The New York Herald Newspaper, April 28, 1863, Page 2

2 —_—_—_ + ‘ ‘ | ‘ . ‘as to b opportunity te see the formasion of the mountain and the My position, if they saccexled, w position of the eoemy. Whiie im that position Erecewed cree TUES NEW YORK H& + — RAL fords there are of ew ny eofe- work win = 7 in hand to aprivg upen the epeny w then re orl vk nae ea DAY, APRIL 23, there <iven were (urnished ral from tne latest and mest turns in Dig pustegsion. I recollect that the Orders j:on. General MeClellan to advanee wit corps, treat, 4 i on the nota ' the read, for Ab varptee nak ine VARIOUS PLANS. nett eo aarans | ae pry pee works dowb below heve G4. troops. In A headquarters... ri a5 something over 70,000, but I canuot give ao ON oe | im ara eee Guonideattack the eaeny lke e-esg. Always bee my cnnrossion that » ranklin, who wis dows th of the month—I wroeW& — Q. bid Richmond ever Polddhe same relation to thom | in that estimate were included the Jroops under Ot which Genaral Burnside "tne | ine thecher. it was dotermined, as {ep ceet—fee there wut — calling bis attention to the | as Wasbingion did to bs for supplies’ A. Everything | Generals Fremont, Banks and Dix! A. 1 think vot General at a att oe tee | Talk te vewanei! with that smpression—that we should at “mune, could have swept everything” bovore hit. He rom. strong pavul force on the Yotomac But | passed through there, | think |, | BEG Une division af F {. Genera! Bloakor’s, was column wm moti a | direc Peepers Aba to | tack them without avy separation or divis‘on of thawrmy, resented the positian down there as very formidable gunboats for blockading purposes Was 60 Q. So that it was really uhe general base of suppres? | ordered to rewain yr the valley of the Shenandowh, under as the divisions arriv AS soon & advance, which re ing poseension of night, where I dire sulted im our gate ved Tay troops to remain until turther orde.s. it was dark when we yained those heights. Ip the morning t 1ers Louk possession of the road, c c, As soon as this was au F was instructed to fol and, if my treope require t Yision, which had beev &@t lO h » wore Wake followed-up » position ‘This was ysburg, tictam creck aud § tof the Potomac, The ene- ouch of which [ judged to . They were formed perpendicvdar Saircetly across the road. about smiles of Ine on one Side Of t d and about three diged that they had in those two (men, It seemed to me at the 2y were drawn up aud displayed for © 1 was already informed that thoy hat fallon back from South Mountain hastily and in dis orice, Abthat time enly Richardson’s division, some of nien'y cavalry andone brigade of my corps (Gib- acrived within about a gmile and a halt of the ‘crock was between me aud the enemy. About I suw that the rear of the evemy’s line was nto columu and marching to the rear, in the of Willicmsport, where there was another ford across the Potom Tiully expecte’ ‘hat they were on the retreat. I immediately seut an Gator of the Engineer corps (Major Houston) to ascertam if there were apy fords across Antietam creek by which | could cross when the rebel force should be so much reduced that it would be sate corme to attack. Iwas prevented from crossing ‘atictun. bridge by reason of the batteries which the revels bad planted to defend it. bags | not less than sixty guus could have swept the bridge Tattem; crow there, By five o'clock that day, 1 think, a:ce of my corps had arrived, aud the other corps were coming up. About that time General McClellan arrived. ‘yhat was before the force in tront of me had been suff ciently reduced to justify an attack by me. When he arrived, of course, I was not at liberty to make the attack | We remained in these positions until about two o’ciock on the 16th, when I received orders to cross An- tivtam creck, near Cadysville—that is, some three or four milos above the road leading to Sharpsburg. 1 immedi- Atoiy pat my corps in motion, and, after proceeding about thrce miles, I fell upon the outposts of the enem; and drove them in; I drove them ahead of me until that night. When night o: Thad as much resistance in front of me as 1 could well stand up under, As soon as T had established my lines, with a view to make my camp secure during the night, | informed General McClellan that I should attack the rebelarmy at the earliest dawn. I desired to take the initiative. I was aware that the ene- my was already in great strongth in front of me, and that in all probability they would be reinforced during the night, When | had left with my corps to make this at. tack, I had been assured that, simultaneous with my atiuck, there should be an attack upon the rebel army in the centre and gn the left the next morning. 1 sont word t) General Me@ellan when I proposed to attack, in order thut he might direct the other attacks to be made at the same time. Slvecpsbur BATTLE OF ANTIBTAM. ‘At dawn 1 made the attack, aad gained the high ground which commanded the position which the enemy fad ken, and which they held at the time I commenced the nent. At nine o’clock that morning I had advanced stoulily, but securely, to the point that I desired. 1 had at (hat ime a battery of howitzers on this high ground. I had sent for two additional batteries to double quick up sition A number of my infantry regiments 1 posted to protect them on their arrival. vancing, on the morning of the 17th, and about hal: past seven o'clock, Mansfleld’s corps, at my request, had been sent to my support, and as soon as all my re serves were engaged Lordered him forward, and about one haif of his command assisted in taking possession of this commanding postion. While looking for a point at Which to post the batteries I had sent for 1 was wounded. At that lime my troops were in the finest spirits. They had whipped Jackson and compelled the enemy to fly, throwing away their arms, their banners, and saving themselves as they best could. Some of the commanding ofticers of the regiments were ridiug.op and down in front of their men with the colors captured from the enemy in their hands® the troops almost rent the skies with their cheers; there was the greatest cood feeling that I have ever witnessed on the field of batt'c 1, was at that time that I seat word to General Sumner that I had been wounded, and that he had better and of the condition of hig advance. Headdressed me an: passed on. I had previously fainted, but was in a state of Partial consciousness at time this happened, J was then carried off the eld; and that is about all 1 know of the battic. We drove the enemy nearly a mile that morn- ing. Ly enemy 1 encountered on the féth had been re- inforced during the night by Jackson, from Harper’s Ferry. All that party my troops had filled with panic, aud they were fatling back, fleeing upon their comrades in a disordered copes I knew that | had wi tacked; go that really, in the first instasce, | was attack- ing the whole rebel army with only my own force. BURSSIDE’S CAMPAIGN. Decemere 20, 1862. By the Chair |. What position do you hold in the miluery service? A. I am a Major General ef Volunteers, and command one of what is called the Grand Divisions of tie army of the Potomac. THE CHANGE OF Bass. Q. You have road the resolution of the Senate under which this committee is now acting. Will you please to go on