The New York Herald Newspaper, December 24, 1862, Page 1

WHOLE NO. 9598. *, " ——— eS ae ‘WAE ARMY OF TUE POTOMAC. | Ad@ress to the Soldiers by President Lincoln. Fheir Courage and Skill a Guarautee of Our Ultimate Suceess. ‘ ws DESPATCH FROM GENERAL BURNSIDE, awe @ur Losses Not So Great as Irevi- ously Reported. Important Report ef the Con- gressional Committes on the Conduct of the War. The Testimony of Generals Burnside and Sumner. HE LATEST FROM THE RAPPAMANNOCK, &e., &e,, do. @he President's Address to the Army of the Potomac, * } Exicorve Mansion, Wasnixetoy, Dec. 22, 1902. ‘Fe Tus Anut ov THE Potomac:— Thave just read your Commanding Ceneral’s prelimi~ nary report of the battle of Fredericksburg. Although | yeu were not successful, the attempt was not an error» for the failure other than an accident, The cou- gage with which yon in an open field. maintained fhe contest against an iutronched ‘oe, and the Gensummate ekill and success with which you crossed ‘amd recrossed the rivor in the face of the enemy, how that you possess all the qualities of a great army ‘which will yet give victory to the cause of the country ‘and of ‘popular government. Condoling with the mourn” for the dead and sympashizing with the sevorely , L congratulate you that the number of both is @omparatively so small. I tender to you, officers aud soldiers, the thanks of the nation. ABRAH AM LINCOLN. Whe Wounded im the Late Battle—Des” patch from Genera! Burnside. ‘Heapquarrmns oF Tie ARMY OF THE PoromAc, Fanqovrn, Deo. 28,1862.” . Major General H. W. Huxtxcr, Genora!-in-Chicf, Wash ington:— : ‘In my report to you of the 17th instant the oumber of eur wounded was stated at about nine thousand, and the ‘sumber receiving hospital treatment at sixteen hundred ‘and thirty. Both of these amounte are wrong. On the @uthority of Dr.-Lotierman, our Medical Director, the ‘whole number of wounded is between six and seven thou- and, About one-half of theee are receiving treatment in We hospitals. A. E. BURNSIDE, Major Genera! Commanding Army of the Potomac. Latest from Burnside’s Army. Heapquarrers Army or THe Poromac, Dec. 23, 1862. By comparing an official copy of General Burnside's Feport to General Halleck with the publication of the fame in the Washington papers of this morning, several ‘Maportant errorsare noticed. In the first paragraph, last Mme but ono, the word ‘to’ should be substituted for “py,” reading thus:—'‘Indicated to you,” instead of “by you.” The tenth paragraph, as printed, erroneously ter- minates in the middie of a sentence. It should read as follows:—I will write you very soon, @n@ give more definite information, and, finally, ‘will send you my detailed report, in which a special acknowledgment will be mado of the services of ‘he different grand divisions, army corps, and my geueral ‘and personal staff departmants of the Army of the Poto. ‘mac, to whom lam so much indebted for their support end hearty co-operation.” The next paragraph should commence with the words, “I will add,” &. A flag of truce crossed the Rappahannock this afternoon ‘with a communication for General Lee, the purport of ‘which bas not been made public. Richmond papers of yesterday and to-day have found ‘their way here. The‘Enquirer says the losses in A. P. Hill’s @vision, on the 13th, were 211 killed, 1404 wounded end 417 missing. This division was confronted by Frank- Bin’s left, and consisted of six brigades with artillery. ‘Mare than half the rebel loss occurred in this division. from below is to the effect that the rebels ‘hewo considerably strengthened the.r forces noar Front ‘Royal, aud that the enemy maintain a contraband commn- saication with their Northern friends, via the Potomac and ‘Mattipoay creek, crossing tho peninsula and Rappahan- mock at Leeds, about thirty miles be'ow this point. No shots have becn exchanged with the enemy for rev- oral days. ‘The river pickets maintain a friewlly disposition (o ‘wards each other. Meport of the Committce om the Conduct of the War in Reference to the Recent : Battle at Fredericksburg. Wassxotox, Dec. 23, 1862. ‘The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War re- ported, in answer te @ Senate resolution of the 18th inst. calling on that committee to inquire into the facts relating ‘to the recent battle at Fredericksburg, Virginia, af par. ticularly as to what officer or officers are responsible for the assault, that they had proceeded to the hoad- quarters of the Army of the Potomac and taken the depositions of Major Generals Burnside, Samner, Franklin and Hooker, and Brigadier Generals Woodbury and Haupt, aud, on their return to ‘Washington, those of Major General Halleck and Brighdier General Meigs. All the facts relating to the movements of the army unier Genora! Burnside, the Sorgarding of pontoons ] tor, the recent battle at Fredericksburg, Biapprce, the Tecent hatte are sotully ana clearly alate inthe | Gopositions herowith submitted that the committee ro. port the testimony without comment. “TESTIMONY OF GENERAL BURNSIDE. Maajor Genoral Ambrose E. Burneide sworn by the chair, man:— ‘Question. You have sen tho resolution of tho Sonate under which (bis committee is now aoting. Will you Bow goon, aud, in your own way, without questioning, give such accounts of the matters embraced in that reso. Aution as you may consider necorsary and propery Anmwor,—In order that the whole matter may be en- Airely understood it may be woll to go back a litte, Question.—Very well; make your statement in your ‘Own way? Answer.—Whoen, a(ter the battle of Antietam, General decided to orors the Potomac, I mid te bim that & my Opinion ho would never be able to take this army on ‘hat route beyond the Rappalannock, unless he sneceed. ed in fighting the enemy at some place on this side; that Whe proposed to go to Richmond by land, he would have 40 go by way of Fredericksburg, and in that he partially agreed with te. After we tmd started we had ‘another conversation” on tht subject, and seve. Fel other officers were prosont. On the 6th of November, after this conveseation, Gonoral MoUlellan gave an order to Cuptaia Dram, bie Chief En- @inecr, to bave ail the pontoon bridgos at Dorlin and in that neighborhood that could be smrod taken ap aud sont down toWasbingtou, with a vicw of getting them | down to this town tu case be decided to go by way of po nit he Tho letter couveying that order was erritton on the 6th of November; but, as I understand, | ‘was not recoived nntil the 12th o@Wovember. or 8th of Novenber I received an order from the Prosident of the Waited States, directing me to | ake command of the Army of the Potomac, and also a copy of the order relieving Gengral