The New York Herald Newspaper, August 17, 1853, Page 2

“SHE QUEEN OF THE APTILLES. IBTORY OF THE LOPEZ EXPEDITION, ‘WRITTEN BY THE LATE GAPSAIN GENERAL DON JOSE BE LA CONCHA. Highly Important and Interest- ing Narrative. Reflections on the Condition of Cnba and the Palicy of the Spanish Government, Importance of Cuba to the United States, &o., ac, de. ‘She readers of the New York Hwnatp need no apalogy from us for presenting them with the follow- fing accurate tran:lation of Geveral Concha’s account @fthe last Lopez expedition against the Island of @xba, in the summer of 1851, and of the measures ‘end dispositions, military and civil, taken by him to Gefeat it. The subject is one of uncommon interest i ths country, even though two years have passed away since the events it narrates. The article was publiebed in the Military Review, of Madrid, and e@opied in the Diario Espanol, from which we make @er translation. It forms part of the memoirs writ tem, but not yet published, by General Concha, on the political condition, government and admuinistra- fen of the Island of Cuba. GEN. CONCHA’S HISTORY OF THE LOPEZ EXPEDITION. ‘The events which had just occurred in Puerto Brizcipe and Trinidad might have been sufficient to make me expect the near arrival o” an expedition ‘emmanded by Narciso Lopez, even if the informa- don which I had concerning the management, the hopes and the fears, of the annexationists, at home amd abroad, had not persuaded me that the invasion maght at any moment take place. I kaew that Lo- pes reckoned ona certain namber of people, and was prepared to embark, and I knew that a certain event in the island might have compelled him to Remsten his departure. I could not, therefore, have ‘Been surprised by any information apprising me ot Bis proximity or disembarkation. On the night of the 11th of Angast I was in- formed by the Captain of the port that on the re- firement of the look-out of the Moro he had mated to him that of two steamers reported in sight as war vessela of the United States, he had perceived that one of them was not so, and that after having been some moments cruising about it bad steered a northeasterly direction. At half-past two o'clock on the following morning, I received at ‘He Quinta de los Molinos, where I was stopping, an tmformation which the commandant of the frigate Esperanzo had given to the Lieutenant Governor of fhe Marie), of having seen a steamer filled wich peo- ple, which he suspected on account of its mancwuvres aad which he had not been able to recognize, as it had carefully avoided that vessel. This information, and those which I had had before, left me no doubt ‘Mot that steamer brought the announced expedition against the island. 1 sent, therefore, immediately me of my adjutants to the commandant-general of fhe station, with the object that as soon as be might receive a communication from the eommandant of the frigate Esperanza, which ¥ supposed would contain the same information ‘that I had received, he might tell him in my name, hat I hoped he had given the order for the imme- Gate preparation of the steamer Pizarro, the only @me dieposable in port, the Colon being useless in ‘eeneequence of its having been grounded. Thesame adjutant was afterwards to direct General Don Manvel Enna, second Captain of the island, to pre- gent himself at the commandancy-general of the station, after having ordered that the picked com- panies of the Queen’s regiment should proceed to the wharf of ja Machina, prepared to embark; another géjatant went, at the same time, to give orders to my yeincipal and the picked companies of the regiment ef Ia Gorona y Borcelona, whilst I directed myself, personally, to give like orders to the regiment of Leon At half-past three o’clock I arrived at the house @f the commandant-general at the station, close to fe point at which the embarkation was to take place. The troops had orders to be prepared at the first notice with their field equipment, and they lost mo time, as at seven o’clock in the morning, Geaeral Enna, with seven companes of grenadiers and light iefantry, and with a force of seven hundred and fifty ‘wen, commanded by the valiant captains Villacy and Bordal. The steamer was to take in tow a schooner prepared from the day before, and in which were embarked thirty horses. These troops brought with them medicine, camp beds, munitions pertaining to them, twelve thousand rations of biscuit and pro- ‘visions, and the necessaries for their horses for eight @sys. The distribu'ion which I had given to the gemy was such that I calculated with certainty that fhe enemy should be attacked at whatever poiat | they might disembark, before twenty-four hours, by very superior forces. A column of a thousand in- fantry and one hundred and twenty cavalry, with flour field pieces,was disposable in the Vuelta de Aba- §p- To cover the jurisdictions of Matanzas and Car- d@enas, I had another column of equal force. Briga- Ger Vargas commanded two battalions, with two Squadrons and four pieces of artillery for the defence Of the territory of the four towns. The garrison of Puerto Principe might reckon upon operations for an ‘equal force, whilat Colonel Qnesada protected the southern ond nothern coasta of the districts of Bay- apno acd Holguin with two battalions, and one hun- @red cavalry, and in the extremity of the eastern de- | i lly strong | partment there might be orgavized an eg eolumn with the troops of Santiago de Cuba. In whatever point, therefore, the enemy mizht dis embark, as, according to all accounts, they @oukd not present more than eight bundred men, they could be immediately ettacked by wery superior forces, with cavalry ond artillery; ‘the sea forces were in combination with those of the fand, to strencthen iastantly with troops the point @ttacked, and there were disposable in Havana, three battalions to assist at whatever point they might be required, organ’ and armed as had beeu already the corps of police. As it is easy to understand, 1 could not think of Cann all points of the coast, and therefore [ adi given orders that the erall garrisons which seme of them had, should join the forces of operations, whilst, on the other hand, i took care that certain yer pry as Cienfuegos and Trinidad should be d at all cost. For some time past, T had fixed as a point of dis- ‘@mbarkation for the enemy, the headland of Mentua, a the northern coast of Vuelta de Abajo, as well Bo 2 lee place, in cl it was sitoated in an they would take from New Orleans, as from interce communica ‘tions and private in’ormation whch Thad, Thus it was, that leaving ungarrisoned that point en ac- mount of its distance from Pinar del Rio, the centre ef operations of Colonel Elizalde’s coinmn, I had chiefs to teke particular notice of antus, and the dif- ] point. Colonel Eli- walde had also precise and positive instrictions as to he should act if the expedition should disem- ig, therefore, the direction which had by the steamer announced as suspicions, no doubt that my celcalations wonld be veri- fied; and such was ly the intention of Lopez, aa @e declarations of all the prisoners attested. “nL. Enna Mean pata received orders to proceed to Me mouth of the Guadisna, uniting in Guane with Colonel Elizalde, who would march to the same peict according to the instructions which had heen to them. But Lopez had received in Cayn- the false information that the inhabitants near ‘Havana had pope Lae ag eag him commit the fewprodence ¢ latter port and Peg me bey within sight of the Moro, ao thet i out had, as he might have done, given notice a time, the of steamer Pizarro wonid ithout ita being abl him to Ortipesa, four lerrucs te the east of Honda, where be would have