and state, in your own manner, what you consider necessary in order to give us a clear and concise history of the movements of the Army of the Potomac since Gen. Burnside assumed the command of itt A. I joined the army at Warrenton avout the 10th of November. At that time Gen. Burnside was in command. After | had beom a day or two, during which time there was some talk of transferring the line of operations from the line of the raiiroad at Warrenton to the line of railroad t Aquia eroek, Geo. Halleck and Gen. Meigs visited Gea, Burnside, a8 1 was informed, to determine whether ‘this trauster of the line of operations should be made. As near as | can recollect, that was about the llth of No- vember, That matter was discussed between those Gene rais and General Burnside, and it was determined that that transter should be made, Some ove of the party re. Halleck or General Meigs, I do not c y thought they could have every n this line in three days. This was not 9 itation. I was present inthe room at the time these things were discusted, and although my opin on ta regard co them was pot asked | heard the conversa tion, Taey said they thought they could bave the pon toons ready, the stores lamded, and everything in readi ness to advance in three days. | remember that 1 thought that was marvellous at the time; that it was pot witl the range «f human possbility to do that. Soon after movement to the Rappahavnock commenced. | will say hore that | bronght up the rear of the army in warching Crom Warrenton two this point. 1 mention this maitor because I think it bas an important bei ing upon some matters whien are to come of erwerds. The rear of thie movement was con si tered the post of hover, After being upon the road tor 1/0 binree days, stop ed one day with my command a vartwood. From that point { addressed a letter to Gev Huroside, requesting tbat he would permit me to cross the river with my grand division atone of the fords there, and come down on the south side of the Rappahannock. t for reasons assigned In comm You from him. the equest wos devied me. I then marched to this place. u the meantime I bad received orders to have my com wrod forawhed with twelve days’ rations, forage tor voree gays. and the requisite amount of ammunifon At HartMoa | had three days’ provisions with me. On reaching this point | found that the division which bar preceded me, | presume in obedience to orders, had pro vided themselves with the prescribed preparations, sacions, forage, &e., for a forward movement, andmotbing was let tor my division, For three days alter reaching here | was on leas than half rations, after a few days, however, provisions began to accumulate here, and after week Or ten days { was enabled to propare for the advance, oe canes related to food, When | reached here, wh oh ‘om the 22 November, ail the pontoons had not arrived, and I was told that tie reason for the United amount of supplies was the difficulties of landing anu forwarding, there were not cars enough, there were | a sr at Acquia creck or Belle Plain for landing them, 4OW HOOKER WOULD GROSS THE RAPPANANNOUK. After the pontoons arrived, it became a matter of im portance to determine where and in what way we shuvid cross the Rappabannock. The offcers commanding. the grond divisions were called L gether to discuss and deter mine that metter. One of the first questions that were sobmitied to ug Was where we shoul he river. soveral Burnside proposed that a portion should * mat twelve miles below here. Lobjected, by my yule he counetl, to crossing two columns se (ur apart, and was determined that the cross. ne should be bere and about twelve miles beiow vers, and the road was corduroyed in the vicinity of he crossing about twelve miles below bere, in order ine litate the crossing, About this time General Hn the mountain on the north side of the | dthad them they were deployed ¢ spirak ridge of the mountata that my on their righ!, below hee. Ghat) Bu sean M, Dub.) BTUAL ha the Navy Department was never able to place am | A. In general terms—yes. Of course a great ‘lex! came | Banks’ command Avuenever he wanted it, uutt! the sabe a attacking the evel ased through | of afluir of - 7 jed—the keevis the y wogether that nen Cou'd have Garr red ¢ 1 a0 Nore foree omthe river. 140 think that army Staunton, by Gordonsville, that never passe rt jairs was perfectly well known—Jackson. di ob ly Be i grist, Tela. we supeove. tho | £40 Hot know tho fact, butt have uoxterstood that large | Wa iM & Coudition tO have the Virgin bank of Rienmond, ‘Fhe antiority existed tram the Secretary of Ware retaia aud Lu oe ct atroug Mae @’ taw pointe, when ous | POrtio of Franklin's force was not engaged at ull the river much before it wotually moved irom Wasbiog | Q It was true, then, was it hot, that when the enemy | that division thore until tho state of thugs was cu tirely THK B30APE OF THE ARMY. ton. The question of attacking robel batteries on the | was ai Centreville and Manassas, that portion of their | cleared up, Banlgs’ coumand was included ‘The origimal Q. After the figat what prevented thp enemy crowding | Potomac was carefully examined, and tho opinion uitimate- | force was some 100 or 120 miles from their priaeipal vase | order to bim was ® take up & line at Manassas, and slong nto the river, if they had made © eA ned was that it would required a general advance | of supplies? A. Yos: 1 @bould think so. the rallway w Chester Gap and Strasburg. -1 bive stated would bo #° much a& weld be Likely to succeed in prisouer, a German, had been taken and brought into this headquafters). This pri y t SULA. paced {n question as carefuily as circumstances per- 1 that you could nd What was the number of your command when you . mm the peniucula? A. Refore the arrival of Krauk- Q. Was there any attempt at co operation of the army and my tmp: cssioms at that time were certainty | iiu's aud McDowell’ “ and the wavy for the papas of relieving ony ; Ay bak Meanie a tet Q. How many had Franklin? A. He" river from those obstructions? A. There was mo ¥ ber, or about that time, bY | about 11,000 oF 1,000. ierincmacneer tinetioes very room (General suuuer y - 4 y from | already th: had ‘the rail: 7 had GA Seleatiae ak ae ting every. | that I had thore to prevent it was tis. ove division v. ou , Of M@entire army. The des of a direct attack upon the | — Q. Suppose you bad operated against tho enemy y that the enero: been forced Lo burn - thing yy ry ; ante tothe! rebel f beeen, pro- | thousand men that not been gugaged, and another | batteries from the water was abandoned in consequence pewergey oe during the month of November, with how road bridge over the vided the rebel authorities wee not informed of it, | division of mine in the upper end of the sown. had | of @ report made by General Barnard, then Chief a- | great a force do you think they could have 0) A you? | YiK NUMBER OF W’CLELLAN’S TROOPS ON THE PENEN- Ho had hceu impressed iato Uuir service, and wanted to | been sent there to relieve General Howard's division. 