MeClotlan from that —’ On the 7th H Ate gotting over my surprise I ‘told General Bucking- ham that it was s matter that required very serious thought, that I did not want the command, that it ua Deen offered to me twice bofore, and that I did mot feel could take it, I counseled with two of my staff offleers Sn'rogard to it for I should think an hour and a half, They urged upon me that I had no right as @ soldier to disobey the order, and that J bad already expressed to the government my unwillingnesg to take the command, I told them what my views were with reference to my ability to exercise sach a command) which views were those I bad always unreservedly ex Pressed—that I was not competent to command such a large army ag this. [bad said the same over and over ayain to the President and Secretary of War, and also that if matters could be satisfactorily arranged* with General McClellan, I thought he could command the army of the Potomac better than any other general in it; but they had studied the subject more than! had, and know “more about their obligations to General MoCiellan than I did. There had been som? conversation with regard to the removal of General McClellan, when he was bringing away his army from be- fore Richmoud. The first of these conversations with the President and Secretary of War ocourred at that time, and then, after Genoral MoClellan had got back to Wash- ington, and before the commencement of the Maryland campaign, there was andther conversation-ef the samé kind; and op both of those me 1 ox preseed to the President tie opinidh that I did not think theye was any one who could do as much with that army as General MeClellan could, if + matters would be so arranged as to remove their objec- tions to him. Atter I had conversed with my staff officers I went to gee General McClellan himself, and he agreed with us that this was an order which I, as a soldier, had tocbvey. He said he could not retain the command, for he, as a soldier, would haye to obey the order directing him to give up that command in the midst of a violent snow storm, with the army in a position that I knew but Kittle of. I had yreviously comminded but one corps, upon the extreme right, and had been upon the extreme rightand in the advance eince that campaign had begun. I probably knelw lesg thanrany other corps commander of the positions and relative strength of the several corps of thoarmy. Gev. MoCleilan remained some two or three days to arrange his affairs, and came with me as far as Warrenton, and then ieft, having given me all the in- formation he could in reference to the army. Genera, Heck came down to see me on the 11th of November. On the 9th I ma:le.out a plan of -eperations, in accordance with the order of Goneral Halleck, which decided mo not only to take command, but also to state what J proposed to do with it. That plan I wrote on the morning of the 9th of November, and sent it by special messenger to Wachingtov, Iean furnish the committee a copy of that plan if they desire it. I do vot have it here now. Question,—State the substance of it, iC you plonse; that may do as well. Auswer.—I stated, in substance, that I thought it aa” visable to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Warrenton, to make aysmall movement across the Rappa- b wk as a feint, with a view to divert the attention of the enemy and jead them t» believe we wore going to m_ve in the direction of Gordonsville, and then to make a rapid movement of the whéle army to Fredericksburg» on this side of tho Rappahannock. As my reasons fo" | that I stated that the further we got into tne interior of Virginia the lenger would be our line of com- munications, and the greater would be the difficulty we would have in keeping them open, as the enomy had | wpon our right flank @ corps that at almost any tim® could, by a rapid movement, seriously embarrass us. if swe were caught by the elements go far from our base of supplies, and at the samo timo in the enemy’s country» | where they had means of getting information that we | had not, it might, I thought, prove disastrous to the | army, as we had but ono line of ratiway by which to { supply it. In moving upon Fredericksburg we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg we would be at @ point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if we should take Gordonsville. On tho Gordonsville line the enemy, in my opinion, would not give us a decisive battle at any place thjs side of Rich” mond. They would defend Gordonsville until such time as they felt they had given us a check, and then, with so many lines of railroad open to them, they would move upon Richmond or Lynchburg. And in either cage tho difficulty of following them would bo very groat. In connection with this movement I requested that barges filled with provisions and forage should be floated to Aquia creek where they could be easily landed; that ma- terials becollected for ihe reconstruction of the wharves there, and that all the wagons in Washington that could possibly be sparod should be filled with hard bread and small commissary stores, and with a large number of beef cattle started down to Fredericksburg on the road, by way of Dumfries, and that the wagon train and herd of cattle should be preceded by a pontoon train broad enough to span the Rappahannock twice. I stated that this wagon train could move in porfect safety, because it would be all the time between our army apd the Potomac, or, in other words, our army would-be all the time be- tween the enemy and that train, but, at the same time, I said that if a cavalry escort could uot be furnished from ‘Waghington, I would snl some of my cavalry wae “ ‘Would be recalled, and we wanted to meet this force and ‘Deen forwarded in time for you to have crossed the Rap- | Deat it before Jackson could make e junction with them, | pabannock when you expected, if all possible efforte had | OF before Jackson eould come down on our Sank and per” | been made by those charged with that duty? hape cripple us, I had recommended that some supplies | Answer.=-Yes, sir, if they bad received their orders 'm Should be vent to the mouth of the Rappahannock, | time. with @ view of establishing @ depot at Port | Question.—Did the non.arrival of these pontoons at the | Royal, after we bid advanced to Fredericksburg. | time you oxpected prevent your crossing when you ex. | After the first delay in starting the pontoove I think | pected to cross, and interfere with the success of your | they were sent as quickly ag they could have been, and | plan? the supplies and quartermaster’s stores have always | Auswer.