The New York Herald Newspaper, December 25, 1862, Page 4

WHAT A PRUSSIAN OFFICER SAYS OF iT. The Seven Days Fight in Front of Richmond. A GERMAN MILITARY SKETCH. Memoirs of a Staf Officer of the Confederate Army. What Would Have Been Accomplished if McDowell Had Joined McClellan. SPLENDID TRIBUTE TO “LITTLE MAC,” &e., &e. ae. Tue following narrative is taken from an officer ef rank in the rebel service whio “has receut- ty gone to Europe to recruit his health. The au- thor was one of the eminent professional seldie who organized the Southern army, in which he held most important command until a few weeks ago, when @ severe iliness induced bim to ask afurlongh. A forélgner by birth, he passed many years in this country, and writes from personal knowiedge and experience. The great military events he describes with so graphic and skilfal a pen he witnessed from first to last:— {Transiatod from the Koelnisch 5 (Cologne Caxetto) of the 26th, 26th aud 27th November, for the New Your Hraaw.) The Bacuation of Forktown and Williamsburg—The Pear ful Panic at Riernond—General Johncton Wounded— General Lee in Command—Tne Flight of Citizens and Oficiats—Jef. Davis and Family go te North Caro Fina—Troops Summoned in Haste from AU Q Graphic Tableau of the Great Council of War, June 25, 1862—The Group of Confederate Generals—The Plan— Concentrated ActiovmThe Position of the Zw» Armis— The Advantage with the Confederates—MeCielian's Fine Position—Jackson's Plantsing Operations—The Action at Hanover Court House—MeDowell’s Inactivity—A General Attack Ord-red—The Battle of Gaines? MiU—The Con Toderate Oneet—H roism of the ivith Brigade-—They Re- pulse the Confederate Vanguard—They Shatter Coblits Legion and a North Carolina and Virginia Regiment — They Hold Their Ground Four Howrs Tnsupperied and tren March off with Fiying Banners and Rolling Drums—They Hepel Stil Another Cavalry Altack—A Fine Military Picturs—The Horrors of the Balls Field ight—Collecting the Wounded—Dreadful Condition in Richmond—All Over with the Union Army— Hivintzelmnan to the Rescue—The Union Low—McCielian's Retvert Compared to that of the Austrians in Lombardy fin 1848—Territie Confedete Loss—Jeff. Davis and His Caisinet on the Picld—Chilling Reception by the Troop:— Soridity of the Federal Intrenchinents—The Burning Puramid at White House—The Battle at Frazicr’s Farm— The Ferocity of the Confederates—They are Beaten Back— Generab Lee out of Humor—The Sixth and Ssven'h Da: and ihe Splendid Battle of Malvern Hill—A Fine Desevip- tion—McClellan's Admirable Management—Geacral Lee Pears Defeat—Orders to Hurry the Public Property from Richmond—The Confederates in a Panic—AUi Lost— Heroic Rally of General Hitt—The North Carotins Boys end Anderson's: Cavalry—“On fo Richmond)’ —Fiar fut Hani to Hand Fight—No Quarter—Major Peyton ond Bis Son—Prodigies of Falor on Both Sides—4 History will Seek in Vain for Braver Soldiers” —The Fury of the Combatants Unparallelea—The Confederates in Great Perit—Reinforcements arrive—Megruder Seventeen Hours 100 Late—The Fleet Opens Fire with 2wo Hundred ond Siaty-eight Pound SheN—Their Effect upon the Con Federates—Malvern Hill a Monument to the Southerm People—Glowing tribute to McClellan , dc. * * © Upon the approach of the terrible Union armada we were forced to abandon our position on the peninsula at Yorktown, and after we had partially spiked our guos we drew Wack to our defensive fastness at Williamsburg, so ae at that point to to cover our capital, Richmond, by throwing up strong fortified works, and perfecting a compact military forma, tion. McClellan, the commaniding general of the Union treops, did not allow himself to be so far deceived by our voluntary withdrawal from our position at Yorktown as to regard usa Leaten army, but with great celerity and skill continued the disembarkation of his troops and began to fortify his position. It was no! until he had com. pleted his preliminary measures that he advanced with hostile demonstrations against our line. The lines at Williamsburg were also given up by us without any great resistance, although it was very difficult to persuade the old fighting General Magrnder of the propricty of the stop, for he loved the position asa father loves his child; ‘and, to tell the truth, all the fortifications had been con- structed with much talent under his personal directions. Tho hard headed old soldier was won over only after re- mowed debate and expostalation. At length, however after a few cavairy affairs, the place was evacuated by our troops, and we took uj our march, in two eolumns, for Richmond. In the meanwhile the mos: fearful panic fell upon Richmond, and atl whe could pos sitly get away packed up everything they had and flew southward. Tae nearer the hostile army approached the city the fiercer the tumult and uproar became, The burn™ ing wanes of po; ular alarm coult not be stayel. The gov. ernment itself furthered the confusion. Instead of re- solving to triumph or to fall with the army in front of Richinond, it at once ordered all the different bureau to pack a magazines and convey their Lreswicnt Davis took @ the voud and hartened, with hit and childven, to North Carolina. As may be readily chyimed, thi less of presence of mind threw the people at larse into the most frantic excess of terror, There was (ung ou all sides but shouting and uproar, and coafu- sion reached its utmost height. The secret police of Gen. Winder bad lost all control. The civil authorities of chmond were snxious to do something, but knew what, and also lost their senses. A small number of the Baltimore rabble took advantage of the bubbeb, and, in public meeting, passed resolutions condeuning Richmond to conflagration so soon as the Unwoa troops should enter it. Yet all who could escape did 90. The sick and the wounded were carried fur- ther ioto the interior; many public and private buildings were marked out for destruction: and, in short, a fright- fai catastrophe seemed to be impending over the South. ern capital. At this most critical moment the General-in-Chief com- imanding our forces (Johnston) was wounded at the battle of Seven Pines, and the command foll into the able hands of Genera! Lee, who was exactly the man to bring quiet ‘an’ order again out of this unreasonable chaos. He went tv work with great zeal and energy to discharge his one. row (ask. All disposable troops were bastily summoned from the interior; General Stonewall Jackson’s army corps was ordered to Richmond; all the hospitals were clearet of their occupante aud preparations made for 10,000 wounded men; artillery aud ammunition wagons rattled by day and night through the streete, while aids ‘and or‘erlies galloped to and fro in wild hurry scurry with th ir despatches. Masses of troops came pouring in daily, yee, hourly but without muste or any other military pomp. Sternty and @ileat!y hose ragged, half starved swarms of men moved obward through the thoroughfares; but the fire in their ‘@yes showed that they were determined to defend their freedom or to perish. On the 25th of June another great council of war was held. In it were assembled nearly all that was eminent in the Confederate army. There stood like a rock Gen. Lee, gazing cheorfally over the countenance of his comrades for each of whom be bad a part already assigned. Thought fully bis eyes wandered from one to tue over, as though he wished to stamp the features of each poo his me. Mory, with the feeling that he, perpaps, should never behold many of them again. Close beside him towered the knightly form of General Baliwin; at his left leanea ponsively Stonewail Jackson, the idol of bie troops, im, paticnt!y swinging his sabre to and fro, as thoug! ‘the quiet room were too narrow for him, and he were longing to be once more at the head of his columns. A little” aside quietly stood the two Hills, arm in arm, while in front of them old Genora! Wise was evergetically speaking, Further to the right stood Generals , Longstreet, Branch, Anderson, Whiting, Ripley and \der in a Foup, Wien all these generals fad sesembled Genera! Ie Said bis plans before them, aud in @ fow stirring Words pointed out to exch his allot tod task, The scheme hod alroaty been elaborated. It