1 | sipeer of the Army of the Potomac, who examined the X had full contideace in those twe divisions, because thoy had not been ongaged Q. What was the number, all together, of our forces that were engaged? A. 1 should think there must have been between —— and —— men under fire. quit it. Hjs appearance. and his story were such’ as to curry conviction to the minds of every one who heard him He told us precisely of the arrangements for de fence they had made ou the right, but in rogard to tho lett be knew less. He said that it was impossible for us 0 er te y osit He informed us of the batteries Q. What was ie number of the whole army that we | auat ration, for the veason that the . hay to destroy their com: | for duty at any ume un the peninsula was 107 90 thee Wade the positions they. had taken aud the defenes | Bad across the river? A. Froaklin had nearly ——~ moa, | never had an force suitable for the purpoee. | munication with thoir base of supplios, and obliged them | That, { think, was. iu the latter part of Jace, ‘scan kae @ force often discussed the matter with the Assistant Seoretary andgive battlo, | Call's division bad arrived. they had thrown up, and said that the rebels regarded tt | 1.should think that we must have had all over the as ze Tmnpossibitiey: for them tobe driven from it. But | river well ou to -——~ men. of the many, and I think the Monitor was completed = equal THR OPBRATIONS REFORK YORKIOWN. Goneral Burnside said that his favorite place of attack | Q. What is your estimate of the robel forces over. | Pably a week or ton earlier than she would Lave was ft for such a movement 2 No- | @. No you know the force at Yorktown when Helutzol- was on tbe telecraph road. Said he, “That has always |sthere? A. 1 think thoy had about 89,000 mon, Tho because I hud aaked for ber to ve used on . ible plan for turning their position | man, with his corps, landed on the peninsula? A. I do been my favorite place of attack.” Tho army was ac- | German prisoner paid. that they claimed to have | the Potomac. 2 did all that I could to secure the co-ope- Manassas would have beon by crossing the Occoquat | got Know positively; but my belief is that there was not as cordiugly slivided to make two attacks, 100,000 men. Once in that positien they are a deal | Tation of the navy in acting upon the rebel batteries upow t to the south | ehat time much more than Magruder’s origival command, THE BATTLE OF PREDERICKSBURG. stromgor to rosist than wo aro to attack, Iman apon | te Potomac. heist west of that; and suca a movement would have éxvosed | which, I think, we had always estimated at froi 13,000 ‘The night before the attack two of my divisions—and | field, in my opinion, they would notbe a matoh for us if |. 2: Was there not a time upea. wi nary | Our own communications with our lines of supplies, and ® | to 20,000 men.’ Movements of troops had been going om they were my favorite divisions, for one was the di- | Our army wad in good condition. should furnish certain eae ae the Grind Fd Sm i battle won in that vicinity would Pate iu my _udement, acroes the Janes river to the peninsula for some days he- Vision which had educated myself, and the other was the QALLANTRY OF THE TROOPS, force of men, in order to attack these ies? A. have produced decisive results. I do not thi it fore my arrival. {remomber that immodistely vpoa my one that Kearny had commanded, and of those two not think that apy fiual and specific arrangement was | movement in question would have been practicable or | arrival at Fort Monroe | was told that quite @ laro num. divisions I knew more tban of any osbors in my com. | They bebaved well. There never was an: deere | Sir mer ceeteanen We, ae while Whe. matoer wal | Dradent (a Novenber. ber of troops bad boon crossed over to Yorktown from —these two divisions were sent down to support | glorious than the bebavior of the men. No in | under, , before it had been finally agreed upon, | — Q. Did you or not regard the retreat of the enemy fro:a | the-gouth bank of the dames. 1 therefore hurried my owe Frankia, Tt POT ET ae eevare gallant weieaie teat Hans: | s0se Batteries were abandoned by the rebels. Iknow | Manassas, and thoit falling back upon Itichmond a8 & | tmovements, and started from Furt Monroo sooner thaw f Franklin. They loft here under orders to hold the bridge head. At ten o'clock on the day of the battle I phrey’a men made there. But they were put toa work was siandiug hereon this roof with General Burnside, it was talkedof, but Ido not think it had assumed ® | misfortune to us’ A. J regarded it as a raisfortune Ovly | would haye done, From the best information that | have that no men could do, in this: : that it gave them more time to comcet- | been abio to get, J think that the largo masses of tho soapeeanien. ealwone, trate on the new line of operations that we were : ag wi the army and navy to take ‘Matthias’ Point | about to adopt. Thea to be able to throw at least forcements arrived in Yorktown (rom oue to two days be- Hoon, vedcred forwetd. with Frankiia. T- sald. t | _Q. What do you know hous the dolay ta the (eg eg fore 1 reached its vicinity. Johnsion nimsoif arrived bg by ned aie gy yee Oe yon eee See seaking before it had been occupied by tho rebels? A. Matthias’ | a portion of the ‘on the new line of operations before | there ‘aa y risetsessioneal ool Tevould lave nothing to sot withcand that [aid uot want | lay ia ue arrival of’ the, Pontoos, re eae Fonts think, waa uaver goodpiod by the rebels. 1 know pony 3 Manassas," BACT regarded the ecw. | ny” At alt pend had tn works of the at Yo 5 eS Pontoons, and thore was alo ® | wo had parties thore thige or four times. From the time | asion of Manassas as a neceuary 2 of our moving | rorcn been constructed? Ae Probabl Cd 5 General Frank)in to fight my div! ; that the nextre | delay in getting the provisions up here. Treacked Washington until I left it was never oocupied A, Probably several months b-fore f port we heard would be that those divisions wore under | . Doyou know ast what time the pontoons were éx- | by any robel guns arrived there. We found at other points op the peninsitla— fire. He assured me that thoy should not cross the ted to ee here? A. ABI have stated, Iheard | "7" T will say Matthias’s Point, or some other At Big Bethel, at Howard’s Bridge, at Young's Mill—ex- nrslge oe there; that they were ordered as supports to eueral ‘er Halleck assure General Burnside that point on the river. ido dt remember the tensive intrenchments that evidently had beom Franklin, to assist in defending the bridges, and wer@not | they would be here in three days. name of the point which has ss to. A. Loan. months before. There was uo sign of fresh. work about to go into battle with him. Soon after roceivedanorder | Q. Would that have been as s00n as the could | Sot think of amything elee that oan be alluded to by that Uneen 96 alt} to send another of my divisions to relieve Goneral How- | have arrived, heret. A. ‘That would pave bow Jur as aera ommenh tue temion Liwve alctadyeatercon 10, of a8, Did you know of those works before you tauded om ard’s division, in the upper end of Fredericksburg. My |-sooe ag the ariny could march bere. They got ready fully | Stiacigag some of those batteries at peragiral Sy he peninaula? A. No: we did uot kuow of to tine of other three divisions were drawn up at the heads of the | as soon as I thought they could. When we possession | which was abandoned in cousequence of Gen. we aloug the Warwick. We kuow that Yorktown itaeit bridges on this side, ready to cross at a moment’s notice. About two o'clock on that day I received orders to send another of my divisions to su t General Gs was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, was when Gon. Hooker was at Budd’s we did uot know of the lige of the Warwick. bes ‘That ermy could ‘Matthias’ Point is one of the most important poivts | in tho transports? A. The points first designated were Yorktown byt rapid mbvectens Warsehalaly oe hero before, the government built a valuable wharf which would have answered every purpose to land stores may 30,000 or 200,000 men. But when the arm: about the same time I received an order from re that wharf was burned, alt the epemy had ‘the river, is it not? A. Yes; iu this, that the channel ‘the Potomac below Aquis Barnelde to cross over my other two divisions and attack | no vessels on the river, and tbe could not have | 0m.