The New York Herald Newspaper, February 26, 1853, Page 2

THE BROADWAY RAILROAD CASE. Supreme Court. ABOUMBNT OF BX-CN IBF JUSTIOE JONES ON BEEALS OF THB GRANTEES. Before Judges Edwards, Morris and Strong. Fes. 23.—John Milhaw and others vs. Jacob Bharp and others. | TocChiet Justice Jonzs—Most certainly, sir that is the only view which can be taken © and Li isupon the same footing by which every ratlroad company in this city holds its powers. Mr. Vax Borex—But the Common Council have entered into an obligation es down these rail Ex-Chiei Justice Jonss—The Common Counc thave made no such obligation; they have no p tomake one. They hav@ given nothing but a li- centre to put down these rails, and there is no time designated or specified. If they are under an obli- tion, tley are equally under an obligation to con- ne it during the litetime of these parties as he are for a aaa day. It is ofthe very esseuce of all these privileges that were 5 ted. Every privilege that a citizen holds, under these powers of the corpo- gation to give licenses or permissions, is held in the game way. It is true that the Common Council is a reasonable body—that it is abody which alway: mpon considerations that are addressed to their un- derstandings—and that, as long as such an institu- tion shall continue te the public benefit and public good, and be sanctioned by public opinion, the cor- poration probably would not interfere; but let public m pronounce against it as an annoyance and as 2 serious evil, and, my word for it, every rail in the sity would be taken up. The Harlem Railroad and he Hudson River Railroad hold under the same foot- img exactly; and, the Court will perceive, in al! in- stances where they made these grants they never specified the time; they make no grants that shall ‘ontinue for a year, for a month, or for an hour; and the people who take them, take them upon the con- fidence that should they be viewed considered aga benefit—they would have such popularity that zo Common Council would dare to interfere with them. But they hold them at the breath of the Common Council, and I may say at the breath of the people. Now, this is a it. The gentleman on the ether side has just said that the corporation is under an obligation. Where is it? wey authorize and ‘is road to be laid down; but do they author- it to be continued? They authorize and permit the hackney coaches to drive, and yet we Kuow that every day their licenses are taken from them. It is the very nature of a license that it is revocable at the Pleasure of the party granting it, or otherwise it be- @omes, as the gentleman denominated it, a contract. Baha@id like very much to know what remedy these ies would have if the next Common Council were \d, next year, to revoke this whole grant / Judge Monris—That was the case in the street- Sweeping matter. Ex-Chief Justice Jones—Yes, sir. And the case of Drake vs. the Hudson River Railroad Company, which has been referred to, was, | believe, substan- tial in al its breadth and latitude, before the court, and ‘the court gave it all the attention which they had the the first case where this question really came, | I will refer the Coart, | = to give it at the time. that , to the opinion of Mr. Justice Edwards, which embraces, in substance, the views taken by fhe court upon this subject :—“The first ground,” Judge Edwards says, “upon which the plaintiits @laim to be entitled to the interposition of this court, is that the State had not the legal power to delegate te the defendants the right to take and use the rty of individuals in the construction of a rail- .” Then, at page 556, he says :—‘It has been held, both in this State and in other States of the Dnion, that a railroad is not, per se, a nuisance.” And, let me observe here, that the same question ‘was before Judge Strong, in the case of the Lon; Ueland Railroad, a portion of that road being lai through the village of Hempstead. Judge Edwards goes on—‘The use of a street for a railroad consists | Merely in adapting its surface to a particular mode ef conveyance.” That we perfectly well un- derstand; and all that is done here, all the wee that theve parties contemplate, in making fhe railroad in Broadway, is to adapt the centre of ite surface to the use of a carriage for conveyance of passe! . They contemplate jo other use of the way than that. And Judge Ed- wards rey properly expresses, in this case: “and when s0 a xe , the running of a railroad car is no More an exclusive appropriation of the street than ‘the running of any other species of conveyance would be.” peat nr however, to another part of the nt of the other side: that a license to lay a = een gee pet, and pare ates me cars, isa rime Hi is @ mono} A we yet to learn what the true signification af es term spats hy”? mo The see goes on—“If ca additional facilities an mereege ich a railroad furnishes will have the effect of increasing the use of the it, and thus cause some inconvenience to persons business or residing in its neighborhood, yet ‘wus opened aad ald out, we gut or aeay nore ane out, no rig] an: mn wil he vicisted.” Task the Court to lock « that. Do ‘we contemplate to divert any part of Broadway to other purpose than that for which it was opened, for which, ever since it has been opened, con- stantly used? ‘Neither will there be any infringe- ment of private rights if the track itself should cause aslight —— the surface of the street, provided — and unobstructed.” ae NG—BSu} the grant to be consum- |, and the rails laid comme could not a private ‘peraon, unconnected with company, put a car ‘upon these rails and drive it. f Ex-Chief Justice Jonss—That is a question, sir, to which I have bestowed no attention; but I have here- fofore said, without meaning it to be understood that oa opinion upon it, that I saw nothing to pre- Mr. Freip—There can be no pnblic vehicle with- | eat 4 license; but whether a private one could do ‘this is another question. Ex-Chief Justice Jonzs—I have not considered ‘that question as sufficiently bearing upon the subject we have now before us to bestow any attention upon %; but I have said, that, if a person using a carriage, which he is authorised to nse, should take the track of this railroad, I see nothing to prevent him. For imstance, if an individual should see fit to build a car- for his own accommodation, the wheels of should exactly correspond with the rails laid down by this com; a wheels upon that trac and ride along it; but T ap- prehend that that question will be settled when a sees fit to construct such a carriage. if corporation cannot license a carriage to that effect, by reason of such objection, it follows that won never use a Tallway in the city, and fore we cannot have the benefit of that modern improvement at all, because, from its own nature, it is exclusive, and you must have it exclosive or not at all. Nor, as I under- stand the affidavits upon the part of the plaintiff, is it set up here, or pretended, that you cannot cross from side to side at portions of these rails. Indeed, i cannot be so contended for an instant, for we have @ railroad in this city, which has been in operation now fourteen or fifteen years, which is, I think, the @arlem Railroad, which conveys vast numbers of — ers from Harlem to the Park, directly gh the Bowery, Centre street, a part of Grand mreet, anda part of Broome street. Now, if the please, here isan experiment actually made. Is there any obstruction to the use of that street by carriuges’ Are not omnibuses running there continually, and do they not cross the track, in direction, with perfect facility ? Judge Srroxc—Supposing an omnibus was on the street, immediately in front ofacar, have you a right to turn it off? Have youa right to stop the ears coming down the street; or is there any power in the corporation that omnibuses and other Vehicles shall not obstruct the passage of the cars? Ex-Chief Justice Jones—A case of that kind has, rehend, sir, never occurred; and since the long that the railroad has been laid out there has no collision—at least from the first year, when there was oy ition made to the use of the road by ‘the cars. There never conld be collisions, and none could ever arise unless it be from the perverseness of ‘the individual ; and then it would be settled as every other question would be settled between two ‘persons using the road, and the one attempting to annoy the other, or prevent the free use of it by the z. Ifsuch regulations were not made, an obsti- carman could