Evening Star Newspaper, May 20, 1940, Page 9

Lax Defense Blamed on Politics Administration Held Responsible For Neglect By DAVID LAWRENCE. Emotional demonstrations and hysteria do not build airplanes or provide adequate security for the Nation. Democracies wake up at the 11th hour to their needs and & then expect out- bursts of pa- triotism to achieve impor- | tant objectives : For the last several days the Nation has been | going through a strange reaction : to the Nazi con- quests. It is much the same kind of reaction which the Brit- ish people have David Lawrence. been going through as surprise after surprise has come to them. But in England and France, where the parliamentary form of govern- ment exists, the administrations re- sponsible for the plight of the country can be changed overnight In America there has been, curiously enough, a disposition to gloss over mistakes of the past and even some Republicans have yielded so mucn to the superficialities of the mo- ment as to insist that the present administration be continued in power for four years more. There are some, too, who want to dispense at once with our form of Government and eliminate the na- tional election this year. Their sug- gestion is that the present admin- istration should not be opposed. Yet it will be too late after next Novem- ber, when the inadequacy of present military, naval and aerial strength is completely known to the Amer- ican people for any change to be made. The British and French can change their leadership overnight The United States by its present Constitution cannot do so. Leaders Should Keep Calm. If ever there was a time when | leaders of American thought in all | parties should not lose their heads it is in the present crisis. The New Deal Democrats hereabouts have al- | ready thrown their hats into the air, rejoicing at the prospects of being continued in office. They see in the ‘whole world situation only a chance for selfish power. Men of that kind will never serve the Nation's inter- ests—they are too much interested in themselves. As for the Republican leaders here, they have played selfish pol- itics so long that they are bewil- dered by the recent turn of events and few have anything constructive to offer. America has had plenty of warnings about national defense. There are dozens of Winston Churchills inside and outside of our Government who can say “ I told you so” today. But the maudlin sen- timentality of large groups of people who choose the easiest line of thought—the hip-hip-hurrah tac- tics—still obscures the truth, What is the truth? Well, for one thing, the great Government of the United States, with its dozens of secret channels of information of a military nature, in some respects the best informed in the world, has been in charge of a group of officials who | have not ventured to build up the | aerial defenses of the country either | because they have been doing wish- | ful thinking about the allies winning | the war anyway or because they | were afraid to assert leadership and to insist on & program of national | defense instead of allowing billions to be spent on W. P. A. projects. 6,000 Planes a Year Now. ‘What are the facts about our air- plane strength? From military sources, we are told that the United Btates is just now up to a production of 500 planes a month or about 6,000 & year, but the President in. his ad- dress to Congress the other day gave the impression that we had already reached a speed of 12,000 planes for this year. The facts ought not to be difficult to establish, but they raise the instant query as to why the airplane program and national defense have been neglected these last two years. Much of the responsibility will be found to lodge in Congress, possibly some, t0o, in industry. But the American people look to the execu- tive branch of the Government for leadership and they will look there today for an explanation of the tragic neglect of our defenses. When all the facts are sifted, it will be found that the American in- dustrial machine isn’t functioning properly. The administration has been much more interested in curry- ing favor with the political groups that support it—the farm bloc and the labor bloc—than in preparing the Nation industrially against at- tacks. The leaders of yesterday in the British and French governments did the same thing—they became interested in catering to particular groups and they missed the bus for the allies. In France, the left wing today stands discredited because it permitted the labor bloc and so- called “popular front” to wreck the industrial machine of France so that the 40-hour week frustrated the whole armament program while the Nazis gleefully took advantage of the situation to put on a 60-hour work ‘week. Results are to be found in the headlines of the daily newspapers these last few weeks. U. 8. on the Same Route. America will go the same route unless courageous leadership can be found. If the American people, in- stead of complacently accepting the President’s speech last week as the beginning of a genuine program of armament, were to inquire a bit beneath the surface and insist on knowing a few things that have been kept secret, there might be more progress made toward achieve- ment of the resl goals. There is, for instance, the report made by the War Resources Board last Octo- ber, which has never been released to the public. What did the busi- nessmen on that board say then and what steps are going to be taken even at this late day to permit the American economic machine to function effectively? In a democracy where free speech and a free press make possible & penetrating public criticism, the truth is not dificult to ferret out. And when the truth is known the people can decide for themselves Lesson of Unity Of Command Still Helps Allies Now In Their Stand By FRANK PARKER, Malor General, U. 8, Army, Retired. “The art of war is simple and depends entirely upon its execu- tion.”