\e"lversu there, and appro 5 Tage eed © pet jw Aquis | landing upon the peninaula? A. No. 1 do uot think be the onomy on the telegraph rond—the samo. position we | beon used by them. 1 knew at Warrenton that a tranater | (s,verY Bafrow there, and approaches very near the point | creek—below Hooker's position. Ct Revenant then wedttearianajes dnmmeen had been butting against all day long. As soon asl re- ceived the order, my divisions commenced crossing. I rode forward to see what I could learn from: the who had been engaged in the attack—General French, General Wilcox, General Couch and General Han- 5 '@. You mean those were the two points from which it | open, repohed Q. How do you in the fact that the enemy never | was first proposed to move? A. Yes. celsaae fas stare and'veions of ba eer oil aid ocoupy that pot? A. It was too far from their main | “g. 1d you anticipate that that movement could be made | the'warwick rivec was tet, Kaowty to uc steed we matt line. One of two things must have been unecessary for without the knowledge of the rebels and in such » manner Fort Monroe, Semtpehane coserina, bet, place. Either they must | as to enable you to cut off or wtercept their retreat trom Q. Was the topography of the peninsula well under: t here they landed until the wharf was built, except it was done by es there, very heavily built, & | Manassas and Contreville to Richmond? A. I do not stood, so faras you know, by any one connected with your cock. Their opinion, with one exception, was that ators. Then there wore bridges to ve built. I think ‘work that would itself, Or to detach a large | th ‘that we could entircly intercept their retreat to Pirocara tla thie A neat ta eianine tin pesisionr te Bhaseover Ei thayton cay g she | force for that purpore. I do not remember pence Richmond; but tho ‘cnces ware that if pep acicemanre ctu proved enteety eamvanstel tat abe ee heeaet Ga ascertain whether or not it could be turned. Discovering | Q. Had this wharf been burned when the conversation cae perhaps 1t is twenty-five miles from was fairly started before they were aware eins 00d, for we ware constantly mistod by hom, no weak point, and seeing that many of the troops that | between General Halleck and Genera: Burnside took piace? them u . Q. Could not this Ine of works have deca fight assaulted, Q, And that would baye extended their lines some Mf- | yefore they could get all thoir troops in hand. “7 eon or twonty miles ax they thon wore? A. 1 should | '"Q.'ho. you. mead by that that you expected to inter- | Mrogpert of succom?” AI thiuk not, T resorted to tae think from twenty to twenty-five miles. It would have | cept their retreat to Richmond in such manner as to operations of a siege, after @ more caretul personal ox- PO yepees ‘their line. divide their forces, leaving a part of it on this side of tho | amination than a ‘commanding usually gives te Q. Do you know at what time, or about what time, it | point where you intercept their communications, and then ings: and | was fully sas ‘that the course t became apparent that the enemy intended to construct | fight the balance of it at Richmond? A, Iu reply to that the boot ended Wie eivouromeence batteries along from Evansport up, say to Cockpit Point? | {cau ouly repeat tha! I hoped, ssa secre es SRE Q. You. did not your batteries as they were A. 1 think they made theit appearance there about the | to reach the meinity of Richniond before they could cancen- | dnished, one by one, but waited tll all ae, er pare end of August. But I cannot ponitive without refer- | rare ail their troops there; that they could not get alt their you not? A, We did, and ‘expected to open fire from (hem, had been already engaged in the attack were considera- bly demoralized, and fearing that should the enemy make an advance, even of but a small column, nothing but dis- aster would follow,I sent my aid-de-camp to Genoral Burnside to say that I advised him not to attack at that place, He returned, saying that the attack must be made. Thad the matter so mach at heart that I put spurs to my horse and rode over here m} » and tried to dissuade A. It was burned long before that. By Mr. Gooch @ From the conversation to which have referred, who did you understand was responsible for having the pontoons and the other necessary supplies for the army eS) here? A. I supposed that was the Quartermaster’s usiness. Q. As the matter was left at tho timo of the conversa. General Burnside from making the attack. He insisted | tion, did you understand that the ibility of having on its be'ng made, T then returned and broyght upevery | the pontdons and supplies bere rested apes General Bara: | (ict autane ieee tek btenereatnasc ped tiaras | (rethe coum Ivo Manassas, ic.» Oefore we pet hate allow Monday morniug, A few shots wero fed for w ape: available v.ttery in the city, with a view to break away | side or upon General Halleck and General Q. That is the narrowest part of the river, is it not NORFOLK ANP TILB MERRIMAC. cial purpose from battery No. 1 against vessels landing at their barriers by the use ef artillery. I proceeded against | think it neceasarily rested upon General k and : . 4 the wharf. above Matthias’ hannel ‘Was it proposed by any one, at any time during the 4 Virginia Frey tangs Wet yr «4 Prien eng catty partot inet winter, tbat, Norfolk mould be taken? | Q. Would it not have beed better to have oenod your bia eo er aie it ot yory great tmportanee to | A. {do not remember any formal proposition to that | batteries as they wore completed, without waltiug lor the event ee) rid the river of, the obstructions, so that | effect, although that matter may weil Nave been talked | completion of allof them? A. I think dccided'y nut; be- by might haye the free navigation of the Potomac? A. 1 | Of, a8 many other points were, cause they would probably have been overwh-lmed by Revor Fogarded it as of vital inportance, because wo had | or, 909 $9000 ure ave feo bet re godt ell mood gor rg ayer ae pe prem ale ape | o ui E men ted 51 Tul leat Er Ue ene cere to the | of Voftress Monroe, aud Norfolk captured and the Merri- | posal as would crush everything before us. the barriers as I would against a fortification, and en- deavored to breach a hole sufliciently large for a “forlorn hope” éo enter. Before that the attack along the line, it seemed to me, had been too general—not sutliciently con- centrated, I had two batieries posted on the left of the road, within four hundred yards of the pssition upon which the attack was to be made, Geveral Meigs, becarse it was beyond the control of Gene- ral Burnside, who was not where he could control it. Q. Then, as I understand you, General Burnside, from that interviow, had a right to expect the and supplies here as soon as he could reach here bimseif? A. ‘That impression was left on ny mind. WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. importance was more & moral one e r apd I had other parts of* batteries posted on the right By the Chai _— be mac destroyed, without incurring any great hazard to us’ Q. What time was occupied from the com or Of the road st the distanco of fve hundred or six undred | 6” itthey tied beon here, what would tiave Geen the | ‘28a ebysicab, C1 may use that expression. 