Evening Star Newspaper, September 22, 1892, Page 11

> THE EVENING STAR: WASH INGTON, D. ©, ruunspat. SEPTEMBER penne s a 22, 1892—PART TWO. horth bank™ of troops because he docs not Bnow where Grant AtG a m. of June 17 Lee congratulates Beauregard on his victory at Petersburg and sks where Grant ie. At noon he still does not think i pradent to draw more troops to the gouth ‘side. At 3:30 he sent the following ir: “4 June 17, 1964—3:30 p. m eadow Station. . Push after enenry and endeavor to ascertain what has become of Grant’sarmy. Inform Gen. Hull . i EL Lee On information from Beauregard that large | Bambers of Grant's men had crossed the James, 8¢ 4:30 p. m., June 17, Lee hesitatingly or: 4 P. Hiil's “corps up to Chafiin's bluff 12:90 a m. June 18, Beauregard telegraphed tbat Grant was before Petersburg with his whole army. but even this did not satisfy Lee. though on regard’s representations he at last “concluded ‘to Ginpatch nie, army, to the real point of r. The first troops of the Army of Northern Vir- Ginia, Kershaw’s and Field's division: arrived cariy on the morning of the 18th and at 11:30 Lee himself put m an appearance. The reader knows that Grant's army had | Already been hammering at the gates of Peters- vurg more than two days, and but for the avility and tenacity of Beauregard’s defense the town and the confederacy must have been lost, as it ought to have been. A COSTLY DELAY. Bat after so sigually outgeneraling Lee, why id uot Grant reap the fruits of his masterly eombinations by capturing the town himself? It will not do to lay at poor Smith’s door all the blame for the long siege of Petersburg. Grant still had two days’ margin in which to effect his object before Lee's army interposed. ‘This is a question that perhaps has never been asked; it is certainly one never satisfactorily auswered. Truc, Beauregard had gathered in @ few more troops and was already behind new breastworks, but the attacking force was now 85,000 strong. Smith had carried a strong line of defenses; why should Grant fail? Even rants arrival there was an unaccount- able delay, perhaps a fatal one. as no general attack was mate until the evening of the 16th. Gen. Butler say+ Grant fuiled because the men Would not attack fortifications any more. It is apparent that at first both Grant and Meade. EES Smith, thought part if not all of Leo's army had arrived. Hence the delay; too auch time was wasted in preparation, repeat- ing Smith's chief error. Then too narrow a front was covered when the attack was made, “great advantage to Beanregard, defending many miles of breastworks with less than 18,000 men. He says there were several miles Of the defenses without a man in them. It must have been true. Grant's 55.000 men could have been st out with perfect safety. outflank:ng Beauregard far to the south d west. But there was no maneuvering, no feeling for & spots, as at Spottsylvanie. After great deliberation, the whole army was Precipitated upon one narrow front. and that tront the one of ail others Beauregard would have selecte: By the concentr: Birney had redan of the 16th ail the corps were ersburg. On that morning earried snother light of the ind captured so four guns and at confederates ir arms. Other and attended with attacks were great | nd appear That night nuer and shorter 17th was it gard’s weak my of the Potomac. A ordered for the early m: But now it Was too lat 's army was beginning to arrive. Notw nding their best efforts to break throazh every assault this day of ull the corps was re} Then the long, costly and desiructive siese of Peter began, That which another hour's energetic work would have so easily effected on the night of June 15. ora few hours of judicious deploy- ment and demonstratian to the left on the 16th aud 17th, had now resolved itself down into a tedious job of many months, The last two days’ tactics in this ur were the most un- satisfactory of Grant's career. Perhaps the subsequent time was jnd'ciously and profitably expended im gradually but surely exhaasting the remaining resources of the south and pre- Paring the southern mind for the acceptance Of the final inevitable. Who can say? — EARLY'S RAID. ‘The Battle That Savel Washington From Capture. F. Lee, Malvern Hull, via | | tions, he learned that the town had been reinforced that morning and the night before by «corps from Leo's army, and after dark he tet out upon a swift retreat goward West Vir- | ginia, It was need of suppif@ as much as fear | of Early that caused him to take this direction. It fs the judgment of most military critics that Hunter's true course was to have attacked and captured Charlottesville before advancing on Lynchburg. EARLY'S MOVEMENT. After the defeat and death of Jones at Pied- | mont Gen. Loo perceived tho necessity of doing something at once to bead off Hunter. First, | he again sent Breckinridge back to the valley, | and on June 13 Ewell’s entire corps, Gen. Jubal A. Early commanding, was detached in the same direction. The head of bis column sr- rived at Lynchburg in time to save the town from the federals. Early followed Hunter far & few days to the westward, but failed to strike the Union force effectively. Hunter safely | made good his retreat down the Kanawha river, by stenmez up the Ohio river and thence by rail back to Harper's Ferry, but not in season to aid in sepelling Early’s rapid foray into Maryland and against Washington. REBELS DESTROYING T ye in extended line from the railroad up ver, with a defending the Baltimore and covering the fe lines, astride the and ‘defending farther detachment under Col, Brown crossing higher uj jeral right fank. Gen. ‘Ricketts, with his veteran division, held ‘to the left of the railroad down stream, in two P map leading to Washing! @ turnpike bridge. down some detachments o} tou Still ca under Col. Clendenin watched the fords. gmall reserve force was held at the railroad. Wallace's total artillery amounted to six guns, which were equally divided between Ricketts and Tyler, though they were all fually sent to Ricketts’ support. 