The New York Herald Newspaper, December 16, 1878, Page 5

BRITON AGAINST APGHAN, Sayyid Jamaluddin vs. Major General Sir Henry Rawlinson. A HEARING FOR BOTH SIDES. Probable Results of the War Pointed Out. BRITAIN’S THEORY EXPLAINED. Danger of Russia's Influence on the Indian Frontier. en THE AFGHAN SIDE OF THE CASE—CAUSTIC CRIT- ICISM BY A CENTRAL aSIAN—THE AKHUND OF SWAT HEARD FROM. ‘Lhe Homeward Mail of November 30 contains a re- markablie article, translated by Rev. Dr. George Percy Badger, formerly bishop of the Nestorian Missions, from tho columns of the Misr, an Arabic paper, pub- Ushed at Alexandria, Egypt, of the 17th of October last. The articie is entitled “The English and the Afghans,” and its poculiar interest arises from the fact that its author is an cducated Afghan, Sayyid Jamaluddin, who is familiar with European history and literature, and can even cite Cicero for the shame and confusion of the hated English. Not the least of tho many noteworthy points in this paper is the assurance it gives that the late Akhund of Swat, in whose career Americans took so deep an in- terest, and whose untimely demise last winter was bemoaned with many melodious tears from American bards, has left a worthy successor, “the Shaikh of the Mountains,” who, in case of need, may be trusted to “roll the border tribes like blasts of fire’ against the Invaders of the Passes. After a prelude about the necessity of studying the Antecedents of race, language, history and institu- tions ofany people whose present actions are to bo discussed, the Afghan publicist attempts to establish_ as regards the English, a “philosophical standard which indicates those innate laws of nature which are not subject to decay, serves as an astrolabe where- with to gauge the condition and affairs of nations, both in prosperity and adversity, and to apportion praise and commendation, blame and censure upon their past, present and future.” THE PAST HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH. We shall, accordingly, he continues, make use of that instrument in taking a survey of tho great English people, which is now bent upon waging war with Afghanistan, in order that we may discover the causes of their past prosperity, and be able to form a judgment of its continuance or decay in the future. Aud we say:— The famous orator, Cicero, in a letter to one of the (Roman) conquerors of England, requested him not to send any of the captives to Rome, becauso the English were an illiterate and untutored race, clumsy in their manners, and very backward in acquiring knowledge, especially in geometry and music, The Normans, also, when they occupied the island, perceiving how rude and uncivilized the inhabitants were, used to put yokes of sluvery upon their necks, These latter, however, taking note of the progress made by their neighbors in learning and science, the advantages which they derived therefrom, and the high Papert which they had attained thereby, were so influenced and wrought upon that their whole temperament underwent a change, and gave place to an ardent thirst for scientific knowledge, which, at the outset, mainly directed to handicraft, developing itself sub- sequently into commercial activity, whereby their operations were soon greatly ‘extended. This, aided by the irresistible force of circumstances, Sveritualty crowned their cfforts with perfect success. Then, when their arm was strengthencd, when they had reached their prime and were fairly set on their feet, they considered their neighbors, the Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch and French, who had conquered yarious countries and climes, had dis- covered islands and founded colonies, and they also sent expeditions to the ends of the earth and despatched ships eastward and westward over the wide ocean in order to compete with and rival thei, One great drawback, however, which they had to con- tend against was a paucity of men. A POLICY OF CIRCUMVENTION AND CRAFT, "To remedy this they udopted a policy of circum- vention and craft, whereby they attained their ends, aud wherein they surpassed all other nations, inso- much that any one who considers the bulky coarse- ness of their conformation, und their cold blooded disposition withal, is apt to wonder how effectually they have succeeded by these subtle means, steadily persevered in, in safeguarding their position. But they made use of it as a weapon wherewith to assail nations and kingdoms, and the weapon has proved niost efficient in their hands for exciting revolt in dit- ferent principalities, stirring them up the one against the other and creating dissensions between rulers and their subjects. ‘The Afghan writer proceeds to tax the English with using this ‘‘policy of circumvention and cratv” in their relations with the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of gaining @ station in the Mediterrancan, and with sending missionaries to the late Shah Abbas of Persia to incite him to hostility against the Lurks. «Ln like manuer, when they set foot upon the coasts of India, the cradle of ma i and the fountainhead of legislation, they instigated the Indian nawwabs and r inst their sovereign, Taimur, inciting them to rebel against him and to acquire’ indepe: dence. Then they (the lish) invoked the assist- ance of each of them against the other, of fathers against their children, aud of Wazirs against the Amirs, until they effected their purpose by es- tablishing their rule well nigh over all the rajah hips of India. It was the: iso, who united all urope aywinst Bonaparte when they begau to be afraid of him, and became aware of the friendly rela- tions whtch had sprung up between him and ‘Tippu Sultan, the sovercign of Madras. Further, they en- tered into a treaty with Fath-'Aly-Shah, of Persia, whereby he engaged to send troops into Khurasan when Taimur-Shah, the Afghany, had resolved to march an army toward India. also sought the aid of Shah-Shujah, the deposed Atghany Sultan, when they heard that the Russian Vicovitch had come to Aighanistan in order to invite the Amir Dost- ‘Muham: Khan to conclude a treaty with the Shah ot Persia, On that occasion they marched their army into the country, headed by Shah-Shujah, succeded in dethroning Dost-Muhammad Khan and set him up in his stead.” Sayyid Jamaluddin then charges the English with inveigling the French into joining in the Crimean War tor the humiliation of Russia, on which occa sion the English losses in men aud money did not amount to # tithe of what the French lost. “It was they also,” he continues, ‘who incited the Amir Dost-Muhammad Khan to seize upon Herat, the key of India, then ruled by a kinsman of the Shah of Iran, fearing the conclusion of a treaty between Russia and Persia, To sum up:—Whosoever has consulted the history of the past must be convinced that the English have not desisted for the twinkling of an eye from pursuing the same uniform to in their ends in the East and West, in the Olid Yorid and in the New. Following up this course they have been successtal everywhere, subduing na- tions, annexing territories and so extending the limits of their sway that their dominions form a zoue encir- cling the terrestrial globe.’’ BRITISH LOVE OF SRLY. ‘Tho writer next elaborately discourses upon the “most reprehensible fault inherent in the nature” of the English, namely, selfishness, which they possess in the third, or lowest degree ove of selt and the acquisition of profit even at the cost of injury to the world at large.” As illustrations of this quality, he suys:—"First, we will instance the Americans, who albeit of one tongue and religion with the Bnylish, revolted against them, evince open eninity to ther and desire nothing better than to see their kingdo: at an end. Were it not for the excessive selt-love above described, such a spectacic as this is hardly con- ceivable, seeing that the unity of two people in language and creed is & bond stronger than any other among the human race, about twenty yeurs ago the people is Sannis, Shia’ahs, and Payuns banded and conspired together to throw off the English yoke. Tho Sannis were headed by Firts Shah, the Shia'ahs by Bajis- Kadr and his mother, the Begum-Sihib and the Payans by Nana-ltao-Sahib. These rosu up against the English, murdered and slew of them, ins much that their rule over the co was well nigh ot aueud. Their rancor and enwity still subsist, and have attained such @ pitch that there is not au Indian living who does not pray tor the advance of the Russiany to the fronticr of India, and who dovs hot wnxiously await the joyful tidings of their ap- proach, in order that they imay have an opportunity of freeing themaclves from English domination.” After contrasting at grout length the policy of the English in India with that of the Mussians in Central Asia and of the French in Algeria, much to the advan tage of the latter uations, praising the French for their promotion of science in Egypt, the Afghan writer denounces the perfidions conduct of Engiand at the Berlin Congress, “where they exposed for sale certain provinces of Turkey,” charges the English with being the cause of the massacres in Bosnia and Hervegovina, with breaking their promises to the Ureeks, earning the hatred of all Ottoman patriots by ee advice to the Sublime Porte, dis- the Austrians, vexing all parties in Germeny aud ‘kindling tho rage of the Italians, , NEW YORK HERALD, MONDAY, DECEMBER. 16, 1878—TRIPLE SHEET. the descendants} 6f the Romans, of whose empire Britain was the most contemptible depen- dency, on account of their occupation of Cyprus, which had formerly been a possession of the Romans, and also on account of their later proceedings in Egypt.” He then bestows some counsels upon the few wise men among the great English people, whom it behooves to exert themselves to cause their nation ‘to com- mune With themselves and to return forthwith from the path of excess to that of moderation; and, further, to divest themselves of the notion that they are infallible in their ideas, and cease to beguile them- selves on the score of their extensive acquisitions and their protracted continuance under their sway. Alas! it will be long before this people rectifies its conduct, unless God has otherwise ordained. To our apprehen- sion its self-love, greed and covetousness are on the increase.” “Passing over along résumé of English treachery to Afghanistan in former times, of the attempts made at the Umballa Durbar four years ago aud at Pesha- wur last year to induce the Ameer Shere Ali to sur- render the passes of his -kingdom to the British, and of the immediate antecedents of the present, we give at length the Afghan publicist’s predictions of the probable results of the struggle, with which his in- teresting article is brought to a close:— PROBABLE RESULTS OF THE WAR. “The probable results of the present design of the English may be deduced from several considera- tions :— 1, He who is conversant with the manners and dis- positions of mankind knows that the Afghans aro a robust race, brave, resolute, jealous of their honor, enthusiastic in their religion, and determined not to submit to foreign rule as long as their hands ean wield a sword. It is scarcely conceivable that the English can have forgotten the bitter taste which they had of the Afghany blades, at a time when they were armed with the most perfect guns and muskets, and the Afghans had no firearms atalL How, indecd, can they forget it, when the mountains that bore wit- ness to the conflict were bathed in the blood of their countrymen, and its valleys were crammed with their bones and skulls? it that again invites them into that country thoy Lave already had such tragical expe- rien ‘To chastise and punish the Ameer,’ say the English journals, apparently oblivious of the fact that he now possesses upward of sixty thousand well disciplined troops, fully equipped with firearms, and thirty thousand more, among whom are to be found, asa trustworthy person lately arrived from those parts informs me, Russian officers and engi- neers. Take my word for it, the English have got themselves into w scrape, and are rushing headlong into a vortex of troubles out of which it will be dit- ficult for them to escape. 2. ‘Tho English are plunging into this war without being sure that they will not be forced to beat a re- treat with a diminished army. How disastrous would be the consequences were that to happen! ‘The tlames of revolt would break out in India, as they did when the army of the Shah approached ‘He- rat, more especially if the Shaikh of the Mountains, the Akhund of Sawat, should proclaim a religious war, 3. After the rivalry which has already arisen be tween the English and the Russians for the friend- ship of the Ameer it is not improbable that on the outbreak of hostilities Russia would seize the oppor- tunity to contract a secret alliance with the Ameer, and enter into a secret offensive and defensive treaty with him, to which the Shah of Iran would also be a party, binding each to aid the other in uprooting the foundations of English rule in India and of appor- tioning its territories among themselves. Petchance they are deceived by the official declarations of the Russians, wherein they have stated again and again that they would not extend their author- ity to Urkinj and Khiva, and that they were not ting Yortifications in Khiwarizm, while in reality, as appeared afterward, they were doing the very opposite. Further, it is more probable than otherwise that the Amir has already cntcredinto an understanding with those Nawubs and Rajahs of In- dia who are only watching for an opportunity to take up arms against the English and to wipe out the dis- grace of the last insurrection there, when their tem- ples were profaned, their leaders and spiritual chicts slain, and when the English, despite their high pre- tensions to justice, put sixty persons to death on tho suspicion that cach was the Nana Rao Sahib, con- verted the royal palace at Delhi into a stable for their cattle and a storehouse for their war material and implewents, as they did also the famous college in- stitutedfor religious pocts at Lucknow. DANGER OF THE ACQUISITION, 4. Moreover, it is not improbable that the Afghanis, out of sheer hatred and spite, may be induced, should they meet with a reverse, to offer their country to the Russians, in which case the English will find a cloven foot instead of an ally. 5, Supposing the English to effect an entrance into Afghanistan, Will not the Russians cross the Oxus and occupy Balkh, under the plea that it is a province of Bukhara, inhabited by Usbeks, which had been un- justly annexed by the Afghanis, and will oblige them to surrender it? Alminah will then fall into the hhands of the Russians, who will convert it into a re- serve camp from which to march their troops to Herat and Kandahar—tor there are no natural imped- iments on that route—and will despatch troops of mounted Cossacks to seize the passes of the Hindu- Kush, taking possession of Bamiyan, which is the key to Cabul. 