Evening Star Newspaper, September 22, 1892, Page 10

4 THE EVENING STAR: WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1892—PART TWO. (Copyrtabt, 182, by Leslie J. Perry.] SPOTTSYLVANTA. Battling Agatnst Gen. reastworks. Fourteen Day: SINGULAR AND IM-| pressive event occurred | in the Wilderness on | the evening of the 7th, The day had been @ t one, each army | holding {ts lines; there | bad been no battle or occasion of any kind whatever for sponta- neous enthusiasm on either side. But for some unknown reason the confederate army | roke out intos regular “rebel This cheering began on their left near | the Rapidan, and ran in a wave of wild, weird sound along the entire line to their extreme right in the dense woods on the Brock road. s distance of fully six miles, where {t receded and then died away entirely for afew minutes. Af- ter a brief space the phenomenon was re- peated, this time returning from right to left. It was nota simultaneous hurrah of the whole army, but sort of running cheer from regi- ment to regiment. Then the Union army cheered in answer, in « similar manner, from ‘one end of its line to the other. Perhaps this e trick—probably was—to de- was a confederat termiae if any portion of the Union army had been withdrawn or changed positions. After dark on the 7th Warren silently with- drew from his lines in the Wilderness in front of Bwell andstrauck south down the Brock all night past Hancock, toward ~ a Srasarmaptar Richmond. The advance ‘was oppesed and greatly impeded by Lee's di- vision of Stuart's cavalry behind barricades, and was consequently slow, the main columa having to waft several hours while the leading brigade of Robinson’s division cleared the road. Lee wasinformed of the federal movement very carly, butseems to have misapprehended its direction,as bis official dispatches conclus- ively prova, He hopefully mistook it for a re- treat of the fedierals to the east on Fredericks- burg,andgotelegraphe Sto Kichmond. It is quite spparend from the confederate records thas thelr movements until near noon on fhe@fh were basedon this mistaken treating. Ewell's |e eames until the ‘Early. There ‘of the real fact of an ad- Bpotteylvania, an ad- vance ‘a federal practice af- tere In this comvintionstany-rate, Lee that night ordened Longstmect's corps, now under RH. Andewem, bolting their right along the Brock reed, tomamipthe next morning (the Sth), as @presenfionarymove,to Spottsylvania, then the enlygoute inthe direction of Fredericksburg Bot fn theqensession of the federals, thus plac- ing him, eZee snpposed—clearly indicated in @ispatches to-Richmond—on the right flank of Gerand.and In a commanding position to observe the roads leading southward in case Grant should feel strong enough to attempt a further movement toward the capital from Fredericks Fortunately for Lee, Anderson concluded or | as compelled to move about 11 o'clock that | night to escape the smoke and fire of the burn- ing forest, and used @ road to the west of that along which Warren was moving, but in total ignorance of the fact that federal infantry was marehing southward on the Brock road, only two or three miles away. Anderson's marob was several miles shorter than Warren's. Thus, when the head of Warren's column, under Gen. | Robinson, euierged from the Wilderness woods at Alsop’s farm on the morning of the Sth, in- stead of being unopposed, as was expected, ex- cept by cavalry, perhaps, it met part of Ander- | son's infantry, just arrived, but already in line of battie. AS ACCIDENTAL Move. ‘This appears like wonderful foresight and en- ergy on Lee's part, but, in fact, it was an im- portant result secured largely by accident. If Anderson had taken advantage of the latitude permitted in Lee's order of the 7th, and not marehed until the morning of the 8th, it is ob- viows that Warren would, have forestalled oor as Grant Robinson's attempt to brush what he sup- posed to be cavalry—which, in fact, was Ander- sont tnfantry—out of his path was repulsed, end the subsequent attempt of the entire fifth corps metelike fate, but some ground was culty. Then the federals fell to and also threw up acontinuons line of intrenchments, Sedg- wick to Warren's left and Burnside still further on. Lee. learning the true situation, had by | this time rapidly pushed everything toward Spottsyivania, where he was concentrated in Grant's front on the morning of the 9th, both lines close up and fortified. Hancock continued to hold as far back as Todd’s Tavern the line of the Brock road until the #th, when he moved down on Warren's im- mediate right, crossing the Po river, in an en- deavor to swing round and locate the rebel left | flank, but darkness set in before he could make @ispositions to attack. On this day Gen. Sedg- wick was killed by a rebel sharpshooter, and Gen. H. G. Wright succeeded to the command of the sixth corps. ‘On the morning of the 10th the confederate army occupied a zigzag line of breastworks, covering Spottylvania, in the shape of a huge semicircle, running from a point on, the leit around by'the north to its extreme right on the southeast of the town, with the federals close up, well covered likewise, and actively feeling for weak spota. The federal line must have been twelve miles long. The region about Spotsylvania presents a rolling surface, much eut up with good-sized streams, and heavily timbered, though not so much of a jungle as the Wilderness, and there are many farms, It was well adapted to Lee's defensive tactics. Early on the 10th Hancock on the Union right, somewhat isolated, found himself con- fronted by a heavy rebel force under Early and Heth, who began pressing him, bis movement on that flank being a dangerous one to Lee. Ile found it impossible to force a passage over the Biock House bridge of the Po where it bends to the south, on