Evening Star Newspaper, January 4, 1942, Page 26

Editorial Page Features TEN PAGES. The Sunday Stax _S_truggle for Singapore Is Key To Probable Duration of War Capture of Britain’s Far Eastern Base by Japanese Might Prolong Pacific Struggle for Many Years and Delay Victory By Constantine Brown. Within the next few weeks the struggle for Singapore is likely to overshadow all other battles in this war, for at the close | of the historic conferences between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and their military, naval and air advisers it was agreed that the great British Far Eastern base must be saved at any cost. The fall of Manila serves to accentuate the importance of holding Bingapore. \ The South Pacific looms in Allied strategy today with magnitude at least equal to that of any other theater of | operations—the Atlantic, Russia or the Near East. To American naval and military strategists it is far more impor- tant than the struggle in North Africa and the Mediterranean. This is not mere selfishness on the part of American naval and air officers, but is based on sound considerations. Before the war council was held in Washington the British and Soviet strategists looked on the South Pacific as a secondary theater of action; we were told repeatedly that Germany is the chief enemy and that as soon as the Reich collapses we need not worry about the little Japs. American strategists agreed with their associates that Japan has much less stamina than the Reich; hence, they argued, if Japan cannot reach its prin- cipal objectives within a comparatively short time, she is likely ot disintegrate rapidly. Japan's main purpose in this war is the capture of Singapore and the rich Netherlands possessions — Java, Sumatra and Borneo. Should her ulti- mate war plans be frustrated, all the spectacular victories which the Japanese air and land armies have won so far | would be of no consequence. ©Oil and Rubber Vital. Germany'’s situation is somewhat dif- ferent, however. She has the entire continent of Europe from the English | Channel to Smolensk and Kiev at her disposal. The Reich is a land power and, with the exception of oil and rub- ber, she has practically every raw mate- rial she needs. Barring internal col- lapse, her defeat will require some time. A Japanese victory at Singapore would further strengthen her power of resist- ance and put off still longer the day of Nazi defeat toward which the Allies are fighting. Consequently, naval and military offi- cers who for years héve studied the problems of simultaneous wars in the Atlantic and the Pacific, maintain that the Allies must fight Germany defen- sively in Europe and the Neer East, while concentrating their main effort in the Pacific. The idea that Japan's might would disintegrate if the Nazis are defeated is fully indorsed in Washington; provided, however, that this defeat occurs within the next 12 months. Such a speedy victory over the Nazis is considered high- ly improbable, however. The Nezis and their associates still pack a powerful punch. We must not be misled into too great optimism as the result of the Soviet victories; they may be only temporary and none will be surprised if they end in the next few weeks. There necessarily will be a lull on the Russian front until late next gpring or early in the summer. Mean- while the Nazis will be active in other flelds. ¢ Must Be Reinforced. Africa and the Near Eest are the most probable theaters which Hitler will choose for his next exploits. If the Allies, with the assistance of United States production, could stall the Germans chere, they would be well on the road to victory. But the Allied purpose would be defeated if, in the meantime, the Japa- nese were to have their own way in the Pacific. Week naval and air reinforce- ments in that area would be just a waste of good equipment and splendid human material. It is no longer a military secret that unless we get heavy naval and air rein- forcements to Singepore and adjacent territories the British fortress in the Pacific will fall. And when the flag of the Rising Sun flies over that citadel, we may be sure that neither Java nor SBumatra will be able to resist another month. Furthermore, India, which has been seething for many years and which has been the field of opération for Japa- nese agents since 1926, is a danger spot. REVENSES IN THE PACIFIC | not take more than a year. | two essentials in the hands of the It would be foolish to imagine that | after taking Singapore and obtaining access to the Indian Ocean the Japanese will sit down and tell its European part- ners: “All right, gentlemen, we heve conquered all we set out to conquer, and the war, as far as we are concerned, is over.” The tie that binds the three robber nations today is like that which united the bootleg barons of prohibition days. They fought~each other in great gang wars, but the fight did not begin until the law was defeated. As long as there was danger from that quarter they stuck together. There is little love lost among Japanese, Germans snd