—Yes, sir. been in as great abundance as we could have expected; Question,—Since you have assuwed the command of tho | for after the 19th of November the weather and the roads | Army of the Petomac have all its movomonts boen made | Were particularly bad, Horses, mules, &c., wore sent | by you, according to your own judgment, or have somo down to ug, 80 that our cavalry and teams were in very | of them been directed by the General-in-Chief, the Secre, g00d condition. After it was ascertained that there must | tary of War or tho President of tho United States? ‘de a delay, and that the encmy had concentrated in such Answer,—They have all been made in accordance with | force ag to make it very diflicult to cross, except bya | my own judgment, In some cases I have submitted my number of bridges, we commenced bringing up from | views, which have been approved, Aquia creek all the pontoons we could. After enough of | Question —Who did you understand was reaponsible for them had been brought up te build the bridges, I | the forwarding of the pontoons to Falmouth? called several councils of war to decide about crossing tho Answer—I understood that General Halleck was to give Rappahannock. It was first decided to cross down at | the necessary orders, and then the officers who should Skinner’s Neck, about twelve miles below here; but our | receive the orders were the ones responsible for the-pon_ demonstration was simply for the purpose of drawing | toons coming here. I could have carried out that part of down there as large a force of the enomy as possible. I | my plan throngb officers of my own. But having just taken | as alde of tho river openod upon us the moment a portion of thon decided to cross here; because, in the firet place, I felt satisfied that they did not expect us te cross here, Dut down below, Inthe next place 1 felt satisfied that this was the place to fight the most docisive battler Ddecanke, if we could divide their forces by pierving their lines at one or two yoints, separating their Jett from their right, then a vigorous attack with the whole army would succeed in breaking their army in pieces. The eflomy bad cut a road along the rear of the line of heights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two w ings of their army, and avoided a long detour round through a bad country. J obtained from a colored man from the other command of an army with which J was but little’) Acquainted, it was evident that it wasas much as J could | attend to, with the assistance of a!i my officers, to change _ ite pontoons from Warrenton to Prodericksburg; and J | felt, indeed 1 expected, that all thé parts of the plan | which were to be executed in Warrenton would be at" tended to by the officers of that place, under he direction | of the different departmonte to which thoge parte of the | plan appertained, PS Question.—Did yon or not understand that you were to | ‘be responsible for seeing that these orders were carried out? Anawer.—I did not, I never imagined for a mo- { ERALD. my troops appeared om the ridge bank of Fal’ mouth. I immodiately put a battery into position and I think im not to excecd fifteen minutes they drove all the mea on the other side from thier gune, aud they ran off and left four guns in the field. My orders were to advance and hold | Falmouth—not to cross; but the temptation was sostrong to go overknd Make these guns the en: my had Jeft that at onetime Tactually gave the order to cross the fora® ‘at all events, and seize the guna and occupy the city; but on reflection I conc!ided I was rather too old a soldier to disobey a direct order; and there wes another reason, too, I hada little too much experience on the peninsula of tho consequence of getting astraide of a river to wish 18 here. For these reasons I revoked my order that night. ‘The same night I sent a noteto General Barnside, who was some eight or ten miles distant, asking him if I could take Fredericksburg in the morning, should IT be able to find a practicable ford, which, by tho way, I knew when I wrote the note that I could find The Génera) replied through his Uhief of Staff that he did not think it advisable to cecupy Fredericksburg until his communications wore established, and on reflection T myself thought he was right; that it was prudent and proper to have the bridges reedy before we ocenpied Froderickeburg. I thivk I could have taken that city and | heights on the other gide of it at any time within three days after my,arrival here if the pentoons had been heres for I donot think there was much force of the enemy Cnestion.—From the boat I have, what satiate the ores of the a saa nswer.—I thought onr fotces were about equal, Question.—At what do mate killed, wou ded and mleding? a Answer.—-1 think ten thousand wonld cover our whol@ Jons. It hag beet nde | things are alwa: See a ee egoraied. : } pi what do you estimate the loes of the . Anower.—A great deal less than our own, from the fact thas they were covered by their wories. [mene in your judgment as a military man, were Te any faults or mistakes in bringing on or conducting that atiacky Avswer—I think not. The General Commanding cons » If he made a mia; forred a great deal with me about take I made one, too, for | certainly approved the the responsibility ove ny he took. Ag jor order attack, I do not ket Genel Commanding myn" "ocieea Pans Weatat ton. He, however; me that he had received a gram from the President Unat he did not wish Lene 4 sacrificed. I think myself 1 would have made buts atiack. Instead of making two attacks, | would have made bat one, massiig eve upon one point, That Js & point upon which milit men may diilter. ) be Que: tion. by Mr. Gooch} cummanders af tha ar m concur, a them, go tar as 4 in the movement that was made ? on NS WOT.) not know, but I suppose they did. Question by thé ehsirman.—What ie your opinion of os onter condition and effllency of the army wince Answer —I consider that witbin afew days, with suf- ficiont exertion. this army will be im excellent order.again, TESTIMONY OF GENERAL FRANELIN, * Major General Frapkiin sworn and examined: By the Chairman. bore up to that time, With regard to tho delay in making the attack, I qo not think | that the movement could have been mace sooner than it | was made, It will be recollected that no preparatir8 bad been made at Aquia creek. When we camo across | here there were uo means at Aquia creek for landing any | Question.—You have seenghe resolution of ¢he Sena under which this Conmittee are now acting. Will you g° on aud state in yourownh Way what you deem it neces: ~ sary to state, Answor.