The San Francisco Call. Newspaper, April 5, 1896, Page 15

THE SAN FRANCISCO CALL, SUNDAY, APRIL 5, 1896. \ \S\\ I 7 i \ 3 \\\\ UNCLE SAM COULD EASILY "y, / W Tl 7 S G 4 1 / \\\\_\ NN \\\\ -~ 0 2 1 ! RAISE AND ARM 4,000,000 MEN. 3% \ i~ BISMARK INGTON AND LEAVE SOME TO GARRISON THE CITIES ON THE ATLANTIC SEABOARD. WITH THIS FORCE THERE WOULD BE SOLDIERS ENOUGH TO REACH ALONG THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY LINE FROM MAINE TO WASH- T is understood that though the pres- eut Congress is disposed to increase | |} the strength of the navy considerably, | L4 yet, notwithstanding the earnest rec- | ommendations of the Secretary of | ‘War the general of the army and the best | judges in the country of the matter, in- cluding many naval officers of high rank, the army, which is most in reorganization and increese, may be left as it has remained for years.- Yet should | £pain be so foolish as 1o go to war in case | the belligerency of Cuba were recognized | there is no doubt but Uncle Sam would soon turn out an immense army of men, | d arm them, equip them, organize and | aiscipline them according to modern con- ditions, though the doing so would take a matter of time. In case of Spain it would | not matter much, but against Great Bri- tain the thing becomes exceedingly seri- ous, for long before we would have this | army in a conditicn to do much damage when thrown against £nglish troops, we | would lose many seacoast towns, miany | lage cities, and much property would be | destroyed. In such a case, many people have won- | what the strength amd manner of nization of the American army would | It has all been thought out, all ned, and the officers are ready to take | arge of it all, should the occasion ‘ever It would necessarily be vastly ferent from anvthing we have ever ex- perienced in the past wars, and more ap- | proaching foreign armies than ever before. st be remembered that the magazine which all modern armies are | Jed have an effective range of about 2500 is and a maximum range of 3700 yards, | = continuous speed of fire averaging | ast twelve aimed shots per minute. An assaulting force cannot move without exposir fuil-length target to this terrific fire, W' it cannot return such fire and maintain its progress. The gun has, more than any other one thing, been instru- mental in bringing about the changed con- ditions of modern war. This change is not only on the tield of battle, but exists the concentration of men forming the armies, ana then again in the marches of the army or armies to meet. the foe or to retreat before him. Letus look ata few figures of actual conditions, and inste..d of their being dry they will be found in- tensely interesting. The following table gives the normal type of a moaern American army corps and division, as decided upon by our best modern military tacticians and strategists, ed over 12,700 officers and men. It is not to be understood that thisis given asan in- flexible type, as many considerations may change the strength of thecorps. Butasa rule, ile the strength of other subdivi- sions varies, that of an army corps practi- cally remains the same. Ivis the strategi- cal unit and is complete in itself, contain- ing asit does all armsof the service and auxiliary subdivisions. It can, therefore, at any time, be considered as the periect fighting-machine, ready under any condi- tions for service. How many corps shall constitute an army is an open question. Thke Germars in 18’ 1 found more than six corps unwieldy. Yet for extended operations on a large scale less than three are too few. The War of the Rebellion brought out army corps of from 12,000 to 40,000 men. General Sherman said no army corps should have less than 25,000 men, and in 1864 five corps of the Army of the Poto- | mac were consolidatea into three, each of this strength. But General Humphrey said of this arrangement that five corps each of 15,000 men would have been better, since the country operated in was so much of a wilderness and with such voor and few roads that it was often impossible to | communicate with subordinates on an ex- tended line of battle or on the march when hurrying troops up for battle. A modern corps may have two, three or more divi- sions, called “infantry divisions,” though each of them has a division of cavalry and | a division of artillery. The corps has in addition an artillery force called the ‘‘corps of artillery.” ~ This is under the command of the corps chief of arrtillery, and includes the horse artillery batteries | which operate with the cavalry divisions. Whether