the west of Spotteslrania. Bir- ney’s and Gibbon’s divisions were during the forenoon ordered to be withdrawn to support another assault by the other corps, When their movement was in progress the confederates tacked Violently. Their assaults were repelled and Hancock recrossed the Po safely with all his divisions, and moved to the support of War- renand Wright = * THE CHARGE OF UPTON’S BRIGADE, In the afternoon Warren, Wright and Burn- side made asimultancous advance. But Ander- son’s front was now too strong to be broken, and Warren was easily repulsed, Further to the left, however, Upton’s bri iy in design, but He penetrated nchmente. It was Doles’ and part of Danicl’s brigades of Ewell’s corps that were broken in this onset, But no support came to Upton; attacked in front and on both sides by the confederates, who had now recovered from their surprise, he en back, yielding up the intrenchinents »ptured guns, but getting off his prisoners, Upton was afterward made a brigadier general for this operation, He wasan able officer for 0 young a man, Burnside, on the extreme left, pushed up al- most unopposed to within musket shot of Spotteylvania, having completely turned the cou e right flank and got upon their rear. Had he here manifested the same appetite for attack that he didat Frederjckeburg in 1862 im- Its no doubt wéuld have followed. tions were of a feeble character and seemingly without a proper understanding of the confederate position, which, unknown seif, he was menacing in its weakest and vulnerable part. Unfortunately, Burn- drawn in fully « mile to connect left, voluntarily yielding the most valuable ground secured durinz the day. Gen, Stevenson of the ninth corps and Gen, e of the tifth corps were killed on this day. In spite of every effort, no permanent mpres- sion was made on Lee’s lines, HANCOCK'S CORPS AT THE “BLOODY ANGLE.” On the night of the 11th Hancock’s corps was brought around to the left, between Wright and Burnside, in front of the angle in Lee's line, where it abruptly turned from its north- ern front to the seuth. Barlow's division was massed in double columns of regiments, Birney in two deployed lines on his right, with Mottin support, while Gibbon was held in reserve. At 420 on the morning of the 12th, in the midst of @ fog, which somewhat favored them. Barlow and Birney advanced steadily against the angle Without firing @ shot, in splendid form, and when close up charged with ‘ cheer.’ The abatis in front was quickly torn away by the men and they went over the intrenchments with | ‘with the fifth corps near Alsop'a. ‘was in position to repulse an effort of Hill’ to get agen the Broek road that night Burnside moved via Chancellors- | a Gritten for the Evening Star { Leslie J. Perry of the i Gar Records Roard.f | _. But the rebels quickly rallied even in this des- | perate situation. ‘Troops were rushed in from | all sides, and Hane subsequent advance stopped, but he repelied every effort to recay ture the line during the day, and eventually Lee had to retire to a now line further back. ‘The musketry firing at this battle of the “Bloody Angle” throughout the 12th was terrible, act- ually clearing the ground of underbrush’ and even cutting down good-sized saplings As usual, the supporting attacks on right and left amounted to nothing. Warren's was feeblo ily repulsed, and the same may be said of Burnside’s, on the left, though renewed sev- eral times, It was hard, under existing con- ditions, to get the troops to go up against the strong confederate intrenchments from which they had been repulsed so often. It is evident, however, that when Hancock smashed through Lee wasnear aserious disaster. ‘On the 13th nothing of moment happened un- til durk, when Wright and Warren were moved tothe left of Burnside, extending the federal lines far to the southward in an endeavor to outflank Lee in the direction of Richmond. Had this movement been set on foot in support of Burnside and simultancously with Hancock's assault the day before, it must have succeeded, Now itwas made in the midst of a tremendous rain storm, and was consequently so slow as to Rive Lee time tomeet it with a like extensionon that front, always closely covered with in- trenchmenis, : ‘The armies wero now facing each other on en- tirely newground. A good deal of desultory fighting was constantly going on, but nothin; of importance occurred during the 14th, 16tl and 16th, except these extensions, but on the 17th Hancock and Wright made a night march back to the old position at the angle, attacking early on the 18th, hoping to catch the enemy bapping. but they wore found in position be- hind the works, as usual, and the Union troops were repulsed. EWELL'S ATTACK. And now for tho first time in this titanic struggle Lee took the offensive. On the after- noon of the 19th Ewell, who had made a con- cealed march far around to the federal right and rear and got upon the Fredericksburg road with his entire corps, broke into active eruption. He struck a division of new troops under Gen. Tyler and a brigade of heavy ar- tillery under Col. Kitching, just up from Fred- ericksburg, equippedas infantry. For ashort while Ewell made considerable headway, cre- ating agood deal of confusion among some of the troops, but, nevertheless, met steady resist- ance from the start. ‘tyler’s dispositions were excellent for meeting the attack, and his troops bebaved well. Some of the second and fifth corps in the vicinity were hurried over to ‘Tyler's aid, but he had mainly repulsed the con- federates before they got up. FIGHTING BEHIND BREASTWORKS. This was.in fact.a severe battle, and a decided Union viet The federal i in this affair reported at 196 killed, 1,09 249 missing. Ewell’s loss must ‘n considerably in excess of this, as he ked in the open’and was repulsed, ‘Tyler ptured