Evening Star Newspaper, October 3, 1932, Page 10

TEXT OF LYTTON FAR EAST REPORT Conditions of Satisfactory Solution of Controversy Given Léague. Summary and conclusions of the Lytton Commission report to the League of Nations regarding Manchuria, as em- bodied in chapters 9 and 10, are as follows: CHAPTER IX. PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT. Review of previous chapters: In the previous chapters of this re- port it has been shown that, though the issues between China and Japan were not in themselves incapable of solution by arbitral procedure, yet the handling of them by their respective governments, especially those relating to Manchuria, had so embittered their relations as sooner or later to make & conflict inevitable. A sketch has been given of China as a nation in evolu- tion, with all the political upheavals, social disorders, and disruptive tend- encies inseparable from such a period of transition. It has been shown how seriously the rights and interests claimed by Japan have been affected by the weakness of the authority of the central government in China, and how anxious Japan has shown herself to keep Manchuria apart from the govern- ment of the rest of China. A brief survey of the respective policies of the Chinese, Russian and Japanese gov- ernments in Manchuria has revealed the fact that the administration of these provinces has more than once been declared by their rulers to be independent from the central govern- ment of China, yet no wish to be sep- arated from the rest of China has ever been expressed by their population, which is overwhelmingly Chinese. Fi- nally, we have examined carefully and thoroughly the actual events which took place on and subsequent to Sep- tember 18, 1931, and have expressed our opinion upon them. Complexity of the problem: A point has now been reached when attentign can be concentrated on the future, and we would dismiss the past with this final reflection. It must be apparent to every reader of the pre- ceding chapter that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly com- plicated, and cnly an intimate knowl- edge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background, should en- title any one to express a definite opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previcusly exhausting the opportunities for con- ciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighboring country, because in Manchuria there are many features Without an exact parallel in other parts of the world The dispute has arisen between two states, both members of the Eeague, concerning a territory the size of France and Germany combined, in which both claim to have rights and interests only some of which are clearly defired by international law; a terri- tory which, although legally an in- tegral part of China, had a local ad- ministration of sufficiently autonomous character to carry on direct negotiations with Japan on the matters which lay at the root of this conflict. Japan controls a railway and a strip of territory running from the sea right up into the heart of Manchuria, and she maintains for the protection of that property a force of about 10,000 soldiers, which she claims the right by treaty to increase, if necessary, up to 15,000. She also exercises the rights of jurisdiction over all her subjects in Manchuria, and maintains consular police throughout the country. Interpretations Diverse. Diversity of interpretations: These facts must be considered by those who debate the issues. It is a fact that without a declaration of war a large area of what was indisputably the Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan, and has in consequence of this operation been separated from and deciared _independent of the rest of China. The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with the obli- gations of the Covenant, of the League of Nations, the Kellogg pact and the nine-power treaty of Washington, all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind. Moreover, the operation which had only just begun when the matter was first brought to the notice of the League was com- pleted during the following months and is held by the Japanese government to be consistent with the assurances given by their representative at Geneva on September 20 and December 10. The Justification in this case has been that all the military operations have been legitimate acts of self-defense, the right of which is implicit in all the multilateral treaties mentioned above, and was not taken away by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League. Further, the administration which has been substituted for that of China in the three provinces is justi- fied on the grounds that its establish- ment was the act of the local popu- lation, who, by a spontaneous assertion of their independence, have severed all connection with China and established their own government. Such a genuine independence movement, it is claimed, is not prohibited by any international treaty or by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations, and the fact of its having taken place has profoundly modified the applica- tion of the nine-power treaty and en- tirely altered the whole character of the problem being investigated by the League. It is this plea of justification which makes this particular conflict at once so complicated and so serious. It is not the