1 | A Such 'a thing was possible, but wodld bave boen difl- | your operations beture Yorktown until its evacuation ? yards. I bad all these batteries playing with great vigor be. 1 think ihe ; result? A. When Sumner’s advance cvlumn reached here iwntil sunset upon that point, but with no apparent Be were dependent ‘ ff ‘ailroad » | cult, 1 do not think it would have promoted the genoral | A. Just abont a month, as near as may — almost wholly for supplies: | oy ces of the wat. I looked upon the fall of Norfolkas a | evacuation was on the 4th of May, and I left Fortress ef ‘there were only some five handred of the rebels in Fred- See Laanre ieaetcemarencslivien teks. ‘oeoieeacaaen ericksburg. 100 uot know why they did age take poomen: | Aichi Cut wraiecigtnne't gute mm general Minted. t | necessary consequence of & movement pou Richmond. — | Monroe ow the 4th of April part of the cannonading J had given directions to General | gion of Fredericksburg. But the feeling seemed | tno bloc! ‘of the Potomac—that rf was necessary to Q. Would not the destruction of the Merrimac have THE OPERATIONS BEFORE WILLIAMSBURO. Hunphrey’s «division to form, under the ghelter which a | ¢ be that they could take possession of Fred- | hold the other bank of the river inorder to-prevent the | been a great pens seine and bave rendered the move- Q. The enemy retreated from Yorktown to Williams mont by way of the James or York | burg did they noty A. They were overtaken in their 6 Obstruction of the meat ane or ‘rus | Tivers, very much moresaie? A. As things turned out, yes. | treat at Williamsburg. ‘The most of their army, I Wink, THE ALLEGED Ww. creunne coger But Tdo not sink, ce 7 aporjgnns of Vhs re <a not Jaton. bale Pergo We avertote a was: jated unt caine out. remeniber very ro t ey had it u cape | le lida seer oct ate | Rd yey aera pr | Whe crea eset el aaa fe ‘were le i imac. | xo Oght at all would have occuri £0, férmy from the time you took command down to the a The question of taking Norfolk the Merrimac made | was brought on, I think, by the fact that our cavalry ite appearance, and destroyed the Congress and Cumber- | caught their rear guard, apd (orced them to bring land, was paricnnly Saceones: ‘The conchision arrived at | their troops, ttor not to depart from the direct Q. There was a line of earthworks at Williamsburg? ‘movement upon Richmond, under all the circumstances } A. Yes; a line of detached earthworks. A orthe: Q. Will you give a coucise description of the battle. small hill afforded, in column for assault." When thetire | at any time; only a few bef Lieutenant rtillery ceased I gave directions for the enemy’s Dehigcen, of the os ene atty-tve ‘men, corks to be axsaulted. General Humphrey’s men took off | crossed the river and took’ possession of the town. Ubeir knapsacks, overcoats and haversacks. They were | When J was at Hartwood I heard that was directed to make the assault with empty muskets, for | be a delay of three or four days in the, estrone there was no time there to load and fire. When the word | bere, and that was one reason why of was given the men moved forward with great impetu- | General Burnside to cross at the osity. They ran and hurrahed, and I was encouraged by | downon the other side of the river. When we got the great good feeling that pervaded them. The head of | we should have been in a condition to march oy all i i j t i General Humphrey’s column advanced to within, perhaps, ‘a without das here. fifteen or twenty yards of the stone wall, which was tbe pete opegtan gt that ‘has been vanced position which the rebels held, and thea they | through this war. 1 think it would baye cure. . were thrown back as qui as they’ had advanced | have held the line where we were, by retaining a sufficient | ‘U° - Pi of not ia 8 Q Was there any itnportant movement of the army of | Williswsburg, and stue by what troops and under ~ not efficient. I “ Fl cent Mat | fi scan ce thy ams | Canc pe me | Rots ae aagharaatar| ca tay reported to me, 1,760 of their number, out of abozt | of wnat we withdrew every man, and even burned the CO Ne ae tana von \ pd ony: an have already referred? A. was a movement con- | under General Stoueman, 4,000. I may as well state hero that Sykes’ division was | bridges, exposing our to the enemy the very | ot, nati abe begin! ition templated by the President to cross the Occoquan, and | suit. drawn up to support Humphrey's, #0 thut incase Hum. | moment we did #0, If General Suqner’s corps. had come | tlveoperations unt te be Seritiod Domiaener- a move upon Brentarille. move by the di phrey should succeed | could throw ‘ward ail the force | down here aud left me up there threatening tbe advance pris ty hogy) of G ont @. Was that movement approved by you? A. It was | while tne that I had left—Sykes’ division, about 4,000 men—to hold | on that line, or lead them to believe that we were going to er cca “ not; | wrote against it. The ouly other dered by the of 30,000 who were massed be- | advance on both lines, it would have been better. But the = " the member was a movement to Of the batte | barg. ‘tranktin hind that wall. ‘hat was why 1 did not like to make the | enemy saw at onco what we were at, and came right dewn | f° ne cen ries om the Potomac. That was s movement of the mass | was ordered attack, because, even if successful, I could not hold the | here, and they were nearer here than we were; and this pa Pit mw re. ould ofthe ary to cross the Occoqnan, and in possesaion of | ing isto the Feason I did not think | country is such that wherever you give them two or three yg age {ies Lee bea ge bathe we. | set Tey se was, 0 for 100,000 men can make any place impreg- Hate we {Rooms oy President, but rendered unnescesary y 3 gee had lost as many HOOKER’S PLAX. io ieee 'Q. Do you know what caused the enemy to evacuate Saas ‘he men abetld bola, for the strength of, your command Fora, fo mers scott on Kuoxvil tn Ch Monthan ahoage bess thas thcy pot woad of vu turned | eives to tis tnd the doamy,s | wood? a: Trans mens ot Hast | ip order to gum pasmasicl Ot tmocement to tae Lower * und tha that eas the | tho'evemy and ohicn eeeld caoea eater | tn tote eee ee eS ae oan Western Norib Carolina and South Caroli x ee cine Sccttemntiog v0 sakip ah tind marsiaeil ah petenbe ition to the musketry po ee faa tunee tae’ feetern toons I os me pay oo Ballecy, and. Gonoral tudtime they evacuated janassas’ A, Yes, that were exposed