Evening Star Newspaper, September 21, 1892, Page 10

THE EVENING STAR: f WASHINGTON, D. C, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1892—PART TWO. FREDERICKSBURG the « og ned time by <6 or i re not received or Se es talked va of plans recreated a8 but he never moved. | 3 z time. | tive to | P on th 3 cou: | Land ordered to any other period of its existence the last few months prior to the fm 1565. We do not reason, Gen, Lee's killed and worn? dered 44,000 mea in the beginning of the per the close of the Maryland cam es authority the it report. But there are whose reports making it ectual number was these there had b ma the reinforeem: added army in June bad disappear the southern hospitals or ¢ z bomes | Grant's losses in killed and wounded f the Bapidan to the front of eters! for which he was stigmatiz were 44, It will be ot aggregates are not very G: @ifforence in resul fastened himself rebellion, and just «i time he set forth he bh plete overthrow to recom) fie mecrifices It is highly pr have made even a shorter can he been in command { the battle of Antetam. e to sear erved ¢ episodes doubtless, as they military reputation. his retreat across the} ourany real, tangible adva bis cause by all these bloody He had inflicted on the than his own army had sv prisoners; the long, unceas! wath tt» harassment on! brought his once formidable army to » stage of morale and disci! well-grounded fear of its total wholesale desertion and ttetam, ff we may bel statements and those of D. HI. Hil September 22, fire days after the bat total infantry foree present for ¢ dut ICKSBU RG. einlly stated at only 8 Becretary Eandolph, fees something is away.” The cont part 2, vol. 19 of fome very interesting aud i In short, at thi wasgloomy. Its ai by ite frightfai los more dangerous to its existe: Ste ehief general's can and his weakened dofe naive. tng Lee's a south deiir bj growing weaker, while etantly gaining ing him more eonfident ani Felatively wor Bis series of b ® term off than a Was any energe Gituation by the f« Army © In frout of Washir At Baltimore & At Fortress Mourve GENERAL BURNSIDE. ding tel 1s to Washington, | most care against beating | Tor ‘The head of the column had | MeCtellan neighborhgod of Warrenton ‘diem on tho eax fell, apie, : “On the President relieved Gavaentitiun. of the MeCie d Gen. Ambrose _E. amazement of the Washing Burnsid © also relieved Gen. files their general went into camp in th. ity of the battle ground and there be rem stock still for more thau six weeks, wi ermy outnumbering his opponent nearly to one, besides an exormous reserve to draw | MeClelian claimed to be resting, equipping | Jokn Porter, com- manding and subsequently ordered him before a cgurt-martial to answer | charges pre‘crred by Gen. Pope connected with the second Bull tun campaign. Or. BURNSIDE ASSUMED COMMAND. aside, a loyal and honest gentleman, j and by appointment Halleck met Burnside at | sented, Gen. L ee, we a ., | ing forward. | ping Gritten for the a Evening tar by Lestic ]. Perry of tne Gar Records Board. could. In answer to the President's request he formulated and sent in on the 9th a plan of operations—to concentrate around Warrenton, as if meditating an advance toward Culpeper, and then to move rapidly down the Rappahan- nock and seize Fredericksburg. From that point, the elements permitting, he proposed to push southward. He made no mention of the point at which he would cross the river in the written plan submitted. Burnside’s arguments were these: It gave him a shorter line to Richmond, a safe water base at Belle Plaine, fully protected Washing- on and freed a large number of troops at that ont for co-operation with the Artay of the Potomac. It appears that the President and ien, Halleck both favored a continuance of the movement toward Culpeper and Gordonsville, Warrenton on the 12th to discuss the various lines and to come to a mutual understanding as to the route and details of the campaign. Af- ter a good deal of argument pro and con the others yielded the point, for two days after re- turning to Washington Halleck telegraphed to Burnside: “The President has just assented to your plan. He t! at will succeed if you move rapid! se not.” Now, it is clear t “your plan” did not mean the President's plan, or Halleck’s plan, but Burnside’s plan, Yet Halleck in his oficial report of a year later avers positively there was a verbal unde standing at the Warrenton meeting that Burn- side was to croms at, the fords of the Raypa- hannock and Rapidan and approach Frede icksburg on the south side this verbal plan to which In his tes’ ct of the oceurrences, esh in his u ck made no and that it was President as- re the committee mber 22, 162, when thing it is a eurious fact that n toa verbal plan, but e’s written plan as the ant omission