The Seattle Star Newspaper, November 28, 1919, Page 13

File pms nap i gaging es aN aguante ete reins ie ny mr ard eR et nnn gm The Seattle Star SEATTLE, WASH, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1979 ee nnn as annanimmmebea? iaimieh , | Pages 13 to 24 | GEN. LUDENDORFF KNEW FRENCH PLANS Says Advance Information on West Front Thwarted Attacks Secondly, the British eyes were fixed on the coast of Flanders. They were preparing for the reat push which came later, de. signed to capture the U-boat bases, Thirdly, the British public had been making a great outery Against the losses of the Somme and was loath to send reinforee- ments to keep up slaughter. Any or all of these things may have influenced Haig. The fact remains, however—tf Ludendorff is right—that he failed to take advantage to the full of a great opportunity Had he done no more® than seize the crossings of the canal in front of Doual it would have been a first class disaster to the Germana for the British would have brought under their guns the important Douai railroad Junction, thru which ran the sup ply lines for a large part of the Hindenburg line to the south ward, and would have put them selves in position to flank this whole defensive system by a new advano BY EUGENE J. YOUNG peamething for Marshal Flaig to ‘ABswer is posed by Ludendorif in @ealing with the great Britiah- French offensive of 1917. Why British commander pause had smashed the Hin @enburg line before Arras, April Why did he give the Ger & chance to bring up fresh and guns to plug the big 7? Why give them time to tm on the Wotan line and pre- still further defenses behind Unfinished part of the St anal? te a blue picture that Lu draws of the effects of British blow. Whole divis Were smashed, all the for and much of the support artillery were captured, with ‘their ammunition, a gap 10 miles _ Wide had been made in the Ger man defenses and the Hritieh “Stood on the hills overlooking the ef Doual, which stretched Away to the east and, except Bt the unfinizhed canal right in front of the Fitish. offered no @efenaive positions short of ch a disarrangement of the the Belgian border German front. even had it | Phe situation was extremely stopped in front of Doual, might ‘Gritical,” says Ludendorff, “and have had a deciaive effect on the teave had far-reaching and French attack im the south. consequences f the en Certainly Ludendorft could not had pushed farther forward have sent reinforcements to meet SE Gas ‘now deeply de that attack while the British had i. Many days had his whole line outflanked; indeed, before a new line could be might well have been forced Sat farm and. consolt to call troops from that front. +. « Doudtlesd exceed tlle Bre Boag | rae ingly import 3 ot was a first-class disaster. Luden ehind the British attack, but | ‘oFft's remarks on mutinies in ME mever been able to dis the French army are amply Tiaie what they were.” borne out by the testimony from SUT aeeres, until Haig speaks Paris, Nivelle’s scheme wan a drive under @ moving barrage, — zone x ved oad which he had used to much good Se effect at Verdun. While his men his ao anes wes were advancing under the pro- guesses that the British tection of the artillery, it fe still worn out after the bat successful. But the artillery wi ‘of the sae gena haga not able to carry out the full "coed ong eon § plan, the men got out from un- are planning a big blow from der its protection and the Ger that battiefield when Ludendortt mans, knowing what was com them by his great retreat ing, mowed them down. March. Three other supposi- Charges of treachery among can be offered. The British Frenchmen in high places have command was strongly in been made as a result of this at that time by the idea fiasco. Ludendorff mys he way to win the war was Germans and save allies learned of Nivelle’s plan thru the fortuitous capture of an army Waing preponderant artillery order. Large sections “of the ‘Haig may have felt that French army and people feel Mot worth while to take certain that he got the full plans ‘of an open battle outside | } range of his heavy guns. | by grapevine thru Switzerland or Italy “MY THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS” By Gen. Eric Von Lundendorff by The Star thru spect Coprrishted, 1919. by Harper fm Great Britain by Mutchines Messrs. Setx and Bariel; in rate tn Canada and All rights reserved for France, jgtum, Rusia and the countries @ up the strategic value| front were Tetreat (the great retirement | proved in the spring of 1917). I STRENGTHENS on the British offensive de | CROWN PRINC to the north at the end of | ne shortening of the lire between | AE was impossible to foretell) , ay and Laon made it possible to . ty where it would take! -cnove the command of the First Be Attack near Arras seemed seny trom thin district. It was transferred to the group of armies under the German Crown Prince, on either side of Rheims, between the Seventh and Third armies, Such a transfer and readjustment of an army command is a troublesome un- Me arrangement with the MeClare N Brothers, All rights ompany and the London Tt reserved very considerably im. * the middie of February, 1917 to improve its position, the army had undertaken a local ‘on the Champagne battle Beptember, 1915. This oper- 1. Amongst the it entails in the lines of communi cations. It cannot be done in a day if serious friction is to be avoided. | I hoped that the army command would be settled, with headquarters in Rethel, before the French attack on the group of armies under the erman Crown Prince was opened | The troops had had two extra months for rest and training, as @ result of the successful carrying out of the Alberich program (the retreat of the Hindenburg line). They had certainly gained considerably in strength, but in the group of armies for an attack. It was, therefore.