interfere with the passage of the the car to stop. The carman would have the game right to use the street as the car; and the oaly ion would be, if he had exerted that right im- Broverly, and that question would be snbmitted to proper judge, viz., the Common Council, or its eficers, who always interfere with these collisions be- ‘tween different persons using the road. It does, sir, sometimes happen that an obstinate carman will inter- fere with a private carvinge, and yon cannot help that. When he interferes rightfully, he is protested; but if he does 90 wrongfully, he is punished. That is the whole of it; but that he has an equal right to the road, and to use it in such a way as his rights autho- rise him to use it, with other vehicles, is always ted to them. Now, the next question is, have corporation the power to give assent? That ‘was the question directly before the Court, and that was the opinion — by Judge Edwards and e 4 the whole court. ion before them was: have the © tion the right to give this assent/— not at all as to the right of the company to lay the y—and he says— It will be observed, as for as the rightof the defendants to mars railroad track in the city ‘of New York is concern- ed, the Legislature have not delogated to them the exer- @iee of the right of eminent domain. In respect to the Fight to use the streets of the city, the Legisiature have ‘mot assumed to interfere with the controll orn with fo: the corporation of the city in inves r the re- of the public streets and highways. The eorpor- ation of the city, as the legislative body, having the whose duty it is, to regulate «trects ony teem d has the power to use of Hudson street for the purposes of a a are violated, and it power to refuse use. ‘This shows that the view the court then took sense of the word, a le- a z he might put his carriage | di | animals. their discretion. The exercise of it, was, therefore, legislative power, and it was aleo the exorcise of a “ 3 right in diseretion. Judge Edwards then goes on— if it neither asvents nor refuses, and no private ‘sare violated, this court will mot be authorized to fere, upon the application of a private individual, nt what the corporation of the city, which he right to act in the matter, does not object er the assent of the corporation has been he legal form or not, it is sufficient, as far ax concerned, that ithas not dissented, and that private rights of the plaintiffs will be violated. ere the views taken of this subject at the time that it was before this Court, and since that time it has been in different forms before the Court, in other respects. Mr. VAN Bunax—Does not your opinions take a different views [Handing book to the ex-Chief Justice.] Will you read those passages? Ex-Chief Justice Jones—1! am referred to the fol- lowing passages in my opinion in the case of Drake ys. the Hudson River Railroad Company :— 4 by-law is arule or law of a corporation for it: govern- ment. It is an act of legislation, and the solemnities and sanction required by the charter for its passage must be ebserved. A by-law may be in the form of a resolution, and require the same solemnities to pass it; but a reso- lution is not necessarily a by-law. It may be the mere assent of the eorporatien to an act of a private citizen operating upon ite property, or affecting its corporate rights or franchises, or a license to a citizen to use pro- } or to exercise a privilege. Why not to the use or exereise, within its limits, of rights, powers, or privileges, conferred upon a party by the Legislature, on conditien of obtaining such assent of the city nment? Can any #uch acts be, in any just sense of the expression, termed or deemed laws or acts of legislation of equivalent cha- racter? A corporate body, whether «pecially vested with the power of legislation, or not, has inherently the power to make necessary rules for its government and opera ations, and the right to assent to rightful, and ratify or cenfirm unauthorized acts of others, affecting its interest, whether favorably or unfavorably. All this is predicated upon the exercise of power hy the Geary asa corporate body, possessing private rights and interests. They may dispose of their common lands, they may dispose of avy right or privileges that they possess as a body, and they may do it by resolution or by-law, as they may see fit.” You may act by resolution or by by-law. Jf you act by by-law, it may be in the form of a resolution. ‘That is the whole that is contained in these zes, from beginning toend. If the act that is now about to be carried into effect—the use of Broadway by this railroad for the put of travel—if that can be called a private right of the Common Conncil, or of the corporation, rather, which they hold in their character as a private corporation, then there is an end of the argument. But has it any features of a private right? Now, the case about taking down one market and erecting another was precisely of that character. That was dealing with the property of the corporation as a private corporation, and “had nothing to do with the public. I have read, if the Court please, the note of Chancellor Kent, a8 bene the best argument to show that the regulation an use of the streets of the city is vested in the corpo- ration, not asa private right of that body as a pri- vate corporation, but asa public right vested in them by a municipal body, and to be exercised by the local municipal legislature of the city. That is the dis- tinction. Subsequent to the decision to which I bave just referred, there came before the Supreme Court, in another branch of it, another case, which was Plant vs. the Long Island Railroad Company, which arose in this circuit. In that case Judge Ed- warde gays :— ‘The primary object of a street is to furnish a free pas- sage to the public. It is for that end chiefly that the soil is appropriated to public use. Such being the case, there keems to be no good reason why the use should be contined to the natural surface of the soil, and why a new surface bas not be created for the same purpose, either by tunnelling or excavation. That*was to meet, no doubt, the objection taken to interfering with the surface of the street—taking up the pavement, if you please. If such new surface can be created, it must follow that it can be used in any way in which the original surface could be legally used. And it has been decided by this court, in the case of Drake vs. the Hudson River Rail- road Company, (7 Barbour, 508,) that the laying of a rail- road track upom a street ina city, is not such an excla- sive appropriation of the street as obstructs or impairs the right of passage and re pascace, and, in reference to the convenience af the public, is legal. There, again, is a reiteration of the fqaettel ae in the case of Drake vs. the Hudson River Company, that the lsying of such a track upon the street is not an exclusive appropriation of the street. This has no reference to aad legislative authority. It is not an exclusive app) ition, in itself, of the street. It does not come within the description of a monopoly. It on— ‘Although a highway in the country is, as s general rule, needed for no other purpose than as a place of pas- sage and re-passage, yet the case is different as to a street in # populous commercial city. There are many uses to which streets in large cities are usually appropriated, for the [bcc of health, trade and commerce, and the public convenience, such as the construction of drains und sewers, and the laying of water and gas Pipes These are servitudes which are highly beneficial to public, end in no way injurious to the private right of Individu- sls. They do not interfere with the surface of the street. They in no manner whatever impair the right of free pas- sage and re-passage. Neither are they injurious to the adjoining property. On the contrary, they are either di- rectly or indirectly advantageous. There can be no doubt but a railroad in a city is calculated to promote trade and cowmerce, and it is equally clear that the public convenience is promoted by its being constructed in sueb a manner that it can in no way interfere with the ordi- nary modes of conveyance. If such be the case, we can see no good reason why it is a misappropriation of the s.reet to allow it to be tannelled for a railroad, any more than it is to allow it to be excavated for sewers, or water or gas pipes. It is not denied that, toa certain extent, the Coumon Council of the city of Brooklyn have