The New York Herald Newspaper, December 25, 1862, Page 2

WHAT A-PRUSSIAN OFFICER SAYS OF iT. The Seven Days Fight in Front of Richmond. A GERMAN MILITARY SKETCH. Memoirs of a Staff Officer of ‘he Confederate Army. What Would Have Been Accomplished if McDowell Had Joined McClellan. SPLENDID TRIBUTE TO “LITTLE MAC,” &o., &e., doe. Tue following narrative is taken from an officer of rank im the rebel service whio “has recent. ty goue to Europe to recruit his health, \The a thor was one of the eminent professional soldie who organized the Southern army, in which he hel@a most important commaud until a few weeks ago, wheu & sevore iliness induced bim to ssk afurlough. A foréigner by birth,he passed many yeare in this country, and writes {rom personal knowiedge and experience. The great military events he desoribes with so graphic and skilfal a pen he witnessed from first to last:— (Translated from the Kocluische Zeitung (Cologne Caxetto) of the 26th, 26th aud 27th November, for the New Yore Herat.) The Boacvation of Forktown and Williamsburg—The Fear- ful Panic at Richmnond—General Johnston Wounded— General Lee in Command—Tne Flight of ens and Oficiais—Jeff. Davis and Family go te North Caro lina—Trvops Summoned in Haste from AU Quarte: Graphic Tableau of the Great Counci! of War, June 25, 1852—The Griup of Confederate Generals—The Pl: Concentrated ActioweTBhe Position of the Tws Armas The Advantage with the Confederates—MeCielian's Fine Position—Jackson's Plan — The Active at Honcver Court Hortse—MoDo* y—A General Attock Ord-red—The Batlle of Gai i —The Con Tadevate Onset—H roisin of the vith Brigade—They Re- yrulse the Confederate Vanguard—They Shatler Legion and a North Carolina and Virginia Regimen They Hold Their Ground Four Hours Cnsupperied and tren March off with Flying Banners and Rolling Drums—They Repel Stilt Another Cavalry Attack itary Pict The Horrors of the Battle Fi —Collecting the Wounded—Dreadful Condition of Tings in Richmond—All Gver with the Union Army— Aivintvelnan to the Reectie—The Union Lass—MeClellan's Retveat Compared to that of the Austrians in Lombardy én 1848-——ferritle Confedercte Loss—Jeff. Davis and His Cabinet on the Pield-—Chilling Reception by the Troop:-— Sonidity of the Federal Lntrenchinents—The Burning Pyramid at White House—The Battle at Frazier’s Farm The Feracity of the Confederates—They arc Beaten Back— General Lee out of Humor—The Sixth and Seven'h Da. nd the Splendid Battle of Malvern HiU—A Fine Desevip- tion—McClellan’s Admirable Management—Geacral Lee Fears Defeat—Orders to Hitrry the Public Property from Richmond—The Comfederates in a Panic—Ali Lost— Bevoic Rally of General Hitt—The North Carolin Boys and Anderson's: Cavatry—“On fo Richmond)’ —Farful Handto Hand Fight—No Quarter—Major Peyton end His Son—Prodigies of Yalor on Both Sides—4 History will Seek in Vain for Braver Soldiers" —The Fury of the Combatents Unparallelei—The Confederates in Great Peril—Reinforcements Arrive—Megqruder Seventeen Hours 100 Late—The Fleet Opens Fire with Iwo Hundred ond Sizty-eight Pound She—Their Effect upon the Con Federates—Malvern Hilt a Monument to the Southerm People—Glowing Uribute to McClellan, dc. * © ® Upon the approach of the terrible Union armada we were forced to abandon onr position on the peninsula at Yorktown, and after we had partially spiked our guos we drew back to our defensive fastness at Williamsburg, s0 as at that point to to cover our capital, Richmond, by throwing up strong fortified works, and perfecting a compact military forma, tion. McClellan, the commaniding general of the Union troops, did not allow himsetf to be so far deceived by our voluntary withdrawal from our position at Yorktown as to regard usa Leaten army, but with great celerity and ‘skill continued the disembarkation of his troops and began to fortify his position. It was not until he had com. pleed his preliminary mensures that he advanced with hostile demonstrations against our line. The lines at Williamsburg were also given up by us without any great resistance, although it was very difficult to persuade the old fighting General Magruder of the propricty of the ep, Cor he joved the position asa father loves his child; ‘and, to tell the truth, all the fortifications had been con- structed with much talent under his persona! directions. The hard headed old soldier was won over only alter re- newed debate and expostalation. At length, however aller a few cavalry affairs, the place was evacuated by our troops, and we took uj our march, in two columns, for Richmond. Ja the meenwhile the mos fearful panic fell upon Richmond, and atl wie could pos sibly get away packed up everything they had and flet southward. Tae nearer the hostile army approached ihe cily the farcer the tumull and uproar became, The burn ing wanes of po ular alarm coult not be staye?. The gov, ernment itself furthered the confusion. Instead of re- solving to triampi or to fall with the army in frout of Richsond, it at once ordered all the different Bureau to peck up, and caused the officers of ordnanes to cmpiy the magazines and convey their stores further South. Kren Lvesvient Davis took W the voud and hadenel, with hit and children, to North Carciina. As may be readily tte les of presence of mind threw the people at jacse iato the most frantic excess of terror. There was ow all sides but shouting and uproar, avd coafu- sun reached its utmost height. The secret police of Gen. Winder bad jost all control. Tbe civil authorities of hmond were snxious to do something, but knew wuat, and also Jost thelr senses. A small nomber of the Baltimore rabble took advantage of the babbub, and, in public meeting, passed resolutions condemning Richmond to conflagration so soon as tho Union troops should enter it. Yet all who could escape did so. The sick and the wounded were carried fur- ther ioto the interior; many public and private buildings were marked out for destruction; and, in short, a fright- fai Catastrophe seemed to be impending over the South. ern capital. At this most critical moment the Gener: Chief com - taanding our forces (Johnston) was wounded at the battle of Seven Pines, and the command fell into the able bands of General Leo, who was exactly the man to bring quiet and order again out of this unreasonable chaos. He wont tv work with great geal and energy to discharge his one. row task. All disposable troops were bastily summoned from the interior; General Stonewall Jackson’s army corps was ordered to Richmond; all the hospitals were cleared of their occupants aud preparations made for 10,00) wounded men; artillery aud ammunition wagons rattled by day and night through the streete, wlile aids ‘and or‘erlies galloped to and fro in wild hurry scurry with th ir despatches, Masses of troops came pouring in daily, yee, hourly ‘but without music or any other military pomp. Sternty an gileatly those ragged, haif starved swarms of men moved onward through the thoroughfares; but the fire in their yes showed that they were determined to defend their freedom or to perish On the 25th of June another great council of war was held. In it were asseinbied nearly all that was eminent in the Covfederate army, There stood like a rock Gen, Lee, gazing cheerfally over the counterances of his comrades,for each of whom he bad a part already assigned. Thought fully bis eyes wanderod from ome to tue other, as though he wished to stamp the features of €ach upon hie me. mory, wth the feeling that he, perpaps, should never bebold many of them again. Close beside him towered the knightly form of General Babiwin; at his jest leaned ponsive:y Stonewall Jackson, the idol of bie troops, im, Paticnt!y swinging his sabre to and fro, as though the quiet room were too narrow for him, and he were longimg to be once more at the head of his columus. A little’ aside quietly stood the two Hills, arm in arm, while in front of them old Genera! Wise waa euorgetically speaking, Further to the right stood Generale Huger, Longstreet, Braneh, anderson, Whiting, Ripley and der in group When all these generals bad s+sembi General Ie laid bie plans pefore them, end to @ fow stirring Words pointed out to each his allot ted task. The scheme fied alroaty been elaborated. It was compact, concentrated action, aud the result could ot fail to be brilliant, nol McCiollan had bis forces Qmcoeeunig’on boi sides of the