| under the Crown Prince Rupprecht for them in the shortest/there wi still some divisions that of time, and at various parts) required rest “et the front, to develop an offensive| ‘Training was suspended. Some of wm betraying their plans by | the new formation were already be Preparations. ing employed tr 4 photogra, he of the enemy's | line, others had only just come into Er excenes Pad works, and the|use as reinforcements. Divisions x checking and verification | from Rumania had arrived in Bel phot ‘aphs secured by our | glum. dab ena only give general in-| General headquarters had also ex ; of his intended movements. | changed Pe caf rod gd sete een Vailly|ern front for ighting forces SET lies and the Argonne pa from the east, altho this necessarily Hy well constructed, so that | involved a weakening of our defenses preparations for attack were there. pe rhe works that were | GERMANY SENDS lly built south of the Chemin Dames we saw when we ad) fn 1918. Their construction | pushed to have dated from 1915-16. It that the French had in- to make an offensive here in| but were prevented by the Ger-| onslaught on Verdun Conditions on the western front | more secure, but the de | due to the battles on the! to their ample labor sup : had been in a post-| to furnish, not only the Verdun) , but also a large portion of| hele front, with all the means of i on and munitions neces The consolidation of the front was on The lator which the Siegfried line was employed be hind those sectors where attack was anticipated, and the completion of the support and rearward trenches had to be accelerated The supply of munitions had im proved, the increase being due to the diminished consumption during sev- eral months, A had been ed, which fave @ certain secur. 3 and at Verdun still weighed the minds of our people and) : long ‘a# the battles east and west did not last too long. The Hin- J od the nerveracking tension | °" > fh tensive. program gradually became () i reserve 6 from being on the de|'*Y * denb f Phe distribution of the higher com-| jracticable, and the further supply had been improved. Crown | of munitions was insured Rupprecht’s command in-| ¢yije Hindenburg program was the the Fourth, Sixth, First anQ|peginning of Ludendorff's practical nd armies, bétween the canall gictatorship. He took Za Vere, Next to this was the) of the manufacture of munitions and nm Crown Prince's command, | mining and militarized the whole in th the Seventh, Third and Fifth | gustrial organization of Germany.) which extended almost a8| (General headquarters began to an the Orne, east of Verdun. | reckon on the great entente offensive ‘came the command of Field|in France, Macedonia and the Duke Albrecht of Wurtem-| Isonzo for the middle of April. From who had handed over the|Kreuznach, whither we had moved th army to General Sixt von|at the end of February, I had often larmy groups C., A. B.), whose| visited the western front and had ‘of the staff was Generdl Kraft) discussed the situation with the com gen. Owing to the| mand of the groups of armies and gt this group of farmies,|the army commanders, as well as on the Alsace-Lorraine| with the general in charge of the over control on spaper | dertaking, on account of the changes | quiet sectors of the| had) been liberated by the occupation of| British attacks In Flanders tn 1917, in the attempt to break th grip of Germany on the Belgian | coast, shook the army of Luden- | dorff to its marrow, At the bat- tle of Messines a clean break- thru was scored, but it was not | followed up by the British, who might have inflicted a decisive defeat’ on the enemy at this point. These are revelations in tomorrow's installment of Luden- most dangerous positions; had exchanged views on ta ‘group of armies under the Crown Prince Rupprecht and the German crown prince were strengthened with divisions, artillery and munitions, and were provided with everythin necessary for successful defense Where help was desired I gave it to the best of my ability, BRITISH BLOW STAGGERING The Sixth a of a local advance at Souches, be | tween Lens and Arras, and prepared hto carry it out at the beginning of April. I had no doubt that a great British offensive was imminent at Arras. The operation at Souches was abandoned | 1 begged the command | group of armies to bring reserves nearer to the area of the Sixth army. ‘The last attacks at Verdun in October and | December had confirmed the old adage that the right place for re serves is close to the firtng fir Th tactics of @ defensive battle demand ed that, in many places on the front under attack, counterattack divi sions should be held in readiness in | the second line to meet and throw | back the