The New York Herald Newspaper, April 19, 1868, Page 3

IMPEACHMENT Trial of President Andrew Johnson for High Crimes and Misdemeanors. Elaborate Argument of Mana- ger Wilson. The Cabinet Discussions and Advice to the President Excluded. Postmaster General Randall on the Stand. The Testimony for the Defence Con- | ditionally Closed. SPECIAL TELEGRAM TO THE HERALD. WASHINGTON, April 18, 1868, The case for President Johnson closed to-day so far as the rendering of evidence ia concerned. People can now determine pretty nearly the exact closing hours of this great impeachment drama. Manager Wilson began the proceedings of to-day by reading an elaborate argument against the admission of the testimony relative to the advice and opinions offered in Cabinet council touching the Tenure of Office act. Mr. Curtis made an effective reply, with- out the necessity of resorting to manuscript to help him in the effort, It proved, however, of no avail, for the Senate immediately afterwards rejected the testimony by a vote of wwenty-nive to twenty. It will be remarked that all of the questions re- cently put by the President's counsel have been steadily sustained by the Chief Justice and as stead- ily opposed, with but a few exceptions, by those radical Senators who have, ever since the beginning of the proceedings, shown a marked animus against allowing an impartial trial. The famous seven doubtful Senators who, by uniting with the demo- crats, are to block the game of the impeachers, are supposed to be embraced in that knot of republicans who have been voting in accordance with the rulings of the Chief Justice. Senator Anthony heads the lst, and the other six are supposed to be, after @ careful examination of the votes, Senators Fowler, imes, Norton, Ross, Trumbull and Van Wink! A few others are looked upon as equally doubtful republicans; but the general tenor of the votes cast by those who are mentioned above, along with the conservative tendencies they have hitherto exhibited in the transaction of legislative business, point them out more prominently as the seven men who will not brook the party dictation which bids them vote a certain way or suifer immo- lation at the hands of their indignant constituents. Secretary Welles, not being allowed, to give his version of the President's intentions regarding Sec- retary Stanton, proceeded to relate what he told the President in reference to the movements of troo 8 in Washington. In the cross-examination Mr. Butler made a lame attempt to confuse the easy-minded Secretary, but the latter heid on to his plain state- ments without a single variation. ostmaster General Randall testified that he sus- pended Foster Blodgett, postmaster in the State of Georgia, on the representation that he was under an indictment on a charge of perjury. Mr. Butler at- tempted to make it aj pesy that Blodgett was sus- pended because he happened to bé 4 Unto thin, but no particle of evidence couid be extracted from the witness to give the least color to the assnmption. The defence having stated that the President's Cabinet were all present to testify on the point rela- live to the proceedings in Cabinet meetings which had been ruled out by the Senate, and as their evi- dence could not, therefore, be produced, there was nothing further left to be offered in the shape of testimony. Senator Sherman, after Mr. Randal! had left the stand, sent a question to the Chair substantiv!!y simtlarto those offered by the de- fence. The witness was recalled, the question read and objected to, whereupon @ vote was taken and twenty-six votes were recorded against eighteen; and as this was a final and decisive ruling out of tire evidence, the counsel for the President threw up the sponge, ah declared they had nothing more to offer save what Mr. Stanbery might have, but with the character of which they were unacquainted. ‘The trial is thus virtually over. Some small share of rebutting testimony may be offered, but it will hardly consume more than afew hours, and then follows the final argument, and then the momentous verdict. The very sudden and abrupt closing of the evidence forthe defence has surprised every- body, and the opinion is freely expressed that the President’s counsel have made somewhat of a mis- take. It is thought that they should have made a formal offer of all the testimony they have and stat- ed what they intended to prove, thus forcing the Court to pass upon every scintilla of evidence and exhibiting to the country the nature of the defence fall, Some of the President's friends are disposed to view the uit of to-day’s proceedings in a rather gloomy spirit, but what additional cause there is for desponding does not appear very clearly. If any mistake has beeh made by the abrupt closing it can probably be removed under the stipulation that ad- ditional testimony might be offered by Mr. Stanbery. ‘The sickness of the latter, jusi at this juncture, is de- cidedly unfortunate for the President. There is no disguising the fact that a great press- ure is now being made upon Senators to insure con- viction. The influx of radical leaders from all the Northern and Western States is quite formidable, and the Senators are greatly bothered in conse- quence. On the floor of the Senate to-day were Governors Geary, of Pennsylvania; Fairchild, of Wisconsin; Fletcher, of Missouri, and Marshall, of Minnesota. It is expected that during the coming week a new instalment will arrive and lend their aid to the radival cau The Governors now here give great importance to the triumph of the advo- cates of conviction and declare ff the President be not deposed the radical party will enter the coming political campaign with a loss of prestige which may result in defeat. Upon this ground the greatest anxiety is felt iu the result of the pending trial, and, notwithstanding the strongest assurances of sustaining the party when a final vote is reached, a strict surveillance is kept over those Senators who are considered doubtful, particularly to prevent the spread of any disposition to break down if such fears are well founded. Although there was great depression shown by the radicals at the close of the High Court last evening, to-night the opposite is the fact, and these same parties evince more satisfaction than ever. The success in k@eping out any evidence showing the motives of the President in the case of Mr. Stanton is considered a big point gained, and the friends of the impeachers are delighted at the pros- pects. By the Ist of May it is now expected the whole affair will be over. There is a rumor to-night that, though the Senate may find (he President guilty, they will not inflict the full penaity of removal and disqualification, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT. Eighteenth Day. UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER, } WASHINGTON, April 18, 1868. § ‘The court was opened at eleven o'clock. Pursuant to the order of yesterday the Managers and members of the House were successively an- nounced, Mr. Stevens was not present at the open- ing. Senator STEWART moved to dispense with the read- ing of the journal. Senator DRAKE objected, and the journal was read. By the direction of the Crimp Justice the question pending yesterday was read as follows:— We, the counsel of the Prestdent, offer to prove that the President, ata neem of the Cabinet, while the Dill was before the President for his approval, laid before the Cabinet the Tenure of Omice act for their consideration and advice to the President res] tiny Nis approval of the bill; and therenpon the Members of the Cabinet then present gaye their advice to the NEW YORK HERALD, SUNDAY, APRIL 19, 1868—TRIPLE SHERT. President that the bill was unconstitutional and should be returned to Congress with iis objections, and that the duty of pre} a setting forth the objections to the constitutionality of the bill was devoived u Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton, to be followed up by proof of what was done by the President and Cabinet up to the time of sending in the message by the President. Manager WILSON rose to speak, when e Senator JOHNSON submitted the following question to the counsel of the President in writing:—“ Do the counsel understand that the Managers