if any su None of the office nt at the Warrenton conference ention having heard any verbal modification of je’s plan of operations. Itis to Burnside, January 7, 1863, that E m that there was an un a considerable part” at the fords, record makes itl contemplated uo other he one on the north mde specifi itten pl up the c “at lea was to cross of th 1 an. Halleck himse own from the upper Po- y telegraph while im actual | ide at War 0, that in all his respondence Hi never alludes in th Vaguest manner to any other pian than the written plan. — SAT FREDER ertiohs, both official ¥ concerning a mulita be held responsib ed with a good deal of allo’ he says Burnside didn't inf KSBURG, nd unofii ster culpable de! sooner, inasmuc ent through Hal- his plan did not reach him until Gen, Sunmer, with the sec- marched directly on tonthe 15th. There repancies about Hal- He states that s nonth. opposite Fredericksbu It is undis- 1 that Su re on th had been up b n. Franklin, and | Hooker, fol- whole army ¢ days be- No pontoons had yet arrived, and to tind lodgment on the so’ tl 1 rebel outpost, | the federals were moving, Was 3 until the 18th, whea he immediately ordered the divisions of McLaws and Ransom toward | Fredericksburg, Yurn there, however, | in am) on to effect his primary object been provided to cross the river or | ushed across at the fords, as he could interposing between Lee and the He held back both Sumner and Hooker g at the fords. because he did not y Fredericksburg until his com- ablished and supplies con He thought it dangerous to iso- corps or two on the south side without plies, town. from crossi wish to A CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATION. It was the belief of Burnside, Franklin, Hooker and other generals that somebody in the quartermaster’s or engineer's department, or higher up. had biundered. The pontoons did not reach Falmouth until the 25th, by which date Lee’s whole army was on the Fredericks- This delay caused the miscarriage ntial part of the operation, and how- ever much denied, the blame evidently lies between Gens. Halleck and Woodbury. Part of the pontoon train arrived in Washington on the 14th anc all by noon of the 15th. The roads Were then good. Here, after consultation with Halleck, they were stopped by Woodbury and ordered into park at Anacostia, But for this stoppage they would have reached Falmouth in time for .. They were not started until the 19th, just as a heavy rain storm set in. Haleck tries to shift the responsibility for this failure upon Burnside, but the record makes a lame case of his effort. Burnside’s not taking advantage of the fords, as he doubtless ought, whatever his reason, neither explains nor condones the neglect of those in authority at Washington to push forward the pontoons. | it was just as well no other troo; t uncertain of their destination | Fi lel with the river, back of the city, out of range of the Union artillery. And now a fatal and undeviating phase of federal battle tactics was to be again illustrated, Having vainly beat the air for twenty days, un- til Lee was at all points fully prepared and fairly itching behind his stone walls and breast- works for an attack, the foregone result of which was sure to revive the confidence of his broken troops, Burnside—seemingly solicitous to do that which his adversary most desired— determined to fling the army against this im- pregnable line of hills. It wae th natural defensive position held by during the war. The Union lines extended over s front of more than four miles, from a point to the right and above and thence through Fredericksburg down the river to and below Smithfield. The army was in a dangerous position, with ite back to the Rappahannock, facing those frown- ing hills, Along the entire confederate front Kas monty « wide, open plain. swopt in all di- rections by artillery and musketry from the crest GEN. covcn. Burnside evidently intended his principal effort to be made on the left by Franklin, though there is some uncertainty about this, The rebel position in that quarter was more assailable ground apparently. At all events he massed there about 55,000 infantry, all un- dor Franklin, His object’ was to gain posses- sion of the Richmond stage road. which here bore off southward, but to secure this the heights on its right had firat to be cleared of the enemy. ‘Thix would place him on the right flank and rear of Leo's army and compel the abandonment of the entire line, But Sumner, who held the right with the second and ninth corps, was also to assault along the Telegraph and Plank roads lgading up the heights back of the town. ‘This move- ment on the right was only to begin, however, when Franklin's succeas appeared ‘probable, according to Burnside’s version, It was here the most formidable obstacles to