to, the Coe gl fend Paring to mn through Caroline county where pod eer tr aiaareng enna the . That was then the proposod movement of the army? | and that were filled with artillery, and the | se Pople BAe unt ser espvisioas,eacugh for anes hen Bee weit Tyee did you first ledih of the evacuation of | raRia’,® foous” waa. the ‘column that moved up to this agent Sleickh ax the tascer’ the conterealian betetea ete tery Mavasnae, and what was then done? A. Tho trst info: | Sraered to the Yas within good canister range, though | General Halleck, General Meige and General Buraside, | Treyuentiy urging epos Gea, Hua Sate a evia uoteset Mare aoe Pratiecied | omaeer rs patens kak patibesly 1 ese ane, Ccrwereing. come seaplane SS ‘upon Knoxville; eeretacy or Wer were at-my Bouse when 1 received i ‘ wellknown to'me before 1 went inlo this'aasault, ‘They | RaVBADAnnock: sald ttt oval ce caatly ast could pet | of ot qpeaser tgartaseo then tho pesnensien st I stated to thera may intention to crors the river ia arder were known also to other officers. General French said | them wi Was at Hartwood.” T know that 1 could tae | (00 posession which I looked upon as the second to obtaingtbe Lest information | could, and to act page to me that the whole army could not take that point, and ing to circumsiances, Luring the night of the ¢th [reported that toGen. Burnside, After estabiishing my | gould not move me from. orcered two regiments of cavalry forward under Colonel icket line, I returned and reported to General Burnside ‘movement bar sion of the Membpis and Charleston Railroad ‘Averiil, to vorify the fact, and I directed a general ad Vinat i bed done. Me was dissatisded with the linet bad | o¢ Sue oct ike thie ariay’ bed bet the means of crossing | <ut.ihe railroad communication bet ‘ direction ot Mawunes, woptng “, | Yauce of the army int eee ee direct | tn; might pose bly, re toate vee ry aod inflict rpg oe som uf aD i: log alse to get men out 0; Q. What did the Army of the Potomac ea their olacamae wid 4 pre gb wed pty mg for active service, mass of the army advanced to the vivinity of | not gu i, amd Uh presence Etnnot apswer that question with any degree of accuracy | Fairiax Court House. Imyself went to Maunssns. iseut | necessarh, “As soon ast heard teat took & boat, About the Ist of November i stated, in a letter written | *t'00k cavalry force, supported by some inf try of | down to camp where my horses wero and immed Se of War, that after D | General Sumner’s command. as tar as the Rappabannock. | jeft for the front, meeting on the way the Prince de Joim- Fesaset Weahiogicn ar. that after providing for the kar. | tous ‘orcing the enemy to buen the railroad uridge aver | yiio. sud ai aid'or General Sumuer, who bad been. seat 65,000 of 70,000 then available for ective operations. that river, and showing that their evacuation wag com- | pack to hurry me up. Up to this time 1 had kad no in- is & general recollection; | cannot answer the question de ‘That gave me t! reason to believe that | jormation from General Sumner, or any ja eidediy. strongest one was nv immediate danger of their returuing by | {uat there wag auything at all serious in front, 1 arrived hour was crossing taken for my pickets. amd said that they must be cstab- | here? A. Yes, sir; because I could take the heights shed at the advanced position that we had held during | there with my command, and put them in a condition of theday. ‘Ve had some men lying down on their bellies. | defenec. if 1 had there not a man of the enemy about ope hundred yards beyond this ditch, on the side | woutd have come to Frederickeburg, but they would have hill which we could sweep with our artillery, and take pos- | gone to some other river and tortitied there, if we bad session of atany tine. I immediately sent word for my | given thew time, as effectually as they have bere. I re- p.ckets to advance to that piace, and make that the line | gard the rebel position on the Rappabannock asa strong of the pickets, as General Buryside had ordered. Gen. | one] mean the one they retired to from Manassas. They Burnside said that if we came back to the ditch! have | had the advantage of two railroads—one to bring their spoken of, it would bea ee of ourarmy. I put | supplies to them from the West, and the railroad from General Sykes’ division on picket duty. That day, while | Richmond to bring their troops up from there. It is the the men were lying there on their bellies, my loss, iv | strongest position they had in Virginia, ‘he advantages General Sykes’ command, was two hundred and four men, | of this position, to hold against a force seeking to cruss and my men were where they could infiict little or no | the river and’ attack it, are such as I have never before injury on the enemy. Had my men occupied the ditch, | geen, there might have been a half dozen casualties during the Q. How far apart are the bridges at the two points day. where our army crossed herer A. About four miles. z that live. The Army returned from the viewity of Fair a ound, u My howe ran tegen penemnles by po Abied pitewed'at pet {ax Court House to Alexandria, where jt embarked for onde tor pein boae: *T Garena’ myeelh in Ee ene tout evant | Hort Monroe as rapidly as transportacion was ready ior it. | ae possibie, with the state of allairs,*abd. jauned! EET ea ane eee rat) | Thom it was not your intention, when the army was | Grdered reinforcements to General Hancock, who anne OO AMnIN an re Tittle teee. than 34,000 | moved forward towards Manassas, after having heard | heayily engaged when | arrived, und ! endeavored to com- eee oN tat eatieaate hat boon, sande pret te | ‘ust the enemy had evacuated, 10 continue the piranit | qanicate © ith General Helntvelioan, who wan ou the left the tat of November. That uumber—t will call it 34,000— | U*¥OU" the poiut yo: reached® A. Not unless tsaw some | of the position. 1 wat told that iL was imiwssible to CONDITION OF THE ARMY. Q. You speak of the telegraph road; will you state more That night, after seeing General Burnside, I returned to | definitely what that road is? A. h reat-advantuge ‘tbe gained. If Tcoumdt have caught | conmunic: F " .Fredoricknburg and took comand of the forces there. “I | leaves Fredericksburg trom ilanover stroet poop in sig i ane phone —manphamreae he Tid Shee rear guar [should have done #0, Ie” | Sine. t-ceut- an oeery Coben decile Sar pone Cee eT he etre Guat through a depression in the hills in the Q. That would niake the whole army of whe Potomac, Ts a ms wi - was the mavens on Richmoud | company to endeavor to open communication with Gen. oe * ‘Guan bod i pees ist ing Green. with the exception of the troops at Baltimore,a little over | PY as, ‘orkiown first proposed. and when was it | feintzelman, that { might learn thestute of aflairs U ‘here. 100,000 men on the Ist of November, would it noty A, | nally deermined upon! A. I do wot remembor wl fret eturned iter dark with the mformation that it was Yes; 1 think it would. —- cussed belore | impracticable to get h the marsh. 