a corps should have two or | more divisions has been argued and dis- uted both ways since the time ot Napo- eon. But two divisions seem to work well, and that is the number adopted by nearly all the great armies of Europe. As against two divisions, it is said tiat the authority of the corps commander is neu- tralized unless both division commanders agree with him. With two divisions, the corps commader must weaken one for ad- vance and rear guards. Also, this ar- rangement leaves the corps commander without a proper reserve, since taking an entire division for such reserve would be excessive, while if less thana division is taken, the command will be split up into too many fragments. If each givision has two brigades of two regiments of three battalions each, then when any part of the division is detached less than = brigade— as_becomes constantly necessary — the brigade commander is left without any suitable command, thus often engendering jealousy and ill feeling. But while it is true that with two divisions the corps commander is obliged to detach regiments from brigades, or bri- gades from divisions, it is better to trast to the loyalty, subordination and patriot- ism of the officers concerned thanto be TABLE IL—NORMAL TYPE OF A DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY; ALSO OF AN ARMY CORPS—PROPOSED ORGANIZATION. DIVISION ORGANIZATION. 3 g Nov-Commissioned | Officers and Privates| & 2ol HiESS -’é 2 2 & 2 Officers. - {e )R [ b5 E 3 ol g 2 - S e » c Sl H : Commanding ofi- 1 I era 3 46 Com.officerd staft 69 6363 Infntry brigades 22 44 5 6354 batteries 4] 12 2 24| Bearer companies 83 118/ 18/ 136/Ambulances 7| 12 30 42|Field hospitals Totals....438 44| 11,845 180/1,063) 456/ 1,519 CORPS ORGANIZATION. 811 811 47] 73| Com.officerd staft 1,260 36795 88,241 4,557/3 divisions Al ‘.w:” 1,473] 1,386/ Corps artillery 5| 126 1,399 Cavalry | 77| ‘08| 852 Engineers | 278 378} 3% |Signal corps 59 ol 42| Hospital reserve 350 330| 2736/ Am'unition train | 74| 1967 Supply. train 3 e [ 216|Horse depot _ Totals...1484/153] 38,784|2,773] 41,657 43,191|120,1,306/6,624|5,142| 11,766/ From ihe above tables, we see that the | obli normal type of a corps contains something over 43,500 officers and men and a division tem that will never admit of an; The French found in 1870-71 thx{ iged to depend upon an inflexible Sys- change. the great | number of small divisions wasfa decided element of weakness and it is now heid that if a corps is reduced to a division, by casualties, or a division to a brigade, it is better to keep it independent under its proper commander, rather than attach it as a third division, or third brigade, to an- other corps or division. The English and Americans have shown in all past wars a reference for three divisions, also the ?‘rench, although their normal organiza- tion calls for only two. As a matter of factin the army maneuvers of 1892 the French experimented with three divisions. The German army corps_is commanded by & general of infantry. Hischief of staff is a field officer of the general staff. The chief of the corps artillery is a major-gen- eral commanding the artitlery brigade of | the same number as the corps. Thus, if ‘we take for example the Third Army Corps, the major-general commands the Third Artillery Brigade. The chief of engineers | is the major commanding the Third Pio- | neer Battalion. The general staff of the corgs commander consists of three general staff officers of any rank and four captains | or subalterns as aids-de-camp detached from regiments of the Third Army Corps. | Then there are two adjutants, one each to the chief of engineersand chief of artillery. In the German army the adjutants are | not, as with us, officers of the staff, but | rather officers who do the official avd cleri- cal work, and are like our chief clerks of army and department beadquarters. The designation of the corps and its various subdivisions is peculiar in the Ger- man service, and consists in retaining, under all circumstances, the same desig- nation, or one derived directly from it, as | the corps. Thus we have taken, for ex- | ample, the Third Army Corps. It bas two infantry divisions, the Fifth and Sixth. They are permanently assigned to this corps. Taking up tne Fifth Division, we find its commander to be a lieutenant- reneral. His staff consists of one field officer of the general staff and twoaids. The Fifth Division contains the Ninth and Tenth brigades, and the Sixth contains the Eleventh and Twelith brigades. The com- manding officer of the Ninth Brigaae, for examgle. is a