about 500 well prisoners besides many wounded, and claimed to have buried nearly 200 rebel dead. ‘This action practically ended the operations atSpotteyivania, On the nightof the 20th Han- cock’scorpa was detached toward Lee's right and rear, m which Grant had two objects, viz. her to tempt the confederate general to ai k Hancock, under the misapprehension that or to turn him out of the in- d force him to battle in the . giving Hancock a fair start all the other corps followed—first the fifth, then tho ninth and lastly the sixth—but not until they had made menacing demonstrations to detain Lee. Only the salient features of the fourteen days’ operations in this vicinity have been touched upon. It wili be observed that the Union army was handled with a boldness and confidence unknown in its previous history, and with a success in the presence of R. E. Les which surprised those to whom his name had been aterror for three yeara. ‘True, hidden behind breastworks, he had succecded in beating off his assailanf, but that was barely all Ail expectation of ‘outmaneuvering and GEN. 0. B. WILCOX. defeating the superior federal army in the open had evidently been put aside, though itis plain that Lee had confidence he could do that ver thing when he marched on Grant in_ the Wil- derness. His previous successes in this favor- ite field aguinst large armies gave him ground for such expectation. But the cyclone tactics of the confederate leader of 1862-3 were now completely reversed. Lee was largely out- numbered, but not so largely as at Chancellors- ville. 1 It is not likely that many favorable openings were afforded by Gen. Grant for promising attack, but in the numb movements of corps back and forth it seems strange that Lee did not make an opportunity with his old-t1me skill to strike effectively, but the early advance on Hancock on the Poand Ewell’s feeble effort of the 19th were the only variations from the timid defensive policy which ruled the con- federate army around Spotsylvania, a pohioy in marked contrast with the bold advance on May 5, and Longstreet’s attack on the 6th. Grant's style of fighting was a now sensation on this front. The partisans of defunct federal generals previously cleaned out by Lee, who Proguosticated disaster, were silenced by Grant's advance; opposition journals and the supporters of McClellan who had declared that the war was a failure spread exaggerated lists of killed before, the country, and stigmatized Grant as a cold-blooded butcher. Through such agencies there was created a popular im- ssion that Grant ly de- void of senso or science; that by mere weight of numbersand through sheer stolidity he was maintaining « losing ht; that Gen. Lec—a great military genius—was constantly outgen- alling him, watebfully biding his time and ing down the Union troops like pigeons almost hile Losi few himself. Chea; Qtr 7 = tora tlie sion, iy those who have read only the cartier histories and have depended. upon sen- sational newspaper accounts for know- ledge of the war, written before contem- Scosenible, SBE ‘Never was there a gr mistake. Lee bad ‘been lucky in his adv had met one who understood his who like himself knew how to weigh chances; who knew when his Te diaot ions hs be way re that all was lost, No such sorios of able—even _brilliant—maneuvers around Ivanis were seen on any other Bite ofthe wae They were met; they had to be: to save the. army. e : ‘THE LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES | | boldly did the losses of the Union army were | isfied the Union he heavier, but the confederates did not by any meaus escape unscathed, and never before was Lee so near the brink of absolute rninas at Spottsylvania, His fortified line was pierced twice and many prisoners captured. Grant's losses during this fourteen days of heavy fight- ‘ing were as follows: Killed. Wounded. Total. 894 Second corps. . 4,947 5,841 Fifth corp: 657 3,448 4,105, Bixth corps... 633 2,820 3,508 Ninth corps 43600 «2191-677 Reserve artillery... — 7 ? Total. ... 2,725 18.413 T6,d88 In addition to the kilied and wounded there were lost 2,253 prisoners, bringing the total lost up to 18,391. Ido not include the cavalry losses, as that arm was operating generally independ: ently of the army. ere are no reports of aggregate confeder- ate lomes in any of tho battles ofthis. campaign. At Spottaylvania they were far less than Grant's, probably not more than one-half as many, in killed and wounded, but in prisoners they were treble, and conld ‘hardly have been less than 6,000'men. Surgeon Guild, Lee's medical director, who, as previouslypointed out, always understated their killed and wounded, furnishes a basis for » fair guess on the head of their losses, Surgeon Guild réported Ewell’s losses during the month of May at 4.437. These figures, ac- cording to the confederate rule laid down by Lee himself, did . not include the slightl wounded, as do the Union reports. Ewell reported his losses at Wilderness, where he suffered lightly compared with Longstreet and Hill, at only 1,250. So the differeace of 3,187 must have principally occurred at Spottsyl- vania, where his losses probably somewhat exceeded the others. And at Spottsylvania he also lost close upon 4,500 prisoners, making the total losses of this single corps at the Wilder- ness and Spottsylvania about 9,000 men. It is hardly probable that the other corps lost less than 2,500 each at Spottaylvania, which would give a total loss there of over 8,000 men killed and wounded, doubtloss.a close approxi- mation tothe truth. I think the confederate losses, including prisoners, were fully 14,000 men; at Wilderness and Spotteylvania together 26,000, of whom 19,000 or 20,000 were wounded. Lee's losses were perhaps 10,000 less than Grant's, but his greator relative loss in morale largely overbalanced that