success were presented and was tho last place where an assault shouid have ever been meditated. Gen, Hooker was in reserve with portions of the third and fifth corps to support either wing as became necessary. OPENING THE RATTLE. The battle was begun on the left by the di- vision of Gen, Meade of the first corps, About 9a. m. he was moved down the river same 500 yards and deployed toward the south to at- tack the lower or eastern spur of the hills, where it fell off into the Massaponax valley, up which the Richmond road passed. Gen, Doubleday’s division followed Meade, passing down further to cover his left flank from be- low. Gen. Gibbon’s division advance: port of Me ing a front line on his ht. Every nt of the Union troops preliminary to th F ran early fog lifted, was in plain observation of the enemy, and made ra galling artillery After getting into position ¥ move over open ground for sever: yards, then up a wooded slope, nemy's — lin Jackson's had to hundred to reach the their attack was Meade’s 4. erans be- isomest manner—indeed as pe suid for all the tederal troops on His movements at first were necessarily slpw; he was subjected to a wieked | be said to have ended lien, enflacling fre from 4 perfunctory support from his officers and the | Porras oe Me army thereafter. F: sburg did 0 | fairly withi ing distance, Meade projected | “mY there " als - based ae ena Fara fishies Tt, carcving tocrat| depress the fighting spirit of the army than in the most g anner, capturing two andsome prisoners, The cnemy was rapidly reinforced, and with both flanks in the air and no support arriving, Meade was speedily stopped and broken, finally retreating in con- fusion. Theconfederato masses then turned on Gibbon and drove his back also, but not before he had penetrated their first line and aptured some prisoners, After the break of Mende and Gibbon, Birney's division, beld in support, received’ the confederate counte charge, repulsing it with loss, Birney main- tained his lines until nightfall. The repulse of Meade and Gibbon pra tical; ded the offensive on the left, thou heavy firmg was kept up throughout the da These two divisions, no more than 11,000men, Were the ouly troops projected against the nemy of the 55,000 infuniry at hand, though irney made a brilliant fight, and Doubleday, protecting the left, was maneuvering all day under fire, doing his work well. . But perhaps i GEN. W. I. FRENCH. were sent in, | Burnside subsequently alleged that Frank- lin’s operations lacked the cohesive vigor and failed of the effect he expected. | . With much reason, pleaded the vague- ness of his orders in extenuation of his failure to make « gene The dispute about this battle resulted in a great enmity between these two officers, re was evidently a chance for victory where Meade broke through if he had been promptly aided. A fleeting chance—the only one ‘ anywhere on that bloody field. Aud, after all, it was on the right—exactly in | the wrong place—at the most utterly hopeless | point on all the rebel front, that the real per-| sistent attack was made. ‘And there ix some | reason for believing that this was Durnstie’s | intention, Gen, French's division of the second corps wasselected to make the assault, sup- | ported by Hancock, At noon, when Meade’s | movement below was progressing favorably and promising success, French's troops sprang forward, front and flank covered by a cloud of skirmishers. ‘They were to move forward stead. ily, and after the rebel skirmish line was broken to rash after them up the heights and into the works. But the fire French met was simply beyond humen endurance, coming prin- cipally from behind + stone wali, which ren- dered the return fire ineffective. His troops were hurled back in disorder, though many of them held ground close up to the rebel line for four hours.” French says they made no im- Pression whatever on the heights crowned with atteries, with lines of rifle pits and walls be- neath, at any time | CHARGING THE STONE WALL. Hancock's division then moved to the front, attacking gallantly, but, like French, failing tomake any impression. But he maintained his deployed line well to the front until night- fall, Howard's division came to his support soon after and several attempts were subse- quently made to take the stone wall, but they all failed, Humphreys’, Sturgis’ and Getty's divisions all took a hand in the murderous work during theafternoon—one and all meet- ingthe same fate. From the rifle pits and the stone wall they met a sheet of flame that was unendurable. Gen. Couch and the di- vision generals accompanied their troops here with a courage worthier a better opportunity. Burnside persisted in this method of buttin the army's brains out until darkness gave the poor soliiers rest from the lash of their