major-general. He has one aid. The brigade has two regiments each of three battalions. These brigades are numbered the Seventeenth and Eight- eenth, The Tenth Briggda has_also the Third Rifle Battalion. Each division has for divisional artillery one division of four batteries of the Third Field Artillery Regi- ment under command of amajor. The pioneers of the division are the first com- pany of the Third Battalion of Pioneers. The corps artillery is commanded by a colonel—the commanding officer ~of the Third Field Artillery Regiment. It con- sists of the Third Division of the Third Field Artillery Regiment of four batteries and the horse artiliery division of the same regiment, and the third company of the Third Battalion of Pioneers, and the third corps ammunition column, R HAMILTON U.SA. under command of a captain, and the third battalion of train_ troops, under a major, and including five provision col- umns, twelve field hospitals and a horse depot. Attached to the corps there is no cavalry, after the old style of using it, for the purpose of attack. Itis due toinde- cision in opinions of tacticians that in later years cavalry has been first assigned to infantry divisions and then taken away. Those even who favored divisional cav- alry were not nfireed as to its proper use, some holding that its proper sphere was for aggressive tactics on the field, and others that it was wanted only as a secu- rity and for gathering information. The number assigned to a division is usually | from 500 to 600, but has been as high as 1000. In the German army corps one regiment of cavalry forms an integral part of each infantry division. In the new German instructions for drill it is stated that the chief duty of divisional cavalry is to consist of reconnoitering work, although when necessary a tactical use on the battle- field is not excluded. Itis further decreed that hereafter no body of troops down to and including a single battalion shall be without a few cavalrymen for reconnoiter- ing purposes, in order thatinfantry patrols may be done away with. . The Corps and Divisional Artillery—Dur- ing the War of the Rebellion each in- iantry brigade of four or more regiments had a battery of six guns. The corps had in addition what was termed the Reserve Artillery, At present the idea of the proper use of artillery.is to bring all and as much as possible right at the opening of a battle. ence each infantry division hasartillery permanently assigned toit. In the United States corps thereare four bat- teries,but in the German sixand sometimes eight. In addition there is another body called the Corps Artillery, under the chief of artillery of the corps and corps com- mander. In our book *‘Troops in Cam- paign” we have a body of forty-eight guns called the Reserve Artillery, but which in war we shall term and “use as corps artillery. ngineer Troops—In the United States army the engineer troops perform the duties of sappers, miners an ntoniers. We have so many skilled mechanics and artisans in our volunteer ranks that it is easy to detail them and do engineer work of any description. Our plan is to have a strong company with each corps and a reserve with abundant material at army headquarters. The company is really a battalion of five to six companies of 100 men each. In foreign services the engi- neers are assigned permanently to division and corps headquarters. The Signal Corps—In our army there is one company of signal troops to each corps, charged with all signai and tele- phone service, balloon service and fifty miles of telegraph wire in nine wagons. Provost Guards—This is the military. police of our army and represented in foreign services by the gendarmerie. In its absence we substitute at each army corps a battalion of jinfantry with a few cavalry. Railroaa Troops — Railroads must be operated with special skill. In all foreign services there are special corps for this purpose. In this country the length and number of roads are so great and the offi- cials all so responsible, and baving attained their positions by long service and experi- ence—that with their American aptitude and executive ability, they are greatly the superior of any similar body of men in Europe—so that we have no need of special troops in the army for such pur- poses. In case of war they would, in con- nection with a military railroad staff, sup- ply all needs, as they did from 1861 to 1866. Train Troops—In our organization the number of wagons of all kinds per corps amounts to 1306, or about 40 per 1000 men. This includes the bridge train, ambu- lances, spare