the legislative control over its public streets. And the Common Council of tee have not higher powers than the Common Council of the city of New Rie I the position is that it is not denied that, to a certain extent, they had a “‘legislative con- trol over the publ’: «treets.”” And they eet he! authorized ‘‘to make and establish all such ces, by-laws and public regulations, not contrary to the constitation and laws of the State, as may be proper for the good government and order of the said city.” This is almost verbatim the powers that are given to the corporation of the city of New York to make by-laws for themselves. The next part of the opinion applies again to the objection that 1s taken; that the land which this railroad occupies was not taken and paid for under the exercise of the right of eminent domain. That question, in another stage of this con- sideration, came before the court, and that part of the opinion wil! appropriately apply to it. In the same book occurs another authority in a case, which is that of Chapman ve. the Albany and Schenec- tad ilway Company. In this case the opinion was delivered by Judge Harris, one of the yee of the third circuit, and le says—‘In the Lexington and Okbio Railroad vs. Applegate, (8 Dana, 289,) the question before the city government of Louisville had a right to authorize thé location, construction and use of arailroad,through a stroet of the city.’ Chief Justice Robertson, in ahd the judgment of the Court of Appeals, says— The purchasers Cota cted on Main street, as on every other street, took their respective lots, sub- ject to all the contingencies that might arise to it, and to the use of it, from all the uses which might ever be made of the street as a public way, consistent. ly with the objects of its original dedication. They purchesed their property, and musthold it, asothers | purchase and hold town lots, subject to any conse- uences that may result, whether advantageously or isadvantageously, from any public and authorized use of the streets, in any mode promotive of, and consistent with, the purposes of establishing them as | coramon highways in towns, and compatible with the reagonable enjoyment of them by all others entitled thereto.” He refers here again to the case of Drake vs. the Hudson River Railroad Company, decided by this court, and he ssya—* The same views have been expressed and maintained, at very great length. by a very distinguished jurist in our own court.” he streeta wherein the tracks of the railroad are laid,” says he, ‘ still continue streets, for the nse, benefit. and accommodation, of the plaintiffs and heir fellow citizens,and the public at large. A ¢ use and purpose of a public street is for tra- vellers and others to pass and repass on and over the fame, with horses, carriages, and other vehicles, and on foot. All parties must concur in that definition as applicable to the right of way over the public strecta of the city.” So, bere the streets continued streets. Broadway continues a street for the benefit, use, and accommo- | 8 | dation of the public at | » equal i ears, and if he had a right to interfere he would com- | Bed te tee tt ait bleed ea ing & railroad in it asitdid before. And does not the railroad, with its cars, propelled by the application of steam or by animal power, come eqnally with the definition a4 the cart, carriage, or omnibus, drawn br It is a new mode of using the street, bat it is still an use of it, for passing and repassing with a vehicle, for the carriage of passengers, ani and freight. And the use of the street by cars with J apeenp is equally in the exercise of the ackuow- edged right thus to traverse the street with carriages, as the use of them by other vehicles for similar pur- pores. Inthe case to which 1 have just referred, I will take the liberty of reading another passage, pointed ont to me by my associate:— The use to which a atreet in acity, or village, is devo- ted, is far more extensive than the inere right of the pub- lic to pass over it. It may be used in any way which shall best promote tne interests and business of the city or village where it is located. What will #0 promote those interests and that business is to be determined by the municipal authorities to whom the control of the street in committed. If it ever was the rule that strecta could only be appropriated to the use of those who may have occasion to tiavel over them, either on foot or by animal power, it is very certain that the progress of improvement nnd the exigences of society have such a rule far behind. \Those who purchase lands adjacent to such streets may be ed to take their title subject to their appropriation f such purposes and objecta as the public interests shall require, This is but one of the branches of this Snpreme Court, which says that the local authority—the leis. lature of the city—to which the power and control of this subject of its legislation is committed, are to determine whether the new use to which it is to be applied is or is not beneficial to the public. In the case of Adams vs. the Washington and faratoga Railroad Company, which is in another circuit, this question came up before the Supreme Court, Jude Willard says: — court was, whether the | goods, | left | ‘The taking possession of t by the defendamts, for the one ‘of constructing a tunnel for their rall- road, occasioned & temporary obstruction of the use of it by the public, but no ground fer the pa. tif to bring thiv action, even if the ull te fee of the land was in him. By the terms of their charter, the defendants hada right to coastruct their road across Or upon 4 street, but they were required to restore the street to its former state, or in sufficient manner not to have impaired its usefulness: (Laws of 1834, p. 442,613.) They hada reasonable time within which to build their read and repair the street. To allow a «treet in a city or village to be used for a railroad track, either upon it natural surface or by tunnelling, is not a misap- propriation of it, provided such use does not interfere as a highway for paskage and repassage. (Plant. v. the Long Island Railroad Company, 10 Barb. eG. ON. Y. Legal Observer, 53. Hudson and Delaware Canal Co., y, the Erie Railroad Co., # Paige, 8%. Hamilton v. New York and Harlem Railroad Co., id. 171. The same a trine is aseerted in Drake v. Hudson River Railroad Co,, 7 Barb. 508.) It was not shown that the street will be destroyed or materially injured by the railroad and tunnel after they shall have been completed. It is a matter of notoriety that railroads pasa through all our great cities, and many of our villages, without essential injury to the right of passage by teamsor persons. Individuals residing in the street must sustain a temporary inconvenience during the continuance of the work; but for this, in the absence of negligence and unskilfulness, the defendants are not responsible. Itisacase of damnum absque injuria. Much less, therefore, can the original proprietor, who not reside in the street, resume the grant and re- voke the dedication for this cause. Now, if the Court please, what escape is there from the question which we have hitherto been consider- ing—from the conclusion that the Common Council of this city had the right to persis this railroad to bef laid in Broadway, and that the laying of the d in that street is not unlawful, or one that the inhabitants of the street, the occupants of the houses uponit, haveno right to complain. Why, if I on- derstand the argument of the opening counsel, two exceptions were stated to the application of these authorities to the present case, one applicable to the case of Drake against the Hudson River Railroad Company solely, and the other applicable to them all. The one application to the Hudson River Rail- road Company was, that in that case it did not ap- pear that Drake was the owner of the soil—of the le- gal title in the land of the street. If the Court will examine that case, they will perceive that no great stress is laid upon that circumstance, and that in no opinion, except the one delivered by the Judge who first gave his judgment, is the circumstance referred to as at all entering into the question. He was a resident upon the street, and, as it was con- tended, suffered all the inconveniences that could follow from the exercise of such a power. The doctrine laid down in the case is, generally, that the corporation have the right—that the Common Council have the right—to authorise these railroads to