deny that the statement made by the President in his message of December 12, 1867, in evidence as given by the Managers, at page 45, No. 9 of the official repert of the trial, that the members of the cabinet gave the opinion last stated as to the Tenure of OMce act and as evidence offered to cor- roborate their statement? or for what purpose is it offered #7" Senator Howarp submitted the following question to the President's counsel:—Do the counsel for the accused not consider that the validity of the Tenure of Office bill was purely a question of law to be de- termined in this trial by the Senate; and if so, do they consider that the opinions of Cabinet officers touching that question are competent evidence by which the judgment of the Senate ought to be in- fuenced f” 4 Senator Epmunps asked whether the argument on the part of the Managers might not be continued while the counsei were considering the questions? The Curer Justice replied in the affirmative, Mr. Curtis said they would prefer that course. Manager WILSON rose and said:—As this question confronts one of the most important questions in- volved in this case I wish to present the views of the Managers respecting it with such careand exact- ness as I may be able tocommand. The respondent now offers to prove, doubtless as a foundation for other Cabinet advice of more recent date, that he was advised by the members of his Cabinet that the act of Congress, upon which rest several of the arti- cles to which he had made answer, to wit: “A. reulating the tenure of certaiu civil officers,” March 2, 1867, was and is unconstitutional, and therefore void. That he was so advised he has aileged in his answer. Whether he was so advised or not we hold to be immaterial to this case and irrelevant to the issue joined. The House of Kepresentatives were not to be’ entrapped in the preparation of this repli- cation by any such cunning device, nor by the Kin- dred one whereby the respondent affirms that he was not bound to execute the act because he be- Meved it tobe unconstitutional. The replication says that the “ifouse of Representatives do deny each and very averment in the said several answers, or either of them, which denies or traverses the acts, intents, crimes or misdemeanors charged against the suid Andrew Johnson In the said articles of impeach- ment, or either of them, and for replication to the said answer do say that the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, is guilty of the high crimes and misdemeanors mentioned in the said ar- ticles,’ &c. There is no acceptance here of the issue tendered by the respondent, and in support of which we object. The advice which he may have formed touching the constitutionality of the sald act cannot be allowed to shield him from the consequences of his criminal acis, nor can his mistaken view of the constitution relative to his right to require the opin- ion of the heads of the severai executive de 3 upon certain questions aid his eiforts to the just demands of violated law. In his answer to the first articles he alieges—‘That this respon- dent had, in pursuance of the constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive departments upon this questiow of consti- tutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the constitution of the United States this power of removal was lodged _ by the constitution in the Presi- dent of the United States, and that consequently it could be lawfully exercised by hit, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof.” The respondent found no provision in the constitution authorizing him to pursue any such cou The constitution says, “the President may require the opinion in wril- ing of the principa! in each of the executive depa ments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.” (Article 2, section 2.) Not of his omMice, not of the legistative department, nor of the judicial department. But when did he require the opinions and receive the advice under cover of which he now seeks to escape? His answer informs us that this ali transpired prior to his veto of the bill regulating the tenure of certain civil Upon these unwritten Opinions and that advie ba his Veto Of said bill and fashiouet the charac- ter of his message. He communicated his objections to Congress; they were overruled by both houses, and the bill was enacted into a law in manner and foru as prescrived by the constitution. He does not Say that since the Onal passage of the act he hag been further Bavpred ive the prinsipa) pi cers of each of thé ec tti lepattments that he fs not bound to enforce it; and if he had done so he would have achieved a result of no possible benefit to hiinself, but dangerous to his admirers; for it will be borne in mind that the articles charge Sha is “did unawtally cbilspite with one Lorenzo Thonias and with other persous to the House of Representatives unknown.” He night have disel Jat \heseUnkLOWn persons were the members of his Cabinet. This disclosure might have placed them in jeopardy without diminishing the eae which attends upon his own predicament. It is not diMcult to see that the line of defence to which we have directed the present objection in- volves the great question of this case. It tends to matters more weighty than a mere resolution of the teciinical offences which float on the surface of this prosecution, Whoever attempts to ineasure the magnitude of the case by the comparatively insis- nificant acts which constitute the technical crimes and misdemeanors with which the respondent stands charged will attain a result far short ef its true character aud be rewarded with a mest beggariy appreciation of the immensity of its real proportions. Far above and below and beyond these mere techn cal offences, grave a8 they undoubtedly are, the reat question Which you are to settle 1s to be found. tenvelopes the whole case and everything pertain- ing thereto, It is the great circle which bounds the sphere composed of the muititude of questions and issues presented for your determination. The re- spondent is arraigued for a violation of and a refusal to execute the iaws. He offers to prove that his Cabinet advised him that a certain bill presented for his approval was in violation of the constitution; that he accepted their advice and vetoed the bil, and upon that and such additional advice as they may have given him claims the right to resist and defy the provisions of the bill, notwithstandin, its enactment into a law by two-thirds ol both houses over his objections. In other words, he claims substantially that he may determine for himself what laws he will obey and execute and what laws he will disregard and refuse to enfor: In support of this claint he offers the testimony which for vhe time be- ing is excluded by the objection under discussion. If 1 am correct im this, then I was not mistaken when lasserted that this objection confronts one of the most important questions involved in this case. It ma be said that this testimony is offered merely to di prove the intent alleged and charged in the articles, but it goes beyond this and reaches the main ques- tion, as will clearly appear to the mind of any one who will read with care the answer to the first article. The testimony is improper for any purpose and in every view of the ca The constitution of the United States, ariicle 2, section 1, provides that “the executive power shali be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The person at present exercising the fun tions. of the executive office is the respondent, Who stands at your bar to-day, charged with high crimes aud misdemeanors im office. Before he en- tered upon the discharge of the duties devolving upon him as President he took and subscribed the constitutionally prescribed vath of oilice, in words as follows:—“I do solemnly swear that that 1 will faith. fully execute the oifice of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States.” This oath covers every part of the constit tion, Laposes the duty of observing every section and clause thereof and includes the distribntion of powers thercn made. The powers embraced and distributed are legisiative, exe Of the first the constivation dec! “ail legis- lative powers herein granved shall be vested ina