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‘upon us the necessity of a fall and elaborate review of the whole case. Both reports will be be- fore the country, and we are prepared to stand upon the fairness of Our statement of facts, and the sound- ness of our conclusions, as drawn from these facts. If no other benefit shall be derived from the large expenditure of public money caused by this investi- tion, it may at leas present a salutary admoni- Gawce American® people to guard their minds against that spirit of calumny and detraction which is ever ready to ascribe the worst motive and the worst condtict to a political oppo nent, and to pause before they permit their impressions of a public functionary to be controlled by the ehrieks of disa ted speculators, when the very offence so loudly obi may have been a firm, faithful and success- ful effort to defeat illegal combinations, and to pro- tect the public interests from sacrifice. Before boars Sg present an analysis of the evidence embodied in this report, some preliminary observations are essential to a just comprehension of the subject embraced in this inquiry. MILITARY RESERVATIONS, Reeervations are portions of land severed from the mass of the public domain and appropriated by law to some specific public use. T! public uses are various. Those designed aa sites for the pri cata of forts, arsenals ay armories, Asbo’ grounds appurtenant thereto for the supply Pine fuel, forage, &c., are termed military reserva- ions. In general the decision as to the quantity of land to be reserved for such public use, and the places bss hed be yore, Peseta the sident, subject to suc! reqy jons a8 Congress may, from time to time, prescribe. hen land is thus appropriated it is withdrawn from the control and supervision of the General Land Office. No power exists in that department to make sale of it. No right exists in a State even, in whose jurisdiction it lies, to condemn it for public Fp ore making just compensation for the same. it is not subject to entry, nor to the right of pre- emption. No title, in oj ition to the government, can be acquired in it, and every person, whether a citizen or a stranger, who without permission enters upon it for the pu: of settlement or occupation, is a trespasser, and may be removed by the judicial, fee need be, by the military force of the govern- ment. The United States has ita military sites in ever section of the confederacy, in the old States as wel as in the new. But those large military reserva- tions which occasionally appear so conspicuously in our Iegislative history have usually been parcelled out from the public domain at some point beyond or upon the verge of our frontier settlements, where oats areerected and troops stationed for the pro- ‘ction of the early settlers against the aggressions of their savage neighbors. populstion, “which, like the Pontic sea, knows no ebb;” the extinction of the Indian title, the retreat of the native tribes still further into the great cen- tral wilderness, soon changes the character of these sites from frontier to interior posts, surrounded by a thrifty and numerous agricultural people, and useless for all the pur, for which they were originally established. ey are consequently abandoned, and new posts planted on the ever changing boundarics of western civilization. A sketch of the establish- ment and removal of our military posts would pre- sent an accurate history of the progress of popula- tion and settlement from the Alleghany to the Rocky Mountains. Notwithstanding the cessation of the purposes for which these trgcts of land were set apart, and even their abandonment for all military purposes by the government, yet, having been appropriated Yor a specific object by law, no authority short of Congress could restore them toa condition to pass into the maas of the private property of the country. To pro- vide a remedy for this inconvenience a law was passed by Congress on the 3d day of March, 1819, and which may be seen by reference to third volame Statutes at Large, page 520. It provides —that the Secretary of War be and he is hereby authorized, under the direction of th resident of the United States, to cause to be sold such sites be- longing to the United States as may have been found to become useless for military purposes. The authority to sell, under the lan, of this act, was construed by the President, with the advice of the Attorney General, to extend only to such military sites as belonged to the United States at ‘the date of the law, and as conferring no authority to sell such as were appropriated and reserved since its date. In consequence of this want of authority many sites that might, with great advantage to the country, have been sold and opened to cul- tivation and improvement, were continued to be held by the government, subjecting Congress to im- portunate applications for the passage of cial acts for the sale of some particular reservation sought to be brought into market. In all these ef- forts at special legislation a struggle naturally en- sued between those who represented the local inte- rests of the Territory and those who re} nted the intereste of the treasury—the object of the first being to bring the reserves under the operation of the general land system, which would subject them to pre-emption and public sale, and secure its disposal at the minimum price of one dollar and a quarter acre; whilst the more special friends of the pub- ic treasury, denying the just application of the pre- emptive principle to such locations, contending that their value far exceeded the wild and frontier lands, and that this special value has been imparted to them by the expenditures of the government and the rotection given to the settlers around them, main- ined that they should be sold in such manner, at public or private sale, as would best secure a fair rice for them and best indemnify the government for the money expended upon them. It is needless to say that in all these acts of special legislation the interests of the treasury were made to yield to the a of the local application. November, 1854, General Jesup, Qaartermaster- General, thus calls the attention of the Secretary of War to this subject;— In connection with this subject it may be proper to re- mark that there are mavy sites po longer necessary for military purposes, which have become very valuabie io consequence of the expenditures of the government and the protection given to settlers in their neighborhood, which, if sold for their full value, would supply a fuad suificient, or pearly so. for all new frontier improvements. Toe Secretary of War bas probably now suthority to sell these sites, but whether so or pot, a modification of the law for their sale, 80 as to authorize the fixing of « mini- mum something like their intrinsic value, below which no sale shall take effect or be considered legal, is required for the protection of the public interesta. The reserves at Fort Howard, Fort Snelling, Fort Crawford, and Rock Island, should tt not be made a military depot, if sold for anything like their value, would bring into the treasury more than a millicn of doilars. Without s:ch « modidca. tion of the law there is great , shoukl these valua bie lands be offered for sale, that unprincipled and lawless speculators will combine, and, by threats of violence, in timidate honest and peaceable citizens from bidding for (bem, snc thus secure for themselves and their coafede- Tates the whole of them at the minimum price of the go- ‘vernment for is wild lands. These suggestions of General Jesup were made more than two years after the passage of the law reducing the Fort Snelling reserve to its present limits, and it shows that as early as 1854 he con- templated the sale of that tract, together with the other military reservations named; al! of which, it is believed, have since been either actually sold, or re- main in jon of the government after unsuc cessful efforts to effect their sale. Hon. Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, in his annual report of December 14, 1854, endorses the suggestions of General Jesup, and thus recommends the subject to the favorable consideration of Con gress: — I have to ask attention to the neceamty for farther legis- Astion for the sale of useless military sites According to the construction which has been given to the acts upon this subject. and which though |'* correctness haa been doubted, must be regarded as settied by the practice of the department, the act of March 3, 1819, appiies only to ater ne then belt; and that of April 28, 1824, only rn “conveyed 0" the United States for forts, &0. According to those views there is no provision for the sale of tends a yan hen Ld _o 1819, have been re- served from the public in for military purposes, and "therefore recommend thst the provisoue o thd acta giving authority to sell nseless military sites be extended embrace these rever vations. Many reservatioes around military posts originally e*tabiished on the frontier, aad pow rendered useless by the advance of population, have acquired great value, not only froth the rise in the price of lands in euch localities, Dut from the improvements put upon them by the iabor of the troope or at the public expense. In disposing at poblic sale of some of these, which came within the act Of 1810, (L wae found that the bids were far below the fair market value of the iand, a result which has been attri- buted, no doubt correctly, to combinations among the bidders. | concur with the Quartermaster General in the opinion that similar resulte can be prevented in future only p Rpm & minimam price, below which the tena all ast be sold. and | recommend that provision be Purpose in any act that pageet on the subject. . pail Similar recommendations were repeated by the Secretary of War in each of his suceseding asnual reports up to the close of his administration, which were finally acted upon by the passage, on the $4 of March, 1867, of the following supplementary law:— Be it further enacted, That the provisions of the act approved March 3, 1819, entitled “ Au act authorizing the sale of certain military sites” be, and they are hereby extended to all military sites, or to such parte there: which are or may become useless for military purposes The President of the United States, as comman. der-in-chief of the ow Dogs the unquestioned right igpendent of legislation, to occupy or abandon any post according to his judgment of the military ne saities of the country. ‘he legislation of Congress was, however, essential to confer authority to make f asite which, in the exercise of his constita ns. the President should deem no longer bevonsary fv) the publig defence, That authority 4 ‘he rapid flow of oar | SEW YORK HERALD, TUESDAY, MAY U1, 1868—TRIPLE SHURT. the country in annulling the sale; but it is difficult to immagine a possible contingency in which the legis- lative department of the government can with any constitutional propriety interfere with rights derived under such a contract. FORT SNELLING, Shortly after the acquisition of Louisiana, and during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, the at- tention of the War Department was directed to the establishment of several milltary sites on the Missis- sippi river. In pursuance of this object, Lieutenant ( ards General) Pike was detailed by General Wilkinson to make the necessary exjMorations and purchases from the Indians then occupying that country. On the 23d of September, 1805, he et- fected a treaty with the Sioux, by which they relin- uished to the United States, for military purposes, the land at the confluence of the Mississippi and the St. Peter's, since called the Minnesota river, com- mencing below the junction of those rivers, and ex- tending nine miles ‘on each side of the Minieotl, tohume of exes ural tit Seats, pos. volume jutive ol nate, . 77 and 80.) withstanding this early indication f the , government, no movement was a Pras t until ot Se pan ae ey as a mili a much later patel. te the fall of 818 Mr. Calhoun, then Secretary of War, decided to take the necessary steps to secure to our be iga the erage of the Indian trade, and keep in eck the numerous and [yen tribes of Sioux and Chippewas which in- ited that section of our country, and who were already be; to give indications of hostile feel- ing to the advancing white settlements. Accord- ingly, in the of 1819, Colonel, afterwards General Leavenworth, was sent with the Fifth regi- ment of infantry to ooeuey the site at the confluence of the Mississippi and St. Peter's rivers, where he placed his command in huts and constructed stock- ade defences. Col. Snelling, having succeeded him in command, erected works of a more permanent character, which, when completed, were then and have since been called by his name. A From that period Fort Snelling continued a mili- tary post of some importance until 1851, when, by the well known treaties of Traverse des Sioux and Mendota, the Indian title was extinguished to that immense body of land west of the Mississippi river, extending over four degrees of latitude and five of longitude, and covering a superficial area of forty- five thousand square miles. As a consequence of this purchase the Indians removed to smaller reservations in the northern and western portions of that Territory. Prior to the ratification of those treaties there were but five organized counties in Minnesota; now there are upwards of forty counties, and this growing republic is now asking admission as one of the States of this confederacy, claiming to have a population of near 300.000, and claiming to be entitled to three members of the House ot Repre- sentatives. Almost the whole of this hardy and en- terprising population is north and west of Fort Snel- ling, between that and the Indian population. Since | the treaty of 1851 Fort Snelling has become utterly useless as a post of defence, whilst, as a substitute to accomplish the purposes for which it had been so many years used, Fort Ripley was established, about 120 ‘miles north of it, on the Mississippi, and Fort Ridgely, 130 miles west of it, on the Minnesota. cap non did the torrent of emigration begin to flow into Minnesota, invited by the extinction of the Indian title, and stimulated