function of our commission to argue the issue, but we have tried to provide sufficient material to enable the League of Nations to settle the dispute consistently with the honor, dignity and national interest of both the contending parties. Criticism alone will not accomplish this; there must be practical efforts at conciliation. We have been at pains to find out the truth regarding past events in Man- churia, and to state it frankly. We recognize that this is only part, and by no means the most important part, of our work. We have throughout our mission offered to the governments of both countries the help of the League of Nations in composing their dif- ferences, and we conclude it by offer- ing to the League our suggestions for securing, consistently with justice and with peace, the permanent interests of China and Japan in Manchuria. Unsatisfactory Proposals. Unsatisfactory suggestions of settle- ment: (1) Restoration of the status quo ante: It must be clear from everything that ‘we have already said that a mere res- toration of the status quo ante would be no solution. Since the present con- flict arose out of the conditions pre- vailing before last September, to re- store these conditions would merely be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It would be to treat the whole ques- tion theoretically and to leave out of account_the realities of the situation. (2) The maintenance of “Manchu- From what we have said in the two proceeding chapters, the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria would be equally unsat- isfactory. Such a solution does mnot appear to us compatible with the fun- damental principles of existing inters national obligations, nor with the good understanding between the two coun- tries upon which peace in the Far East Makes Report LORD LYTTON, Chairman of the League of Nations commission which recently completed a lengthy investigation of the Manchurian situation, whose report the findings of the committee was presented to the League at Geneva yesterday. Lord Lytton was the British representative on the commission. —A. P. Photo. depends. It is opposed to the interests of China. It disregards the wishes of the people of Manchuria, and it is at least questionable whether it would ultimately serve the permanent inter- ests of Japan. About the feelings of the people of Manchuria toward the present regime there can really be mno doubt; and China would not voluntarily accept as a lasting solution the complete separa- tion of her three eastern provinces. The analogy of the distant province of Outer Mongolia is not an entirely per- tinent one, as Outer Mongolia is bound to China by no strong economic or social ties, and is sparcely inhabited by a population which is mainly non- Chinese. The situation in Manchuria is radically different from that in Outer Mongolia. The millions of Chinese farmers now settled permanently on the land have made Manchuria in many Tespects a simple extension of China south of the wall. The three eastern provinces have become almost as Chi- nese in race, culture and national senti- ment as the neighboring provinces of Hopel and Shantung, from which most of the immigrants came. Apart from this, past experience has shown that those who control Man- churia have exercised a considerable influence on the affairs of the rest of China—at least of North China—and possess unquestionable strategic and political advantages. To cut off these provinces from the rest of China, either legally or actually, would be to create for the future a serious irredentist problem which would endanger peace by keeping alive the hostility of China and rendering probable the continued boycott of Japanese goods. Japanese Statement. 4 The commission received from the Japanese Government a clear and val- uable statement of the vital interests of their country in Manchuria. With- out exaggerating the economic depend- ence of Japan on Manchuria beyond the limits ascribed to it in a previous chapter, and certainly without sugges ing that economic relationship entitles Japan to control the economic, still less the political development of those provinces, we recognize the great im- portance of Manchuria in the economic development of Japan. Nor do we con- sider unreasonable her demand for the establishment of a stable government which would be capable of maintaining the order necessary for the economic development of the country. But such conditions can only be securely and effectively guaranteed by an adminis- tration which is in conformity with the wishes of the population and which takes full account of their feelings and aspirations. And equally is it only in an atmosphere of external confidence and internal peace, very different from that now existing in the Far East, that the capital which is necessary for the rapid economic development of Man- churia Till be forthcoming. In spite of the pressure of increas- ing overpopulation, the Japanase have not as yet fully utilized their existing facilities for emigration, and the Japa- nese Government has not hitherto con- templated a large emigration of their people to Manchuria. But the Japa- nese do lock to further industrialization as a means to cope with the agrarian crisis and with the population problem. Such industrialization would require further eccnomic outlets, and the only zrge and relatively sure markets that Japan can