Iteliens, but | Ninpon knows that if the Nazis are ever cefeated its turn will come mighty quick- Iy. Hence, if the Japanese capture Singa- pore—and they are bound to do so un- less heavy reinforcements are received, even at the risk of setbacks in the At- lantic—they will not remain static. Their naval and air forces, based on Singapore and the Netherlands possessions, will press on and attempt to reach the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. A gigantic pin- cers movement then will be organized. The Allies, with no base closer than Australia, 2,000 miles away, can only look on, powerless to check the Axis success. Could Replenish Stocks. According to the best available re- ports, Germany and Japan have gaso- line and oil supplies for a war of about 12 to 18 months (the lesser figure for the Reich, the greater for Nippon). The same thing applies to rubber. Even though the Dutch destroy the Indies oil fields, even though the British cut down every rubber tree in the Malay Peninsula, the Japanese ultimately can re-establish production. Revival of rub- ber production under these circumstances would take about seven years, it is true, but resumption of oil production would With these enemy, their resistance could continue for many years. With such prizes at stake, the Japa- nese are fighting fanatically and without regard for human life. They are rush- | ing their forces blindly into battle, bas- ing their strategy on a quick victory. Their air equipment is first class; the equipment of their land forces—with the exception. of the mechanized divi is relatively poor. The erack J:& armored forces, fighting in Malaysia, have modern armament, but the rest of the land divisions are using antiquated ‘weapons. The Japanese compensate for the lack of adequate armament by throwing over- whelming numbers into battle—five to one, in some cases. Afr superiority makes | it possible for them to gain important terrain, but if this momentum can be broken it is more than likely that the ‘wear and tear of the first weeks of the war will force them to slow down. Planes Are Essential. ‘The question of the Allies reoccupying territory Japan has conquered does not arise yet. Their entire present strategy is based on preventing Japan from reaching the chief objective of her mad drive—Singapore. Ninety per cent of the Allies’ chances depend on whether the Japs can be stopped short of Singa- pore. Reinforcements undoubtedly are being rushed to Malaya at this moment, and it is to be hoped that they will not arrive too late. The question is not so much one of men and tanks as it is of inter- ceptor and bombing planes. It is ad- mitted in Washington that if Gen. Douglas MacArthur had received the hundreds of planes for which he had clamored since August—planes which had to be sent to Russia and the British in the. Near East—the Japanese would still be on the high seas, trying to find a place to land. Invasion of t&:e Philippines at all was possible only because the defending force lacked air power; the lesson of that in- vasion has been thoroughly learned in Washington and London. What rein- forcements have been dispatched is a secret which only a few share, but from certain statements in responsible quar- ters it appears probable that vital weap- ons are now on the way to give the de- fenders of the South Pacific the strength to hold Singapore and the Netherlands Indies. WASHINGTON, D. C, JANUARY ¢, 1942 Four Sea Dogs in Top Commands Wartime Burden Settles on Experienced Shoulders 23 Above, left to right: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commanding the Allied Asiatic Fleet; Admiral Er- nest J. King, commander in chief, United States Fleet; Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commanding the Pacific- Fleet. At right: Vice Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, commanding the At- lantic Fleet. —A. P. and Wide World Photos. i 'URT beauty No. 2, with a laugh as rosy as his cheeks. Temper— don’t fool with nitroglycerine!"—From “The Lucky Bag,” United States Naval Academy, Class of 1901. He is still very handsome, with cropped gray hair, eyes of cold blue fire and six lean feet of whipcord—this midshipman of 40 years ago whose blooming com- plexion led classmates at Annapolis to give him the nickname of “Dolly.” He no longer suggests a palace belle. The cheeks, tanned to mahogany, are seamed with trenches cut by wind and salt spray. The laugh has grown in- frequent and harsh. But the temper of dynamite persists—as may become an officer vested with authority unequaled in the history of the United States Navy. On Tuesday of last week Admiral Ernest J. King formally assumed duty as top fighting man of American sea power. By an Executive Order of De- cember 18, he was named commander in chief of the United States Fleet, with “supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets of the United States and of the operating forces of the naval coastal frontier com- mands.” Removed from the jurisdiction of Admiral Harold R. Btark, Chief of Naval, operations, he