—T do not recollect tho precise tit just before we move but it was rom Warrenton, General Halleck thing there, All those things had to be prepared after wards, ‘Ihe railroad had to be completed before we side of the town information in regard to this new road | ment that I had to carry out anything that required to be | could got up supplies for this great army. It takes an which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain posses sion of that new road, and that was my reasonfor making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to maké the attuck on the right until tha position had beep taken, which I supposed wonld stagger the enemy, cutting their line in two; and then J proposed to make adirect attack on their front and drive them out of their works, Isuoceoded in building six bridges and taking the whole army across. The two attacks were made and wo were repulsed, still holding a portion of the ground we had fought upon, but not our extreme advance: ‘That night I went all over the eld on our right; in fact, I was with the officers and men until nearly daylight. 1 found tho feeling to be rather against an attack, In fact, it was decidedly against it. I returned to my headquarters, and after conversation with Gen, Sumner told bim that I wanted him to order the Ninth army corps, which was the corps I originally commanded, to form tho next mo-ning a column of attack by regiments: It constated of some eighteen old regiments and some new ones, and desired the column to make a direct attack upon the encmy’s works. J thought that theee regiments, by arriving quickly up after each other would be able to carry the stonowall and the batteries front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and by going in with them they would not be able to fire upon us to any greatextent. Ileft General Sumner with that undor- standing, and directed Lim to give the orders, The order was given, and the order ef attick was formed, ‘The next morning, just before the columa was to have started, Genexal Sumner came ‘0 mo and said:—Genoral, I hope you will desist from this attack, Ido not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove dissstrous to the army.” Advice of that kiud from Gen, Sumner, who has always been in favor of our advance whenever it was possible, cause me to hesitate. I kept the column 0° attack formed, and cent over for the divi- sion and corps comman an! consulted with thom’ ‘They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to eee the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same optnion prevailed among them, 1 then sent for General Franklio, who was thon on | the larger portion of whicm were playing upon the town. I | the enemy. the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. Thi® Caused me to decide that I ought not to make the at- took 1 had contemplated; and besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had tod mo not to be in baste m making this attack» that he would give me all the gupport he could; Dat he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed: I felt that I could not take the responsPbility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the tim? that the works of the enemy could be carried. In tho afternoon of that day Tagain sw the officers, and told them that I had deci¢ed to withdraw to this side of the Tivor all our forces, except cnough to hold the town atl the bridge neads, but should keep the bridges there for future operatioy*, im case we wanted to cross again. {accordingly ordered the withdrawal, leaving Gen. Hooker to conduct the withdrawal of our forces from the town, and Gen. Franklin to conduct it on our leit. During that evcning I received a note from General Booker; and about ten o’clock at night Gea. Butterfield came over with a message from Gen. Hooker stating that he (Gen. Hooker) felt it h's du‘y to represent to me tho ‘cgndition in which I was leaving the town and the troops init, After @ long conversation on the snbject with Gen. Butterfield, I felt that the troops I proposed to leave behind would not be able to hold the town. I thon partially decided to withdraw the toguard the train. On the morning of the 14%h of No- | vember, feeling uncaey with reference to the pontoons, as | Lbad not heard of their stariing, I directed my chief en- gineer to telegraph again with reference to them. | Guestion.—To whom did you telograph? | Answes.—He telegraphed to General Woodbury or to Major Spaulding. It sud-equently appeared that that was ‘the first they ever had heard of my wish te bave the pontoon train started dowafor Fasdericksburg, although the authorities in Washington bad my plan sent to them on the 9th of November, and it had also been discussed by Gen. Halleck and Gen. dieigs at my headquarters on the nights of the 11th and 12th of November; and, after dic- cussing it fully there, they sat down and sent tele grams to Washington, which, as I supposed, fully covered the case, and would secure the starting of the pontoon trains at once. I supposed, of course, that those portions of the which required to be attended to in Washing- ton would be carried out there atouce. I could have sent officers of my own there to attend to those matterg, and porhaps I made a thistake in not doing 90, as General Halleck afterwards (ofl me that [ought 00¢ to baye trust- ed to them in Washingtoa for the details, 1g reply to the telegram 1 had orgergd (p bo sent Goncral Weodbury tele: | graphed back that the pontoons would start on Sunday morning probably, and certainly on Monday moruing, which would have beou on the 16th or 17th of November, , Sad Wald have been in tims, They did not, however, start until the 191, and 03 (rtuiny { COMM ace CQ! | ing, which delayed {hem $0 much, abd +. Toa45 became to bad, that when thoy 36" (> Damtrios,, they floated the pontoons off the W8<%ns, sont to Washington (ora steamer, find carried them down to Aquia creck by water, ‘sending the wagons around by land. The poatoons did cot got here {inl the 22d or 25d of November. Oa the 15th of November Tstarted the column down the road ¢o Fredericksburg, not kuowlag anything about the delay of tho starting of the pontoona, becanse the telegram anaouncing the dolay did not reach Warrenton Junction until 1 had left to come down here with the troops, and that telegram did not voach me til T arrived hero on the morning of the ttn: when it wae handed m9 by an orderly, who had brought it down to Warrenton Junction. Aftor reaching here, w at once that there was no crossing the Rappabannock with the army at that time. °Tt commenced raining, and the river bogan to rise, not to any great extent, bit I did not know bow much it might rise. There were no moang Of crossing, excopt br going up to the fords, and