merci- taskmaster and the bullets of their hidden foes. Then they were withdrawn, Burnside purposed to repeat this wholesale CROSSING THE RIVER. Burnside mado no decisive movement after this failure until December 11, on which day he threw five or six pontoon bridges over the river at different points—a bold and brillient opera tion. A strong force of infantry crossed that night, and on the 12h the bulk of the army passed over to the south side, four miles of the river front and the town, Gen. Teorgauizing. He called for larg: rein- eg Sau. wane cham ant toe 1 ward. Between September 17 and October 20, | 37,000 fresh troops joined the Army of the | j Lng maple every branch of y expressed doubt of his ability to direct such sn army. Had he been asked be would have declined, but being ordered to assume command he obeyed. He would do the best he ecole narecd tat it poule ts ree Tecinenty = that if possible this cross~ ing should be effected, no matterawhat hap- Toongly fordided line clon the igh aides coat spot, but every subordinate general in the army was aghast and emphat a against a further useless sacrifice of life. Burnside but very reluctantly, tale Jemasenl, cad nt Teter ee disas- 000 men. Lee's strength on the 10th of arms. The federal losses were as foliow: of 10,834 killed and wounded, an & Fredericksbur; that he had lost caste everywhere, and though he bravely shouldered the entire re. sponsibility for the stra heart; he ¢ country. only friend, something in Burnside, ably the hope of securing McClellan's reinstat Burnside crossed the river with about 113,- em- ber was officially stated at 78,513 men 8f all Killed. Wounded, Missing. 847 2,429 561 412 8.214 488 145 882 206 1,669 53 229 ul 1,077 1,274 9,450 1,767 In addition to the above there were 160 men lost in the cavalry aud engineers, making a total ‘aggre- te joss, including the missing, of 12.051. me of the missing were slain and wounded. Of this long butcher's bill 7,619 were lost in front of Longstreet’s parapets and stone wall, while he lost but 1,894 mea, What a sickening tale! On the left the three divisions of Meade, Gibbon and Birney scored a loss of 4,070, in flicting on the enemy a loss in return of about 8,000, us near as Ican ascertain, Lee's losses of course are not officially stated in the aggregate. Surgeon Guild makes out the killed and wounded to have been 4,202 dur- ing the 11th, 12th and 13th of December. He seldom agreed in his reports with those of the fieldcommanders. In this particular report there is astatement of regiment having 119 men wounded and another 103, without aman killedin either. The medical director handled only the wounded and necessarily his figures relating to the killed must have been very im- perfect. Foriuatance, Longstrect’s loss is stated officially at 1,804; Guild makes it only 1,519. It isnot likely, however, that their total loss mach exceeded 5,000 men. — CHANCELLORSVILLE, The Story of Hooker's Battle—Causes of Federal Disaster. T IS WELL DER- 7 stood that Burnside’s appointment to the commend was displeas- ing to most of the gen- eral officers of the Po- tomac army because of their partisanship for McClellan, while the rank andiile, who loved McClellan with their whole hearts, viewed his removal as a heavy affiiction to themselves and the Union cause, They parted from their hero with actualanguish, ‘Truc, Burnside him- self had been one of McClellan's warmest adhe- rents, calling him “My Dear Mac;” his record as a soldier had been fair, yet as the suc of their favorite he was accepted by the rank and file with reserve. even distrust. This was un- propitious. His unspeakable failure so soon after the change served to confirm what had previously been almost a conviction—that Mc- | Clellan was the only leader the country had who could put down the rebellion; it aggra- | vated their distrust and suspicion into actnal hatred of the man who had innocently planted him, GEN, JOE HOOKER, From the day of any other defe: Burnside knew 1 in its history. lure, the defeat and the ned situation succeeding rankled in his fed for another opportunity to re- deem himself in the eyes of the army and the President Lincoln seemed to be his Lincoln still thought there was ‘The general energe cally and hopefully ma- tured a plan for a second crossing. this time | below Fredericksburg, cove feint on the river above, and some flyi Iry expeditions to their rear to distract and | keep the confederates busy tt by a strong eay- here, About 30th of December his preparations were complefed for this new movement, when he re- ceived a telegraphic message from President Lincoln Thave good reasons for saying that ‘ou must not make a general movement with- out letting me know of it. Burnside was thunderstruck, as he had di- vulged his plans to nobody outside the