divembarked had he net oh pncectpangg ghelgebo pred Experanza, wl com; im to steer more the east, and gos ide the Morrillo of Mani- wani, four keagues to the east of that point at day- break on the 12th. At the very moment that the Pizarro was pared to leave, and when that vessel bad vei anchor, the master ot the schooner, detained b; Lopes, and with whom he had spoken, arrived gave ii ation of the couse steered and of the force which he brought. Nevertheless, I did not wish to detain the departure of General Enna and of his even btndred and fifty grenadiers and skirmish- ers, which constituted one of the best and most bril- liant picked columns which T had ever seen even in the period of our civil war, and which cond not leave me any doubt of its ay to completely subdue the eremy’s foree; so much the more, as in case of their meeting, as they expected, with Colonel Elizalde’s colvmn, they would work in combination with it The most natural direction, however, which the enemy mizht take was towards the hills of Cuzco, a point well known to their chief, and which offered the 10st facilities to avoid the enconnter of our troops. On this account I cansed Col. Morales, who accompanied Gen. Bona, to disembark alone and to proceed at noon on the same day by the railroad to Guavajay—at which point he met a colamn of 400 men and 120 horses—t» command a e from ‘those hills in the direction of the capitol. The Pizarro, commanded by the worthy General Bustillos, commandant-general of the station, left ort at half-past seven. It communicated tirst with Mariel, whose LieutenantGovernor had not had any notice before; but, on arriving at the head of Babia-Honda, and seeing the castle flag at half- mast, it was suppo-ed that the enemy had di-em- barked in the Morrillo. The steamer, on account of its great draught, had to anchor at two miles from the wharf of Bahia- Honda so that the disembarks- a force which bad been stationed lately in to watch the passes of the hills of Ouzeo, and wh despatched in front a section of cavalry, varoed the pirates of the imminent danger in which they were placed, obliging them to leave their mess immedi- mareh towards the it, trepid General, advancing with one-half of the light infan- try on the enemy’s flank to intercept him in his re- ‘treat, he received _@ mortal wound which compelled bim to command his colamn to halt --an unfortunate event, which interrupted the operations that day, and which saved the pirates, even though they were 80 exhausted and fatigued that they had be rash ai a Jongye anda hai smn the, calthe paw Trias. f Not having under my orders any one of the generals whom I contd employ in the com- mand of the operations, I took their direc- tien mycelf.. It waa to reorgan- neve-rary ize the different columns, to place thm in @ disporition to oppose any new expedition that might present itself, as wos announced, aud at the same time to render it impossible that a single one of Lopez’s men should escape, by embarking at any of the coasts, and by taking refuge in any of the infinite shoals around to take advantage of the pas- rage of ac vessel crossing. And such was the ob- ject which T_ proposed to wy-elf in sending precipi- lately from Havana, on the isth, Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez, with four hundred men of the regimeut of La Corona, whose arrival at San Christobal oppor- tunely prevented the occurrence of that which I had calcu ated to avoid. s It is enough to examine the map and consider the sbort extent which is ‘occupied from north to south by the hills of Cuzco, and the few roads and open- ings which they comprise, to under-tand that both oleae were attained by the order which I, to that effect, had given the column of Brigadier Rosales, on whom, by the death of General Euva, the command had devolved, was to occupy San Diego de Nufez, for the purpose of cevering the norshern tion could not be Faieg teee before eleven o'clock at night. At that hour, however, General Buna under took hig march to San Miguel. which has only one Tuined house of palm-tree, and there he encamped with his column. Few men have faced a crisis more laudably than General Enna. An honorable cavalier, a loyal Spaniard, a soldier of cool and well- proved valor, endowed with a nature of bronze, be suffered with the rame indifference thirst and hanger, heat and cold. Asinglethought occupied him—that of meeting and conquering the enemy, beheving it impossible that it could reaist his valor and that of the soldiers. However, with the singularity of his privileged na- ture, capable of sustaining alone his ardor and love of glory, he made no calculation, and to this only it was due, that even having had sofficient time and sober reaconings on the part not only of those whom he led, but of.all the determined and enthusiastic population of Babia- da, who would have sup- plied bim with abundance of food and wine, his soldiers did not, in the latter point, nor in the en- campment of San Miguel, after having been in motion from tbe early part of the previons day, take no more provision than some biscuit which had been distributed to them on board the Pizarro. Lopez imagined that he might reckon on the sup- port of the country, and believed it impossible that our troops should ‘arrive in sight in less than three or four days, a8 he manifested in bis declarations ; but from the moment that the expedition disem- Darked, he might bave observed that a general and uniform rentinent was pronounced against the expe- dition. Of the few inhabitants of the Morrillo, some who bad arme, opposed him in his disembarkation, and the rest, without distinction of white or black, retreated as much resolved to fight him. Every- thing announced that the population, in mass, was determined to oppose him, of which he might have been still more persuaded, when, proceeding to the town of las Pozas, he tound it abandoned by its in- habitants. The authorities of the jurisdiction had continuons and repeated notices of all the movements of Lo- pez, and therefore Enna supposed that, having left some 140 men with the baggage and munitions in Morrillo, the rest of the exvedition, to the nnmber of 360 men, bad occupied Las Pozas. : San Miguel, where our troops encamped, is situ- ated at two hours from this point, and four from that of Morrillo. The division of the enemy's forces presented to ours a very considerable advantage, be- canse if the latter were by themselves sufficient to ecnqner them united, they might have easily annihil- ated them in detail. It was a lamentable error to deprive themselves of this unnecessary advantage, only to be explained by the same coutidence which General Enna had in his valor and that of hs sol- diers, particularly since he should have recollected that the enemy, whose certain death he watched over, might have Ba ages a desperate resistance. It ia proper, nevertheless, to record that the event of Cardenas and the charge there made by oar valiant Jancers, might have contributed much to his having formed a contemptnous idea of the pirates; to which circumstances, joined to that of his excessive intre- pldity, should in part attributed the resolution Ww General Enoa adopted of dividing his forces. He did so, indeed, and ordering the Commandant Villaoz to march on Morrillo with three companies and some cavalry, be proveeded at seven o'clock in the morning to Las Pozas, with the four remaining com- panies, from which he still detached a rear guard to reach the reserve munitions. The enemy saw themselves surprised with the un- expected attack of our troops. They did not reckon, according to their own confession, ss I have said, upon being attacked within four days, and they had