was compact, concentrated action, aud (he result could aot fail to be . a had nia Jemeee necessarily sides of the iny, and, ow- ing to the aap ines in his neighborheod, could pot, without great difticulty and much joss of time, execute his military movements. His frout luc a a distance of more than twenty miles, of $ gemicircts, extending from the Jawes river tewards Richmond aud Ashland. While one part of his od. the Chickahominy, be took position with the on the north elie of the river, from Meadow ‘vhe heighta on the banks of that his army, nots standing the great longth of Ite lines, had exce!'snt dofe: sive cover. On the 26th of June, in the morning, our troops took up thetr positions. sou hastened by forced marches tg Ashland, there to commenge hig cutilanking operations Sgaiust the epemy. Ha’ apie there his advanesd guard drove in the weakly posted foe, and on withogt joss of time to Hanover Court House, where he forward General Rraueh’s brigade betwoen.the Y rivers, to establish @ junce tien with General Hill, (1si) who bad to cross the stream at Meadow bridge. General Hill very gallantly opened the offensive and began his operations ayainst the little town of Mechanicsville, The euemy who were stationed here made a brave resistance. Storming attacks wero made again and again with a fury, and a8 often re- pelied with @.cool determination, that awakened admira- tien. fa rain aig Sogn Hit si his aids in qvest of General Branch. latter: encountered e@6 many topographical difficulties that meached his position ia frout of Mechanicsvilic @v!y Into at might, when the con flict was at an end. The morning of the 27th scarcely n to dawn ere our artillery Gponed a tremendous fire upon the cuemy’s front, so that the latter, when they aisosaw Branch’s brigade advanc'ng to the attack on their right, abandoned their position at Mechanicsville and fell back, Oghting, upon their second defensive line, further down the stream. Just at the moment when wo has es- tablished the crossing of the Chickahominy arrived Gen. Longstreet’s maghificeat army corps—old, experienced veterans of the Army of the Potomac—and tho division of Gen. Hill (2a), “At once the order to advance was given ail the ‘line. The divisions of Genern\s Hill Anderson aud Whiting ‘ermed the centro, moved towards Coal Hurbor, while « Jack- son, Hill @st) and Longatrest formed the” left, and marc! wz the bank ef the river. Magrae commanding tho right wing, was, on account of the f the ground he occupied, ordered to ly om the defensive. General Wise took arm main be command of For er. All these miliary cffaasive operations and the twa receding fights must have give Gencral Me lye of oir ix tention (0 ¢ at Richmond, and. to procur i. freedom. of j motion. He army corps of General McDi Trid incotive near Fiederi | tion ating the Richmond res rg. to make a a By such @ % the flank march of General would he impracticable. But 6 Meleein a din the chara eral MeDoive sanding alt the munications in to our combined C3, with imperterlable indifferenc lft General Me reread greatly by cussions of our aftcck, 3 Lee recerved reliable inte: pactivity than @ gene id Bimiu!tanoons jellan’s whole Tit staff, repaired to Gaines’ Mill aud ordered the divis Anderson, Hil! (ist), Longstreet and Pickett to attack. fore these columns got inte motion the thunder of artil- lory at our left announced that General Jackson ready at work. This calied forth in our troops the utmost enthusiasm. Generat McClellan's position on that day was remar':- able in the highest deyree. With one portion of his troops be had crossed to the south side of the Chickabo- miny, and there confronted pineender while, with the larger portion of his force, he had taken up more to the rear and nearer to the railroad was resolved to accept battle. His disposizions ve- tealed comprehensive forethought, talent and coolness. The diiferent divisions of bis army took their posi- tion with admirable precision and awaited our onvet with firmness. It was the first time that the two bos- tile armies had, in relation to numbers, confronted one another with foree so nearly equal: but tho Unionists had the ‘mdvaulage of a better protected position, while our troops had to expose themsolves to the hostite fire. The attack was opened by tho columns of Hill (1st), Anderson and Pickett, These gallant masses rushed forward with thundering bi upon the musketry of the foe, as though it were. to them. Whole ranks went down under that terr! hait, but nothiug could restrain their courage. The billaws of battle raged flercely onward: the Strugglo was man to man, eye to ¢yc, bayonct to bayonet. Tho bestile Meagher’s brigade, composed chiefly of Irigh- men, offered heroic resista After a flerce stroggic our people began to give way, and at longth aul orders and epcouragements were vain—they were failing back i the grevtest disorder. Infuriate, foaming at the mouth, bare- headed. sabre in hand, at this crit‘cal moment General! Cobb appeared upon the field, at the head of bis legion, and with him the Ninctecnth North Carolina and Fourteenth Virginia regiments. At once these troops reuewed the attack, but all their devotion and self-sacrifice were in vain. The Irish held their position with a determination and ferocity that called :orth the admiration of our own officers. Broken to pieces and dis- organized, the fragments of that fine iegion came rolling back from the charge. The Ninetconth North ¢uroling lost eight standard bearers, and the most of their st officers were either killed or wounded. Again, Gener: Hill (1st) and Anderson Jed their troops to the attack, and ome regiments covered themselves with immortal glory. Our troops exhibited a contempt of death that made them the equals of old, experi:uced veterans; for, notwithstanding the bloody harvest the destroyer reaped in our ranks that day, no disorder, no timid bearing revealed that many of the regiments were under fire and smelt guppowder then for the first tine. But the enemy, nevertheless, quictly and coolly heli out against every attack we made, one after the other. Notwith- sanding the fact that solitary brigades had to stand their ground from four until eight o'clock B. M., they performed feats of increditle valor; and it was yn!y when the news came that Jackson was upon them in she rear that, about eight, they retired before our actwance. Despite the dreadful carnage in their ranks they marched on with streaming banners and rolling drums, and carrial with them alb their slightly wounded and all their baggage; an-l, when the cavalry regiments of Davies and Wickham wen! in pursuit, repelled this ossantt aleo with perfect coolness 4 this time night had come on avd overspread the fieid of death with darkness, compassionutely shutting out from the eyes of the living the horrid spectacle of slaughter. Quiet gradually returned; only a feeble can- novade conkt be beard upon our farthest left, and that, too, little by little, died away. The soldiers were so fear- fully exhausted by the day's stroggie that many of them sank down from their placea in the ravks upon the ground. Although I, too, could scarcely Keep in tho saddle, so great was my fatigue, I hastened with cue of my aids to that quarter of the ficld where the stragcle had raged the most flerceiy. The scene of rnin was horrible; whole rapke of the enemy lay prone where they stood at the beginning of phe battle. The number of wounded was fearful, too, and the grown: and impioring cries (or Leip that roso on ‘all dides lia’, in the ovscurity of tbe night, a ghastly elect tnat froze tne blood in one’s veins. Althongh Thad been npon go many battle fields in Iuiy and Bavgary, never had my vi beheld such « spectacte of kuman Gestruction. The pre- parations for (het tation of the wounded were too trifffog, and the Jotailot for thiat purpose was either too feodle in mumbers Or hatt 0 proper knowledge of iis duties. Even the medical cofps ‘had, by the terrors of the situation, been rendered facapablo of atteuding to the wounded with zea! and officieney. With inconceivable exertion T at length succeeded, with the arristonee of some humane officers, in bringwy about sone kind of order emid this frightful coniusion. By the happicat chance [found some Union ambuinces, had all our men who could drive and knew the way pressed into sorvice, and set to work to get the wounded ito Richmond, A most heartrending task it was; for often the poor sut- ferer would expire just as we were aboot to extend him succor. By midnight we haa got the firet train ready. It consisted of sixty wagens with two hundred seriously wounded. 