be laid down in the public streets, and that they bay Henly be laid down and used there, so long as they do not interfere materially with the use of the street by other persons for legitimate Pi 5 The other exception—for the exception I have just mentioned only applies to that particular case—the other exception, it is said—— Mr. Van BurEN—It appliesto all. Ex-Chiet Justice Jones—The other exception is, that in all these cases railroads had been established or incorporated by the Legislature, and that the Le; lature had referred to the corporation to give this mission. Now, ifthe C please, in this view of it question, the very fact that the Legislature in their act referred to the Common Council of the city for their consent to a railroad being laid out in the public streets, is the strongest argu- ment to show that the corporation conceived that they had that power, and it with ; and they, having powers to regulate, manage and govern the streeta that they had a right to au- thorize it or withhold that authorization if they please. It is, therefore, a recognition, on the part of the Legislature, of such a right in the corporation; it is the city Council and the Legislature only that can authorize the laying down of a railroad in the peu streets o! a city, and that they have full power make that authority. In the case of Drake vs. the Hudson River Railroad Company, the first Act did not authorize them to enter into the city at all, but it was the second Act that gave them that permission, and then only subject to the assent of the local Le- gislature, in which the power and right to assent or refuse regularly rested. The Act vests this company with nothing ‘but the franchise. They cannot lay the railroad anywhere, and receive profits, and re- ceive compensation, and take tolls, without an act of the Legislature to authorize them to do so; and the only purpose of the Act of the Legislature is to vest these pares with a right to use such a vehicle, and to id passage money from passen- gers. You do not want the chater to authorize you to use the railroad without charging others with the money for carriage. Any man can make a railroad where he poet: if he can acquire the ground over which it is to run, without an’ for the purpose, provided he rides in it If alone, or takes persons in it for nothing. It is a franchise that authorises him to take the toll, and that makes it necessary for the wing tl rivilege of ca ers for 5 Rua iromesesentie, all that % these acts of the Legis- lature did was to confer upon the company that fran- ‘ise, and the power to take the land where the land was required, by vesting them with the ginal right of the eminent domain in acquiring the land over which the railroad was to , by making com- ition to the owners, but did not touch or inter-- fere with the right of passing over the streets, That, was the right vested in the corporation with which the Legulators had nothing todo. Again, if Iam correctly informed, in the Harlem Railroad charter. the Le; ture exvressly—in iting them the pri- vilege in making the railroad from Harlem to Twen- ¥, d street, in the first pete, and afterwards to ‘ourteenth street, and rwards throughout all ee of the city—-they expressly, in granting them this ense, state, if [ remember the phraseology correctly, that they must apply to the corporation, who may t_ or refuse them the privilege; thus showing at the Legislature considered the whole subject of the right to use the street as vested in the corpora- tion, and in them solely. And, also, in the case of the Washington and Saratoga Railroad, if T under- stand the matter, the act there gave them no power to make the tunnel, for which an action in that case was brought, and that that depended solely upon the assent of the village of Whitehall, through which the tunnel was constructed. The third proposition for which we contend is, that the Common Council, possessing the right to make this road, they have regularly made a grant of it. I have already re- ferred the Court to the resolution itself, which was adopted by that body, and shown the Court, I think, that that was simply a license from the corporation to these persons to use Broadway by laying in it a double track for the purpose of enabling the passage upon that track of railroad cars for the conveyance and carriage of passengers. The objections taken to the regularity are the operations of that license; and one leading one is, that this isa grant of an interest in Ney which the corporation were incompetent tomake. That will more properly belong to that part of the subject presently to be considered. The first whichfapplies to it, is, that there was no assent of a Mayor to the passage of the resolution. It is true, that the Mayor did not give his consent or concur in the passage of that resolution; but does this in any | way impair the validity of that act of the corpora- tion? I would refer the Court to the second amend- ed charter on this point, for] do not propose to spend much time in the discussion of it. The char- ter of 1830 declares that the legislative power of the ration shall he vested ina Board of Aldermen | and a Board of Assistant Aldermen, who, together, | shall form the Common Council of the city. Now, | here the Court will f aptoe ag there was avery mate- rial variance made between the amended charter and the charter as it sree stood, a8 granted by Don- | gan, and confirmed by Montgomerie. In the first j cad the Aldermen, A layer dissev consist of the Alderinen and Assistant Aldermen only, and mecting in two Boards, and deprives the Mayor of all concurrence in the acts of the corporation, | or either Board, and giving him simply a Hey el | or rather veto, upon the acts of the two Boards, which causes these acts to be returned to the Com- mon Council to be reconsidered; and, in order to go into effect, they must be repaseed by each of those | Boards. Put, still the Common Council of the city, thus organized and constituted, are precisely as much | the Common Conncil of the city, and possess all powers and authorities vested in the corporation, as now constituted, as they possessed under Dongan’s and Montgomeric’s charters, and vested in them by those charters. Now, as to the provisions of the charter. The charter of 1849 is, in substance, the same as that of 1830. What isthe order of legisla- tion prescribed by the paramount legislature of the State? It is this: that a law or an ordinance offered in one Board must receive the assent of the majority of that Board, go to the other Board, and receive the assent of the majority there, and then be transmitted to the Mayor. If the Mayor approves it it becomes a law; if the Mayor dissents, he senda it back, and then it must be approved bi the two Boards again, and then becomes a law. It is passed without any actual concurrence of the Mayor, and becomes as effectual, a law of the city as if he had, instead of sending it back himself, concurred in it. What does the charter say? “Any resolution, ordinance, or by-law’ — | thus making a resolution precisely as much in the form | of a law as an ordinance. That resolation or by-law is to go through these forms; and the amended charter | says, having either received the assent of the Mayor, or being concurred in—re-passed by the two Boards of Aldermen—it shall become a law—using the very term ‘‘a law’’--of the corporation of the city. The resolution therefore, precisely infthe form of a reso- | lution, when it has gone through these forms, and received these assents, is a law of the city. That there may be resolutions that do not £° through all these fortns all persons can understand. It is not an uncommon thing for the two Sean resolu. tions—sometimes both do it and es one which are not nec to be sent to the Mayor. Those, therefore, are not lawa. Nothing becomes a law except What wich bas passed the twe tioards, stant Aldermen and , with the free and unobstruucted use of it by the public | objection, in point of form, and in question of order, | and either received the concurrence of the Mayor, or, on his dissent, bas been reconsidered and paased by the two Boards. That is as effectual and binding as any law of the corporation. How far the Mayor might still be considered as a n part, agent, or actor, in the transfer, or sale, or conveyance of the private property of the city and the corporation, considered 48 a private corporation, it is nut neces- sary here to diseuss, though it would seem to me, | looking at the whole