Chickahominy, and, ow- yy ravines in bis neighborheod, gould Bot, a ey jculty and much loss of time, 10 his military movements. His frout linc re&ched over a distance of more than twenty miles, in the form of a somicircls, extending from the Jnwes river towards Richmon!l and Ashland, While one part of bis y orgssed the Chickahon took poaition with the paw: a “a north etc the river, from, low veidge to bridge | ‘the b: ‘on the banks of tho stream were fortitied go thi his army, now ith- standing the great longth of Ite lines, had exce!’snt dofen- sive cover. On the 26th of June, in the morning, our troops took up their positions. Jackson hastened by forced marches to Ashland, there tg commenge hig outilanking operations agaiust the epemy. Having arrived there his guard drove in the weakly posted foe,and pushed on without toss of time to Hanover Court House, where ho threw” forward General Branch’e brigade between-the Chickahominy and Pamunkey rivers, to establish @ june. tien with Genera! Hill, (1st) who had to cross the stream at Meadow bridge. Genera! Hill very gallantly opened the offensis 1 began hie operations syuinst the little town of Mecbanicsville, ‘The euemy who were stationed here made a brave resistance. Storming attacks wero made again and again with a fury, @nd 48 often re- pelied with & cool determination, that awakened admira- tien, I ae eae Hill sen¢ his aids in quest of General neh. he Intter~had cucounterod fo many topographical Si Bantteaee et he reached bis position ia frout of Mechanicsvilic duly Into at -night, when the con nage atanend. Tho morning of the 27th had scarcely began to dawn cre our artillery Gponed a tremendous fire upon the cuemy’s front, 80 that the latter, when tho; #aw Branch’s brigade advancing te the attack on their right, abandoned their position at Mechantosvillo and fell back. Oghting, upon their second defensive line, further down the stream. Just at the moment when wo had @s- tablished the crossing of the Chickakomivy arrived Gen. Longstreet’s magnificent army corps—old, experienced yoterans of the Army of the Potomac-—and the division of Gen. Hill (24), “At once the order to advance was given all along the line. Tho divisions of Geuernis Hill (24), Anferson and Whiting formed the centre, and moved towards Coal Hurbor, while. Jack+ son, Hill st) and Longatrest formed tho~ left, and marched down aloug the bank of the river. Magra der, commanding tho right wing, was. on account-of the awampy nature of the ground he occupied, ordered to hold lilinself merely om tue delensive. General Wise took command of Fort Darling, on the James river. All these miliary offarsive operations and the twa preceding must have givan General Meticllan k tention (o chontge our inconveni nt » and to procure Tor ov . € motion. He should, army comps of General McDo Urid’ incotive near Freder tion ating the Richmond 1 the flank march of General Jackeo derid impracticable. But General MeTeliam must have been decrived in the character of General Mc norwihsanding alt th Mi otions to our combined mancur latier with imperterlable indifference Ais scout tion, and left General MoCiellan’s arny, had suffered greatly ly sickness and devertion, a tu the heavy concussions of © ‘Searcely, thereiore, bad Genera! Lee recerved ble inte: of MeDowell'é inuctivity then @ general and si attick ou McViellan’s whele line was. reso! goon, then, as the arrival of General Jackson at Coat HarDor was reported, the Commander-in-Chie!, with nis staf, repaired to Gaines’ Mill and ordered the divisions of Anderson, Hill (ist), Longstreet and Pickett to attack. Be- fore these columns got ity motion the thunder of artil- lory at our left announced that General Jackson was al- ready at work. This called forth in our (roops the utmost enthusiasm. General McClellan's position on that day was remayls- able in the highest degree. With one portion of his troops be had crossed to the south side of the Chickabo- miny, and there confronted Magruder, while, with the larger portion of his force, he had taken up @ position more to the rearand nearcr to the railroad, where he was resolvod to accept battle. Zis dispositions 7c- vealed comprehensive forethought, talent and coolness, The different divisions of bis army took their posi- tions with admirable precision and ‘awaited our onset with firmness. It was the first time that the two bos- tiie armies had, in relation to aumber=, confronted one another with force so nearly equal: but the Unionists had the ‘advaniage of a better protected position, while our troops had to expose themsolves to the hostite fire. The attack was opened by tho columns of Hill (ast ), Anderson and Pickett. T! gallant masses rushed forward with thundering bi mpon the musketry of the foe, as though it were to them. Whole ranks went down under that territfe hail, but nothing could restrain their courage. The billaws of battle raged flercely onward: the Struggle was wan to man, eye to cye, bayonet to bayonet. The hostile Meacher’s brizade, composed chiefly of Irish- men, offered heroic resistauce. After a flerce stroggic our people began to give way, and at longth all orders and encohragements were vain—-they were failing back i the grevtest disorder. Infuriate, foattng at the mouth, headed, sabre in hand, at this crit‘cal moment Genera! Cobb appeared upon the field, at the head of his legion, and with him the Nineteenth North Carolina and Fourteenth Virginia regiments. At once these troops reuewed the attack, but all their devotion and self-sacrifice were in vain. The Irish held their position witha determination and ferocity that called :orth the admiration of our own officers. Broken to pieces and dis- organized, the fragments of that fine legion came rolling back from the charge. The Ninetcenth North ¢uroling lost eight standard bearers, and the most of their et officers were either killed or wounded. Again, Gener: Hill (J8t) and Anderson led their troops to the attack, aud tome regimeuts covered themselves with immortal glory. Our troops exhibited a contempt of death that made them the equals of old, experi-nced veterans; for, notwithstanding the bloody harvest the destroyer reaped in our ranks that day, ho disorder, no tim!d bearing revealed that many of the regiments were under fire and smelt gunpowder then for the first tine. But the enemy, nevertheless, quictly and coolly held out against every attacl: we made, one after the other. Notwith- standing the fact that solitary brigades had to stand their ground from four unt? eight o'clock B. M., they feits of incredible valor; and it was oly when ‘the news came that Jackson was upon them in the rear that, about eight, they retired before our acwance. Despite the dreadful carnage in their ranks they marched on swith streaming banners and rolling drums, and carrial with Ueir slightly wounded and all their baggage; and, when the cavalry regiments of Davies and Wickham wen! in pursuit, repelled his ossantt alco with perfect coolness. By this time night had come on aud overspread the feild of death with darkness, compassionately shutting out from the eyes of the living the horrid spectacle of siaughter. Quiet gradually returned; only a feeble can- ade coukl be beard upon our farthest left, and that too, little by little, died away. The soldiers were so f fully exhausted by the day's stroggie that many of th sapk down from their placea in the ravks upon the ground. Although I, too, could scarcely Keep in the saddle, so great was my fatigue, I hastened with oue of my aids to Ubat quarter of the ficld where the stroggie had raged the most flereeiy, The scone of rnin was horrible; wlule ranks of the enemy lay prone where they had stood at tke beginning of fhe battle The number of wounded was fearful, too, and the gros.n: and impioring cries (or Leip that rose on ‘all dides lad, in the ovscurlty of Ube night, a ghastly etlect that froze tne blood in one’s veins. Althongh Thad been pon go many battle fields in Italy and Huvgary, never had my vision beheld such # spectacle of kuman destruction. The pre- parations tor hearapeparias ion of wounded were too frifffug, and the foreb detailed for that purpose was either too feodle in numbers Or hat wo proper knowledge of iis duties. Eveu the medical corps ‘hm the terrors of the situation, been rendered jagapabic of atteading to the wounded with zeal and officieney. With