1 cautiously and slowly conducted this train with snecess to the City. The first hogpital reached 1 was met with retueal. ‘All full!” was the ro- ply to my inquiry. ‘Forward to the next hospital!” was my word of command. “Allfulll”’ was again the answer Just then a friend said to me that if T would wait might be able to help me,as he would have a noighbor- ing tenement used a8 a tobacco warehouse prepared for a hospital. So} had to make up my mind to wait the an hour anda balf in the street with my dying ebarg Idid my best to supply the poor fellows iwiti water, and other refreshments, 80 as to aileviate their suffer. ings in some degree: but the late hour of the nixht aud theagitation of the city prevented me from patting my design inte more than half execution. AU oe the zo-called hospital wea ready, but T could scarcely believe iny eyes when | saw thedisma! holeoffered me by that name. Tt without windows or doors, a few plavks nai! were to be the bede of the unfortunate defenders of our country. During those days of fate the soldier had endured al! things— hunger, thirst, heat; nothing could rob him of his courage, bis indifference to death; and now he lay there wounded to the death, at the door of his friends whore property be had defended, for whore welfare he had exposed his life, and these friends tura him away to an open bara, where, without dressing for hls wounds or auy care, lie yee {city had @ population of 40,000 <! In Of 40,5 gou's, had churches adinirably adapted to conversion inte nos: pitais, had clergymen in pum! But neither the doors of the churches |, Bor were the miuistere of the Goz- 1 there to sweeten the last moments of the dying soldier. a and dispirited, | gave the wounded; cast one more and horror, and then swing myself into my saddie and fled, with « quiet oath on my lips, back to my regiment. Goneral Jaskson had accomplished his flanking marci without meeting with important resistance fm the enemy. Hardly he arrived st the positions marked out for him ere be sent his columns tw the cherge. Not- in open. fea itnstanding the éifenltios and exertions of the march which they had executed om short allowance, he hurled his t desperate sans culoites of his-—upon the federals. In vain wa# all the courage, ali tho wold maumuvering of the y. Like ® tempest Cencrad Stuart and bis cavalry swept down bo them ane hurled everything to the earth that stood jo his way. tury, took possession of Jackson’s y Who, ihr iwing aside their muskets and drawing t terrible bowie knives, fell with these alone upon the victime « ed np to thi Horrible was the carnage that t ensued, and, although the federals ha. lirst made obstmate resistance, they now lost ground and e!! back, turow: away arins, knapeacks, Dlankete—in floc, every Ube that could impede their fight. Subordination and discipline were ot ab end. The soldier no longer heard the command is officer, and deserted tho post entrusted to his keep. of | mg. Already had two generals of the four hostile bri ‘been loft by their , and it was believed that all was over with McClellan's entire army, when, at this perilous crisie, General Heintzolman appeared with bis division, and again brought the battle toa stand, With ieed the great ability and gall repul of our troops. and at once orderad the organization of ty beaten . saw Ditnsedt competiod to abandon his position, and, like an ox, with bead down and ready to Feceive attack at’ any momont, he drew slowly bck to the Chickahominy. “All pert ty the secum- lated stores of the enomy fell into our hands, aud Jackson could, clear conscience, issue the order, ‘Fnough had performed rapidity and suecess as he, ant, of his victory were unusually iontsts bad lost durivg, an Nove of the other with such therefore, the fruits large. the’ day’ two fifteen staff and*baggage wagous, with all their lading Was immense; bit, iu a stintegic point of view, Jackson’ SuCcORS was of far greater importance, siuce ft cut Gene ral McClellan. off completely from his base of retreat When, therefore, the triamph of Jacksou's arms became kyown ‘at headquarters, all ted with perfect cer- ‘tiaty upon thé destruction or capture of McClellan's en tire toxoe, The rejoicing bordered on freny, and wens euely next morning, I igjoined my nigmad. T found my. poor fellows in a slate Of fecerich aritemen', for evcry nun of them wanted to have @ hand in the h cupture or avnihilation of the great federal army. alone shrugged my shoulcert as my offic:rs communicated heir antiipations on the subject. Wo bad gone through a similar experience in 184%, under Radet sky, in lialy. There, too, the Itatians had already prepared quarters forsthie old man and his troops, and the Mayor of Milan was #0 firmly ‘confident of victory and its ¢ nse guouces that he hurried out tor meet the gray old hero & prigoner,at the very moment when the latter, over- coming ail difficulties, wag quietly withdrawing wio bis fortremses at Mantua and Verona, I bad but just reached my regiment when we received tho order to advance along the whole tine, Liooked with sadness upon our once fine division. How-feart\ regiments bad been ¢ceimated! Many which, like my own, had marched out with eleven hundred men, had now but three or four hundred effective soldiers deft, ‘Yes, 8ome—for insiauce, the seventh Ceo and Twen- ty first- North Carolinaetad only something over ono hua® dred and eighty inep. A vast number of officers were disabled, 2nd many a fine fcllow who, a few days before, full of contidence and jollity, had prophesied a golden future, was no more. Ino longer had the courage to ask for one or that one whom f did not see, but tool 1¢ for granted that he had fallen on the feild of honor— it Was too Bad to always hear the same response, (He is devi,’ he fell here,” or “there, in such and such & way. As our div appeared the jong svore gotting inte esident, Jefferson tay tho general of cas Joseph I bnston and Smith, | collowed ‘er Randolph and military Cabin when the danger waa aver, when Kichmond had been tree from the tron yoke placed upon her mack by the enciveli Of the foe, and when they began again to bi within their walls, these parlor herdes could, close of the bloody struggle, assume a Yel, with no hurrah as of yore, did the solv wena Viste, With a cold eve and as slong the front of the regi: ata, only once ra word lo some friend. ked its way ted artillery, shattered wagons aud deal aud wound idigi's and got roow for freer movemoat, we opened our ayer wide with estenishment wher, on vedching the pusilions evacuated by the enenay, we fund nothing but a few stands of arms and come bag,7ge. Ali their material had been carried of by theta is thts part of the fel, and number of dead tuid how feartully the batt r ai this point. The fortifications wero of colossal dimen- sions and had far greater solidity than had su We at once received orders pursue the foe immediately, or at least so soon as could aacertain lis exact whereabouts. We had bar got beyond White House when we descried ahuge cloud of smoke which eddied above the woods abont a mile and a half to our right. As we carefully advanced in that di- rection we perceived a high heaped up pyramid briskly burning with ared hot glow and sending fortn volumes of steam. The hostile genera! had given ordera to com- mit ail the preperty that could not be carried away to the flames, and here the eager conquerors were rubbed of ‘millions of dollars worth of booty. Like hungry wolves my poor fellows rushed toward the huge glowing heap to save whatever could ye be saved, There were bun- -Of casks of meat, coffee, sugar, molasses, r' even champagne—in tine, all those delicacies with which the Northern army was more than abundantly provided, and which we poor devils scarcely knew the names of, piled upon one another. Yet all eur efferts to