was made directly answerable, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to Presi- dent Roosevelt himself. ‘Westerners Rule Navy. ‘This, the Navy's second shake-up in 11 months, placed its destiny as a battle instrument in the hands of four men, all of whom, curiously enough, are West- erners. Three are natives respectively of Ohio, Texas and Michigan. The other, born in the District of Columbia, was appointed to Annapolis from In- diana and maintains his residence there. The “Big Four,” two of them newcomers to highest combatant rank in the Navy, are as follows: Admiral Ernest Joseph King, com- mander in chief of the United States Fleet. Admiral Thomas Charles Hart, com- mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and, as of yesterday, commander of united nations’ naval forces in the Southwest Pacific. Admiral Chester William Nimitz, com= mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Vice Admiral Royal Eason Ingersoll, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. The rank of commander in chief of the Fleet has been utilized at intervals since December 22, 1775, when Esek Hopkins, thus commissioned by the Con- tinental Congress, took command of the first American Navy of two small ves- sels. Last February 1 the sea arm was reorganized on a three-fleet basis. Ad- miral Husband E. Kimmel, now relieved of duty in consequence of the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, was appointed commander in chief of both the Pacific and United States Fleets. The second post was merely nominal. Beyond such matters as uniformity of training and regulations, the Atlantic and Asiatic Fleets remained independent commands. Stark’s Shh‘l Affected. Turmoll following the Pearl Harbol reverse obscured an important circum- stance—that the President’s order of December 18 in effect stripped Admiral Stark of his function as senior combat officer of the Navy and transferred it to Admiral King. Except for a vague man- date as to preparation of long-range strategic plans, the former was reduced to administrative tasks. The latter was instructed to organize a staff which has charge, among other things, of devising and executing all cur- rent war operations. Admiral King was directed to establish his principal office at the Navy Department in Washington. But he was left wholly free, in his own discretion, to exercise personal command at sea. Admiral King became chief of the country's first line of defense at one 8f the most desperate moments in the Navy's annals. When the first bombs rained on Pearl Harbor in the Sabbath dawn of December 7, a nightmare burst into reality. The Navy was involved in two-ocean warfare, although a two- ocean fleet was three or four years fgpm consummation. . Against all strategic principles, its units were scattered from Reykjavik to Manila. As bitter fruits of & protracted national policy of timidity and complacence, of indecision and ap- peasement, & series of incredible dis- asters thronged the Pacific. Vanished was the dream of the “Ad- miral Blimps” that they would devote some fine week end t‘pollmluoflhpm. By Richard L. Stokes. It was not, as they had boasted, the paper and bamboo habitations of Tokio upon which explosive and incendiary bombs began to fall, but the civilian quarters of Manila. Instead of the leisurely, long-range blockade of Nippon which had been mapped, the United States found itself cut off in a week from tin and rubber. The American Fleet, it appeared, was on the verge of being thrust back on its second Pacific ram- part, the far-flung line of Alaska- Hawali-Samoa-Panama—with Japan in of the offensive and with the free initiative for attack. Heavy Responsibility. Such was the crisis confronting the new commander in chief. Upon his shoulders were thrust the consequences of American statesmanship in the Far East since the Manchurian incident; of error and delay in the national defense program during its first 15 months; and the policy which supplied Japan, for possible employment against the United States, with steel for ships and guns, copper for shells and motors, gasoline and oil for bombers and fighting planes. As befitted & seaman, Admiral King gave way neither to despair nor over- confidence. His sole personal pronounce- ment, issued December 24, was realistic but also valiant. It contained six brusque, clipped sentences of 45 words, 43 of which were vocables of one curt syllable, “The way to victory is long,” it read. “The going will be hard. We will do the best we can with what we've got. We must have more planes and ships—at once. Then it will be our turn to strike. We shall win through—in time.” 1t will be observed that in his fourth sentence the admiral set planes before ships. This is in keeping with his unique position as the first aviator to become chief of the United States Fleet. In this respect, his career shows a striking parallel with that of his redoubtable op- ponent, Admiral Isoroku ‘Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese combined fleets. Both, at mature years, read the