find are in Asia and par- ticularly in Chira. Japan requires not only the Manchurian but the whole Chinese market, and the rise in the standard of living which will certainly follow the consolidation and modern- ization of China should stimulate trade and raise the purchasing power of the Chinese market. This economic rapprochement be- tween Japan and China, which is of vital interest to Japan, is of equal in- terest to China, for China would find that a closer economic and technical . collaboration with Japan would assist her in her primary task of national reconstruction. China could assist this rapprochement by restraining the more intolerant tendencies of her national- ism end by giving effective guarantees that as soon as cordial relations were re-established the practice of organized boycotts would not be revived. Japan, on her side, could facilitate this rap- prochement by renouncing any attempt to solve the Manchuria problem by iso- lating it from the problem of her re- lations with China as a whole in such a way as to make impossible the friend- ship and cellaboration of China. “Lifeline of Japan.” It may, however, be less economic |'security which has determined the actions and policy of Japan in Man- churia. It is especially in this con- nection that her statesmen and military authorities are accustomed to speak of Manchuria as “the lifeline of Japan.” One can sympathize with such anxieties and try to appreciate the actions and motives of those who have to bear the heavy responsibility of securing the defense of their country against all eventualities. While acknowledging the interest of Japan in preventing Man- churia from serving as a base of operations directed against her own | territory, and even her wish to be able !to take all appropriate military measures if in certain circumstances the frontiers of Manchuria should be crossed by the forces of a foreign power, it may still be questioned whether the military occupation of Manchuria for an in- definite period, involving, as it must, a heavy financial burden, is really the most effective way of insuring against this external danger; and whether, in the event of aggression having to be resisted in this way, the Japanase troops in Manchuria would not be seriously embarrassed if they were sur- rounded by & restive or rebellious popu- lation backed by a hostile China. It 2 surely in the interest of Japan to der also other possible solutions of the problem of security, which would be more in keeping with the principles on which rests the present peace organization of the world, and analogous to arrangements concluded by other great powers in various parts of the world. She might even find it ible, with the sympathy and good- will of the rest of the world, and at no cost to herself, to obtain better se- curity than she will obtain by the costly method she is at present adopt- ing. International interests: Apart from China and Japan, other powers of the world have also im- considerations than anxiety for her own | | | THE EVENING tion by agreement must be compatible with the stipulations of those funda- mental agreements, on which is based the peace organization of the world. The considerations which actuated the representatives of the powers at the ‘Washington Conference are still valid. It is quite as much in the interests of the powers now as it was in 1922 to wssist the reconstruction of China and to maintain her sovereignty and her territorial and administrative in- tegrity as_indispensable to the main- tenance of peace. Any disintegration of China might lead, perhaps rapidly, to serious international rivalries, which would become all the more bitter if they should happen to coincide with rivalries_between divergent social sys- tems. Finally, the interests of peace are the same the world over. Any loss of confidence in the application of the principles of the Covenant and of the pact of Paris in any part of the world diminishes the value and efficacy of those principles everywhere. Interests of U. S. S, R.: ‘The commission has not been able to obtain direct information as to the extent of the interests of the U. 8. S. R. in Manchuria, nor tp ascertain the views of the Government of the U. 8. S. R. on the Manchurian question. But even without sources of direct in- formation it cannot overlook the part played by Russia in Manchuria nor the important interests which the U.S. 8. R. have in that region as owners of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and of the territory beyond its north and north- east frontiers. It is clear that any solution of the problem of Manchuria which ignores the important interests of the U. S. S. R. would risk a future breach of the peace and would not be permanent. Conclusions Presented. Conclusions: These considerations are sufficient to indicate the lines on which a solution might be reached if the gov- ernments of China and Japan could recognize the identity of their chief interests and were willing to make them include the maintenance of peace and the establishment of cordial rela- tions with each other. As already stated, there is no question of returning to the conditions before September, 1931. A satisfactory regime for the future might be evolved out of the present one without any violent change. In the next chapter we offer certain suggestions for doing this, but we would first define the general principles to which any satisfactory solution should conform. They are the following: Conditions of a satisfactory solution: 1. Compatibility with the interests of both China and Japan. Both coun- tries are members of the League and each is entitled to claim the same consideration from the League. A solu- tion from which both did not derive benefit would not be a gain to the cause of peace. 