form of this amended charter, that, even asa private corporation, in the disposal of their property they would have to go through pre- cirely the same legislative forms that they are com- pelled to go through in regulating the public con- cerns of the city; and that may or may not be cor- rect, when you come to examine the subject in its hearings upon that point. The next difficulty in our ; Way as to this resolution is, that 1t was void and in- operative, because it has not been passed regularly by a Board of Aldermen, at a LS Fad meeting: and that objection is founded upon this—— Judge Stro think it will be unnecessary to discues that point. Ex-Chief Justice Jonzs—Very well, sir. The next point, then is, that'this grant is void because another court—the Superior Qourt—has_ grant- ed an injunction, as it is said, prohibitin the two Boards from passing that resolution, an that they passed it in disregard of this injunction, and that the resolution thus passed is, for that rea- son, void. ‘The whole of the authorities, as I under- stand, upon that part of the subject, are drawn from the acts of the Legislature, and an authority which refers specially to these acts, and which is to this effect: That an injunction is Leva eae the party to whom it is addressed, and that violation of it is not only a contempt of the court which issued it, but is a misdemeanor, punishable by indictment. Now, if the Court please, any act or order of a court —and I vances there is no distinction in substance between the present order of injunction, as it is call- ed, in being an order of the court, and the old writ of injunction which, issued by the direction and under the authority of the court—in the court which issued that ah pee the punishment of the violation of it. They have that subject before them, and if the think that order has been disobeyed contumeliousl¥, without cause, and without reason or excuse, why they regulate the punishment accordingly. The statute has given a further consequence to this act as against a party who violates that injunction, viz.: that he may be indicted as for a misdemeanor; and this is the whole extent and consequences of such an injunction as given by the laws of the State, and lam a little at a loas to see, in the absence of all authorities, a ate case ever adjudged that an act could not be valid, and passing priviliges of any kind to anybody, and becomes ineffectual and inoperative, because it has been done in violation of an order of any particular court. To expose myself to an indict- ment, it must be for what is called criminal contempt of the court. But I disregard all that; and the ques- tion is, what is its effect es an act that a party enjoined goes on to commit? Now, upon that sub- ject, one of the cardinal rules which I have under- stood to prevail from the origin of our laws, is this: that one court never regards or looks to the orders and injunctions of another. They do not know what the other court does. And the document produced Ws associate, of the bill before the Parliament of gland—now in course of enactment, I believe— where the Parliament did lay down, for the first time, the rule that carried the effect of the injunction be- yond that, and states in a note to it, in terms, that at common law the effect given by that act of Parlia- ment would not follow from the breach of it. We pro- duce no authorities, because it is the first time, I believe, that the question has ever been seriously put to a court, that the act which has been done in vio- lation of the injunction, or in breach of it, if you please, is in itself for that cause inoperative or void, or that it will be taken notice of anywhere else than in the court where the act itself was done; and if that court has any power over the subject, it is but a new exercise of power, in compelling the party, if he has the power to do it, to undo the act that he has done. ‘There are some cases which go to that length in the arty who issued that injunction. For example, an qjanction was issued against a person, prohibitin, him from erecting a Punaine and he goes on an puts a story there, the court have, I believe, upon one occasion, held that they might direct himto take down that story thus erected in violation of the injunction. How far that court, in issuing an attachment, would | possess any such powers, or to what extent they could them, is not for me to examine or con- sider; but I should rey aes question whether they could do anything further than to prevent the final | action of a thing still in fiert. But certainly no | other court could have any other jurisdiction upon the subject, or undertake to reyerse what had been done, merely because it was done contrary to the order of another court. But in addition to all that, we apprehend that this injunction, in the Superior Court, so far as it could beconstrued to apply to the action of this Common Council, and tl two Boards, was wholly in itself inoperative and Mwar- ranted by the jurisdiction of that court. It will be necessary, if the Court think, in any point of view, any streés could be laid upon this objection or any weight given to it, for me to examine that question. This isin connection with a part of the subject I was last considering, a8 to the effect of the disobe- dience of an injunction upon acts done which it pur- ports to forbid. It is the case of Kelley and Marce against Cowan, 4th Hill, 266, the opinion in whic! case will be found at page 268, and which was de- livered by Judge Nelson. [To be continued on Monday.) | Broadway Rallroad injunction Case. | SUPERIOR COURT. _ | _ The following are the interrogatories and answers filed in this case:— First Interrogatory.—Were you not, during the whole of the year 1852, one of the Aldermen of the city and county of New York; and of the Sixteenth ward in said city; and are you not now such Alderman? Second Interrogatory.—Was not the injunetion order granted in this action (and of which a copy is hereto an- nexed, marked A.) served upon you on the 20th dav of December, 1852; was not such service made by deliver- ing to you a copy, and at the same time showing to you the raid original injunction order? Third Interrogatory.—Were you present at a moetiug ofthe Board of Aldermen of said city and county on the 20th day of December, 1862, when a majority of all the members elected to said Board approved and passed a certain resolution or grant, (ot which a copy is hereto | annexed, marked B,) notwithstanding the objections thereto of the Mayor of said city? Fourth Interrogatory.—Did you not, after the service | ef said injunction order on you, and such mecting, to- | gether with a majority of all the members elected to | taid Board of Aldermen, vote in favor of, and assist in, the adoption, approval, and passage, of said resolution or grart, notwithstanding the objections thereto of the Mayor, and notwithstanding said injunction? : Fifth Interrogatory.—Did you not, at such meeting, | vote with a majority of the members of said Board of Aldermen in favor of, and assist in the adoption and pas- | sage of, a preamble’ and resolutions (of whieh a eopy is | hereunt nd was not said preainble and res@lutions thereupon adopted by said Board? Sixth Interrogatory.—Was not said resolution or grant, (of which « copy is hereunto annexed, marked B.), subse- | quently sent to the Board of Assistant Aldermen of said | city and county, and was it not on December ‘0th, 1852, approved, adopted, and passed by the votes of a majority Ail the members’eleeted to such Board? McMURRAY & HILION, Attorneys for Relators. The answer of — to the interrogatories filed against him in this proceeding:-— First —To the first interrogatory he saith that he was, uring the last year, and is now, an Alderman of the city of New-York, for the —— ward. fecond.—He admits the service, and in the manner in. nired of; such service was made at the chamber of the rd of Aldermen, at their evening session; but no eopy | of any complaint or of any affidavit was ever served on him, or shown to him, or seen by him. ‘Third.—To the third interrogatory he saith that he was. Fourth.