Congress of the United States, Which shal) consist of @ Senate and House of Representatives.” — (Article 1, section 1.) This encircles the entire range of legis- lative action, The will of the — legislative department is made known by the terins of the bills which it may pass, Of these expressions of the legisiative will the constitution say very bill Which shall have passed the House of Represen tives und the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States, and, if he approve, he shail sigu it, but, if not, he shail return it with his objections to the house in which it shall have originated, who shail enter the objections at large upon their journal and proceed to reconsider it. I, after such reconsideration, two- thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it Shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsid- ered, and, if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law.” (Article 1, section 7.) Thus laws are made, but laws cannot e: ecute themselves, However wise, just and necessary they may be, they are lifeless declarations of the legislative will until clothed with the power of action by other departments of the goverument. The builders of our constitution understood with great exactness the philosophy of government and pro- vided for every contingency. They knew that laws to be effective must be executed; that the best and purest law could not perform its proper omce in the absence of executive power; therefore they created that power and vested it in a President of the United - States, To insure a due execution of the power they imposed the duty of taking and subserit. ing the oath above quoted on every person elected to the Presidential office, and declared he should comply with the conditions before he entered upon the execution of his office, Chief among the executive duties imposed by the constitution and secured by the oath is the one contained tn the injunction that the President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, Article 2, section 8). What laws? Those which may ave been passed by the legisiative deparuinent in man- ner and form as declared by the section of the consti. tution heretofore recited. The President is clothed with no discretion in this Tevard. Whatever is de. clared by the legisiative power to be the law the t President is bound to execute, By wis power to veto | @ bill passed by both houses of Congress he may challenge the lewialative will; but if he be overruled by the two-thirds vote of the houses, he must respect the decision and execute the law which that consti- tutional voice has spoken into existence. If thts not true, then the executuyve wer is superior to the legislative power. If the execu- tive will may declare What 18 and what 1s not law, Why was a legislative department blushed at alit) Why impose on the Preswient (ie constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faitifully ex- ecuted if he may determine what acts are and what are not laws? ft is absurd to say that he has any discretion in this regard. He must execute the law. | “The great object of the executive department is to | accomplish this purpose, and without it, be the form of government whatever it may, it will be utter! worthless for offence or deter ‘or the redress of grievances or the vrotection of riglts; for the hap- piness, or good order or safety of the people.” (Story on the Constitution, vol, p. 419%) De Toequevilie, in his work cn “Democracy in America,’? | in opening the chapter on executive power, very truly remarks that “The American legislators un- dertook a dimMeuit task in attempting to create an execative power dependent on the majority of the people, and nevertheless suiiciently strong to act without restraint in its own spiere, It was indispensable to the maintenance of the republican form of government that the representative of the executive power snould be subject to the will of the nation.” (Vol 1., p. 128.) The task was a difficult one, but the great minds from which our constitution sprung were equal to its severest demands. They created an executive power strong enough to execute the will of the nation, and yetsufiiciently weak to be controlled by that will, They know that “power will int6xicate the best of hearts as wine the strongest heads,’ and therefore they surrounded the executive agent with such proper restraints and limitations as would confine him to the boundaries prescribed by the national will, or crus him by its power, if he step beyou The plan adopted was most per- fect. It created the executive power, provided tor the election of the person to be entrusted with its exercise, determined the restraints and limita- tions which should rest upun,guide and control it and him; and out of abundant caution decreed that “the President * * * * of the Uuited States shall be removed from oM™ce on whycacument for and con- viction of treason, bribery, o! O..er nigh crimes and misdemeanors.” (Article 3, sectlon 3.) It is pre- preectons for the respondent ta attempt to deiend imself against the corrective power of this grand remedy by interposing the opinions or advice of the principal otticers of the executive departments, either as to the body of his offence or the intent with which he comuitted it. His highest duty is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and if he fails in this particular he must fail in all, and anarchy will usurp the throne of order, The laws are but expressious of the national will, which can be made Known only through the enactments of the legislative department of the govern- ment. A criminal failure to execute that will, and every wilful failure, no matter what its inducement may be, is criminal—may justly cali into action the remedial power of impeaciment. ‘This power ts, by the express terms of the constitution, confided to one brauch of the legisiative department, in these words:—“The House of Representatives * * % * shall have the sole power of impeach- ment.” (Article 1, section 2) This lodginent of the Most delicate power Kuown to the constitution is most wise and proper, because of the frequency with which those who nn, ercise it are culled to account for their conduct at the bar of the people; and this is tie check balanced agaist a possible abuse of the power, and it has been most e: But the wisdom whien fi pned our cons did not stop here. It next declared that “the 5 shail have the sole pr to try all finpeach ments.’? (Article 1, rt ) In the theor of our constitution the © represents the States, and its members being removed from direct accountability to the people are supposed to be beyond the reach of those excitements and pas- sions which so frequently change the political coin- plexion of the House of Representatives; and this is the more immed: check provided to balance the possible hasty action of the Representatives; wise, iderate and safe to the perfect work of demon- stration is this admirable adjustment of the pow with which we are now dealing. The executiv power was created to enforce the will of the nation, ‘The will of the nation appears in. its laws. 2 two houses of Congress are entrusted with the power to enact laws; the objection of the ative to the contrary notwithstanding, lw thus enacted, as well as those which receive the Hxecutive sanction, are the voice of te people. if the person, clothed for the time being with the Executive power, the only power which cau give efiect to the people's will, refuses or neglects to en- force the legislative decrees of the nation, or wii- fully violates the same, what constituent elements of governmental power could be more properly charged with the right to present und the meaus to try and remove the contumacious Executive than those en- trusted with ihe power to enact the laws of ihe pecule guided by the checks and balance: w which I have directed the attention of the Senate? What other constituent parts of the government could so well understand and impede a perverse and criminal refusal to obey, or a wliful declination 43 execnie the national will, than those joining in its expres- fen? There cay he but one answer to there ques- ond, Thé provisions of the constitution are wise and just beyond the power of disputation in leaving the entire