—Napoleon. — In the summer of 1914 I was a student at the Superior School of War in France and on the declara- tion of war in early August was or- dered to duty at our Embassy in Paris. In late August Henry Brecken- ridge, then Assistant Secretary of War, arrived in France as head of a mission sent by our Government to aid Americans stranded in Europe by that war. I was assigned s an aide to his staff. In conversation with him in those hectic days when the German armies were rushing on Paris and several days before the first battle of the Marne, I stated my belief that the French Army would turn bgck the German Army in their first major encounter, and I based my prediction on the facts that the defeat of 1870 had caused France to remedy her military weaknesses by creating a sound gys- tem of high command, general staff and services and by organizing mili- tary effort on a national basis. This policy has progressed under the stimulation of the victory of 1918. As to the French combat troops, there has never been any weakness in that department. Moreover, the French military traditions are quite as good as those of Germany. Situation Better Than 1914. I therefore estimate that the rela- tive conditions of the adversaries of today are still sufficiently similar to those of 1914 to warrant a considera- tion of the war of 1914-1918 as the best light upon the probable devel- opment of the present war. Handi- capped as she is by an apparently precarious gasoline and oil situation, Germany'’s present advantage in air- planes and mechanized units is of no greater value than her superiority in heavy artillery and automatic small arms in 1914, The mechanized forces of Ger- many are just now beginning to meet the French field artillery along the Maginot line. The isolated German salient with apex at Rethel is, as always in such cases, very vulnerable. The two great armies of Europe are now apparently beginning the first decisive battle of the Second World War. On the available data, present and past, the allied armies are in my estimate in a better sit- uation than they were on the west- ern front in late August of 1914, Short War Was Predicted. Just before the World ‘War, a great economist of international fame had esilmated. by careful research and calculation, that for economic rea- sons such a war could not last longer than three to five months. When that war ended after a duration of four years and a half, principally because of shortage of manpower on the losing side, he explained the in- accuracy of his forecast as follows: “I knew nothing about my sub- Jject. Ah, those imponderables! They upset our most sincere and thorough calculations.” The imponderable is probably once more the element which will decide the present European strife. In the light of the past we may expect some unforeseen event or combina- tion of circumstances again to decide the issue, and these surprises will be the best test of the relative power of the opponents. Bold indeed must be the prophet who, on the known data of today, dares predict the out- come of the present European war. The Past War’s Record. Leaving prophecy to the prophets, let us turn to the more solid matter of certain records made upon this same European battlefield by the same adversaries a quarter of a cen- tury ago. Field fortification and de- fense in general have become stronger, but offensive weapons have likewise gained in power. There is nothing as yet to indicate any con- siderable change in the text of the final lessons of 1918 on the western front. Once more this front, from the North Sea to Switzerland, seems indicated as the field of final de- cision. Its artificial barriers are formidable, but the advantage of the interior position gertainly favors Germany upon any other possible front, under the present European status, which is very much like that of the spring of 1918, after the Ger- man-Russian peace of March 3 and before our intervention occurred on April 6. As the major campaign opens, there are certain definite - factors which give to the allies a far more advantageous situation than that of August, 1914. The surprise element has long since departed, unity nf command has been solidly estab- lished, and Germany’s admittedly superior military preparation has yet to show as a factor of greater value than the supply systems of the world open to the allies by their suprem+ acy of the seas and abundant water transport. Similarity in Strategy. The initial German strategy seems to be that of August, 1914, with a probable air concentration from Belgian and Dutch bases against Great Britain prior to the main attack southward against the allied line between the Meuse and the North Sea. In the forecast of this writer, the wedtern front of 1918 will again be the