not passed even twenty-four hours yet since their disembarkation when General Enna, with his little column, presented himself in front of Las Pozas. Without doult that town does not occupy a stron position, nor did its houses, composed of plank an im tree, oppose any remarkable shelter to its de- fenders. Nevertheless. I should mention that the accidents of the ground made in reality the situation of the euemy more advantageous thau it appeared at first sight from the road by which our troops arrived. This road is narrow, and hardly permitted the march of the column in more than four men deep, because on the right it is bounded by a thick wood, from which rise some rods of high land, terminating in a house, whilst on the left it rons along a palisade of live fenee, which separated the road from lands sufficiently undulating, and which terminated in a little eminence, which extending in ita descent on the same side, serves as a site for other houses. On this solitary house, situated at the head of the road, the company of grenadiers which was in front moved in the order directed and was received with a quick fire; but our valiants rushed on with the bayo- net at the same time that the General made the two rersaining companies to stretch out to the left in gue- rilla fashion, to attack the eminence. The grena- diers being charged in their tarn by the enomy’s forces, had to retire on the firet attack; but the com- pany in the rear having arrived they returned to the charge, and supported themselves again on the houses in the outskirts, arriving even within the town, which extends in a slant towards a litte river hard by. Bravery bad, nevertheless, to yield to numbers, and the two companies after a very con- siderable logs, vacated the town. The valiant Gene- ral at that moment thought to reunite the compa- nies which had deployed to the left, so asto make a | final attack, because the enemy, surprised by the in- trepidity of our soldiers fell back at the lower part of the town, and there remained only a group of the mott bold and desperate defending the eminence re- ferred to; bat unfortunately the palisading rendered impossible the onion of our troops, who, already wearied and futigued,were suffering considerable loss | by the certain air of the enemy, and the General who had a thousand times faced death saw himself forced to give the order to retreat. Our soldiers, nevertheless, were not conquered or routed. The enemy, taking adventage of the mo- | ment of retreat, took the offen nd issued from the town to charge them; bat, our skirmishers and grenadiers, halting at the voice of their Ge and giving the war cry of via /a rein, in a charg with the hayonet, repulsed the pirates in snch a manner that they were obliged to retire into the town, leaving the Hungarian, Genera! Pragay, dead. ‘This was sofficient that our troops shooid not any more molested in their retreat, and that ti might halt and re-establish their camp at a league and a half from Las Pozas. While this attack was taking place, the Command- ant Villaoz was proceeding to Morrillo, in front of which point he presented himself with only two } companies, that which went aa vanguard and which | afterwards joined in the combat having lost its way among those dense plantations. The attack was mo less vigorous at this point. Our troops charg- ing constantly with the bayonet, and despising the enemy’s fire, managed to completely surround them ; and their situation was so desperate that even the Commandant Villaow having desisted from their extermination, on account of hiv having received from the General the order to retreat, the ene- my segarded themselves a3 #0 lost, that their chief, Crittenden, followed by fifty men, thought coast, being ready to repel and destroy any now ex- pedition which might. disembark; to which end he could reunite to his the forces stationed in Caysjabos, uncer the orders of Lieut. Col. Toron, and which was to cover the pass from these hills in the diree- tion of Havana, Col. Elizalde was to be stationed in San Cristobal, to cover the southern coast, and to guard the jurisdiction of Pinas del Rio, and in the meantime the colawns of Col. Morales and Lien: Col. Sanchez were charged to harass the enemy in- cessantly. It was impossible that, so soon as the troops had taken this station, the complete extermination of the pirates could be deferred more than ove day, since they would necessarily be pursued clocc!y by some of the columns, and at a distance of one or two leagues from those which they had designated as the centre of operations. These orders baving been given on the 18th, I had only wo overcome some difficulties to realize them on the two following days, on account of the alterations which the different columns had suffered in their strength and situation. Neverthe- lers, with the information which I had on the 20th, of the ete occupied by the enemy, I directed Col. Elizalde, that in marching to San Cristobal he should teke the direction of San D'egode Tapia, whereby he should encounterthe pirates. So, indeed, it oc- curred, and that gallant chief met them with his column in the Candelaria de Agurcata. The enemy, although conupying & most advantageous position, had to yield before the intrepidity of our troops and their valiant commander, who, even after being wounded, continued persecuting the foe until a fear- fal storm put a forced end toit. This encounter took place on the 22d, and on the 28a I directed Lieut. Colonel Sanchez, by a coarier, that, having information that the dispersed pirates were uniting in San Diego de Tapia and Quifions, he should depart tbitber without loss of time—uan- derstanding, { told him, “that the column of Gene- ral Elizatde, commanded by Captain Ramos, will merch to-morrow, (24th,) in the same direction; aud as it will be possible he wil! first meet the enemy, you will hasten with all ible rapidity to the Rae where you hear the firing, bearing with you for this purpose good and skilful guides of the ground.” Lieut. Colonel Sanchez executed my orders, and overtook the pirates in the Rosariv. His troops rusbed on them with the bayonet and harrassed them so tenacionsly among those im- penetrable thickets, which only permitted our sol- diers to march one by one, that they could have been completely exterminated that day had Capt. Ramos’ column, instead of returning to Bahia Honde by or- der of the Commandant-General, made the move- ment which I bad directed, taking the same and only direction which the pirates could pursue in their retreat. Colonel Morales afterwards took command of the troops; and from the moment of his being separated frem the contiguity of the enemy, in consequence of the order which Genera) Enna gave to march to Cayajabos, he had to make a very forced march to Las Pozas, on account of having received from the Lieutenant-Goyernor of Bahia Honda information of the disembarkation of a new expedition. That of Lopez already found itself entirely destroyed, and the combined persecution of its dispersed members, by the troops and peasants, was so active and effisa- cious that not a single one—the chief incladed— failed to be made a prisoner. Such were, in resume, the military operations which took place up to the complete extermination of the Lopez expedition, in the relation of which I might not have uccupied myself had I not wished to estab- lish certain facts importing to the heror of our va- liant troo) For to what mili glory could [ pretend for having destroyed five hundred with the forces which I had then at my disposal? None cer- tainly; such an expedition might have been by itse!f alone very contemptible. Nevertheless, to what at- tribute the importance given to it