4 sPrniTeD Fiour, Gen. Wallace states that Early’s skirmishers began to appear on his front along the Frod- erick pike about 8a. m. of July 9; that artil- lery soon opened the engagement, and that the enemy's main columns appeared upon the scene about 9 o'clock. Gen. Early makes no mention of these carlier movements; in fact he gives no details of the battle, except the meager statement that while Gen. Ramsqur demonstrated on Wallace's front Gen. Jobn B. Gordon crossed the Monocacy below bya route — by McCaush 12's cavalry, and got upon ‘allace’s flank, driving him in disordered retroat “on the afternoon of that day” toward HEC. A YD O. CANAL. Lee's primary purpose in detaching Breckin- ridge and Early was, of course, to eave Lynch- burg and the western communications of Richmond, the loss of which, with Grant at Potersburg, would have been fatal to their | cause, But an ulterivr purpose, if eircum- stances favored. was an advance into Maryland. | | Hunter's eccentric direction in retreat made easy the subsequent raid on Washingt8n, ser: ing Lee's purpose of diverting troops from Grant and of hurrying Hunter away from southwest | Virginia, @ ticklish quarter. After observing Hunter for a few days, Early headed his forces down the Shenandoah valley, now open to the Potomac river. He had a force approximating to 20,000 men, but it is impos to definitely fixthe number from the official records. In fact, during these days the contederates had no time to make records of any kind. On the 27th his command was gathered about | Stannton, where the men and wagons were re- duced to light marching order and the trans- portation loaded with only bare necessaries. ‘The 28th they took the valley pike for Winches- ter and the Potomae, reaching the first named point on the 2d of July. Here his cavalry was | detached in all directions, to befog the federals, | OES. 3. B. GORDON. burn bridges and generally smash up the B. NEIMPORTANTPART of Gen. Grant's grand campaign against Rich- | mond in 1964 was But- James river to Bermu- da Hundred. Butler's PES7, operations were at first Bal\ very promising, but he from the Drewry's Blafft who had rapidly gath- ered a force of about 25.000 men tomcet him, and thence fell back to ibis fortitied lines between the James and Ap- Pomattox. This practically ended the James Fiver attack on Richmond. Beauregard’s troops Were thereafter mainly withdrawn to strengthen y of Butler's were calied up to Grant's support | fal partof the spring campaign | Was the proposed advance of Gea. Franz Sigel up the Shenandoah valley, an offensive move- ment which at the sume time covered Washing- ton on the west, Sixes force was small. Ou the | GEN. LEW WALLACE. 45th of May he had a severe encounter at New Market with the confederate general Breckin- midge and was easily defeated. Sizel then fell Back. It was in thos little battle that the cadets of the Virg: Military Institute so greatly istinguished themselves, Gen, Breckinridge, supposing Le had cleared the valley for some ume, hurriedly joined the hard-pressed Lee on the North Anna. Gen. Sigel's management proving unsatisfac- tory to Grant, be was superseded on the 2ist by Gen. David Muster, a West Point graduate and an officer of duwtinction. Gen. Hunter promptly resumed the offensive on the 26th. Gen. Ge Crook was to march from Meadow Bridge, W Va., to join his columa in the upper valiey Hunter's motements were decidediy energetic. Ox the 5th of June he met and badly whipped the confederates at Piedmont, seattering them, | capturing about 1,000 and killiug their distin enished commande jen. W. E. Jones. The text day Hunter entered Staunton without opposition, Crook, another able and energetic officer, Jowed Hunter on the 8th with about 10,000 men, im fiue condition, after & march of 250 miles, Op the 10th the united commands proceeded toward Lynchburg, which was Hunter's ob- jective. His total force was now about 18,000. June 11 he entered Lexington, and here the Union general committed his one fatal error of waiting three days for some of his raiding cav- alry to come in. Nothing after Piedmont was im his way; all these movements were weakly opposqd by Luts small force of cavalry and infantry. Once storted again on the 14th the army ler's movement up the | ‘was ultimately repulstd | F\ front by Beauregard, | and 0, railroad as well as the C. and O. canal. Early made dispositions on the 3d to capture small force of federals under Sigel at Martins- bury, but failed. Sigel bad been warned of | Early’s approach. and sending off all his stores by rail had promptly retreated to Shepherds- | town. In attempting to get behind Sigel at | Martinsbarg Bradley Johnson was severely re- pulsed at Leetown and thrown back upon’ the | rebel infantry by Col. Mulligan, Who afterward | safely withdrew, joining Sigel.” On the night of the $d Sige! established himself on Maryland Heights, with a miscellaneous command of perbaps 5,000 men, Thus, while Early had achieved no surprising success such as had marked previous confeder- ate onsets in the valley, ha had nevertheless | established himself ou the Potomac by the 4th of Jaly. 1864, and become a problem to the federal military authorities. Sigel’s occupa- tion of the heights effectively prevented Early from using Harper's Ferry as the base for an advance on Washington and also endangered a retreat in case of disaster. but notwithstanding all this bis position was a menacing one. There was great alarm in Washington and Baltimore as well as in Pennsylvania. The resident calied for a force of 10-day men trom several of the states to repel the invatler, THE SIXTH COMPS AT MONOCACY. For several days after the first alarm was sounded Gen. Grant was in doubt if the con- federate movement was more than a mere raid under Dreckiaridge and others, and tele- graphed Halleck that Early's troops were still iu his front at Petersburg. But by the 5th he became fully convinced that Early’s whole corps was on the Potomac, and he promptly die patebed Ricketts’ division of the sixth corps by water to Baitimoro, where ho arrived on the 8th, pushing om out to the Monocacy by rail, without artiLery or wagons, Some dismounted cavalry were also forwarded, but performed uo service, G. a. Low Wallace, who commanded the mid- die department. bad previously picked up some odds aud ends of troops aud sent them to the front as carly as the 4th uader Gen. E. B. Tyler. A few troops under Gen. A. P. Howe from the Washington