by the liberal policy of the Ele rage authorizing settlements and pre- emption rights, even in advance of any survey made by government, when the public mind, impressed with the further inutility of Fort Snelling as a mili- , invoked the legislation of Congress to re- | pad ihe bounds to bring the hoy portion of it into market, The Fort Snelling reservation, as held by the gov- ernment until a very recent period, embraced be- tween thirty-three and thirty four thousand acres of land. of that reservation, and By an act of Congress passed on the 26th of Au- gust, 1852, the reserve was reduced in quantity, and — its new boundaries defined. Twenty-six thousand and baat ee acres were severed it, which the Commissioner of the General Land Office was required to have surveyed and sold at public auc- tion, under the direction of the President of the United States. The jon thus cut off embraced some government buildings, worth $5, nificent water power of St. Anthony’s Fglla; the sites of the cities of Mendota and Mineapolis, and a soil for Me oe beauty and productiveness not surpassed by any in the Northwest. A sale of a portion of the land thas separated from that reerve, to wit: five thousand three bun dred and sixty-two acres, lying in what is called the Still- water district, was made on the llth day of Sep- tember, 1854, at public auction, after having been advertised for six months in all the leading papers of the Northwest, and brou; a single acre having been so the minimum price of dix, pages 35, 36 and 3 The residue of it, twenty thousand six hundred and sixty-one acres, was sold in 1855; not one acre having been disposed of at a higher price than $1 25 per acre. (See Appendix, 28 to 34.) Some of this land has since sold for six and even ten thou- sand dollars an acre, and yet we have beard no com- id for one cent more than | plaint of the inadequacy of the price received by the government, although it was but for $1 25 an acre, and although some of those who have been most active in stirring up discontent at the Fort Snelling sale were among the largest beneficiaries of this liberal policy of the government. There then remained of the original reservation about seven thomsand five hundred acres, situated at the confluence of the Mississippi and Minnesota ri- vers, upon which stood the barracks, yey offi. cers’ quarters and other buildings erected Ary go- vernment. These buildings had been erected some thirty years before, were put up in a rude and imper- fect manner, some of them were in a state of dilapi- dation and decay, and if held by the government | would have continued an annual burden upon the treasury for repairs. THE SALB. The majority of the committee in their rt pre- sent with great prominence the fact that in April, 1866, a an application being made to Secretary Davis for the purchase of the Fort Snelling re- serve, he declined to entertain proposi- tion, upon the ground that it was “still needed for mii eo wrong and they contrast the opinion an See m of that eminent states- man with the course pursued by the present Secretary of War in the disposal of the same Pro perty in less than eighteen months t! . For the Opinion of General Davis upon all civil as well as military questions we entertain the. highest re: it and deference; but he has not fnrnished us with the grounds upon which he based his militar; judgment in the particular case alluded to. It is more than probable that he was influenced in that decision by the views which he so ably presented in his annual report of the same year, in which he sought to impress upon Congress the necessity of a radical change in our present poli © of locating posta in advance of set- tiements, and of distributing our troops in small de- tachments at numerous posts, and the expediency of concentrating them in large numbers at a few points, from whence detachments at a favorable season of the year might be sent out into the Indian country. Had Congress adopted his suggestions, there would have been so clear and obvious a fa oe | in his conclusions as to the retention of Fort Snelling that no one succeeding to the administration of that de. partment would have been likely to have d rom it. But Congress decli then, and de- clined since, to change the present policy, which has become sanctioned by various acts of legislation, and by the concurrent views of several preceding admin istrations. The present Secretary acted, as will here- after be more fully shown, upon a military policy such as he found established when he succeeded to the War Depa: approval of Congress and of the country for the pre- ceding twenty years. On the 7t Rice, at that time delegate, and now a Senator elect from Minnesota, addressed a communication to the Secretary of War, urging upon his attention the ex- pediency of a speedy sale of the Fort Snellin servation. It does not appear that Mr. Rice had any interest in this suggestion, except such as might properly influence him as the representative of that erritory. “Large reservations (he states) were in- jurious to the interests of the citizens, often pre- venting improvements by the State, counties and towns.” This communication, in accordance with the usage of the department, was referred to the artermaster-General for his opinion. General Jesup replied, that the propriety of a sale of that | reserve would depend upon the military policy to be hereafter adopted. If the policy then existing was to be changed, and the troops hereafter | concentrated at central points, where the: can be cheaply supplied when not in the field, there was no place near the northern frontier so suitable as Fort Snelling, and no portion of the reservation should be sold. But if the present policy of posting the troops in small garrisons was to continue, then a quarter section of land, with the buildings, and a control of the ferries, would be suffi cient for a mere depot of supplies. Upon a full con sideration of the point, the Secretary of War decided, in view of the then existing and long established po- licy of the government, that a sale of the reserve, or certainly a large ‘ion of it, should be made. He accordingly, in the same month, despatched Major Seth Eastman, an active and intelligent officer of the army, who had resided nine years at that post, with instructions to survey the land in forty acre lots, stating that he wished it so surveyed that persons of smal] means might have an — of per shas- ing. (See answer to question No. 1.) Whep suilicieyt Sime hag glapsed fey tag com 000; the mag- | it $1 25 per acre; not | ie lands. (See Appen- | tment, and which had recsived the | of April, 1857, the Hon. Henry M. | pletion of thia survey, the Secretary of War appoint: vein ia a ad Wille omen : —%.., % 5 on Oats ct en taped of eald roserve ae could be dis- posed of with a due regard to the public interest, accompanied by the following letter of instructions: Wan Derarruent, Wasmsaton, May 25, 1857. Geotummen--You are hereby requested aad iastructed to viait, in person, the military reservation made by the the Executive at Fort Swelling, m the of Minne- tote, end examine aad ascertain how far it bas