1 then . Q. Was it not much larger than that on the Ist of No. | te movements of the army were finaliy Jetormined mpon. | @ronnd some seven OF eight aniiLs, by coe the yotiber At recnilect this letter, to the ecretary or | Iwas tually determined upou when the army was ai | Communicate, Duriug the night | heard from von bad Q. How do you explain the fact that the enemy did not shell the city when our troops were crossed there’ A. I cannot explain it. it is inexplicable tome that they did not do so. As lhave before stated, it is reported under Couch, Irequested of General Burnside that all of the troops over there, but two divisions, might be witharawn to this side of the river, because, if the enemy should throw a shell into the city, it could not fall amiss with al! | flag of truce that,they had at one time shot heating with ot | Fairfax Court House. Heintvelman that Houker's-di been thowe troops there. -Many'of the troops were such. 4.] witch to tre the‘ity>aod tbat would have made Scernic | Marjand my imprestion i that the number, 65-000 or | Uy. Was itdetermived ayer i a couacl of war, the pro. | Qu. aod ‘could, nyt. be Teled, upou for very heavy work condition that they gave me no additional strength. it | ple time of it. 10 oe petioon. +H camer give'e precise answer tober | ceedings ot which have been inate pubiicr A. Yes: 1 | in ine morning: that hearuy's diviion, anhough Ayo] nag been reported through rebel sources that great dis THR WITHDRAWAL OF THB TROOPS. question without referring to the returns think it was. fated severely, could be fully relied to hola satisfaction is felt at our not having been shelled while |g. Was our recrossing made unbdeknewn to the enemy? ‘@. ho you know how much the army was incrensed Q. And it was then decided, was it uot, that the army | ite own, and ‘that no advance cud be made oar troops were in the city amd I have heard that courts | 4.9j chink it was here; how it was down below t oanuot | aftoritclevar November’ ft tmea down’ to the tiae | sould go by way of Alexaudria’ A.'Atexamdria was | jy that’ quarter without heavy — reinforcements. artial are now being heid among the confederates to ex | gay, It was late when I got the order to withdraw my | when ‘you made your forward movement: or at the peried adopted ag the most conveniest point of embarkation. L felt satigfied , from what I knew of Hancock's position, that eee tastier pork at Cts tiene thor wore command—etweon three and four o’clock in the morn- | prior to that time, when it was the largest. A. I do not Q. Wore there not = esse oo bane tare ay the baitie wean won; tha! he hadt occupied the cecirive point and nally heating shot ir furnaces to thro e J af porte at Aunapelis, which were to have been a jw the sient ‘ie eT ewe Rare thare, "We remained there until es, | é—aod it was between elzht-and nine o'clock when the | remember the greatest strength of the army; but my re. porie at Aunapolis, which were to have been used in the | gaia yonssion of a portion of the "s tine, and that last troops were withdrawn. The enemy did not seem to realize but that there were troops in the houses. 1 with- drew my exterior line of pickets last of all, and they were not followed by the samy Q. Had they discovered that our troops were to be re- crossed, what could they have done? A | do not think we should have suffered much from their artillery fire on sucha night as that was, as It would have been but ran- dom firing. TESTIMONY OF GEN. M'CLELLAN. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Wasnixaron, Feb. 28, 1862 Major (General George B, McClellan gworn and ex- amined. mut! male a night retreat or we wou! have grea’ly the ington, more than 107,000 men for duly. That was | ‘Ht many of them wore there. an aye of rem ing. So Sully was | sabisfed ebro return I had; 1 conch on the fadinaain carn G. And it aoe Deenens cosemancy 00 move thems 10 Ales. | (66 shah, mau ene manded orders eet hai givun io ign. 1 think that after the battle of Antietam 1 had a | sudriar A. Many of (iow, The most of them wore Eirper number, brougot to Alexandria. There was a large depot of wagons k's division to the (ront, and sent them back to York. Q. What did you estimate the number of the etemy op- | ** Perryville that was t right down that wa: posing you her®, including at! in Eastern Virginia, except jy, GM beu pad iret heard Uhal.the enemy wereevacuating the force at Norfolk, during the month of November, | Matagaal COnld not a rapid movement have been made | vou, We saut the cavalry iu pursuit; took « few i 186M A. I think the estimate formed at that time of the | S6TOss the Occoquan, so as to reach the Orange aud Alex ‘and afew guns. he condition of the voads was eueh sreagih of the enemy was about 150,000. andria Railroad and cut off or intercept the retreat of the | (ay we could not promptty advance thearmy. We could mat Q Where were the enemy at that’ time—I mean the | enemy? A. I think not. 2 for more than forty eigh! heurs after the baile com feed the ncipal points? A. Their right was in the vicinity of | THE ROUTH TO RICHMOND BY MANASSAS IMURACTI- | mem on (he ground where they soad ; wo could wot get the aup- Frotericksburg. i think that at that time they had some «CABLE. plies ‘0 them. small detachments as far down as Tappabanieck. Their Q. What were the reasous (hat infuenced the decision @. Had there not been a great rmisapprebension ag to ‘main force wus in the vicinity of Manassas, their left ex. | in (avor of the movement by way of Yorktown’ A. Ip | the character of the roads and the nature of the feet A tending to Leesburg and Wimchester preierence to ihe direct movement by way of Manassas? the peninsula’ A. 2 wos deorived. 1 expected to find @. I believe that, just prior to your movement at the Q. Yea. A. J thinikno one regarded the Ivne, ee 3 of Man | nature of the sail much more than il was. ond of February, 1862, there was an estimate made of the | “a8 as @ practicable one, tt bring 40 long. Phe difficulty of Q. What was the object in sending Frankla and Sedg- force of the enemy, was there not? a. Very probably, | guarding our communications was almost insuperable: and | wick to West Point by water, and what wes accomplished I do not now remember it. tt allowed the enemy to fake up porition after position between @. Lam informed the estimate then was 60,000; can | Manassas and Ric mond 4 other lve yore Ha the adoun you tell me whetber that was probably the estimater | ‘age af water transportation, and rendered the laryest por A. [never regarded the force of the enemy 60 low as | sble amount of the force available for active operations, there 60, being so few necessary (o guard the depots and ommunica You do not remember the estimate at that time? A, | fons. I do not, Q. Was it not a serious objection to the movement, by . At the ist of November, 1861, what was the disci. | Way of the peninsula, that it did not cover Washington: @ a mt su , at the pline and organization of the Army of the Potomac? Was | A. Not in my judgmept. ated by tt not nearly as good as it was at any subrequent time’ Q. By your answer do you mean that the advantages | tion of the two armies were suo that Richmond couki could jay night and Tuesday morning, when orders were is sued, first, for General Sumner’s command to be with- drawn: and afterwards, between three and four o’cleck in the morning, for my own command to be withdrawn. bd A COUNCIL OF WAR. I ought to say here that the mornitig after we had made our attack, orders were issued for anotl tack to: be