scene of the final decision, the infantry-artillery combination, with its auxiliaries of navy, air, mech- anization and supply, will again be the court of last appeal. The imponderable hangs as heav- ily over the duration of ‘present hostilities as in 1914, and warns against overconfidence in economie statistics as known quantities in the equation of war. In the four years and a half of the World War there were only two —_— serving at this time of a complete whitewash for its mistakes—a whitewash that is simple to ad- minister when people allow emo- tions instead of cold logic and de- tached analysis to guide them. ‘This is a critical period in Ameri- can history when citizens who are Democrats first or third termers first or Republicans first or selfish labor or industrial leaders first and Amer- icans second are going to find themselves in the minority before long as the tides of informed pub- whether the administration which has spent billions of dollars in the last several years, though possessed of secret information concerning the lic opinion demand that Congress stay in session and get at the truth of our past mistakes in government so that intelligent corrective proc- THE EVENING LEGEND FORTIFIED AREAS R INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES STAR, WASHINGTO: CHARLEVILLE 4 - C, MONDAY, MAY 20, 1940, -, 3 'tsma\/} MEZIERES - SEDAN =3 - / MONTMEDYS L o gl ™m ? LONG! A \ = IEDENHOFEN CHAUMONT :mé@ -~ L5 1,.:,‘\ ) SCALE OF MILES S0 GERMAN STRATEGY, FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE, 1914— This conception by Gen. Parker of the Schlieffen plan (Gen. Schlieffen was chief of the German staff from 1891 to 1905) indicates the proposed enveloping movement of the right flank— the fist and forearm—swinging from the pivat (the elbow) at Metz. At first successful and resulting in a far deeper pene- LANGRES BELFORT ) V. @pIJON tration of France than has been failed because the enveloping OLuxEMBUR History of First World War Strategy Invites a Feeling of Some Optimism By an Old Soldier Who Knows the French and Their Battleground |ER: X (THIONQ.LE ) -Bgirscn The Capital Parade ‘Fifth Columnists’ Held men they may be, these organizers of ominous new phrase in our mouths. They are not pleasant fellows, number who used to be known to your correspondents. He was large, blond, South German, expensively dressed in English clothes, flourishing the easy manners of the perfect jay, and talking much, in those days, of how Nazi-ism was really a mild form of political insurance against the Com- munist menace. In those days, he was attached to the German Em- bassy in an important capital. Hijs wife was remarkably beautiful. youthful Hermann Goering. they were much seen about. the just-beginning Nazi movement. and felt fine about it. {His Patron Roehm no less a personage than the leader of himself. \‘\9 ", MOLSHEIM DS a- S A 4°NEUNBURG 0 LAND Q i }5~ S E 3 made today, the plan eventually flank was weakened by with- drawal of troops to support the stationary (upper arm) troops. The present invasion of France seems to be a modified applica- tion of the Schlieffen plan. The mistakes, if there are any, have not yet, as in 1914, become apparent. decisive battles—the first battle of the Marne, at the outset, September 6-10, 1914, and the second battle of the Marne, which began July 18, 1918, and continued along the front until the armistice of November 11, 1918. Neither of these battles pos- sessed the characteristics of a great decisive victory. The first, & de- fensive fight, saved France for the allies, and gave them a definite strategic status; the second was ended by an armistice which, while imposing the will of the allies, lacked the psychological value of unconditional surrender. Between these two battles, four years apart, occurred many local efforts on both sides to break the opposing front at a particular spot, all resulting in heavy losses and eventual failure. First Marne Battle—Sept. 6-10, 1914. When the World War broke in early August of 1914 Germany im- mediately invaded France, apply- ing the Schlieffen plan to the cam- paign. This maneuver under the original scheme as prepared by Schlieffen, chief of staff from 1891 to 1905, divided the German Army into two wings, hinged and pivot- ing on the fortified region of Metz- Thionville. The northern wing, comprising seven-eighths of the army, was to sweep on a continuous front through Belgium around Paris to the west and then apply flank and frontal pressure on the French Army so as to roll it back upon the Swiss frontier. The other one-eighth of the German Army was to hold between Metz and Swit- zerland, prevent an invasion of Alsace and Lorraine and if pos- sible without heavy fighting to in- vade France between her eastern fortifications of Toul, Epinal and Belfort. Under the Schlieffen plan this wing was really hardly more than the extension of the Metz- Thionville pivot to the Swiss fron- tier. “Make the Flanx Strong.” The decisive element of the Schlieffen maneuver was to be the flank attack eastward after the en- circlement and capture of Paris from the west, and Schlieffen’s dy- ing words in 1913 had urged creating and maintaining a strong envelop- ing flank throughout the:operation Had Schlieffen directed his own plan the campaign of 1914 might well have had an end very different from that of the record. But