The Daily Worker Newspaper, August 29, 1925, Page 8

i P i sion in the Central Executive Com- mittee. No: as I said before, the main ob- jective of the party in bringing about the united front for presidential eampaign was defeated. Why? The answer is very simple. Because the forces that were bringing to.the sur- face the LaFollette movement, the economic and political conditions that made this movement big and influ- ential in those months, were much stronger and much more powerful than the influence that our party could exert. I do not need to go here into detail to explain why those condi- tions were more powerful than our party. The LaFollette movement as it functioned in those months found great sympathy, had great attractive power precisely among those sections of the workers who were beginning to think politically. Precisely among those sections of workers whom our party was trying to attract and it goes without saying that in those months and even now at the present state of development of capitalism in America, the petty bourgeois, progres- sive, liberal movement which has the backing of the official labor move- ment, will be much more successful in winning the masses at the present moment than a Communist Party can be. And so the June 17 convention did not produce what our party was striving for. Thus in May, 1924, our party was confronted with a very seri- ous proposition. But before I come to that I must recall to your atten- tion a very important event that took place in the life of our party in May, 1924, something that must not be overlooked when you are study- ing the report of the Central Exceu- tive Committee. Namely, the deci- sion of the Communist International which nullified our proposition for a third party alliance. This is very important. Why? Because from Jan- uary until May, until the Communist International decision became known to us our party was basing its policy on the third party alliance. It is true that the last party convention re- ferred the matter to the C. I but that did not help matters very much +from: January -until.May for the rea- ..99n_ that the Central Executive Com- _..mittee and the party as a whole had to function. Political life does not stop for a Communist Party to make up its mind and the Central Execu- tive Committee had to function dur- ing those months politically and the only basis on which it could function Was on a policy in which f believed in, The Central Executive Committee was nearly unanimous in believing that the policy of the third party alliance was the policy to apply un- der these conditions. All our tactics all our literature, all of our slogans formulated during the months of Jan- uary to May were based on this gen- eral idea of the third party alliance ‘and then at a certain moment the Com **munist International said to our paf- ooty, you cannot do it, and the Central Executive Committee was confronted, comrades, with a very critical situa- tion. I am sure every member of the Central Executive Committee will be able to recall now very vividly the situation we found ourselves in at that particular moment, We were confronted with the necessity of com- pletely reorientating ourselves prac- tically within 24 hours, and comrades, a reorientation which was to take . Place. was in the close study of your library, not in your own room, a re- orientation of a political party on the open political arena, under the very fire of the enemy, because you must remember that at about the same time LaFollette and Gomfers opened their attack on the June 17 convention and against the Communists. We main- tain that the ability of our party to reorientate itself quickly under these conditions is a tribute to the Com- munist quality of our party. To have changed within one day, almost, fan- damentally, our main political line un- der the very fire of the enemy with- out in the least demoralizing our ranks, was proof not only of the po- litical flexibility of the Central Exe- cutive Committee, but also of the discipline and Communist quality of the party as a whole, ees tenet Oe Ji 2? som. vention, one of its. basic. features or main features, was the predominance j of farmiég elements over the elements from the industrial centers. That was one feature, The second feature was that nearly everybody in the conven- tion, with the exception of our own delegates was in favor of LaFollette being the presidential : Lnd when we came there ar sit established for ourselves these main facts, we realized that there is hardly a chance to fulfill or reach our main objective. And during the convention (the whole Central Executive Committee was’ in St. Paul) a meeting of our committee was held and this question was raised by Comrade Foster. minee S there any use of our continuing with this convention? Would it not '*|be better perhaps to right here real- ize that we cannot form this farmer- labor party, that the -basis is not here, that the forces outside this convention are so strong and powerful against the realization of our proposi- tion that it cannot be realized? The proposition was that we establish this fact right there and do not proceed on the basis that we can form such a united front. But the majority of the committee, and by the way, on this proposition the factional lineup broke up completely, the majority of the committee, which included