Evening Star Newspaper, August 25, 1935, Page 33

LEAGUE HELD TOGETHER BY FEAR OF GERMANY Powers Will Not Risk Italian Offense by Ethiopian Inte rvention, Because They Want Aid. BY FRANK H. SIMONDS. 8 THE Ethiopian affair moves the most optimistic have al- ready accepted as inevitable, consider from a detached point of view the performance of European major crisis. To analyze the motives of the several countries, too, is to un- #o inconsistent with past pretensions as to be practically unintelligible. And courses are most impressive. Four years ago, for example, when whole question of the future of the League of Nations was raised. It was with her Asiatic adventure the prece- dent would be fatal to Geneva's influ- had long been the most earnest advo- cate of League action rather than British were the champions of the collective idea because they were vert to the old condition of rival al- liances, but make use of the machin- But in the crisis of 1931 the British utterly declined to share in any at- effective. Mr. Stimson carried the United States to Geneva and made it the effort to insure combined action. But the British saw their Asiatic sit- afford to make an enemy of Japan. Instead of accepting the Manchurian League and the collective idea, there- fore, they permitted it to assume the United States and Japan, in which they were using their good offices. Necessarily, they later subscribed to the Lytton report, which uitimately erally, but by no means unanimous- ly, the British press criticized Japa- Throughout the crisis the relations between London and Tokio were not ton and Tokio were. But the double precedent of Japanese triumph and since to plague British statesmanship. In the Ethiopian affair the British there was a direct break between the elements in England actually anxious convinced of its value and those who thought Japanese friendship more Far East than the fortunes of the League. Today. however, both those the Italian adventure and those who are concerned with the material in- in agreement. And this explains the wholly different tone of British com- was lacking four years ago. A new general election is coming in the present government to support the League to the uttermost will provide of attack. But, at the same time, those Tories who have little concern in Ethiopia must have very disagree- able implications for British inter- London is disturbed over the possible approach of Italy to the headwaters 8s Gen. Smuts indicated the other day, that this war of Mussolini’s may millions of King George's black - v 3 ck sub. Britain wants the hand of the League strengthened now as the in the Manchurian affair. In 1931 the problem of the League was awk- was a collision between principle and interest. In 1935, however, these run League and the British, though, the situation is otherwise for the French. tonc_emed with keeping relations with Tokio cordial. Paris recently has been new entente with Rome. Having to choose between sacrific- resentment, the British chose to let Geneva down. Having to decide be- has now followed the British exam; ple and let Geneva pay the price in lost French like the Italian preference— neither for that matter did the Brit- but each country in turn has fa Ce identical situation in the same l‘:.s;: note that just as Sir John Simon de- flected Japanese resentment from Laval turned Italian wrath from French to British shoulders. curately if you say that in 1931 Britain felt that she needed Japanese friend- to back the League in 5 feal interference with Japaness. s needs Italy too gravely in her Euro- Pean enterprise to help Geneva hinder today 1s to soften British-Italian acerbities as to prevent Italy’s depar- is trying to convince Britain, the League may well prove an admirable British hands to defeat a German aggression later. Called upon to choose between see- ing League prestige shaken by failure its ranks further thinned by the de- parture of Italy, France has deliber- Paris is patently annoyed with Musso- lini’s course in embarking upon an Tope at a moment when the danger from the German direction is mount- the British and save the face of the League at the price of Italy's with- cent Franco-Italian quarrels. Italy, therefore, is in the situation the Manchurian affair. She knows that she has nothing to fear from any through the League because these powers cannot agree. She is aware of likely to make war singlehanded against her to validate League princl- toward that end which all but it is interesting and illuminating to statesmanship in what has become a derstand moves which are otherwise in this respect the British and French the Manchurian episode occurred, the clear then that if Japan got away ence in the future. Great Britain, too, operations of individual nations. The eager that the world should not re- ery of Geneva. tempt to make the collective system a practical partner of the League in uation as such that they could not affair as a direct challenge to the character of a dispute between tie Double Precedent Remains. condemned Japanese action, and gen- nese withdrawal from the League. strained as those between Washing- British passivity has remained ever attitude is quite different. In 1931 to back