2. Consideration for the interests of! U.S.S.R. To make peace between two of the neighboring countries without regard for the interests of the third would be neither just nor wise, nor in the interests of peace. 3. Conformity with existing multi- lateral treaties. Any solution should conform to the provisions of the Cov- enant of the League of Nations, the pact of Paris and the nine-power treaty of Washington. 4. Recognition of Japan's interests in Manchuria. The rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria are facts which cannot be ignored, and any solution which failed to recognize them and to take into account also the historical associations of Japan with that country would not be satisfactory. 5. The establishment of new treaty relations between China and Japan. A restatement of the respective rights, interests and responsibilities of both countries in Manchuria in new treaties, which shall be part of the settlement by agreement, is desirable if future fric- tion is to be avoided. and mutual con- fidence and co-operation is to be re- stored. 6. Effective provision for the settle- ment of future disputes. As a corollary to the above, it is necessary that pro- vision should be made for facilitating the prompt settlement of minor dis- putes as they arise. Government of Manchuria. 7. Manchurian autonomy. The gov- ernment of Manchuria should be modified in such a way &s to secure, consistently with the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China, a large measure of autonomy designed to meet the local conditions and special characteristics of the three provinces. The new civil regime must be so con- stituted and conducted as to satisfy the essential requirements of good gov- ernment. 8. Internal order and security against external aggression. The internal order of the country should be secured by an effective local gendarmie force, and security against external aggression should be provided by the withdrawal of all armed forces other than gen- darmerie and by the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between the countries interested. 9. Encouragement of an economic rap-, proachement between China and Japan. For this purpose a new commercial treaty between the two countries is de- sirable. Such a treaty should aim at placing on an equitable basis the com- mercial relations between the two coun- tries and bringing them into conformity with their improved political relations. 10. International co-operation in Chinese reconstruction. Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world, as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international con- cern, and since the conditions enumer- ated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong central government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co- operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Results which would follow from the tulfillment of these conditions: If the present situation could be modified in such a way as to satisfy these conditions, and embody these ‘ideas, China and Japan would have achieved a solution of their difficulties which might be made the starting point of a new era of close under- standing and golitical co-operation be- tween them. "If such a rapproche- ment is not secured, no solution, what- ever its terms, can really be fruitful. Is it really impossible to contemplate such a new relationship even in this hour of crisis?> Young Japan is clam- orous for strong measures in China and a policy of thoroughness in Manchuria. Those who make these demands are tired of the delays and pin-pricks of the pre-September period; they are impetuous, and impatient to gain their end. But even in Japan appropriate means must be found for the attain- ment of every end. After making the acquaintance of some of the more ardent exponents of this ‘“positive” policy, and those especially who, with undoubted idealism and great per- sonal devotion have constituted them- selves the pioneers of a delicate under- taking in the “Manchukuo” regime, it is impossible not to realize that at the heart of the problem for Japan lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern’ China, and the future to which it is tending. This anxiety has led: to action, with the object of controlling that development and steering its course in directions which will secure the economic inter- ests of Japan and satisfy strategic re- q;flrements for the defense of her em- pire. Japanese opinion is, neverthless, vaguely conscious that it is no longer practicable to have two separate pol- icies, one for Manchuria and one for the rest of China. Even with her Man- churian interests as a goal, therefore, Japan might recognize and welcome sympathetically the renaissance of Chinese national sentiment; ht make friends with it, guide it in her direction and offer it support, if only to insure that it does not seek support elsewhere. In China, too, as thoughtful men have come to recognize that the vital roblem, the real national