the brain and will of a Schlieffen were needed for the execution of his bold and grandiose program and Schlieffen’s successor, Moltke, did not possess those Schlieffen attributes. When the test came in August of 1914 not only had Moltke made an initial reduction of the marching wing by one-fifth of Schlieffen's plan, but during the operation he further reduced the marching flank by detachments to other fields. Moreover, at a critical time in the midst of the torrent of events ot mid-August, 1918, he changed the entire maneuver by attempting to break the French lines by a major offensive through the valley of Charmes toward Nancy, at the other extremity of the front. To this at- tack, made by the sixth and seventh armies (the force occupying the pivotal region undef the Schlieffen plan) Moltke assigned the greater part of his general reserve, thereby giving: to these two armies greater strength than that of the first and second armies, to which had been assigned the principal elements of the Schlieffen plan, viz, the en- circlement of the PFrench left, the capture of Paris and the flank at- tack eastward. Schilieffen’s Plan Changed. Moltke had thus changed the uni- lateral Schlieffen plan to & bilateral maneuver consisting of two simul- taneous attacks on the French right and left flanks, separated by a distance of some 200 -miles—a divided effort which failed in both cases. The wreck of the Schlieffen plan was complete about August 28, 1914, when the German high com- mand left the army commanders pretty much to their own initiative in pursuing the retreat of the French main forces. armament of ali other powers, is de- | esses may at once be set in motion.| By this time Moltke had pretty A 4. Maj. Gen. Frank Parker Observer with French armies practically throughout World War to April, 1917. Head of American mission at French general headquarters from April to December, 1917. Commanded regiment, bri- gade and the division succes- sively in 1st Division, A. E. F., throughout our participation in campaign. Took courses of Superior School of War and Center of High Studies of France, 1919- 1921, Assistant chief of staff, United States Army, 1927-1929. Corps and army commander, 1929-1933. Command of Far Eastern de- partment, 1933-1935. Corps and army commander, 1936. Retired in 1936. Gen. Parker has been asso- ciated with Foch, Petain and Weygand. When Marshal Foch visited the United States Gen. Parker was assigned to him as aide and interpreter. Gen. Parker was on Petain's staff from May until December, 1917, and he served under Gen. Wey- gand during a year’s course at the French Cavalry School in 1903-04 well lost control of the situation and the armies of his marching wing were moving with little co- ordination away from Paris and straight into the pocket between the fortifications of Paris and Ver- dun, where the French high com- mand was preparing a counter- offensive. In this pocket, between September 6 and 10, 1914, the ex- cellent German armies were driven from the fleld of the Marne by the allied armies whose high command had been able to control and direct their umified action under a plan, curiously enough, about the same as that of Schlieffen. The French Maneuver, 1914. The initial Prench plan and op- eration supposed the respect of the Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers. It was a divided and unsuccessful effort northeastward to the north and south of the Metz-Thionville fortified region and was aimed at Germany’s Rhine communications. The German success against the French attack south of Metz, in Alsace, caused Moltke to make the fatal error of changing the original Schlieffen plan to the double at- tack on both French flanks. About August 14, from documents captured by the French cavalry, Joffre knew of the initial German maneuver and at once changed his plan to a8 withdrawal of his main force to the line between the forti- fled areas of Paris and Verdun, with decision to counterattack from that line. Concurrently he formed an army (the 6th, Gen. Maunoury) to the west of Paris to attack the German right flank in _conjunction with the frontal attack along the Marne. ‘The plan of this operation was about the same as the original Schlieffen plan, ie., a frontal sweep- ing attack pivoting upon approxi- mately the same region selected by | opening the Schlieffen plan for that purpose, and turning the German right flank in about the same place as had been intended by Schlieffen for the corresponding movement against the French left flank, The success of the French counter offensive in tire first battle of the Marne seems a rather clear vindica- tion of the original Schlieffen Plan. At all events, history records that between September 6 and September ‘10, 1914, Germany lost the first phase of the World War, and to all intents and purposes this war itself. Second Battle of the Marne, 1918. Twenty-two years ago in March, 1918, the issue of the World War hung in a deliacte balance, about the same apparently as that of the pres- ent situation. The year 1917 Rad resulted in a series of disasters for the allles: Rumania’s defeat, failure of the French offensive s e a5 the Chemin des Dames and of the British attack at Cambrai, the Rus- sian revolution and defection, the Ttalian route of Caporette, and'the destructive German submarine cam- paign. . On March 3, 1918, Russia