the League and genuinely important for British interests in the who consider the moral aspects of terests of Britain in the premises are ment and display of zeal now which Great Britain this Fall. Failure of the opposition with a convenient line for Geneva are fully aware that a war ests. Not only does this mean that of the Blue Nile, but it is also aware, produce unrest and worse among the Wants League Strengthened. United States sought to have it backed ward for the British because there parallel. Unhappily alike for the Thus, just as London was at all times equally occupied with preserving its ing the League and arousing Japanese tween the League and Italy, France Dprestige. That is not to say that the ish approve of the Japanese action— fon. It is, moreover, interesting to Britaln to the United States, so has You put the thing brutally but ac- 8hip in her imperial business too much tion. In the same way in 1935 France Italy. The objective of French policy ture from Geneva. Because, as France instrument in French, Italian and France Has to Choose. to stop the Ethiopian war and seeing ately chosen the former alternative. imperialistic adventure outside of Eu- ing. But it is not prepared to follow drawal and a renewal of the still re- which Japan exploited so cleverly in collective action of the great powers the fact that Great Britain is as little > A ples as was the United States to fight Japen in the name of the Kellogg pact. She is also aware that there is | no sound British retort to the inquiry as to why British statesmanship has become so active over Ethiopia after having remained so passive over Man- churia. Of course, the answer is that the headwaters of the Blue Nile are in Ethiopia and not in Manchuria, and that British colonies almost surround the new battlefield while they were far removed from the old. But the British cannot make that answer and that enables the Fascist press to charge British action now to purely selfish reasons and thus destroy the moral force of the British protest. Even the PFrench, too, do not fail to note the inconsistency of British pol- icy, which, having resisted for a dec- ade and more French efforts to invest Geneva with force to act, are now pressing to have the League act forcibly. Soviet to Follow France. As to the other countries, the Soviet Union seems bound to follow France at Geneva as do the nations of the Little Entente. Like France, all are confronted with the prospective peril of a rearmed Germany. The defense of the independence of the Austrian state is primarily an Italian duty. If Italy should withdraw her veto of the Austrian-German union it could not be prevented easily, if at all. Assent to Mussolini’'s African war of con- quest, then, is the price those inter- ested countries have to pay to insure that Italy will hold her portion of the line against German attack—and they will give it. But Americans must perceive how far European policy in respect to the League of Nations has traveled away from the original expectation of | Woodrow Wilson. Like the Manchu- rian affair. the Ethiopian constitutes a simple problem in preventing war by the collective action of the member nations of the League. Italy's action, like Japan's, amounts to precipitating a war of aggression and of conquest. But France and her allies will not | today risk offending Italy by backing | the League in effective intervention, | precisely as Great Britain would not risk {rritating Japan by supporting | Geneva four years ago. ‘What does worry the statesmen of France and her allies, what is plain to the leaders in British policy and opinion is that the attempt to use the League at some future date as a sym- bol of a peace-loving world to restrain German aggression on the Danube, the Vistula or the Rhine is going to be difficult in the light of the Man- churian and Ethiopian precedents. For, on the moral side at least, Ger- man aggression East, West or South is hardly likely to be more indefensible than the Japanese or Italian opera- tions which have escaped with only verbal castigation from Geneva. And the Germans will be the first to point out the inconsistency of any attempt to employ the League against them in ways other than it was used against Japan and Italy. Ttaly Would Prefer to Stay. There is still another amusing up- set in the present affair. Italy has in the past, through the mouth of Mussolini, covered the League with expressions of scorn. It is now un- dertaking to defy League intervention and stands ready to leave if that intervention even goes to the length of the Lytton report in the Man- churian episode. Nevertheless, the Italians would prefer to stay at Geneva and to keep the League in being because they, too, see its value as the basis for a general alliance against Germany in case Hitler makes & new bid for Vienna. Great Britain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union and the Little Entente are all ready to use the League as an instrument of national policy when- ever possible, but none is ready to back Geneva always and unreservedly in giving effect to the principles of the_ covenant. Italy has by her own action deliberately challenged those principles. The British would like