, bounded harmlessly over the labler. A few minutes after.as the General and stat werd moving between the lines towards General | mory, « abel) from the Diana came cutting through the air, striking the earth not more than fi(ty fect ahead apd. shan, ibity foot from the first line, plunging deop into the fro » and throwing up the dirt in & shower, sunfiar to what might be expected to result from a large, heavy body thrown with great foree tntwa theet of water. | not ced this one more particularly than the others, probably be- cause it struck much bearer, from every portion of the fold our linos aud the enemy's breastworks the earta tant was riviig in clouds, © ‘Ax General -y saw the xbellx striking all around wa, he shouted, “(Keep your staff and body qusrd away, Gen. eral, the enemy are directing their fire towards you. We were all ordered t) keep back and await bis return, while Genera: Banks rode wwards General Kmory with only one of bis stai. About five o'clock the Commanding General Wook a last look ut the Diana, He bad just passed «large white au: ar house on the left hand side of the » about mx flandred yards from tho battery, when « shot from the wed, two pounder smouh vore struck the roof of the building A section of hay oo Bradbury's battery was sent to guard the pontoon bridge which bad been Ubrown acros the Teche, while the , ae | have before stated, cron od the river, with two of Colonel Gooding's regiments, ‘TU INVARTRY. While the artillery was at work the idie. The brigades in the advance line of nr , to the right, and Weltzel’s, on the left-—the for- mer reaching to the Teche, and the ‘latter resting oa the woods Bkirmishers were thrown out all along the frout, aod the whole carefully advanced, At balf-past four o'clock there was & reconnoimmance by the Goveruls Commanding, and an attempt made to 0 the enemy's batteries, the earthworks, dirtaut from three quarters of & mile, © similar in color W the mtanding cane fold, it was found impossible to distingvish them or ree the mition of the guns, Our Datteres were opened ines advanced, and ekirmiabors depinyed of drawing their fre, ‘There was ou along the whole lines, and along the edge of the w there was a sharp muskelry engagement lor sume | the enemy coming out of his Intrenchments to attack ws driven back with bons. our skirmishers advanced wear ir batteries, On the wine 0 they bad fourtewn oF 0 other vide of the bayou the enemy's enough to dr of the Teche » guns, On @ wan unknown ‘The fring coused with the darkness, and it being fourd that both the lines of battle were wituin range of the enemy's gant, an order wan given hat the advance should revire out of the range of light artillery and Divouns for the night, taking porition Im two lives, the bei. gade f General vaine foriaiug the tight bail’ of each line and Gemoral Weitzel’s the left balf, AN LMCORTANT OHTION To MOLD. General Paine'® command had soarcely ubeyed thie or dor (hin right resting on the road), when General kinory ordered the Fourth Wisconsin, Colonel Bean, to be turown forward w hold the woots and sugar boone on the right Of the twain road, as the anemny's defences and prineiyal Bune Were inasked by them, This position was contented with epirilt ail might. The pickets were Oring and skirmishing Minune the ireer aud buiidings during the whole of the time, but the ground was fvialy aod gallantly held by the Fourth Wisconsin With but stall joss ou our bide, Lieutenant Colone) Dean had bis horse shot from onder him dering the engage ment. About one o'clecks on Toeeday morning Colonel Mexn venta communication 9 General Paine, stating that onder cover OC the (og aud darknuers the @vetny had been b mix AL work near their picket line ail night, barnmert g and chopping, leading him W believe that Ukey were planting bacterien, OF preparing in noine tember UW give ul “0 reeeption in the morning. Geoers! Emory won informer of thease facts. He at once gave Gevoral Paine perminaon to piace au additional force ln yor lon Wo support Comme! Beau if pecessary. Hefore the fog lifted General Paine tnoved bie head quarters up to the tine belt by the Fourth Wixeoorin. He was pcoompaniod by the Highth New Hampshire, Thin regiment waa placed in line of battle ia the rear of the Foarth Wiscowsin, aud both regiments were ordered te piace themselves in the decoy plantation ditches, so that Jay ing down they might be sieliored from all mimeven, eXompling abel! bursting iirectiy verbowd won determined to mai fearon the meaning of the veral Paine recording'y wont up to the ling of pick ete in from of the Fourth Wisconsin. Proesedirg cau iin short range, having tnoved frum ber former a day ing lie wight As Gon. Value bad jant toe to the comelucion thet or Ullery ould be placed in pomition mo ae to eumily dee roy bor, the Diane fred ity pound rifled Parrot, we abel pamning in yromieniy a our Ittle ‘This was et thirt, fve mocha Ce ee the signal (or ue seed day 6 NGNT TO COMAESCR—A HARE CONTI — wre, ARIS TONNE At baif past eit o'clock om Mor lay morning a large for:o A ihe eneiny # infentry and cavalry advanemd from be hind (heir breastworks, for the yorpme of sencton Of the RugKT noe and w nde, Dewt (two), the thirty-two pou reed, the bo tteren aloug “he bresstworkn @ halter y on the wippe it TUE AntLenY to the whe oat ftom ond ve cent) Gomeern, at Lor we woe Very WOney, ve Wited (tik M) dacavering ber pate * tet BH tat nee Arebet battery tad been quieuy pitcet between the Diana sud our (arene, ton one Ye mod ty yan te toe baat fom (he inter, and nenriy ret yards ios fem their wan & fre, whieh mast © /< when | eoerat Pee he u y aw CONTINUED UN TENTH PAGR,