army. He went up to Washington and there learned that the feeling against him had assumed the shape of a cabal among the entered upon by some from amb —natural conspirators; by honestly of the opinion that Lurnside was ing oficers, ous motives others who were 2 incompetent, dangerous commander, but prob- chief motive of the majority was the nt. It POSITIONS SUN incredible defeat at | @id not intend to remain idle; soon a more | carded one—to effect a crossing of the river at Banks’ ford above and by a flank movement force Lee out of Fredericksburg. But fate seemed to pursue both the general and the | army. The new movement had hardly begun When aheavy and continuous January rain | storm set in from the northeast, and the roads | soon became impassable for artillery and wagons. In fact, on the second day the entire army found itself mired; it came to an abso- inte standstill in an ocean of bottomiess mud. This brought to an inglorious end an unfor- tunate campaign, undertaken at an inaus- Picious season, afterward celebrated in the |army os “Burnside’s mud march.” But the general, of course, was in nowise blamable for its failure, The army returned to its cantonments around Falmouth by the 24th. Burnside then formulated an order dismissing from the service Maj. Gen. Hooker, Brig. Gens. John Newton and W. T.H. Brooke and relieving from duty in the Army of the Potomac Maj. Gens, Franklin and W. F. Smith, Brig. Gene. Sturgis, Ferrero and Cochrane and Lieut. Col, J. H. Taylor—for insubordinate language and general unfitness for command. On the ad Vice of confidential friends he submitted this order to the President before it was published, together with bis written resignation, for his action on either in the best interest of the pub- lie service. After a day's consultation with the cabinet and his military advisers the Presi- dent concluded to relieve Burnside and ap- point Gen. Hooker in his stead. The sup- planting him with the very man at whom his order was principally aimed instead of dis- missing him from the ser had a hard iook, but Burs 3 the President's ‘will, and was sent in days of April, 1863, to command the Depart- ment of the Ohio.” * GEN, HOOKER IN COMMAND. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker assumed com- mand January 26, 1863. It is generally sup- posed that the chief intluence which brought about Hooker's choice was S. P. Chase, then Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury. On the day of his appointment Lincoln” wrote Hooker one of his strong, peculiér letters, in which he expressed the conviction that Hooker was @ brave and skillful soldier, though he was well aware of his having taken counsel of his ambition and thwarted Burnside; also that he wax aware of his having recently said both the army and the government needed a dictator. ‘Of course,” continued the President, “it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you t 4.” Then this wise statesman proph IY expressed the fear that the spirit of criticism and insubordination which Hooker had thoughtlessly aided to in- fuse into the army would now turn upon the new commander, and closed the letter by ad- jurin to beware of rashness. Gens Sumner and Franklin were also relieved with Burnside, the former aj bis own request, probably because he did Shot like Hooker and was his senior, Gen, Daniel B | tertield was made chief of staif. Gen, Co: | command of the right \s . Meade succeeded Hooker rae, but with a good s handsome and It is nd arm in command of the center grand division; W. F. Smith took Franklin's place a of the left grand division, and « 2 Sigel con the grand reserve division, ‘The grand ns of Burnside were discon- tinued on Gen, Hooker's appointment seems to have been expected, aud the change was balled with geucral satisfaction, Hooker was a pic resque figure; a brilliant and fascinating an in social interco lof personal vanity, ld a soldier as evel probable he thought himself a military and that it would be ashort and easy and capture Kichmond. Next to an the army liked Hooker best of all its commanders, The new gen staim was to stop de- sertion, which own into an enormous evil since Fr burg, and to infuse new | spirit into th and disheartened army. | His measures to secure these ends proved speedily efficactous, but the weather and the state of the roads precluded any for- ward movement until spring. By the last a | of April the had recovered its elastic and contide nd Hooker was busy matur plans for a successful campaizn agamst Lee, On th of April, 1863, the strength of the | Army of the Potomac present for duty was | officially stated to be as follows: First corps, Gen. John F. Sceond corps, Third corp Fifth corps, Sixth corp: enth corps, ith Caval Artillery of provost guards, ards and orderlies, im this series