inconceivable exertion I at length vuceeeded, with the arsistonee of some humane officers, in bringwg about some kind of order emid this frightful contusion. By the happicat chance 1 found some Cnion ambulances, hae all our men who could drive aud knew the way pressed into soryice, and set to work to get the wounded into Richmond, A most heartrending task it was; for often the poor sut- forer would expire just as we were about to extend him succor. By midnigit we haa got the firet train ready. It consisted of sixty wagens with two hundred veriouely wounded. I cautiously and slowly conducted this train with snccess to the city. The first hoepital reached 1 wag met with refusal. ‘ali full!” was the re- ply to my inquiry. ‘orward to the next hospital!” was my word of command. ‘Allfall!” was again the enawer. Just then a friend said to me that if I would wait he might be able to help me,as he would have a neighbor. ing tenement used as @ tobacco warehouse prepared for a hospital. $0} had to make up my mind to wait th an hour anda half in the strect with my dying char, Idid my best to supply the poor fellows iwith water, and other refreshments, 80 as to alleviate their suffer. im some degree; but the late hour of the pixht and the agitation of the city prevented me from patting my design into more than halt execution. ‘At length the eo-cailed hospital wea ready, but T eould scarcely believe wy eyes when | saw the disma! holeoffered me by that name. in open: without windows or doors, a few planks nailed Fr were to be the beds of the unfortunate defenders of our country. During those days of fate the soldier had endured all things— hunger, thiret, heat; nothing could rob him of his courage, his ind! death; and now he lay there wounded to the death, at the door of his friends whore property she had defended, for whore welfare he had exposed his life, and these friends tara him away to an ope ‘By where, without dressing for h!s wounds or auy care, he ia left to perish. And yet this (city had @ population of 40,000 souls, had churches admirably ed to conversion inte hos- pitals, had clergymen in pum! But neither the doors of the churches |, Bor wore the mivistere of the Gos- pel there to sweeten the last moments of the dying soldier. Sad and dispirited, | gave the to carry in the wounded; cast one more glance at that house ef death and horror, and then swing myself into my soddre and fled, with « quiet oath on my lips, buck to my regiment, General Jackson had acoomplshed his flanking marci without meeting with important resistance ffm the enemy. Hardly had he arrived at the positions marked ont for him ere he sent bis columns to the chorge. Not- withstanding the difficulties and exertions of the march, which they had executed om short allowance, he hurled his t desperate sans culottes of his-—upon the federais. In vain was all the courage, ali the wold mauouvering of the y. Like a tem Stuart and his cavalry swept dowm npon the every Gaing to the earth that stood jn his way. ‘ury, took possession of Jackson's men, wlio aside their mauekets and drawing Meir terr) knives, foil with these alone upon the victims to them. Horrible was the carnage that t and, although the federals had, at tirst made obstmate Fosistance, they uow lost ground and fel! back, turow: away aris, koapeacks, Dlankels—in flvo, everyting that could impede their tight. Subordination and discipline were *t ap end. The soldier no longer heard the command of his officer, and deserted the post entrusted to his keep- ing. Already had two generals of the four hostile brigades been loft by their men, and it was believed that ali was over with MoClellan’s outire army, when, at this perilous crisis, General Heintzelinan appeared with bis ry division, and again brought the battle toa stand. With great ability and gallantry he repulsed the o1 of our troops. and at onee arderad the organization of We beaten | ith them, end rushed ral saw Tinsett Hed to abandon his position, and, like an ox, with beaa down, and ready to iy moment, he drew slowly back to all nd all the accumt- enemy fell inco our hands, aud Jackson le , issue the order, “Enough -” Novo of the other generals had performed with such rapidity and snecess es he, and, therefore, the fruits of his victory were wiusually large. The Uniontets ad fost during the: day two erals, One and fifteen staff and snbaltern — officers, thousand ivatos, and tweotyone caunon, and hoodreds of ambulances and baggage wagons, with all their lading. The tooiy Was iinmonse; b it, in a stentegic point of view, Jacksons success was of far ‘greater importance, siuce ft cut Gene | ral McClellan off completely from his base of retreat When, therefore, the triumph: koown at headquarters, all twiaty upon the dest Jackson's arms became ited with perfect car- jou or capture of MeClellan's en The rejoicing varderel on fr: rs and whens carly next morning, Z vejoined ney regiment. I found my poor fellows in a slate of feverith exitencn!, for every nen of them wanted to have @ hand in me cpmeerheeg, capture or annihilation of the great fot-ral army. alone shrugged my showllers as my offic-rs communicated their antiipations on the subject. We bad gone through similar experience in 1848, undor Rs ltaly. There, too, the Jtatians had already guatters forthe old man and his troops, and the Mayor of Milan was #0 firmly ‘gonfident of victory and. its 6 nso queuces that he hurried out tov meet the y old hero @ prigoner,at the very moment when the latter, over- comlng ail difficulties, wag quietly withdrawing ito bis fortresses at Mantua and Verona, T bad but just reached my regiment when we received tho order to advance along the whole fine. [looked with sadness upon our once tine division. Howfearfully sane regiments bad been ‘ceimated! Many which, like own, had marched out with eleven huudred men. now but three or four hundrod effective soldiers ‘Yes, Some—for insiauee, the Seventh Georgia and Twen- ty Jirst North Carolinaelud only something over ono hun dred and eighty men. A vast number of officers were disabled, and many a five tcllew who, a few days before, full of contidence anc jolity, had prophesied a golden future, was no more, Ino longer had the courage to ask for this one or that ono whom 1 did not see, but took it for granted that he had fallen on the field of honor—!t Was too gad to always hear the game response, ‘(He is i,” “he fell here,” or “there,” in and such @ thogeneral of cavalry, aud M suhnston aud Smith, | 6 by ‘Secreta War Randolph and his military Cabinet. Now the danger wag awr, when Kicimond had been free from the iron yoke placed upon her mack by the encircling Of the foe, and wher they began again to brea! within their walls, these parlor heroes could, at ias!, at the ‘ose of the bicody struggle, assuine a theatrical attitude, Tet, ih NO hurrah as of yore, did the soldiers receive the ‘on of Buena Visto. With a cold eve and as stif! as . long the frombof the regime: ata, only once ‘ing’ a word to some friond When our division bad successfully worked its way oat from among the labytiuths of disniounted artillery, shattered wagons aud dew! aud wounded soidiers and got roou for freer movemoat, we opened our ayer wide with astonishment wher, on vedching the pusilions eracuated by the enemy, we found nothing but a few stands of arms . Ail their material had been carried off by thera hls part of the fleld,and only a huge number of dead told how feartully the batule had raged at this point. The fortifleutions were of colossal dumen- Bio: and bad far greater than we sup] |. We at once received orders to pursite the foe imnicdiately, or at Teast so soon as we could ascertain Lis oxact whereabouts. We had hardiy got beyond White House wien we descried ahuge cloud of smoke which eddied above the woods about a mile and a half to our right. As we carefully advanced in that di- rection we perceived a high heaped up pyramid briskiy Durning with ared hot glow and sending fortn volumes of teain, ‘The hostile genera! had given ordera to com. mit ail the preperty that could not be carried away to the flames, and here the eager conquerors were of mallions of dollars worth of booty. Like hungry wolves wy poor fellows rnshed toward the huge glowing heap to save whatever Could yei be saved, There were bun- dreds-or casks of meat, coffee, sugar, molasses, r' even champagne—in tiue, all these delicacies with which the Northern army was tore than abundantly provided, and which we poor devils scarcely knew the unmes of, piled up on onc another. Yet all eur efferts to rescue something usciui were vain: the enemy had tam his tions for the total destruction everything left mind with such cunting siiil that there was nothing remaining Wit and useless gaoils. On the other hand, the entire field was covered with the heavy cloth cloaks of the fugitives, and these wore very welcome to our troops. Vet alt essential parlicwars rowed to me that General McClellan had accomplished is retieat with order and sagacity, and that there was nothing farther trom his thoughts than a surrender of the army. Indeed, from some stragglers captured by my men,] learned that he had crossed the Chickaliominy with his entire force, hod given up his former base of re- troat and was now approaching the James river, probabiy with a view to form a jnnction with the fleet. 