defenses were also seut out via more by rail to Sigel on Maryland ‘There were soldiers cnough, but not- nding every effort the government to concentrate a force of suiticent | | strength and efficiency at the right spot to | make head again | advance. Early or even to stop his Hunter's return was greatly and un- v delayed, Early without los of time, marching to the north around Sigel, perched on his eyrie,crossed | South Mountain at Crampton’s, Fox's and Sur- ner's passes apd moved directly on Frederick, threatening both Washington and Baltimore, To the west of the town he began to meet re- e 7th Bradley Joknsou was driven back from the mountain pass. Wallace, with 3,000 or 4,000 men, heid on in the vicinity of Frederick throughout the Sth, when, learn- ing that the enemy waa endeavoring to reach bis rear at Urbana by way of the Buckeystown road, thus cutting him off from Washington, he wisely withdrew that night to Monocacy Junction, eventually taking up a position along | the east sige of the Monocacy river, which de- fended the railroad bridge and other crossings, and prepared to fight a battle. Gon. Ricketts here joined bim, raising his fighting force to between 8,000 and 9.000 men. Wallace says his Feason for making 4 stand here was that while he kept open rail communications with Har- | per's Ferry he also covered. the toward Yasbington and Baltimore. He gained | time for the further concentration of troops to oppose the confederate hivasion. BADLY AT FREDERICK, Gen. Early and his hungry tatterdemalions : | entered Frederick on tho morning of the 9th, seizing food and clothing indiscriminately, and levying a direct contribution of $200,000 on the frightened town, which in his official report he says was paid in United States money. It ws apparent there was no rainbow chasing after ‘liberty” for the downtrodden sons of Mary- land by the confederates in this campaign Here he detached Col. Bradle: Marylander, with a cavalry Baltimore, destroy railroad sible to proceed to Point Lookout and | the river. Baltimore. This all appears to ha easy, but asa matter of fact Earl © been very was met in a most spirited manner and hudahard fight for his success, Wallace furnishes us with a complete story of the battle, divagrceing. however, in many particulars with the confederate reports. He says the onemy forced a crossing abcut a mile below Ricket Union skarmi left, ‘ing no attention to the ers. Until 10:30 nothing more serions than some pretty warm. slirmishing occurred, Early plainly demonstrat Brown was warinly superiority in artillery. Baltimore pike stone Col. bridgo = his at the assailed, but held hisground. Wallace changed front with Ricketts toward the south, 8 soon as he learned of the rebel crossing below, regt- This subjectea Ricketts toa heavy eufilading fire from across ing bis right on the river. Gordon soon advanced in a lon, line which greatly overlapped «and threatene to envelop Ricketts, bring up all his reserves, upelling Wallace to In this Wallaco is confirmed by his subordinates, but it is worthy of note that Gordon asserts on the other hand that his lines were overlapped by the federals, Wallace claims that Gordon’, repulsed and driven back vy and I am inclined to think thi Teport refers to a re cavalry. Gord occur until | was not ordered ucross the river until It is possible that he may have been p.m. ke rat attack was etts early in | the day, but Gordon reports no such diseste part ot Wallace Ise of Mec usland’s temporarily repulsed ence or twice in his earlier efforts to break Ricketts’ lino. It is quite clear, however, from the reports of both ides that the veterans of the old sixth corps baved magnificently under a terrific entilad- About 4 o'clock ing fire of shot and shell. Gordon ma: so he say: flual assault all along the line, and after a fierce and continuous struggle, lasting an hour, forced Ricketts back. Gen. Wallace says the reckless cha 3 of the énemy were only justified on the supposition that they were attacking militia, RETIRING FHOM THE FIELD. | About the time Gordon was advancing td his last attack Wallace states that he had issued orders for Ricketts to retire, which were exe- cuted with extraordinary coolness and courage. One of the brigade commanders, however, sa} there was considerable confusion at the rail- road crossing. ‘These citations will ow how difficult 1t is to reconcile the statements of the Union and confederate reports of this affair relating to time and some other particulars Col. Brown had throughout coura; asly maintained his hold on the Baltimore turnpike bridge above, thus protecting Wallace's pro- posed line of retreat, resisting several serious attacks. Gen, Tyler did very good work along the river front, holding his lines until Ricketts’ had been safely withdrawn, troo} Some of his raw 4 became shaky toward the last, quite a number taking to the woods, bat ihe main body retired in good order, following after Ricketts. The brunt of the battle was borne by Ricketts, whose division sustained the bulk well as those of Gordon bear incontestable evidence to the stubbornuess of the fight made by the federals, 07 the losses. These losses a BATILE OF THE MONOCACY" In this battie Wallace lost no flags, no can- j Bon and no stores, but the dead and wounded were left upon tho field. ‘Tho manner of the fight led him to believe that the confederate casualty list excceded his own Gordon's next d. official report leaves very littl doubt that Wallace wus correct. tance from Wallace, and om the eveutng of | fe aud Gel In his firat legraphic report. sent to Washington th after he had had time to get his wind, Wallace stated that he did not consider bimself seriously beaten, and bore enthusiastic testimony to the bravery of the troops, But some of his « atehes on the night after the battle show that he was some- what demoralized. He retreated rapidly that night on Baltimore, entirely wrong as it subse- quently turaed oul, as Early was aiming for Washington and Wallace's business was to keep between Early and his objective. THE Losses. Gen. Early vagnoly reported his losses in the battle of the Monocacy at “between 600 and 700.” ‘They © undoubtedly considerably in excess of his greatest figure, for Gordon offic- ially stated his loss