to employ Geneva to protect their inter- ests at the headwaters of the Blue Nile, the Italians would be glad to use it to reinforce their interests on the Blue Danube, the French, are eager to utilize it in covering their frontier at the Rhine. But there is no country concerned with giving effect to the principles of the League everywhere and willing to contribute its share of the costs of such an enterprise. Since Great Britain, France, Italy and the nations of the Little Entente, together with the Soviet Union, are all to a greater or less extent con- cerned with German purposes, how- ever, and since, further, they all recognize the value of the League of Nations as the moral facade for mili- tary agreements to resist German plans, it is fair to surmise that once the battle at Geneva over Mussolini's war is over, a fresh effort will be made to restore League prestige. Nor is it by any means impossible that this attempt will include an invitation to Japan to return. After all, if Italy remains, there is no reason apan should stay away. el German Events Now Watched, ‘Unquestionably the failure of the League in the present crisis will prove a bitter disappointment to many ele- ments in Great Britain who have been and remain convinced of the viability and usefulness of the collec- tive system. It may even be that the failure of the present govern- ment to support the League in the Manchurian affair will provide a rallying cry for the opposition in the coming election. Meantime, however, European statesmanship will now have its attention congentrated upon Ger- man events. And in this connection it is interesting to note how thick has been the silence of the German press in the Ethiopian matter. Obviously, Berlin believes that the Italian adventure in Africa will hasten the union of Austria with Germany. Hitler sees Mussolini setting out for Ethiopia with the same satisfaction that Metternich had in observing Na- poleon’s invasion of Spain. He watches the financial strain which preparation for war has already im- posed upon Italy; he waits for the moment when the military and moral strain will be equally hard to endure. Nor is the National Socialist dictator less pleasantly aware of the implica- tions for the future of the present failure of Geneva. While apprehen- sion for the Fuehrer's purposes may preserve the machinery at Geneva, its failure in the Manchurian and Ethiopian episodes either to halt in- vasion or to prevent annexation leaves its effectiveness in & future Austrian putsch at least open to question, (Oopyright. 1938.) A THE SUNDAY STAR, WASHINGTON, D. C., AUGUST 25, 1935—PART TWO. What Europe Thinks of U. S. Peoples Ignorant of the Real America—OQur Popularity Has Waned—Lack of Tourists Resented. BY ALBIN E. JOHNSON. PARIS.—Whether one likes to ad- mit it or not, Americans are no longer the “tin gods” in Europe that they used to be, and the United States is not unanimously considered as a workers' paradise to which all of the Old World's struggling masses should emigrate. Nor do the utopian schemes for “making the world safe for de- mocracy,” inauguration of a reign of “permanent and universal peace” and hammering of swords into plow shares, which used to originate in tHe United States, cause much more than a weary smile among the rank and file of the common people in Europe today. In Germany, Hungary, Italy, Rus- sia—and Japan, China and Ethiopia, too—mention of Woodrow Wilson's League covenant and self-determina- tion of peoples, Andrew Carnegie's Hague peace palace, ex-Secretary Kellogg’s outlawry of war pact and Harding’s, Hoover’s and Coolidge’s dis- armament ambitions, bring the na- tional equivalent to “Oh, yeah!" In Great Britain and France, and to a certain extent in the Scandinavian countries, the skepticism is perhaps more polite and diplomatic. Since the armistice the writer has roamed from one end of Europe to the other—Scotland, Finland, the Baltic, Germany, France, Portugal. Spain and through Central Europe and the Balkans to Istanbul—back and forth and back again. Almost every year changes in European public psy- chology are noticeable, even to the most casual observer. And when one lingers among the peasants of Prov- ence, the mountaineers of Switzerland, and the “just ordinary folk” of Den- mark, Sweden or Spain, to say nothing of following politicians and diplomats in the multitudinous international conferences and foreign offices, the | change is striking. Things aren't af| all what they used to be! Most Are Ignorant of U. S. One inescapable conclusion in siz- ing up what Europe thinks of the United States and Americans these days is the realization of the colossal ignorance of the 300.000,000 “common people” of the Old World, a realiza- tion that the rank and file know little, if anything, about the real America and true Americans. Their concep- tions of what lies across the Atlantic are as varied as their sources of in- formation. The sources of informa- tion these days, unfortunately, in many countries are tainted with government propaganda. One French friend of America that I know reads the Amer- ican newspaper assiduously and, at his own expense, sends a resume of the news to several hundred other Frenchmen 