subject of the pepe of the Execu- tive to faithfully execute his office and enjorge the laws to the charge, trial and judgment of (he uwo several braiches of the legistatite Epart- ment, regardless gf the opinions of Cabinet oMlcers or the decisions of the judicial departinent. ‘The respondent fas placed himself within this power of impeachment by trampling on the constitutional duty of tke Executive, and violating the penal laws he land. 1 readily adimit that the constitution of the United States in almort every respect is different from the constitution of Great Brita:n, The latter 13 to a great extent unwritten and is in all regards sub- Ject to such changes as Parliament nay enact. An act of Parliament may chavge tue constitution of Engiand, In this country the rule is dierent. The Congress aay enact no law in conflict with the con- stitution, The enactments of Parliament become a part of the British constitution, The will of Partia- ment is supreme, Tie will of Congress is subordinate to the written constitution of the United States, but may not be judged of “ the executive department. But the theories upon which the two consututious rest at the present time are almost identical. In both the executive is made subordinate to the legislative power, ‘The Commons of Engiand tolerate no en- croachments on their power from any other estate of the realm. The Parliament is the supreme power of the kingdom, in spite of the doctrine that “the King can do no Wrong,”’ aud in spite of the assertion that he exercise of the sovereignty rests iu the several tes, The kindred character of the theories pe meaiing the two constitut.ons may be illustrated certain Parliamentary and ministerial actiom con nected with the American revolution, and which will well serve the purposes of my argument. On the 27th day of February, 1782, General Conway moved in the House of Commons the following resolution:—“That it is the opinion of this House thai tne fur- ther prosecution of offensive war on the con- tinent of North America for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force wiil be the means of weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies; danger- ously to increase the mutaal enmity so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain and America, and by preventing a happy reconciliation with that country, to frustrate the earnest desire, graciously expressed by his Majesty, to restore the blessing of public tran- quillity.”” (iansard, vol. 22, p. 107.) The Commons passed the resolution, but the Minjstry did not seem to catch its true spirit, antl, therefore, on the 4th of March next following, — Gene- ral Conway moved another, in these more ex- press and emphatic terins, to wit:—That, after the solemn deciaration of the opinion of this Mouse, in their humbie address, presented to his Majesty on Friday last, and his Majesty's assurance of his gracious intention, in pursuance of this advice, to lake stich measures as shall appear to his Majesty to be most conducive to the re tion of harmony) between Great Britain and the ‘ revolted colonies,’ 80 essential to the prosperity of both, Uis House will consider as enemies to his Majesty and this country all (hose who shall endeavor to frustrate his Majesty’s paternal care for and happi- ness of his people, by advising or by any means attempting the further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America for the pur- se of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force.” (Ibid, page 1,08%) This resolution Jed to an animated debate, and the temper of ghe Commons was equal to the directness of the resolution, The ministry saw this and understood exactly its meaning. They were dis- posed to avoid the impied censure, and attempted to show by expressions of a determination to ob- serve and respect the opinion of the House as de- clared in the first resolution, that no necessity existed for the adoption of the second. To effectuate this end, Lord North, the Premier, in the course of his re- marks said;—“The majority of iat House had re- solved that peace should be made with America, and the answer given from the throne Was so satisfactory that the House had just concurred in a motion to re- turn thanks to his Majesty for making it. Where, therefore, could be the ground for coming to a reso- jution which seemed to doubt the propriety or sincerity of that answer?’ He was not of the disposition of those who compiained of majorities in that House, who condemned them, and by factions and seditious misrepresenta- tions held them out to the public in that most odious color, A majority of that House was, in Parliamentary language, the House ttseli—it could change @ singie opinion, yet he bowed to that opinion which was sanctioned by the majority. Though he might not be a convert to such opinions, still he held it to be his Lee teary duty to obey it and never once to lose sight of it in the advice which, as a servant of the crown, he should lave occasion to give his sovereign, It was the right of that House to cormmand; it was the duty of & Minister to ovey ite resolutions, Parliament had aiready expressed its desires or its orders, and as it was scarcely possible that a Minister should be found hardy, daring, infa- mous enough to advise lis sovereign to dif fer in opinion fro his Parliament, so he conld not see that the present motion, whieh must suppose the existence of such @ minister, Could be at all neceasary.”’ ([bid, p. 1,000.) And again he satd:— "To the policy of that resolution he could not subscribe; but a8 Pariiament had thought rr Shey the orders of Parliament, that resolution the standard of his future ¢ h North did tot solution Commons, passed and peace followed, It will be observed that these proceedings om the part of the Commons trenched on ground covere. prerogatives of the clod To sonie EXtent The powers of and entering into y bowed th obedience to the 14 Geclared that ‘st was | in the scarcely possible that a Minister could be found hardy, daring, infamous enough to advise his sovereign to differ in opinion froin his Parhament.” This grand action of the Commons and its result dis- closed the sublimest feature of the British constitu. tion, Itis made to appear how thoroughly under that constitution the executive power was dependant on the legislative will of the nation, The doctrine that the King can do no wrong, while it protected his person, resolved into an almost perfect subordination of the Ministers through whom the powers of the crown are exerted to the acts and yesoitutions of the Parliament—until at last the roar of the lion of England is no more than the voice of the Commons of the realm, So completely had this principle asserted itself tis yustiiution (hat the velo power had passed into disuse for nearly a century, and it has not been exercised since. The last instance of its Use Was in April, 1696, when William IIL, refused the royal assent (oa bill to regulate the election of members to serve in Parliament, (Harsard, vol. 5, p. 993.) The men who framed our constitution in 1797 were hot untanght of these facts in English his- tory, and they fashioned out the government on the plan of the subordination of the executive power to the written law of the land. ‘They did not deny the veto power to the President; but they did declare that it should be subject to a legislative limitation under the operation of which it might in any given case be overruled by the Congress, and when this happens and ‘the vetoed bill be- comes a law the President must yield the convictions of his own judgment as an individual to the demands of the higher duty of the office and execute the law. His oath binds him to this and he cannot pursue any other course of action without endangering the public weal, e constitution re- gards him ina double capacity—as citizen and pub- ie onticer. In the first it leaves to the same ac- countability to the law in tt ry process as would attach to and apply in case he were a clvilian or the humbiest. citiz it sub- jects him to the power of the House of Representa- tives to impeach and that of the Senate to remove him from ofice if he be guilty of Ureason, bribery or other high erimes and misdemeanors, If the citt- zen disobey the law and be convicted thereof, he may be relieved by pardon; but the oficer who brings upon himself a conviction or impeachment cannot receive the Exeoutive clemency; for while it is provided that “te President shall have power to aut reprieves and pardons for offences against the “mited States” it is also expressed and declared that this power shall not extend to cases of impeach- ment, (Article LI, section 2.) The same person, if he be a civil officer, may be indicted for @ violation of law and impeached forthe sane act. If convicted in both cases he may be pardoned in the former; but in the latter he is beyond the reach of forgiveness. ‘The relief provided for the disobedient citizen is dented the offending oficer. 