been mate valuabie by government improvements. Also, whether there are any actual bona fide settlers upea the reserve who have made valuabie improvemenis thi yaad who settled there wita the expectation, suporfizuced by tno action of the government agenia, of having pre emption rights extended to them; ana iT, uncer the cirsum- etances, they saould be allowed to purchase not exceedicg one hundred aud sixty acres oach, covering their improve ments, at the goverumeat price of one dollar aad twenty- five centa per acre. Upon thoabove points you will report to this depart- after you have obtained the eale, in tracts or lots of forty acres each, 8) as to onadie Persons of emeli means to purchase, or in whole, which- ever, in your judgment, may be doomed best, but in neither case at lesa than $7 60 per acre. You swillexamine Fort Saciling with rsference to its ‘being retained asa military depot for the use of the go- verpment. If you should deem it necessary for euch ae, YOu will reserve from sale the buildings and reece aad claimed by, the Catholic con; worshipping there, not excedding twont -five acres, but allow thosame to remain in under the of said con. geegetion, the understandin; Or disposed of for any other purposes. Vory respectfully, your obedient 5 JOHN B. FIOYD, Secretary of War. Mejor Sern Easruan, U.8.A., Wittiam King Heiskatt, Eeq., Washington. It may be here remarked that Mr. Heiskell is a well known citizen of Virginia, a farmer by occupa- tion, a gentleman of intelligence and high character, who had been a member of the Gener haaealy that State, and was a man in whose honesty, in! ‘i rity and firmness of character Governor Floyd had, from personal knowledge, the fullest ce. It will be seen from the above instructions, first, that, in accordance with a suggestion contained in the communication of Gen. Jesup of the 14th of No- vember, 1854, previously referred to, and endorsed by Secretary Davis in his annual report of the 4th of December following, a minimum was fixed, below which the land was not to be sold. That minimum was $7 50 per acre, a price exceeding the highest sum at which any acre of military reservation had ever, in the history of this government, been before sold out of the limits of a corporate city. Secondly. They were uired, if upon examina- tion they thought it proper be retained as a mili- tary depot, to reserve from sale the buiidings and so much land as they might consider guitable, not less than forty acres. Thirdly. They were authorized to sell the land in forty acre lots at public auction, it, in their judg- ment, the public interests would thereby be best promoted. Fourthly. They were authorized to sell at pubtic or private sale, in whole or in part, as in their judg- | ment they mignt deem best, but in no case at less than $7 50 per acre. | | Assuming the commissioners to be competent and honest men, it is difficult to conceive how any in- | structions could have been better devised to protect | the ages of the Cail geen bn propre were cl ly inf Dy ie it wi 7 they had p Ble oo the Secretaly of War any private instructions beyond those contained in the above letter. Major Eastman was at Fort Snelling at the date of his ea, and did not see the Secretary, nor had he any correspondence with him | from that period until after the sale. Mr. Heiskell, | who bore to Major Eastman his appointment, states that the only further instructions he received were: “T want you to do the very best you can for the go- vernment. I want that sale to be the best ever made in the United States. You will have a parcel | of sharpers to deal with, and you must keep your | eyes open. | ” From the date of their appointment until after the | sale it appears from the evidence that there | was _no communication between the Secretary of War and the agents aj ited by him, and that the latter, keeping within the limits of their instructions, proceeds 7] exercise ‘e Kee disc! wers vested in them, uj pang rpm Bas responsibility. sin fon te After a satisfac examination of the | which was quite familiar to one of them, | sidence of B | ers decided that the public service did not require | the retention of any portion of the reserve for mili- tary uses; that, in view of the experience of recent | land sales, and of the combinations then formed and forming to force the sales at the minimum price, it be expedient to avoid the hazards of a public sale, and, if possible, to di of it for its full and fair value to some nsible purchaser, and finding | in the person Franklin Steele a jleman | who combined all the essentials a fair, pen ewer po and honorable purchaser, and having first | horses, mules, &c., to furnish to the two ine years atthe place, the commission- | the value of the government interest in | | that erty, they opened a nce in | writing with him to learn if he desired to purchase, | and what price he was disposed to give for it. Mr. | Steele, in reply, expressed his wish to become the chaser perty, and offered the gross | of pan of $75,000 for Tithe same which he had a | fered to give in 1856. They informed him t they had estimated the interest of the ‘govern- ment in that reserve as fairly worth the sum | of $90,000; that they would not sell it at private sale below that sum, and if he would give that | price they would close a contract of sale with him, | Re acceded to their proposition, and on the 6th of June the following contract of sale was executed be- tween the parties: — Articles of ment made and entered into the Ott day of June, 1867, by and between Seth Eastman, Major | United States Army, and Wm. King Hewkell, ceo yh of rains o. (1) one, ta section : twenty eight, in townshi tweety ht, tn res busy twenty three, ranting tor (40) fatp rote, | thence weat (80) end rods, thence south (40) forty rods, thence east (80) eighty rods to the ae | the same being reserved far a Ontbolic church and barial | ground, where the church and burial ground now is; also | excepting and r the northwest quarter of section } pms Be A ee my ee twenty en, in range (43) twee , contalni ten acres, e same being | serves for a Protestant graveyard. | sideration of the above, the party part agrees, and hereby binds himself, heirs, exe. cutors, administrators, &c.,to pay to the United States | government, or authorized agent or ageats, the sum of ninety thousand dollars—ove taird of said sam payable | om the 10th day of July rext, and the residue io two eqaal | annual payments . The said tract of land or re. | servation contains sbout seven thoisand acres. Poses | sion of the said lands and improvements to be given as | soon ae the Secretary of War can dispense with it for | military purpores, and a deed given when the {iret pay ment aforesaid is made and satisfactory security for the deferred payments given and approved by the Secretary of War, or agente appointed for that purpose as witnees our hands and seals the day and year above written. SETH EASTMAN, Major U.S. A., Agent, (Seal.) WM. KING HEISKELL, Agent, &c. (seat ) FRANKLIN SfEELE. [Seal.) The report of the commissioners, embracing the contract of sale, was delivered to the Secretary of War on the 17th of