advantage. — AROUND COLD HARBOR. ‘Lee Heads Grant Off Again and Repulses All Attacks, HE NEW MOVEMENT of the Army of the Po- purpose of coaxing or turning Lee out of his lines around Spottsyl- vania and getting fight out of him in the open. It was hoped that by dispatching Hancock forward by a night march to gain such a start as to en- able the army to secure the line of the North Anna river and the cross- ing of the Virginia Central and the Fredericks- burg railroads at Hanover junction ahead of the confederates, or some other position which would force Lee to fight an offensive battle at a disadvantage. Grant's object’ was to destroy Lee's army, not solely to capture Richmond. Hancock's corps arrived at Guiney’s station at daylight on the 2ist, dispersing @ small con- federate force, Pushing on, by evening of that day the second corps was at Milford sta- tion, where the railroad crosses the Mattapony river. Here Hancock drove off Kemper's brigade, on the way from Richmond to rein- force Lee, capturing the bridge and a few prisoners, He was stopped at Milford until the rest of the army could be brought for- ward. Warren followed Hancock on the morning of the 2ist, pursuing the same circuitous route by Guiney’s, Burnside and Wright were left in position at Spottsylvania, menacing the rebel lines twelve hours longer, to deceive and de- tain Lee and cover the movement of the others, In the afternoon the sixth corps was attacked by some of Hill's troops, probably in an effort to determine what the Union people were at They were repulsed. Tho attempt of Burnside to move southward by the Telegraph road was stopped by an intrenched line of confederates at Stannard’s Mills, and he thereupon con- cluded to follow Warren's and Hancock's line of march, Wright also withdrew and followed the others that night ‘These movements were all utmost circumspection, and Hancock gained | the lead desired, but the failure of the other | corps to secure shorter lines on which to quickly close up lost the advantage of his twelve hours’ start, for he had to be stopped at Milford as 4 measure of precaution until | they could march around by the same route to his support, lest Lee should suddenly pounce upon his isolated corps and destroy it, Lee held the road rauning directly south from | Fredericksburg to iichmond, known as the Telegraph road, below a point to the southeast of Spotsylvania, where Burnside had been stoppod, and conscquently the shorter line to the North Anna. HOW LEE MET THE MOVEMENT. Lee was not long deceived. He discovered Hancock’s march on the 2ist and also the sub- Sequent movements of the other corps, He made no attempt to strike Hancock, as Grant had hoped he might, but merely began extend- ing southward on the Telegraph road to meet the federal flanking columns on the Bowling Green road, to the east, His game was simply to throw himself in the way of Grant. On the 22d he abandoned Spottaylvania entirely, mov- ing down the Telegraph road ahead of the Union army, and was that day already across the North Anna with the head of Ewell’s column. His army was then massed behind that river, holding a wedge-shaped position, witf the point headed on the river at Ox ford andthe wings thrown back and covered by #| line of works as strong as those he had left at Spotsylvania, ‘Thus Grant's main object was defeated, though hé was nearer Richmond. But his army was close after Lee. Warren’ corps struck the North Anna five miles above the Telegraph road at Jericho ford, where he crossed by the night of the 28d, While getting into position just before nightfall he was sud- denly and violently attacked by Hill, who at first caused some confusion in Cutler's division. There was a sharp battle of a few minutes and le with the Hill was repelled with loss and Warren fully deployed and closed (western) lateral of which extended two tomac was made for the | yenals that the works could not be carried. In fact, Lee's position on the North Anna was found to be much jess vulner- able than that at Spottsylvania, while that of the federal army was bad, even dangerous, the two wings cut off from each other by ariver, and the confederate army also wedged down between them. Onawr's Kew PLAX, As early as the 25th Grant had determined to withdraw, move quickly down the tast side and cross the Pamunkey, formed by the North and South$una rivers, in an endeavor again to get Lee into the open and attack him before he could cover himself with earthworks, With this object in view, on the afternoon of the 26th Bheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, moved down the north bank of the riyer, and after feinting on other points seized the crossing at PONTOON BRIDGE ACROSS THE NORTH ANNA. Hanover ferry, taking position on the south side of the Pamunkey. ‘The cavalry was fol- lowed by Russell's division of infantry. The night of the 26th Wright and Warren quictly withdrew to the north side of the North Auna and moved down past Burnside and Hancock, who still faced the enemy. Then Burnside in turn recrossed, following Wright and Warrei and later Hancock brought up the rear. It was adangerous but successful operation, be- ing entirely undisturbed by the confederate eneral. By noon of the 28th the federal in- fantry was crossing the Pamunkey and deploy- ing two miles in front of Hanover ferry. On that day Sheridan had asuccessful cavalry fight at Hawe's shop with Hampton and Fiiz Lee. Grant was now within eight miles of the spot where Lee had first attacked McClellan in 1862, On the morning of the 27th Lee became aware of the new movement of the federals down the river on his flank toward his right rear. He immediately crossed the South Anua, marching by Ashland, taking position on the north side of the Chickahominy, with his back to Richmond, where he was developed in line of battle