definitely withdrew from the war by signing the Brest-Litovsk treaty with the Central Powers. By this treaty 100 German divisions were released from the Russian front and their transfer to the Western front was at once begun. When it is remembered that for a period of time that can be counted in years, the Germans had held the Western front with about two-thirds of the strength of the opposing forces, it may be concluded that the coming of those 100 Ger- man divisions was bad news for the allies, and particularly so as their arrival would coincide with that of the weather best suited for opera- tions. Our intervention was still a month away, and very problematical. The British and French envoys sent to us for aid at that time declared that unless we hurried we should be too late, and this statement was quite true. On April 6, 1917, we declared war on Germany and June Gen. Pershing was sent to France with a small staff and the first contingent of the A.E.F. Similarity of Instructions. In Gen. Pershing'’s briefcase was a letter from President Wilson which read as follows: “In military operations against the imperial German government you are directed to co-operate with the forces of other countries em- ployed against that enemy, but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your Jjudgment may approve.” 1t is interesting to compare this letter with that given to Rocham- beau, March 1, 1780, by the King of France, when the French expedi- tionary force came to our aid in the revolution. “His majesty desires and orders Count de Rochambeau to retain as far as circumstances will permit the French troops entrusted to his command, collected together in one corps, and to represent on a proper occasion to Gen. Washington, com- mander in chief of the troops of Congress, under whose orders the French troops are to serve, that it is the King’s intention that the French troops should not be dis- persed but that they should always act as a body and under French generals, except in the case of tem- porary detachments which are to rejoin the principal corps in a few days.” The manner in which Gen. Pershing executed the above man- date, under difficult circumstances, is the achievement among the many others which contributed in the greatest degree to the confidence which he enjoyed in increasing measure throughout the war. Three German Armies Strike, The Germans lpst no time in their offensive on March 21, 1918. On this day three powerful German armies, on a front of 50 miles, struck the juncture of the British-French forces east of Amiens and in five days had driven a wedge | was still reluctance on the part of | the British and French to estab- | lish unity of command and the Doullens conference appointed Gen. Foch only as “co-ordinator for the | British and French armies.” On April 3 the British and French representatives, on the request of Gen. Foch, agreed to his exercising “the strategica! direction of mili- tary operations” and on April 14, 1918, the British and French gov- ernments finally agreed to his ap- pointment as “commander in chief of the allied armies in France.” It was high time. For three and a half years of practically constant fighting on a bloody circle which extended from the North Sea through France, Italy, Greece, Rumania, Russia, to the Baltic Sea, the allies had failed to apply the first of military prin- ciples—unity of command (and, therefore, of effort). It is a source of legitimate pride for our Nation that Gen. Pershing was the first of the allied com- manders to give clear expression and energetic adherence to this | principle in his direct and personal | statement to the allied commander | in chief, Marshal Foch, of March | 28, 1918. At Cantigny, on May 28, 1918, the 1st Division of the American Ex- peditionary Force, launched its first attack against the Germans. It is interesting to note just here that although we had been at war with the central empires for more than a year, with the exception of the rifie and bayonet, all of the ma- teriel of these units had been ob- tainedfrom the French and British: Artillery, airplanes, tanks, machine guns, flame throwers, automatic rifles, gas masks, etc., came from until the armistice. Change Under Unified Command. From the very hour of Marshal Foch’s appointment as allied co- ordinator the situation changed. Orders for further withdrawal were discarded, and unified action, in- tensified by American intervention and directed by & skillful command- er in chief, blocked the further ad- vance of the Germans toward Amiens. The German offensive of 1918 on the western front, beginning March 21 and ending July 15, consisted.of four heavy local attacks, three of which made deep pockets but failed to break the allied lines: In Picardie in March, in Flanders in April, and on the Aisne at the Chemin des Dames in May. The last attack, made in the region of Rheims on July 15, was a complete failure. These attacks, widely separated in time and space, seem to have been only local efforts to pierce the allied line with no interrelation of a gen- eral plan for the entire front. On the allled side, on the contrary, with the assumption of the supreme command by Marshal Foch in March, 1018, we find a progressive and com- préhensive plan carried out continu- ously, beginning with the flattening of the pockets made by the German