alone at 696 killed and wounded. Gordou's figures donot include cavalry, nor auy of the losses in Ramseur's division, which is kuown to haye suffered quite Between 400 and 500 of Earty’s desparately wounded wero, captured the after the battle in Frederick. Union Pw ‘was 123 killed, 603 wounded and 563 missing— some of the latter undoubt some 12,000 a though utte: y chica Jobnsou to Davis asa for tosh aa e the killed and for numbers moro crowded than whi the field. It is also evident that his retreat was afterward effected without loss, that ho was not pursucd and that Early did not re- sumo his advance on Washington until the next day. ‘The time saved was more than worth tho battlo and defeat. It is highly pro able that but for Wallace's fight at Monocacy Early would have been enabled to occupy Washington temporarily, with all the couse- quences such a calamity implied. ty PRREANE SHERIDAN AND EARLY. ‘The Confederates at Last Come to Grief im the Favorite Ficld. OTH THE MILITARY and political branches of Union affairs pre- sented n serious aspect about the time Early was threatening Wash- ington, The attack on Potersburg had settled down into amere siege, the progress and result of which were viewed by people at tho north with doubt and misgiv- ing. Early was at the doors of the capital, while Sherman's movement at the wost toward Atlanta was apparently ineffective. And Early was hardly driven back when the mine disaster at Petersburg shocked the country. There was great depression throughout the country, and the prospects of the republicans in the impending presidential election looked sloomy unless there was immediate milit success portending the downfall of the re. bellion. Gen. McClellan been nominated against Mr. Lincoln on a pence-at-any- price platform. His election probably meant the collapse of all Union effort to beat the confederates, Something was necessary to be done, and that something speedily oc- curred, Gen. Grant was confident,that on the arrival of Gen. Wright with the sixth corps, also part of the nineteenth corps from New Orleans, to assist Hunter and Sigel, that Washington would not only be saved, but a fatal blow struck Early’s army before he could get back across the Potomac. But Hunter was greatly delayed in getting back from West Virginia by the de- struction of the B. aud O. road west of Har- per's Ferry. Another drawback to vigorous operations around Washington was the mul- titudinous nnmber of commanders, Chas. A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, telegraphed Grant: “Nothing can possibly be done for want of a commander. Augur com- mands tho defenses of Washington, with Me- Cook and « lot of brigadiers under him; but he GEN. C. c, AvGUR. is not allowed to go outside. Wright commands his own corps; Gilmore has been assigned to tho temporary command of tho nineteenth corps, Ord to command the eighth corps and all other truops in tho middie department, leaving Wallace to command the city of Balti- more alowe; but there is no head to the whole, and it seems indispensable that you should ap- point one. Gen, Halleck will not give orders except as he receives them. The President will,give none, and natil you direct * * * fatal way which it has gone ou for the past week.” A queer condition of affairs truly. Grant CONFEDERATE FORAGERS finally bj j nearly an entire day and was finally 7 super. ything will go on in the deplorable and | Ins conference Hunter had expressed a will- ingnees to be relieved, and Sheridan, who had been waiting at Washington, was immediately sent for. At the Monocacy he had a talk with Grant, and then passed on up to Halltown, the lieutenant general returning to Washington. Owing to the political as well as military ten- sion it was necessary Som, s8 tated at the autsct, to beat This was pointed out to Shorten.” He wan tor fight, but not to fight until he was confident of a “dead sure thing.” In noting the new commander's caution in the earlier operations of this glorious campaign this fact must always be kept in view. | Sheri- dan had the largest force the Union had yet assembled in the Shenandoah valley and it mostly made up of good troops. One gro advantage was his large and efficient cavalry force, which could be mane very effective in the open country of the va fis@ommand was called the middie military division and the active force the “Army of the Shenan- doah.” ‘Torbert was made chief of cavalry. Important rosults immediately followed all these changes. SHERIDAY, Sheridan, as soon as his cava!ry arrived, pro- oved to strike for Winchester, which was the ey of the lower valley. On tho 10th his column marched from Halltown. As soon as this movement began Early itamodiately con- centrated in front of Winchester in line of bat- tle. But perceiving that the federals had been largely reinforced he quickly drew farther back toward Strasbarg, establishing bimeelf at the strong position of Fisher's Hill, where he awaited the arrival of Anderson's division, which had been sent ta him from Petersburg, Although it was uncertain about the reinforce- ments, Sheridan acted with extreme cau- tion; when he became convinced of Anider- son's arrival ho turned to a defensive, as it was supposed Early was nearly 40,000 strong, | outoumberiug the Union force. Sheridan retreated down tho valley on the 15th and 16th, taking position at Berrysule, ten miles east of Winchester, at which point he left a strong cavalry force. He eventually went back to the vicinity of Charlestown, Sheridan notified Grant that there was no rea- son for alarm. Early moved down to Bunker Hill on the Martinsburg pike and sent Lomax's cavalry out toward Shepherdstown. A concerted attack arranged by Early miscarried on the ist, Anderson not coming up in time. There Was @ sharp action, but nothing serious. That night Sheridau retired again to Hnlltown—a strong position—where his flanks wero eov- ered. Early made demonstrations but did no attack, and then feinting as if to cross the Po- tomuc, finally withdrew once moro to the front er, In explanation of Sheridan simply wrote Ha it it best to be very prudent. This camo of seesaw continued until Septem- rly's chief purpose being to keep the railroad broken and to detain as many as possible in the