0 that they may know the facts rather than be influenced by the one-sided reports that appear in most of the Parisian press. Russians see the United States, through the eyes of the Soviet press, as capitalism at its worst and the ma- chine age at its best. They imitate one and excoriate the other. They | read: of lynch law rampant, class hatreds and vested interests in- trenched behind a system of brutal industrial peonage. One hundred million Russians have learned to read and write since the Bolshevists seized power two decades ago, but they had a chance to read only the Communist press. They know what Moscow and the Third Internationale wants them to know—about political conditions in other countries—and little more. In the Third Reich the Nazis pic- ture the United States as a hodge- podge of racial elements, Jews domi- nating. After the armistice and be- fore Hitler took over the government, the Hans and Gretchens of the Weimar Republic saw the United States as a Croesus, rolling in wealth and plenty as a result of Germany's misery. Their relatives’ and friends in the United States wrote to them about a country where even newsboys, street cleaners and day laborers played the stock exchange and where workers drove to the factory in auto- mobiles. In the Hofbrauhaus at Mu- nich a sweet motherly waitress proudly showed me, on the wine ljst, the vin- tage that “Mr. Jimmy Walker” has ordered. It was the most expensive. She also prized, above all things, a gold coin New York's playboy ex- mayor had given her as a tip. To her “Jimmy” personified America. Versailles Blame on U. S. In pre-Hitler days the Versailles treaty was blamed for most of Ger- many’s ills—and America was re- proached for not having forced a peace based upon the 14 points. publican Socialistic Germany sur- rendered to Americans, not the French, the people said. Had they not believed in Woodrow Wilson's a just peace 5t mans were led to believe that Wash- ington's insistence upon payment of the allied war debts alone was re- sponsible for London's and Paris’ in- ability to scale down German repara- tions. Now they know differently. With the rise of the Nazis more cordial relations between the Amer- icans—who sympathized with Berlin's case against allied armaments—and the German people should have re- sulted. The Freach and British atti- tude on war debts had alienated the friendship of the American public, which was highly critical of Europe's post-war policies. But the anti- Semitic and anti-Catholic crusades, to say nothing of the militarist psychol- ogy and intolerance of the National Socialists spoiled any chances for a rapprochement. Today, while seeking to encourage tourist and trade with America, the Nazis also find it polit- ically expedient to arouse their popu- lace against Americans of non-Aryan extraction. The delightful, colorful, romantic Germany of pre-war days, which held so much appeal for Amer- icans of all races, creeds and origins, uvofortunately is gone, just as is the happy-go-lucky and somewhat dis- organized pre-Fascist Italy. National Socialism has ruined memories of old Heidelberg, Munich, Dresden, and even the Passion Play at Oberammer- gau seems strangely sacrilegious under the aegis of the swastika. French Change Attitude. The French people, thrifty and tight-fisted, who think of money first, last and all the time, formerly wel- comed with open arms the generous, spendthrift American tourists who flocked to Europe in thousands after the war. Their one aim was to get back as much as possible of the in- terest their government was paying to the United States on the war debts. And, until the depression arrived, they got plenty. Of the 14,000,000,000 francs that were left annually in France by foreign visitors (in 1928) American tourists contributed the bulk. Last year only one-seventh of that amount was spent by visitors to French resorts and Paris. That the PAN-AMERICANISM KEY IS HELD BY SCHOLARS Their Approach to Goal Is Better Than Political and Economic Methods, Observer BY GASTON NERVAL. HILE in the Capital of the United States, George ‘Washington University was holding its fourth annual Seminar-Conference on Hispanic- American affairs, down at Panama City students from several American republics attended the first Summer school of the Centro de Estudios Pedagogicos e Hispanoamericanos. Both of these educational institu- tions announced as their main purpose the promotion of a better inter-Amer- ican understanding through mutual knowledge of the culture and people of the various nations on this conti- nent. Realizing that the greatest hindrance to the progress of pan- Americanism is the astounding lack of knowledge of one another among the inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere, the .organizers of the Washington and the Panama Summer schools prepared a number of special courses on the civilization, history and people of the American republics. They gathered at both cities a distinguished array of experts on social, political and eco- nomic problems bearing on pan- Americanism, and attracted the in- terest of a wide audience, not only of regular students, but of outside in- tellectuals and observers. At George Washington