Mt would be impossible to do that, because of Vhe inability to supply the troops after they ahoulé cross. Gonersl Sumnor arrived hero with luis troops in the adeance. Flo sent to me astting wae if he should cross the river. Ho was very mi tempted to talce bis own corps noross to Fre tericksburg by a ford gent | Falmouth, as ukore wae no enomy there, excops a very | ' smatt force. I did uot think tt advisable that be should crosa at that tine. ‘The plaw 1 bad im contemplation was, if the stores and thowe bridges had come hero, as [ had | expected, to throw @enoral Sutinoe’s whole corps acroas | tho Rappahannock, fll the wagons with as many small | up the whole of their army here, which’ I think i now | stores as weconld, and having beof cattle along for moat, then to make @ rapid movement down fa the direstion | of Richmond, ant thus to mect the enemy and fight a battle before Jackson cowld make a joncvion there, Wo | know that Jackson was iv the valloy, ond felt that there | was force enough on the upper Rappabavnock to tale | command. This ordor wes conveyed to me by General | care of him. We felt cettain thet aa soon as the enomy | ‘Bvtklogham, who wag attached to be War Department, knew of ou crorsine down bero the force unger Johnaog | Question—_in your jaqsment could the popjoona have | the 47(p of Noyomber, abattery of artillery on tie oLker whole command, a still more perilous operation done at Washington, General Meigs told me distinctly | several days ago, in Washington, that he never saw my | plan of operations until I showed jt to him on that day, | Question.—Do I understand you tosay in your statemeny, that you expected General Franklin to carry the polutat | the extrome left of the ridge ia the rear of the town, and | thereby enable our troops to storm and.carry their fortid- Apswer.—T did expect him to carry that point, which being done would have placed our forces in the rear of their extreme left, and which I thought at the time | would shake their forces on the ridge to such an oxtent, that the position in front vould easily be etormed and | carried, * Question,—To what do you attribute bis fuilure to ac complish that ? | Anawer.—To the great strength of the position and the accumulation of the enemy's forces there. I expected tho bridges would be built in two or three hours after they | wore unloaded, which was at about daylight. instead of | that those on the right were not buitt until three o’¢lock | in the afternoon, and Thad only the means of getting | across one division over the bridge on the right. Gen. | Franklin’s bridges wore built about noon, and we'e hold | by our troops on the opposite bank. ‘This gave the enemy | time to accumulate their forces, which were stretched along the rivor from Vort Royal up to tho battle lek! b. fore I was able to order the attack, Whilst the men here were unloading the bridges and yu! the water, the enemy's sharpsbooters opened a very | heavy fire from the town, and our batteries opensd on | the town with a view to silencing-thom. Jn this manner the bridges were built about two-thirds of their length, at which time the bridge builders were driven off and had totake shciter wnder the bank. Repeated efforts were made to get these bridge bnilders out to the ends of the @ridges with the necessary materials, but they all | failed. Ht wos then reported to me that jt was impossible | to buil@ the bridges wader that fire, and that the sharp’ | shooters could not be driven out of the town by the artille- | ry. (Welad one hundred and forty-threofguns ip position’ | said tothe officers who had reported to me that it was im- | possitie'to build the bridges that they must be built, ana \ sume plan mast be devised for getting these abarpshooters i ‘out of the way, so that onr men could get'to work, Upon consulting with Goneral Hunt, Chief of Artillery, and | General Woodbury, of the Engineers, it was agreed to fii! | the boats with oar own men, run them quickly across | under fire, throw them on the bank and {ct them go up | into the streets and houses and drive the sharpshooters | away. This plan was successfully carried out, and in | fiftcen minutes after the first detachment of troops bad | roaclied the oppostie bank our men began building ths LU bridges, and in half an hour more they were aah leted, | Qu —What was the conduct of the officers and mon during the atta! Answer.—With the exception of a single regiment it was excellent. Question.—Wiil you state as nearly as possible the whole number of our troops that were engaged? Answer.—We had about —— meu on the other side of the river. , Question.—What part of that number were actually ‘engaged in the battle? Answer.—Every single man of them was under artil- Jory fire, and about half of them were at diferent times formed in columns of attack, Every man was put in column of attatk that could be got in. Question.—Have you any knowledge as to the force of It commenced raining, which, t) some extent, was an assistance to vs; but was a very bad thing in the inoving for the troops. I thought over the matter for about two hours, and about one o'clock I sent over an order to withdrew the whole foroe, which was successfully ac- complished. There.had been a great deal of division of opinion among the corps commanders as to the place of crossing; but afterall the discussion npon the subject the decision to cross over bere was well f0- ceived, I understooa, by ail of them, While, on his way here General Hooker, on the morning of the 20th of November wrote mea note, which I received on the 2ist, in which he saggesto1 that he should crosa his force over the Rappahannock at the ford nearest the town, Richard’s ford, and move rapidly down to Saxton’s Sta” tion, and take position thoro, Ho stated that he hed threo dasa’ provisiona, and thought he could meet any force of the enemy infront of bim. 1 replied fo him that was alws very glad to take the advice of my general of. cers,and should always be loth to make a move without consulting them; but I could not approve ef the more bo had suggested. Because, in the frat place, he weuld have march some thirty-six miles to get to Saxton's Station. {¢ Ygerginjng and be would have to ford two rivers, which abd gut bigot from the ma body oF cae Cth and as bad no means of crossing at foderickedurg 1 would be prevented from sending him supplies and asetstance; and although he might reach Saxton’s Station and not meet aay force of the ene, my at that time, yet it woull bea vory hagardous movo- ment to throw 9 column like that beyond theTéach of its proper support. This roply I semt to Gen, Mooker by au aids de-camp. He thauke 1 me. and said be had only made it as a saggestitin, aud the weather, as it was then reinings of course rendered it impossible to make the movement ho had suggested. the enomy here? Answer.