by all parties? In what find cause for the inquietude and alarm which its simple announcement had produced within and without the country? Contemptible of itself as that expedition was, it was known, nevertheless, that it reckoned with a recurity inspired into those who directed it, on cansing a general rising in the island; and though such an event did not take place, still ita results conld not fail to have been grievous. Revolts, or pattia) risings, might have been sufficient to ex- cite the passions of the good Spaniards, and to deepen the mortified division of the white popula tion, and the information of those risings might have attracted new expeditions of pirates, so that in fif- teen days the island might have been converted into a theatre of desolation—a picture which will be presented whenever the sons af a common country are armed against one another, who united had no- thing to fear except from foreign enemies. immense syne of the country would continue taithfnl and loyal to Spain; but at the same time that I ouzhtto endeavor at all cost to avoid, or im- meviately repress any sedition, however insigniticant it might be. I considered it right that no ar- Litrary or violent means sbould be taken to exhibit the situation of the island as dan- gerous, exciting the fears of all good Span- jards. In those moments there was nothin, more easy, or nothing which might have so muc' satisfied those interested in the conservation of the island, 22 a manifesto declaring it in a state of siege, and imposing, from the first to the last article, the capital penalty on whomever might be apprehended with arms in their hands, or their aiders and har- borers. That is a thing which, unfortunately, ia too ceealy held among us as_a proof of energy, and which is commotly sought from an authority charged to defend the interesta which they consider their own. But I never have had any confidence in that sys- tem to escapefrom the difficult circumstances ia which government are situated by; terior errors, or in which the course of inevitable events places the Inthe situstion in which the isiand then hich, as (said, it ‘cops at my disposal, I tight have been able, perhaps, by means of those precismations and of the shedding of blood, to ating the expedi- ; butt preferred arriving at it in such a manner a8 that country might appear addicted to the , and not subjected by the force of bayo- he riger of military proclamations. There- ide no declaration of a state of siege, nor any more proclamations, then a general order, placing the invaders outside of the law, as bere pirates in fact, and according to the law of nations. Ja my opinion governments err as much when through weakness or wantof precautions or proper measvres, they are not prepated to resist and energe- tically subdne a revolution,as when they take exag- gerated dispositions of rigor; beceuse if the ele- ments of revolution which they have to combat are weak, such measures are unnecessary, and dis- credit the power in the mind of enlightened people; and if the elements are powerful, rigorous measures ere not deficient. The efforts of governments have to be directed, in my opinion, fimt to obviate revolu- tions hy governing well, and taen to employ the en- only of seeking safety by hetaking to the sea in boats, where, in a few hours afterwards, they were captared. The reaainder were able that night to take refuge in fas Poaas, though not withont having leit many dispersed, who were taken and shot on the following days. é The fight whick i have just referred to took place on the 15th; the 14th, Brigadier Rosales left Havana in a steamer, with tive companies and four pieces of mountain artillery, and on the Lith he mcoceded in joining General Enna, as did aiso Colonel Morales with bis column. By these means the General fonnd himself in the neizhberhood of the enemy with a force of 1,500 men, four pieces of artillery, and one hundred and twenty cavalry, aldhangh Co. Morales having been detached from him toward Caynjabos, in consequence of an eqnivoral state- ment, he had only his colamn and that of Brigadier Rosales on the 17th, when he again came in sight of the pirates at the coflee planation of Frios, whoro they were resting themseives, after a long merch, without any knowledge of the proximity of our a it was more than an hoar ofter the latter were aware of the presence of the enemy—the Generai being oc- enpied in preparing hie attack—when the arti zal ofa new coleman of tio compacise and a hundred cavalry, etgy absolutely necessary, using with fitness and reso- Juteness the indinite elements of strength upon which a constitnted power may reckon. }ov the same reason, no government baa a right to canse 4 fuction to raise the standard of rebellion. Our war of independence, in which we conquered our powerful encinies, not withstending the French having pursued a system of exaggerated rigor; that merciless war which we carried on in America, terminated by its indepen- dence; and that of Don Carlos, which enced only in the fields of Vergara, confirm me more aud more in my principles. J decided, therefore,to work ia accordance with them, Jhad,formy part, done ax much ga waa postible for me to gin in favor of the govermment that which represented the public opinion of the country, In the very jurisdiction in which the pirates were defeated, I had svperacded various finexionaries, who, tothe tnjury of the government, bad there given cause for zreat censnres,and appointed in their pace honorable men, who, as Lieut. Coiancl Soto, gave Up their command without as much money as wold defray the cost of ther retarn to the Pevinenlary and the proofs of gratitude which I received for thata.d other evidences of the desires which animated the government for the well-being of the ialaud, were Soy me the most pertain indica- For myseif I have not the slightest doubt that the | general spirit. But although I eon- the conduct of the . of the country. I di¢ not for all that feel te continne vigt lant and watelifu) of the conspirators, who worked actively, and imagived that they could reekon on strong sympathies and elements. Nevertheless, neither that eare, por the with which [ closely followed the machinations %, prevented me boasting of ce, 80 28 to inspire it im all, Touring of their With when the arrival of an expedition was announced, was noteffected on account of the detention of the Cleopatra in New York, I directed a circular to the Lieutenant-Gavernors, which I published, and in which 1 inclaleated these ideas; and if, sometimes, the peninsulars, scattered throughont the country, at a distance, solicited me to permit them to arm themselves, I resolutely refused yielding to their request, maintaining im them the confidence which they ought to have in the govern- ment, and in the good spirit of the country. Had I thought for one moment, thot there really ex- isted any serious elements of revolution; had I, for ore moment entertained the fear of an insurrection, I should at once have taken preventive measures, and, as I etated on a different occasion, I shonld have transported to the Peninsula all such indi- viduals as I considered dangerous, even though the vessels of the bay bad been insufficient to contain them, ard the military commissions had acted in conformity to the laws. But the triumph of the cause which I defended, I should have made to de- pend, in the event of an insurrection supported by the Americans, were upon the activity and skill of military operat.ons, the courage of our soldiers, and* the derision of all good Spaniards, than upon the infliction of severe penalties. Happily, and as! hoped and urged from the progress of puvlicopinion,thia case did not