comrades from the majority and the minority, decided that if eventually we must give up the idea of forming a united front for the elections, this should not be done at the convention. This should be postponed until after the convention and particularly after the July 4th conference of the C. P. P. A. I will not go into detail as to the arguments. The fact of the matter is that the Central Executive Commit- tee decided to go thru with the con- vention and watch developments fur- ther. But when the July 4th conyen- tion was over and our delegates came back from there to report to the Cen- tral Executive Committee, it then be- came clear, at least to some of us, that the Workers Party might be com- pelled to enter the election -eampaign under its own banner on its own pro- gram ald with its own candidates, And that, comrades, was the decision of the Central Executive Committee— it was neary unanimous, I think, two or three comrades voting against it. Why did the Central Exceutive Com- mittee make the decision. It made the decision for; two reasons. One reason was that inasmuch as the for- mation of a labor party, or its continu- ance is justified only if it is a real united front between our party and wider masses of workers, and inas- much as this primary condition for a united front was lacking, therefore there is no reason why we should pre- tend that we have a farmer-labor party, there is no reason why we should pretend that we do have a united front and base our policies on @ wrong basis. Central Executive Committee was determined not to fool itself and not to fool the workers, When we realize that the objective condi- tions being stronger than our party defeated our main objective, we drew the only possible conclusion, and the conclusion was that our party will take the field in the elections as the Workers Party, on its own program and with its own candidates. The Communist International found that this decision was correct, It found that that was the only possible decis- ion to make under the conditions as they existed then. ‘Now, comrades, as to the election campaign, You are already familiar with hew we carried on the campaign, and what it resulted in. Some com- Trades of the minority, I think the min- ority as a group, have found it pos- sible months after the election cam- paign to bring forward a number of i i: Ba Nie wea i -Reee a ey Nh at RSE Pasa Why ie. Care Nr else ae: ee A bet lea lS Sane NE Ral Ran SG cee better, that the Central Executive Committee during the election cam- paign was unanimous as it never was before and never was afterwards, in the manner in which the election cam- pafgn should be carried on so that in this convention today, whether the minority or the majority are going to criticize the shortcomings of our elec- tion campaign policies, it should be understood that these were policies of a unanimous Central Executive Com- mittee. I might perhaps indicate one or two shortcomings of our election cam- paign not its policies so much, the policy was correct, but the defects and shortcomings in the carrying out of these policies. One is that the party for one reason or another was not fully successful in linking up our presidential campaign with the im- mediate issues that were disturbing the minds of the masses during those weeks. The policy provided for it, our election program, our pamphlets, our resolutions, our instructions, all provided for that, but in the carrying out of it the party was not successful, and when I say the party, I do not mean the Central Executive Commit- tee, I mean the entire party organ- ization. Every city committee and district committee, our organizers, speakers, writers, etc. The fault was not with the resolutions, not with the policy but with something else which I am not ready to explain. The party did not seem to be able to fully link up its.campaign with the labor strug- gles that were going on in those months. This is one shortcoming which must be criticized and avoided in the future. A nae second difficulty was that one of the main instructions, organ- izational instructions of the Central Executive Committee for the campaign was not fully carried out in the party organization, at least not with enough enthusiasm and determination. I re- fer to the decision that in every city and in every district the party should call together conferences of labor to endorse our ticket and election cam- paign and to organize supporting committees for our election campaign. Asa general rule this was carried out but the results we believe could have been much bigger even in spite of the LaFollettee sweep, if our party lad shown more determination in carrying out this part of the program, As to the results of the election campaign, not’ much need be said here. The party succeeded in winning about the maximum that it could un- der the circumstances. The election campaign in our opinion established the fact that American capitalism at the present time has immenge re- sources, immense and tremendous re- sources to break up, to demoralize and to temporarily defeat opposition movements of the petty bourgeoisie. This is a very important factor. I am sure that all of us as well as the entire country not only the Commun- ists, were disappointed partly in the results of the election as far as La- Folletiee movement was concerned. Everyone believed, even