—it is estimated at all the way from 100,000 to 260,000, I think myself it was less than 100,000, Question.—What was the extent of the casualties on ou, | side resulting from all the Oghting? Answer.—It will pot be farfrom ten thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. Question.—What is the present condition of our troops here? | town, as we did carry it by surpris | was necessary, ther. for i tion | between the tivo crests: and Raving got on the top of one | erest we would have been compelled to contend with | ma. aes of freshe troop | division in readiness to enpport those euormous amount of transportation to supply an army of one bundred thongand men, and I do not think, if the General could have made his preparations, he could have | done all that was necessary to do sooner than he did after the arrival here of the pontoons. The first propo” sition to cross the river was to cross at Snicker’s Neck, It seemed to me that you could rearecly cross a oations? | fiver in the face of an enemy of equa! or superior force, ‘except by surprise, Therofure, after the preparations were made to cross at Snicker’s after a large num* ber of wagons Lad bean sent by the General down there’ in order to deceive the enemy, 1 was decidedly in favor of throwing the bridges over here and carrying the as the enemy wero massing their troops down below, expecting we were yoing to cross below there. 1 was iw favor of crossing the Rappabanock, becanse neither our government nor onr pedple id be sutisfled to» haye our army retire from this position or go into wivter quarters we knew the force that was on the other site of the ri and the only way we could hay ue Bo Was by going ov there and feoling of them. I think it was necessary to have made the atts: was what frequently happens in cam: | paigns. The works were strongor than wo believed them | tobe. Ikne was a hazardous movement, but I did | believe we could carry the cuemy’s works. ‘Ihe attack failed owing to tbe enemy's fortifications being much | more formidable than we supposed them to be. } you describe those fortifications? pnot describe them avy farther than tier upon tier for two or three tiers, rot tier we could not have held {t, | more formidable row of | yund on a higher posi- still; and no doubt hu mi 8 of infantry were and the repul If we had cart their next tier ver whom their own butteria by the General commanding to ke the attack. [selected the corps T was or » 70 e and General Haucock, two 0; the most ga'lant offfcers in our army, and two corps that bad heither of thom ever turned their backs to ,the eno- ’. They mado repeated assaults, but were driven the ellorts that could be | mare by there officers. pal obstacle that they | found waa a jong stone wall, which was tho vutwork of Znat wal. Gas sous See eee undrea | ‘ards in lem, represented tome, beon raised H alr ay ‘The enemy had artiilery that enfila- | fire. my bick in spite of all | I think the avrapgements for the cross! and Genoral Meigs came down there and had a conference with Goueral Burnside, The reault of that confe- | rence, as I ‘stand it, wad that General Burn- io was e this amy from and that to Fredericksburg, and not oos the river here as an important part of @at move- nent. 1 understand trom General Burnside that wh the adyaneo of his army arrived in fiont of Frederie! | burg ® pontoon troin, enough to build two bridges, was to meot him tere. 1 know the advance of the army did arrive at Fredericksburg at the pro,er time, but there oon” train to meet it there, and in conse. that the courd pot coms at the We expected to c We were, thero ore, delayed Warrenton ‘ ral days in He 0 of the de.uy in tne arrival of | the pentoun arriving here we accumulated provisions ¢ ys. Then General Burns called a conneil, in which it was the unanimous opin I think, of ali the generals present thet if this rh iid he crossed it ought to be cros-ed, nd atter what might happen atorwards. The polvs not then defiuitely determined upon, bat @ time wo were to cross several miles’ fur. Afterwards eal Purnside called as toy | Recher again, and informed us that he had de:ormined t cross ut the two points at which we finally di I had no objection to that, but toot they good as the point farther down. I knew nothin in fact, abont the defences on the ether eide. 1 ot my business to know anything about thom. ail well mae; at tho samo tine I doubted our power to croas, an do not believe we could have crossed had the ehemy chosen to vent it. And I know from what I have wince nd what be.ore suepecied, that they cold bave ted our crossing at those two pints if they had chozen. Howover, as the committee know that the ¢ross- Ing was successful'y made under cover of a fog.and-as far aa my wing was concerned, we got into position safely with the loss of a very few n Still we were in euch ® pos tionfthat if the enomy any moment opened upon ag with the guns they had bearing“upen us, I think that in the course of an hour our meu would have been #9 1oith rod that 1t would bave been impossible to rally them., For geome unaccountable reason they did not open their bat- teries. On the morning of the 12th instant | made ap attack accoriing to te order of General Burn-ie. Our Falmouth Correspondence. . Farovm, Va., Dec. 20, 1862. Quiet Again~ Our Losse:—the Loss tn the Second Army Corpr—The Tuas in Hancock's Division by Brigadeom Removal of the Woundet—Cavalry Movements, ée. ‘The army has again settled down to ite old quiet along the banks of the Rappahanock, and one who had visited itten days ago would, on revisiting it now, hardly b fware that the river had been crossed, terrific battle fonght end the army bronght buck Ww ite old positions ogain, ‘ ‘The leeses on our eide ore, 1 am bappy to state. ~ ed that wali on both sides. ‘They helt their fire until our troops arrived at a certain point, when they rose and are t volley ovor this wall, then artillery en. | Fiadingor column at the saine time. No troops could ptand such a firo as that. [do not think it @ reproach to those two divisions that they dld not carry that ition. ‘Whey did all that men could do, Ibad General Howard's | wo, and oue strong | division of General the Ninth | oor General Barnsides old corps, detached to | keep open communication with General Franklin’s rigbt. H ‘Phat division was not undgy fire during the day. Some of | the ether ivicsum of the Ninth corps were more or lesa | ongted. General Hooker had a partof the grand division in the town, and one o ph was engaged. They made a gallant attack, but Were driven back. The fight was continued on the leit, Dut | was so° remote from that that I caniot give any do- gcription of jtat all, Th General Commanding diront me (oestablish my headquarters a way Wott ; tat] could superintend the operat! “of Doth my I was there while the Genera), Commanding was at the }billips House during the ac’ During ileox'a Oorps, thore is a constant running for ” ere for reinforcements, artillery, troops at different | pees ammanition. ‘ko. crossi of” the riverp under the cit+ consider the 1 also cometances, re * creditable enaider t Te'reat, under the @rcumstances, hed very creditable, “There was not [ow Mw Og thiag élse ‘ost. The entire army retur.” accifent, 1 should like to add here, because . a Kea t ying the Geveral Commana: and myself bave in rd to any point, that | did not wish to relinquish Fredoricksburg. 