signs of the time and devoted themselves to mastery of the air arm. Both have commanded plane carriers, as well as shore stations or bureaus of seronautics. There is no evidence, how- ever, that Yamamoto ever became an actual pilot, as did King. Saw Action in Cuba. The son of a railway mechanic, the future “Cincus”—to give his title in Navy shorthand—was born 63 years ago at Lorain, Ohio, on November 23, 1878. He was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1897, and took time out while a mid- shipman for patrol duty in the Span- ish-American War, during which he saw enemy shells fall into the sea off Cuba. Commissioned ensign in 1903, he rose through the grades until the World War found him chief of staff to Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commander in chief of the United States Fleet. For this service he won the Navy Cross. During two years he was head of the post-graduate school at Annapolis. His experience with undersea boats started in 1922, when he was made com- mander of two submarine divisions. The next year he was commandant of the submarine base at New London, Conn., and in 1925 was in charge of salvaging the submersible S-51, which sank off Block Island, with a loss of 33 lives. The Distinguished Service- Medal was his reward for this notable exploit. When the submarine S-4 was rammed and sunk in 1927 off Provincetown, Mass, he was placed in command of the sal- vage force, and had the rare Gold Star added to his D. 8. M. In the meantime, as commander of the U. 8. 8. Wright, he had charge of & squadron of seaplanes, and found them 50 fascinating that at the venerable age of 49, when he had held the rank of captain five years, he betook himself to Pensacola for the.headlong air training | devised by the Navy for daredevils half | his age. He qualified as a pilot in 1927. | <Thereafter, for 13 years, his career lay in the skies. He was successively commander of air- craft squadrons in the Scouting Fleet, assistant chief of the Bureau of Aero- nautics, commander of the carrier Lex- ington for three years, chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and commander dmn{xmmmemme. Scouting Force and Battle Force. Hav~ ing gained thte rank of vice admiral, he reported for service on August 1, 1939, as a member of the General Board, a sort of “cabinet” to the Secretary of the Navy. In December, 1940, he assumed duty as commander of the Patrol Force of the United States Fleet, and on Feb- ruary 1, 1941, became commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, with the rank of admiral. Depending on severity of discipline, there are two sorts of vessels in the Navy—“taut ships” and “happy ships.” Admiral King is a foremost exponent of the “taut” school and is renowned as the strictest “sundowner” of them all. ‘This is an officer who insists that shore leave must end with the setting sun. * In 1905 King was married to Martha Rankin Edgerton of Baltimore. They have six daughters and one son, who is now a “plebe,” or freshman, at the Naval Academy. The family home is in Annapolis. Admiral Nimitz a Texan. Admiral Nimitz, who on Wednesday succeeded Admiral Kimmel in the crucial post of commander of the main American Fleet in the Pacific, was born in Predericksburg, Tex., and will be 57 years old next February 24. ‘Young Chester yearned to be a soldier, and would have tried for West Point if there had been a vacancy. As next best, he accepted an appointment to Annapolis in 1901. It took him until 1938 to become & rear admiral. In the meantime he won a silver life-saving medal for rescuing & Navy fireman from drowning, and developed into an expert on marine engines, submersibles and naval admin- istration. On the entrance of the United States into the World War, he was named chief of staff to Admiral S. S. Robison, com- mander of the submarine force of the Atlantic Fleet. His duties consisted mainly in getting submarines ready and then across the ocean to operate with the Allies. The reward was a special letter of commendation from the Navy Department. In 1939 he was appointed chief of the Navy Department’s Bureau of Naviga- tion, which has little to do with navi- gation, but is the department's person- nel office. He is noted for a soft Texas drawl, an icy visage, steel-blue eyes, a bearing of invincible serenity and hair so white that behind his back he is sometimes nicknamed “Cottonhead.” He has three daughters and one son. Following in the paternal footsteps, Lt. Chester William Nimitz, jr, is now on submarine duty, “somewhere in the thick of things.” The family home is in Washington. Hart Not Caught at Base. Admiral Hart, who was already nick- named “Dad” when a student at Annap- olis, has been commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet since 1939. What the Navy thinks of him was shown by the fact that it refused to let him retire when he reached the statutory age of 64 last June 12. The wary veteran re- paid its trust by making sure his fleet would not be caught at anchor, off guard, in case of sudden attack. Long ago he