present itself. The inhabitants of the coun- try, both in and out of the cities, offered an example of fidelity on that occasion, of which there are few instances, That hatred of foreign dominion, so pe- coliar to ovr race, having been aroused, their con- duct was only comparable to that of their brethren of the Pevinsula at the time of the French invasion. Hence it was that at the sight of so grand 4 specta- cle J should most earnestly have wished not to shed one drop of blood, and if,as I had good reason to expect, Lopez had been beaten in the first four and twenty hours, and he and all his follow- ers killed or executed on the field of battle, neither Puerto Principe nor Trinidad would have witnessed these acts of political justice, even though I had ex- posed myself to appear wanting in euergy in the eyes of a few fanatics, Unfortunately the delay experienced before the comple'e rout of the insurgents compelled me to eactifice my feelings and even my convictions before the demands of political reason, and it became inevi- table that the law should have its course in the case of Agiiero and three of bis accomplices at Puerto Principe. ard in that of Captain Armenteros and two others at Trinidad. But immediately after the de- feat of Lopez, 1 revoked the authorization which I had extended to the military commanders of Puerto Principe and Cuba, to cause military sentences to be executed, and this did not occur in ropes to any one of those in which the law declared that the pen- alty of capital punishment should be inflicted. ‘rom the outset I saw all the importance of the capture of Lopez and his adherents, and to effect this I neal esti parted with all the forces which T had in the capi‘al, only retaining the precise num- ber of men nec to the daily military service of the city. Still, notwithstanding all this, the popula- tion of Havana witnesced no measures calculated to inspire alarm. Nota single peo. left the bar- racks. The single armed force of the police sufficed to inepire all good Spaniards with confidence, aod they all considered this, under the direction of the active, energetic and wary commander, Fructuoro Garcia Munoz, 08 amply cient to preserve public order and erence Feeling quite eonfident of the saccess of the opera- tions against the insurgents, I calculated that, in the pocition in which they found themselves, it was im- possible that a single one should escape, and I hoped that this would also be the lot of theirleader. What- ever the capacity of the latter, and the unfavorable character of his past life, his capture was a matter of immense interest. He was, in truth, a Spanish | Genera, bearing the banner of Cuban annexation; one, too, who had long lived in Cuba; who had many friends and periesas there, and who, as is usually the case with persons representing any politi- cal idea, had succeeded in causing his fanlts to be forgotten and his qualities exalted. Thus in Cuba, as well asin the United States, Lopez was spoken of as a man of extraordinary valor and great devotion to the cause of liberty. Posterior events only served to confirm the importance of his death for the Cuban annexation party, which has not found a leader to supply his place, for this name cannot be given to a Gonzalez ora Tolon. For whence comes it, that the a) of the Lone Star, composed of Americans, should have observed the junta of Cuban emigrants, and the fact that if a pew expedition should be di- rected against this island, # would have to look for North American Generals, whose names alone would be sufficient to kill any echo iu the country, and es- pecially among the peasantry, who can have no symyathy with men speaking a language different from their own. The annexation, as far as it could be effected by Cubans, some of them men who were xious to conceal the bad character of their former life under the protection of a political banner, suf- fered its death blow in the expiation of Lopez. This Havana well understood, and this it manifested in ita exuberant mirth on the 30th and 3lstof August, thongh even this excessive joy could not conceal the sensibility and kindness of the inhabitants at the time of the execution of the sentence. “I desire,” caid I, in a short allocution, “that the most profound silence should solemnize the execution of the sen- | tence of the law;” and twenty thousand persons wit- nested, without one single voice being raised, or the | slightest disturbance of any kind manifesting itself. On the day next following, nothing indicated that such serious events had met with their termination. This conduct, as loyal as decided in the inhabit- ants of the island, had completely changed the posi- tion of the government in the country. Until the confidence whichI had in their immense majority had been tested by actual experiment, the expedi- tions, however contemptible per se, were of conside- rable importance, in so far as they might give rise to interior complications; but, once freed from all | auxiety on this head, they appeared so insignificant | that, in a communication directed to the government of her Majesty, on the 31st August—that is, on the ay previous to the execution of Lopez—I said, in reference to the expedition of 5,000 men which Gen. Huston was preparing at New Orleans, that, in case this should turn out to be real, I felt confident that it would be completely destroyed ina very few days. Thad taken possession of all the papers and cor- respondence of Lopez. I had before this in my bauds many of bis communications, and on the otuer hand,the declarations of prisoners clearly pointed out the persons in the island who were guilty of a share standing and importance in the country; but [ was, | Deverthelesa, unwilling to make use of these antece- dents, and I avoided, as far as I was able, to use them for the a (i of filling My the prisons and occupying the Military Commission. 1 confined myself, then, to banishing those who had been most active, and whom I considered dan- gerous. Some of these there now are, however, who accuse me of violence and injustice, and who, hav- ing escaped from Spsin, are now the most active agents ol agents of the United States. * Bat it was not merely interior complications that were to occupy my attention with regard to the ex- pedition of Lopez. It is a well known fact, that by reason of the singular organization of the g: rent of the U S en when that yi ment may he decidedly f expeditions from the country against fri tions, it ie nevertheless accustomed to meet with dit- ficulties of a more or less serious character, which can in every case ferve as 9 pretext for intentional forbearance. The cave of the tirst expedition of Lo- pe, when a member of the cabinet of Washington ‘urnished not only money, but arms belonging to the State in support of the vai is too recent to be for gotten, and although the distinguished and honor- eble President, Mr. Fillmore, might have bona fide desired, as J think he did, that a eim'lar at- tempt should not hefrepeated, it is nevertncless certain that he conld not or would not prevent the departure of a new expedition. There is fh the Unit- ed States a party anxiously desiring the annexetion of Cubs. In this, too, the Southern States are very much interested, for they are siaveholding States, and were they only able by their sole efforts to effect this annexation, they would continue slavery in this island, and would find @ counterpoise for the prepoa- derating influence of the North, and an advantageous investment of the capital represented by their slaves. On the other hand, public opinion was greatly op- 4 to the Spanish rule in Cuba, and it was sup- d that the population at large was ceady to rixe in arme