University, the emphasis this year was centered on the Colonial period of Hispanic- American history, with special atten- tion to those conditions which have affected modern life and institutions of the Latin-American countries. Lec- tures were given on the geographical background, on the native and the European background, on the con- quest and settlement by the Spaniards, and on Colonial government, church, society, intellectual life, economic life and international relations of Hispanic America. For some years, George Washington University has made a specialty of studies in inter-American matters. It was one of the first institutions to establish a chair of Hispanic-American history, and two years ago it founded the Center of Inter-American Studies for the purpose of “offering courses and special lectures and encouraging research and scholarly publications in the field of inter-American problems.” the native civilizations of Mexico, Panama, Peru and Eucador down to Declares. ered uniforms. They look at it from & political point of view. Naturally, they expect to accomplish the ideals of pan-Americanism, that is, permanent peace and co-operation in the New World, through the age-old political methods of treaty signing, arbitration pledges, “recommending” conferences and spectacular good-will missions. The second way is that of business men and traveling commercial agents. They advocate the establishment of closer economic links as the only means of turning into material reali- ties the dreams of internationalists. To a certain extent, it must be ad- mitted, they were once among the ploneers of pan-Americanism, though perhaps without realizing it. Because of the world depression, both their enthusiasm and their influence have dwindled in recent years. Outside these two methods, the po- litical and the economic, which are the only two so far attempted—im- perfectly of course—in a century of inter-American relations, there is an- other, almost ignored to this day, which we might call the intellectual method. ‘The principle behind jt is not new, but its application only recently has been suggested. Its promoters are men of letters, educators. college pro- fessors, writers snd other idealists who never have enjoyed much favor with hard-boiled public opinion. They believe that the best way to attain, or at least to approach, the goal of pan- Americanism is that of better knowl- edge of each other, cultural inter- change and the mutual understanding which only popular education can avail. Although the real solution probably will be found only when the three methods are put to work simultane- ouslyy not before, the merits of the third one are self-evident. If none of the three alone could, by itself, suffice, the third one has the advantage that it may show the way to the other two and simplify their problems. ‘The settlement of political differ- ences is, obviously, an essential re- quirement before any two nations, or any group of nations, can come to a lasting friendship. Dissensions as to principles and practices of interna- tional law can block the road forever. So can political “shibboleths.” But political adjustments are impossible while misunderstandings, lack of mu- tual knowledge and the suspicions which both create are allowed to stand they in promoting international good will. There is danger, however, in over- estimating that importance. In an era of scientific progress, rapid means of communication, radio, wireless, etc., commercial links and material con- tacts, undoubtedly, should have con- siderable weight in building up friend- ship among 21 republics which are to profit from their mutual co-operation. But friendship based purely on ma- terial foundations is not permanent. It is not even reliable. Under the present organization of society, eco- nomic links are artificial, intended for private or temporary national benefit. As things stand today, one should not hesitate to prefer the pan-Amer- 18 |jcanism of scholars to the pan- Americanism of politicians or that of salesmen, even if that still may be, for the public, the pan- Americanism of “visionaries.” . “Welcome Sign” was put out only when tourists had plenty of money to spend—on luxuries, wines and amuse- ments—is evident from the indifferent reception given to the few thousands of Americans who still remain abroad. For the mild contempt in which they are held by the majority of Frenchmen the American tourists have partly themselves to blame. They invaded France at a time when Europe was groaning under the aftermath of four years of war. Knowing little of what the French people had gone through— or the Germans, Italians, English, Austrians, Yugoslavs or Hungarians, for that matter—and scarcely touched by the struggle at home, except for the war-time prosperity, the American nouveaux riches did many stupid things. When the French franc drop- ped to around 50 for a dollar, in the Summer of 1926, they lit cigarettes with 10-franc notes and pasted 50- franc notes on their luggage, along with hotel stickers. Of course only & few unthinking travelers did such things, but the publicity was as great as if it had been done by thousands. The Ameri- can philanthropist who went on an