7 Mhoughe we could have held it with a le division by posting our ba‘teries right. It would not have becu giving up an ex- pedition, but simply a cbauge of taction, That inthe way in which I viewed it; that we would just be drawing back a little in order to try it again. I was therefore strongly in favor of holding Fredericksburg. 01 were not. ; Perhaps I was the general oficer of ik who was of that opinion. I thought it would present a better aud a diferent appearance if we continued to hold the town. We could have command@ it any time with our artillery, and we can do so now. I do not thiok there was any danger or difficulty in hoiding it, “ Answor.—As far ag my knowledge and information goes: It is good. Questicp.—Do you, or Ao you not consider your troops demoralized, pr the efficiency of your army impaired, ex- cept so far os iPncs been from the loss of 6o many men? Answer—t1do not, I would add here that, althongh at the time I ordered the ¢s4mym of attack to be formed on the morning after the battle, { ‘hought the enemy's works could be carried, and adhered {@ that opinion during that day. I afterwards became conyi77ed that that could not bo done, owing to tbe great strength of *ae enemy, the time given them for reinforcing, and the be- Kiof also of our officers that it conld not be done, Lace | cordingly telographed to the Presideyy of the United | States that I withdrew our army because I felt that the enemy's position gus uot he carried, ae Gat - TESTIMONY OF GENBRAL SUMNER. Major General E. V. Sumner sworn and examined by the Chairman :— Question.—What is your position im the Army of the Potomac? Answor.—I command the right grand division of that | army, consisting of the Second and Niuth corps d'armee, | Question.—Of how many meu docs your grand division eonsist? Answer.—Before tho late action it consisted of about Question.—What reasons @. you assign for the failure of your attack here? Answer.—It was found te be impossible to got the men up to the works. The cnemy’s fire was too hot for them. ‘The who‘c command fought most gallantly. The evemy themecivos say they sever saw Oar men fight as bard as om that day. Question.—Were the enomy’s works vory strong? Anawet.—Their works are sot strong works, but they occupy strong positions. {tts possible that the pointe of attack were wrongly ordered. [f sach is the case, I can only say, I did to the best of my ability. It ts also pes- idle that-qe would have dove better to have crossed at Skinner's Neck; but (or what b to be good reasons, Ffelt we had better cross at we would have a moto decisive engagements hore, and that if we succeeded ta defeating ‘the enemy Morp, we woulf break the most desirable thing, uct even seoond to the taking of R.chmond; for if this army wes broken up, though ‘hoy might defend Richmond for awhile, they could ut make any protracted defence here, Question by Mr. Gooch.—Do I understand you to say that it wae your understanding that General Haliock and | General Meige, while at your headquarters in Warroaton, | and before you commenced the movement of your army, | sont orders to Washington for the poutoots tobe immo. | diately forwarded to Falmouth? _ Answor. —That was my vaderstanding, ¢ertawly. H eae by new troops as they come up.” It was origillally intended to be somethiog over —— men. Question.—Would it have beon better in your judg ment to have crossed the river and engaged the enemy earlier thea you did, and if 30, why was it not dono? Answer,—When General Burnside was ordered to taxe command of thisarmy he told mo what he proposed to do—that is, {0 march on Fredericksburg, instead of Cul. | pepper. Ithought that the wisost plan, for these rea. | eons:—If wo had marched on Culpepper, according to the | former plan, overt if we had been successful, €* would | have bad to fal! back for supplies; whereas, by coming on | Tine, on reech'cg Fredericksburg 1 confidently ox. | pected to take tho heights in the rear of it before the | army of the enemy could come from Culpepper; and { | thought that the chauce of making Richmend was much | bettor than by going the other way, because, tine pontoons had been here on my arrival, and in time for | me to have crossed and occupied the Boights in tho rear | of Fredorick#burg before the enemy could mask thom, | we should bave kept parsning the enemy off from the line | of railroad, keoping it In our own possession; aud if wo | could net lave preceded them to Richmond we could than by eaying there is {Tuere i not autefont bnt I may have been mistaken. —-Do you know any reason why the pontoon Question.. bridges did yo4 arrive earlier? hoster —f do bot. Question.—You know nothing on that subject ? expected ‘ hp oa do not. ry soon afterward. ‘Questicn,—It you had found them here as yon expected, what would, in your opinion, bave been the result. Answer.—I should have taken the crest iu the rear of tho town on that night oron the fvilowing day. Not con. sider Frodericksburg as being of any consquence, ex- copt ing on the road to ‘pmond, I should have passed through the town aud taken possession of the | crest. Question.—Are there any fords her: My any fords here which might have | Ansvver.—There are several fords on the river, and in | tho Zummer time two or three of them would be prac ticabte, 2 tion, —I mo2®s Were there any practicable fords at | tune rea aaersie, ai 80, where wero they? Answer.—There is a sayalry ford down by the men sometimes 8 the tide, which Tikes above the town. The tide was io when I arrived | here, which was in the afternoon tide was then recoding, and a citizen told me that it Would Yot, be per. gible to get anything over the ford until after dark. That | ford ie represented to me as being a deep holes in it; men ean skep fi to rock a fow mon | at a time, but there are cccasionnsily deop holes (rom +ix to eight feet deop, Sch aford would never be consi- dered practicable for marching troops o | Question.