1 at once gent an officer with the intelligence to General Lee. Herexpon 1 received ordors to halt, and presently there rushed by the twelve fine brigades of Hill (1st) and Long- street to give the supposed fying cuemy his death blow. Abont five miles from Darleytown, on the Newmarket road, we got sight of the foe; ‘they had taken up a Splendid position. The plain, thickly beset. with trees. at this point, and roogh, broken ground, was very unfavore. bie to the operations of oar bravecavalry, and they were condemned to inset. General McClellan bad taken his position at Frazier s farin, which formed his centre. This point he had #trenzthened with nineteen pieces of heavy artillery, had collected his best troops there, and firmly and coolly awaited our attack. We bad, at all hazards, to drive the enemy from the neighborhood of our capital or succumb ourrelves. No other choice romained for ue. But Gensra! MeCieilan on'y too well understood his critical port’ By the folly of General McDowell, the pitiful com! ct of Secrelary Stanton and the politleal reasons of Commander-in-Chici Haleck: at Washington, he was offered up, as it were, to destruction. Many another gencral would, perhaps, unde? such dreadful circumstances, have sought death anid the crash of baitle. However. he did not hevilats @ moment, nolwith:tanding the frighiful lowes he had suffered during those Four la,s° struggles. to trust his fate, like ax old and galtant soldier, to the sword. ‘Daring that four days’ massacre our troops had beon transformed into wild beasts, aud hardly bad they caught eight of the onemy, drawn up in order, ere they rushed upon them with horrible yells. Yet calmly, as on the —pa- rade ground, the latter delivered their fire. The bat- tories in the centre discharged their murderous volleys ob Our men, and great disorder ensued amoug the storin- ing masses, Genoral Lee sent all his disposable troops to the rescue, but McClellan cpencd upon these newly formed storming columns 39 hellish a fire that exen the voldest blooded veteran lost his self-posiession. Whole vanks of our men were huried to the ground. The thunder of the canuon, the crackling of the musketry from a hundred thousand combatants, mingled with the screams of the wounded and thé dying, were terrific to the ear and the imagination. Thns raged the conilict within a compara- tively narrow space seven long hours, aud yet uot a feot of ground was we All oar reserves had been led inte the fight, and the brigade of Wileox was amnthiluted. At longth the coming of night compelied a truce. and utterly overcome by fatigue, the soldier sank upon the ground at his post, U bt of oven the (riend torn from his side and engrossed only with the instinct of sel{-preserva- tion, But ‘Water! water!’ was the cry irom the perched lips on all sides. ‘he empty Jasks contained hot a drop, alus! and at length sicep overcame cach wernout’ warrior, and oven thirst and hunger were forgotten, Gloomy and out of humor, General Lee rode through the camping ground of the decimated regi- mente attendod by bis stuf, and then, witm a dry, harsh voice, ordered up the divisious of Wise and Magruder to bury the deat, Witla brie! remark, he next indicated to Coneral Longstreet hiv position for the next d and rode of with Lis aids to visit other portions of the line. THE SiXTB DAY AND THE SEVENTH, WT THR BATTLE OF Pe rer es om jo gray of morning was just beginning to appear upon the horizon when the rowr of artillery was mace more beard. A battery which, during the wight, General An- derson had placed nearer to the hostile lines was in- stantly noticed by the enemy aud vigorously attacked by his fleld pieces. "Every shot struck, and the fragmenta were hurled in all directions, Of the twelve pieces in the battery five were quickly dismounted and the teams haif destroyed, yet the oaminat ding officer held his port. In the meanwhile our columns formed without hay- ing tasted apy strengthening or nourishing refresh- ment. Exhausted by the fatiguos of the nreecding days, they fairly reeled’ on the! shrank back from daty. At length, as the sun rose in splendor, and we could bettor distinguish the enemy ’s position, ap involuutary exclamation escaped me, for it ‘was evideut to me, from the denser ranks he exhibited, that McClellan had been considerably reinforced during the night, and could therefore withdraw his wornout troops trom the foremost lines, and have an easy suriggle with fresh men against ony famished and exhausted force. Gevere! Lec, convinced of the perilous position of affaire, ‘at once igsued orders to Stonewall Jucksow to cover the, retreat iu case the army should be compelled to jail Lack, and directions were sent to Richmond to get all the public property ready for iinmediate removal. Then the divisions of Hill (24), Longstreet, Anderson, Cobb amd Whitcomb were ordered to storm the enemy's works. Aud now again commenced one of (he most deeperate combate that ever took place in any war. The loxs om our side was absolutely frightful. “McClellan, olserwing the devastation his artillery was making among our troops, called up @ division of reserves, and ov.iwhelmed us with a cervific rain of musketry. His masses preseed forward, step by step, nearer and nearer, wutil at length some Ol ies ot threw their arms away and flo, MoClelian availed b Dank moven.ent of Ander. gon placed bimsel at the head of our horse, aud leu three Togiments to the eharge, Their once was magnificent, Our Texang burst with ringing buzzae into the ranks of the foe, who, without even giving us time to try our sabres, turned to the right about; but hore, too, the hos- tile field pieces prevented farther success, and we bad to draw back from before that crushing fire. The enemy, noticing onr confusion, now advanced, with the cry, “Guward vo Richmond” Yes, along the whole hostile Tront rang the shout, “Onward to Richmond’ Many old soldiers wh Tn served in distant Missouri and on the plains of Arkengsas wept in the bitterness of their souls like obildren, Of what avail had it hee to us that our best blood had flowed fr #ix long days ?mof what avail all our unceasing and exhavatless endurance? Everything, everything seemed iost, and a general depression solidity if feet, yet not a man came over all our hourte, Batteries dashed past in headlong flight: ammunitim hospital and supply wagons rushed along, and swept the troops away with them from tho battle fed, In vain the most frantic exertion, eptreaty and self- sacrifice of the stall ofticers, The troops had lost Weir foot. hold, all was over with the Southern Confederagy. In this moment of desperation Gen, Hill came up with a few regiments he to rally; but theenemy was inually pressing nearer and nearer: louder and Joudor jeir shouts, and the watchword “On to Richmond!” could pe heard. Gavalry officers sprang Crow their saddlog and ,? o he wat 7 he had formeriy commanded—and to the soldiers, “if you will not follow meJ wil! perish alone!” Cpun thig.a number of officers dasbed ferward to cover their beloved general with thoir Dastics be soldiers hastil rallied, and Lead c your old Nort ld id. And now Hil! charged forward with this mass he had thus worked up to the wildest enthusiasm. The enemy halted when they saw these columns, in flight @ moment before, now advancing to the attack, and Hill bess wea his lato pursuers like a famishod lion, A fearful wo hand conflict now engued, for there was no time to load- andfire, The ferovity with which thiscombat was waged was iuercdible. it was usoless to beg the exasperated ier for quarter. there wags no moderation, no pity’, 20 compassion in that Dlooly work of bayonet and knife, The son sank dying at his fathor's feet; the fathor forgot that he had a child—s dying child; the brother did not seo that a.brother waz expiring a few paces from. him; the friend heard not the last groans of a friend; all natu- ral tes wore dissolved; enly one feeling, one thiret panted pce mt Pe + aap it pg, Sat me = of a on, but tiftcen years of age, called to his father for beige A ball bad stnticred otk his legs. Whos we havo beaten the onemy then I will belp you,’ an- swered Peyton; “T have here other sone to lead to giory, Forward!’ Rut the column bad adyunced only afew paces further when the Major himself fell to the earth a corpse. Prodigies of valor were here performed on both sides, iso wit ask in vain for brava soliiers than those heve fought and ‘Yell. But of tho demoniac fury ef both parties one atadistance can form no idea, Eyen the wounded, de ring of succor, collecting their last energies of life, Cihtene their knives: le the bosoms of foemen who lay athing. ‘Thesuecess of Genoral Htti enabled other goucrals to once more lead their disorganized troupe back to the fight, and the contest was renewed aloog the whole line, and kept up wnt! deep into the night: for everything depended upon our keeping the enemy at bay, ceunting, too, upon their exhaustion at last. until fresh troops could arrive tw reinforce us. At length, about half-past teu in the 1g, the divisions of Magruder, Wise and Holmes eq to the front of our army. Had the 6 divisions oxecuted their orders with protptitade aud kil! streams of blood would have been spared, und the fe would have beev thrown back upon his) reserves in the course of the forenoom; but they reached us fully seventeen hours behind time, ‘The generals bad been uncertain concerning the marching ordors, their eviumns crossed eaeh other mo catansled, and precious time was irremedia- y Still, as it was, the remaiuder of our force had to thank the dual arrival of these divisions for their Sy scon ag these reinforcements oorld be thrown to the front ts wore draw back, and as far aa pos- « tho night, the needful officers appointed, and after the distribution of provisions, which had also ' fortunately arrived, tn es were adopted fur the gathoring up of the wounded and tho burtal of the dead, ‘On Tuesday, July 1, at two o'cleck in the morning, while the stars were ‘still visible in the sky, Geueral Magrnder again opened the battle. und very soon began Acapnonade so fearful that the very earth trembled with the concuss By tweive o'clock meridian McClel- lau had sbandoned all his positions, leaving behind his baggage and many pieces of cannon. wed Lim, hot foot, but cartiousiy, as he hod first to sweep the surrounding woods with artillery and sharpshootors, About half-past four P, M. our troops reached the viein- ity of the well known farm of D. Carter, known as Mal- vern Ifill. Hore General McClellan had again drawn ap his arty lo reopen the fight. General Vagrtider no sooner saw the enemy's position than he once more led his men to the attack. His columns advanced ia magnificent order over the space that separated them from the foe and stormed the intrenched position, Bat a murderous hail of grave received the brave feliows aud mowed then down, until floaily the fragments of these splendid divi- siors were compelled to seek the sheiter of the woods, Again Generals Smith, Anderson and Holmes. led on their troops, butfsuddenly missiles of monstrous dimensions tore down ‘whole ranks of our soldiers and caused the most appalting damage. This was the fire of the fleet, which, atthongh two and @ half miles distant, now took part in the contest. Our men stilt rnshed forward with. desperate. courage against the hostile position, and Malvern Hill was attecked on all sides. MoClollan defended himself coarageously, and it was twelve o'clock at night ere he evacuated this position, which both nature and art bad madea strong one. Tho heroic daring and energy of ovr troops had overcome atl obstacles. The-datile of the seventh dav will live forever in the memory cf the a6 the battle of Malvern Hilt. Ne where, in all the actions fought around Richmond, w: tho contest cunfiaed within so small a space, and thera ‘was added ¢o it the fire of the monster guns om board the enemy’s ships. It was terrible to see those two hundred and sixty-eight pound ahell ofashing threugts the woods, and when one exploded i was as @aough the globe had buret. Never. in any war since the world began, were of such magnitude before used, fhe battle ern Fil willbe & monument for that people, testi- the determined will and resotation with which it ended for its independence as a n:tion, and the indo- mitaiie firraness of its vow to conquer or to die. Tinst avard to General McClellan my fullest recognition. There ave few, if any, genavals in the Upion army who can rival him. Left in the most desperate straits by kis companion in arma, Me 1; victimized by the Secre- tary of War, Stanton, at Woashingion; offered up as a ice (0 destiny by political jealowsy; cut of from his basis of retreot, selected & new line of safety of whicke no one had even drewmed. He defended cuery/ foot of ground with courage and talent, and his last stand at Malvern Hill, as well as his system of defence and his strategie ccmbinations, displayed high mititary ability. Yet his troops were too greatly demoralized by ther 5 von days’ fighting, and iost their stamina, while several of his generals could not comprebeud the ideas of their commander, and sustained him but poorly or not at all. At Harrison’s Landing, where the James river forms a curve, he collected his sbattered array under the guns of the federal fleet. But, on our side, we had no longer an army to molest him. THE FREDERICKSBURG BATTLE. Conclusion of the Report of the Commitice en the Conduct of the War, &e., TRSTIMONT OF GENERAL FRANKLIN. Major General Frauklin sworn and examined By the Chairman. Question.—You have seen the resolution of the Senat® under which this Committee are now acting. Will you go on and siate in your own way what you deem it neces” sary to state. Answer.—I (lo not recollect the precise time, but it was just before wemoved from Warrenton, General Halleck and General Meigs came down there and hed a conference with Genoral Burnside. The result of that confe- rence, as 1 understand it, was that General Burn- side was (0 move this army from | Warrenton aud that viciaity to Fredericksburg, and not across the river here as an important part of that move- ment. I understand from Generai Burnside that when the advance of bis army arrived in front of Fredericks- burg @ pentoon train, enongh to build two bridges, was to meet him there. i know the advance of the army did arrive at Fredericksburg at the proper time, but there was no pontoon train to meet it there, and in conse- qnence of that the army could not cross at the time we expected to cross, We were, therefore, delayed several days in consequence of the delay in tne arrival of the pontoon train. Alter arriving here we accumulated provisions jor twelve days. Then General Burnside called a council, in which it was the ananimons opinion, J think, of all the generals preseut that if this river could be croswed it ought to be crossed, no matter what might happen atterwards. The point of crossing was not then definitely determined upon, but 1 thought at the time we were to cross several miles fur- ther down. Afterwards General Burnside called us to- gether again, and informed ue that he had determinea to cress at the two points at which we finally did cross. IT had no objection to that, but thoaght they were as good as the point further down. } Knew nothing at all, infact, about the defences on the other side. It was my business to know anything about them. I think the arrapgemenis (or the crossing were well made; at the came time J doubted our power to 1 do not believe we could have crossed had the enemy chosen to prevent it. And] know from what | have since seen, and what! before suspected, that they eo ild have prevented our crosging at thore two points if they had chosen. Flowever, as the committee kilow that the crosse ing wag suocerefully made under cover of a fog and asfaras my Wing Was cencerned, we got inte position safely witp the lozs of a very fow men, Still we were in such a po-i- ye exiemy had any moment 0 upon us with they had bearing ‘upon us, 1} think that in the course of an hour our men would have been #0 scattered that it would have been impossible to raily them. For some unaccountable reason they did not open their bat. teries, On the morning of the 13th instant I made an attack sooataieg, to the order of General Burnside. 