enemy if he broke thru the | first Line. The divisions which constituted | the second and third waves were My deed moved up by the Sixth army, but on the Sth were not close enough up. On the 9th, after a short but Jextraordinarity mtense artillery Preparation, our army encountered a powerful attack, led by tanks, on both sides of the Scarpe (east of Ar ras). Several of our advanced posi. tions were overcome. The neighbor. ing divisions which stood firm suf- fered heavy losses The enemy succeeded before noon in reaching our battery positions and seizing heights which dominated the country far to the east. The coun: of the their the up line in to throw the enemy back; only por. | tons of the troops could be brought | up by motor transport. | HE WAS DEEPLY | DEPRESSED | The situation was extremely criti- cal, might have had far-reaching and serious consequences if the ene | my had pushed further forward, But the British contented themselves | with their great success and did not | continue the attack, at least not on | April 9. | On that day I celebrated my birth day at Kreuznach. I had looked for ward to the expected offensive with confidence, and was tow deeply de Was thie destined to be the all our care and trouble during the past half-year? Had our principles of defensive tactics proved false, and If no what was to be done? 4 was not at the time able to get a clear view of all the details of the battle. I sent for officers who had }taken part in the conflict in the | front line, and by means of conver | mations with them: and telephonic communications gained the impres sion that the principles laid down by general headquarters were sound. But the whole art of leadership lies in applying them correctly. More- |over, a division had failed here which |had previously enjoy tation, The battle of Arras on April 9 was |® bad beginning for the decisive | struggle of this year. April 10 and the following days were eritical. The | consequences of a break thru of 12 | to 15 kilometers (8 to 1@ miles) wide and six or more kilometers (4 miles) | deep ard not easy to meet. In view | of the heavy losses in men, guna and }ammunition resulting from such break thru, efforts are needed to make gool the damage | It was the of general | headquarters to provide reserves on scale, But It was absolutely impossible, with the troops at our disposal, and in view of the military | situation, to have a second division jimmediately behind every division that might possibly fall out. | HARD TO FORM | A NEW LINE A day like April 9 threw all cal culations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a new tine could freally be formed and consolidated | The end of the crisis, even if the | troops were available, depended very | largely, as it generally does in such | cases, on whether the enemy, after | his first victory, would attack again, {and by further success aggravate the difficulty of forming a new line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were to be won only | too easily. | The British attacked again |same spot from the 10th onws | great strength, but not reall grand 9% They extended offensive on both sides, especially to south, as far Bullecourt. On llth they took Monchy, and dur the following night we evacu: Vimy ridge. (The Canadians | colonsal business a large the 4d in on a their the took Vimy by a charge after tremendous | bombardment.) April 2ard and 28th and May 3rd were again days of se © fighting, and in the intervals arp local engagements took place. he battles continued; we launched minor counterattacks, which were successful, but also suffered slight losses of territory here and there. The commander-in-chiet of the Sixth army, General yon Falkenhau- sen, whove chief of staff was Colonel wanted to make! & rectification of its line by means| terattacking divisions were not there| known as minister of war ed a high repu: | von Loszberg, was very energetic In| organizing the defense of the new | position, and was supported in hi! efforts. by the commands of the! groups of armies and by general headquarters, A further withdrawal to the Wotan position, which was | still under construction, though con templated for @ time by the Sixth army, was not found to be necessary ore | Men in Fur pe take off their hats | | when @ funeral procession pasnes | | | n ; Spokane Shivers | in Zero Weather| SPOKANE, Nov 28 Following | the coldest weather eince last Janu: | ary yesterday, when the thermome | ter fell to 7 above zero, snow began | falling last night and t y had cov ered the city with a heavy blanket The battle of Arras wan at its height in the second half of April, and was swallowing up a liberal sup: | ply Of reserves and material, when. The French offensive had collapsed on April 16th, the French also with terrible loss of life, and altho opened thelr formidable offensives | France was obliged to celebrate it as | on the Alsne and in Champagne a victory, it caused great depression. Doubtless exceedingly Important The minister of war admitted in July | strategic objects Iny behind the Brit-| that the attack had failed with losses | ish attack, but I have never been that must not again be incurred. | able to discover what they were, I These losses were so great that the took for granted, in spite of