against it at the first opportunity that would present itself. This latter tgct is clearly apparent from their having ecnpoeed t so insignificant an expedition could fulfil ite ubject. From these consi- derations, and many others, it may easily be imagin- ed with what pleasure the annexation party would hail any iucident calculated to promote a collision between the United States and Spain; for it knew that ite clamors weuld then find a ready ecko in the exaggerated susceptibility of the whole American people, Such @ conilict would certainly be underirable on the part of the Spanish ‘nment or of Spain, in any case not involving the national honor nor the possession of Cuba. The Captain- General of the feland, who, by any fault of his, or | by any imprudent act, might have produced this, would have been responsible to his country for the serious consequences thet might result therefrom. Nothing, however, coukd be less calculated to awaken surprise than the fact that some such pretext mighs arise from these piratical expeditions, or thet any of | the measures of the anthorities of the island, however legitimete and called for, might serve a4 a handle for thore persons in the United States who were enxivusiy awaiting | anything that might tend to produce @ confit between the two goversmmme nts. The circumatare that occurred in the las} expedi- tion ot Lopez, whe™ he and fifty pirates were beaten in the expedition. They were ail, it is true, of little | at the Morrille, snd captured when secking to es- Say, FO eadenbiedly one. of theve, este whieb T have just alluded. i that I had ef ihe eo pture of these filty individnals, mostly Americans, I received from the General who coptured them’; it reach oe! in the afternoon. the penalty of death, as pirates, was recent and an ‘ocal, and it was impossible not 0 cem- vy the public and explicit declaration that no quarter would be given them, especially, too, a8 the expedition had succeeded in surviving the ex- | pedition to Las Pozas, Still, #8 far as I was personally concerned, Imight have avoided one difficulty of the position in which I was placed by causing the pirates to be tried by the naval tribunals, they having been captured at sea, 98 was done the year previous in the case of the Contey prisoners. But would these tribunals have recognized the edict promulgated by me as General- in-Chiet? For such is, in reality, the singular _posi- tion of the Captein-General of the Island of Cuba, though he is made responsible for its defence and pre rvaition. When the prisoners of Contoy were ought to trial they appeared only before a court of admiralty, and aftera Hong onion of the Judge hearing the cause (anditor), in which it was proved that they were pirates, they were set at liberty, and it was only subsequently, and after 9 long interval had elapsed, that the Tribunal of Revision con- demned two captains and one pilot to the presidio. It may be that such a sentence was just; it may be, too, thet nnder the circumstances it was in ac- cordance with the dictates of a wise policy; still I cou'd not expose myself to see the decree which I | had published remain void and without effect. It was evident that it could have no effect in any fortified place on the coast, where the excitement would have been avoided which could not fail to be produced in the capital of the island, unaccustomed to scenes of blood; but at Havana it ‘was a matter of urgent necessity to enforce a law so justly established, and totreat as pirates individuals who, well aware of the penalty attached to their un- dertaking, hed sought to attack a peaceful country and destroy its nationality. 1 did not hesitate then to make up my mind as to the coure which I was to pursue in this serious crisis. Limmediately sent for the Lieutenaot-Gene- ral, the Mayor de fa Plaza, and the principal chief of police, and in the presence of the Comiander- General of the navy I ordered that the troops of the garrison should be drawn up on the morning follow- ing at 7 o'clock, in the immediate neighborhood of the castle of the Atares, as the execution of the fifty prisovers was to take place before half-past seven. 3 was to be the duty of the Chief of Police to col- lect togetker and hold in readiness all the funeral Cae necessary immediately to carry away the dead eB. It was my object, in disposing of matters as I did, to advance the hour of the execution as mach as | poss'ble, and as causing it to be eflected before the news became gererally circulated throughout the | city and the neighborhood, to create as little excite- ment as ible. I reflected, however, that the | military decree which I had issued was to be exe- | cuted Without any formality whatsoever upon the | mere apprehension of the pirates. These had not been captured on e adjacent cayos, and it was necessary to justify the appli- | cation of the decree in this instance, though it was a matter of public notoriety that they had taken part | in the action of the Morrijlo. With this end in view, | I ordered two officers of the Military Commission, in | company with interpreters, to proceed on board the frigate Experanza, where the prisoners were kept, to take from them a general deposition. As their num- | ber was considerable, however, and it was necessary | to employ interpreters, only ten depositions had been taken when the bour fixed for the execution had ar- rived. Thus delayed, it of course became unavoida- | ble that an immense concourse shoyld be present at | the execution; for in spite of the utmost diligence on the part of the officers of the commission, it was half past ten before the depositions were concluded. The sentence having been immediately signed by me, | was executed at eleven. On the same day, the American steamers left Ha- vana, bearing the intelligence of this event to New Orleans. Prompted by a feeling of humanity, I had allowed the prisoners to write to their families. In | al] their letiers they companied of Lopez and cer- | tain newspapers, which they charged with having | brought such a fate upon them, by deceiving them | as to the real state of public opinion in Cuba, declaring that it had shown itself entirely hostile to them, and bearing evidence, at the same time, to the valor of our troops. | By a fortuitous circumstance, however, it Povpened | that there letters could not become generally known | at New Orleans, and the only ones that did come to | light were letters of adieu, which could not fail to | interest the inbabitants in the fate of their fellow , countrymen. Besides, the editors of those newspa- | ers, espec'a'ly Mr. Sigur, of the Delta, an intimate | friend of Lopez, and the soul of the expedition, fear- | ing the effect likely to he produced against them by the declarations of those unhappy men, zealously cir- culated the foud calumny that the dead bodies had been dragged through the streets and quartered; an infamous falsehood, the Grp ees of which had been perfectly calculated, for this gave birth to the scandalous riot, in the midst of which New Orleans— that great city of one of the countries which pretends, not without reason, to be at the head of civilization— presented the degrading spectacle of a savage peo- ple, forgetting all the respect and consideration due the law of nations, to attack the Spanish flag, the house of her Majesty’s consul, andthe homes of many | honorable and Spaniards. These moments | of excitement General Huston also sought | to take acyantage of, and proclaimed an ex- pedition of five thousand men against Cuba, and | that not without result; for ina few days two thou- | sand five hundred men were armed and gathered to- | gether at New Orleans, although they did not fail subsequently