o! papers nt for duty’ returns unless otherwise specitical and include officers and men. Hooke argest one ever taken into mmander, outnumbering my by over 20,000 men, at this date was the action by a Union Wild sides the Army of the Potomac, there were men at Washington under Gen, Hemt- 5 ud around Baltimore un .705 at Fortress Monroe 000 more at Newberne, N. C., Foster, a total of 249,765 men pres- on the Union front threatening Richmond and the armies defending it, HOOKER’S PLAN, plan of operations had for its object » purpose of Burnside’s mud march, to turn Lee out of Fredericksburg by a flank MAY 3. Y MORNING, had been represented to Lincoln that in its present demoralized condition and temper an- other battle under Burnside’s direction meant practical ruin to the army. ‘These representations came in person from Gens, John Newton and John Cochrane, the first a West Point graduate and the latter a civilian.soldier, and both too obscure in rank to warrant them in waiting on the President without invitation with such purpose unless they were speaking for others, In fact, they movement across the rivers above, covered by a strong demonstration below the town, a feint til the 27th, when, everything being ready, Howard's corps. with eight days’ rations in hav- ersacks, took the road for Kelley's ford on the Rappahannock, twenty-five miles above, where Spee chet Sb ela pontoon br: en wis across. He was followed by Gens, Slocant | secretly and energetically executed that thi ployed st and near Chancellorsvillo, under Slo- | threatening Lee's communications with lich. mond and covering the passage of the United | States ford, over which the rest of the army was to join them. This was a well-conceived initiative and so three corps had established themselves at Chaneellorsville before Lee fully comprehended from which direction to look for the Union at- tack which he well knew was soon to burst At) GEN. BUTTERFIELD, CHIEY OF STAFF. any rate, whether he knew it or not, there the troops were, where it is quite apparent the confederate leader did not want th Hooker had ordered Stoneman out on a cav- airy raid to aid and cover his i. Losing sight of his instructions, Stoneman practically turned this into a private marauding expedi- tion of his own, which resulted in having no bearing whatever on the campaign. Simulta- neously with these movements, on the 27th the first, third and sixth corps under Sedgwick moved down the river in diversion. Early on the 28th the first and sixth corps forced two crossings, laying pontoon bridges and sending tothe south side a considerable force, as if meditating an advance on that fron! These demonstrations had the desired effect. Jackson with the bulk of the confederate army was detained at and below Fredericksburg until the morning of May 1 by this threatened movement on their right, Bat as soon as the Union advance in force from up the river on the eonth side was announced Lee quickiy formed the conclusion th: igwick was mereiy feinting and immediately turned his attention toward the west, leaving only # sual force to watch Sedgwick. Ler’s army, Lee's army at this time consisted of Jacksé: corps and two divisions of Longstrect’s, thala ter being absent on the Blackwater. Ther no official contemporancons return of his strength, but it seems to be general that Lee's numbers at Chan 1 under Gen, ly mam look after aff: Lee unhesitatingly order ions of his army toward Ch Part of Anderson's divisi ing to the west and observing the fords, had been pushed back by wents on the 30th, au two or thi ridge running north and south across the pike | and plank roads to Fredericksburg. Here he a8 reinforced by MeLaws’ division at dayli on May 1, and Jackson's enti four hours afterward. W brigades, watching Banks’ ford, were also brought up, and the e ¢ army was ready to checkmite Hooker's future move- ments, Couch, with two divisions of the second corps, aving Gibbon at Fredericksburg, had laid a pontoon b at United States ford and ar- tived at Chancellorsvilie b m, of the 30th, Sickles also, by a rapid an me ford, had arriv on the morning of May 1. on. that had taken up @ position T Hooker had morning massed around Chancellors- ville ab .000 infantry to meet Lee's 48,000, deducting Early. Facing Early's 10,000 at Fredericksburg he had the first and sixth corps and Gibbon’s division of the second, not iess than 45.000. GEN. 0. 