the re. morale of the army began to suffer stricted area of their onslaught, that and mutinies broke out, tho we & great break thru was planned, and heard bat little about them, and th not merely « battle, of attrition and only by degrees. Only later on did diversion, But possibly the British | we learn the whole trath, army had not quite recovered from NIVELLE LOSES the battle of the Somme and had un WIS COMMAND ahaa & diversion here whilst the) Changes were also made in the| army wae to gain a decision. | rrench high command. Genernt Ni Tho ultimate strategic ; rates! of | velle was replaced by General Petain. | Gen. Nivelle was to bi r Gorinan Tine hatreen valine. ant} Both had made thelr reputation at y Verdun, General Petain by hin de-| Rhel: ne er" * pI : helms in the first few day ‘Ol! fense in the apring and summer of | jowing on this a push east of he 1916, General Nivelle by his offen. jas far as Sulppe was to widen sive of October to December The | breach and shatter our front for 79! tactics which had succeeded ther kilometers (47 miles). were expected to lead the F The decisive blow was to be struck | army to final victory in the jby the French army against the) o¢ 1917 group of armies under the German! acne to th: . . jerown prince. ‘The pressure from |, Thank Pochette prea: < Pre lade Gadteasd om. Teusl aed the n for nee and the resistance [Recker jogo mgt f the group of armies under the n German crown prince, this promised via Rethel in the direction schore is teikaa tole & aan th | Meatores wan to develop the Siegfried | Vt # turned into a defeat. By | he Siegfried | superhuman efforts we gained « position, the construction of which had been surveyed by hosts of aero tn + Pregnted and showed ourselves | planes. The entente intended to make |"? 2S ae Our wastage of men and material our whole front reel as far as the was extraordinarily high. It was im- | sea. possible to foresee what turn the con. | CROWN INCE emis aioe | ict might take and what claims we | might have to meet. The preparations for defense were | ————. mee carried out with extraordinary care! lby the group of armies under the German crown prince and the Sev enth and Third armies. The crown |prince and hin chief of staff, Col |Count Schulenburg, were indefatiga bie. ‘The command of the Seventh army |was in the hands of Gen. von Boehn. lone of the best generals in the Ger |man army, a Prussian oMcer of the jold wchool, a good trainer of troops and a man of untiring energy. Hix chief of w#taff, Col, Reinhardt, was & clever man, whore carefal work lmade him a useful complement to his commanding officer. Gen. von Einem, who was in charge of the Third army, ts well) an able and far-sighted officer who knew the army well and understood the pay |chology of the troops. His chief of | staff, Col. (ater Gen) von Oldershau sen, was a man of irrepressible vi ltality and loved his work; he, too,| was the right complement to his «u perior. | ‘The headquarters staff of the Third army afterward withdrew from the! conflict. In the first fortnight of April the headquarters staff of the | First army took over the command under ¢ Fritz von Below. He had ans bis ansietant Lieut. Col. von Kivu |ber, who had gained valuable expe: | rience in the battle of the Somme, and, like bis general, was particu larly sound judge of tactics. He was afterward murdered by Sparticists in the discharge of his duties TROOPS NOT EAGER TO FIGHT At first the troops would not be Neve in the possibility of an offen- sive, as they had seen no prepara- tions for it, But gradually they brought themselves to face the se vere fighting that Iay before them, After several days’ artillery prep | aration the French attacked early on April 16 between Vailly and Brimont |to the northwest of Rheims, They broke thru at various points on the Chemin des Dames and forced us to | withdraw with heavy es from the Vailly salient to the heights of the |Chemin des Dames. Further to the east the French clung firmly to the ridge that to the north falls sharply into the Ailette valley Between the Winterberg and the Aisne the French pressed forward with tanks to the outskirts of Juvin purt, but were held up by a counter-| attack divinio Due east of the Aisne our held their ground. | Towards Brimont another break thru was made, but was neutralized by a| push on the part of our counter. attack forces, On April 17 and 18} the enemy renewed the assault, but was unable to gain any advantage. Meanwhile offensives in Cham pagne had also been opened, directed against the heights of Moronviliiers, One division gave way, and we lost | the heights which formed a key po- sition, When the French attempted to descend the northern slope they } were exposed our artillery fire which mowed them down and brought them to a standstill, | HE INQUIRES INTO A FAIL Our count down tn Champagne also, tho here it blazed up again on the 20th, object ench spring tro In early years my experience of making men 1 able to tractive ustomers of RE attack divisions, subsequently ascertained tn perso conversation with the regimen commanders, were thrown In too has. tily, so that on the 19th we failed to capture the heights The loss of them was a severe | blow, as they afforded a view, to the) north, right over the whole