6. Should the English succeed in taking Afghan- istan, cithor they will remain there and annex it to their territories, in which cuse they will be conter- minous, side by side, with the Russians, and thereby expose themselves to endless disputes and dangers. On the other hand, should they retire from the coun- try after reducing the Ameer, taking him under their protection, then any war against him would be a war against them. But if they should rest satisfied with occupying the passes, leaving the Ameerate to tako care of itself, in that case they will have succeeded in making the Atghanis—a warliye people, inexorable in their hate, and bent on retaliation and revenge—a ready instrument in the hands of Russia to use it us it pleases, and thus the upshot would be more disastrous to the English than ever. but should it be objected here that the English will have safe- guarded their territories by the occupation of the passes leading to India, and would thenceforward be under no apprehension either from the Russians or the Afghanis, we reply:—First. The possession of the passes will not prevent the Afghany tribes inhabiting the mountains overlooking India from making raid after raid upon the British ter- ritories. Second, Should the Russians, under the circumstances supposed, desire to make war upon the English, they will ally them- selves with the Afghanis, will assemble at Kandahar, and march trom thence to Fushukh aud thence to Kala’at-Nasir, encountering no opp tion trom the people of Bolan, aud thence toward Sind, Or they will take the road by Gundawa, or that by Sajistan leading to Kala’at-Nasir, where there ure no physical obstacles to be overcome. And here we cannot help asking what has poss the Eng- lish to contemplate the occupation of the island of Ram-Hormuz, in order to make it a depot for their troops and war material, and from wheuce, in case of need, they may march an army to blockade the road by the two last named routes to Gundawa and Sajistan. Such a proceedne would be an act of overt hostility to the Shah, and would dis- [deed him to side with Russia, Moreover, it would © useless to them, for in the absence of physical impediments it is not low f that they would be able to cope with the combined Russians and Afghanis. Further, it must be borne in mind that were they to obtain possession of the passes they would have to place them in the keeping of the Hindu soldiery,: 100,000 of whom, owing to their maltreatment by the English at the time of the mutiny already referred to, withdrew from their allegiance and turned against them the weapons which been supplied them to fight their enemies. LOSS OF THE MOSLEM SUBJECTS. 7. By declaring war aguinst Afghanistan the Eng- lish will deprive them themselves of all hope of friendship toward them on the part of the Ottoman government and its Moslem subjects. For how, in that case, could they expect the attachment of the Ottoman Sultan, to Whom the Moslems apply the title of Khalifah, a religious office, the bearer of which could not consistently hold amicable relations with those who wage war with a Moslem Amirate, an Ami- rate more devoutly wedded to Islam than any other? He (the Sultan) is now seeking the suffruges of the Moslems at large, but he will assuredly fail therein should he abstain from fulfilling the duties of Lis position. And how can the English venture to rely on the sincerity of the Moslem subjects of the Sultan after these latter have had such experience of them, and sceing now, in addition thereto, that they are preparing to make war upon their Moslem breth- ron? It is passing strange that, notwithstanding all this couduct on ther part, the English people persist in regarding themselves a@ the bounden protectors and defenders of the Moslems, who have suffered evils at their bands such as they have never and can never suiler trom any other quarter, It is they who hw yrived them of India, a great and large coun- try, fertile in its productions, aud the inhabitants of which exceed 200,000,000, of whom, 50,000,000 are Mos- lems, and have, besides, set their hearts on its re- maining provinces, insomuch that they were recently prepared to fix their claws upon some of them; and would have done so hai not the scissor of French justice and integrity clipped thom and arrested their design. — Yes, they do protect the Moslems, just as the butcher protects the sheep from the wolves, in order that he himseli may kill and flay it. It is passing strange that the Moslems should be oblivious of all this aud be- lieve that the Russians axe their direst enemies; whereas, wore these latter to invade the country of the Mosiems for a hundred gears they would fail to appropriate therefrom such spoils as the English have tuken-, What we have penned thus far is neither out of in- tolerance nor enmity, but a plain statement of facts lan exposition of the true state of the case. We purpose following Up this dissertation by another, describing the character of the Afghans, their cus- toms, mode of living, the creeds obtaining among them and the form of their government, according to the requirements of each of those subjects. THE BRITISH SIDE OF THE QUESTION AS SEEN BY MAJOR GENERAL Sik HENRY RAWLINSON— AN IMPERATIVE NECESSITY THAT RUSSIA SHOULD BE. CHECKED—BENLFICENUE OF BUS SIAN RULE IN CENTRAL ASIA, Under the above title Sir Henry E, Rawlinson con- tributes a paper to the December number of the Nine- teenth Century, from which the following extracts are tuken:—Regarding a war with the Afghan Ameer as the inevitably result of “two distinct elements of, mischief” at work on our Indian frontiers, one of these “the intractable character of the ruler of Afyhonistan, the other the persistent advance of Russia toward the Indian border lands,’’ the writer proceeds to “trace in outline the svope aud tendency of each of these factors and to show how, by their united action, they have led up to the present crisis.” Sketching briefly the course of Anglo-Afghan diplomacy from the accession of Shere Ali, Sir Henry Rawlinson points out the causes which have contributed to bring the Ameer under the influence of Russia, and indicates the numerous slights and insults England has suffered at his hands. Coming to the more important portion of the article, he continues :— Before proceeding to show how Russian intrigue has complicated the Afghan questfon and aggravated its danger to India I must briefly ullude to the last effort at reconciliation that was made by Lord Lytton in 1876, in accordance with the general scheme of Central Asian eg with the execution of which he was intrusted by Her Majesty's government on his appointment to the Viceroyalty of India, Lord Lytton’s first proposal was to send a special envoy to , charged with ment of his own arrival and of Her Majesty's assumption of the title of Empress of India, but further instructed to make every effort to remove the ill-feeling of the Ameer, that had been continually on the increase since the period of ihe Simla conference, This proposal, however, was formally declined by the Ameer, who maintained a most repellant attitude, and only suggested, atter miuch hesitation and delay, the Ailternative arrangement of a meeting at Peshawur, Sir Lewis Pelly representing the Viceroy, while 8yud Noor Mahomed, the Ameer's evil genius, who had previously failed at Simla and was now bit terly opposed to us, was again deputed to do battle for the Afghan cause. As the papers connected with the Peshawur Con- ference have not yet been made public, I abstain from tollowing in any detail the remarkable otia- tions of January and February, 1377, The result and general tenor of the couterence, however, are sufti- ciently known to warrant us in believing that Sir Lewis Pelly would have sigued an oitensive and de- fensive treaty with Shere Ali, and would further have pledged the British government to recognize and sup- port the succession as determined by the Ameer if is Highness would only have placed his foreign re- lations in our hands and permitted British officers to reside, for the mere purpose of observation, not at Cabul, but at Herat and on the frontiers exposed to Bhussian aggression. WHY THE NEGOTIATIONS FAILED, It is of essential importance, indeed, to a true un- derstanding of the present crisis to bear in mind that the Peshawur negotiations fell through, not because we neglected or undervalued Afghan interests, but because Shere Ali preferred Russian interests to Brit- ish, Lhe Ameer’s demands of 1869 and 1873 were conceded, and more than conceded, at Peshawur; but when we sought in return to take precautions for the defence of our own political interests—pre- cautions which could not injure the Afghans, but were of vital importance to us—we were met