—What reaeons do you arsign for not cross. | ing cither above or below Whare the ony Laye.fortl- | fled! ‘Answer.—The reacon was this:—We did not attompt to tarn their left fauk, because there is then a slack water navigation taken out of the river some two miles ° here, aud brought with the basia at the eod of the town, that runs along at a considerable distance from the Pappahannock. Im making the movement toturntheouc | Jeft dank if a force had been sent up between tho — r and canal, the canal weuld have to be crossed, and to do so it would be necessary to br! it. The oniy | way to bave made that my weg havo | have gono entirely on the left of that canal, and that would bave the ti ithe way up to @ firo | upon the flank had been erected | allal ip thore, without our being able to return their fire at all. Qestion.—In regard to the condition of tho rent site | the battl it demoralized any more than by the of that number of men? Answer.—I think it is, Question.—To what extent and in what way? Answer.—It ts diicult to deseribe it in any other way” deal too much creaking. ‘ueation.—What pambor of mon, or about what num. | ber, do you » Were @ngaged on our side during | the duy of the battle? ‘Anewer.—Under fire, do you moan? Queation.— Yes, sit. Apster.—Do you mean to inclade the reserves? Q cmon, —I mean to inclade all under firs. a al think there was hardly ——— mea Avswor.—T should ne have kopt 59 close to them that they would havo had no under 4 mare sa = Baar ee cata 4 tine to build fortifications, These were the reasons why Were wo ire, I woul v ; jo wi oe Tthonght that it wasa very judicious imensure on tho _fetres hereed untetry Se vee osacly vps a part of General Barnside to chango bis base’ot operations | instead ofadyancing on Calpepper, which I beliove Gen: MoCiellan intended te Seve done. On my arrival hereon Question. — What was the whole number of owr forces over tho river? t ‘Answor.—t1 should suerose there must have beeu ——, | and the difference betwoon that number aud the aun ber « fogunlly undgr Kee was Deld as a reeorve, | his corps, under General H..m- | an action | | beginning to make their brought down by the official returne. When 9° « footed up the number will be considerably le thous:nd, and this 6 fil include many who v of bruised, not sufficiently to require the —@te Boratched from duty over twenty-four hours, ifr 4 to bo absent ‘ng of this, T must mention thatt? <6 all. While 8} prnotice often resorted to on the Are if a reprehensible ting down the slightest injury + part of officers of pute ing the list of casualties, «8 a-wound, thereby gygik plication the valor of in order to show by ims ‘The appearance cf th + their particular commands. appearing in te rojy _¢ Mates of the men thas wounded | tho friends ans arto.ten causes much uneasiness to | Th loss in the s0yunes to the reported wounded man, \pally eng Second ¢rmy corps, which was the one Prclpally &OF god, foots up, by oficial roports, as. 40k | a Killed. Mining, | rm ion, Hancock's. "ioe" secon aftivision, Howard’ a3 90 | Thit’ | Givision, Trench’ 912 an Total... 0.0. ..37 3,063 | Making a total of 3,951 in the corps. 7 = Hancock's division, it will be seen, wag the greatest. } ferors, and ef that division Caldweill’s brigade lost most.’ The loss being:~- Kil meded. Missing. ‘ Caldweil’s brigade ee ee no “Sy | ycoseher’s (rish).s 42° aia 80 a ee to etiee ao OH 08 Batteries... podetg = & Total...+.+. ee | A flug of trace Went to ine GMMEF Bide of the i afternoon, under/charge of iv. Maen’ Charles H. aid-de-camp to Colonel Zook, comu. to ; Hancock's division. The object was u. the safe conduct through the rebel lines 0. °~ @ seeesston young Indy of attractive appearan. é i | Suiliciently captivated General Sumner to procure * tage turongh our Noes. < re remaising now in the Second but one hundred and forty-Give mea, all Ry boon sent to Northern hospitals, Those remening ad nvatiy cages too severe to be removed at present. There in otis tasartion to Coe. general quiet of the eriny exhibited by the cavalry, who are constantly seam moving ta various directions. This movement fs probably only a thorough system of scouting the sae. rounding pf “ie for the past forty-eight hours the weather been intensely cold, too eontios in the tanning streame.. ‘The camps have been made quite by log. glug and imp:ompta furnaces, and, with a little attention on the part of the commisearies, the of the men wouid be qifite comfortabie, Paymasters: uch to the catéon of the soldiers, a! many ments who hye not'been paid for neglect on the part of the government causes much com- p'sint in the army and much guffering in the families of the soldiers. Strenuous exertions should be made to fuifit the obligations on the pars of the government, ter eMicioney would undoubtedly result from 2088. Our Dead from Fredcricksbarg. Tio remains of several officers belonging to New York regiments, kiilod at the recent engagement about Fred. cricksbarg, are expected to arrive here ina few days, 8 © | apd the Common Council Committe on National Affairs have made arrangements to give them a grand funeral, Friday, the 26th inst., has been iixed for the obsequies, Among these deceased officers are:— s Colonel James Hy Bull, of the Qixty-sixth ali | Vauntenrt ; Capt. John P. Dodge, of the same regiment, ‘The bodies will Ife Io state in (he Governor's room when they arcivo until the funcral takes place, The Seventy. first rogiment, N. ¥.8..N. G., will act as a guard of honor. Capt. Dolge was assistant surgeon of the Seventy first regiment during their first campaign iu Virgiaie, Haurax, N. 8., Doc. 22, 2968. ; ‘The crew of the British iron slip Queen of the for Portland, has arrived at Weymouth, N. 8. The fn the mea:itime was found abandoned six miles of | Sable, her after apartmonte full Of water. Oz two schooners were put oa besrd an@ navigated her Halifax. A steam tug {e going to hor sssintanee, vargo is valuable. ; The New City Hall a€ Bostum. ‘ Boaren, Deo, 29, 1902. ‘The corner stone of the new City Hall was lakt today, | seayor Wrightman delivered om address, after whicB the Grand Lodge of Masenchusetis copdncied the cere monies tn conformity with ancient Mas wic wange. ERA AO Coast at CRLERRATION OF tHe Gremas Soctal AND qarat Scu0ot vou Gns—There was ® Christmas Dration at this school, loorted st 281 Grand strest, Tuowday evening. The exercises will consist of apecches and (he digtribution of preseuts to the ol school is ander the direotion of the Chixdren’s 2b The Society ~