—To the fourth interrogatory he saith that on | the 29th day of December last, at the meeting last men tioned, and after the service of the injunction as above admitted, one of the members of the Board of Aldermen moved the reconsideration of the joint resolution of the Common Council mentioned in the interrogatory, the same having been returned by the Mayor, with his objections; that thereupon the President of the Board declared the question to be on reconsidering and passing said resola- lon, notwithstanding the objections of the Mayor, and ordered the question to be taken by ayes and noes, and directed the Clerk to call the roll; and therenpon the Clerk calied the roll of members, and as the name of this respondent was called, he did, in the ee of his Iegulative and public duties as a member of +id Board, yote aye upon said resolution, according to his judginent and conselence, and that this was the only act done by him in relation to the said resolution after the issuing of the said injunction. That he did then believe that the said injunction did not purport and did not mean to re- | strain him from voting G favor of the said resolution; that at such meeting, a majority of all the members elected to said Board of Aldermen did vote in favor of said resolntion. Fifth.—To the fifth interrogatory, he saith that the ex cepts to the raine, and to all the allegations relating to the caine matter prefixed to the interrogatories, and in- sists that he is not bound to make any answer thereto | and hat they should be expunged. Sixth.—To the sixth interrogatory, he saith he does not knew. Seventh.—To the seventh interrogatory, he saith he does not know. ‘And this respondent doth now deny and protest against the jurisdiction of this court to issue the injunetion, or to prevent his voting in the discharge of his legislative duty, or to call him to account for his vote upon said regolution, And in answering these interrogatories, he does not waive any exceptions tothe jurisdiction of the court, but denies that he can be held answerable to this court for any vote or act mentioned in these anawers, City and County of New York, ss. —-—— being sworn, saith, that the foregoing answers are true. | Sworn, this —. day of February, 1853, before me. The foregoing are the answers of all the members | of the Board except Messra, Wesley Smith and Stur- tevant who have served special replies upon the re- lators’ attornies. Sccond Avenue Railroad—Another Injunction, SUPREME COUR’ | Before Hon Judge Edwards. | Frm. 25.—-Gerrard Stuyvesant vs. Denton Penrsall.— | Motion to show cause why an injunction choukt not issue, | Granted. we eae W.R. Sumner butehered and killed a German, named Krebbiel. at Jackson. Mo., last week, by cut- | ting his with o bowie malig iu iyurioeu phivey, COURT OF GENERAL SES&TONS, Before the Recorder aud Ald. Wesley Smith and Bard. TENTH DAY—~TUR DEFENCE CONTLNUKD, Fen, 25.—Lhe People vx. Win. M. Doty.—Before the rising of the Court, yesterday, the following question was put to Mr. Cook, a’ witness, and objected to by the Attor- ney General — &. Did you ever hear Mr Forrest make any remark relating to the trial of Doty, &e. / ‘The Recorder announced that the Court sustained the objection. (Exception ) Henry H recalled—Q. you searched the minutes and files of the Superior ¢ previous to the Forrest trial, for the appointments of the general and sve- cil terms?’ A. Yes. © Did you find yy? A. Idid, Produces minutes of tke court, commeneing January, 861.) This bo+k contains the minutes after the consoli- dation of the tranferred branch with the other branches of the Evperior Court; that is, the latest appointment made by the judges of that court as to the general and special terms. 2 Mr. Clark read from the minutes the rales of the Su- perior Court, and the regulations of the terms, which spe- cified that the term should commence on the first Mon- day and terminate on the lsst Saturday of each month. 3. When did Judge Oakley take his seat, under hin Inst election? (Objected to. Mr. Clark said that, in England, a misdescription of a jndge was ruled to be # fatal error. He is styled Ohief Justice in the indictment and we contend there is no such officer known to the code. ‘Witness—He was elected Chief Justice by the other five judges of the court, and it is so entered in the minutes. Mr. Whiting—We mean to show that there is no such office known to the law. (Objection sustained. Q. When did he begin to act as Justice, after the last lection? (Objected to, Same ruling and exception en. Attorney General—I have the minutes of the December term, 1851. The Attorney General proposed to read from these minutes an order made by a full bench at general term of December 27, 1851. Odjected to by Mr. Clark, who contended that the judges of the court had no right to extend the December term into another month, though he conceded that they bad the power, previous’ to the commencement of the term, to alter their appointments. ‘This order was made on the 27th of Recember, the last day of the term. The order of the court, it would be secn, extended the term only to the following Saturday, giving to Justice Oakley the power to extend it from time to time as he deemed fit. Now, he (counsel) contended that there was no au- thority known to the law which gave a court the right to delegate its powers toa single judge, however worthy and distinguished he might be. . The Attorney General replied, and said that he sup- posed that the Suptrior Court—which was composed of some of the best minds, some of the clearest intellects in the country—knew well what they weredoing. The coun- sel, too, engaged on the trial, were amongst the highest in their profession. He (Mr. Chatfield) continued to con- tend that the statute clearly gave the power to the Judges to act as they ad done. Mr. Clark argued at considerable length in reply. ‘The Recorder, in giving the ruling of the Court, said that the clause in the code referred to was meant to con- fer upon the court powers such as it has exercised. Ho thought, therefore, under the law, that the court had the | ppwer to make that rule. He thought it was the fair and just interpretation of the clause. He admitted it was a grave question, for if that court had not the power, it would have rendered utterly void and nullified all the pro- ceedings after that date; but that was not a question for this court. [The objection was overruled, and defendant's counsel excepted.) ‘The Attorney General asked the witness if that was the book of the minutes of December, 1861? Witness—It is. aa Cael General then read the order, dated Dec. 2 = ‘Superior Court—General Torm.—Present, Chief Jus- tice Oakley, and Justices Duer, Mason, Campbell, and Paine, Rule—Ordered, That the present trial term of this court, hela by Chief Justice y, be continued until Saturday next, and so much longer as he shall direct.” Witness continued—The next term of the court com- | menced the first Monday in January, Mr. Chatfield then read several subsequent orders of the court, extending the term from time to time, during the trial of the Forrest divorce case. The law reporter of the New York Henan was recalled by Mr. Whiting, and deposed-I was present at the trial of the Forrest divorce case at the time Dr. Quackenboss was examined as a witness. Q. State what Dr.Quackenboss said in his evidence as to his attendance upon Miss Josephine Glifton, from the 10th September, 1844, back to April 26, of that year. A. 1 sec it stated in my report— Attorney General—That won't do,” Can, you remember it independent of your report? A. I could not remember it independent of my report, nor did I until my atten- tion was called to it just now; Dr. Quackenboss stated that he bad lost his book, in which he thought he had entries of professional visita to Miss Clifton, Q. State what he said as to time? A. I cannot remember it now, without reference to my notes. Ihave not the origiual notes with mo. I presume they are in the office. Mr. Whiting—We have the original notes of Mr. Lexow. Witness—I cannot prove anything by Mr. Lexow’s note: ‘The Attorney General to Mr. Whiting—We will not pei mit you to read Lexow’s notes; but we are perfectly wi ing you should take the whole book of Mr. Kempston report, and put it in evidence. ir. Whiting—It’s rather long. Attorney General—Then we are willing to put in evi- dence Mr. Kempston’s report of the testimony of both Doty and Dg. Quackenboss, but not of Dr. Quackenboss | one. al Ye Mr. Whiting did not assent to this. Witness continued—I read the proof of my report near- Wy [gvery evening; Idon't particularly recollect reading that of ‘Dr. Quackenboss; the book was printed from the in the Hxratp. would acne the original notes a ir Whiting said they of the witness if they could be ha Samuel S. Acker, officer of the Superior Court, called— Did you hear the evidence