with the old stories of personal danger and fear of responsibility, which I always believed to be a mere pretext, and the falsity of which has been demon- strated by the impunity with which Russian officers have now for some uionths past resided at Cabul, ‘The fact is that as far as the Afghans were concerned the Peshawur Conference was throughout nothing but a solemn farce. Shere Ali had made up his mind beforehand not to accept the condition of a prince protected by the Indian government. He was watch- ing events in the sar West, and fully ex- ecting that, sooner or later, war would be cclared between Russia and England, in which case he would have the game in his own hands and could make such terms with either party as best suited the interests of the Afghans. His personal feclings, too, were at this period decidedly against us. He had ever been suspicious of our good tuith, be- lieving us to be Sally. capenle of making use of him for a time and then leaving him in the lurch, He was further irritated by our unfortunate interference in favor of his disgraced son, Yacub Khun, as well as by our indifference to the claims of Abdullah Jan, whom he had named as hissucceasor. Notimprobably, too, he really feared us, looking to absorption in the In- dian Empire as the natural tate of Afghanistan, un- less averted by Russian interference, and thus at- tributing to measures udopted by us in our general scheme of administration an importance and hostile significance which they did not righttully possess, THE BRITISH THEORY. On these measures it may bo advisable to offer afew words of explanation, as they have uot unfrequently been put forward as thé proximate cause of Shere Ali’s hostility, and as almost justifying him in throw- ing himself into the arms of Russia, His main grievance is supposed to have been our occupation of Quetta, at the hed of the Bolan Pass, which was held to indicate an intention to advance on Candahar. Now, whatever may have been the prevailing opin- ion in former times, Lord Lytton’s military advisers ‘were Unanimous in asserting the necessity of holding the upper end of the Bolan Pass, in order to give due strength to our position on the frontier. The same principle, indeed, in theory applied to all the passes— to the Gomal, the Peiwar, the Khyber, as well as to the Bolan, but in the latter case alone were we able to put the theory in practice by having access, under treaty engagement with Kelat, to the upper country. Thad myself always recognized the military advan- tage of occupying Quetta, but hesitated to recom- mend the measure in my memorandum of 1868, for tear of alarming the Ameer. After his rejection, however, of the Viceroy’s overtures in May, 1876, it seemed that any further deterence to his ‘suscep- tibilitics would be misplaced. ‘he occupation, in- deed, of Quetta seems to me, under the circum- stances, to havo been a wise and proper measure of detence, and I can only suppose that it wus the Ameer’s consciousness of his own disloyalty to us which made him regard the movement as @ menace. He is said to have been further disturbed by our opening relations with the independent rulers north ot the Cabul River; but it must be remembered that he never had possessed any claim to the allegiance of these chiefs, while, on the other hand, it was of tho utmost importance to us to have a tree right ot way through their territories, the best and shortest road from Peshawur to the upper valley of tho Oxus lying through Bajour, Dir and Chitral, altogether beyond the hmits of Cabul jurisdic: tion, A third ground of complaint rests on the threatened advance of the Cashmire forces toward Chitral; but here again there could have been no ditti- cuity, Unless the Ameer had been predisposed to take offence, The obvious intention of the movement was to gain possession of the castern passes of the Hindd- Kish range—the Ishkaman, the Darkit and the Biro- ghil—a precaution which, in the menacing state ot affairs beyond the Oxus, might seem to be equally ad- vantageous to Cashmir and to Cabul. Whether our adoption of these measures of frontier policy had any part in confirming it—it could not have originated— the Ameer’s ill humor must remain uncertain. What certain is, that for the last two years, or almost from the time of Lord Lytton’s assumption of the Vice. royalty, Shere Ali, while maintaining the most cor- dial relations with Russia, has pursued a policy of 30 undixguisedly hostile a character toward us that we should have been justided at any time in demanding redress, or even in making reprisals. A summary of these proceedings has been drawn up by an oflicer well acquainted with the course of events, and may here be quoted with advantage:— Intelligencé reached Indiv from Cabul during the Pe- shawur negotiations that the Ameer was making every effort to increase his military force; that he was massing troops at various points of his British frontier without giv- ing us warning or explanation; that ho was publicly ex- horting all his subjects and neighbors to make immediate preparations fora reiig ‘ar, apparently directed against he Bnglish, who he denounced as the traditional ene- mies fain; that on behalf of this religious war (or he was urgently soliciting the authoritative support ‘of the Akhoond of Swat and the urmed co-operation of the chiefs of Dir, Bajour other neighbor- ing knanates; that ho was, by mu f bribes, promises and menaces, endeavoring ‘to bring under personal al- logiance to himself these chicts and territories, whose in- dependence we had recognived and with whoin iy many casos we had contracted engagements; that he was tampor- ing with the tribes immediately on the frontier and inciting them to acts of hostility against ua, and that for the prose cution of these otjects he was in correspondence with Mo- hammedan border chiefs openly subsidized by the British governinent. BLESSINGS OF RUSSIAN RELE, Can it be wondered wt that under such circum. stances Lord Lytton withdrew the British agent trom Cabul and suspended relations with the Ameer? 1 may now turn to the Russian factor in the Afghan question, which has probably had a more direct in- fiuence in bringing on the present crisis than even the eccentricitics and caprices of Shere Ali. Ido not propose to examine in any detail the carlier phases of Russian dominion iu Central Asia. Vhether Russia, in founding and consolidating ® large additional province of the Empire, wu- der the namo of ‘Curkestan, was actuated by “earth hunger,” according to one school, or by @ large-hearted benevolence, according to anothe whether she merely obeyed a natural law of exp sion and progressive civilization, or whether, as some of her popular writers now cynically affirm, she had conceived a plan from the coninencement, which sho systematically pursued, in defiance of obstacles and irrespective Of cost, of pushing on her conquests in Asia until she had attained a position of iny ng strength on England's ouly vuinerable flank? These are questions Which may aniuse the leisure or exer- cise the skill of future historians, but which cannot at present be discussed with profit or determined with any approach Colonel Veniukoff’s elaborate paper on “The Progress of Russia in Central Asia” may be studied with advan- tage by those who take an interest in the subject; ior although it expresses an ultra-optimist view of the character of Russian policy, and includes among the results of that policy various measures of doubt- ful general advantage, it certainly shows that, taken as # whole, the Kussian administration of Central Asia, with all its shortcomings, has beon a blessing to the inhabitants, substituting, as it has, peace aud order, and industry aud content, for the tyranny, aad cruelty, and anarchy of the preceding period, BUSKIA’S FUTORE PURPORK. Amid much is well worth perusal, there is one observation in Veniukoil’s paper which seems to mo of particular interest. He