offensives, for salients are very vulnerable and their creation was carefully avoided in the Foch ma- neuver. Second Battle of the Marne. On July 18, 1918, the allied forces began the counter-offensive of the second battle of the Marne, which was to extend from Vercdun to the North Sea and continue, with brief interludes, to the armistice of No- vember 11, 1918. The strategy was 30 miles deep to within eight miles.iquite simple, The two wings of the of the main line of communications between ‘the French and British armies. The separation of these two allied forces was the German ob- Jective, and it came very near to allied forces were hinged and were to pivot successively on Verdun. The northern wing, comprising four- fifths of the allied armies, extended to the North Sea. The southern wing, with one-fifth of the total our allies and continued so to come | Far From Pleasant Fellows: Observers Recall Man Attached to German Embassy By JOSEPH ALSOP and ROBERT KINTNER. Reading of Norway and Denmark, Holland and Belgium, hearing the strange tales of well-organized treachery, one wonders what manner of the “fifth column” who have put an if they can be judged by on® of their He was not pleasant to look at himself, for an increasing grossness of the chin line made him resemble a more But both were effusively agreeable, and His story was strange, and it seemed odd that when every one knew it, so many people were glad to go to his house of drink his fine Rhine wines, He was the son of a poor, decent couple, his father a tobacconist or something of the sort, in a big South German city. In the years of chaos after the war, when he was growing up, he became fascinated by His respectable father and mother, thinking the Storm Troopers street roughs, tried to hold him back. But he joined the Hitler Youth, got himself a uniform, marched in parades, ‘When he was 16 or 17, his good fortune came. Being something of an athlete, he took part in Nazi-organized games which were attended by all the Storm Troopers, Capt. Roehm He caught Roehm’s eye, was made one of Roehm'’s personal aides de camp, and from this interesting and rather special beginning rose | rapidly in the Nazi party. Soon he had a reputation as an extraordinarily | brutal and efficient street fighter in working class districts. He was given | Hitler's daggered honor, and became a member of the Fuehrer's body- guard. A little while before Hitler came to power, he saw and decided to marry the daughter of a powerful and rich German family. | was one of those which had to watch | much like it, but they accepted the The family They did not His wife polished him up the political currents. alliance. | a bit, and he and she began to go out among the rich Berliners. Then | Hitler became Reichschancellor, and it was necessary to bring the German diplomatic service into the Nazi line. The young couple, being consid« \erably more presentable than most of the faithful, were sent to the | Embassy in the capital aforementioned. Gospel-Spreader The new job was simple, if somewhat ignoble. He had to spy on and | give party orders to the career diplomats whom the Fuehrer could not | trust. Before long he had terrorized the Ambassador, a kindly old fellow, | with a rubicund face and a plume of thin white hair, who made it quite 'iclesr to every one that he was only sticking to his post until he could | retire on a pension to a safe obscurity. He also had terrorized the lesser | members of the Embassy staff. Just to show he was worth his salt, he caused the dismissal of an inoffensive little man, 25 years in the service without a penny saved, for being too poor a ‘“representative of the Aryan race.” Fortunately our hero was at his new post when the Roehm blood purge occurred. If not he would hav he did, with the loss of his dagger e lost his life, instead of escaping, as of honor But after a few days of | looking pale and shaken in the death of his first pesition, he began to work harder than ever at a new task, of making friends with the right people. He did it well. Certain army officers thought him a fine type. A certain sort of rich man was enchanted by his talk about the Communist danger. He also exe plored the political underworld, making cronies of some of the more notable lobbyists and demagogues. Then, about a year before the war began, he disappeared from the | Embassy for six months on a mission to the hinterland. He had often | been away for short periods before, and when he returned used to boast, | after a glass or two too many, how he had been spreading the Nazi gospel among German racial groups. He came back from his six months’ mission | coastal city. There he rented one | there, so far as your cojrespondents find and started the process of making friends all over again. with his dagger of honor restored, and a new post as consul of a large of the handsomest houses he could And know, he is still at work today. (Released by the North American Newspaper Alliance, Inc.) | | | By JACK STINNETT. tion—even if that nation should be one whose acts you don't like—is 99 times out of 100 more wish than | thinking. like that Remember only a few writing about the sour predicament | of Germany. Now she's waging a war, the cost of which would black out the most vivid imaginations. This is all by way of cautious prelude, because Washington is hear- ing that Japan is