on this new front by the evening of the 29th, Lee had been reinforced recently by Pickett's four brigades, the brigades of Kem- per and Hoke and other troops, amounting to about 15,000 men, Grant had also been stead- ily reinforced and on the 3ist of May, notwith- standing his losses, the official retarns showed 103.540 fighting men present for duty, exclusive of 8,900 quartermaster's employes, &c., sLow- ing a net loss since May 1 of only 10,310. Thus the relative strength of the two armies bad not materially changed, CLOSING IN TOWARD RICHMOND, Several days of maneuvering now took place, Grant extending southward by his left flank, always closing in toward Richmond, in the en- deavor to outfiank and uncover Lee, and the latter, always on the alert, meeting the new federal front by like extensions to the south of his right flank. About Bethesda Church sev- eral severe engagements took place, the feder- als gaining some ground. Warren here repulsed ‘heavy assault on the 30th. Sheridan attacked and captured Old Cold Harbor on the 3ist and held it on the morning of June 1 against re- peated infantry assaults until Wright, who had marched all night from the extreme ‘Tight, ar- rived with the sixth corps, when the attempt to recapture the point was abandoned by the rebels. Lee marched Anderson’s corps to the right to mect this dangerous movement. In fact, Anderson and Wright were both moving on parallel lines simuitancously for the same point. Wright arrived first, as has been stated. Anderson's column was observed early in the morning passing down in front of Warren and ah y Rie AN AMBULANCE TRAIN, Grant promptly ordered Warren to attack it in flank and Wright at tho samo time to strike its head, belioving there was now a splendid opportunity to crush at least a part of Lee's army before it could intrench, But on this occasion both Warren and Wright were timid and dilatory, failing to do more than demonstrate feebly. In fact, Warren says the line in his front was already strongly in- trenched, It was a great opportunity lost Finding himself forestalied at Old Cold Har- bor, Anderson took a position further back and of course immediately intrenched. Hoke came in and took the extreme right of the coufeder- ate line, The confederate army, strongly intrenehed, was now mainly facing ‘northeast and east, with its extreme right refused toward the Chickabominy. Lee's right was occupying nearly the same ground held by the federals under Porter when he attacked that general on June 27, 1862, though occupying a much longer front toward’ the north than Porter covered and a mile or two in advance of Porter's posi- tion, The federal line on June 1 was Wright on the left, about Old Cold Harbor, then War- ren, then Hancock, with Burnside, his right doubled back toward the Pamunkey on the ex- treme federal right. About 3 p.m. Gen, W. F. Smith, with the eighteenth corps of Butler army, joined, taking position between Wright and Warren. OPENING THE BATTLE, Grant now believed the opportunity was Presented to successfully assault Lee's right, and that evening, after Smith had deployed, the sixth and eighteenth corps moved forward in fine style over open ground generally, receiv- ing a heavy fire, but driving back both Hoke and Anderson, going over their front line of rifle pits and capturing 700 or 800 prisoners, But back of the first line of works they camo upon another, which stopped Wright, who was already encouraged with the hope of extend- ing on the left to the Chickahominy. Smith suffered severely from a flank fire on his right, which was in the air, he having drawn ava: from Warren, and was also finally repulsed, Both held all that they had gained, During the afternooh the confoderates fiercely attacked Warren, but were repulsed several times with great loss. Other but fee- bler attacks were made on the front of Han- cock and Burnside, and were all easily re- pelled. Grant's pressure on his right toward the Chickahominy seemed to be making Lee nervous During, the. night several attacks were made on Wright, but without effect. ‘Theso operations were important to Grant be- cause at Old Cold Harbor he secured the roads to the James, where he was eventually to and covered his line of communications with White House, # ‘The successes of the Ist, however, deter- mined him to strike the confederates sain next morning all along the line. This led to the battle of Cold Harbor. That night Han- cock was withdrawn from Warrei ht and transferred to the extreme left of Wright, to- ward the Chickahominy. He was to get on to the rebel flank and attack at ‘His march was delayed by darkness and the attack was deferred until 5 p.m. of the 2d, and after- ward to the morning of the 84. Burnside was drawn into Bethesda Church, Simultancously the sixth corps moved forward | positively until the afternoon of the 17¢h that | to the asswult on Hancock's right, end Smith | with the gighteenth corpse advanced in the | center. Warren and Burnside, further to the | right, also pushed forward. Darlow broke through the rebel line, captured some prisoners and three pisces of artillery, but the confederates on that front soon rallied and drove him out. Gibbon forward the most determined manner over rough ound and through a swamp, getting clove up, ut failing to penetrate the enemy's line. The sixth torps captured a line of rifle but failed in its assault on the main line beyond. Smith met the fiercest fire, but carried the first line, losing many men. He could advance no further, Hs assault was over ground cnil- laded by the rebel fire from the direction of Wright's front. Warren and Burnside both gained the rifio pits immediately in frout, but Were repulsed at the main line, though Burn- side gained some good ground, and was pre- to on again when Grant, perce: Ing. the futility of farther