worked out a system of keeping his ships at sea and sending fhem into Manila Harbor, one at a time, under cover of night, for refueling and over- hauling. When the veil can be lifted, his superiors believe he will be found to have drawn the last ounce of resist- ance from his small fleet in the face of overwhelming odds, and to have made particularly expert use of submarines. He was born at Davidson, Mich., in 1877, and was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1897. He emerged from the ‘World War with the rank of captain and the Distinguished Service Medal, having commanded submarines in the waters of the British Isles and the Azores. He is a graduate of both the Army and Navy War Colleges. A Native of the District. Professionally & submarine man, he has never lacked a penetrating instinct for airplanes. In fact, lectures which he delivered 20 years ago on the role of aviation in future warfare are held by some Navy officers to have been useful to Gen. “Billy” Mitchell. Along with his appointment as com- mander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Vice Admiral Ingersoll would no doubt have received advancement to full ad- miral—if the law did not forbid the existence of more than four of this rank at the same time. Congress may be asked to amend the statutes in his behalf. He was born 58 years ago in Georgetown, D. C., was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1901 from’the Hoosler State, and gives La Porte, Ind,, as his home. Admiral Nimitz and he were class- mates at Annapolis. His father is Rear Admiral Royal Rodney Ingersoll, U.S. N,, retired. The new “Cimclant”—to use a service abbreviation—was assistant to the chief of naval operations when faté installed him in Admiral King's former shoes, charged with the Atlantic end of the naval conflict and marked out for lead- ership against the new submarine and bomber onslaught which Hitler is ex- pecti to launch in the spring. . 0 . Civics Organization News Future Anglo—Am_e—r;can Unity May Hinge on Canada’s Role Dominion Will Have Chance to Serve as Catalyst in Insuring Long-Range Co-operation of U. S. and Britain in Post-War World By Felix “Canada occupies a unique position in the British Empire,” said Winston Churchill in his speech at Ottawa last Tuesday, “because of its unbreakable ties with Britain and its ever-growing friend- ship and intimate association with the United States.” And the British Prime Minister went on to define the great self-governing Dominion as “a potent magnet,” drawing together the English- speaking nations on both sides of the Atlantic. It is no qualification of the Canadian war effort, which, in Mr. Churchill’s words, has been “magnificent,” to suggest that the Dominion’s greatest long-range contribution in the world upheaval will turn out to be of a political character. For in Canadian hands, to a very large | extent, rests the answer to the question of whether or not present Anglo-Ameri- can unity will prove permanent. During the First World War the setup for enduring solidarity between the United States and Great Britain was very much as it is today. Then, as now, Can- ada was theoretically in a position to modify and reconcile both British and American policies in & way which would have furthered permanent peace. But after the Armistice of November 11, 1918, reaction set in. In political and in economic policles Washington and London drifted far apart. The Smoot- Hawley tariff on the one hand. the Ottawa Agreements on the other, com- bined to demonstrate the unreality of Anglo-German co-operation. There was sardonic frony in attaching the name of the Canadian capital to a commercial system of imperial preference under which American loss was the measure of British gain. Impotent Role. If Canada was a magnet during those critical years, it was one which proved singularly incompetent to accomplish anything permanent toward Anglo- American unity. During the early thir- ties, indeed, the Dominion could have been far more accurately defined as a dangling tail of the British imperial kite. ‘The chief obstacle to effective Cana- dian leadership in securing permanently closer relations between Great Britain and the United States is psychological. Both for the political leadership of the British and for the industrial supremacy of the United States the average Cana- din cherishes respect and admiration which fall not far short of an inferiority complex. Canada’s lack of positive national con- sciousness is well illustrated by wartime posters which throughout the Dominion display the pictures of both Prime Min- ister Churchill and President Roosevelt. The Canadian Prime Mipister, Mr. Mackenzie King, may lack the dynamic qualities of these two outstanding fig- ures. Nevertheless it is arresting that Canadians themselves should be so con- tent to advertise their role as subordi- nate. ] Those who do not assert themselves are always in some danger of being pa- tronized and in the attitude of both Brit- ish and Americans toward the Cana- dians, in the past at any rate, there