shows that, notwith- standing the acknowledged richness of the valleys of the Jaxartes and the Zar-afshan (or “gold scatterer”), the public expenditure has hitherto execeded the revenues of the province of Turkestan by more than # million sterling annually, and, like # good Russian, he laments over the deficit; but his lumentation is notso much at the exhaustion of the national re- sources as ause the reflection naturally arises that 80 poor a country as Russia could not submit to so heavy and continuous a drain unless with some ulterior view, that view being the hope of indemnitication ‘at some future period out of the rich spoils of India, Of course Veniukott disclaims for his country any such interested motive, but he admits that appearances are stronyly against her. Por my own part, L see no reason to change the opinion 1 have always held of the policy of Russia in the Kast—that jealousy of England entered largely into her caicuiations trom the outset; not, perhaps, that she has ever seriously contemplated the actual invasion of India, or that she looks to any such con- tingency in the immediate future, but that “she must,” as I wrote thirteen years ago, “have been always well aware that if i had any vulnerable joint it was in the East—that, in fact, the stronger ‘position in Central Asi: higher would be we tone she could command in discussing with us any question of European policy. Recent events yive a strong coloring of reality to the picture which I thus drew inferentially of Rus- sia’s designs in 1865, Without, indeed, adopting the exaggerated and boastful tone of the St. Petersburg and Moscow press, it cannot be denied that Russia does derive considerable advantage in her present dis- cussions with ns on the Turkish question from her position in Central Asia, and it is only, there- fore, as it seems to ime, a fair action that, as she has deliberately and with a definite object in view acquired that position, so she will seek to maintain it in the future, whatever cost it may entail on her, If this be admitted it be- comes of special interest that we should be able to trace the channels through which danger is approach us. ‘Forewarned is forearmed.” perience of the past year in revealing the plans which ussia proposed to follow in the event of war ought to show us our weak places, and enable us, not only to thwart her present designs, but to forestall her in the future, THAT MISSION TO CABUL. Sir Henry Rawlinson then traces the steps which lead to the establishment of the Russian Mission at Cabul, pointing out the duplicity characteristic of the Muscovite proceedings, aud exposing clearly the in- tention of the Czar and his advisers. An able sketch of the military operations and strategic movements is given, and some pertinent remarks upon the legal aspect of the Afghan question are also contained in this interesting article. Sir Henry further quotes “the opinion of India’s highest military authority, Lord Napier, ot Magdala, who, although approving of our ‘hap- hazard’ frontier at the base of the hills so long a8 our only enemies were the border tribes, has entirely changed his view since Russia mingled in the fray, andthe prospect has thus arisen that we may be called upon to meet an Afghan army lod by Russian officers. Lord Napier now says:—‘A mougtain chain that can be pierced in many places is no security if you hide behind it. India has often been entered through her mountain barrier, which was never de- fended. India waited to fight the battle in her own plains, and invariably lost it.’”” The paper concludes with a postscript, in which the writer say “MY LITTLE WAR, You KNow.” As these sheets are passing through the press the die is cast, and we are embarked in another Afghan war. Adespatch from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, recapitulating the main features of our quarrel with Shere Ali, has, in the meantime, ap- peared in the newspapers, and seems to have pretty well satisfied public opinion that we have not ap- pealed to arms unadvisedly or without ample provo- cation. Although in the preceding essay my rapid sketch of Cabul affairs will not, of course, bear com- parison with the Gere and detailed explanations of a State paper, believe that, so far as the Afghan portion of the question is concerned, no es- sential difference of fact will be observed in the two accounts; but Iam bound to note that in the Rus- sian portion of the question a very marked dis- crepancy is apparent. In the official account reserve on this poiit has been carried, and very properly, to its utmost limit, whereas as an 6ld so-called Russo- phobist I have not thought it necessary to observe any such discretion, In my view it is the intermingling of the Russian element which alone imparts gravity to our quarrel with tho Ameer. Had there been no Russian mission at Cabul, no indication of a desire on the part of the ‘Turkestan authorities to interfere in Indian politics, we might have aliowed the Ameer to be sulky and grumbling, and even insolent, for the term of his nutural lite, so averse must we have always been to renew our blood feuds with the Afghans; but when Tiussia sends a mission to Cabul, and maintains it there in our despite, and all Asia is watching this first collision of the two great European Powers, to have sat down meekly under such a menace would have been treason to the national interests. I admire and heartily approve the concluding sentence of Lord Lytton’s proclamation, which declares that the Brit- ish government will not tolerate the interference of any foreign Power at Cabul, and I honor hii tor having had the courage to proclaim aloud this standard principle of our Indian polic MR. VANDERBILT AND HIS HORSES. While looking after the men and {horses that go the road the writer met Mr. W. H. Vanderbilt on Sat- urday afternoon, when, in a conversation about fast horses and the numbers to be seen on the road at the present time, heremarked to Mr. Vanderbilt that ‘it looked as it Mr. Bonner would next season endeavor to make up for lost time in trials of speed and that ho (Mr. Vanderbilt) would haye to look out for his laurels.” To this Mr. Vanderbilt replied:— “I have seen an claborate article copied in the differ- ent papers of this morning and comments have been made suggestive of a rivalry between Mr. Bonner and myself, and I desire to say that I am not a candidate for such honor; that I keep horses for my own amusement and health, and in my daily drives it is my habit and pleasure to speed my horses. ‘This speeding seems to add to the excitement of the road, and is enjoyed with as much zest and pleasure by my friends as it is by myself. It is true,” added Mr. Vanderbilt, ‘something over a year ago, in one of these drives, I used the Fleetwood Park track, as was CLUSERET AND SIMO Sharp Reply of the General to the Historian of Thiers, JULES SIMON’S MISSTATEMENTS. Cluseret Portrays His Military Career in Franca, Ttaly and America MIGHT HAVE IMITATED BONAPARTE. An Insight Into the Workings of the Commune in 1870. ConsTaNtTINoPLe, Nov. 20, 1878, To THe Eprror or tHe HExaLp:— Thave just read the abusive extracts in the HERALD of October 15 which were taken from M.Jules Si- mon's book upon the Commune. Hitherto I have not thought it worth the time to reply to the thou- sand and one diatribes of petty paragraphers, whom one cannot fairly strike, ButI can scarcely ignore M. Jules Simon, Minister of Public Instruction, member of the International, Chief of the Cabinet and pam- phieteer. Iwill not call him historian, because I hope to demonstrate in a very brief space that, at least in the matter concerning myself, there is not one word of truth in all that M. Simon has written; and if all the rest of the book is in conspnance I fear the Henavp has been somewhat hasty imannouncing it ag a history of the Commune. That history has yet to be written, or, rather, it has yeé to be pub- lished, for