1 put in all the troopa that J thought it proper and prudent to put in. IT fought the whole strength of my command as far as} cod and at the same time keep my communication with the river open. The reason that wo failed was that we he! not troops enongh to ke. “ arry the points where the attack was made. Under orders that were given, after we wero press. ed back, J directed that a position ehould he held os far ab advance as it was possible to hold it, and I brought ip all the trooper in reeerve to hold that position ; held that pesition until Twas ordered § to recrose the river, and from what 1 knew of our waut of success on the right and the demortlized condition of the troops on the right and eentre, as represented to me by their commanders, confecs that J believe the order to recross was a very proper one Wo roerossed on the night of the 15th without the loss of & mau, and with no tronblent al}. Question by Mr, Gooch.—Bad tho pontoons been here at the time of the arrival of the army, what would oi probably, been the result? Answer,—The probable result wouln have been that the army, as much of it as Genera! Burnside su was necessery, woukl bave immediately croesed river, driving away the enomy here, perhaps five hundred or one thousand men, and they would have occupied the very hvights which we haye since been obliged to attack; feat crossing would have begn por it and suc- . and coastal Quostion.—Do you know on whom ¢oats the responsi- bility of the delay in the prrival of {fie pontoons? ‘Sug y@r—l do vot, oillgially, ; .—What, in ¥ Bement 6 wi aan about tou thousand wher, Quvstion.—Blane you any knowledge of the loss of the enemy ons Answer.—I ha vg tht, except what I saw incidentally in @ Kiohmond paper. Question.—Do T andy stand you to say that you con. curred in the movemiat t’ cross the river? Answer.—It was not aapvopiaien that we vould eross at auy of the points indica! 4 Question. Wi state wwhother or not it is your opinion that if t of the army from Warren- ton had been delayed until the fee the pontoons arrived here, the army have then come here, and with those pontoons have made @ crossiag here aud occupied tho Heights before the enemy could iawwe reached here ia Sutfleient force to have prevented it? j Answer.—Yes, sir, that is my opiniod® Question.—Then it'ig your opinion thataif it had been ascertained that the pontoons gould uot poxsibly be here at the time General Burnside expected them\ to be hore, he should have beeu notified of the time when ¢hey could be here,so that be might make the movements of hig pny correspond witb the time when the pemtooms id e lero? sBi%i Answer.—That is my opinion, Question.—What is fhe condition of tbe army now ag to ita officiency? Is its efficiency impaired, oftor ‘than by hn of so many men, er is it demoralized by the reocnt isasters? 3 A.—I think it is not demoralized at all; that ts, 60 far ‘as my own wing is concerned. J know ft {s mot. Question.—Afler the crossing had been made was it possible, in your opinion, for our trecps to Rave carried the helghts, or to have held our positions upon the other side so as to have derived any advantage from it? Answer.—It is my opinion that if, instead of making two real attacks, our whole force had been concent: on our left—that is, our available forcea—and the rcal at- tack had been made there, and merely a feipt made upon the right, we might have carried the heights, I think we could have carried them. Whethor the army would have achieved a success by that, I cannot gay, Ido not mean to say that the mere carrying of the heights would have secured our auccess. I do pot know what was behind them or how much of a force the enemy had there. I kuow that wherever we appeared we found a great many more men than we had 1 would like to impress ns firmly upon the committeo, as firmly as it is impressed upon my mind, the fact that this whole disaster hag reaulted from the delay in the arrivalof the pontoon bridges. Whoever ie responsible for that delay is responsible for all the disasters which have followed. We were rather astonishod when we came dovn bere to find that Sumner had been here for some days and had not received the pontoon bridges. I think that is the main cause for this disaster, Question.—Do yoa know what the expectation was as to the pontoona being here. On the arrival of the first army corps that would get here, was it expected that the pontoons would be here? . Answer.—Certainly, it was expected they would be ere, : Question. —What was that corps to have done if pon. toons had been hero? Answer.—That corps was to have croased at once, and taken possession of the heights. If the poutoons bad ‘been here there would have been very Ixtle difficulty iu doing that. TESTIMONY OF GEN. HOOKER, Major General Hooker’s testimoay was to the following effect:—About the 10th of November Burnside was in command. After Hooker had been there a@ day or two, there was some talk of transforming the line of operations from the line of the raiiroad at War- ronton to the line of the ratiroad at Aquia creek. Gene- rl Haileck and General Meigs visited Gonera! Burnside, as he was informed, (o determine whether the taansier of operations should be made. As near as he could re collect that was about the 11th of Novomber, That matter was discussed botween those Generals and Gan. Burnside, and it was determined that the transfer should be made, Some one meationed, cither Gen. Halleck, or Gen, Meigs, he did not recoliect which, that they thought they could have everything ready tais side in three days. This was not aprivate conversation. They said they thought they could have the pon- toons ready, the stores landed, and everything advance in three days. But he thought not within the range of — ‘himan possibly to do that. Soon after the movement to the Rappabiannock comtuenced, he brought up tho'rear of the army in marching to this point. He mentioned this be- cause he thougit it had au important bearing upen some matters which were to come afterwards. rear of this movement was considered the post of honor. After being upon the road for about three days, he stovped one day. with bis command at Hart- wood. From that point he addrossed a, letter to General Burnside, requesting that he would pormit him to cross tho river with his and division at one of the fords — and sae Mog on the south wien ies the Rappahannock; but, for reasons ass in 8 commaunicagion’ frou: him, the request denied, A(ter sik nccronmatantin) account of movements, be said when Sumner’s adyance column reached here, there were oniy some 500 of the rebois in Fredericksburg. He did aot know why they did not tuke possesgion of Fre- doricksburg, but the feeling seemed to be thoy could take possession of Fredericksburg at any time. Quly'a few days before Lieut Dahigren, of the cavalry, with fifty. five men, crossed the river and: took possession of the town, When he was at Hartwood he heard there was going to be a delay of three or four days in getting the pontoons here, and that was One reason why he ucked permission of Ges, Burnside to cross at the! ford there and come down on the other side of the river. | When we got here ho said we should have been im condition to march right forward without stopping a day anywhere; Dut the same mishap was made here that has been made all slong through this war. I think it would have been better to have heid the lines where we were, by repairing sufficient force there to threaten the enemy and keep them up to their works at Culpepper and Gordonsville; but instead of that we withdrew every man, avd even burned the bridges, thus exposing ur plan to the enemy the very moment we did so, If Geu. Summer's corps hud come down here and left one up there threatening to advance on that line it led them t believe that we were going to advance on beth lines. It would have been bet- ter, but the ene saw at once what we were at and came right on heré, and they were nearer here than we were; and tlie couutry is such that whenever you give thom two or three weeks to fortify, oue buadred thousand men can make any place impregnable to any other hundred thousand men, By Mr. Gooch—What was the strength of your com- mand at Hartwood ? Answer.