effort, orieced a ‘cessation of fighting. ‘The entire federal line had advanced against | the confederate works, and after vain | straggle, which did not end until 10 o'clock, | were repulsed ali along the line. Barlow's tem- | Rorary success and Warren's and Burnside’s | Operations were the only gleams of light on this otherwise dark aud discouraging affair. | ‘This assault was made two days tov late. The | early merning of the Ist was the favorable time. Graut reported frankly that this was | the only general attack made from the Rapidun to the James which did not inflict losses on the | enemy to fairly compensate for his own. Lee | had fought a careful, defensive battle and won | 4 victory, simpiy repelling his antagonist, but | he attempted no counter assault. But the | federals wero not driven back, though they bad becn repulsed ‘They held’ their ground and fortified the line close up to that of the confederates, in some places within fifty yards of the enemy's, THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES. Gen. Grant now determined to carry out his long meditated operation to the south side of the James, after destroying the railroads and rebel lines of communications north of Rich- mond. For this purpose on the 7th he sent Sheridan with two divieions of cavalry out along the Virginia Central railroad to Gordons- ville, and to Hunter, in the valley, if possible. Constant skirmishing was kept up along the Chickuhominy lines while these movements were in progress and maturing, for the pur- of holding Lee north of Richmond, but no important action occurred after Cold Harbor. On the 9th an attempt on Petersburg with cavalry and infantry from Butler's command under Gillmore failed, and attaching great im- portance tothe capture of that place. Grant bn the 12th put Smith's corps on board trans- ports and dispatched it around by water to renew the attempt. The movement from Cold Harbor to the James commenced after dark on the 12th, the advance corps reaching the river on the 13th, and the second corps, under Han- cock commenced crossing on the morning of the 14th at Wilcox’s Landing by ferry boats, to hurry forward to Smith’s assistance in the attack on Potersburg before Lee could rein- force it, Tho whole army was across by the 16th and advancing toward Petersburg, on the south side of the Appomattox. In the operations from May 22, when the Spottaylvania front was abandoned, up to June 15, when the army was crossing ' the James, including the fights on the North Anna, around Bothesda Church and the battles of Cold Harbor, covering a period of twenty-four days, the federal losses were 2,436 killed, 11,811 wounded and 2,47 missing. ' There is no data, except that already given, from which to esti- mate the confederate losses during this period. Union reports of captures show their loss in prisoners to have been somewhat greater than the federal, In many of the engagements they were the attacking party, as, for instance, Hill on Warren at North Anua, Early’s attack ‘near Bethesda, and the assaults to retake Old Cold Harbor on the Ist, besides many other occa- sions, In these engagements their losses were equal and in several instances greater than those of the federals, At the grand assault on the 3d they were hardly one-quarter those of Grant, Ido not estimate their loss in killed and wounded during this period at over 5,000, prisoners, 3,000—total, 8,000, ———_—_-+e+—____ SMITH BEFORE PETERSBURG. ‘The Failure of the First Attack on the Rebel Stronghold. EN. GRANT'S GRAND Strategy, as well as tac- tics, in his Virginia campaign was com- prehensive and able. But while always understanding perfect- ly the necessities of a given situation, never ata loss fora feasible plan commensurate with the means to achieve @ desired re_ sult, and always clear and positive in his orders and instructions, he was singularly unlucky throughout in their execution by subordinates, W. F. Smith’ attack on Petersburg is an illustration of this fact, Grant clearly understood the vital im- portance of Petersburg to the confederac; foresaw the necessity of its capture, and the federal general's army was across James, whereas by the night of the 15th at least 40,000 men were already in front of Petersburg. It was only on the urgent repre- sentations of Beauregard that Lee on the Ors. BUTLER. | dispatched his first troops scross the James at | Chaftin’s Bluff toward Petorsburg. Dut Grant | and Butler, and Smith also, supposed his troops were arriving at Petersburg two days before. He did not arrive at Petersburg hitn-| | self until June 18, AT BERMUDA KUXDRED. Gen. Smith arrived at Bermuda Hundred from the Chickahominy in the evening of the 14th. His troops were debarked near Gen. | Butler's pooutoon bridge just-below Point of Rocks as rapidly as possible. . Butler, in | whose department Petersburg was situated, added to the eighteenth cSrps the division of colored troops under Gen. Hinks, four bat-| teries of artillery, and about 3,000 cavalr® under Kautz, raising Smith's force to from 15,000 to 18,000 effectives. The Appomattox was crossed on the pontoon bridge, and the direct advance on Petersburg was initiated from Broadway. not more than seven mi from the city, on the morning of the 1st Gen, Smith in his short report of these oper: tions, dated June 16, 1864, says the head of bis column left Broadway at 4a, m.; Gi ofticially reported at the time that Broadway about 5 o'clock. In letter to ¢ Butler in 1891 he asserts that he did not m until 7 a. m., but had been ready since 1 | o'clock, Gen, Kautz probably moved with the cavalry about the timo stated by Gon. Smith, | as he reports having crossed the river between | midnight and daylight. The march was directly south from the | Appomattox to the roads leading from the James at City Pomt aud Jordan's Point into | Petersburg on the east and northeast, Kautz’s | cavalry leading, then Hinks’ colored division, followed by the divisions of Brooks and M: tindale of the eighteeuth corps, About thr miles out, after the head of the column had crossed the City Point railroad and arrived in | the vicinity of Baylor's farm, it was stopped | early in the day by asmall confederate force | supported by a batter® Gen. Kautz leaves the inference in his report that he carried this line, but Hinks says the cavairy was driven in, and Gen. Smith states positively that Kautz failed to clear the road, Gen. Hinks depioved line on each side of the road, which he pushed through a swamp in front of the enemy's position. Getting on their flank, the enemy thereupon quickly abandoned their hastily consiructed defenses, and with | them one cannon, as a trophy to Hinks. He Jost several men in the affair, and reports that | the rebel line was carried @ littie after 8 a m., | and that by 9he had resumed the advance. But it s evident some time was lost, as Gen, Smith saysin the dispatch to Butler, dated | 1:90 p. m., that the affair at Baylor's broke up his arrangements temporarily, but that his lines wouid be straighteued at once. The march was resumed southward to the Jordan's Point road, which it appears was reached by Hinks between 10 and 11 o'clock. Martindale's division, according to the plan, had turned to the right at Baylor's farm, mov- ing along the City Point wagon road, in order to strike the enemy's defenses well toward the river, with Brooks between himself and Hinks Kautz's cavairy moved to the left, demonstrat ing in division toward the Norfolk railroad and around to the south of Petersburg, Smith's general dispositions for the advance seem to have been excellent. When Hinks struck into the Jordan's Point road he turned to the right toward Petersburg and advanced with little opposition to the main line of rebel defenses near Jordan's house, where he says he arrfved at ila. m. Smith says his troops did not get into position until 1:30 p.m. About 2p, m. Links con- nected with brooks, on his right, and the skir- mish hne was pushed well gp to the enemy's works, Here the fedorals®remained in line several hours, subjected toa warm artillery fire, which silenced the national guna, WAY ux DELAYED. Gen. Smith says the delay in making the at- tack was caused by the formidable front the enemy's works presented,which he was obliged to reconnoiter thoroughly in person before he could determine where and howto assault The enemy's line was a series of rifle pits along the ridges in zig-zag form from the Appomat- tox at a point two miles or more from the city around to the southeast, strengthened here and there with a fort or redoubt, The ground in front was lower and open, affording good play for artillery on an attacking line. Smith per- ceived thaf he had a pretty heavy contract on his hauds to break through this fortified line, It was fully7 p.m. before his preparations were finally completed for making the assault, Itis possible this consumption of time was ecessary toa proper understanding of the situation by the Union commander, but it proved fatal to the enterprise. Gen. Smith ‘Was an engineer officer and his instincts doubt- Jess made him too painstaking before Peters- burg. His operations bad alarmed the confed- erates on the north side of the Appomattox, confronting Butler's lines, and Beauregard was already bringing troops to the support of the Petersburg ggrison before Smith attacked. Smith himself knew that other troo; were moving to oppose him and consequently real- ized that it was a critical situation. Some should, therefore, have been taken. en the assault was made the works were carried in twenty minutes, notwithstanding the fact that tho columns ‘of attack had to cross a ravine and go up sharp ridge. The colored troops fought nobly,entering the works first. The line was met with « heavy arti and musketry fire, but speedily overcame all evolved an able scheme to effect that purpose, One of the finest movements of the war was the withdrawal of 100,000 men ftom the very presence of the opposing army on the Chicka- hominy and placing them on the south side of the James—and over 40,000 of them at Peters- burg—two days before his able adversary was aware of the change of base. But in spite of Grant's well-laid plans and the overwhelming means provided to success- fully carry them out they failed. The failure to capture Petersburg on June 16, 1864, was one of the mysteries of the war. Gen, Butler, who commanded on the James, had previously made an effort to take it and failed, Gen. Gillmore, with about 4,000 infantry, accompanied by a column of cavalry under Kautz, on June 9 moved against the place, which Butler had tearned was then gar- risoned by less than 2,000 men, but Gillmore’s efforts were so feeble that he returned without even making an attack, being scared off by stories that the town was full of troops, Kautz actually rode into the suburbs, captured a gun and some prisoners, but being unsupported had to withdraw. On the 14th Butler relieved Gillmore from command, and the latter asked or @ court of ing uiry, . GEX. SMITH’s EXPEDITION. opposition. Gen. Hinks says ho captured five | not to | ani | now te it night. The rebels were moving a! advance of another wile eccured ground com- manding the town. It was more than a failure Proceed, it was an absolute disaster to the Union cause. It is booties to «peculate Upon results had he done vo, but it is certain the subsequent siege would not have occurred sad Probably many thousand lives would bave Deen & it is no’ itself would have ea did ond with the eapsure next spring. rer sys eRy oF I. ‘The military valve of the city then. the man- ifest anxiety of Grant to have it secured, Bi it wrsbarg the le ler's urgeat dispatches