The New Hampshire Gazette Newspaper, November 7, 1760, Page 3

R Here then, let me change the Scene, and having fettled our Af- fairs in Canads (would to GOD they were fo- fettled at the Peace!) permit me to finith my Plan of Negociation, by giving my Senti- mentson the Part we ought to a&t, to obtain a proper Settlement of Afairs in Germany. If a great Number of Alliés can make themfelves formidable to 2 - con®non Enemy, during the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin every Advantage they may have gained, by quarrelling amongft themfelves, when they begin their Negociations for Peace. Like an Oppofition in our Parlianent, carried on againft an over- grown Minifter, all Sorts of Parties and Connexions, all Sorts of dif- agrecing and contradiftory laterefts, join “againft him, at fi#k, asa common Enemy ; and tolerable Unanimity is preferved amonit them; fo long as the Fate of this Parliamentary War continues in Sufpence. But when once they have driven him to the Wall, and think themfelves fure of Vicory ; the Jealoufies, and Sulpicions, which, while the ‘Contefts depended, had been ftifled, break out; 'every ‘one who fhared in the Fatigue, expeéts to (Hare in the Spoils 5 feparate Interefts counteract each other ; feparate Negociations are fet on Foot 3 till at latt, by untimely and mercenary Divifions, they lofe the Fruits of their Victory,-and the Object of the common Refeat- ment is able to make Terms for himfelf *. This was exactly the . Cafe, in the Conteft between Lewis X1V, and the Princes of Eurape united againft him before the peace of Utrecht ; and the unhappy Di- vifions of the Allies (Divifions too likely to have fprung up, even tho’ thete had not been a -party in England, who to gratify their private Refentments, blew up the Coals of Diffention) gave the French the Means of procuring more favourable Terms of peace, than they could well have hoped after fo unfuccefsful a War. I have mentioned this witha View to obferve, that the Circum- ftances of the prefent War on the Continent are very different s no fuch unfortunate Difunion feems poflible to happen to us though it may happen amongft the Confederates who are engaged on the fame Side with France, againft Hanover and the King of Pruffia. It may be colleéted from more than one Hint dropt in the Courfe of this Letter, that [ am no Friend to Continental Meafures in general; efpecially fuch continential Meafures as engaged us during the three Jaft Wars, as Principals ; when we feemed eager to ruin outfelves, in Support of that ‘Aufirian Family whom we now find, with un- parallelled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in clofe Alliance with France. But the Continental Meafures now adopted by England were necefflary both with Regard to Our Honour and Our Intereft. Hanover has been attacked by France, on a Quarrel entirely Engli/h ; and tho® Care was taken, by the Aét of Settlement, that England fhould not be involved in wars on account of Hamover 3 yet Grati- tude, Honour, the Reputation of our Country, every Motive of Generofity, bound us, not to allow the innocent EleCtorate to be rvined for England’s American Quarrel with France. In Regard to our Intereft, no Englifh Minifter, however inflexible. in his Attach- ment to his native Country, could have devifed the Means of mak- ing the beft Ufe of our American Conquefts, if the Fremch could bave treated with Hanover in their Hands. It was with a View to prevent this, to oppofe the French in their Projects in Germauy, the Succefs of which would have been fo detrimental to England, that we boneftly and wifely have formed and have maintained tire Army mow commanded by Prince Ferdinand ; and Kave entered into an Alliance ‘with the King of Pruffia. But tho’ this was a Meafure of Prudence, it was fcarcely poflible for the wifett Statefinento forefee all thofe great Confequences which it hath already produced. The Efforts which the French have made in Germany, and the Refiftance they have there met with by the Care of the Britifp Adminiftration ; have contributed more than erhaps we could expect, to our Succefs in America, and other Parts of the World. Full of the Project of conquering Hanover, France faw herfelf obliged to engage in exorbitant Expences; Armies were to be paid, and maintained in Weflpbalia and on the Rbine ; valt Sums were to be advanced to the Court of Vienna always as indigent as it is haughty ; the ravenous Ruffians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not move, unlefs allured by Subfidies ; and the Mouth of every hungry German Prince was to be ftopr, with the Loais D’ors of France. Involved “in Expences thus enormous, our Enemies have been prevented from ftrengthening themfelves at Sea where England had moft Reafon to dread their becoming ftrong. ~ The infinite Advantages which this Narion hath reaped from the German War, are indeéd now fo well underftood, that we have feen the greateft Enemies of this Meafuré acknowledge their Miftake. - They now confefs that if we had not refifted France, in her Pro- je€ts of German Conquelts, her beft Troeps had fiot been deftroyed ; her own Coafts would have been better proteéted ; fhe would have been able to pay more Attention to her Zmerican Concerns ; Eng- Jand might have been threatened, fo ferioufly, with Invaflions, as to be afraid of parting with thofe numerous Armies which have con- quered, at fuch a Diftance from Home. In a Word, that univerfal Bankruptcy, which hath crowned the Diftrefles of France and gives * The true Hiftory of the Tranfatlion ber alluded to, may, poffibly, fome Time or otber, appear 5 