international mission to Greece, car- rying a suit case full of $1 bills for personal distribution among the refugees, did not do his fellow coun- trymen who came along afterward a favor. In France the inevitble result of misdirected prodigality and uncom- plimentary disregard for the sensibili- ties of the people in belittling their currency (which ironically now can give the once-proud dollar a 40 per cent margin), mide it easy for many Frenchmen to follow their government in repudiation of a.national debt. A nation which had so much money did not need to press its debtor, the French felt. A great many, it is true, felt the national disgrace of default so keenly that they sent their per capita share to the American Em- bassy as & protest. Premier Edouard Herriot resigned rather than default. But the French as a whole felt other- wise, and still do today. Make Light of New Deal. In general public opinion in France is badly divided over the United States. On the one hand the news- papers—especially those of Paris— seek constantly to make light of the “New Deal” and Washingtons eco- nomic and financial pclicies. In their fight to maintain the gold parity of the franc, and avoid revaluation or inflation, the French—and Swiss, Dutch and other pseudo gold bloc states —naturally try to make their people believe that currency depreciation is undesirable and useless as a remedy for the depression. The battle between the gold bloc and the depreciated dol- lar and pound sterling has not yet been won, although the odds are on the side of the pound-dollar. In hammering down wages, salaries, pub- lic expenditures and prices naturally Premier Laval has to meet heavy in- flationist coposition. It is easy for him to blame Washington and London for blocking currency stabilization. On the other hand, the same newspapers which so viciously attack America— and Americans—for political pur- poses lean over backward in advo- cating a& “hands across the seas” policy. The absence of American tourists in France—they used to swarm over in tens of thousands instead of hun- dreds—and the departure of other thousands who once made their semi- permanent home in Paris and along the Riviera, also has had a bad effect upon the tempers of the French hotel keepers, tradesmen and others who prospered on the transient trade. Scores of hotels and de luxe shops have closed their doors or gone out of business. As the depression deepens—and conditions are still getting worse in- stead of better in France—the resent- ment against the tourists who no longer come, or those who come but no longer spend, is all too evident. It must not be assumed that France is not still the grandest place in Europe for Americans to play about in (ex- cept for the cost) for all the country’s beauty and charm and romance re- main. And individually Frenchmen who are not touched by the drying up of tourists’ dollars, are unchanged. But to the casual traveler, who does not get off the beaten paths, the vaunted French hospitality does not appear at its best when American visitors spend sous instead of francs; when they argue over prices instead of dispensing lavish tips, and when they look for cheap restaurants and hotels instead of complaining that the best is not good enough. English Act Superior. In Great Britain the attitude of the average Englishman toward Amer- toward icans—and from Canada, Australia and South Africa as well—has apparently under- gone no great change basically. The alr of bored superiority to any one not & native of the “tight little isles” per- haps will last as long as Englishmen on Page.) A D-3" WISCONSIN NEW DEALERS SEEN READY TO WEAKEN Gov. La Follotte Hints at Turn Toward Goals Traditionally Linked With Re- publicanism, With BY DUNCAN AIKMAN. ADISON.—How many -forks has the New Deal highway? Huey Long was pinneering up an exciting bypath even be- fore the present route was surveyed roughly in the 1932 campaign. The “brain trusters,” during their honey- moon journey with statesmanship along the main route, found a new one almost daily—sometimes several s day. Various interesting groups, like the California Epic, the Utopian Society, the Townsend Planners and the House of Representatives “mavericks,” have found them, sometimes studded with posters advertising technocracy, social credit, American party socialism. Oc- casionally there have been symptoms that various Democratic Senate lead- ers in Washington have been looking for a detour back to Jeffersonianism. But do any of the forks leads to- ward a revised Republican credo—a new interpretation of Herbert Hoover's doctrine of “rugged individualism"? After a few days in Wisconsin and a serles of conferences with actors, spectators and objectors in the State political pageant, including Gov. Philip La Follette, it is possible to suspect it. Premier New Deal State. ‘Technically Wisconsin is the premier New Deal State. It is the only Com- monwealth whose official leaders, Sen- ator “Bob” and Gov. “Phil” La Fol- lette, have been singled out for acts and expressions of administration favor despite nominal partisan differ- ences with the President. This is a huge distinction in the Farley era, but in a sense Wisconsin has earned it. Wisconsin