of Dr. Quackenbess? (Ob- eected to; overruled, and exception taken.) Q. Did you hear Mr. Forrest say that if he could send Doty to the State pricon be would be willing to go to hell, or words © that effect? (Objected to; ruled out, and exception aken, T. E Ieanes de |—That he knew Mr. Doty six or Libs years; s0 far asI know, his general character ia good. By Attorney Genezal—I speak of his general character as known to me; I heard people speak good of him; I am in the habit of going to a public house—the Excelsior— to get my meals every day, and I heard people speak well of him there; I believe Doty is carver at that hou bad at remembering names. Q. Can you mention gle individual whom you heard speak well of his character? A: Tam in the habit of going there every day, and beard people say he was a very industrious man in attending to his duties there; they were opie that I knew, but I'don’t know their names. Q. Did they speak of the general estimation of his eharacter in the commu- nity? A. No; what I heard was in relation to his duties at the Excelsior; Iam not a particular friend of Doty; 1 | have no hostility to any of the parties; I have not ex- preaced any hostility to Mr. Forrest; Iam not an enemy of his. Harriet Doty, examined by Mr. Whiting—I reside in | Burlington, Vermont; I am sister of William M. Doty; | I reside with my mother, two sisters and one brother, at Vermont; we moved from Roehester to New York in 1844; my brother, William M. Doty, made a visit to our house at Rochester in 1844; I think he arrived at Ro- chester in July; I think it was in the latter bat | of July; 1 tnink it might have been the last week in | Suly; { have means of fixing the time; I recelved a letter | fiom him soon after his return to New York. [Letter | produced.] This is the letter. Mr., Whiting offered it to the witness, to refresh her memory as to the date. Witness continued—This is the first letter I received from him after his return to New York; it is dated 29th July, 1844; I think I received the letter within a week after he left Rochester; I think my brother was home (in Rochester) less than a week on that vieit; when he left us my youngest sister wont with him; I remember @ con- yersation between my brother and my mother on the sub- ject of his age. Q. Do you remember, and if you do, please state what was said between them on the subject of his age? ‘The Attorney General, in objecting to the question, said | it was not a matter in issuo—it was not a part of the ret jesta—whether Mr. Doty was in Rochester or not; he may have been, but still that does not prove that Mr. Forrest and Miss Clifton were on board the boat, as sworn to by Doty. He therefore contended that they cannot give evidence of the conversation the accused had with his mother. Mr. Clark replied, and after ome further argument from the Attorney General, the Court sustained the ob- jection, and counsel for Doty excepted. Q. State all the conversation between your mother and brother, the defendant, in which conversation the subject of his visit, he occurrences on his way up, and his age, were spoken of. [Objected to. Objection sustained, taken,] Cross-examined—I am eure this is the letter I received from my brother; Iam eure it i# in the same condition now, in every respect, that it was then; that stamp was then on it. Q. Did’ you receive that letter by mail? A. It did not eome by the regular United States mall; it came by penny post; the roark on it is the express mark of Pomeroy’s Express. Q. Is there a penny post between New York and Rochester. A. If it brought this there is; without the aid of the letter I could state as to the year he was home; without reference to the letter I can how state what time he was home; if I had not seen the letter I think I could have stated the month; I think I can positively say it was within a week after he left Rochester that I received the letter; Ithink it was on a Friday he left; Lhave not read this letter recently; Tam able to state that he was there less than a week; f am not positive as to the day he arrived there, but I think it was on Mond ro Tuesday of the same week he left on Friday; I remember an oration or a lecture by Mr. Gough on the 4th of that July; I had lived in Rochester since my remembrance; I don’t recollect the exact number of years it was since I had last seen my brother before that time. Q. Did you ever receive any other letter from your bro- ther? ‘Objected to as irrelevant and as immaterial, nnless it was within the dates at issue. The Court ruled that it was a question of accuracy, and admitted it, Except- edto. ‘Witness continned, 1 recoived other letters from my brother during previous years. Q. What years? Mr. Whiting chjected unless the letters were produced, and he advised tho witness notto answer the question lest she may mistake the date and subject herself tos prosecution for perjury. A discussion arose between the learned gentlemen, and the Recorder remarked that there had been a great many irrelevant remarks made, and he requested that for the future counsel would confine themgelves to the facts in the ease and the issue they were trying. The question waa allowed. Witnors continued. 1 could not state what year [ re- ceived the other letters without reference to the letters; I could not state that I received any in 1843, or in 1842, or in 1841; Tcan’t state positively, without seeing the letters, what times betwoen ‘41 and '44 I received them; I’ received letters from him after he left home; Tean’t say when. Q. Where waa he from ‘40 to '44? [Objected to, everruled, and exception taken.) ‘The further cross-examination of tho witness was do- ferred till Saturday morning. Previour to the adjournment, the Attorney General said he would ark the Court to give the usual eaution to the jury respecting the necessity of their not conversing with any pereon, or allowing any ous Ww oycak to them, end exception | much of oo tue f tendent of that iustitutive in granting uj bject of this trial He made this suggestion because he learned frow respectable authority that Mr. Henry Smith, of the firm of Cook & Smith, Wail xtreet, had heard one of the jurors make use of a remark which was ineonsistent with bis duty as @ juror ‘The Recorder sgaia admonished the jury to refrain from conversing with any one, and not to allow themselves to be approached by any person the subject. If an attempt, should be made it would be the duty of the jury to re port the fact to the Court. ‘the case was then adjourned to ten o'clock on Satur- day (this) morning. BRIDING ALDERMEN, Before Judge Beebe and Aldermen Brisley and Doherty. Fen, 25.—There was a great crowd of citizens at the Tombs, to hear the arguments in the case of George C. Byrnes, whom the Grand Jury charged with obduracy in not answering to questions. The Grand Jury had put in tte following statement, and attended in ‘court yesterday to hear the decision of the court in the matter, after counsel had argued the question: — pu “Granp Jury Room, Feb. 24, 1853. 10 Ta aan THE JUDGES oy Tue Count oF GevERaL ONE: — “‘T certify that, on an investigation now pending before tho Grand Jury of the city and eounty of New York George C. Byres was duly sworn asa witness in said matter; and, upon his examination, the following ques- tion being pertinent and material to the matter under investigation, was put to said witness:— Q. Who was that individual? ‘Which question the witness declined answering, epore the ground that it would convict himself of a crime, or might have # tendency so to do. “Q. Did you pay or cause to be paid any money to & ly year, ta member of the Common Council, within the Procure or aid you in, proouring certain lease “Which question the witness declined answering, om the same ground, under the advice of counsel. ““ HENRY ERBEN, Foreman.’’ ‘The Clerk of the Court having called over the names of the Grand Jory, Mr. Blunt, district attorney, rose and said that, in accordance with the order of the court the pre- vious day, the counsel of Mr. Byrnes was then present. Mr. Jordan said that he had advised Mr. Byrnes to maintain silence in the matter, as answers would ba ialy to criminate him. As he bad been very much en- gaged with other business, he had been unable to give the matter the requisite amount of attention, and claimed an adjournment of ihe case to a future day, when he might argue the caso é Mr. Blunt remarked that there was a difficulty in the matter, as the labors of the Grand Jury were to terminate next day, and it was therefore necessary to have the question determined at once, and thus set at rest the point whether or not witnesses could be compelled to an- swer questions. Judge Beebe—Do I understand the counsel to ask for Ce ae Ir. Jordan—Yes. The matter is of much significance, and involves the questien of bribery, which is an indict- + able offence. The quostions of bribing and taking a bribe are relative respectively. The Jury might ture round on Mr. Byrnes and indict him for the offence if he oriminated himself, and therefore it is discretionary oa his part to preserve silence. Mr. Blunt.