rescue something usclui were vain: the enemy had tale his wutions for the total destruction of everything tft such cunning” skill taat there was remaining Tal spoiled and useless gooxls. wind — wil nothing On the other hand, the entire field was covercd with the heavy cloth cloaks of the fugitives, aud these were very welcome to our troops. proved to is ret Yet ol essential pariicuars me that General McClellan had accomplished with order and sagacity, and that there was fi riher trom his thoughts than a surrender of the \leed, from some stragglers captured by my men, 1} learned that he had cros#ed the Chickaliominy with his entire force, Lod given up his former base of r6- troat and was now approaching the James river, probably with a view toform a jnnction with the fleet. I at once sent an officer with the intelligence to General Lee. Hereupon 1 received orders to hail, and presently there rushed by the twelve fine brigades of Hili (Ist) and Lang- street to give the supposed flying cuemy his death blow. Abont five miles from Darleytown, on the Newmarket Toad, we got sight of the foe; byt they had takon up a splendid position. The plain, thickly beget, with trees. at ‘Wis point, and rough, broken ground, was very unfayora- bie to the operations of our bravecavalry, and they were condemned to inaction. General McClellan had taken his position at Frazier 5 farin, which formed his centre. This point he had #trenzthened with nineteen pieces of heavy artillery, had collected his best troops there, and firndy ' and coolly awaited our attack. We nad, at all hazards, to Grive the enemy from the neighborhood of our capital or succumb ourselves. No other choice remained for us. Bul Gen-ral McCieilan only too well understood his critical povirior. By the folly of General McDowell, the pitiful cal) ct of sec and the politleal reasons of Comnander-in-C at Washington, he was offered mp, as it wer ¢ Many ancther gencral weuld, perhaps, under such dready circumstances, have hs death anvid the crash of baitls. However, he did not hevilats a moment, nolwithitanding the frightful lowes he had suffered during those Four Ja,s* struggles, to trust his fate, like au old and gallant soldier, to the sword. During that four days’ marsacre our troops transformed into wild beasts, aud hardly they caught sight’ of the enemy, drawn in order, ere they rushed upon them with horrible yells. Yet calmly, as on the pa- rade ground, the latter delivered their tire. The bat- tories in the centre discharged their murderous volleys on our men, and great disorder ensued among the storin- ing masses, Genoral Ive sent all his disposable troops to the rescue, but McClellan cpencd upon these newly formed storming columns 30 hellish a fire that even the voldest blooded veteran lost his self-possession. Whale ranks of cur men were hurled to the ground. ‘The thunder of the cannon, the crackling of the musketry from a hundred thousand combatants, mingled with the screams of the wounded and thé dying, were terrific to the ear and the imagination. Thns raged the conilict within a compara- tively narrow space seven long hours, aud yet uct a foot of ground was won, All oar reserves had been led into the fight, and the brigade of Wileox was amuthiluted. At longth the coming of night compelied a truce. and utterly overcome by fatigue, ihe soldier sank upon the gronnd at his post, U hu of oven the (riend torn from his side and engrossed only with the instinct of self-preserva- tion, But “Water! water!’ was the cry jrom the been had up perched lips on all sides. ‘The empty liasks contained not @ drop, alus! eae and at length sivep overcane wernout warrior, and even thirst and hunger forgotten, Gloomy and out of humor, General Lee through the camping ground of the ‘iccimated regi- mente attendod by bis staf, and then, with a dry, harsit voice, ordered up the divisions of Wise and Magruder to bury the dead. With @ brie’ remark, he next indicatod to General Longstreet his position for the next day, and rode off with Lis aids to visit other portions of the line. THE SIXTH DAY AND THE SEVENTH, WITT THR BATTLE OF + MALVREN HILL. The gray of morning was just beginning to appear apon the horizon when the rou of artillery was ouce more heard. A battery which, during the night. General An- derson had placed nearer to the hostile lines was in- siantly noticed by the enemy aud vigorously attacked by his field pieces. Every shot struck, and the fragments were hurled in all directions. Of the twelve pieces in the battery five were quickly dismounted and the teams haif destroyed, yet the commanding officer held his port. Tn the meanwhile our columns formed without hay- mg tasted any strengthening or nourishing refresh. ment, Exhausted by the fatiguos of the preeeding days, they fairly reeled om their feet, yet not a man sbrank back from dnty. At length. as the sun rose in apiendor, and we could better distinguish the enemy ’s position, aD involuntary exclamation escaped me, for it ‘was evident to me, from the denser ranks he exhibited, (that McClellan had been considerably reinforced during the night, and could therefore withdraw his wornont troops [rom tbe foremost lines, have an easy struggle with fresh men against our famished and exhausted force, Genera! Lee, convinced of the perilous position of affairs, At once iasued orders to Stonewell Jackson to cover the, retreat iu caso the army should be compelled to (all Lack, and directions were sent to Richmond to get all the pubtic property ready for immediate removal. Then the divisions of Hill (2d), Longstreet, Anderson, Cobb amé Whitcomb were ordered to storm the enemy's works. Aud Low again commenced one of the most desperate combate that ever took place in any war. The lo<s om our side was absolutely frightful. “McClellan, obseraing the devastation his ee making amwng our troops, called up @ divivion of reserves, and wiwhelmed us with @ terrific rein of musketry. His messes preveed forward, stop by step, nearer and nearer, nutii at length some companies ot ours threw their arms away and flod. Metlolian availed himsel! of this panic and ordered a fank movenent of hie cavalry. Quick ag thought ander. gon placed bimsely at the head of our horse, and jeu three regiments to ihe eharge. Their onset was magnificent. Our Texans burst with ringing buzzas into the ranks of the foe, who, without even giving us time to try our sabres, turned to the right about; but hore, too, the hos- tile field pieces provonted farther success, and we had to draw back from before that crushing fire. Tho enemy, noticing our confusion, now advanced, with theery, ‘“Cnward to Richmond)? along the whole hostile front rang the shout, ‘Onw: jehmond'’? Many old soldiers tone served in distant Missouri and on the plains of Arkansas wept in the bitterness of their souls like obildren. Of what avail bad it been to us that our best blood had flowed fr six long days ?of what avail all our unceasing and exhanatless endurance ? Everything, everything seemed lost, and a genoral came over all our heurte, Batteries dashed in headlong = Hight; ~~ ammunition hospital and eupply wa, rushed along, and swept the troops away with them irom tho battle fold. In vain the most frantic exertion, ontreaty and self- eacrifice of the staff officers, The troops had lost their foot. hold, and all was over with the Svuthern Confederagy. In this moment of desperation Gen, Hill came up with a regiments he had mavaged to rally; but the enemy was nn veg opeprer tome abet louder and louder elt and the watchword ‘On to Richmond!” could pe heard. Qavalry officers sprang (yo their saddles and CS SS VERRAEOLE: wade ~ ES. Gieer eae rallied, abit the yet oy i your ia Nori ; ot 4 ‘ol Nort Caroling boys” Foo over tl id. now Hill charged forward with this mass he had thus worked up to the wildest enthusiasm. The enemy halted whon they saw these columns, in flight moment before, now advancing to the attack, and Hill hes Une 13 ate pr Tike 4 famished lion, A fearful to hand eouflict now engued, for there was no time to load- and fire, ‘The ferocity with which this combat was waged wasdaeredible. It was useless to beg the exasperated wen for quarter: there wags no moderation, no pity, 20 passion