The Daily Worker Newspaper, August 29, 1925, Page 7

“The idea becomes power when ft pene- trates the masses.” —Karl Marx. - SPECIAL MAGAZINE SUPPLEMENT THE DAILY WORKER. SECOND SECTION Thi magazine suppic- ment will appear every Saturday in The Daily Worker. ‘ SATURDAY, AUGUST 29, 1925 ze 290 The Report of the Party’s Executive Alexander Bittelman reported to the convention of the Workers (Communist) Party for the Central Executive Committee as follows: ERMIT me to preface my report with a’few remarks as to how the report of the Central Executive .Com- mittee should be approached and how it should be oonsidered. We have heard a good deal during recent months about Marxism and Marxian meth- ods and I think that the convention here should approach the report of the Central Executive Committee from the point of view of Marxians and not in the manner in which the C. BE. C. has been dealt with so far by some comrades in our party. What I mean by this is that the final result of the sum total of activities of our committee should be judged and an- alyzed on the basis not only of the policies of the committee but also on the conditions, of the objective conditions in which the party had to carry on its work. It is very import- ant before we proceed any further to keep clearly in mind the following facts: That the objective conditions in the United States during the last 20 months were extremely. unfavor- able for the quick growth of our party. It is sufficient for Me to men- tion only a few of the more import- ant facts. One of the most outstand- ing is the fact that American capi- talism succeeded in stabilizing itself -to a certain extent, to liquidate, truly, at the expense of the masses, but to liquidate the very ‘sevéfe agrarian crisis and also to stabilize partially the industrial situation. This, com- rades, is the basic fact. During the 20 months in which the present C. E C. was in office, there were no severe crises, no severe disturbances and no big mass struggles of the American working class, It is this background that must be kept in mind continual- ly when we analyze our activities dur- ing these 20 months. : SECOND fact, of secondary im- portance, is the depressed mood of the American workers. Now this is a factor which nobody can over- look and surely not a Communist Party. Communist policies, or in the formulation of Communist policies, the mood of the working masses, their readiness to fight and struggle is a basic factor and when you realize and when you understand, comrades, that during these 20 months the general characteristic of the mood of the American masses was one of depres- sion, was one of unwillingness and unreadiness to offer real resistance to the attacks of the capitalists, you will understand that this second fac- tor considerably influenced the prog- ress, the development of our own ac- tivities. The third factor, is the Sweep and then the going down of the LaFollette movement. In my re- port I will go into detail and will analyze what this movement meant as far as our party was concerned, But it is without doubt that this sweep of LaFollette movement and its compar- ative defeat in the presidential elec- tions, seriously hampered the prog- ress also of the Communist movement of the country. Then the very se- vere attacks and persecutions against our party and our comrades in other labor organizations, These four outstanding objective facts in the situation created an ex- tremely unfavorable condition for the development and quick growth of the party. Having this in mind and if you add to this a continual internal fight that lasted nearly 20 months, you will understand with what condi- tions and difficulties our party and cen tral executive committee had to con- tend with during these 20 months. R the purpose of my report, com- port into a number of sections. I will divide the period of these 20 months into several sub-periods, The division is not going to be arbitrary because it so happens that during these 20 months we have been passing thru four quite distinct periods. The first period. It lasted from about Jan- uary, 1924 to May, 1924. That’ was the period when our party was laying the basis and preparing. itself’ for the June 17, convention, for the St. Paul convention, Now that was the main strategy of our party during those months between January and May, 1924? The main strategy was to bring about a united front of labor and the poor farmers in the presiden- tial elections. of 1924. The main ob- jective that our party pursued dur- ing that period was to bring about if possible the formation of farmer-la- bor unity. If impossbile, at least unit- ed political action in the presidential campaign, to unite as large a num- ber of workers and*poor farmers as could be organized on a certain pro- gram or partial demands. This was our basic strategy and undoubtedly, tain crisis, a crisis which resulted primarily because of our break of the split which occurred on July 3, be- cause of the failure of the Federated farmer labor party and because bf the growing power and influence in those months of the LaFollette move- ment. When the present Central Ex- ecutive Committee got into office it realized that it is dealing with a very difficult situation; We..found ur- selves ‘isolated to a very large ex- tent in the industrial centers of the country. We found that in practical- ly none of the important industrial sections of the country was there in existence a farmer labor movement of any importance at all for us to ally ourselves with and to continue our strategy for a farmer labor party. The only places in the country where there were any