wagons, escort wagons, cais- sons, etc. They require altogether about 6000 mules. The Germans have nearly 2000 wagons and use 6000 horses, and in ail foreign = armies there are regularly re- cruited men for the Train Corps, suitably uhiformed and equipped. We depend on men detailed from the line and on civilian employes, and they areall placed in charge of the Quartermaster or Subsistence De- partments, except the ammunition col- umns. $ For campaign purposes there are used in the wagon transportation the six-mule wagon, the two-horse and the four-horse escort wazon and the packmule. The last is not usea for the supply of alarge body, of troops, but only in marching in moun- tain or isolated regions, where but small bodies of troops would go. The six-mule wagon, according to condition of the roads, carries from 2500 to 4000 pounds, and the escort wagons from to 3000 pounds. While the number of wagons is always very great in an army, yet this number must vary with circumstances. The number of six-mule wagons given in the corps table ison the basis that they will carry 2500 pounds and five days’ forage for their own teams. Now artillery am- munition weighs eighteen pounds gross per round, 1000 rifle cartridges of small caliber 52 pounds, the soldier’s ration per day 4 pounds cross, and the forage ration 9t0 12 pounds, There are five days' ra- tions in the supvly train, five days’ forage in the foraoge train, 50 extra rounds per gun and 100 extra rounus ver infantry- man, Each infantryman carries 150 rounds on his person and the small arm ammunition wagon carries 36 to 50 rounds additional per man. Then there are 64 rounds per man more in the ammunition column. A field battery carries 231 rounds per gun, or 42 in each limber and 126 in each caisson. There are 9 caissons. The re- maining 42 per gun are with the ammuni- tion columps. This is a total of 270 per gun. The horse batteries- have the same number. The caissons have two chests, so that 105 rounds are with the ammunition column. This latter is in charge of an artillery officer of the Corps Artillery. It is divided into four sections, one for each division and one for the corps. It is accompanied by a personnel of 250 trained artillerymen. The supply train with forage and rations is also diyided into four sec- tions, three for provisions and one for forage. The army wagon in column occu- pies twenty to twenty-five yards, and it re- uires but” hittle calculation to show that the wagon transportation for an army corps occupies twelve miles of road. On leaving the road, each section leaves at the same time and is parked on the side in rows with poles to the road. The wagons on breaking park pull out simultaneously. For every twenty-five wagons there is one wagon-master, one as- sistant and twenty-nine teamsters. The following table gives the number of wagons and animals in the train for the division and army corps: TABLE IL.—SUPPLY AND AMMUNITION TRAINS, UNITED STATES ARMY. 6-mule ‘A-mnle‘Z-hone 1-horse i Reziment. . 3 T Hoadaqrts o Medical dept ‘Ammunition. Totals. ... 3 regts equal 1 brigade.. ...... Brigade hdquartrs 3 bricades equal 1 division....... Division hdquaris| Hospital . | Totals.. 8 divisions equal 6-mule. Caissons Ammunition col §E’) Int (46) Art Forage train 25 Supply tral 344 538 46 calssons 684 From corps .....cocvveinnee 268 847 6-mule wagons 63 2 65 4-mule wagons 162 2-horss W:ggns 7 1-horsewagons Ammunition column 234 1,081 _total wagons Now a company of infantry moving in column of fours, the usual marching for- mation, takes up about thirty-three yards of depth. A regiment of ten companies would require 330 yards A regiment of twelve companies would require, with the | intervals between battalions, 420 yards. A brigade of three regiments with usual in- tervals between regiments would require 1320 yards. panies of cavalry, marching two abreast, will require 1872 yards, while a_battery of artillery of six guns will need 240 yards. Considering that all the baggage is at the rear of the division or corps column, we see next that a division which con- tains three brigades and four batteries, besides ambulances, field hospital and bearer companies, will take up 5040 yards of road or a distance of three and three- fourths miles, without its baggage, while an army corps of three divisions will take three times this distance, and a great deal more, since we have to add the cavalry di- vision, the corpsartillery, the signal corps, the engineers and the trains. Adding the exact amcunt of depth of these other parts by piving fifteen yards as the dfipth