in that bloody work of bayonet and Knife. ‘The sou sank dying at his fathor’s feet, the fatber forgot that he had a chitd—s dying child; the brother did not seo that a. brother waz expiring a few paces from him; the friend beard not the Jast groans of a friend; all natu- ral ties were dissolved; enly one feeling, one thiret panted Bg every pS ee Fh pe yore +: Sey ne an jor on, but fificen years of age, called to his father for help, A ball had shattcred both his legs. «Whoa we have beaten the onemy then I will bolp you,” an- swered Peyton; “T have here other sone to lead to giory. Forward!” Rut tho column bad adyunced only a few paces further when the Major himself fell to the earth a corpse, Prodigics of valor were here performad on both sides. Lis! wilt ask in vain Sor braver soliiers than those here fought and fell. But of the demoniac fury ef both parties one atadistance can form no idea, Eyen the wounded, de- wring of succor, collecting thoir last energies of life, Plange¢ their knives into the bosoms of foemen who lay ugar thom still breathing. ‘The suocess of General Hi enabled other goucrals to ouce more lead their disorganized troop2 back to the fight, and the contest was renewed aloug the whole line, and kept up untt! deep into the night: for ever) thing depended upon our keeping the enemy at bay, counting, too, upon thoir @xhanstion at last, until freal troops could arrive " to reinforce us. length, about half-pust ten in the evening, the di of Magruder, Wise and Hoimes seame up aud deplo to the front of our army. Had the Cominanders of thase divisions executed their orders with protaptitade and skill streams of blood would have been spared, and the fve would have beev thrown back m his reserves in tho course of the forenoom; but reached us fully seventeen hours behind ‘The generals bad been uncertain concerning imns crossed eaeh other time. the marching ordors, their o: amo cataasled, and precious time was irremedia- fost, Still,asit was, the rematuder of our force had hank tho dual arrival of these divisions for their resone. v scon ag these roiuforcements could be thrown to the front our regiments were drawm back, and as far wa pos- sibic reorgauized during the night, the ueedful officers appointed, and after the diatribution of provisions, which had also’ fortunately arrived, tneasures were adopted for the gathering up of the wounded and the burtai of the ly 1, at two o'clock in the morning, were ‘still visible in the sky, General Magrnder again opene’ the battle. and very soon began ds arful that the very earth trembled By twelve o'clock meridian MoClel- lau bad abandoned all’ his positious, leaving behind his wounded, his bageage and many pieces of cannon. fotiowed Lim, hot foot, but cautiousiy, as be cep the surrounding woods with artillery tors. four P, M. our troops reached the vicin- ity of vern Mill ellan had again drawn ap his artuy to reopen the fight. General Vagruder no sooner saw the y 8 position (han he once more led his men to the attack. His columns advanced in magnificent over the space that separated them from the foe wed the intrenched position. But a murderous ‘ave received tho brave feliows aud mowed them the frayments of these splendid divi < the sheiter of the woods, Again G troopg, butfaucdenly missiles of monstrous dimensions tore down ‘whole ranks of our soldiers and caused the most appalting damage. This was the fire of the fleet, which, aithongh two and a half miles distant, now took part in the contest. Our men stilt rushed forward with . desperate. courage against the hostile position, and Malvern Hill was attreked on all sides, MoClellan defended himself courageously, and it was twelve o'clock at night ere be evacuated this position, which both nature and art bad made a strong one. Tho heroic daring and energy of ovr troops had overcome all obstucles. The-hattie of the seventh dav wilt live forever in the memory cf the people rs the battle of Malvern Hill. No- where, in al] the actions fought around Richmond, was the contest confiaed within so small a space, and there wae added to it the fire of the monster guns onboard the enemy’sships. It was terrible to see those two hundred and sixty-eight pougd shell crashing through the woods, and when one exploded i was as gh the globe had buret. Never. in any war since the world eogens missiles of such magnitude before used, fhe battle of Malvern Hill willbe a monument for that people, testi- fying to the determined will and resotation with which it Coatended for its independence as a nation, and the indo- mitabie firraness of ils vow to conquer or to die. T must award to General McClellan my fullest recognition. There ave few, if any, genavals in the Upion army who can rival him, Left in the most desperate straits by his companion in arma, McDowell; victimized. by the Secre- tary of War, Scant, at Washingion; offered up as a sacrifics (0 destiny by yolitical jealousu; cut of from his basis of retreat, he selected « new line of safely of whick no ome had even dreamed. He defended cuery foot of ground with courage and talent, and iis last stand at Malvern Hill. as well as his system of defence and his strategic ccmbinations, displayed high mititary ability. Yet his troops were too greatly demoralized by their se- von days’ fighting, and ost their stamina, while several of his generals could not comprebeud the ideas of their commander, and sustained him but poorly or not at all. At Harrison's Landing, where the James river forms a curve, he collected his shattered array under the guns of the federal fleet. But, on our side, we had no longer an army to molest him. THE FREDERICKSBURG BATTLE. Conclusion of the Report ef the Commitice en the Conduct of the War, &., ke, we THSTIMONY OF GENERAL FRANKLIN. Major General Franktin sworn and examined By the Chairman, Question.—You have seen the resolution of the Senat® under which this Committee are now acting. Will you go on and siate in your own way what you decm it neces” sary to state. Answer.—I do not recollect the precise time, but it was just before wemoved from Warrenton, General Halleck and Genera! Meigs came down there and hed @ conference with Generel Burnside. The result of that confe- rence, as 1 uulerstand it, was that General Burn side was (0 move this army from Warrenton aud that viciaity to Fredericksburg,: aud not across the river here ag an important part of that move- ment, I understand from Generai Burnside that when the advance of bis army arrived in front of Fredericks- burg a pentoon train, enongh to build two bridges, was to meet im there. i know the advance of the army did arrive at Fredericksburg at the proper time, but there was no pontoon train to meet it there, and in conse- qmence of that the army could not cross at the time we expected to cross, We were, therefore, delayed several days in consequence of the delay in tne arrival of the pontoon train, After arriving here we accumulated provisions for twelve days. Then General Burnside called a council, in which it was the unanimons opinion, J think, of all the generals preseut that if this river could be crossed it ought to be crossed, no matter what might happen afterwards. The point of crossing was not then definitely determined upon, but J thought at the time we were to cross several miles fur- ther down. Afterwards General Burnside called us to- gether again, and informed ug that he had determinea to cress at the two points at which we finally did cross. I had no objection to that, but thought they were a8 good as the point further down. } Knew nothing at all, infact, about the defences on the other side. It was not my business to know anything aboutthem. I think the arrangements (or the crossing were aj! well made; at the came time ] doubted onr power to cross, aud 1 do not believe we could have crossed had the enemy chosen to prevent it. And} know from what | have since geen, aad what! before vag See that they eo i!d have prevented our croseing at thore two points if they had choren. Flowever, as the committee kilow that the cross. ing was euocersfully made under cover of a fog and as fares my Wing Was concerned, we got into position safely wit the loxs of a very fow men, Still we were in such & po. i- tionfthat if the enemy had any moment opened upon us with pom one pe ing OpoD us, I think that in the course of an hour our men would bave been #0 scattered that it would have been impossible to raily them. For some unascountable reason they did not open their bat. teries. On the morning of the 13th instant I made av attack sone to the order of General Burnside. 