0, HOWARD. Naturally Gen. Hooker was very much eluted, From Falmouth on the 30th he issued a bul- letin to the army, after the manner of Napo- leon, announcing’ that his prefiminary opera- tions had been a complete success, and boldly asserted that “the encmy must either inglo- riously fly” or come out and give battle on un- favorable ground, where “certain destruction” awaited the unfortunate confederates, In continuation of the original plan on the Ist, toward noon, Gens. Slocum and Meade were ordered to advance toward Fredericks- burg for the purpose of uncovering Banks’ ford and to get into more open country. Sykes of the fifth corps advanced along the pike; Meade with the other two divisions moved down along the ri rhile Slocum with the twelfth corps: the plank road to the south of the pike. Gen. Sykes soon became heavily en- gaged with McLaws and n, and failing to connect with Slocum was casily outilanked on his right and mamtained his ground with difficulty. Meade advanced without opposition to near Banks’ ford, which he could have seized, while on the right Slocum had a slight engagement with some of Jackson's forces. Sykes’ battle lasted about an hour. Nothing serious had happened, yet orders were received from Hooker for all the troops to retire to their original lines and to intrench, which was ac- complished in good order, but leaving the wounded. About 4 p. m, the enpmy’s line nnder Jackson appeared in front of the Union right under Slocum: there was a heavy arullery duel, but his intantry did not attack. Hooker's move- ment was made one day too late, for on the Ist it found Lee ready, as we have soen; it is clear that he ought to have advanced aud uncovered Banks’ ford on the day previous, before Lee got But why his offensive should have een discontinued, once started, even as late as the Ist ig, inconceivable, especially in view of the fact tat the troops’ had already secured strong and commanding poritions, The order to retire under the circamst * Was #0 extra ordinary as.to excite the surprise of all the general officers, THE SECOND OF MAY. On the 2d of May Hooker's army occupied a line running from the}Rappahannock on the left across the pike and/plauk roads in front of Chaucellorsville; from this point it bowed around westwardly, well out south from the plank road, until its right again intersected that road about two miles west of Chancellors- ville, at Dowdall’s Tavern, and extending along that road a mile further to the west. On the left were Meade and Couch, facing southeast and east; then came Slocum, facing east and south; then part of Sickles’, jooking to the uth along the buige in the line, while How- ard, with the cleventh corps, heid about Dowd- all's, facing south and west. The lines were enerally intrenched, in the very heart of an mense jungle of dense brushwood known as the Wilderness, ‘On Friday night Lee and Jackson matured a plan by which the latter should strike the Tight flank and rear of the federals. Having abandoned the offensive, Hooker re- mained quiet in his lines throughout the 2d, awaiting for Lee's initiative. Jackson march at daylight, making a wide de- tour with his columns on old b; gener ally out of sight of the federals, to the south of Chancellorsville. But about 8 o'clock a steady movethent of confederates toward the west was discovered in front of Sickles, who ceeded to attack them. He succeeded in dri the road, and captured a regiment. near but the and little id E Hi i & tf j iF | i i i : i FF | | vr if E § F i i ; t i i : if i J [ i i F Bu Ertl rege i i i Ls ¢ te Hi fl i 2, Hi ! i i i | f Ly | miles east of Chancellorsville on a | it In fact the worst disposition possib'e had promising plan was substituted for the dis-|¢um, on the right flank of Fredericksburg, been made of the troops covering this portion of Hooker's lines, A conspiracy could not have shaped things more to the advantage of the ene: Jackson strack abont 6 p.m. Rodes’ divi. sion in front abd forty rods in the rear Coletoa moving in support. A. P. Hill was not yet deployed. The Union pickets and a briga outpost were driven in with a rush, and Devens division, carelessiy cooking and eating supper, Uns stacked, wa pt away in ten minutes by the rebel mastea, An atvempt to burriediy ping like ebay» Schurz’s division into som failed, he maintaitied the aemb minutes Steinwebr. > went to pieces. bad permitted the catastrophs, to stay the thde of retrent, bus The fugitives poured down the pike in stream on the rear of the Union army, sbouting enemy at thet like that of Ball Run, where Howard had his first experience; forta- i t did not carry away the rest of the army. But the confederates in this onset through the brush were so badly broken that th extreme advance lost its momentum and force. Gen. Pleasonton, near Toad, ot some thirty guus hastily into position on the south side aud about nightfall stopped the eddying and nearly spent confederate charge with a withering artillery fire and brilliant charge of the eighth Pennayly: cavalry, in which Major Keenan, the com- mander, lost his life. This energetic work gave time for new dispositions to save the army. Berry of the third corps swung division across the pike; other