June, and on the same day sub- mitted to the President of the United States, and, having received the assent of the President, was for- mally approved by the Secretary of War on the 24 of July. Inthe same month the first payment of $30,000 was made by the purchaser, and an order a to the commanding officer at the post to de iver immediate possession of the military reserva- tion and property ye thereto to the purcha- | ser, Franklin Steele, excepting the fort and other buildings, which were temporarily retained for the use of the troops at the post. Having now briefly shown the leading and promi nent facts of this sale we will proceed to notice in some detail the objections to it which have been urged by the majority in their report, and which have brought them to the conclusion that this aliena- tion of one of the defences of the country was hasty and improvident and calls for the condemnation of Congress. hey assail not only the expediency of the sale, but the authority of ‘the President and Secretary of War, under the circumstances of this case, to have made it. This leads to the inquiry— | did the military interests of the country require that Fort Snelling should have heen longer retained by the government? It is conceded by the majority that whenever a mili tary site becomes useless the authority is by express ww conferred upon the Secretary of War, ander the | direction of the President, to make sale of it. Bat they contend that as this authority is by the terms of | the Mw limited to cases where the site is useless, if it can be shown by evidence subsequently taken that is to say, by the opinions of persons differing | from the conclusions of the President and Secre tary of War—that it might be longer advan | ly retained for the uses of the government, the contingency has not arisen upon which the power has been conferred, and the sale is without authority of law, and therefore void. This extraordinary doc trine, alike subversive of the purposes of the law and of the authority of a co-ordinate department of the government, although without any practical beat ng in the present case, requires a ing no tice. It is a bold attempt to substitute the opinions of any and every man in the — for the au- thentic judgment and action of those in whom the people have regularly vested the powers of govern. pout. Ut is practically qecting fram ollicg the President and Secretary of War, and clothing with the attributes of executive power and with trusts the witnesses subpoenaed before a commit or Wnelber Ww! Fort Saclay was useless aa a military site on the 6th June, 1857, the day of its sale, ia & question of fact to be determined alone by those in whom the constitution and laws have placed the decision of that question. The occupation or aban- donment of a railitary t, the march of troops from one section of the federacy to another, their con- centration at, or distribution from particular points, are all incidenta of that control over the military defences of the country which the constitution has vested in the President as commander-in-onief of the army. ress is free to raise and support an army or not at its pleasure; it may authorize regi- ments when the President does not call for them, or it may disband them when he most desires them; but when once raised their movements are wholly subject to his disposition and control. So it may ap- propriate money, and authorize the purchase of a miltary site, but if the President does not choose to make tise of it for military purposes he need not do 80; 60 that the practical decision at all times of whe- ther any particular post is needed for the public de- fence must necessarily rest with him who. the right to distribute and station our troops at! re. But his decision that a site is no longer useful for the blic defence does not thereby involve the preerity To make sale of it. The public property of the Unit States is vested in Congress, and authority to make sale of my oe of it can only be derived from Congress. mn, therefore, a law is passed conferring upon the executive the power of: use- Jess military sites, he is, bya union of his constitutional functions with the’ iveagency, thereby created, clothed with full au! ty over the subject. From the constitution he derives his authority to decide whether it is useless or not; from Congress he derives his power to sell if deemed useless. But if this power was not thus deducible from the constitutional function of the lent as commander-in-chief it is clearly conferred by the acts of 1819. and 1857. A power vested by law in an executive agent of the ent, to sell or todo any other act upon the ppening of a stated contingency, unless other- wise restrained, makes him n: lly the sole and exclustve judge of the event upon which his autho- rity toact becomes operative. How otherwise is this power ever to be exercised? Who, under the present law, could determine the vee period of sale but the President ot the United States? From what other department of the government is he to seek for counsel or information? Is it from the ju- diciary, or is it from Congress? Is the validity ok a solemn official act of the highest functionaries of the Soveenee to be determined by the opinions which a few witnesses, constituting no part of the government, may, entertain of the wisdom or pro- riety of that act? The power of the President and retary of War to make these sales is, under the existing laws, absolute and unconditional. The title of the purchaser is perfected through their act. Its validity cannot be affected by the opinions of others. They have exercised their judgment, and the case is closed. It is a judgment in rem, from which there is no apeeel. The reason- ing of the majority is at war with the clearly estab- lished principles of our government. It would over- turn every sale, and render insecure every right of pl 'y acquired through any of the executive agents of the government. But there is no necessity in the present case of in- voking the aid of any such construction of law to screen from inquiry the late act of the Secretary of War. ye ged this subject had not already been disposed of by competent authority; that the Presi- dent and Secretary of War had not already author- ized and ratified this sale; that the purchase money, 80 far as due by the contract, had not already been pala, and possession of the property delivered, and it it was now an open question for executive de- cision, we shall proceed show that the weight of authority and the force of reasoning contained in the accompanying evidence sustain the expediency of the sale of the Fort Snelling reservation. It is shown conclusively by General Scott, General Smith, General Jesup, and by every mi officer, without exception, who has appear- ed before the committee, as aiso by public facts known to the committee, and to every intelligent man in the country, that since the extinguishment of the Indian title, and the removal of the native tribes from that vicinity in 1851, Fort Snelling has become an interior post, and useless for any of the purposes of defence. Upon this point there is not a contra- di opinion in