the capital- ists themselves, that in view of the acute agrarian crisis that prevailed for so long a time, in view of the se- vere defeats of and attacks on the workers by the capitalist, in view of the general disturbed situation, that the-.LaFollette movement would be able to muster much more strength than it really had and when the count was made after the election, everyone realized that what the LaFollette movement actually achieved was much below that which was expected by everyone. It proved a number of things, but the point I wish to make in this connection is that it proves the immense resourcefulness, econom- io primarily and then political, of American capitalism in fighting oppo- sition movements. sagen second point proved to us, and it is very important for our fu- ture policy, is that, that in spite of the temporary defeat of the third par- ty movement, this movement has not been totally destroyed. This move ‘ment will come into existence again and will again roll up much power and influence as conditions develop im the United States. The LaFollette movement was not destroyed in the elections. It did not emerge from the election as strong os as some expected, but the results pro- duced proved that the awakening sec- tions.of the American working class in the industrial parts of the country and the poorer sections of the farmers were willing and ready to proceed in- to a third party movement and actual- ly in the formation of a third petty Dbeourgeois party. And when we are going to adopt our policies for the future, we must keep in mind this very important factor, confirmed again by the results of the election campaign. The basis for a third pet- ty bourgeois party is here. Eventu- ally it will materialize and develop in- to a power in the United States. And a third fact established in the election campaign proved to us that in the face of this sweep-of the LaFollette movement the labor party movement in its present stage could not retain its independence. As we have foreseen so it has happened. The labor party movement’ was nearly totally disinte- grated. and then swallowed up by the LaFollettee movement. What con- clusions one should draw fyom this fact is another matter, but it must be established that the labor party move- ment was not strong enough, was not politically conscious enough to be able to withstand and successfully resist this rising sweep of the petty bour- geois ideology. And the fourth factor that the election campaign established is that our Workers Party, tho small yet in numbers, is already quite firm- ly established. The number of votes that were actually cast for our presi- dential candidate should be consider- ed as we have been considering them, in view of a number of other condi- tions. First, that the most exploited sections of the American working class, those whom our appeal reaches quickest, are disfranchised and could not therefore take part in the election campaign. The second thing to con- sider in connection with analyzing the result of the elections, as far as we were concerned, is this fact that the LaFollette movement had captured the minds not only of those that just began to awaken politically but even™ those who thought they mae politic. , ally class conscious. And in the face of these two conditions the Workers Party could carry thru its election campaign with the result that it actually scored, I believe it is safe to state that the Workers Party has already firmly established itself. It has a basis wide enough to proceed with confidence and energy in build- ing its power and strength for future larger campaigns. Now, confronted with this result of the election campaign, the Central Ex- ecutive Committees was beginning to give serious consideration to what the situation really meant ag far as our policy was concerned, Soon following the election campaign our party pub- lished its statement on the results of the election campaign, there we made it known for the first time that we no longer believed in the usefulness and appealing force of the labor party slogan. This question was discussed at great length last night, therefore I will not now go ‘into detail about it. What I do wish to emphasize is that the comrades of the minority up am this very moment, still ‘refuse’ derstand what the real position of the Central Executive Committee Was be- ginning with that statement and fol- lowing it, I have mentioned a few moments ago the outstanding facts or lessons that we should derive from ‘the election campaign. And. what were they, comradés? We must ‘know them in order to understand what has moved the Central Exécutive Commit- tee following the election campaign to reorientate itself or to change was policies as far as the labor party was concerned. The Central Executive Committee in those months saws the situation as follows. We knew the labor party movement was disintegrat- ed. There was no longer to be found in those months a labor movement in the country, distinct either politically or organizationally from the general third party movement. Second, the Central Executive Committee saw that the disappointment caused by the failure of the LaFollette move- ment to bring results expected by the masses will militate very seriously against any attempt to promote a movement for a new party in the. United States, for a labor party in the