1 put im all the troope that J thought ii proper and prudent are in. T fought the whole strength of my command as far as} could and at the same time keep my communication with the river open. The reaccn that, wo failed was that we had not troops enongh to carry the pointe where the attack was made. Under cr we wero press. Position = should he held os far av advance as it was possible to hold it, and I brougbt dp all the trooper ange) to hold that position tion; Th that until Twas rraered to recross the river, and from what 1 knew of: our want of success on the right and the demortlized condition of the troops on the right and eentre, as represented to me by their commanders, confers that J believe the order to recross was a very proper one We roerossed on the night of the 15¢b without the loss of & mau, and with no troubleat all, Question by Mr. Gooch.—Bad tho pontoons been here at the time of = arrival of the army, what would pave probably been the reauit? Anewer,—The probable result wouln have been that ‘the army, a8 much of it as General Burnside Cow was necessery, woukl have immediately crossed the river, driving away the enomy here, | owicy five hundred or one thousand men, and they would have occupied the vory lvights which we baye sinco been obliged to attack; avd ‘ag ‘oronsing would have begn pormavont and suc- . Quostion.—Do you know on whom ¢ests the responsi- bility of the delay in the arrival of {fo pontoons’? “hag yet do not, olglally, ‘What, in Answer) thivk it will amouut to about tou thousand ws Qusston. law? ou any knowledgo of the loss of tte pep 2 hove mt, except what I saw incidentally in Kichmond a paper. Question.—Do T ands stand you to say that you con. curred in the movemegt t? cross the river? Avswer.—It was not opinien that we vould eross at uy of the points indicated Question. —Wi state grhother or not it is your opinion that he dee it af the army from Warren- ton had been delayed until the fae the ponions arrived here, the army have then come bere, and with those pontoons havemade a crossiag here aud occupied the Heights before the enemy could ixive reached here in sufficient force to have prevented it? , Answer.—Yes, sir, that is my opinioms Question.—Thon it ig your opinion thateif it bad been ascertained that tlie pontoons could uot poxsibly be here at the time General Burnside expected them: to be hore, he should have beew notified of the time when ¢hey could be here, so that be might make the movements of his be hero’ Answer,—That is my Opinion, Question.—What is the condition of tbe 7 army correspond witb the time when the pentoons ee army now ag to}. ita cfliciency? Is its efficiency impaired, ofhor than oy b> loss of so many men, er is it demoralized by the recent disasters? x 4.—I think it is not demoralized at all; that ts,@o far as my own wing is concerned. 1 know it {s got. Question. ter the crossing had been made was it possible, im your opinion, for our troops to Bave carried the heights, or to have held our pene upon the other side go as to have derived any advantage from it” Answer.—It is my opinion that if, instead of Lena 4 two real attacks, our whole force had been concent: on our loft—that is, our available forces—and the real at- tack bad been made there, and merely a fetpt made upon the right, we might have carrio: the heights, 1 think we could have carried them. Whether the army would have achieved a success by that, I cannot say, Ido not mean to say that the mere bey -y of the heights would have secured our success, lo pot know what was behind them or how much of a force the enemy had there. I kuow that wherever we appeared we found a great many more men than we had. 1 would like to impress as firmly upon the committee, os firmly as it is impressed upon my mind, the fact that this whole disaster hag resulted from tho delay in the arrival of the pontoon bridges. Whoever iz responsible for that delay is responsible for all the disasters which haye followed. We were rather astonished when we came dovrn here to find that Sumner had beon here for some days and had not received the pontoon bridges. I think that is the main cause for this disaster, Question.—Do yoa know what the expectation was as to the pontoons being here. On the arrival of the first army corps that would get here, was it expected that the pontoons would be here? he Answer.—Certainly, it was expected they would be ere. 5 Question. —What was that corps to haye doue if pon. toons had been here? Answer.—That corps was to have crossed at once, and taken possession of the heights. If the pontoons’ bad been here there would have been very title difficulty iu doing that. TESTIMONY OF GEN. HOOKER, Major General Hooker’s testimony was to the following effect:—About the 10th of November Burnside was in command. After Hooker had been there @ day or two, there was some talk of transforming the line of operations from the line of the rajiroad at War- renton to the line of the ratiroad at Aquia creek. Gene- ral Haileck and General Meigs visited Genera) Burnside, ‘as he was informed, to determine whether the taaasier of operations should be made. As uear as ho could re collect that was about the 11th of Novomber, That matter waa discussed botween those Generals and Gan. Burnside, and it was determined that the transfer sbou!d be made, Some one meationed, cither Gen, Hatlec! Meigs, he did not recoliect which, that they tho: could have everything ready (ais side in three ‘This was nol aprivate conversation. They they thought they could have the pon- toons ready, the stores landed, and eyerything ready to advance in three days. But he thought not within the range of ‘human to do that. Soon after the movement to the ypahaunock commenced, be brought up tho'rear of the army. in marching to this point. mentioned this be- cause he theugit it had ao important bearing upen some matters which were to come afterwards. The rear of this movement was considered the post of honor. Gen. the After being upon road for about thres days, he stopped one. with big comtn: at Hart- wood. From that point he addrossed a. letter to General Burnside, requesting that he would pormit him to cross the river with his grand division at onc of the fords thore and come down on the south aie of the Rappahannock; but, for reasons assigned im a communication from hisn, the request was denied. After sivtae nt cometsatial account of tii bo said when Sumper’s advance column reached hei there were only soiune 500 of the rebeis in Fredericksburg. He did not know why they did not tuke possession of Fre- doricksburg, but the feeling seemed to be they could take possession of Fredericksburg at any time. Only'a few days before Lieut. Dahigren, of the cavairy, with Mfty- five men, crossed the river and: took possession of the town, When he was at Hartwood he heard there was going to be a delay of three or four days in getting the pontoons here, and that was One reason why he asked permission of Ger, Burngide to cross at the ford there and come down on the other side of the river.) When we got here ho said we should bave beon im condition to march right forward without stopping a day anywhore: but the same mishap was made here that has been made all glong through this war. I think it would have been better to have heid the lines where we were, by repairing sufficient force thore to threaten the euemy and ki them up to their works at Culpepper aod Gordonsyil but instead of that we withdrew every man, and even burned the bridges, thus exposing -ur plan to the enemy the very moment we did so, If Geu. Sumner’s corps hud come down here and loft one up there threatening to advance on that line it led them to believe that we were going to advance on beth lines, It would have been bet- ter, but the enemy saw at once what we were at and came right on here, and they were nearer here than we were; and thes couutry is such that whenever you give them two or three weeks to fortify, one hundred thousand men can make any place impregnable to any other hundred thousand men, By Mr. Gooch—What was the strength of your com- mand at Hartwood? Ans Tt was men. Question.