valiey; Sheridan watching for a‘dead sure thing” to It now occurred. concerted by the ene: e and movements, although he had or- ct cautiously, by appointment : B&O. troops warily attack. a contereuce he discovered that Sheridan Was willing enongh to fight and that only two words of instruction were necessary .. Sheridan’s pian of battle suited him his own, brought along, was not produced, In fact § battle when come. He hb Wright of W rant d he: arrived, His time had ned from Miss Rebecca r,on the evening of the 16th, that Anderson's artillery and infantry had jet and promptly made — dispositions to attack, Grant's visit came near disconcert- ing bis plang, as Early at once took the alarm and concentrated the somewhat scattered divi- sions of Ramseur, Rodes, Gordon and Breckin- ridge xeross the Berryville pike, two miles to the east of Winchester, with the Opequan creek mm his front, directed Wright to assume command of the troops in the field and to immediately pursue Early. But old Jubal on the 16th of July, threatened by both Hunter and Wright, rapidly moved out of Loudoun county, into which he had retired after his Washington raid with the immense spoil of his Maryland campaigh, over into the Shenandoah. Grant's first idea, as soon as ke learned that Early had escaped, was to immediately deaw the sixth and nineteenth corps back to Petersburg and make a decisive move on that front before Lee could be re- inforced, leaving Hunter to watch and hold the enemy in tho valley, But Early remained still a menacing factor in the lower valley and this could not be done. Hunter arrived from the west in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry on the Ith and troops began to concentrate from other quarters on Earl Where were a uamber of hot affairs at vari points in the lower valley. Avere}l with hi avalry finally got on to Farly’s line of com- munications threatening his trains. This fact and the pressure from Hunter on the*west and Wright from the east compelled the confed ate exder to tall back as far as Strasburg. But he sent Ramseur’s divisin to drive Averell off. Averell met the confcderates with a bold front somo three mites north of Wipvhestcr and with the aid of two infantry regiments in a brilliant action completely defeated Ramscur’s entire infantry division, a KARLY'S ATTACK ON CROOK. On the 24th, hearing that the sixth corps had withdrawn toward Washington, Early xuddeuly turned on Croox’s Ijttle army at Kernstown, striking it ow the flank and speedily routing it. The victory was complete, the Yederals flying as far back as Bunker Hill, Crook lost about 1,200 men, but no artillery. This Kernstown victory gave Early command of the valley again, Crook retiring across the Potomac into Maryland, taking post by Gen, Hunter's diroc- tion near Sharpsburg, to defend the South mountain passes toward Washinton, Gen. Early now promptly advanced again to the Potomac, but contented himself with send- ing McCausiand’s cavairy to levy tribute on Chambersburg. Pa.,or burn the town, The people cou! pay, and the torch was ruth- Recivnppliod. Aftet.a close chess and_ sume hard blows this land pirate eventnally effected his egcape into West Virginia, This Chambers- burg’ raid caused even a greater panic than Early’s first incursion; fora timo it was sup- posed to be auothor roil tvasion in force. +7 ad one favorabie effect, however. It caused the return of the sixth and nineteenth corps to this theater of action and the determination on Grant’s part to make a serious Job of ‘cleaning out Early and to give the contract toa com- petent oflicer with adequate means, Gfant, with this end in viow, suggested Gen. Franklin for the command, in place of Hunter. who was too old, but to this he received no en- couragement from Washington, Finally, on Augus: 1, Grant scems to have thought of Gen. Sheridan, and he was sent to Washington with the suggestion that he bo put in command of the cavairy aud the sixth corps asa movable column and turned loose to clear the enemy out of Maryland. Ho also sent two divisions of cavalry to strengthen our forces there. The President himself, seeing the disjointed, inef- fective policy pursued aguinst Eurly, and deem- ing himself powerless to improve ‘this condi- tion of affairs. telegraphed in answer to Grant’s proposal to havo Early followed to the death: A repeat to you, it will neither be Sst ser attempted, uiless you wa every day an hour and force it,” THE FIGNT AT OPEQUAN, Sheridan moved to the attack before day- light on the 19th, The cavalry was to attack and carry the crossings of the Opequan creek, supported by the sixth and nineteenth corps. After crossing, the cavalry was to protect the flunks,while the infantry deployed to the attack. The cavalry’s advance was so sudden as to se- cure the crossings without much opposition, But they were narrow, and it was noon before the two corps were in line ready to advance. The ntry was somewhat wooded, affording fav- orable ground for defeuse, As the blue coatsadvanced they were opened upon by Enrly ape. Getty's division eleft and Ricketts’ on the right of the ille pike, with Wilson’s cavalry, began steadily to gain yround against Ranseur’s i fantry and Lomax's cavalry, Then Grover's division of the nineteenth corps_attacked vig. orously on the right, breaking Evaus’ brigade and pursuing. This left an interval into which Gordon and Rodes sprang, driving back part of Ricketts’ troop: Sheridan's onset. As the chargi came on, however. they were etru by Upton’s brigade of Russell's reserve division and thrown back to their original line, ‘This charge was briliiant, but it cost the: life of the brave Russell, who had been Sheridan's cap- tain on the Pacific coast, ‘Then Crook's eighth corps was brought into action on the enemy's loft just as Torbert’s cavalry attack from the north along the Mar- tinsburg pike began to drive the enemy in con- fusion back on Winchester. And also simul taneously with Crook’s attack the whole line fedcrater OREN. AVEREM. of the sixth and nineteenth corps pressed for- ward in front with the greatest precision; the tactics were altogether beautiful. It was a grand sight. and Crook's advance was success- ful from the beginning; he pressed forward almost without a ha':. Merritt’s and