Felix Pyat, the author, the onky man ca- pable of writing such a work, refuses to print it until he can date it from Paris, And I haye folsowed M. Pyat's example—i. ¢., touching the events with which I was personally familiar. While awaiting this:oppor- tunity, which cannot be far distant, to reveal’the trne history, I trust that the Henan, having inserted ‘the error, will also publish the correction, In our-coun- try of “a free fight and fair play” I hope Iam entitled toa fair hearing. According to the-extracts printed in the Hrnatp I was compelied to leave the French army, owing td “irregular comduct;”’ I am “an adventurer;” I was ‘the tool of M. Carayon Latour;” I was “colonel and_ general under I was “only a colonef’ in the United hat I ‘took part in the attack on Chester ii that I have “only written for the most ad- vanced radical journal in'England;’? that. ‘wanted to be dictator ed firmness.” Is this REY GIVES HIS ARMY RECORD. list of accusations, but I will do my best to disprove themjall to the satisfaction o¥ every impartial American. ‘First, as to my “irregula,? con- duct.” Lentered thermilitary academy of St. Cyt in February, 1841. I left’ the institution as an officer in Apeil, 1843, in a regimant commanded by my ‘father. I served stcces¥- fully as lioutenant, captain and chief of battalion ith the Fifty-fitth and Féty-eighth regiments of the line, ,| the Third, Fourth and Eighth Chasseurs and they Twenty-third and Sixth of the Garde Mobile. In July, 1858, I tendered my _ resignation, not because I was compelled to, but, in the first place, because I wished no longer to serve Napoleon; secondly, because Ifwished thoroughly to study m: Protession, and T fab that the French army could teach me nothing’more. Not only is this true, bat the records will show that my resignation was thrice offered and refused previously. It was only when I stated iy intention to retire to my estate that my resighation was accepted, Now, if M. Jules Simon is ignorant of a fact which every sub-lieutenant in the French army 18 acquainted with, I will inform him to this extent:—There is in every corps a matriculation register of officers, every one having a page devoted to him, on ‘which are inscribed all the punishments meted out to him, and generally all the important incidents of his mili- tary carcer. ‘These archives are preserved by the an- thorities and “may always be consulted. In tuct, this record is kept with sch mathematical accuracy that it is impossible for an officer to shroud the sniallest event of his Life, These registers are in existence, and I think all earnest minds will agrce with mo that, before attempting to give my history as a pub- lic Inan, the first duty of the histarian was to consult ‘authentic sources for the truth. Not consulting such information, and contenting himself with tittle tattle, Mr. Simon remains simply ® pamphletocr and not a historian. been more than compensated by the glorious title of American citizen. But I may well be surprised that? my title of general is contested, as I have now me Iny parchment of promotion to that rank, si “Stanton,” and bearing the inseription:—*For gallant: ana distinguished services at the battle of Cross Keys,’* It seems tome thet this document is neither the brevet of an adventurer vor the brevet of @ politician, but an official acknowledgment of services rendered by me toa country which onght, I think, to abstain. from ranging itself on the side of my calumniators, ‘Thus, upon the second point, as upon the first, M. Simon did not understand what he wrote about. made me colow nd yeneral in Italy, while I was only lieutenant colonel and major, and refuses mo the title of general in America, where I was both it ral. If a doubt exists as to this, any ertain from the regiments of Vire Pe Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, which 1 took to the front, whether Cluseret at Cross. Keys, at Strasburg, at Winchester and in the ‘Shenandoah was a myth or a reality. lf I was a myth, then the written testimony of ot cers who served under my orders and that of ee erals under whom I served must also be mythical, Among the signatures to friendly and applaudatory letters now under my hand are those of Mr. Schurz, no retary of the Interior, and General Schenck, ex-United States Minister to London, PERSONAL CROSS FIRING. As to my being ‘the tool of M. Carayon Latour,”* T have never becn subject to any one. “I have neve even seen M, you Latour. I understand that he is the De from Bordeaux, whose father made. a colossal fortune out of rabbit skins, which he hastened to lay at the fect of his boy. Much good may it do him, M, Jules simon, “being ‘his colleague, may — hava consulted him, and to all appearance he did, receiv= ing this reply:—Leave me alone, if you please; [ don’t know the yentleman,”” This at it is what he might truthfully have said. With r ace to the taking of Chester Hall, All E know of Chester is closely connected with a certain: quality of cheese—Chester cheese—although even, here my acquaintance is very limited; the hall T neversaw. Again, Lam accused of being a Fenian which I shall not attempt to deny. If I could have found men, or more properly arms, to fight, I should have fought. But I found none. 'I discovered the whole thing was a vast humbug, which unfortunately” made many noble and generous victims, I admire, those heroes who gave their time and means, but Tf deplore the frivolity of truckling schemers whor plunged them into shame. My work for the English press! Among the journals tor which I have written are Fraser's Maga~, zine, then edited by James Anthony Froude, the greati English historian; the Fortnightly Review, the Sian chester Guardian, &¢. ‘These are far from being adical” journals. Not that I intend to defend my-; self in the least against the charge of writing for the’ most radical press, but M. Simon having made the! assertion that I wrote only for this class of journals in England, I have quoted the above papers to prover that M. Simon knows nothing of what he has written—e a very serious defect in a historian, NO DESIRE TO BE DICEATOR, Dictator! Ah! what 4 great word to use. Wel I shall teach M, Jules Simon that I have suffered to much from parties to whom this title may be ap-/ plied ever to wish myself in their shoes. I once held in my power the three largest cities of Franco— Paris, Marseilles and Lyons. At Lyons and Mere seilles the people shouted, ‘Assume the dictatorship ;! Command, we will obey.’ At Lyons, too, the Presi-: dent of the Municipal Council wished me to socepe in addition to the iilitary command, a seat at the! council table with him. “At Marseilles the Presi-! dent of the Commune insisted that I should occupy his chair, Many and many a time at Paris I was so placed that I could have over~ thrown the Commune and assumed a dictatorship. Not only was I encouraged by the faubourgs, but also by agents of the Right at Versailles, who sought; to inspire me by a guarantee of material order.’ ‘Where is, indeed, a history of this yet to be written. Without biuster, without ostentation, I was content to do my duty and to remain the first servant of thot people represented by the Commune. M. Jules! Simon, who would probably desire to fish in troubled. waters, calls that a “lack of firmness.” It seems{ to me to be quite the reverse. Dictator! Ha forgets I was an American! My ideals have always’ been Lincoln and Bolivar. My object was (and still; is) to rid the path of civilization of monarchies, and} once haying swept them away, to say to the people» fake the power wud use it yourselves,” giving affairs’ into their hands as soon as they knew how to con! ‘them. NO MORE ROBESPIERRES OR BONAPARTES. This mission of dictator is very dificult. Nog ‘Frenchman can give a good account of hime salf in the réle. jon fond of speaking’ ot equality, having forever the word ‘liberty’ upon its lips, France only aspires to a master; does) noibunderstand and does not practise any’ but authority. I might have been proclaimed dicta a Bwnaparte or a Gambetta; many would have : drawn into the vortex in a short time if surrounded by the same enthusiasts that were around me. But! ML Siraon fails to say this. Virmness, indeed! He: has attucked me most for remaining an honest man. Butan Lronest man after eighteen years of empire is not readily umderstood in France. Not only do they misun- derstand the meaning of honesty, they caluminate it The pericyl of dictatorships approaches its end. Robespicr re, Bonaparte—a Robespierre on horseback. After Bonisparte, Gambetta—a Robespierre in a short coat. This ended the march. Happily the people, commence to understand that a master, how- ever perfect he may be, is an enemy. And the better he is the more dangerous he is, for his qvtalities reconcile with the institution— absolutely bad in itself—which leads the people to political :min. Irepeat, it is in taking charge of their affairs fat the people will learn what to do, may have exercised a kind of military dictatot It he had performed his duty in this respect he would have seen that during nearly gixteen years’ service as an officer theonly punishmen suffered was frequently my custom to do, and I did what was con- sidered by the lookers-on a wonderful thing—drove my horees a mile in 2:23—but I never looked upon it as such, simply because it was done by my horses in their usual road con- dition, and without any extra effort. Horses are like men; what is an easy job for some is a very difficult tusk for others. Continuing in this strain, Mr. Vanderbilt said:—“I have not had in the past, and do not intend in the future to have any of my horses put in training to accomplish any predetermined feat, and it amuses me when I think, after other people have expended several hundred thousands of dollars on horses that have not beaten that time, I picked up 4 pair in a week, within the last threo months, that I have no doubt can beat it handily.” Mr. Vanderbilt was then asked what ho intended to do with Maud 8. He replied:— “She is merely a plaything forthe present, I donot intend to match her for speed any more than any of my others, but will have her education finished, and then I will drive her on the road.” Mr. Vanderbilt finally said that he wanted it to bo distinctly understood that no issue, under any cir- cumstances, could be made between himself and Mr. Bonner or any other gentleman on the subject of horses, “because,” as ho remarked, “I merely keep horses for my own hoalth and recreation.”” HORSE NOTES. R. H. Corey, of Menlo Park, Cal., during a recent’, visit to Lexington, Ky., made tho following pur- chases of thoroughbred brood mares for Governor Leland Stanford, who will send the mires to his ranch at Palo Alto, about thirty miles from San Francisco :— Rivulet, br. m., by Rivilo, dam Bosio, by Eclipse, 5 years old, in foal to Vigil. Frolic, g- m., by Thunder, dam imp. Siskin, by Muscovite, 7 years old, in foal to Lever. Helpmate, b, m., by Planct, dam Full Cry, by Van-¢| dal, 5 years old, in foal to Vigil. Bay mare, by Versailles, dam Florac (Warfield’s dam), by imp. Mickey Free, in foal to Lever, 7 years old, Lizzie Whipps, br. f., by Enquirer, dam The Grand\ Dutch 8, by Vandal, 4 yearsold, bred to Tom Bowling. 4 Cuba, ch. f., by Australian, dam Bettio Ward, by Lexington, 4 years old, in foal to Lever. Bonnie Lightfoot, br. m., by Bonnie Scotland, dam Young Miss Lightfoot, by Lexington, 7 years old, in foal to Administration. Dame Winnie, ch. m., by Planct, dam Lis Mardis, by Gilericoe, 7 years old, in foal to Smuggler. Chestnut mare, by Asterisk, dam Lucille Western, by Lexington, in foal to Smuggler. Bay mare by imp. Knight of St. George, dam Sally Wallace, by Star Davis, 8 years old, in foal to Springbok. Florence Anderson, by Enquirer, dam Sally Ander- son, by Glencoe, 4 years old, in toal to Foster. Pianatea, ch. m. by Planet, dam La Henderson, by Lexington, 7 years oid, in foal to Poster, Blarney, b. m, by Blarneystone, dam Genuera, By Lexington, 6 years Old, in foal to Monarchiat, Miss Campbell, ch. m. by Endorser, dam Cynthias Sue, by Jo Stoner, 6 years old, in foal to Lonyicliow. »bin Girl, b.m., by Enquirer, dam Cynthia Sue, 6 years old, in foal to Germantown, Piney Lewis, by Endorser, dam Lou Lewis, by En- dorser, 4 years old, in foal to imported Ashstead, Liazie A., b. f., by Longfellow, dain Cynthia Sue, 3 years old. Hattic Hawthorn, by Enquirer, dam Little Girl, by Endorser, 3 years old. ‘The,above finely bred mares will bo a great acquisi- tion to the thoroughbred stock of California. Mr. D. Swigert, Stockwood Farm, Spring Statian, Ky., states that he has refused a Ade offer of $14,000 for his chestnut coit Spendthritt, two Younis old, Australian, dam Airolite, by Lexington, and* that he will not sell him for less than $20,000.” aan will be likely to have him on hand for some me. Mr. Eastman, of this city, has purchased the bay gelding Glendale, seven years old, by Mambrino ‘agner, dain Rosedalv, by Edwin Forrest. Glendale has @ record of 2:27. ie is represented as one of the highest styled aud handsomest ruadsters that ever lott Kentucky, fifteen days of close confinement for having termed my colonel an “old blockhead;” this waseaid to my father’s successor. Icertainly merited the punish- ment; but did this constitute “irregular: conduct?” MUSTERED OUT BY NAPOLEON. On the eve of the d'etat Land 1,200 other offi- cers of republican tendencies wero retired from the active list. Our influence over the army was feared. Was this irregular conduct? A wan. who can be charged with irregular conduct in the French army must be either a gambler, a drunkard or one who refuses to pay his just debts. I never led in my life, I never was intoxicated and I defy any one to name an individual in France, Italy, America or anywhere else to whom Lam indebted to, the extent of one cent. scarcely left the French army when I received dozens of letters from many of my former comrades asking - permission to scrve under my orders and expressing a readiness to resign their commissions to forlow me, I still have these letters and shall publish them at the proper time together with other documents. Such was the feeling between me and my coturades. A tow months before I re. signed three officers were selected from the entire army to confer on them the cross of officer of the Legion of Honor. I had been a chevalier for ten years. { was the second chosen for the honor, the first being Foucault, aide-de-camp to the Mi Governor. Whoever is acquainted with the usages in the French army knows that this distinction is never conferred except upon superior officers, never upon. captains, and, for the strongest reasons, never upon an officer who may have been charged with irregular conduct. L hope Ihave sufticiently proved an this oint that M. Jules Simon has deccived the public, if eo has not deceived himeelf, concerning my private character. GOKS TO ITALY UNDER GARIBALDI. Now, as to my being an “adventuser.” I have given my reasons for leaving the French army. My reason for going to Italy was, first, to serve the cause of liberty; second, to complete my military education, or, in more common ‘parlance, to learn my trade, a black- smith who wished to become a master of the forge. Fearing, however, that L might be taken for an adven- turer, L took the only precaution I could—viz., 1 se- cured regular letters of introduction. Taking the military idea first, and as a matter of tact, my general of division, Renault, who was afterward slam at Champigny, recommended me personally to Generals ,La Marmora and Villamarine. Henri Martin, the historian, now a French Senator, Pienot de le Faye and Prince San Cotaldo — give me letters to Garibaldi. 