troops were hurried into position to eupport him. Lee, hearing Jackson's gttos, bad made @ noisy attack, extending toward his left nect with Jackson at the earliest pra moment, but he made uo impression on the Union lines, Jackson reformed his lines as rapidly as possible, withdrawing Rodes to Dowddil's and putting Hillin front. While this was being ¢ 4, with some of his staiT, he had ridden forward to reconnoiter the federal lines, as wont, retarning up the a GEN, SVKES, plank road at a gailop the party in the dusk was | mistaken for federal cmey by the confeder- ate line and a volley of musketry poured inte th Jackson was rely wounded in from the field. He ard, more from than the wound and of pneumonia, A. P. by the federal fire later in ut dark the Union artill the Toad was something terrifie, About midnight Horney’s division of Sickles’ cor made a night uttack on Hill's right flank, driving it mand recapturing some guns and Then he retired, Hill's troops mpanying attac | Hall was woun: ed by attacking Berry, but were re- pulsed. Next morn: first cory now pertc in vie « Kevnoldsarrived with the ricksburg, where it i clear he ought to have remained of the orders scent to Sedgwick to and capture the town and advance om Leo's rear, SUNDAY MORNING, Sunday morning, May 3, found fully 45,000 federais huddled in « bad position around Chanceliorsville, with lateral branches to the Rapidan, on the northwest, and the Happahan- nock, on the northeast, West of this southern projection of the federals, resting like a spear- head on the pomtof Junction of the lateral bra 8, Was Jackson's corps, numbering per- 009 men, deployed acrovs the plank road, awaiting daylight to renew the attack, East of it, and fecling well around to connect with Jackson, was Lee with not more than 23,000 men.of Anderson aud McLaws, but still om Jackson by Sickies at Hagel Grove, commanding position was finally vol- untarily abendoned, one of the weakest moves of this weak campaign, Iu fact, Jackson's defeat of the eleventh corps had not decided the battle, Ihe confederate advance had been stopped—hed «pent itself in the brusb—and there was ample time and plenty of troops with energetic action to mect the morrow and roll back the rebel tide Hooker had hardly been tonched; totally elitm- ting Howard, be still bad 77,000 formidab! ‘ings of the confederate army, be- 000 menacing Lee's rear at Frede Lee wax far from victory at day- sides the icksburg. light on Sunday morning, May 3, with his ablest lieutenant gone and the isolated part of his army practically without a bead In fect Lis situation was critical in the extreme, With anything hike intelligent and vigorous action the Union general «till had the game all i his own hands With his force either Grant or Sheridan would willingly have traded off the entire eleventh corps with Howard throt in for such an opportunity at Lee as was here presented. But Hooker conspicuously failed to utilize thene immense advantages, Early in the morning Jackson's preseed to the attack under commagd of J. EK Stuart, At first they were successful, but the federais recovered the lost ground, capturing prisoners and colors, But stuart pernis! ‘4 in making attack after attack, There was apparently no skill or order iw these onsets; the Confederates were sity hurled against the Union lines tm as lar; masses as possible, Dut the federal pomtion was so bad as to permit Stuart to constantiy outnumber them af the point cf coutact and to entilade their lime with artille After fighting with varying fortunes several houre under these dvantages, they sulleniy Fielded the ground around ‘Chancellorsvilie, hot whipped by the foc, but by their general But they had inflicted severe losses on the charging foe, Gons. Berry and A. W. Whip- ple were killed. No of the splendid troops of Reynolds and Meade, who bad scarcely fired re brought forward to th uppers and Slocum. Compared with the jon battle tactics at Chanceliorsville Pope's cond Bull Run was fairl: apoleonic, In accordance with Hooker's orders Sedg- wick on the 3d had cromed his entire corps and moved up the river against Fredericks barg. Gibbou's division also crossed, After e good deal of reconnoit:ring, about noon storra- ing columns were formed under Gen. Neill, Col. Lewis A. Grant and Col. Seaver on the left, and Col. Johns and Col Spear on thi right. A brilliant charge all ‘the line resulted in the capture of the heights which Buruside’s entire army could not reach in the Preceding December, d mauy prisone it was a re 4 and if Reynolds bad remained rick with his 27.000 the campaign would have Sedgwick then advanced Chancelloreville. About his inferior fighting foree Union army is @ sufficient commentary on Hooker's battlefield tactics with a superior force. It was none too soon 6 Salem 4 gE F z i ft