though, as yet, we are perfuaded; the > World kinows very little of it, nay a Monarchy already furk. England greater Reafon of Exultation, than any Event of the VVar, might have been prevented. ltis entirely owing to the German Part of the VVar.that France appears thus low in the political Scale of Strength'and Riches 3 that the is found tobe a finking Monarchy, : And, perhaps, ‘it ‘might be 2n Iaquiry worthy of another Aontefquien, to aflign the Caufes of the Rife and Fall of the French Monarchy 3 and to polnt out thete filent Principles of Decay which have, in our Times, made fo rapid a Progrefs, that France,in 1712, alter upwards of twenty Years almoft conftant -V Var, maintained againft all Zarope, was ftill more refpe&t- able, and lefs exbaufted than it now appears to be, when the /ngle Arm of Great Britain is lifted up againit her, and the V Var has laft- ed no more than three or four Years. If this then be the State of the VVar in Germany 5 if England be bound to take a Part in it, by every Motive of Honour and Intereft ; and if the infinite Advantages it hath already produced, be ftated fairly—the Inference 1 would draw, and which [ believe the wholé Nation will'alfo. draw, is, that we fhould continue .to exert thofé Endeavours which hitherto have be&n fo effectual, in defeating ghe Defigns of France to get Poficflion of Hanover. His Majefty, as Eletor of Hanover, has no Views of Ambition : His Country bas been atiacked only becaufe it belonged to the King of Great Britain 3 and notliing more is required of us, but to be true to ourfelves, by negletting no Step that may prevent Hanover from falling again into the Hands of France, after haviog been'fo miracu- loufly refcued from the Contributions of the rapacious Richlicu, and faved from the Military Defert of Belleifl. I need not fay any . Thing of the Glory acquired by that Army, which notwithftanding it’s great Inferiority, hath driven the French twice from the #efer to the Rbine. 1fhall only obferve, that the next Campaign ( if another Campaign fhould precede the Peace ) will, in all Probability, lofe us none of the Advantages we have gained, om that Side ; if our Army, ftill headed by Prince Ferdinand who has already gained fo many Laurels, be rendered more formidable, as I hope it will, by fending to it fome Thoufands more of our national Troops; who now, fince the Conqueft of Camads, and the Defeat of the -long threatened Invafion, have no other Scene of Aion lefr, but to contribute to another Victory in Germany. ; It would be a very pleafing - Profpe&, if we could fpeak with equal Confidence, and Probability of Succefs, concerning the future Operations of the King of Pryffia. However, when we refleét on the amazing Difficulties he has had to ftruggle with; attacked on every Side by a Number of Confederates, cach of whem, fingly, one would have thought, an equal Match for his whole Strength ; bearing up, at the fame Time, againft the formidable Power of the Houfe of Aafiria ; the brutal Ferocity of the Ruffians 3 the Attacks of the Swedes ; the-Armies of the Empire ; and, at one Time, hav- ing the additional Weight of the Fresch Army upon him ; when, I fay, we refle@ on the uncommon Difficuities this magnanimous Prince has to refift, we muft rather exprefs our Wonder and our Satisfa@ion that his Situation is flill fo refpeétable, than indulge our Fears, that it is likely to be worfe. The fevereft Checks he has met with during this War, have only ferved ‘to fhew how cale he poffefles himfelf under Diftrefs, and how ably he can extricate him= felf. The Hour of Adverfity has called forch all his Abilities, and if he has failed fometimes, from too great an Eagernefs to conquer, he has always been able to retrieve his Affairs, and like Anreus, gain- ed frefh Strength from every Overthrow. 7§ And, upon this Principle, I flatter myfelf his Pfuffian_Majelty will ftill be able to fecure to himfelf the greater Part, if not the whole of Saxony tor his Winter Quarters, and to recruit his Army, no Doubt much fhattared with it’s Loff¢s and Fatigues, before the opening of another Campaign. Itis to be hoped alfo, that befides the amazing Refources ‘He has flill lefc in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous and effectual Support which his Connection with England, affords him s the Power of the Cdnfederacy againft him may be broken, by difuniting the Conféderates. Hiftory faisfies us. how feldom a Confederacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a fingle Power attacked. 1 have given one Inftance of this already, when 1 fpoke of the Grand Alliance againft Lewis X1V. and the League of Cambray againft the Venetians, in the 16th Centary, is an Inftance ftill more remarkable. But, if contrary to our Hopes, our Withes, our Endeavours, this thould fail ; if his Pruffiar Majelty, like a Lion caught in the Toils ( after a Refiftance already made, which will hand him down to Pofterity as the greatelt of Men ) thould at laft be unable to defend himfelf 5 let him not defpair while he isin Alliance with Britain: For 1 would inculcate a Doérine, which [ think will mot be unpo- pular amongft my Countrymen, and which, therefore, 1 hope, will not be oppofed by our Minilters, That whatever Conguefls twe bave made, and whatever Conquefis we may fitll make, upon the French, except North- America, which maft be kept all our own /bauld. be laoked upon as given back to France for a moft important Confideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Pruffia from any un- forefeen Diftreffes. [ To be continued. ] GRS B 7‘?33&37&0&" c}:a»::as.us AT AW A A AR ARG RS A [N E S