1 began my inilitary career in Italy as aide-de-camp to General Garibaldi. After a short time, thinking 1 could do better, I took command of the French legion and performed the duty of advance guard, But my rank was not changed on that accowat, and it was not until after I had been wounded at tho siege of Romo that L was made lieutenant colonel; then I was promoted, after peace had been declared, to the rank of staff major general of the army. I was neither colonel ner gen- eval in [taly, Iwas made major for the second time, then received the rank of licutenant colonel upon the Geld of battle, On this point again M. Simon evi- cently did not know what he was writing about. ENCKRS THE UNITED STATES ARMY. Tim 1861 the war broke out in the United States, and the :tatne motives that had led me to Italy then led me wsAmerica, It was natural that I should desire to take part ina war which would aifect to such a degree the futuro of republicans in Europe. 1 uddresse., myself to Mr. George Marsh, our ister -at Turin, asking him to send an account of pre- yious serices to Washington, and inquire whether fhe goverixnent would give meacomimand. When an _aflirnathye reply, came 1 immediately sent in my resignation x0 the King. His Majesty flatly refused to accept it, Jt required all my entreaty and argue meut, and thedutervention of the Count di Castiglione, who ‘held a hig position near the person of Victor Emmanuel, to induce the King to give his consent to my departure, I4ook with me a four-paged letter from Garibalif to General McClellan, the longest letter Garibuidi eve wrote. In this document he made what appeared to Ine a somewhat exaggerated estimate of my services, and explained the reasons why he bad hastened to say this mach forme, Me. Giclian has this iteresting autograph, Generals Cozens and Avizzaria Also ave ime testimonials in it handwriting. Count Pulski, the famous Pumgarian as my ‘triend, and gave tne a letter to. Mr. Seward. Honri Mu,‘tin recommended me to Senator Charles Sumner, wh temained my friend to the. day of his death, When Ue wrote to me at Vor- sailles, after the Commun he said;—"I may not hava been able to eaplain all your politi- cal conduet, but Te aswure you that your frieuds in America still retain | their esteemz’ 1 still have that letter. Mr. Marsh ave nme @ personal letter to General Jolin A, ix. Comnot wrote me that he and his friends agrecd with me on my judgment of aifairs in Ame Pilletou asked permission to dedicate to mo his “Roi Coton” (King Cotton), He was not Senator then. Ail threo are ative to-day and I haye theireorrespondence munder my hands. me to be calumniated without entering their protest, Ate these tne intrigues of an alventurer? HIS AMERICAN COMMISSION FROM SRANTON. , Wypase over all my services in America, ‘Lhey have I will add her: that I had” for thirty days at Paris. I ordered what I p As a fact, per baps, I ordered 30,000,000 ot and, by way of papenthosis, if my conduct been “ire ular,” pertmps something would have remained of a substantial nature, whereas now I have to work hardj in order to live, and live poorly enough at the best. Besides retain: 0 direction of allies open td Iwas compelled to supervise the provisioning of Paris. These dutiasconsumed all my time, not leay~ ing me even an hour a day for private affairs. As to the epithet of “haughty * which M. Simon applies to- ame, others have addressed that to me before him. by “haughty” he-means 4 man who has @ horror o! promiscuous gabblers,I am haughty. I have a mi protound disgust for the white, velvet hand of } mocracy, but I have-always been bappy and — to 3 hand of a brave man who did not toile! HOW CLUSERET OFVENDED DELESCLUZE. A peculiar circumstance contributed to my arrest by the Commune. Thave said 1 was much oce cupied. Notwithstanding this the affrighted Com- mune wished to be reassured every moment. There, was an incessant demand tor bulletins, which Icons, sidered superfluous. Already the Jacobin sentiment! represented by Deleseluze had replaced the iy socialist wentiment in the Commune. In to: conform \itself to the gospel of St. Robespicrre the; Commune had instituted a military cot taken frongits ranks. his was the resurrection of the “representatives of the people” to the armies. Delescluze presided over this commission, As imi-) yators of tlie men of 93, however, they did nm amount to much, One day I saw cluze ent the doors ot’. the ministry stiff as just itself, and! the followings dialogue cnsued betwoen ws:— “Ah, good day, sir; what have you of a welcomes nature to report? Are you aware that the Commune has created ut military commission to supe! the operation: the administration, organization generally all that appertains to your d ‘tment?’* “No,” Lwaid; “buat they have done nothing.” “Tain the president.” ‘So much the better.” And I come to begin—"* Warm youself. There is Rossel, my chief off staff, who will place everything see dis) State papers, carrespondence, everything is at yout service except myself, who aim obliged to go at once to Fort Issy. Good day.” I entered acarriage which was in waiting and dow parted. Delescluze never torgave me for this, which, ne considered a piece of unparalleled insolence, ie ‘Three days after I was at Mazas without oh. | heard from, and twenty days later still the Verautl laise were at Paris, Then T was ar of wi event 1 might say a great deal, WHY THE DEVENCE WAS DIVIDED, M. Jules Simon is also misinformed when hey attributes to Rossel the redividing of the defence. of Paris into three commands. Koblewski and La Cecilia were still alive, and it was easy to ask them?’ who signed their commissions. ‘This is how it oc, curred:—The evening of iny interview with cluzo, toward halt-past eleven o'clock, se bers of the Commune came and asked me to confide to Dombrowski the command of all the works defence. 1 had had too much experience with men to be deceived as to the value of Dombrowski. Ha was an excellent general upon a restricted base, In, the defence of Neuilly he did wonders. With 1,389! renewed twice only in thirty days he forved ‘the main body of Montandon, a fort of 40,000 men, which was twice renewed. This is set forth at length im the official report of MacMahon, This success tude, died the Parisians, who swore only by Dombrowski, But it was quite a different ee a barricaded village, supported by a city like Paris, from embracing a whole line of ¢ i Nevertheless, in order to satisfy public opinion as far as possible, 1 divided the defonce into three, giving. one-third to Dombrowski. What 1 had foreseen came. to pass. Dombrowski's vision did not expand with his command. He continued only to see Neuilly, While he was gazing to the right the enemy entered at the left, at Auteail, He was accused of That was the custom, He had simply been the vic- tim of his friends, JULES SIMON AN INTERNATIONAL Amid all these errors M. Jules Simon has stated one truth, He and 1 both belonged to the Inter> national soon after it was started. His number was 606 and mine 735, it L mistake not. And this was not the best thing the Iuternational might have done, Representing the interests of workingmen it should have recruited exclusively from amo Workingmen are not always tolerant to socicty should have laid politics aside until its come plete organization, which would have made it miss tress, ‘These errors ave now in course of repair. Since then M, Jules Simon has greatly © After having drawn all ly uld trom the red inter~ to the u0ow Rational he hws gone ove lack internation n of Guibert, the spirit or tie shoprie rf Paris, begins the bis< After the nomin tory of the Commune. After having played on ni ; diTdouve lke Tdo not believe they have allowed ty, who do not know me, I am Jesuits of the arc rouge, Simon now plitys ou the noir. will break the bak. As to my own condition, it is sad enough. For mys colleagues of the Commune, who know Iam ® poor, military mute, Yor M, Jules simon wma his, un powdre ata beggar. But, fool or 5 one thing for me to do, and that is to esty, Lam honest from head to fi 5 A tae G. CLUSEIIER, General, i