has heen more than a suspicion of patronage. Even in Mr. Churchill's speech at Ottawa there was a trace of this, perhaps unconsciously revealed by his definition of the Canadian role in Anglo-American relations as that of a “magnet.” Industrial Progress. For all its virtues, the magnet is not a very positive instrument. It is not a catalytic agent and does nothing to fuse and permanently combine the materials which it attracts. One of the great changes brought by this war, however, is a Canadian indus- trial evolution which will of itself force a less colonial outlook among the people of the Dominion after hostilities have ceased. Mr. Churchill himeslf drew at- tention to this on Tuesday when he pointed out that Canadian shipbuilding, virtually non-existent before the war, is now “proceeding on a scale almost equal to the building of the United Kingdom.” This development is in no way unique. In steel, chemical and machine produc- tion, in the growth of light as well as heavy industry, in the expansion of hy- droelectric plant and in mining opera- Morley. tions, the same shift from agricultural to manufacturing emphasis is apparent. All this foreshadows increasing national assertiveness on the part of postwar Canada. Wartime expansion is building the basis of a strong Canadian nationalism. But simultaneously the wartime need for co-operation is strengthening the politi- cal tie with Great Britain and forging that “intimate association with the United States” to which Mr. Churchill referred in Ottawa. It seems not unlikely that the Domin- fon government will before long write off the enormous and mounting debt owed to it by Great Britain, not merely as a gesture of common purpose but as a practical sten envisaging”post-war Brit- ain in the light of a market for Cana- dian manufactures as well as for agri- cultural produce. Actually at hand is the striking recom= mendation of the newly established joint Defense Production Committee of Can- ada and the United States. This body has officially recommended that all tariff and trade barriers which “impede the free flow of necessary munitions and war supplies between the two countries should be suspended or otherwise eliminated for the duration of the war.” Unlikely to Be Abandoned. If Canada and the United States form this foreshadowed customs union, it is unlikely to be abandoned at the close of hostilities. In spite of specialized com- petition, the general economic co-ordina=- tion to be expected will probably make continuation of a North American free- trade area desirable for both parties. Such outcome will be the more likely if the war continues for several years, with increasing dominance of governmental over private interests. As Canada and the United States tend 1o coalesce, at least in the economic field, their joint influence on British policy will become enormous. Exhausted by its stupendous war effort, drained of financial reserves, largely dependent on North American assistance for recovery, the power of direction will inevitably swing westward from Britain across the Atlantic, assuming that the wartime mer- ger now obliterating the Canadian- American frontiek proves continuous. Until the entry of the United States into the war, there was much doubt as to the outcome of the triangular relations between Britain, Canada and the United States. The rapid growth of Canadian nationalism might well have led to the development of antagonisms, rather than co-operation, between Washington and Ottawa. Long-range British interests might have seemed to call for post-war revival of the imperial preference policy, rather than for admitted dependence on New World economic supremacy. Opportunity for Canada. But since December 7 the irritations and suspicions interfering with the de- velopment of unity amcng these English- speaking nations have been, at least temporarily, swept away. And the seri- ous setbacks suffered by both the United States and Great Britain in the Far East serve only to emphasize the neces= sity for that joint effort now being plan= ned in Washington. In total war, co-ordination of military effort means parallel co-ordination of both political and economic policy. It means the enforced acceptance of de- velopments which in normal times would be regarded as utterly impossible because of their variance from traditions or ac- cepted ideas. And co-ordination of mili- tary effort means, further, the establish« ment of new practices which, if tried long enough and eventually successful, will not be wholly relinquished when the war is over. The general character of the post- war world is shrouded in obscurity. Yet it may be predicted with confidence that one almost certain result will be further erasure of the already faint frontier be- tween Canada and the United States. And if the Canadians assume the leader- ship indicated by their strategic position this unity will almost automatically in- clude post-war Britain. It is & remarkable opportunity, not so much as & magnet but as a positive catalytic agent, which is opening for Ca-