—It was ——— men. Question.—Would thefe have been any difficulty as to supplies in your moving down the other aside of the river. as you proposed ¢ Answer.—I had three days’ rations there. Iwas pre paring to march down through Caroline county, whore the people had just gathered their crops, and 1 wonld haye got plenty of forage and provisious, enough for a week or a fortnight. At the time of the conversation between Generals Halleck, Meigs and Bernside, there was some tatk of forwarding some supplies up the Kappahannock. I said that at Bowling Green L could draw my supplies from Port Royal as easily as 1 could get them when was at Hartwood. T knew that I could take a position with 40,000 men that the whole rebel army could not move me from. Question.—Would that movement have been safe m view of the fact that the enemy had uot the means of crossing here? Auswer.—Yes, sir; because I could take the heights there with my command, avd thew jut them, in a con- dition of defence. Ii I had gone there, not & man of the chemy would have come to Frederickeburg. bt they would herve goue te some other river and fortified there, if we had given them time, a8 effectuaily as they baye here. I regard the rebel position on tho Rappahaunock asastrong one. 1 mean the one they retired to from Manassas. They had the advantage of two railromls— one to bring their suppHes to them from the West, and tho other railroad from Richmond to bring their troops up from there. it is the strongest position they had in Virginia. ‘The advantages of this position to hold against a force wishing to cross the river aud attack it ure such as | have never before seen. Question.—How far apart are tho bridges at the two points where our army crossed here? Answer.—About four miles. Question.—¥ou speak of the telegraph road; will you state more definitely what that roud is’ Auswer.—The telegraph road leaves Fredericksburg from Hanover street, and rvns through @ depression in the hina in the direction of Bowling Green, Question.—How do you explain the {xct that the enemy did not ehell the city when our troopers were there? Answer.—I cannot éxplain it. It is inexplicable to mo that we'd did not do so, as | have bet stated, It was reported, under flay ef truce, that they had at one time shot by heating which to fire the city, add that would have made a terrible time of it. Question.—Was our crossing made unknown to the enemy? It was late when I got the order to withdraw my com mand, between three and four o’chick in the morning, and it was between eight and nine o'clock when the last of the troops were withdrawn. The enemy did not seem Wo realise that there were troops in the houses. J wiht drew my exterior line of pickets Jast of all, and they were not foHowed by the enemy. Question.—Had they discoverer that our troops were to be recroseed, what cou!d they have done? Anawer.—I do uot think wo shonld have suffered mnch from thelr artillery fire om such a night as that was, as it would ¢ beon but random fring. GENERAL WOODBURY’S THSTINONY. Brigadier General D. P. Woodbury waseworn. Doring his examiuation he said he had charge of the Engineer J vigade, consisting of the Fifteenth and Fiftieth reyinents of New York Vohinteers, He said on the morning of November 13, he received the following telegram from General Halleck: Brigadier General, Wooonvxy, Eucin Call upon the Chief Quartermas t all your pontoons and bi Creek, € rah ied ay hg one hund r naire Oe HALL Wannentoy, 7102. Me ie | Rucker, to to Aquila * and xandri EC, Genevai-in-Chief, And other orders were produced, Attor giving the de- tui! of his proceedings, he says on the 15th he sent down three companies to build some temporary wharves, ‘There were no pontoons to send with them, but some ar: rived before night of that day. On the 16th, eight com. panies started with forty eight pontaous which arrived at Helle Vain on the afternoon of the 19h, the wansport having been aground twenty-four hours, Ov the 19th, fearing that the land train woukl not arrive in time,! bad thirty pontoon Shipped to Belle Plain. Those were dlelayed by rough weather, and did not arrive’ tii! tho These wagons were loaded on the night of the 224, and a pontoon train was takon to headquarters, ag already stated. on the morning of the 24th by moans of teams, which had come down w#h the army. Tho ad- vance of army arrived at Faimonti on tho 17th, estas eae order to me of the 13:h mado it appa» ib that army was ring to march to Fredo- r 'e. to the t when the movement would made I never receivel any informa: tion. Fearing, however, that the movement would be revipitate, I went to General Halleck’ office and ur; ua (9 delay We MOVeMNED' BOE Liye dave, jp erage tei + | boing dowels was referred by we A it Mt | pantry roference wo ouly to the fanny | tobe or ¢ naeieary 3 , ‘ tér’s depariment was ‘very scamthy supplied with | means regnired for these ‘landings, I may say aly totally destitute of means, Widhe the shart | sioane there Was ouly one popsibie wa: army with @ pontoon train in ime. the er geucy ‘been made known to me in any manner, [could Y isrcgarded the forms of service scized teama, teams aud wagon masbers for tnetant service whenever Ie: | find them. se wi god rouds aud good weat | might poss: 6 beet dn tigiey but I had | wae for such a course, which, r all, could q) have been carvied ont by the authority of the Generas||) Chief, RA posmrerpation with Genorat Meigs on ||} 16th, in wi much waa aaid about the work to be a) ‘at Aquia creek; not a word, so far as 1 can reme i about ‘the laud pontoon trains, the department of w matter. My requisitions for horses were answered it~ mediately. " 1 o “ag eral Helge is chief, cannot be justly blamed in ! j TESTIMONY OF GENERAL MAL LC! was duly sworn and © |) Major General 11.17, mined:— 4 Question—By the Chairman.—By a resolution of tho f Nate we aro instructed to inquire tnto the recent assault Fredericksburg, and the reasons for the deluy in attack the enemy’s works, There seews to be a misunderstar, ing as to whoge duty it waa to furnish the pontoon boa! It appeared to be material that they should have be: | there atthe same time the army got there. The arn | got there first, and the pontoons did not get theret some time afterwards, through mistake or delay, T i is. matter of inquiry. State, in your own way, ouythi), yen think materia’ which will throw light upon the sv ject of our inquiry, aud especially ag to the delay. i Answer. will state that all the troops in Washingt¢, aud its Vicinity were under the command of Gener, MeCiclan when he was relieved: and he tseued his orde} directly to the commanding officer at Washington, wil) | one single exception, i ono troops should 1 i moved trom the command ‘of Washington until I we | notified by Gei 1 McClellan or the coinmmanding offic here. In all other respects they were all under directio. of General Burnside, When he relieved him I was thut they remained precisoly the seme as before. Ou mw visit to General Burnside at Warrenton en the 12th ¢ Navember, in speaking about the boats and things the ho required from here, Lrepeated to hin that they wer all subject to his orders with that siugie exception. 1% provent the Necessity of the commanding officer here re porting the order for the boats here, the order was draw up upon his table and signed by me directly to Geners, | Woodbury. Oa the evening of the 12th, I thin the evem) that T was there, General Woodbury, on iny returp told me he had received the order. 1 dol him that in theso matters bo was undor General Burnaide’s dirce) | ton I had nothing further to give kim exce| to communicate that order to him. Jn versation with him and General Meigs i) | was. proposed hat the. train of — pontoon: should go down by land, 43 they could be gotten dow: sooner in that way, without interfering with the sup) | plies which bad to be sent to Aquia creek. Igave nd) other order or direction in regard to the mattor than all other matters were wider General Burnside’s direc. tion, He also informed me, while at Warrenton, | that Captain Duane, Chief of the Engineers, had al-)|| ready ent ap order to Harper's Ferry for the pontoon) train there to’ g. The order had beon issued. They being under General Burnside’s immediate and di-. |) rock command dit not interfare ut ali in relation to them|) Question.