1 have already ob- served that the constitution of the United States dig- tributes the powers of the government among three departments. First in the order of constitutional arrangement is the legislative department, and this, doubtless, because the lawmaking power is the su- preme power of the land, through which the will of the nation is expressed, The legislative power—in other words, the lawmaking power—is ‘vested in the Congress of the United States.” The acts of Congress constitute the municipal law of the repub- he, “Municipal law is a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power of a State, commanding what- everis right and prohibiting what 1s wrong.’ (1 Blackstone, page 44.) The.supreme power of a State is that which is highest in authority, and therefore it was proper that the constitution should name iirst the legislative department in the distribution of power, as through it alone the State can speak, Its voice is the law—the rule of action to be respetced and eee by ail persons subject to its direction or amenable to its requirements, Next im the order of its distribution of powers — the names the executive department. This is proper and logical, for the will, the law of the nation cannot act cept through agents or instrumentalities charged with iis execution, The Congress can enact a law, but ft cannot execute it. It can express the will of the nation, but some other agents are required to give it eect. The constitu- tion resolves these agencies and instrumentalities into an executive department. At the head of this department, charged imperatively with the due execution of its great powers, appears the President of the United States, duly enjoined to “take care that the laws be faitifuily executed.” If the law which he is to execute does not invest him with discre- tionary power he has no electicn, He must execute the will of the nation as expressed by Congress, In. no case can he indulge in the uncertunties and irresponsibilittes of an ofcial discretion unless it be conceded to him by express enactment. In all other cases he must follow and enforce the legisiative will. “ ‘the oMce of executing a law ex- cludes the right to judge of it,” and as tie constitu. tion chargeg the President with tie execution of tie lawe it dee!fires what is his duty and gives him no pone beyond.” (Rawle on the Constitution, page 37.) Undoubtedly he possesses the right to reco mend the enactment and to advise the repeal of He may also, as I have before remarked, e of laws by interposing his veto ans of changing, directing or ob- structiny national willhe may not go.“ When the law ng power has resolved his opposition must be at an end. ‘That resolution is a law and resistance to it punishable.” (Federalist, No, 7.) The Judgment of the individual intrusied for the time being with the executive power of the republic May reject 28 utterly erroneous the conclu. sion arrived at by those invested With Une icgisiative powers Dut pee g. the law; he 10 O} such as the” par en this he must exercise in obedience to the which the act provides. A high oficer of the gov ment once gave to a President of the United States an opinion relative to this doctrine in these words:— “To the Chief Executive Magistrate of the Union is confided the solemn duty of seeing the law faithfully executed, That he may be able tu meet this duty witha power equal to its perforinance he nominates: own subordinates, and removes them at his pleasure.” This opinion was given prior to the pas- sage of the act of March 2, 1507, wluch requires the concurrence of the Senate in removals from ofice; which, witile denying to the Presi- dent the power of absolute removal, concedes to him tie power to suspeud officers. and to supply their places temporarily. For the same reason ihe land and waval forces are under his orders as their Commander-in-Chief; but is power is to be used only in the manner prescribed by ‘he legisiative departinent. He cannot accomplish o legal purpose by illegal us, or break the jaws himself to pre- vent the yfrom being violated by others, The acts of Congress sometimes give the President a broad discretion the use of the means by Which they are to be execu- ted, and sometimes limit the power so that he can exercise it only ina certain prescribed manner, When the law directs a thing to be done without saying how, that implies the power to use such means a8 may be necessary and proper to accom- piisi the end of the legislature; but where the mode of performing a duty is pointed out by statute that is the exclusive mode, and no other can be followed, The Uiited States have no common law to fall back upon wicn the written law ts defective. If, there- fore, an act of Congress declares that a certain thing shall be done by @ particular oflicer, it cannot be done by a different oiticer, ‘The agency which the law furnishes for its own execution Imust be used to the exciusion of all others.’? (Upiuion of Attorney General Biack, November 20, 1860.) ‘This is @ very clear statement of the doctrine ou which the particu- lar branch of this case now commanding our atten- tion rests. If we drift away from it we un- setile the very foundations of the government and endanger its stability to @ degree which may well alarm the most peaceful minds and appalthe most cours A departure from tits view of the character of the Executive power, and from the nature of the duty of the obligations resting upon the officer charged therewlih, would surround Uns nation with perils of the must feartul proportion and of unparalleied inagnitude, Such a departure would not only justify the respondent in his refusal to obey and execute he law, but also approve his usurpa- tion of the judicial power when he resoived that he would nut observe the legislative will, because, iin his judgment, it did not conform to the provisions of the constitution of the United States touching the subject embraced in the articles of impeach- ment, on which he is now being tried at your bur, Concede this to him, and when and where) may we look for the end? To what result shall we arrive? Wiil it not naturally and inevitably lead to a consolidation of the several I sof ihe government in the executive depart: ment? And would this be the end? Would it not rather be but the beginning? If tie President mi: defy and usurp the powers of the iegisiative and judl- cial departments of the governue tw his caprices or the advice of his Cabinet may incilne him, why may not’ lis subordinates, each for himself, and touching his own sphere of action, determine how far (he directions of hits superior accord with the con- stitution of the United States and reject and refuse to obey all that come short of the standard erected by his judginent?’ it was remarked by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Martin ver- sus Mott (12 Wheaton, 19), that “if a superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the President upon hisown doubt as to the exigency referred constitution to by the statute having arisen, it must be equally the right of every inferior and soldier; and any act declined by jay person in far- therance of such orders would subject him to respon. sibility in a@ civil suit, in which his de ust finally rest upon his ability to establish the facts by competent proofs Such a course would ve subver- sive Lo all discipline and expose the best disposed oificers to Wie chances of ruinous litigation.” The ower itsell is confined to the Executive of the nion, to him who is by the constitution the com- mander of the militia when catled fnto the actual service of the United States, whose duty it is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, aud whose responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligation i8 secured by the highest sanction. He ws necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, aud is bound to call forth — the militia. His orders for this purpose are in strict conformity with the provisions of the law, and it wouid seem to follow as a necessary consequeice that every act done by a subordinate officer in obe- to such orders is equally justifiat The mitemplates that under such circums orders will be given to carry the power into eite and it cannot, therefore, be a correct inference tat other person has @ just right to disobey them, y the principles here enunciated to the case at and they become its perfect support. If the ¢ to obey bur President has aright to contest and refuse the laws enacted by Congress hte subordinates may ciwe the same right and refuse to obey his or. ders, Hf he may exercise it in one ese Wey may assert iin any other, Ife may challenve the jaws oF Congress, Wy may question the orders of the President. it is hie duty to enforce the jaws of the nation, and it 18 their duty to obey his orders. | If he muay be avowed LO defy Lue jegisivuve Wiki, Uiey muy be allowed to disregard the executive orders, This he- | gets confusion, and the affairs of the public are made the sport of the contending fac nd conflicting agents. No such powers beiong to either. To Con- gress is given the power to enact the laws, and wiule they remain on the statute books it is the constitu- tional duty of the President to see to thelr faithful execution, This duty rests upon all of his sub- | ordinates. Its observance by all, the President inciuded, makes the executive department, though it be acting through ten thousaud agents, a unit, Unity produces harmony, harmony ts directness of action, and this secures a due execution of the laws. But if the President may disregard the law because he has been advised by his Cabinet and believes that the Congress violated the constitution in its enactment, and his subordinates may follow his example, disobey his orders and directions, the object and end of an executive unity Is defeated; anarchy suceeeds order; force—irr premibis and vicious—supplants law, and ruin envelopes the re- public and Kis institutions. If the views which [ have imperfectly presented are correct—and such I believe them to be—the testimony to which we object must be excluded from your consideration, and thus will be determined one of important questions encircled by this case, have been able to arrest your attention and to centre it on the question which I have im- perfectly disgussed, the time occupied by me will not be without pPofit to the nation, have endeavored to show that the royal maxim which asserts that “the king can do no wrong” cannot be applied to the President of the United States in such a manner as to shield him from the just condemnation of vio- luted law, The king’s crimes may be expiated by the vicarious atonement of his ministers; but the President is held personally amenable to the im- peaching power of the House of Representatives. Concede to the President immunity through the advice of his Cabinet oMicers, and you reverse by your decision the theory of the constitution, Let those who will assume this responsibility, I leave it to the decision of the Senate. Mr. CurTis—I have no intention, Senators, to make a reply to the elaborate document which has now been introduced here by the honorable Mana- gers touching the merits of this case. The time for that has not come. and the testimoay is not befor you. The case is not in a condition for you to con sider and pass: pow its merits, whether they be based on law or not. The simple question now before the Senate is, whether a certain offer of proof will be carried out in evidence? Of course that inquiry in- volves another. That other inquiry is, whether the evidence which is offered is pertinent to any matter involved in this case;.and when it is asserted that the matter is pertinent, I suppose it be received, Its creditability, its weight, its eifect finally upon the merits of the case is a subject which cannot be considered and decided upon preliminarily to the reception of the evidence, and, therefore, leaving on one side the whole of this elaborate argu- ment, which is now addressed to you, I propose to make a few observations to show that this evidence is pertinent to the issues in this case, The honorable Manager has read a portion of the answers of the President and has stated that the House of Repre- sentatives has taken no issue upon that part of the answer, As to the effect of that admission by the honorable’ monary, I shall have a word or two to say presently, But the honorable Manager has not told you that the House of Representatives, when they brought to your ear these articles, did not intend to assert and prove the allegations contained in them, which are matters of fact. One of the allegations, Mr. Chief Justice, as you will find by referring to the first article, and to the second article and to the third article, is that the President of the United States, in removing Mr.tStanton and in appointing General Thomas, tntentionally violated tne constitution of the United States; that he did these acts with the intention of violating the constl- tution of the United States. Instead of averring that it is wholly immaterial what intention the President had, it is wholly immaterial whether lie honestly be- lieved that the act of Congress was unconstitutional; it is wholly {immaterial whether he believed that he was acting in accordance with his oath of office to preserve, protect and defend the constitution when he did this act—instead of averring that, they aver that he acted with intention to violate the constitu- tion of the Unit Now, when we offer to introduce evidel ri this question of intent—evidence that, before offering any opinion on this subject, he resorted to proper advice to enable him to form a correct one, and that when he did form a fixed opinion on this subject it was under the influence of this prejudice, and that when he did this act, whether it was lawful or unlawful, it was done with an intention to violate the constitution—the honorable Manaer gets up here and argues anhonpr by the clock that it is wholly im- material what his opinion wis, and what advice he hed received in conformity with which he acted in this matter, @ honorable Manager’s argument may be a sound one; this Senate fnay ulttmately come to that conclusion after they have heard this clause, That is a discussion into which T shall not enter; but before the Segate can come to the con- sideration of these questions they must pass over this aiiegation; they must either say, as the honor- able Manager says, that it is wholiy imimaterial what opinion the President has formed, and under what advice or under what circumstances he formed it, or eige be admitted by the Senators. But it is material, and the evidence must be considered, Now how ts it possibie at this stage of the inquiry to determine which of these courses is to be takea by the honorable Senate? If the Senate should pong come to the conclusion that ti is wholly imunatertal, Unis evidence wilt dd no har. If, on the other hand, the Senate should finally come to the conciusion that itis material What the intention of the President was. in commitiing these acts, and that they wil examine to see whether it was or not a wilful violation of t constitution, what then? It would lave ex- ciuded the evidence upon which it could have determined that questisn, 1 respectfully subinit, ther e, that whether the argument of the honorable Manager is sound or unsound; whether it will finally appear in the judg- ment of the Senate that this is Mauterial or not this is the time to excl round Ciat an ex- Jon of t these jucrits will show that it 1 that is shown the evidence can be laut If the other conclusion should be arrived at by any one Senator or by body then they will be in want of this evidence which We now offer. In reference to this question, Senators, is it not pertinent? Ido not intend to enter into