made in the same place; but the officers who had already boen engaged demurred to it, and the order was not carried into execution. Q Had you made any impression, in the meantime, their works? A. Not the slightest; no more than could make upon the ide of a mountain of rock. On the day following the attack another council of war was held, and the question was submitted, now that place could be taken’ When I think of it, the council was held y. itt Se nek mite. Tt wee conipenna of | By Mr. Gooch:— rais commanding the gr ivisions—all but Q. Will you give to the committees a concise ac Franklin, who enid he could ot leave town, a8 | your administration of tue Army of the Polomes, eluc, he was expecting an attack—and some of the corps com- | jng its organization; the battie of Ball's Bluff: the ob- ‘The opinion of most of the connec) was that the | struction of the Potomae by the batteries of the enemy; iid not be taken at all. My own opinion was that, | the long period of inaction of the army; the it there was auy chance to take the place, it was by form- | movements, if any, prior to March, 1862. the peninsula ing « heavy column of attack at night, when the enemy campaign, Naclading the withdrawal of ihe ‘army from ie = bo their artillery. the cd San the ts oo of Ed command in connec- om w rmy of Virginia: the defences - @” What was there to prevent flanking them on our | (08 Areay et Vive! 4 of Wash: : Campaign, and other right, beyond their batteries” A. Water-—the lake and a | w ye ey rr your command? "9 res tan ae wou. Daring the w if Li ii z E a mill race, whieh was reported to me to be impassable, ganization of the army. A. After the battle of Rich r iecip! z A. No; the armament was and the di line | gained were more than enoagh to for the fact | easily be taken? A. Noteasily. I thonght that I . 1g OF THE REBEL POSITION, Mountain and Carrick’s Ford, at Beverly, in Western Vir- | was by no means 40 good; it was by no means so effective fiat Washington was cov by that movement? A. 1? take "t: but I thought that enemy world bring to eo he pine $a inia, | received an order to turn over my command to | an army, in my opinion. regarded the defences of Washington as adequate for its | bear a larger force than | had. Q.- Was ti i" : se mepheorbongy as could be ies Be ‘and report to Washington at once. I Q. Ab what period, in your opinion, was the Army of [cee ge Bae oe the mowement of the Army of the y. How much time was occpied in the movement (rom sacertained [ Ry le of the river, before was then engaged in preparing to meve a column to the | the Potomac the most effective? A. I think they im | Potomac would necessarily draw from infront of Wash. | Wiliamsburg to the Chickahominy, and what is the die- jayne A. no gh I precise information of | Kanawha, to capture Wise and Floyd and their proved in efficieucy and discipline every day they re ington the force that had apne hn it. My | tence from Witllameburg to the Chickakommy? A. I ir peeition from S = pinpe| German prisoner T 1 Pacey get the 26th of July, 1861. | mained here; and’the army was decidedly better armed; | mind had always been clear and distinct that the mo- | tirink It i about fifty miles—that i#, to New Bridge. have before Be sae Weenabe unt naa the eae 1 on hess 8 One he Je Of the Potomac, | and « bewter tue od from the Lower Chesa- t been stated that some two weeks were coou who made the attack in the forepart of the day told me contern Virginie, ing all the troops on bod siden of tes, ‘ ‘ the same thing before | made my attack, and the troops | the Potomac. | found & very wasatiefactory state of af: | tend'to ix massed behind had bee® seen from the baitoon; but if {| fairs, The defences of Washington were was very was ordered to make the attack | was perfectiy willing to There was uothing whatever on the Maryland side, apd | period you inake it, for it made no difference what became of me; I |.on the Virginia side merely some ‘works’ con- | armamest made the attack, and such an attack as! believe bas | ti the principal roads. There was nothing to other never before been made in this war. Q. What is the length of that stone wall’ A. | cnould think it was some five hundred or six hundred yards, | montha’ regi and rifle pits were continued all along, amounting to at 33 ; d i Hi rf ircumstances. their | “The turther efamination of the witness was pretponed sth: é 3 Hy qi ; : late an q until Monday next at eleven o'clock. . most the same thing. ‘This wall appears to be not simply | name of an army. old wore not instructed, Fecollect that the . Wasnimatow, March 2, 1943. | Slfenrpsatd age Mitra bream tanvas | Stace” Berke atten seme se mene Ei wecies |, Jeanna a Sere Som el . rifle yf the city. 0 I pite and the wall. To batter down that wall was like soa'te ousetroes # yatem of works whi ‘woud’ bad in ‘Dovamben ts ay Mr a . Could nos the advance om Richmond battering the masonry of a fortification. 1 thought at | a small numberof to hold the capital. When I * recall of your trom Wiitamaarg bare Boot made ih better prospect | eS es en ir beeen wee ere oe a tn fe phn yp pe 1 thiok months of November and December was 40 uot think | of success by the ee ee ae . oo ad the enen: ™ u reasons faiury ta baterlon chu be verved. “They "hved fntes, | ‘met otemaane tate tagedwaheatos: eres, init | it or ua true tant (hearsay. men end omoers, wore ok see oon toa chat time ann | well a8 batteries could be fred. But thelr fire made no | impression at all, [do net think one rebel ran trom be hind the wallor from the rifle pits All 1 wanted todo was 06 toRke ont bole through the wall, ight to ‘A. [do not think that the navy condition to make the line of the James river perfoetiy Was most thrown in avntact still desired more time to | was that.of Jackson upon General Bavks, When i heard | sure for our supplier. ‘The line of the Parmunkey offeret The majority of them did not re. of that 1 telegraphed to the President that | beltewed the ‘ater advantages im that respect. The piece was mm a fer powition te ellret a jabetion with any troops tet ington to & perfec nd y which might operate on any line ot Cee prepared for offeusive op intention to be simply to preven mforcomente bering it to cho thot @ : ae ing Washington entirely secure.— (See fati'a inf anawans and (entrevt! aent come, Cline mo iden that 4 meant ® seridiye threat | pnight move [ram Washington on the Freterick: Nine. f thet PLANS. Lost imomy .) 8 (he Bupplics Where upon Washingtow Teimemier Ly edn pal oxy My ra! pevenes crvenint ORSTRUCTION OF THK POTOMAC. Was their principal vase of mupplies? As They dfew their | Q. Wliet you took the army to the pon a seriousty discussed at that time: DRC Re conctnsion e twelve mow CaP yO tH aupplies tainly by the (r acdria Ratiroad— | troops were | he defence of Wi was arrived al Chat, onder (he ¢ifevmstances then eutet , truops vho wer ite aad Mans stationed and by whom wore they eon Te, the route actually folkwwed was the best 1 pas, “Lier whe were mem there eyo 7 ur been pebiished a lester whieh } wroteon | phe Merrimac was destroyed while we were at O preven ine tire | cederickah « TA f or Commodore gon the tet of April last te ure. . Oe ee hay were @ And from what pot or owes? A Phew HHI PY Se Ra U Olivo beye aey couse le’ 90 with (eaare me re