—Would thee have been any difficulty as to supplies in your moving down the other side of the river. a3 you proposed Answer.—I had three days’ rations there. Iwas pre paring to march down through (aroline county, where the people had just gathered their crops, and i would have got plenty of forage and provisious, enough for a week or a fortnight. At the time of the conversation between Generals Halleck, Meigs and Burnside, there was some tatk of forwarding sume supplies up the Kappahannock. I said that ut Bowling Green L could draw my supplies from Port Royal as easily as 1 could gct them when! was at Hartwood. I knew that I could take a position with 40,000 men that the whole rebel army cvuld not move me from. Question.—Would that movement have been safe m view of the fact that the euemy had not the means of crossing herey Auswer.—Ves, sit; because I could take the heights there with my command, and thew jut them, in a con- dition of defence. Ik I had gone there, not & man of the chemy would bave come to FrodericKshurg. bat they would hve goue to some other river and fortified there, if we had given them time, us effectually as they have here. I regard the rebel position op tho Rappahaunock asastrongene. 1 mean the one thoy retired to from Manassas. They had the advantage of two railromia— one to bring their suppHes to them from the West, and tho other railroad from Richmond to bring their troops up from. there. it is the strongest position they had in Virginia, ‘The advantages of this position to hold against a force wishing to cross the river aud attack it are such as Lhave never before seen. Question.—How far apart are tho bridges at the two points where our army crossed here? Answer.—About four miles. Question.—¥ou speak of the telegraph road; will you ‘ate more definitely what that roud is? Auswer.—The telegraph road leaves Fredericksburg from Hanover street, and rens through @ depression in the hitla in the direction of Bowling Green, Question.—Iiow do you explain the {xct that the enemy did not ghell the city when our troopers were masecd there? Answer.—I cannot éxplain it. It is inexplicable to me that bend did not dose, as | bave betore staicd, It was reported, under flay ef truce, that they had at one time shot by heating which to fire the city, add that would have made a terrible time of it. Qnestion.—Was our crossing made unknown to the enemy? It was late when] got the order to withdraw my com mand, between three and four o'clock in the morning and it wos between eight and nine o'clock when the last Of the troops were withdrawn. The enemy did not seem to realise that there were troope in the houses. J wiht- drow my exterior line of pickets jact of all, and they were not fotowed by the enomy. ‘Question.—Had they ‘overert that our troops were to be recroseed, what cou!d they have done? Anawer.—I do not think we shonid have sudered much from their artillery fire on such a night as that was, as it would have beon but random firiug. GENERAL WOODBURY'S THSTINONY. Brigadier General D. P. Woodbury wea sworn. During hie examination he sait he had charge of the Engineer J vigade, consisting of the Fifteenth and Fiftieth regiments of New York Vohumieers, He said on the morning of November 13, he received the following telegram from General Halleck = Wannentor, Nov. 12-710 P.M. Brigadier General Wooonxy, Engineer Brigade — Call upon, the Chief Quariéemasier, Coton I Ricker, to transport al OnE oor hey materia in Agu Crete Colonet: Bdicor ba meta to ohare bee tend me one hunceed nevab-in-Chief, ‘ing the de- to)! of hie proceedings, he says on the 15th he sent down three companies to build some temporary wharves, ‘There were no pontoons to send with them, but some ar+ rived before night of that day. On the 1éth, cight coms panies started with forty cight pontaoue which arrived at Belle lain on the afternoon of the 1h, the transport having ok twenty-four hours. On the 19th, fearing that the land train would notarrive in timeyt bad thirty pontoon p# Shipped to Belle Viain. Those were delayed by rough weather, and did hot arrive tii! the 22d. Those ree were loaded om the night of the 224, and a pontoon train was takon to hearlquartors, ag already stated, on the morning of the ith by meane of teams, which had come down w#h the army. Tho ad- vance of tha army arrived at Falmouta on tho 17¢! a 8 order to me of a ay a it ay that, my was ig to march to F r cB. Att the tina ron the mvonest would made I never received any informa. tion. Fearing, however, that the movement would be eee ies to General Halleck’s office and urged lua (0 delay the movement some Lire dave. jp erdgr |. the enemy’s works, There seeus te be a misunderstar rence Gv tobe rofe: but to the landi ie quarter tor and te commtssery. {| tér’s department was ‘very scan! supplied with || means required for these ‘landings, I may say al! totally destitute of means, Widh the wars eos ne Vou me there Was Only. one possibie way of suppl e army with @ pontoon train in (ame. Tat the vl) gency ‘been made known to me inany manner, [could Y | isregarded the forms of service, scized teama, teams und wagon masbers for instant service whenever Ic: | find sess, a Meg Bv0d roads and good weal} ) Nh poss: ve been dn tities but I had es wi itera could ))) have been cursied ont by the authority of the Genera, Chief, I had a conversation with General Meigs on 1th, in which much was aaid about the work to be d | at Aquia creek; not a word, s0 far as 1 cay remertit about the laud pontoon trains, the department of wit General Melgs is ohiet, cannot. be justly blamed in (|) tier, ly requisitiong for horses wore wered ik mediately. 2 a a. “ay i TESTIMONY OF GENERAL MALGHCK. 1 ‘Major General H.W. Halleck was duly sworn and 0 mined:— R ‘Question—By the Chairman.—By a resolution of the : nate we aro instructed to inquire thio the recent assault Fredericksburg, und the reasons for the delay im attacki ing as to whore duty it was to furcish the-poutoon boa! It appoared to be material that thoy should have be: there at the same time the army got there. The arn got there first, and the pontoons did not get thors t some time afterwards, through mistake or delay. Tb!) is & matter of inquiry. State, in your own way, auythi() yen think matorial which will throw light upon the sv | ject of our inquiry, aud especially as to the delay. i Answer.-=I will state that ali the troops in Washit i aud its Vicinity were under the command of Gener MeCicltan when be was relieved: and he tasued his orde| directly to the commanding officer at Washington, wi! one single exception, that no troops should b | m™ from the command of Washington until I we _ notified by General McClellan or the cotnmanding offic here. In all other respects they were all under directio of General Burnside, When he relieved him I was thut they remained precisely the seme as before. On m visit to General Burnside at Warreutonen the 12th « Navember, in speaking about the boats and things the ho required from here, I repeated to hin that they wer all wnbiect to his orders with that singie exception. 4 prevent the necessity of the commanding officer here ré porting the order for the boats hers, the order wag draw uy upon his table and signed by me directly to Genera, Woodbury. On the evening of the 12th, I think the evea, ng that I was there, General Woodbury, on my return told me he had received the order. 