to disperse, thanks to the speedy intel- ligence of the result that had attended the Lopez expedition. For while these events were occurring | at New Orleans, the expedition was completely routed and urdone—a large number of the pirates | had been killed in the difierent battles, others shot, and the rest, dispersed, famished and unarmed, could offer no serious resistance to our troops. The measures which I had taken assured me that I should scon be master of them all, which would, in | fact, have been the case, had Commander Ramos | executed the prescribed movement. This it wasthat | induced me to issue a decree granting an exculpa- | tion from capital punishment, which, had it been de- layed fora day, would have been nugatory. I de- sired to appear energetic and severe, but not san- guinary; and it would have been unjustifiable to shoot men who found themselves in so distressed a situation, after having resisted, for several days, the perrecution of the troops. Even ourmil.tary command- ers and soldiers urged the necessity of sacha measure, | and it should be recorded, a3 doing honor to their fentiments, thut in consequence of their forbearance over sixty men escaped being shot, who had heen in their pewer since the day previous to the pardoning decree; and that immediately upon their being in- formed of their pardon, the troops enthusiastically burst forth with loud acclamation in honor of her Mejesty. To our august and magnaniinous sove- reign, they were certainly indebted for their lives, for, as i then steted to the government, my desire bad been solely to give a proof of the lofty feelings and boundless clemency of her Majesty. It may be that, at first, there were some persons who did not | appreciate the importance of this act; it may be, too, theteven now, the sight of tue ingratitude with which it wos repaid by weny, would cause many to disapprove of it; bat I have had the satisfaction to fee that those persons who at first deemed it impoli- Twards came to congratulate me ; it may be ne exciiement under which they labored ared, or perhaps in mence of the | ‘ion which this act produced in the and the vnanimous jadgment with d throughout Europe. ont at Washington, however, yielding y of satisfying the impression preduced te! nce, commissicned Commodore to proceed to Havana to ascertain the truta harges brought forward against the authori- nd inhabitants, He arrived at the port on the 3d of September. Mr. Parker gave me official com- munication of his commission, and 1 answered, re- fusing to receive him in any other capacity than that of Commodore; 1 also, subeeqnently, refused to allow him to visit the prigoners, he having solicited yermission to do so ofticially. By this course I sus- ‘ined the dignity of my author'ty as representative of your Majesty in the island. I also caused them to be put in irons for twenty four hours, that they might ece that they were not considered in the light of pri- vonere of wir; after which { ordered their irons to be taken off,"and I treated them with all the kindness that humanity and even policy required, allowing them to be visited and assisted by their fellow- countrymen, while at the eametime I sent them to the Peninsula, without loss of time. On the other hand, and asa new proof that it was only through motives of humanity, and becavse in my opinion it was consistent with my character, 25 representing the magnatituity of onr sovereign, that 1 had acted as I did, with pirates allowed to escape capital punishment; to show this, I repeat, a suit was brought a short time after against a person re- pies to be one of the most active correspondents of ¢ annexation newspapers of the United States, and the most efficient agent of the piratical expe- ditions. Mr. Thrasher, the individual to whom i re- fer. was an American citizen, resident of this island, and os such had been for along time enzaged 48 a merchant, and having taken the editorial ou ofthe Faro Industrial, wos laboring zexlously make this paper an instrament of the cane to which he was apparently devoted. 1 chal clxewhere have occasion to state the reasons | confided to him, as digvified and polite in hig presidio, whieh ly approved! 1y me. Ceuta was to be the place where this papod » The first inte ligence | was to be avcomplthed while I never an’ instant, notwithstanding the numerous and warm ‘riends. which cer‘am ir fluences in the United States ed me at about three | had obtaned for Mr. Thrasher, vor his friends ot The decree imposing | foreign eitizensbip, nor, iv fine, the urgent remon- strances directed to me, in consequence of sueh pros teste, by the American Consul. The crime having beew proved, and the accused tried in conformity to our laws, and by virtue of an established code of rights, it was necessary and urgent to show that the Spanish government was ° not disposed to show the leust toleration in the ease of tbe persons abusing its generous ‘hospitality, while it p sebyaoe abd energetically made of indisputable sights in cuses which, like Mr. Thrash- er’s, were to show the world its resolution to be firm, as it had, in former instances, solemoly showed ite desire not to go beyond the limits of necessary seve~ rity. ‘ This was, no doubt, fully recognized by the gov- ernment at Washinyton, which having become op- * ortunely and adequately informed of the real Iicts of the case, absndoued all the prooeed- ings which it hed begun with regard te the sentence of Mr. Thrasher. Unfortunatel: , how: ever, he was pardoned shortly after; still what had < already been done cou'd not be effaced, and I think, Ihave shown beyond any question to foreign reais dents at Havana, that if they were in my esteem? worthy of protection so long as they indare’ our rights, notIing would preveut my punishing them ag soon a8 they should appear unmindiul of their duties. But these were not the only incidents that could ir duce a conflict between the two governments. be fact that steamers were continually reaching the port of Havana, carrying letters and a t number of passengers, mostly to the same count rend it possible, nay probable, that any insult or any slight mirtake committed towards one of them there, might lead to serious difficulty, On four different occa- sions steamships evtered the port, between the time of the Janding of the expedition and the execution of Lopez, and that, too at the most critical period, such a8, forinstance. the execution of the fifty Ameri- caps and the death of the worthy General Enna; they brought intelligence of the New Orleans dis- turbances, and one of them came in at the very mo- ment of the execution of the Jeader of the aves Surely, fer mavy persons, there would have been in all this no pretext for uny difficulty; nothing was more expedient than ‘to avoid the danger of the moment by preventing the landing of the passengers, and Gad J the vessels to receive coal at, the Tris:, conia wharf, or by detaining them under the guns ofthe Cabuna. The right of Cuba to do all this was urquestionable; but in questions of such a natare, and in such circumstances, I could not fail to regard it as much a right asa political convenience. Thougir there were no grounds of complaint against the government and people of the United States, ‘the , event of a disturbance had not arisen, nor even of + the slightest intexruption of relations; in proportion as, on the other hand, there was no grave danger to. be dreaded, nor was there, indeed, any reason to be- lieve piiclenty justified a measure certainly antho- rized by luw, but which would vaturally have in+ jured many travellers who might be, and were, ‘en- tirely strangers to the events which were passing im Cuba, and prejudiced the public