invented “New Dealing,” with the current evils and dislocations of individualistic capitalism, as far back as the first gubernatorial term of the late Senator Robert M. La Fol- lette, more than 30 years ago. In the “warfare against emergency” since 1933 no State has bettered the Wis- consin record in compliance with ‘Washington's “war measures.” No Open Rifts With White House. Although both generations of La Follettes have been notorious political individualists and last year organized their new Progressive party to prove it, there have been no open rifts with the regimenting spirit in White House politics. In fact, the brother Progres- sives have stood ready at times to deliver to the President even more than he asked. When Mr. Roosevelt last Winter wanted $4,800,000,000 for work-relief Senator Bob wanted to make it $10,000.000,000. Last Spring, casion to praise Gov. “Phil's” famous “Wisconsin plan” for co-ordinating State activities under the work-relief appropriation as a model of State co- operation. The “Wisconsin plan” sub- sequently was defeated by a Republi- can-Democratic coalition with a ma- jority of 1 in the State Senate, but that scarcely weakened the bond be. tween Madison and Washington. Strength of Alliance. The current strength of the La Follette-Roosevelt alliance is to be | measured, in fact, by something even more tangible than President Roose- velt's kudos to Senator Bob's senato- rial campaign last year—in which he was opposed by an ostensibly orthodox Democrat—and by the frequent friendly exchanges of ideas between the White House and the executive mansion in Madison. The Wisconsin Democratic organization 1is spitting fury over it. Having lost the Gov- ernorship to Phil La Follette in 1934 because, as it figures things, of Presi- dent Roosevelt's kind words for Bob's senatorial campaign, the Democratic leadership feels itself cheated by its own people out of the one chance for power and patronage that has come to it in two generations. Con- sequently, the considerable Demo- cratic bloc in the Legislature is di- vided principally over the question of whether it finds more pleasure in kill- ing a La Follette or a Roosevelt meas- ure. “Reservations” Evoke Surprise. Under these circumstances, it is something of a surprise to find the New Deal banner being carried by the La Follettes in Wisconsin with reser- vations. Yet reservations and symp- toms of reservations stick out over Madison as palpably and almost as numerously as evidences of the pres ence of the University of Wisconsin. The official acts and statements of the Phil La Follette administration are full of them. They bristle in the frank and often sardonic talk of the Gover- nor’s political entourage, and especially they speak out in the divergences from ‘Washington precept and practice ex- pressed in the conversation of Gov. Phil himself. The Governor, in fact, thakes no bones about admitting that his main course of action is toward goals tra- ditionally associated with Republican party policies, and that whatever smacks of socialistic regimentation or ultimate communistic purpose in the administration leaves him cold. Philip La Follette, to be sure, does not openly take issue with the Roosevelt regime in Washington or directly criticize it. More significant still, perhaps, in a 45-minute interview the other day he did not, except when the subject was forced on him, refer to it except by inference. Trail Back for Governor, But the inferences were all to the effect that the Progressive Governor of Wisconsin and the New Deal Presi- dent of the United States did not see eye to eye on the ultimate solutions of the Nation's economic problems, and that when the next fork of the New Deal highway appeared the Governor might be found hitting the trail back toward orthodox progressive Repub- heanism. Indeed, the Governor defi- nitely proclaimed that the Republican insurgents ‘of his father’s time had the “right fundamental economic prin- ciples” for the present emergency, and that “with the help of a rather strong paradox I believe that preserving eco- nomic individualism is the most im- portant object we have in government.” “The main thing we must steer away from,” Governor La Follette stated as his basic difference with New Deal philosophy, “is the tendency on government's part to try to ad- minister too many things. There are any number of flelds of human ac- tivity too big and complicated for government to administer efficiently, just as there are more and more busi- ness corporations too big and un- wieldy to run their own affairs moreover, the White House found oc- | Reasonable Curbs. from rolling up problems and come plications bigger than any one can administer. That means we must give economic individualism some- thing it hasn't had for a good many decades—a falr chance. “T like to put it this way. It's & pretty strong-sounding paradox, but business requires just so much regu- lation from government as will pere mit the individual or individualistic group of small capital or technical re- sources to engage independently in business on a scale that will insure efficient management and to conduct that business profitably. Government in Wisconsin doesn’t want