Averell’s cavalry had swept everything up the Winches- ter pike back behind Breckinridge, who at- tempted to stop them, but Merritt charged the infantry on the left as Averell passed around his flank. With saber and pistol they rode down a battery and eaptared 1,200 prisoners, Crook just then struck Breckinridge’s right and Gordon's left, forcing them to give way, Wright had broken Rodes, and the whole rebel army fell back near Winchester. where Early Grant, some- | arlestown on September 17. | heridan was already to bring ona | | stricken army burst upon his astounded view. | Crowds of slightly wounded and other un- and temporarily stopping | u the flank | snd cont- ntos and entMcbianm "A vitor wes not saty . but the presidential probably Saved, Lancoty sent Bheriaee’ tes fellostey dispatch: sumterven Gan 20, ees. asnixoros, Gen. Sheridan, Wincvester, Va.: bless you all, oficers and men. Strofgly in- clined tocome Up and see you. id A. Lixcony. AT Fismen’s BILL. The pursuit of Early began at daybreak on the 20th, His defeated army was found posted ina strong position at Fisher's Hill, where no immediate effort was made to dislodge him, Looking the ground over Sheridan concluded it would be suicidal to attack directly in front, Instead he set on foot a turning movement under Gen. Crook around Early’s left and rear. Crook's entire corps was secretly moved to the position selected for this attack entirely unobserved by tho enemy, after two days of preliminary “marching and manezvering, where he lay in concealment, while Wright and Emory were pushed up yards of Early an assanit. eral severe fights occur while this was being accomplished. Everything indicated an attack at an en- tirely ‘different point of the lines from the real one, and Early was concentrated at the wrong place when Crook's blow fell. His ad- vance striking square on their flank and left Tear was a complete surprise, as Sheridan ex- pected, creating great confusion and conster- nation. In the midst of this Wright snd Emory threw their columas against the rebel front. Crook's movements were so rapid that no time was given the confederates to make new dispositions; they were routed ine few minutes and fled up the valley in a panic, as Sheridan says, without the semblance of an organization, abandoning nearly all their ar- tillery and much other property and muni- tions, As apart and parcel of the strategy of this | battle Sheridan had sent bis cavalry under | Torbert through the Luray valley to come upon Early’s rear, but Torbert entirely failed on this occasion to meet the expectations of his | fiery chief. Otherwise the plans at Fisher's Hill were carried out like machine work and were overwhelmingly successful, It is prob- GEN. FARLY. able,had Torbert gained the required position. that'the greater part of Early's army would have been captured in ite scamper to the rear. ‘This and a subsequent miscarriage of Averell ermitted Early a breathing spell, and 0 gathered his demoralized troops to- gether again south of Mount Jackson. | Threatened again, however, he soon fell clean back to Rock Vish Gap. Sheridan then took sition around Port iepublic and Harrison. are. He now systematically devastated the country | in the upper valley, destroving mills and crops | mercilessly and driving out cattle and other live stock for the purpose of making it unten- abi for the enemy, After accomplishing this ‘ose according to orders on October 6 he red down tho valley with all his forces, ing stayon along the north bank of Cedar |ereek west of the valley pike. Immediately after his defeat at the Opequan Kershaw's division and Cutsbaw's battalion of artillery were hurried back to Early’s assistance, and hi | followed Sheridan's retrograde closely, burn- ling for revenge. He was also under the im- | [Fession thata largo part of the federal force ad been detached to Gen. Grant “SHERIDA: RID! On the 16th Sheridan received a summons to come to Washington on military business, and went there the next day. After a short con- ference with Halleck and Stanton he started on his return to the army by special train by way of Martinsburg, where he arrived on the evening of the 17th. Here he remained all night, and the next morning, taking horse, rode out to Winchester, where be slept the night of the 18th, Ou the morning of the 19th, while the general was yet in bed, a picket officer reported artillery firing in the direction of Cedar creck. It appeared to be irregular, indicating a reconnoissauce which he had ordered before leaving, and Sheridan pmd but hittle attention to it. Presently the officer came back again and said the firing still con- tinued, This made Sheridan restless and nervous. Ho asked to have the breakfast hur- ried up, and before 9 o'clock of the 19th was in the saddle again, headed to creck, This was “Sheridan's ride, famous by T. Buchanan Read's poem. ‘As the Union general rode out of Winchestor revel women at their doors and windows made insolent and insulting gestures, indicating to Sheridan's experienced mind ti secret which tkey guessed, and that there was something up. At the edge of the town be halted, and, listening, plainly heard the long unceasing roar of artillery, telling that a heavy action was in progress toward Codar creck. Then riding forward he placed bis head down on the side bow, listening intently, trring to locate und interpret the sullen sound. it grew louder as he advanced, much faster in ratio than he traveled. Front this fact he correctly argned that his own army was coming to- rd him in retreat. Satisfied that everything was going wrong, Sheridan now dashed forward at ® regulat swinging pace, when on rising the crest beyond Millcreek the appalling spectacle of a panic- wounded but utterly demoralized men camo streaming down the pike toward Winchester, He was assured positively that all was lost; the army was routed and broken up. After comprehending something of the terrific ity that probably happened Sheridan says ho walked his horse for awhile, trying to fix in his mind what was his proper course to pursue. ‘Then, learning further of the disaster, taking two aids and twenty men, leaving his other oficers to stop and rally the runaways, Sheridan started for the extreme front. ‘The roads were