—That is not the question involved. Judge Beebe. is about our allowing time. Mr. Blunt. peculiar state of this case it would be at variance with public justice to defer the matter, for the case has very far, labors of the Hag ares be ended if the point was settled. It cannot be denied that itis misdemeanor for the members of the council, the heads of has wahoo or clerks. to receive bribes, but it is not an indictable offence for an individual to offer a bribe to a member of the Common Couneil. Judge Beebe.—No, not on the part ef the giver. But the question is, shall Mr. Jordan bave fusther time? Mr. Jordan claimed Monday. After the members of the court had had a consultation, Alderman Brisley raid a sy ape ies point was involy- ed, and it would be as well that time should be given. Mr. Blunt.—It is an abstract prineiple, and might a« ‘well be now decided. Judge Beebe.—Owing to the fact of the labors of the Grand Jury being near ended, and their having devoted sa ir attention to this matter, it would be a well that the case should not go before jury. I is my opinion, therefore that the matter should now be proceeded with ; but my colleagues differ with me. Alderman Doherty.—Mr. Jordan, would you be ready by to-morrow? Mr. Jordan.—Not possible. Ihave important engage- e ments. : Mr. Blunt here intimated that there were really no dif- ferences between himeelf and the other side. All he wished was to have the point settled as to whether wit- epeed should or should not be compelled to answer, questions. Mr. Doherty called the attention of Mr. Blunt to the fact of the Yodictment, preferred against Mr. ‘Morgar Marsh, in 1846, for a matter in which he had, in answer to queitions, criminated himself. ir. Blunt remarked that that was a different case to the ba After the escape of certain prisoners from ckwell’s Island, Mr. Marsh was examined and made ta answer compulsorily, and, therefore, on that ground the indictment could not lie. ’ As a public officer, he (Mr. B.) was prepared to say that the lay members of the court did brag! right to quash the indictment. In the pre- sent case, he did not dispute the proposition that no man is bound to criminate himself. wished to sea that proposition carried out in its full length and breadth. ‘Alderman Brisley—That point will come before us im the argument. ie Blunt—I want to show in how narrow 8 & com) int lies. The question is as to it being an indicta- fence for a private citizen to offer to bribe a member of the Common Council; and if so, the witness isnot boun® to answer, ard if not he is bound. I am prepared to how that it is not a criminal offence, punishable by indictment, for & private individual to offer to bribe a member of the Cemmon Council- ‘ 4 sapere eet if he should convict himself of moral u le ir. Blunt—Well, that does prevent him answering the questions. ‘Jndge Beebe—An I am in the hands of the majority of the court, I can only personally Gee am willing te go on with the matter. ie powers of court fer this term expire to-morrow. prepare Mr. Jordan—If the Court assigns a day I would to argue the case. * Pik Beebe—It is impossible to name a day, for the court adjourns to-morrow. Mr. Blunt—I move that the order to show cause con- tinue till the first Monday of the next term. The sppli- cation is for attachment for contempt. If the wit impro arly refuse to answer questions, the Court can wn: im. r3 Court decided to adjourn the case till the first Mons day in March. . Erben, the Foreman of the Grand Jury, said that their investigations into this matter would have to cease, as they could not go on examining witnesses till the point relative to making them answer was set! Judge Beebe—If the Jury has nothing more before it we will discharge it. Mr. Erben—The Jury wants to know whether it be necessary to trouble the Court with anything more of this matter? Judge Beebe—Of that the Grand Jury is itself the best judge. The Jury thon retired, THE ATTYMPTED MURDER IN PEARL STREET. Before Judge Beebe and Ald. Brisley and Fr —The case of Henry Seaman, charged with hay- ing attempted to murder Mr. Haydock, in Pearl street, about a month ago, having been called up, Mr. Blunt, Distriet Attorney, entered on the examination of wit- nesses, the principal of whom was Mr. Haydock himself, who swore to the identity of the prisoner. The particulars of the caee must, of course, be fresh im the recollection of our readers, and we will therefore merely briefly state that when Mr. H. was about shutting up his stere he founda negro up stairs, and was aseault- ed by him with a knife, and severely injured. Ex Recorder Tallmadge defended the prisoner, and, after making an address te the jury, and endeavoring to make it appenr that Mr. Haydoed might very possibly be mis- og as to identity, called several witnesses to prove az aliti. : Mr. Haydock was then again called, and questioned aa to the probability of his being mistaken in the prigoner, but he had no reasonable doubt on the subject. ‘Another question arose as to the ownership of a pair of shoes which were found in the store. the part of the prosecution, it was shown that an officer of police had taken the shoes to a girl to whom the prisoner was betrothed, and she had owned to the prisoner having shoes like them, For the defence again it was shown that the prixoner usually wore boots. : Judge Beebe having sumined up, the Jury consulted to- gether, and returned a verdict of not guilty. “Sefore Hon, Juage Daly. Before Hon. Ju . Fre. 24.—E. K. Finch os. Plin White, Willet N. Hawlins and Isaac W. Winn.—This was an action bronght by the plaintiff to recover from the defend- ea wy heal Sea em rag from the 7th of February, 1852. appeares 6 open- ing remarks of Mr. Edmon Blankman, who with Mr. John Cochran represented the plaintiff, that in en 1852, and for some time prior to that » month, the defendante werein the gold dust business, * under the name and firm of “Winn & Hawkins; that their office was in Broadway, near John street, and that before the 7th of February, 1852, the firm: created liabilities to an amount exceeding $60,000; H and that the plaintiff advanced the said about that time the sum of $1,600, for which they gave hinr a check payable at the Chatham Bank on the 9th of February, 1852;] that he presented the check to the bank for payment, and was told that defendants had no funds there; that he, the plaintiff, immeiately proceeded to the place of business of the defendants, ‘and was told by Hawkins, one of the firm, that Plin White, his partner gbad left the city. Mr. Plin White went to Europe, and returned this city a few months ago. His defence to this action was that he never was a partuer of the other two defendants. Many witnesses were called and examined on both sides as to the facts above stated, and afterthe cause had been ably argued by Messrs. Blankman and Cochran for the plaintiff, and Mr. N. B. Blunt, (Dis- trict Attorney,) for the ‘defendant Plin White, the case was givento the jury, who rethed, and in a few minutes came into court with a verdict inst all of the defendants, and in favor of the plaintiff, for the » sum of $1,700 and costs, Tae Sacrsace or A Meprum.—A man whose name is Samuel Cole, residing in Washington county, pets Rd was May rons from the workin; A the it-rapp! lelusion, became possessed ic idea that he rat otter like Abraham of old, @ sacri- fice to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. He ac- agg ie Aa to carry his object into execu- pills, i Off one of his fect, which he succeed- ed in doing some days since, in a very scientific man ner, and with a heroic determina’ that Ke ts with the self-sacrificing deeds done in the earlier ages. His family fearing that some other of his limba might be demanded ina rn ee had bim where he is now in the enjoyment of ag much liberty , Lunatic Asylum, at Columbus, as the nature of his disease will warrant the superin: |