the evidence, or if 80, none worthy | But another idea has been suggested in refer- ence to the pu for which Fort Snelling might | still be used, since it has become useless for those of defence, and that is, asa convenient point to keep up @ government establishment of officers, em ceca routier , which, since the removal of the Indians, have | established on the Minnesota and Mississippi | rivers, their provisions and supplies. It is upon this | asserted benefit of Fort Snelling to the government, that there bas been any diversity of opinion amongst | the witnesses who have appeared before the com- | mittee. In support of this idea of retaining Fort Snelling as a depot of supplies, Colonel Lorenzo Thomas, an assistant adjutant geveral of the army, Major J. G. Martin, an assistant quartermaster, who was sta- tioned at Fort Snelling at the time of sale, and Capt. Thom, have very clear and decided boa Gen. it and Gen. Jesup favor the same , bat with so many modifications as to time and policy, as to make their opinions, j nta, who have favored u: in cg that polic; Douglas and Adam D. jart concur in the same view. It may be here stated that, in the opinion of all witnesses, it would be expedient to retain, for the pu: of such military depot, merely the | public build gs and a small of the land. | In opposition to these views, General Versifer F. | Smith, then commanding the western military de- ment, in which Fort Snellfhg issituated; Colonel rrancis Lee, at this time, and since the transfer of pag Formas bo Utah, commanding in that dey 4 ment; Major Eastman, |, Captain J. A, Whithall Cieutenant Richard C. Drum, oftcers of the army; and Hon. Charles E. Stuart, Senator from Michigan; Hon. H. M. Rice, Senator elect from Min- nesota; and Hon. Wm. K. Heiskell, one of the com- missioners of kale, all express most decided opinions that Fort Snelling had ceased to be useful fer any military purpose whatever. Some of these witnesses have assigned reasons for their opinion, marked by 40 much intelligence and knowledge of the su! upon which they have testified, that we shall incorporate a portion of their evidence in this report, and adopt their views as the | conclusions of our own minds. General Persifer F. Smith says:— An a point of defence, the value of Fort Snelling has on- tirely gone. It is within the frontier. Asa in & great measure its value has gone, too, eplirely gone, because a man; further towards the frontie tbe country is tettied up the a bundred and fifty milee, am ments up the Mineissippt value of a depot lies in one or,two things: one, whethor it is in the centre of a large producing region, in which you could collect whatever yay wish for supplies, in order to distribute them the country, ,» = i But asa di were pot other pot only for ite own country immediately around it. Now, there are posts up the Mississippi above, and up the St. Peter's, and those posta can be reached by the same means of trans . 14 not obliged to change ite cargo at any point Fort Ridgley, if ing up the Minnesota, and ts only obliged to tranship to get around the falle of St. Anthony, if going up the Miseissippi to Fort Ripley. Therefore there is no need of a depct atthe junction of those two rivers, becanse it does not answer cither of those suppositions,] have made that is, the necessity of changin the mode of trans. | or the neceanity of passing around the obstacles: y portage, or something equivalent thereto, such as by a canal or railroad. It bas lost, in fac., ita value, either as a place of defence or aa a depot, in consequence of the ad vance of settlements. He expressed the decided opinion that the proper mode of ti ting supplies for the whole region of the upper ippi is from Fond du Lac, on Lake Superior: — There are two objections to river navigation: one is, that it i# frozen up during the whole winter, and in the sommer the water is #0 low an to render the navigation difficult and dangerous. Roata are afraid to go up for fear of het unable to return. The same difficulty may occur e pavigation in the winter that obstructs river tion; but in the summer you can at any time take nay supplies trom Ruffalo, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, or from ‘any of the towns which border upon the Iskes, to the north western extremity of lake Superior, by the larrest clans of steamers “pe C&M pase the canal at Sault Sante Marie, and at Fon du lac you are about upon a ranze with the line of the posts now established noar Pembina, and thoee lower posts, such as Fort Snelling. Major Seth Eastman testifies as follows: l consider F rt Snelling perfectly useless as a military station, The country is inhabited, north, south, east and weat of it. A city of 16,000 inhabitants lies within five or six miles of it, The Indians have removed a hundred miles or more west, and the country is inhabited by our own people. Ido not consider it necessary even asa do. pot, There is but one post to be supplied, supposing Fort Rip'ey We be abaadoned, and phat is Fort Ridgiey. Fort s one night, for boa's are running there daily. For tke suppiy of a sma’) lke that, one steamboat would tak: supply. If there were not the means of transportation in tbe country, then it might be necessary for the g>vern- ment to keep up @ depot for trains at any exoense. Hon. Henry M. Rice, Senator elect from Minneso- ta, thinks the Secretary of War acted with judgment in disposing not only ‘of the reserve, but of all the government buildings upon it. He says:— Tt would have been an extra expense to the government of from ten to forty thousand dollars @ year if they had been retained, and they would have been of no earthly use. I wae formerly agatier (a the army, and have trans- Ags an immense amount of government su The is situated on @ high bill, up which all the supplies have to be carried. Taree eae comet the ri must be boats which run up the Minpescta river, and which take supplies to Fort ey. To send the from St. Paul would save the ace an be beg Senate Se Sane ings that cover 20,C00 white people; Indians are now celdom seen there. The buil ‘are of stone, and are ola. They aL all materials, except stone, had te be taken up in Mackinaw boats. The buildings were put up in a rough manner, apd are out of repair. I believe, however, one oo we buiidings have been put up since the fort was ail. To the undersigned, who have no knowl de- rived trom personal observation of that section of country, and who can only look at this question through mapa, and by the light which geography and the testimony of competent witnesses can throw upon it, there does not occur to our minds one sub- stantial reason why an expensive government es- tablishment should have been maintained at Fort Snelling for the purpose of forwarding supplies to one, or at most two frontier posts. The demands of our service would not allow of more than one com- pry being stationed at Fort Ripley, and one at Fort Ridgley; indeed, during the last mer the pressure upon the service required the withdrawal of that one company from Fort Ripley, and the total abandonment of the site. From subsequent indica- tions of discontent among the Indians, Somnrar