to push on with onergy, the pains that had been taken to beguile Lee and in the arr: ment of detatis for the at- tack—everything adicushea Gon Smith of the gravity of bis undertaking and th expectations predwcated upon his energy and ability. Yet with the « he balted for the mo call the great mvatery of th Petersburg on th Gen, Staith’ after the confed: in the following extract from his of Jun nation of ex Lis stopping ate line Wan carrie: i mg learned re rapid ming that euemy's line of ght it prudeat to make no f ther advance and made my dispositions to boid what I already had.” Grant, in his official report, written than a year afterward, criticises Smith's 8 before attacking, as well as bis failure to push on after the assault, but it is neve theless a queer fact that at first uo fault was found with Smith. It was suppored—and Smith evidently shared this opinion biusif he bad really captured the key aM A. Dana, then « close frend of graphed to Mr, Stantor the next hat Smurth's achievements gave genera ea This was after Grant and M bad looked the gron But when it monstrated by the assaulte of the 16th, 1 Sth of June that mn fact he had really nc- complished practically nothing there began to @ conviction in high military quarters that vomebody had biundere troversy ensued, with wh 2 It tt necessary to vindi- If of the suspicion of having been his march and derelict in his du cate hi dilatory befor. erally blameless for that great fissco, movements appear to have been energetic and timely, Although the senior general, he waived his rank and offered his troops for any movement Smith should deem proper to orders Hancock stated while this eontroversy was in Progress that the town ought to have been Cap- tured. Gen. Humphreys, chief of staff of the army, has expressed the ‘opinion that an ad- van nas late as 9 o'clock that night would probably have secured the town. Gen. Hum- phreys was one of the ablest men in the mili- tary service, REGARD PORES: If anybody was entitled to the credit of sav- ng Petersburg to the southern confederacy other than Gen, Smith it was G.T. Beauregard Their only military officials who bad « true conception of its value and realized partially the extent of its danger were Beauregard and D. H. Hill, The former from the first had been strenuous in urging that it was the key to Richmond, After the eye-opening demonstra- ton of Kautz on the 9th Beauregard foreshad- owed that it would lead to other and more de- termined assaults and warned his superiors ‘that the city was practically defenseless. Gen. D. H, Hill, then shelved and acting as mere aid-de-camp to Beauregard. sent the fol- lowing singular note to his chief on the l1th, penned at the very moment when Grant was taking steps to elude and deceive Lee with the pu of projecting his entire army on Pe tersburg: Joxe 11, 1866 Gen. Beauregard, Commanding: General: I am eo much disturbed about ovr condition, but especially about our relations to Petersburg, that you must excusé me for a suggestion. It seems to me that thore is but one way to save the country and bring the au- thorities to their senses, and that is to say: “I cannot guard Bermuda Hundred aad Peters burg both with my preseut forces. I have de- cided that Pe 8 the important polut and will withdraw my whole commend to that lace tonight” Itisarrant nonsense for Lee Qoeny that Gront con's make © hight) marc without bis knowing it. Has not Grant slipped around him four times already? Did not Buro- side retire from Frederi: and Hooker from the Wilderness without bis knowing it? Grent can get 10.000 or 20,000 men to Westover and Lee know n« of it What, then, is to become of Petersbu Its loss surely involves that of Richmond—perhaps of the confederacy, An earnest appeal is called for now. else « ter- rible disaster may, and I think will, befall us, Very fully, D. H. Has, Mejor General and Aid-de-Camp. Beauregard’s available force for the defense of the city was 10,069 men—Johuson's Wise's brigade and Dearing’s cavalry. He had been stripped to reinforce ‘On the even- ing of the 14th he was aware that additional troops were joining Butler and suspected for forts or redans, six cannon and some prisoners. Brooks went over the line at the same time on Hinks’ right, capturing cannon and prisoners, and Martindale, between Brooks and the Ap- pomattox, also broke through, getting two guna, Neither Brooks nor Martindale made an Official report of their operations, if i Hits what pi . The Richmond authorities can- not complain ‘that he did not keep them fully He urged the necessity of reinforcing Ramton instantly. Dut me hh divined the purposes of Grant somewhat, even Beauregard ‘was far from realizing the magnitude of the movement He ‘would have been aghast had he known the entire Army of the Potomac was marching on Potereburg. Other leading coufederates seo ts total iguorance ot what was transpiring. No atte tion was paid at Richmond to Bosurezard’s representations; they doubted tLe imminence of the danger. Still Lee, who knew Beaure- gard’s ability, on the 14th reluctantly started the single division of Hoke toward I'ctersburg, with « string tied to it, as it wore, for he was to halt in the vicinity of Drewry's Biuff unless the city should be “threatened.” But Beaure- gard, under high pressure, ordered Hoke tom ward at once. . . Hoke, however, did not take the rond from Drewry’s until noon of the 15th and did not ar rive untilafter Smith had captured the de fonses. Meanwhile. accepting the deruier re~ sort suggested by Hull. Beauregard hed alee ordered Bushrod Johnson's division down from Bermuda Hundred. The trooy divisions were the reinforcements from * army” noted by Smith. Though they aid not arrive in time to repel him from the their movement, which he it, ae rd. os since stated in an historical review bene E ea iy i i at