blockaded with the wounded, wagons and debris of’ a retreating, defeated yy. Beyond these he came toa different class of meu, as he drew nearer to the actual scene of the fighting; crowds of unwounded, who, out of immediate danger, perfectly cool, had halted and were cooking ‘coffee. When aA saw the general they abandoned their coffee, threw up their hats with cheers, and, what was better, shouldered their muskets al started after him. ‘This was @ most promising indicanon. To acknowle: tion Sheridan took off his hat and rode along the road alone ahead of his escort, Thousauds faced about and followed on, Mounted officers rode out among the scattered M cre just heard of your great victory. God | the: to within 700 | fortified front, as it intending | ing bis oope and waiting for another tunity? No; be not only intended todo t! She inspiration had taken ion of him to Yin deck thie lect Geld before the sun went wu. With frenzied energy the unbroken divisions were brought forward into line: thousands of stragglers rallied upon these firm lines, aud 2 . and from this citcumstance that he had but Just arrived, He had at thet time been engaged two hours reforming the troops and tmak- w dispositions for another battle. resently a lucky thing happened. A feeble attack was made on the right of the nine- teenth corps, which waa promptly and enaily repulsed, in plain sight of the greater part of the line, greatly restoring the shaken cont- dence of the troops, About $:80 p. m., evory- thing being ready, Sheridan advanced his whole line in a ewinging movement to get Possession of the val!oy pike Overlapped by Eariz on tneright, anattempt | was made to strike him in flank, but the infantry of McMillan broke tlie attacking rebel | line in two at its angle, whereupon the isol Part of it was charged by Custer and com- Pletely disorganized, he "capturing Privonera, Sheridan sare bis whe as the eye could reach was driving thing before it—from behind trees, stone walls and other sheltering obstacles. He rode over on to tho valley pike, where Crook's reorganized battalions were preparing to go in. With ap encouraging word he urged them on. A brilliant charge of Union cavalry under | Lowell, in which that officer was killed. fol- lowed by an attack of infantry, completely stove up Early’s right Iiut the federal ad- Yance everywhere was really magnificent; such a renewal of confidence and clan ina beaten army was never before seen. ‘The con- federates, probably greatly exh: night march and much bro! by their early charge, were pressed steadily back, and at last | broke in full retreat, Sheridan had good his word; the federal camps were Beyond Cedar creek, noar Strasburg, Merritt and Custer’s cavalry charged the disorganized masses of Early, capturing prisoners, guns and | Wagons. Gen. "Ramseur was here captured, | mortally wounded. As a result of Sheridan's Magnificent nerve, judgment and fine baitle tactics, ell the artillery, transportation and camp equipage lost in the surprise of the early morning were recovered, and in add 2 twenty-four cannon, 1,200 ‘prisoners and num- bers of battle flags were taken. Utterly d, Early’s army fled. It did not stop until New- markct was reached. It was many days before Early had recovered enough cohesion to make @ reconnoissance. This was the end of important military oper- ations in the Shenandoah valley, Never again was the enemy able to make head in this their favorite camping ground, where so many bril- liant successes bad been won by Jackson and Ewell and others. In fact the end was drawing nigh. Later the sixth corps and some of the other troops were sent back to Grant, Sheridan holding the devastated valley throughout the winter witkhis cavalry. When spring opened, with his rOWganized divisions he started over- land to join Grant. Early's loss is estimated to have been about 3,300 at Cedar creek, of whom some 1.200 were Prisoners. Sheridan's lose was about 5, 4,000 being killed and wounded. — THE MINE BATTLE, The Famous but Unsuccessful Attempt at Petersburg. HE MILITARY VALUE of Petersburg consisted solely in the railroads centering there and thence running to Richmond. Grant Paramount object was to ext these railroads and thus in large mea- sure stop supplics from the far south to the confederate armics de- fending Richmond. Failing in direct as- saults, the federals began throwing up a sys- tem of intrenchments extending from the Appomattox on the northeast sround to the south of Petersburg, “enveloping and keeping 4 close as possible to the enemy In fact the system soon became one of active, unceasing extensions to the left, under cover of fortifications, with the expectation of ulti- mately outflanking the rebel defenses—mean- while cutting off all the railroads—and rench- ing the river again on the other side of the town. It was also expected that this system of extensions would compel Lee in meeting them to leave many spots in his own lines thinly defended, affording opportunity, sooner or later, for successful attack, And this is exactly what happened eventually, The works coustructed consisted of forte, connected by infantry parapets. On noth fronts these fortified Union lines were also protected from surprise by slashed timber, abatis and ditches, and could be successfully defended by a very small number, thus leaving A BOMB Puoor, the main force available for attacking weak and exposed points elsewhere on the rebel line or in extending still further around Peters- burg. ‘These lines of investment had to be met by defenses equally strong, manned by watchful defenders, A great deal of prelimi- nary work had already been done by the con- federates before the town was attacked. ‘This work of digging went on industriously day after day under constant musketry and artiliery fire, interspersed with many severe battles and numberless cavalry raids, The Petersburg and Norfolk road was cut in the first day's operations—in fact it hud been of no service to the confederates for several weeks previously. Later thero occurred an obstinate contest for the Weldon road, runuing directi south from Petersburg, but after several battles Grant established a firm bold on that line to within three miles of the city. In attempting to ewing the tnvesting lines from