was restored aud the fort temporarily reor; 5 It seems to us absurd to say that there could be any economy in the government keeping up an_estab- lishment which they were able to sell for the sum of $90,000, expending the money every year uired for repairs upon buildings original- ly imperfect in construction and in a! state of decay, maintaining .some forty | or fifty employés, two hundred head of mules, horses and oxen, and the necessary officers in command, and all for the Meal of supplying two companies upon the front! that country was destitute of the means and facili- ties of t tation, it —_— be a military neces- sity to which we should submit,no matter what might be ita cost. But when all the means of trans- portation, both by land and water, are known to abound in that region; when streams, always navi- gable at certain seasons of the year, flow in sight of the picket walls of those forts; when the Quarter- master General informs us that he has never encoun- tered any difficulties in pore. in that country the facilities of transportation; when he further informs us that a capitalist of acknowledged responsibility bas tendered to him to transport all the supplies re- quired for the troops at those posts at if of what it has cost the government, which offer the rtermaster General tells us he means to accept, retention of Fort Snelling, under these circum- stances, and for such purposes, would have been an official misfeasance, meriting the rebuke of the re- presentatives of the people. It is still more remarkable now, since this property has been sold, that there should be deemed so urgent an occasion for its use as a depot, as we learn that peer to its sale, and when the private facilities for Transportation were far less abundant than they are now, the oa ae 80 well accomplish token purpoees of su to those two frontier posta, with- out the aid of ort Snelling. This isa Tost curious and interesting fact, and deserves to be further elu- cidated. Listen to the clear and conclusive statement of Colonel Francia Lee on this point: — Iwas in command of Fort Snelling between three and four years—from the of 1851 to the summer of 1464. reservation. I 09 00 reason Teannot from be reduced, and there was a largo the supplies for the upper rent from St. Paul to Fort Ripley, and Fort Ridgley. . Ithas always bees done. ae. Again: Captain J. B. 8. Todd states: — While I was in command there for several years the supplies for Fort Ripley, 125 miles above, were never y were Inoded at St. Paul, and reshipped to the fort direct im 3805 and 1864. Again, we learn from the Hon. Henry M. Rice:— I supplied Fort Ripley for several years from St. Paul. I received most of the supplies at St. Paul, and sent them trom there to Fort Ripley direct, as to Fort Ridgley, [cannot Ihave been absent from St. Paul « considerabdie of ime since that fort waa built. I know that WA great many teams at St. Paul for sup- = for . Whether they were purchased re OF Hot, I do not know, There is but one aspect of our national speak oe licy, as | we think, in which it could be maintained that the government should have held the control and pos- session of the Fort Snelling reservation, and that | would have been, to have met a requirement not called for by the existing military system of the country. Within the last twenty years a practice | has grown up, founded in error, stimulated by local interest, and too mach favored by Congress, of lo —~ posts in advance of settlement, and of dis tributing our troops at numerous in small gar. risons. Experience has shown Kat these small posts are nearly powerless beyond their own limits, whilst they enormously multiply the cost of transpor- tation, involve the frequent construction and ro donment of posts, retard discipline, and impair the efficiency of the troops. The present system is con- demned by the most enlightened officers of the army. Secretary Davis, in his annual report of the Ist of December, 1856, argues with mach force and ability in favor of a change of the present policy; urges the selection of a few points, a ible by steamboat and railway, from which strong detach- ments should annually be sent out into the Indian country during the season when the grass will suffice for the support of cavalry horses, and beasts of dranght ans burden, He cites with commendation the occupation of Algeria by the French as nt ing a case of paralletism to our western frontier. Had these views met with the approval of Congress, it is manifest that Fort Saelling would have possessed an importance, in a military point of view, which it can lay no claim to at present. But these views were permitted to pass unheeded by Congress, and the changes were too radical to be introduced without its assent. In the close of that portion of the report he says: “ As our present policy rests upon various acts of legislation, and the concurrent views of several receding administrations, a change as radical as hat which is here suggested should receive eritical examination, and perhaps require legislative action before being adopted.” Having shown, as we think conclusively, that no considerations of military policy required the fur ther retention of Fort Snelling, either as a post of defence or a depot of supply, we will proceed next to examine the objections which are taken to the mode of sale. Was the mode of sale objectionable? As a general rule of executive action we concur most cordially with the majority in the opinion that all sales of government property should be made at public anction, and after due notice, thereby afford ing to every citizen who desires it a fair and eqnal opportunity to participate in the purchase. This is arnle demanded not only by the relation which exists in a country like ours between the govern ment and the people, but it is an important check to official favoritism and partiality, and operates bene. ficially in guarding against that sense of individaal injustice which springs from the preference of one man over another, where all have common rights. So strong are our individual convictions on this sly ject that it would require proof of a very per verted sentiment in any State or Territory to excuse, in our judgment, a departure from so sound and salutary a rule of action. The amount which the government will at any time realize from # sale of its property must be insignificant gowpared + ‘t with provisions and clothing. If | bens, justice and. dintorediodnees ken yet it to eas, j And it is difficult for any fair-minded man who the ac. companying , and learns of sales in the West, to cast the slightest censure upon the motives and conduct of the commissioners of sale. We would not applaud their act asa precedent. We cannot condemn it as an individual case under the ese jud, nent, fe the bast oho aks Pood ir judgment, for int 4 ment, we have doubt; that their mode of was beneficial to the public treasury we cannot question on the evidence; but we trust that some plan ma; be devised, if practicable, for the future, that wi combine all the advantages of free and unrestrained competition, with the necessary safeguards for the public interests. Whilst