to admin- ister private business, and I don't think government anywhere in the United States should. What we are trying to do here is make any cor- poration or industry, no matter how big or little it is so long as it is effi- |clently run, feel safe and inde- pendent in Wisconsin and give it & fair chance to survive.” “What's the prescription?” the Gov= ernor was asked. Corporate Regulation. “Sensible corporate regulation. of course,” he replied. “We pioneered more than 30 years ago in Wiscon- sin in laws that would give the breaks to the honest and efficient corporation rather than to the other kind. I believe we have kept pretty well up to date in it. “But more important than any- thing else is the kind of a distribu- tion of wealth and income that keeps the economic life of a population re- volving. We've got to have money constantly spent in Wisconsin, men constantly hired in Wisconsin, or it wouldn't revolve fast enough. Then we would come to one of those pain- ful stoppages in which so many thousands of the small individualistic business enterprises of the sort we believe in here regularly perish. “Well, we don't propose to see them perish in Wisconsin. We propose to keep things revolving. as well as we know how, instead. To do it we use income taxes—other taxes on wealth, of course; but income taxes especially. We've got high income taxes here, and we admit it. In some brackets they have been higher even than the Federal income taxes. What is more, we have learned how to tax income from dividends and even from slick little family corporations. The State of Wisconsin gets what is coming to it, which is one of the reasons a good many financially important people in | this State”—and the 38-year-old Gov- ernor grinned boyishly—“hate every bone in my body. “But the reason for having high | income taxes is, if my pet enemies | only knew it, a sound, constructive, conservative economic reason. We have them, not to take anybody’s money away from him for the fun of it. but to keep income and wealth in ‘Wisconsin constantly circulating. We don't propose that any corporations or financial groups in Wisconsin, sim- ply by the natural accretion of wealth, shall have it in their power to shut off purchasing power the mo- ment a period of economic distress overtakes the Nation and starve ef- ficiently managed small business en= terprises out.” “Saving Small Business Man.” “Wasn't saving the small business man the main aim of the original Progressive in your father’s time 30 years ago?” the Governor was asked. “You bet it was,” Governor La Fol- lette almost shouted. “The old in- surgent Republicans thought of their movement as a moral crusade. They didn't bother their heads much about economic planning. All the same, they had sounder fundamental eco- nomics for the 1930's than most people realize. We have had to devise new methods for protecting indi- vidualism for these times, of course. But the main object is still to pro- tect it.” The fate of the celebrated “Wis- consin plan” apparently has stirred up no regrets on the score of damage done to the Roosevelt program. Gov- ernor La Follette speaks of his defeat philosophically as one of the fortunes of political warfare, while among his close political advisers are some who are almost jubilant. Loss of the “plan,” they insist, besides giving the La Follettes an excuse for anything that may be unfortunate in W. P. A. developments, saves them from an excessive bond with the ad=- ministration. The Progressive party itself is re- garded even by some of its own lead- ers more as a local convenience than as a germ culture for a National third party. “It is the kind of a party the La Follettes always will have to invent when the Democratic party gets progressive enough in the Nation to give the Republicans a real fight in Wisconsin,” a veteran newspaper observer in Madison described if. How actively “Phil” and “Bob” La Follette are scouting for the fork of the New Deal highway that leads back into the progressive Républican fold remains, of course, a matter of deep political secrecy. But when “Phil” La Follette was asked if he didn’G consider his ideas closely akin to those of some of the New York State young Republicans, he smiled and re- plied: “I know a lot of those New York State Republicans mighty well.” Three Perils in Europe Endanger World Peace (Continued From Pirst Page.) periodically stultifies itself? That in a European conflict, Britain would not intervene, and that her vague threats ought not to be taken very seriously? That, moreover, having discredited itself, the Baldwin cabinet will be swept off the board at the forthcoming general elections and make room for a Labor administra- tion which will bring the country to complete paralysis on the interna- tional plane? Of course, we are sure that such a situation will never actually material- ize. But the very fact that such thoughts are not unreasonably enter- tained is enough to bring the Euro- pean perll to a head. Only the adhesion of England could invest the coalition which strives to keep Ger- many within bounds with enough power to make it an effective deter- rent to all would-be disturbers of the peace. By Great Britain’s faults of and