the constitutional inquiry which was started yesterday by the honorable Manayer (Mr. Butler) as to the particular character of the Cabinet counsel. One thing is certain, that every President from the origin of the government has resorted to oral consultation with the members of nis Cabwet, and oral discussions in his presence on questions of public importance during the course of his oficial duty. Another thing is apparent, and that is that although the written — letter remains, and werefore ite would appear with some certainty what the advice of a Cabinet counsel Was, yet every practical man who has con- nection with the business aifairs of life—every | yer, every legisiator, knows that there is no such the most | 3 honoroble Senator from Michigan (Mr. Howard) as to why we should put members of the Cabinet on the stand, I would say that we pat them on the stand for the same purpose as the Semator, when practising: jaw, has frequently put lawyers on the stand, A man ts proceeded against by another for an improper arrest or for a malicious prosecution, and it ts neces- sary to prove motive. If no proper cause is proved Invtive is tinpossibie; but it is perfectly well settled when the defendant can show that he fairly laid his case before counsel and that the counsel advised him that there was probable cause, the inference of mo- tive is overthrown, We wish to show here that the President called for the opinions of his ad- visers and acted upon that advice, In re- onse to the question of the honorable Senator from Maryland (Mr. Johuson) he will Aiow me to say that this ts a question which the 1 answer much better than the Presi- y nestion is, “Do the counsel for and that the Managers deny the. pnt made by the President in his message of ember 12, 1867, as given in evidence by the Man- agers (page 45, oictal report), that the members of the Cabinet gave in the opinion there stated as to the Tenure of OMice act? and ts the evidence offered cor- roborative of that statement, or for what other ob- ject is it offered? We now understand from what the honorable Manager has said this morning that the House of Representatives has taken no issue on that part of our answer. The tu ie Manager does not understand that that view coutroverts or denies art our argument. We do also understand that the honorable Managers have themselves put in evidence the message of the President to the Senate of the 12thof December, in which he states that he was advised by the members of h net unani- mously, including Mr. Stanton, that t! W Was un- constitutional, Nevertheless, Scuutors, this is an affair of the utmost gravity in any aspect or in any possible view of it, and we do not at liberty to evade or abstain from offering the members of the President's Cabinet, so that they might state to you, under the sanction of their oaths, what advice was given to the President by them on the subject. Senator WILLIAMS. submitted. the following ques- tion to the counsel:—‘“Is the advice given to the President by his Cabinet with a view of preparing a veto message pertinent to prove the right of the President to disregard the law aller it was passed over his veto #” Mr. Cunrtis—I consider it strictly pertinent. It is not enough that the President received such advice, but he must show that an occasion arose for him to act upon it, which, in the judg@ent of the Senate, Was such occasion that any wrong iuteution cannot be imputed to him, But the fimt siep is to show that he honestly believed that it was an unconstitutios law. I wish, in closing, simply to say that Senators perceive how entirely aside this view w! | © presented to the Senate is from ie claim ihe part of the President that he may disregard a lay simply be- cause he thinks it unconstitutionu. lie makes no such claim. He must make ® case beyond that—a case such as is stated in his answer; but in order to make a case beyond that, it is necessary for him to begin by satisfying the Senate that ue honestly be- lieved the law unconstitutional, and iv is with that view that we now offer this evidence, ‘The CmEr Justicr—Senators, the only question which the Clef Justice considers as before the Sen- ate respects hot the weight: but the winissibility of the evidence off Mine that ques~ tion, it is necessary to show what is charged in the articles of impeachinent. The first article charges that on the 2ist of February, the President issued an order for the removal of Mr. Stanton from the oice of Secretary of War; that that order Was made unlawiully, and that it was made with the intent then and there to violate the consti- tution of the United States. The same charge is re- peated in. the articles which relaie to the appoint ment of Mr. Thomas, and which were necessarily connected with this transaction, The intent, then, 1s the subject to which much of the evidence on both sides has been directed, and the Chief Justice con- ceives that this testimony is aduussibie for the pur- pose of showing the intent with which the President has acted in this transaction, lie will submit the. question to the Senate if any Senator desires, Senator Howaxp called for the yeas and nays. The vote was taken and resulted—yeus 20, days 29, as follows:— Yras—Senators Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Dooiittls, Fessend Fowler, Grin Henderson, Hendricks, Johuson, Patterson of Tenn. Ross, » McCreery, F Saulsbury, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey 20, Nays—Senators Cameron, Cattell, Chahdier, Cole, Conk- ling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, ' Ferry, Fresinghuysen; Harlan, Howard,’ Howe, ‘Mor,an, Morrill of forrlitof Vt, Patterson of N. H.. Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sprastc, Stewart, Thayer, ‘Mpton, Williams, Wilt ton, Yates So the evidence was excluded. Secretary Welles was then called to the stand, and vd eXamination was resumed as follows by Mr. Evaris:— Q. At the Cabinet meetings held durizg the period from the presentation of the bill to tis President until his message sending in his objections wes com- pleted was the question whether Mr. Suton was. thin the operation of the Civil Tenure act the sub- ject of consideration and determination ¢ Mr, BuTLER—We object. ‘The Caigv Justice directed the counsel to put the offer in writing. ‘The offer was reduced to writing as follows:— “We offer to prove that at the meeting of the Cabmet at which Mr. Stanton was present, held while the Tenure of Oiice act was before the advice of the the same was asked by the Cabinet; the President for approva Cabinet in reference to | by’ the President and thereupon ti her Mr. Stanton and the other Seer ppoint- ments from Me, Lincoln were within the resirictions of the President's power of removal trom office created by said act was considered, and the opinion expressed that the Secretaries appointed by Mr. Lincoin were not within the restricuions.”* Mr. BUTLER objected, stating that the question came withi 4g Already made by the Senate. Mr. Evan ‘ton, stating that he did not regard the question as coming within the ruling, The ruling already made might have turned on one of several cousiderations quite outside of the present jiquiry. The present evtlence sought to be introduced presented questions of another coiplexion, In the first paace it | derieg the question a8 to the law ite whether P t had in any way, or was inteuded te | lication to Secretaries whom tho hever selected or appointer ‘Th the subject of much consideration aud w President himself, and his action concerning it was what brought the question ii ‘the removal or Mr. Stanton was based on the President's opinion, after proper and diligent efforts to get a opinion, that Mr. Stanton was not within t and therefore the evide: President's conduct and ae ton was not in the intent of viojating the law, The purpose pow was to slow that he jon in remey init Mr. Stan- satisfactory mode of bringing out the truth as an oral discussion, face to face with those who are in- terested in the subject; that it is the most sugges- tive, Ue most searching, the most satisfaciory mode of arriving at the conclusion; that solitary written tna composed in a closet, away from the colli- jon between man and man, Which brings out new thoughts, new conc *ptions, more accurate views, Is not the best mode of arriving at a conclusion; and, under the influence of this practical consideration undoubtedly it is, that this habit, Lae poy § with General Washington, not becoming universal by any means until Mr. Jefferson's time, but from that day to this this habit has been forme President Johnson had found it in existence. When he went into oice he continued i therefore say that when the question of his comes to be considered by the Senate; when the question arises in their minds whether the President honestly believed that this was an unconstitutional Jaw; when the particular emerger arrives; when, if he carried out or obeyed that iaw, he mast quitthe powers Which he believed were conferred upon him by the constitution and not be able to carry ou the departments of the government in the manner the these questions: te then they ublic interests required, When t Brose f r the consideration of the Seua ought to have before them the fact that the advice of the usual proper advisers; sorted to the best means within his fullopinion upon this subject, an iy is a fair usion that when that opinion ie Doce al which he fel} he must carry 0 propa TEAM ould. dive. View, and this polat of view only, that we offer this evidence. The honorable Ser Michigan (Mr. Howard) has proposed a question to te counsel for osident. itis this:—"Do the counsel for the «1 not considgr that the validity of the Tenure e bill was purely & question of lay?” I shall answer that part of the question tirst. The constitu. tional validity of auy jaw is, of course, parely aques- tion of law; ic depends upon @ comparison of this provision of the bil with @ law enacted by the peopte that therefore he did form As af fidnest and fixed opinion, No practice Hf the yf is in this point of for the government of ragents; it depends upon whether t agents have transcended the authority wien tT uple gave; and that comparison of the coustituuon Wilh the law is, in the sense in 7 it was intended by the Senator, a . The next branch of the question ther that question is to he determined in the y the Senate. That is @ question | cannot an- sit isa question that can be determined only by the senate themselves, If the Senat: should find tiat Mr. Stanton's case was not wit! in this law, then no such question arises; then ther: i+ no ques- tion in this particular case of a conflict between this Jaw and the constitution, If the Senate should fad that im these articles charged agains! the President itis necessary for the Senate to believe that there was some act of turpitade on his part connected with this matter—some matagides, some bad intent. and that he did not honestly believe, us he states in his answer, that this was an unconstit 1 Law that a case having arisen when he must act accord. ingly under his oath of office; if tie Senate comes to that conclusion is immaterial whether this Was @ constitutional or an wuconstitutional law. be one or be it the other, be it did not do it with the intent of ylolating the law, but with the intent of exercising a well known, perfect- ly established constitutional power, deemed by hin tn the advice of his Cabinet not to be efveted by the law. If the question of inteat, of purpose of mo- tive, and of object in the removal of Mr. Stanton were the subject of inquiry bere, then it was proper to show that he acted within obedience of ihe constitu. tion as he was advised, and within obedience to the law as he was advised. The question, too, had a bearing upon the presence Mr. stanton and his assent to the opinions of the Cabinet, and had a bear- ing in reference to the President's right to expect from Mr, Stanton acquiescence in the power a te. moval. Mr. BurLer said that, without desiring to enter upon debate, he wished to cali the aticntion of the Senate to the fact that the question sought to show whether the Cabinet, inevading Mr. Stanton, had not advised the President that the bil did not apply to Mr. Stanton. In that connection he would refer the Senate to the President's message of the 12th of De- ver, in which he made use of the following ian- “Yo the Senate of the United States:—T have carefully examined the bill to reguiate the tenure of certain ¢1vil offices, The waterial portion of the bill lx coniained in the first section and ts of the effect fol- lowing—namely, ‘That any person holding any civil offic: has beea appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every per- who siwtll hereatier be appointed to any such office and shall become duly quaiiied to act: therein, i8 ancl ghail be eutitled to held such oMee until & Succestor suai pitvyg been appoiated — by President, With tie aivice gud consent 1¢ Sehate and duly qualified, and that the Seere- taries of State, of Ue ‘Treasury, of War, of the Navy and of the Interior, the Postumster General and the Attorney Genera shall hold their 4 reapectively for and during the term of the President by whom tiey may have been appotated, and for one mont thereatter, subject to removal by and with the advice. aud consent of the Senate. These provisions are qualified by a reservation in the fourth section that thing contained in the bill shat be construed to extend the terat of any office the duration of which is limited by law. In effect the bill provides that the vr lent suaill not remove from their places any civil officers whose terms of service are not lunited by law Without the adviee and con- sent of the Senate of the United states. The question, as Congress is well aware, is by no means a new one. The President in that same m then wen! he debate tn 178, which wholly appited to Cabinet oficers, and the Senate will (ind chat that Was the gist of the whole argument. On page 41 the President, afer having exhausted the arguiient &8 to Cabinet oiicers, Went on to sayi—"lt appiles equally to every other oficer of the goveru- ment appointed by the President, whose term of du- ration is not spectally declared. It is supported by the weighty reason that the subordinate oiticers in the executive department ought to hold at the pleas- ure of (he head of the department becanse he Is invest ed erally with the executive authority, and the participation in that authority by the Senate was an exception to a general principle and ought,to be taken strictly. The resident is the great rrspousible ofl- cer for the execution of the iaw, and tle power of re- il true or false, that the President cominitted an offence by his inter tion of the law, he has not com- iultted an impeachable offence aa charged by the House of Repregentatives; and as we must advance beyond this question before we reach tue third ques- tion that the Senator pi nds, there is no neces- sity for tie Senate to determine that question, The residue of the question is, “Do they consider that the opinions of Cabinet officers touching that ques- tion—tuat is, the constitutionality of that law—are competent evidence by which the judgment of the Senate ought to be insipenced:"” Cériululy not. We do not put them on the stand as experts on ques. tions of constitutional law; the judges will determine that out of their own breasts, We put them om the Stand as advisers of the President to state what advice in polnt of fact they gave him with a view to stow that he was guilty of no tinproper tatent to vio- late the constituuon, In reply to (ie question of the moval was incidental to that duty and might often be requisite to fuifil it.’ Mr. Butler went on to call the attention of the Senate to the additional reason Srvie con by Mr. Evarts in reference to Mr, Stanton’s giving consideration to the law. ‘The proof Of it was offered to show that the President, when he removed Mr. Stanton, supposed that Mr. Stantoa did not be- lieve himself (Stanton) to be within the law; bat Mr. Stanton had just been reinstated under the law, had refused to resign because the law could touch him, He had put the President's power at flance (as the President himself stated his mr 4 sage), and now he (Mr. Butler) asked whether sane man belteved that the Prestdent thought 0 440% Qist of February that Mr. Stanton would yie 2 the office on the ground that he was not coy the law?’ The President had not put CONTINUED ON TENTH P* 40k n—eneeriaeadiital 3S poo