country put we had to make the best of it, The crisis of the April battle had been survived In these battles the French infan try had attacked in close and its losses had been appalling. Both on the Aisne and in Ct pagne General Nivelle again attempt ed to score a victory By this time our line was once more re-established and thats on both the fields of this great dual battle the new offensive came to grief with heavy loss. , Thé 7th of May saw fierce fight ing all along the front, after whieh | the attack on the Alsne died out, and subsequent to the 9th it flickered | have beer offer a bargain should this sale never more My old ¢ take advantage consolidated, 80 Accepted at Their Full Face Value LONE GUNMAN bal station jr ¢ u" ing flourished throw 485 from the bin aid ner live hotel moment carrying a bi containing $42 and grip from Keerl's hand of the station mobile made toward this and K gun lowed, reached the wtarted toward the city of the machine while man He dreaned in a gra: cate the robber’s car without success Men’ Overcoats tch Them Elsewhere, If You Can, for Less Than $50 to. IAN ARREST DRIVER COLLECTS $510 |Robs Gas Station and Es-|5-Year-Old Youngster Sus- capes in Automobile tains Serious Injuries A city-wide search Ip being made Friday for the lone bandit who held up three men in the Northwest Automobile club's ser vice station at the north end of the University bridge at 1005 jock Thursday cht and robbed his victims of $510, The bandit made his escape jn « aiting automobi in a fusiiiade of te after the robbery robber walked into the service se ceR nner IA ttendants, were count receipts. The bandit commanded the men thelr hands. He scooped sh reginter into one of pockets, Peterson and Zen at 4 18th ave. Ez. : Wore « Beard Bm. Ke a collector, Sorrento walked into the station at this ek leather grip bandit wheeled He mnatched the There was an auto away. The bandit} rl pulled a ri fob bandit nd of 00 Carson « 5 year-old Le 6 the won ne B lacqua Thursd fternoc Hinekie and * machine Marginal way. [with a number of other boys Hinckley told the police h hia horn, and the boys mov Jk, but that struck elacqua ind he ch the curb. amination found to hav fered severe scalp wounds | ous, if not fatal, internal injuries Flood in Phoenix Th an Peter the day's a black pefore The boy. revol| rg and up was 8 PHOENI Ariz, Nov. (United Press.}—Flood waters we ceding here today, after react state capi@) grounds, sev sections of the city. 50 famil of town combined The ered Keerl a block Melted mountain with a “cloudburst” | night the fait and the Fria rivers out of their banks lives are reported lost damage will be considerable. and b etill gan firing firing machine drove The jumped in @ Keer! told the police that the driver | leather cap, | jexcribed as a 6 inches tall beard and was d cap wore a the bandit is about 25, 5 feet nN A glass for X-ray has been invente in absorbs only fr wore black overcoat Motorcycle officers attempted to lo-| pietures to be made than fore R, Van Cleve, Hinckley, 33, a clerk, | is being held in the elty jail, pending | disarrangement the outcome of Injuries sustained by . when he was struck by |siving guests at Myrtle ave.|the guests. honked A to the the could upon ex wut ri Does Big Damage re ng the} al other |the parlor of the and maroonin: 4 of farmers east and south snows last Ag but propert photography Europe which m 10 tg 15 per cent of the rays, permitting much sharper hereto | most as modern as the famous ATTACKS GUEST, WHO HITS BOY WRECKS PARLOR |Host Suffers From Nervous Breakdown . ‘| suddenly overcome by a mental A. F. Deveraux, 4%, jumped a davenport at hie home at 2 11th ave, N. B., while |his family wag entertaining Thanks | and attacked one of from y | Deveraux’s wife, attempting t& The lad was playing In the street|save the guest from her infuriated husband's attack, was herself eet upon. The husband pulled several strands of halr from his wife’ before po’ quired six he was ove men to ov eraux before handcuffs could placed on him. He is in the city waiting examination ® Police and detectives, speeding @ |the Deveraux home in a city autee mobile, struck a moto rid by ey, a We n Ui at Seventh ave. and Olive knocked from not seriously at machine, jured By was but was the officers arti Deveraux home e in great disorder. Furniture Was] overturned, brica-brac was bro i and strands of Mrs, Deverauz’s w strewn about the floor, guests told the police that De jumped suddenly from where he during a quiet conversation and began his attack, * It is said that Deveraux has under treatment for some time ber cause of @ nervous breakdown, the time Fiume has docking facilities ab terminal in New York s Suits .$ —AND— MAKE YOUR SELECTION IN THE MORNING DISTINGUISHED -——— WOOLENS It will be a fastidious man, indeed, who cannot find a suitable pattern in my immense stock. Serges? worsteds, tweeds, cashmere in an almost infinite variety of patterns, shades and colors. Imported and domestic suitings, heavy and medium overcoat fabrics. Garments made in any style you like and tried on while being made as often as nec ry to insure perfect fit. Good substantial linings and trimmings apd de pendable tailoring are what you are guaranteed. 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