such are our individual opinions, it may be proper to remark that no law has existed from the origin of our government to the present time, whick requires or even contemplates a sale of a military reservation at F naiees auction. On the % legislation of Congress shown a marked tZebed for teste of the great mass of the pebli r the domain, and those which it has adopted in relati to the reserves severed from it. In stance, in the year 1840, re within the corporate limits of the growing and flour- ishing city of Chicago, it was surveyed off inconformty to the general plan of that city, the streets extended, public squares reserved, and residue divided into lote of twenty-five feet front, the property valued before sale, bids not amount the commissioner of sale. case of the Fort Howard reservation it was divided into lots, a minimum price fixed, below which no sale was to sakes pene public auction attempted, but not a bid le, and the property ia still unsold. Fort Ripley was exposed to public auction without any minimum prescribed, the price reduced by com- binations to seven cents an acre, but the sale set aside and declared a nullity. Fort Snelling was sold by private contract. These are instances of the four different modes of sale, at different periods, and under variant circumstances adopted by the War De- artment. Undoubtedly the most unexceptionable fh all its results ef these public sales was that of the Fort Dearborn reservation, within the corporate limits of Chicago. The gross sales of the two hundred and fifty lots were one hundred and stx thousaud dollars. One lot alone yielded four thousand one hundred and fifty dolars, and several were bid off at two thousand dollars. This was a special case, and the only instance in our history; and the results of a sale of town lots in a city like Chicagocan scarcely be regarded as an inexorable model in all other cases of sales of public property. The sale of Fort Snelling, except so far as it may be objectionable ag a private sale, is the most advantageous ever made by ie greece, beyond the corporate limits of city. In the objection which we have expressed to pri- vate sales of government Property, it must not be inferred that there was an’ @ in the facts or cir- cumstances connected with the sale of Fort Snelling to give point to the remark, unless, indeed, it be that torrent of unfounded calumny and miasre sentation to which individual disappointment partisan feeling gave rise” a thereafter, and which may be re; as one of the conse- quences that will usually follow a departure from the system of open and public bidding by the it. motives which prompted the eoantelalaneen to prefer a private to a public salewere honest and praise- worthy. The parchaser with whom they made the el and motive of improper favoritism and partiality, and the sum ati- ited to be paid was the full and fair value of the Propert ,and more than could probably have been real by any other mode of rim ‘The reasons which induced the action of the com- missioners are set forth with great clearness in their official report, and also in their testimony taken be- fore the committee, and they are sustained in their course by many of the most intel it and best in- formed Witnesses who were ¢: d before the commnittee. Their reasons were:— 1. The tale of public land in that section of country for the preceding ten years—not a sale having taken place that combinations had not been successful in reduc- ing the price to the minimum prescribed by law. 2. They were satisfied, not merely from the past experience of the government, but idence pal- pa le to toeir own ears, that combinations were reing formed to reduce this land to the minimum rice. . Pes They saw, in the event even of there no ee = it was for gals wn to carry ov astractions ‘ar rare which limited them tothe minimum of $7 50 readiy have com! a wegh gy. the mum, @ portion was much and a deal not worth fifty cents an acre. bel , therefore, that they would best advance the interests of the instructions un ) aT ment, and comply with the which they acted, by selling the vate to some responsible rchaser, either at the minimum price prescribed y their instructions, or for such greater sum as, upon a careful examination of the Property Se SS ane fall value. ical sagacity and soundness of the course by the commissioners, 80 far at least as the Sooty ieeent of Se ym rend indicated an overwhelming mass of the testimony taken before the committee, to which evidence the Honse is referred for full combination fore» many years practised {i com! for so many years at the sale of all raisons lands a versally approved in those new countries, ee ee one eae plies ernment property a rule which it would scorn in its transactions with individuals, and ever make our a tage we subject of appropriation . many wi will be to decide apon the propriety of the of the commissioners of sale may not have any ade- uate conception of the embarrassments of their po- ition, and of the difficulties which ghey had to en- counter, growing out of that of com! to reduce the price of the public lands, so in the new States and T we will onl few extracts from the testimony of some of the wit- nesses, whose means of information will not be quea- tioned, and whose public positions would afford them z #3 iy i ge é Aj E 5 3 H 35 t ES motives to suppress, rather than magnify the evil. The Hon. ¢ L. Becker, tative elect from Minnesota, in reply to q sobmitted to Tone ES ae sale there would have beon a fair of the reservation? Answer. Question 1,418. Do you been offered at Loy i it ‘ ; ‘8 land apecuiator a e day of sale. The without disturbance, bat the land was all dollar and a quarter acre. Question 1,422. Were you ever en, in sue) a com- bination? Anawer—t bid off a part of that land. The Hon. Henry M. Rice testified as followa:— Queation 2,532. Had the !and been advertised and sold at Public anction what in your jndgment and from your know!- edge of that country, would it have yielded to the govero- ment at pudlic saie? Answer—I do not think have ror more than the minimum price; 1 go in iy it; vored any pian which would out of the hands of non reaidents, Question 2,533. While you disapproved of the mod pF ice teas the comenlanionere atepied mode calcu promote the peeuni the government? ‘Anewor--Undouteoaiy ; Yaore qneation about it; T might have done the same hed Appointed commissioner to sell, but being a resident immediate region I did not like the mode in which i was sold. Question 2504. The intercet you felt, aa T understand You, was an interest m behalf of the people rather thaa in bebalt of the government, and in opposition to the pecuniary intereste of the government? Answer. Yes, sir; L 4i4 not care anything about the government; T Would rather it had brought fifty cents per acre then what it did bring, so far aa the government ie concerned ; I think the public Janda should be held in trust by the government for the use of the people, and I do not think proper fer the government to speculate in thom Question 2,656. Did you inform Major Fastman thet « combination would be formed tf {he exis was made in q Purchased at a