of each vehicle and its teams, we will have as the closest possible space that the army corps can close up to on a road 40,612 yards. But this does not allow for any of the necessary intervals between different organizations: and add- A regiment of twelve com- | ing these," which are computed at 360 yards we have an entire total of 40,972 %ards, or a distance of twenty-three and a alf miles from front to rear of an army corps on a single road. But it is impossi- ble for a column of this length to keep | from stretching or ‘“lengthening out,” as | it is technically termed, and so the best | authorities make an allowance of 33 per cent to the toral, which added gives a |length of thirty-two miles altogether. General McClellan says: “IfI had marchea the entire army, 100,000 men, on a .-msle column instead of on five different roads, the column with its trains would have stretched out fifty miles.”” Now, why must we add this 33 per cent? 1f roads were all broad enough and in good condition, columns could all march with a far greater front and the depth be vastly j reduced. But in .this country, at least, there are few roads where there is room for a column of greater width than a setof fours to move and leave sufficient space for the animpeded progress of orderlies and staff officers, or for vehicles which have to go in an opposite direction. Now, having the data of an army corps at hand, it is easy to compute that for armies. A modern army consists of from three to six army corps. More than six are considered unwieldy for one com- mander. The Germans so found in 1870-71, while less than three makes it hard for the commander to retain a reserve in battle and leave his corps intact. Therefore, considering that in case of a great war, such 4 one as we might have with Great | Britain, we know that we would raise at least five armies. Theses would operate as follows: The first one on the extreme noriheast boundary, of three army corps; the second oné would operate on the thickly populated part of Canada, the neck of land that juts down between Lakes Huron and Erie, and from where our greatest danger would-come. This would be the largest army, and would consist of at least five corps. It would be fol- lowed by another army to hold cap- tured places. This third army might consist of independent corps, since it would be designed to operate only as garrison forces. The fourth army would operate on the northwestern boundary, and would consist of three corps. The fifth army would be the large one of six in- dependent corps, which would be kept within striking distance of any seaport to repel any attempted invasion or to assist in any assault against an enemy’s fleet or landing columns. Thus we would have at least fifteen army corps, a number of men amounting to 650,000, and all these would come at the first call for volunteers. It would be a number of men that, compared with all available, would hardly be no- ticed. It certainly would not hinder any commercial, manufacturing, agricultural | or business pursuits. Yet it would be a | suflicient number to repel all the men that Great Britain and France together could transport to this country, and to canra Cnnaga and hold it, and to capture Cuba. If these men could all be put in ons column with their baggage trains they would form a line nearly 500 miles in length. It is therefore not ioo much to say that were all Europe united to attack America the United States alone could raise, organize and, given time, arm also, 4,000,000 men. This number would be | sufficient to have a single continn- ous line of men touching elbow to elbow, and reaching ‘from the most northern R"" of the coast of Maine clear around to Mexico, then again from Seattle, in Puget Sound, another continuous line reaching out to the Pacific, and thence down to San Diego. Or, to put it in an- other way, they could be rangea along the northern border, beeinning say at Port- land, Me., and striking the Canadian bor- der just to the northward of St. Albans, Vt., thence following the boundary line by the shores of the Great Lakes along through Minnesota, Dakota, Montana, Idaho and Washington to Puget Sound. And there would be of these soldiers even then over 200,000 left, while there would still be 5,000,000 men lefg in the country notcalled out. And what iy more wonderful still is the almost absolute belief amony the better informed that this immense mass of men, in case of danger, would rise and act as one man, all actuat: with one common impulse—the safety of the country and the honor and fair fame of *‘Old Glory.”