1 wold him that in theso matters be was under General Burnaide’s dirce) || tions. I had nothing further w give kim exce| to comumunicate that order to him. In versation with him and General Meigs 1) was proposed hat the. train of — poutoond | rotten dow! should go down by land, 46 they could be sooner in that way, without interfi plies which bad to be sent to Aquis k. Igave nq) other order or direction in regard to the mattor than all other matters were wider General Burnside’s direc) | tion, He also informed me, whiie at Warrenton, that Captain Duane, Chief of the Engineers, had al ready fcni an order to Harper's Ferry for the pontoon) train there to’ go down, The order had beon issued. They being under General Buruside’s immediate and di-. rect command did not interfare at ali in relation to th Qu Tropes you know whether there was any doiay ing them in their progress there ¢ —-I think that there was a delay from thei) Steamer’s getting aground with the pontoons, and there}, wag a delay, I understood, in the trait going dowu by land on account of the difficulty of the roads and the, inexperience, perhaps, of the officer in command, aud it had to be taken by water part of the way. It could not. get througieby land. I considered, from the reports £ received, that these delays resulted mainly from accident and the elemeuts tnat no roan had any contro! over, Gon. || | Burnside telegraphed to me in relation toGen. Woodbury, thinking that he had not used due diligence, but after- Avarcde told me he was perfectly satisfied with what Gen. Woodbury had done, and that he did not know but that | the comranding officer of the train that went down had done bis duty: fo that he was di ‘to make no far- See, Angrayeation of that matter, that he was pretty well — Question.—Was there any request for you to delay the Sdepnenctihbonar until the boats. arrived, ‘or anything |. cin | Ahswer-—No, sir. I remember this, that General Woodbury, in a couversation with me, sald that Genoral Burnside could not.get down for several days after I told | him, and that hecould not need the boats till (enerad Bornside arrived, T think J remarked to him that I did not know exactly the day when Genera! Buraside would move; that Tcould not tell him,as the General did not Kuow himself, While T was at Warrenton he proposed this moyement, and be wae directed to make al! i rations for it, but not to begin it till the Preat- dent was consulted, I retarued on the after- noon of the 13th, and 1 think on the morning of the 14th I bad an interview with the President, ia which he consented to General Burnside’s plans, aud I im- mediately telegraphed him to go ahéad as he had pro. posed. I understood that there was cousiderable delay in [Si 4 the boats from Aquia creek down. to the Rappa- annock river, on account of the bad roads, difficult; transportation, &c., but no other delay than that wi would naturally occur over a rough country like that an@ accidentally. delay in laying the bridges was reported to me from the inexperience of the pontooncers, who laid the te 74 bridges. There was considerable delay in that. eo could not commence the repairs of the railroad until Gen. Burnside took possessicn of it,as it was at] in the possea- sion of the peony 3 That was understood between Gea. Haupt and Gen. Meigs in my presence. Gen, Haupt went over with ine tomake the arrangement in repairing the roads a3 carly as poesibie. Lremember the conversation. He could not have anything, but would have everything dow ready as soon as be could, and when he found Gea. Burnside was in possession, he commence. Question by Sir. Goocu.—When you wore at Warrenton had General Burnside just assumed command of the Army of the Potomac’ Answer.—Five days before, 1 think. Question.—Was there, or not, any agreement or under- standing between vou and General Burnside that the pon- toons and army stores, or either of them, should be fur- nished to him by the authorites here without his look- ing after thema himself? ‘Answer.—No, sir. Question.--1 wil! say any stores necessary lor him to cross the river and move orward for Fredericksburg? Answer.—-Yes, sir. I requested General Meigs, a3 Chief Quartermaster, and General Haupt, in charge of the rail- roads, to go with me to consult with General Burnside, and. told bim that every thtog was at his’ disposition; he must make his own requisitions and give his owm orders; that I would not {uterfere, except to aesist in carrying tis views out as much at could; whenever any thing was reported to me ag not beiug done ihat | wonld render ali the assistance i just previous to that. time,,with rete- tion which he had sent me,j told tim ny requisitions, but to make them om tue proper bonds of deparuments, and if they did not do their duty then smimediately report itto mo, bul that £ contd net attend to any reqitntthons, ata, _Question.---W ben _ were there wat thie time con- sidered that it would take to move the army from where Tt was to Palmonth, opposite Fredericksburg? Answer.—No, sir, for it was not determined at that time that the movement should be made. Question,—Waseit not determined that it)should be made, provided the President assented to it? > Answer.--Yes, sir, and he was immediately to com- monce his preparations a3 though it had been assented to, until Leiegraphed to the contrary, but netite make any movement, Question.---Was or was not the time requisite for the movement of the army from where it was to Falmouth. considered at that time? Answer,—TIt inay have been spoken of in conversation. We had a long conversation of t or four kours, and it may have been allvded to. Nothing definite was decided upon in relation to the time ft would take. Indeed, ! re- marked when [ left him that he was of opinion that he ‘would cross 9 portion of his forces at the fords above the junction of the rivers. That was the opinion expressed before i teft. Question.And the residue at Falmouth? Answer.—Yes, sir. Question,—Do you recollect whether or no there was. any discussion when yon were thore as to the point that it was necessary that the pontoons and the army should arrive at Falmouth at the same period of time go that the — “or not know the point designated for the crosping! Answer.—I do not thivk that was mentioned. This matter I knew was mentioned, that the pontoons should be there as soon as they could after we had got posses- sion of the road, so that Bes eat ie nenee Seen. Question. —At any time did Gen, yo to you and suggest to you thet it would be impossi! 10 got the pontoons or stores at Falmouth as soon as was expected, and that was the reason it would be advisable that the movement of Lhe army of Gen, Burnside should be dolayed? Answoer.—Not to my recollection. Gen. Woodbury ine conversation (1 oink a part of the time Geo. Meigs was Present) spoke of the dimeulty in getting instantly sum. cient transportation to go down, and, therefore, that the train shoukl go by land, The transports wero requircdta get down provisions, and it waa guagented that ag few as possid!e should be used for moving the pontoon trains. Question.—sinee General Bu has been in con. mand of the Army of the Potomac have all its move- ments been made according to his judgment and dirce- tion, so for ag you kuow ? Anawer.— You, sir, Rete Ape tion by Mr. WrightI understand to say, PR oy that the delay in the brirges, yeuamat, pnd caused by the clemenis and the ineticioncy of tien, awd that there is nobody to blame that you Know of ? Anawer.—I will not say inefieieney of men, but I will gay Unis: thatGon, Baruside reportod to me that the officer in comraan? of the land traip bad not been as efficient oa he Might to have been; bet he afterwards moditiod thas report, I told him to arrest oor eee who had noglect- ed his duty and send hin to Washington: timediately, and he valid to me that he did not think itnecesgary. By the Ohairman—Qne more question is ext to mo, Which TFwillpnt. Itt whether vou wore requester to repair that road before the ag loft Harpers Forry? Tho Witness—Hofore General McClellan's army Vert Napper's Ferry. ‘The Chairman-Ves gir. Before they left there wore you aye by General McCicilan to have that toad re- rod Pe AoaW ot. —Not that} romembor, 1 was told that one of his staff oMficora had requested tt to be vepeived, and the eae re mop y ty _ by myselt “we cannot do, anything there ut faker possession of tho ’* a U'not know tht bo was going there, for he m@ as to where he intended (6 go. If ab any time jon of that Kind was tnade to mie it was made with reference to ome future time, and not as to any immediate action, No request was «nado, according to My recotlections. T will add that it any papers came tv ine In which an allusion was made to that ing dowel Was referred by me to the | | )