the east around the city toward the west and northwest a confederate line of fortifi- cations was struck running laterally toward the southwest, covering the Boydton plank road well down, and also the South Side railroad, the last line now in their possession, It was found impossible to pierce this line, which was gradu- ally extended across and covered the upper part of Hatcher's run, eight or nine miles out from Petersburg. Every extension toward the west and south- west to outflank and get into the rear of this lateral line was obstinately contested by Lee, commands ip the fields on either side of the road and shouted that Sheridan was » and to fallin. The effect was simply electrical. Order was quickly effected, and soon columns of what but » moment before was a sullen mob were marching toward Cedar creek again, Everybody willingly, enthusiastically turned toward the front as-if the one thing needful restored to the army. It must have been Sgratifyiug moment to this little hero. But all he said as ho rode among those men on the road was: “If I had been with you, men, this disaster would not ha’ face the other cover our camp. ‘MEN WHO STOOD THEM GROUXD. But all was not disorganization on this field. Soon the commander came to the sturdy divi- sions of Ricketts and Wheaton, presenting » bold front toward the south, and part of the i free i i i | mvely to. display of the relics of the battle, | collected and preserved by Mr. Grifithe— | ahattered muskets, ewords, baronets, jeannon b nd shells of all sizes, | human skulls and bones, pleces of silver | money and every conceivable kind of military | equipment, nearly all showing bullet marke The fort, the crater, this coiliction of Mr. Grifiit debrig, nteligible account of the tere that took place here, are weil to sce and hear, And with ‘ont goit he sightscer on this «pot con form a pretty fair idea of the character of all the fortifications used by both armies end | somewhat of the desperate natare of the ght | ing between them. It commands » good of many historic positions beld by during this memor: object lesson in itself, | siege, besides being am 10 ie_‘nuquestionably one of the most interesting and tmetructive all the remaining visible landmarks of the rebellion, RUNNING THE STOR, About awook after the rogular operations against the city begaa Lieut. Col, Henry Pleasante of the forty-cizhth Pennsylvania, @ regiment from the mining regions of that state, and @ mining eagincer of ability himself, approached Gen, Potter with « proposal to | mine and blow up a confodcrate redan oppo- site their position on the line, which afterward | proved tobe Pogram's saliont, defended by Gen. Elliott's brigad Tho idea origmated with the private soldiers of the forty-cighth, | ail practical miding men. ‘To reach the dors Was necessary to run an underground gailery or tunnel Sii fect long from a point in rear of the federal intrenched picket ine, ia @ ravine, fortunately entirely hidden from ‘the enemy's observation, After some investigation Gen, Burnside ap- proved the plan submitted and ordered the work to be donc. Col. Pleasants commenced work at noon of June 25. Gon. Humphreys says “its continuance was subsequently ms sented to by Gon. Meade.” This “assent” could scarcely be called approval, and indie cated cold faith in the enterprise; in fact, Col, Pleasants afterward testified that his projeot was discounteuancec and discouraced in every | Possible manner at army headquarters, He | received no help from anybody. Gen, Mesde | and Major Duane, tke acting chief engineer, Doth agrced that the thing could not be doney such # length of untimbered mine had never been excavated im wilitary operations an@ could not be. ‘The professional military men of the feom to have unitedly endeavored to sneer frown down the enterprise, because it did not originate with them, Meade explains that the rebel fort was polut for atiack, because tt was commantod on oth flank+ and rear by other rebel works, When Pleasants applied for the inate ment to determine the exact fort to be mined it was deniod him on some ound of punctilio, although they had one af jeadquartors, and Burns to send to Washington ~ — not — 4 ee ok carried out in cracker boxes, with iron boope from barrels, with hid ory poles nailed on for bandon, But notwithstanding the obstructive of the regular engincers, from Gen. works sah down, and other impediments to « satisfactory prosecution of the SECTIONAL VIEW OF THE MIKE, cradest of tools this clear-headed and ener getic volunteer officer and his noble of 400 men.doggedly persevered and on the 234 of July finished the Job. After point exactly under the confederate fort the main tunnel lateral galleries were run to the right and left, thirty-eight and a feet long, respectively, divided into ry azines, each of which was charged with 1) unds of powder, and the mine was for the match. ‘The miners could plainiy hear the confederate soldiers at work in the fort overhead, little dreaming of the catastropbe im store for them. Col. Pleasants says the work could have been completed in one-third the time consumed bad be properly supphed with facilities, PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK. After careful reconnoissances by Meade an@ other officers everything on this confederate front was pronounced favorable to attack, an@ 3:30 a, m. of July 30 was fixed upon as the hour for springing the mine and striking the pro= posed blow. Grant had purposely made «uch 4 serious demonstration in the nature of « feim® against Richmond with Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavairy on the 27th as to cause Lee to withdraw everything from Petersburg 10 defend the capital exceptthe three divisions of Malone, Johneon = Hobe, Thee 8 Hence Was secretly and y brought Petorsburg front ‘again, Meado afterward stated that about 60,000 troops were massed here to take advantage of any success by Burnside’s attack, which proves that be bed at last some faith in the mine, 5 ‘THE CRATER. Dy Meade's direction Burnside's ninth was to initiste the attack, supported on eighteenth corps on the right, in reserve, Burnside originally use Ferrero’s division of nogre a column, but Meade None of the other di FE i f f | } tis i i i aT] ef ts j i i fell i