-Do you know whether there was any deiay) || it ing therm in their progress there ? Answer.—I think that there was # delay from tl Sleamer’s gctting aground with the pontoons, and there wag a delay, I understood, in the trait going dowu by land on account of the difficuity of the roads an inexperience, perhaps, of the officer in command, and it had to be taken by water part of the way. It could not get througtrby land, I considered, from the reports received, that these delays resuited mainly from accident and the elements that no man had any control over. Gen. Burnside telegraphed to me in relation toGen. Woodbury, | thinking that he had not used due diligence, but after- Warde told me he twas perfectly antisfied with what Gen. | Woodbury had done, and that be did net know but that tho commanditg officer of the tra i done bis duty: algo that di © make no far- ! that went down bad | | ‘he was Ser desneneation of that matter, he was pretty well ] ‘Question.—Wat there atiy request for you to delay the advance of the war until the boats arrived, cor anything |. of that kind? a Answer—No, ait. I remomber this, that General Woodbury, in a conversation witn me, said that Genoral Burnside could not.got aown for several days after I told him, and (hat he could pot need the till Generad. Bornside arrived, T think I remarked to him that I di@ not know exactly the day when Geuera! Buruside would hat Tcould not tell him,as the General did not mseif. While T was at’ Warrenton he proposed. this moyement, and be wae directed to make all prepa- rations for it, but not to begin it till the Prest- dent was consulted, I returued on tho after- noon of the 19th, and 1 think on the morning of the 14th 1 had au interview with the President, im which he consented to General Burnside’s plans, wud J im- mediately telegraphed him to go ahead as be had pro- posed. I understood that there was cousiderable delay im getting the boats from Aquia creek down. to the Ray annock river, on account of the bad roads, difficulty of tratisportation, &c., but no other delay than that wi would naturally occur over a rough country like that an@ accigentatty. delay in laying the bridges was reported to me from the inexperience of the pontooncers, who laid the u; bridges. There was considerable delay in that. We could not commeuce the repairs of the railroad until Gen. Bornside took posaessicn of it, as it was ail in the possea- sion of the ent ‘That was understood between Gea. Haupt and Gen. Meigs in my presence. Gen, Haupt went over with me tomake the arrangement in repairing the roads as on as poesibie. I remember the conversation. He could not have anything, but would have everything down ready as soon as be could, and when he found Gea. Burnside was in possession, he would commence. Question Ly Mr. Goocu.—When you were at Warrenton had General Burnside just assumed command of the Army of the Potomac’ Answer.—Five days before, T think. Question.—Was there, or not, any agreement or under- standing between you and General Burnside that the pon- toons and army stores. or either of them, should be fur- ished to him by the authorites here without bis look- ing after them bitaself? Answer.—No, sir. Question.—1 will say any stores necessary lor him to cross the river and move orward for Fredericksburg? Answer.--Yes, sir. I requested General Meigs, a3 Chief Quartermaster, and General Haupt, in charge of the rail- reads, to go with me to consult with General Burnside, and told bin that everything was at ‘his’ disposition; be must make his Own requisitions and give his owm orders; that I would not interfere, except ta assiet in carryiog bis views out as much at I could; whenever any thing wi reported to me Ag NOL Deiug done that 1 would render all ‘the assistance: in my power, and just previous to that time,.with rete- renee to a requisition which he had sent mor] told tim not to send me any requisitions, but to make them om Ane proper heads of departments, and if they aid not do thoir duty then siamediately report itto mo, bul that I could not attend to any reqiisitions at all,” Question.-Waeu were there wae tiie’ time con- deren that it would take to move the army from where was to Falmonth, opposite Fredericksburg? Answer.—No, gir, for it was not determined at that time that the movement should be made. Question.—Was) lt nei determined that it’should be made, provided the Presideut assented to it? > Answer.-~Yes, sir, and he was immediately to com- monce his preparations a3 though it had been assented to, until telegraphed to the contrary, but notite make any movement, : Qvestion..Was or was not the time requisite for the movement of the army from where it was to Falmouth considered at that time? Auswer,—It inay have been a] of in conversation. We had a long conversation of t or four hours, and it may have been allnded to. Nothing definite was decided upon in relation to the time it would take. Indeed, ! re- marked when [ left him that he was of opinion that he would cross a portion of his forces at the fords above the junetion of the rivers. That was the opinion expressed before j teft. Question.«-And the residue at Falmouth? Answer. —Yes, sir. Question,—Do you recollect whether or no there was any discussion when yon were there as to the point that it was necessary that the pontoons and army shoul@ arrive at Falmouth at the same period of time so that the — “mt not know the point designated for the crore! Muswer.—1 do not think that was mentioned. This matter I knew was mentioned, that the pontoons should be thére as soon as they could after we had got posses- sion of the road, so that they could be taken down. uestion.—At any time did Gen. yaar 4 10 you suggest to you thet it would be impossible to get the pontoons or stores at Falmouth as soon as was expected, and that was the roagon it would be advisable that the movement of the army of Gen, Burnside should ‘be dolayed? 7 Anawor.—Not to my recollection, Gen, Woodbury ine conversation (J think & part of the time Geo. Meigs was Present) spoke of the dimeulty in getting instantly sum. cient transportation to go down, and, ¢, that the train shoukl go by land. The transports wero required ta get down provisions, and it was erates that as few as possidto should be need for moving the pontuon trains. Question.—Since General Burn: has been in mand of the Army of the Potomac have all its ments bees made according to his judgment tion, so far as you kuow ? Anawor.—-Yex, sir, entirely. Qugstion by Mr. Wrighte=I understand you to say, General, that the dolay in the Pridges, you think, waa by tho elements and the inetticioncy of men, aad fs nobody to blame that you know of ? —I will not say inefi¢iewey of men, bat I will say Wiis: that Gon, Hurnsido reported to me that the officer in comsnand of the [and tray bad not been as efficient om ho Might 1o have been; but he afterwards modifiod thas report. 1 told him to arrest at pee who had negiect- ed nis duty and send hina to Washington: fiimediately, and Ae eaid to me that he did not think itnecessary. By the Chairman—Qne more question is suggested to mo, Which Twill pnt. Itte whether you wore requested {to repair thas road before the army loft Horpers Forry? : ‘The Bie Gevoral McClellan's army Jett larpor's Fer , ‘The Chairman—Vos sir. Before they left there were you Ng uested by General McClellan to have that road re- paired + a awet.—Not that I remember, 1 was told that ono of his staff officers hail requested jt to be repoired, and the answer Was immediately mady by myselt “we cannot do anything there until ho takeg possossion of tho fee, ant, moreover, 1 did not know that he was go! Hore, for he to go. Tat 2 move: dl diree- had not informed me as to where he inter: any, time Suggestion Of that Kind wae thade ti mit was matte With reference to gome future time. nod not as to any immediate action, No request was unade according t0 My recollections. T will add that if ang oy tue to ine In which an allusion was made to that damedievely to whe