in a bad way. don’t argue that it is not. I just mean that if you are a Japanese sympathizer don't go committing hari-kari—or if you are anti-Nip- ponese don't start holding any joy- ful wakes. The facts are pretty simple. The been costly. The cost of living has skyrocketed. Wages (except in the munitions industries, which are cre- between the German northern and southern armies. (2) While this attack was going through the southern wing was sim- ply to hold. When the first phase was completed the roles of the two wings were to be reversed—i. e., the northern wing was to hold while the southern wing, reinforced to 500,000 men, was to pivot on Ver- dun, march north and place itself between the main German force and the Rhine. - The first phase was successfully carried out and the Germans sur- rendered on November 11 to avoid the second phase offensive which had been scheduled for November 14. Had the entire maneuver been completed the main body of the German Army ‘would have been caught between the two allied wings operating like a scissors whose ful- crum was at Verdun. Unity of Command. The success of the allies in the first battle of the Marne and in the closing campaign of 1918 was basic- ally due to the fact that on those two occasions, four years apart, there was unity of command. In the first Marne the British com- mander in chief, Marshal French, by direction of his government, ac- ceded to the plan of Marshal Joffre for that occasion—moreover, the British force was at that time only about one-twentieth of the French Army. In the closing campaign of 1918 Marshal Foch was definitely invested with the unified command. The allies have profited by the les- sons of those three and a half futile years of headless, unco-ordinated, sanguinary effort and have begun the present war with athorough application of the principle of unity of command. By their records, the appointments of Marshall Petain as vice Premier and Gen. Weygand as commander in chief (with- Gen. Gamelin as probable assistant) assure to the war government of France and the L co-operation a on of the highest order. Certainly the situation of the allies today is far better than it was in th ding period of August, e COrTespon: 1914, in the first World War. & ‘To hint at the collapse of a na- | Nations just don't go bust—poof, | short years ago economists were | 1| three-year Chinese interlude has | 'Conditions in Japan i A Cold Spring Adds to Troubles | Already Complicated by Low Morale | ating the most amazing class of nouveau-riche you ever heard of) | haven't. The foreign trade business } looks good in yen, but the country | is painfully short on foreign ex- change . . . and/or gold. * % ¥ X Jolted by Weather. Last year Japan had a drought. It knocked the very watts out of i the vital Japanese hydro-electric power system. A coal shortage caused householders to turn their charceal braziers into central heat- ing plants. | Then came that same blizzardy spring which swept America. Latest | reports say it has put the blight of | frost on Japan’s important crops. Latest Government information is that the Japanese silk crop may be affected as much as 80 per cent | by the spring freezes. | This much of it is truth and T | can give you the figures if you are | mathematically minded. For ex- | ample, the general retail price index | is 58.1 per cent above the June, 1937, level. The wage index for March was only up 14.7 per cent in the last | vear. The munitions industry, | which employs a comparatively small percentage of the population, | accounted for a lot of that. Spring estimates indicate subnormal crops of wheat, barley and rye. There's a general trend toward inflation, a significant decline in the absorption of national bonds, an increase of 50 per cent in the national debt, a | much heavier tax burden, a mount- | ing shortage in nearly all commodi- | ties, a decline in labor efficiency. * X X X Prices Keep Climbing. The inability of the government to control prices was admittedly a contributory cause of the fall of the Abe cabinet. Price control is one of the major aims of the present administration. | Your Government has received | confidential or official confirmation for all of these statements. There are other straws in the wind. Washington hears that the morale of the Japanese at home is at its lowest. There have been grumblings no end over the fuel shortage, over the high prices and low wages, over the wage favoritism shown munition workers, over the thousands and thousands of “little white boxes” of ashes of war dead that keep coming from the war in Chind, over the endless chain of propaganda lies intended to bolster the spirits of the masses. » One Government reporter, a lit- tle more lyrical than the rest, in- cluded the phrase that not only in the cities but in the sticks Japan wears the pitiful air of a nation swept by the plague. I wouldn't know. Whatever the truth Washington is finding time, between comments on the whirling dervish that’s sweeping over Europe, to talk about the Orient. Lincoln Park Citizens Officers for the coming year will be elected tonight by the Lincoln Park Citizens’ Assoclation at its annual May meeting in the Bryan Schocl, B street, between Thirteenth and Fourteenth streets SE., at 8 p.m. Representative Sheridan will address the group on a bill to in- vestigate small loan practices. L