problem, for their country is the reconstruction portant interests to defend in this|and modernization of the state, they Sino-Japanese conflict. We have already cannot fail to realize that this policy referred to existing multilateral treat- of reconstruction and modernization, lasting solu- Ppromise ies, and any real and already initiated with so much STAR, WASHINGTON, D. C, MONDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1932. of success, necessitates for its fulfil- ment the cultivation of friendly rela- tions with all countries, and, above all, with that great nation which is their nearest neighbor. China needs, in political and economic matters, the co-operation of all the leading powers, but especially valuable to her would be the friendly attitude of the Japanese government and the economic co- operation of Japan in Manchuria. All the other claims of her newly awakened nationalism — legitimate and _urgent though they may be—should be sub- ordinated to this one dominating need for the effective internal reconstruction of the state. CHAPTER X. CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGES- TIONS TO THE COUNCIL. " Suggestions to facilitate & final solu- jon: It is not the function of the com- mission to submit directly to the gov- ernments of China and Japan recom- mendations for the solution of the present dispute. But, in order “to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries,” to quote the words used by M. Briand when explaining to the council the text of the resolution which originated the commission, we now offer to the League of Nations, as the result of our studies, suggestions de- signed to help the appropriate organ of the League to draw up definite pro- posals for submission to the parties to the dispute. It should be understood that these suggestions are intended as an {llustration of one way in which the conditions we have laid down in the preceding chapter might be met. They are mainly concerned with broad prin- ciples; they leave many details to be filled In and are susceptible of con- siderable modification by the partles to the dispute if they are willing to accept some solution on these lines. Even if the formal recognition of “Manchukuo” by Japan should take place before our report is considered in Geneva—an eventuality which we cannot ignore—we do not think that our work will have been rendered valueless. We believe that in any case the council would find that our report contains suggestions which would be helpful for its decisions or for its rec- ommendations to the two great powers concetned, with the object of satisfy- ing their vital interests in Manchuria. It is with this object that, whilst bearing in mind the principles of the League of Nations, the spirit and letter of the treaties concerning China and the general interests of peace, we have not overlooked existing realities, and have taken account of the administra- tive machinery existing and in process of evolution in the three eastern prov- inces. It would be the function of the council, in the paramount interest | of world peace, whatever may be the | eventuality, to decide how the sug- | gestions made in our report may be | extended and applied to events which | are still developing from day to day; | always with the object of securing a durable understanding between China and Japan by utilizing all the sound forces, whether in ideals or persons, whether in thought or action. which are at present fermenting in Man- churia. | Invitation to the parties to discuss settlement : We suggest in the first place that the Council of the League should invite the governments of China and .Japan to discuss & solution of their dispute | on the lines indicated in the last| chapter. Advisory Conference. An advisory conference: to discuss and to recommend detailed proposals for the constitution of a spe- cial regime for the administration of the three eastern provinces. Such conference, it is suggested, might be composed of representatives of the Chinese and Japanese governments and of two delegations representing the local population, one selected in & man- ner to be bed by the Chinese government and one selected in a man- ner to be prescribed by the Japanese government. If agreed by the parties, the assistance of neutral observers might be secured. the conference were unable to reach agreement on any particular point, it would submit to the council the point of difference, and the coun- cil would then attempt to secure an agreed settlement on these points. Simultaneously with the sitting of the advisory conference, the matters at issue betweep Japan and China re- lating to respective rights and inter- x lhollld‘hb: l’lllm-ed separately, in case ), agreed, with he_g o(u neutral ob:eonzn. &5 nally, we suggest that the results these discussions and negotiations (Continued on Eleventh Page.) 7 Lo Ul ol AND TELL YOUR THROAT qgod limes are here. ¢ famous throat-ease. of It’s finer tobacco quality . . . that’s all. Queen-leaf tobacco, from the heart of the stalk. Sun-ripened, domestic and Turkish tobacco. Cured and heat-treated so it reaches you as free of impurities as the sunshine that grew it. Get this, folks: OLD GOLDS are FULL-WEIGHT If the invitation is accepted, the next step would be the summoning as soon as possible of an advisory conference, THE @ P. 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