correspondence which those steamers brought. Besides, a considera- tion of honor, and even of convenience, required the show of confidence from the government, as well in its own power as in the support of the country. I preferred. therefore, to avoid the inconvenience of prohibiting travellers to disembark freely, confiding in the good sense of O* pe accustomed to respect the measures taken the government, and in the respect with whick he Americans had also been accustomed to regare , the Spanish authcrities—a re~pect which onght ta be increaced by the very fact of permitting their cir- euJation in such cirermstances. A sim pla tion of policy, upperceived by all, assured me of the immediate repression of whatever disorder, and it sa ‘ happened thas there did not occur the least disae greeable occurrence. The rights and dignity of Spain being thug arded, disposed to sustain them with equal energy in the future, contemptible as the expedition might be, I ought not to be indifferent to anything whick might conduce to avoid thei, since it is easy to divine what loss they must produce in a country of such commerce, and where there were 80 many ace cumulated elements of destruction; so I did not lose sight, for a single moment, of the desirableness of | conquering, at the same time, the invading pirwes, and the opion which favored them in the Uni States; and I bave no fear ‘o assert that the energy and the moderation opportuvely emplo} no Jeas than the coafidence in their owm force, wit whieh the government of Cuba shunned every kind of ob- struction, contributed in a great manner to rectify that opinion. And I have here precisely the motive of another disposition which I made, though it tot sufficiently comprehended by some; | mean tB : liberty given to several of the North American / curnale, Iwill say but little to prove my Wi drdird oot a tbat messure. The tribunals had not interfered to punish them. They had been coudemned through the effect of a proclamation issued by me, as General- in-Chief ; and as such, I possessed the facaity of ex- cluding those whom I might design. I ought, there-’ fore, to judge of the propery of that disposition simply under the point of view of political conye- nience; and when I have demonstrated all the in- terest which I had in rectitying public opinion in the United States, it will not appear strange that, with this object, I might desire to have published there, and in such a manner as would leave no room for doubt, the conduct observed by the inhabitants of the island, and by the troops, against the in- vasory expedition ; particularly so, when all the priso.ers confesced onenly the valor of our soldiers, and the unanimous hostility with which they had been received by the 1 Resale hh At that time Mr. Owens exercised the charge of American Consal in Havana, a gentleman as zealous for the intere ta Su duct with the authorities of the Spanish “ and Ihad torequest him to cesignate to me two of the / journals whore anterior c nduct mie have beer honorable, so as that I might give them liberty to circulate. Mr. Owens mentioned to me the names of Colonel Haynes and Captain J. A. Kelly, and both having been called into my presence I instructed them, gave them money, and told them ee the only thing Irequired from them was that they shculd publish in their country the truth of what occuned. Unworthily corre-ponding to the conduct held towards them, there two wretches (nriserables) did nothing more than distert events, as if the very fact of theirfliberty were not sufficient to belle them, since it does not agree with good reason that if I bad had anything to fear I should have placed them in a situation to publish it, But the icea of being converted ivto heroes, and of being acclaimed by the demagogical multitade, choked in them even the least sentiment of honor. All, however, did not behave themselves in thia manner, and so I acceded to the liberty of three youths, of respectable families, in whose favor re- Sponsible persons of their couutry interposed, that they might inflnence, us they afterwards did, the rec~ tification of public opinion, making known with, troth things as they bad occurred. The result corresponded to my idea, and thus it ts + © that I do not doubt th government of the Ur facilitated the power of the tates to give the satisfac- | fion to which we bad a right, and which her \jeety’s government was at full liberty to exact, thout in avything having bad to compromise the / ilar graceyconccded by me to some of the | ule as I was to observe with them what- ree I might judge fittest—a course which I sidered should always have to end by the conces- of liberty, sooner or Inter, and according to tha direction which affairs might with the govern- meut of the Union. soart from these and other consid fact ia that in the of the incidents which might during the expedi- tion, and of the difficulties which other incidents might produce, the American goverament coald not promote nor did it promote, tue slightest complaint’ against the Captain Genoral of If the sup- ored excesses with the buries of the filty men shot ad been true, if they had been shot without a pre- vious declaration, if viclent measures had been token against American voxsela or ngers, or* that avy outrage or insult had been offered to those dwel ia the island, the government of the United States would have addressed strong reclamations to- that of her Majesty's, and it might have heen an excnse for them to refuse all reparation for the acan- dalous events of New Orleans And if those com, plaints might not have been entertained our go* vernment, then in what a condition would our go- ° yernment have been placed by their refasing any satiefaction for the Lian done to our ss and ta. ovr countrymen? To what measures might jt not have been forced? Tho withdrawal of our Minister at Washington, the cessation of eur relations with the United States, which would have stimulated the annexationists and augmented their numbers, and finally, perhaps war, because the national sent it had been awakened in Spain, and Spaniards ia not have wished to endure the affront calmly. The government of the United States, not being: able to iauke the Jeast demand against the Captain- General of Cuba, their own reputation and honor, and the opinion and dinity of a nation which as- , pires—and not without reason—to be considered ag very enlightened, couid not the less compel thea to disapprove an act which dishonored it. And so, hy cbserving how public opinion was gradually eet, right as to the events of Chba, and how those of New Orlesna continued appearing in darker colors, and by devreea the national resentment produced. Ww the fueillade at Havana was calmed, the acnte Mr. Webster, who studiously took care that thet ex- ? whieh in@uced me to decree the suppression of this paper, pending the events which occapied my atten- tion; for the present I shall merely say that to Mr. Thracher's antecedents, which I have just mention- ed, private information was received, seriowly ag- gravoting the suspicions which be had already in- corred, Mr. Thrasher was in consequence soon after surprised with his c mndence, and brought be- fore » military commission, which oomraission in a public connec)! of war, septensed bing to eight years’ change should take place, did not delay in jd Pod cine which was due to the Tixnmine, therefore, whether I] should have cont? mitted a grave error in qualifying the greater or less importance of the expedition, by simply attending to the porel vuiltay 3 reeks Bek bow ede wore tt the purel ct. iow place relief fe real ad Bost interesting ‘: if thys the guvernment as well ay the ppblie opiniog —e thi rere |