organized groups of any substance at all that dur party could ally itself with and continue its policy for the farmer labor party were to be found in the agrarian north west and comrades, it is not the pres- ent Central Executive Committee that switched itself to the northwestern THE WRITING ON THE WALL | SE Left Wing of the British labor movement. correct strategy in every respect, The second question is how successful were we in that strategy and what means did we employ to achieve our objective. This main objective of our party was defeated. oped party did not succeed in bring- ing about such a united front in the presidential elections. We failed inspite of the fact that we were suc- cessful in bringing about quite a well attended convention in St. Paul. It is very important for us to un- derstand why our party failed in real- izing this objective. Last night in our debate on the labor party contro- versy the question of our northwest orientation was brought in. This is also an important fact in the discus- sion of our report. "When the pres- ent Central Executive Committee came into office, what did it find?’ It found that the labor party policy rades, I am going to divide my re-of our party was undergoing a cer- < main objective of the party which was to bring about a united -front in the presidential elections was compelled to refuse to continue along these lines which resulted in the June 17 con- vention in St. Paul. Now comrades, it is“very import- ant for the party to know that dur- ing the months of. January to May, 1924, when our party was preparing and building the June 17 convention, there were very serious difficulties of opinion within the Central Executive Committee on the methods and tac- tics to be pusued in preparing the June 17 convention. Those of you who think that the Central Executive Committee in those months was united on this question will be greatly surprised to learn that the meetings of the C. BE. C. in those months were far from being peace- ful on the question of how shail we prepare for this convéntion. “The basic tactical principle that the ma- jority of the Central Executive Com- mittee was insisting upon during those months was that we do~not repeat again the mistake of July 3; that we do not go to the St. Paul convention with the same tactics that we brought with us in the convention of July 3; that we take all necessary neasures to prevent splits on issues ind bases as compelled them In July 3. Saige first question as I remember, & question of importance, that arose in connection with the June 17 convention, was its date; - There; Was very serious - disagreement’ bes - cause our party, the Workers Party, . and our allies of the farmer labor parties in the northwest, particularly ‘he leaders of the Minnesota farmer ‘abor party. Differences of opinion on olicy and tactics and objective, And tt one period in the development of our work, the question arose as to postponing the convention until after che July 4 convention of the C, P, ‘, A, Our opponents, the so-called progressives in the farmer labor moves ment, were very much determined to wake this convention postponed and the question was, can our party com- promise on this point? So our party = efforts to come to an agreement with these soalled pr: “Ans: other question that ened ee the | Central Executive Committee. very! heated and serious debate was under what conditions our party would de. mand the immediate formation of a farmer labor party. And again we saw in the Central Executive Committee two main tendencies. One was that the main task of the Workers Party in the labor party policy is to create a | farmer labor party and to seize lead- ership, irrespective of whether the party created is a mass party with ' mass support or is only our own party and a little group of sympathizing or- ganizations, The other tendency in it was that in our labor party policy our main objective is to get a mass orientation, The present Central Ex-| Patty, And there is no use to be im- ecutive Committee, beginning with January first, found this switch al- ready made by the previous Central Executive Committee. It found in other words, two factors—one of ob- jective nature and the other one was a policy that was pursued and laid out. by the previous Central Execu- tive Committee. The objective fac- tor was that there was no mass move- patient about dt. A labor party which does not bring us into contact with large masses, does not really satisfy our main objective in the Policy. It is true and it must be said now, that while we were fighting in the Cen- tral Executive Committee between Januray and May, 1924, on these ques- tions, some comrades of the minority one or two, Comrade Ruthenberg, one ment in the industrial centers for aj of them were at times taking the po- farmer labor party. There was no basis for political strategy along the lines of a farmer labor movement in the industrial center, but there was some basis for it in the agrarian north west. igac second factor was the policy pursued by the previous Central Executive Committeo, the policy of orientating itself on the agrarian northwest. The present Central Exo- sition of the majority, agreeing with them on the tactics to be pursued in connection with the convention. But this, comrades, is not an important thing, or at least not the most im- portant, The most important thing - is that during these months the strug- gle between the majority and minor- ity was along this central line, i. oe. what kind of labor party we are go- ing to fight for. This was the main cutive Committee in pursuit of the }substance of every political discus-